[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 81 (Wednesday, June 11, 1997)]
[House]
[Pages H3706-H3717]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
EUROPEAN SECURITY ACT OF 1997
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 159, I call up
the bill (H.R. 1758) to ensure that the enlargement of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] proceeds in a manner consistent
with United States interests, to strengthen relations between the
United States and Russia, to
[[Page H3707]]
preserve the prerogatives of the Congress with respect to certain arms
control agreements, and for other purposes, and ask for its immediate
consideration.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The text of H.R. 1758 is as follows:
H.R. 1758
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``European Security Act of
1997''.
SEC. 2. STATEMENTS OF POLICY.
The Congress declares the following to be the policy of the
United States:
(1) Policy with respect to nato enlargement.--(A) The
emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe that will
be invited to begin accession negotiations with the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) at the NATO summit in
Madrid on July 8 and 9, 1997, should not be the last such
countries invited to join NATO.
(B) The United States should seek to ensure that the NATO
leaders assembled in Madrid agree on a process whereby all
other emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe that
wish to join NATO will be considered for membership in NATO
as soon as they meet the criteria for such membership.
(2) Policy with respect to negotiations with russia.--(A)
NATO enlargement should be carried out in such a manner as to
underscore the Alliance's defensive nature and demonstrate to
Russia that NATO enlargement will enhance the security of all
countries in Europe, including Russia. Accordingly, the
United States and its NATO Allies should make this intention
clear in the negotiations with Russia, including those
regarding adaptation of the Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe (CFE) Treaty of November 19, 1990.
(B) In seeking to demonstrate to Russia NATO's defensive
and security-enhancing intentions, it is essential that
neither fundamental United States security interests in
Europe nor the effectiveness and flexibility of NATO as a
defensive alliance be jeopardized. In particular, no
commitments should be made to Russia that would have the
effect of--
(i) extending rights or imposing responsibilities on new
NATO members different from those applicable to current NATO
members, including with respect to the deployment of nuclear
weapons and the stationing of troops and equipment from other
NATO members;
(ii) limiting the ability of NATO to defend the territory
of new NATO members by, for example, restricting the
construction of defense infrastructure or limiting the
ability of NATO to deploy necessary reinforcements;
(iii) providing any international organization, or any
country that is not a member of NATO, with authority to
review, delay, veto, or otherwise impede deliberations and
decisions of the North Atlantic Council or the implementation
of such decisions, including with respect to the deployment
of NATO forces or the admission of additional members to
NATO; or
(iv) impeding the development of enhanced relations between
NATO and other European countries that do not belong to the
Alliance.
(C) In order to enhance security and stability in Europe,
the United States should seek commitments from the Russian
Federation--
(i) to demarcate and respect all its borders with
neighboring states;
(ii) to station its armed forces on the territory of other
states only with the consent of such states and in strict
accordance with international law; and
(iii) to take steps to reduce nuclear and conventional
forces in Kaliningrad.
(D) As negotiations on adaptation of the Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty proceed, the United States
should engage in close and continuous consultations not only
with its NATO allies, but also with the emerging democracies
of Central and Eastern Europe, Ukraine, and the newly
independent states of the Caucasus region.
(3) Policy with respect to ballistic missile defense
cooperation with russia.--(A) As the United States proceeds
with efforts to develop defenses against ballistic missile
attack, it should seek to foster a climate of cooperation
with Russia on matters related to missile defense. In
particular, the United States and its NATO allies should seek
to cooperate with Russia in such areas as early warning and
technical aspects of ballistic missile defense.
(B) Even as the Congress seeks to promote ballistic missile
defense cooperation with Russia, it must insist on its
constitutional prerogatives regarding consideration of arms
control agreements with Russia that bear on ballistic missile
defense.
SEC. 3. AUTHORITIES RELATING TO NATO ENLARGEMENT.
(a) Policy of Section.--This section is enacted in order to
implement the policy set forth in section 2(1).
(b) Designation of Additional Countries Eligible for NATO
Enlargement Assistance.--
(1) Designation of additional countries.--Effective 180
days after the date of the enactment of this Act, Romania,
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are each designated as
eligible to receive assistance under the program established
under section 203(a) of the NATO Participation Act of 1994
and shall be deemed to have been so designated pursuant to
section 203(d)(1) of such Act, except that any such country
shall not be so designated if, prior to such effective date,
the President certifies to the Committee on International
Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate that the country fails to
meet the criteria under section 203(d)(3) of the NATO
Participation Act of 1994.
(2) Rule of construction.--The designation of countries
pursuant to paragraph (1) as eligible to receive assistance
under the program established under section 203(a) of the
NATO Participation Act of 1994--
(A) is in addition to the designation of other countries by
law or pursuant to section 203(d)(2) of such Act as eligible
to receive assistance under the program established under
section 203(a) of such Act; and
(B) shall not preclude the designation by the President of
other emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe
pursuant to section 203(d)(2) of such Act as eligible to
receive assistance under the program established under
section 203(a) of such Act.
(3) Sense of the congress.--It is the sense of the Congress
that Romania, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania--
(A) are to be commended for their progress toward political
and economic reform and meeting the guidelines for
prospective NATO members;
(B) would make an outstanding contribution to furthering
the goals of NATO and enhancing stability, freedom, and peace
in Europe should they become NATO members; and
(C) upon complete satisfaction of all relevant criteria
should be invited to become full NATO members at the earliest
possible date.
(c) Regional Airspace Initiative and Partnership for Peace
Information Management System.--
(1) In general.--Funds described in paragraph (2) are
authorized to be made available to support the implementation
of the Regional Airspace Initiative and the Partnership for
Peace Information Management System, including--
(A) the procurement of items in support of these programs;
and
(B) the transfer of such items to countries participating
in these programs.
(2) Funds described.--Funds described in this paragraph are
funds that are available--
(A) during any fiscal year under the NATO Participation Act
of 1994 with respect to countries eligible for assistance
under that Act; or
(B) during fiscal year 1998 under any Act to carry out the
Warsaw Initiative.
(d) Extension of Authority Regarding Excess Defense
Articles.--Section 105 of Public Law 104-164 (110 Stat. 1427)
is amended by striking ``1996 and 1997'' and inserting
``1997, 1998, and 1999''.
(e) Conforming Amendments to the NATO Participation Act of
1994.--Section 203(c) of the NATO Participation Act of 1994
is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``, without regard to the
restrictions'' and all that follows and inserting a period;
(2) by striking paragraph (2);
(3) in paragraph (6), by striking ``appropriated under the
`Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund' account'' and
inserting ``made available for the `Nonproliferation and
Disarmament Fund' '';
(4) in paragraph (8)--
(A) by striking ``any restrictions in sections 516 and
519'' and inserting ``section 516(e)'';
(B) by striking ``as amended,''; and
(C) by striking ``paragraphs (1) and (2)'' and inserting
``paragraph (1)''; and
(5) by redesignating paragraphs (3) through (8) as
paragraphs (2) through (7), respectively.
SEC. 4. AUTHORITIES RELATING TO THE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL
ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE.
(a) Policy of Section.--This section is enacted in order to
implement the policy set forth in section 2(2).
(b) Authority To Approve the CFE Flank Agreement.--The
President is authorized to approve on behalf of the United
States the Document Agreed Among States Parties to the Treaty
on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990,
adopted in Vienna, Austria on May 31, 1996, concerning the
resolution of issues related to the Conventional Armed Forces
in Europe (CFE) Treaty flank zone.
(c) Sense of Congress With Respect to CFE Adaptation.--It
is the sense of Congress that any revisions to the Treaty on
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe that may be agreed in the
ongoing CFE adaptation negotiations can enter into force only
if those revisions are specifically approved in a manner
described in section 33(b) of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2573(b)), and no such approval
will be provided to any revisions to that Treaty that
jeopardize fundamental United States security interests in
Europe or the effectiveness and flexibility of NATO as a
defensive alliance by--
(1) extending rights or imposing responsibilities on new
NATO members different from those applicable to current NATO
members, including with respect to the deployment of nuclear
weapons and the stationing of troops and equipment from other
NATO members;
(2) limiting the ability of NATO to defend the territory of
new NATO members by, for
[[Page H3708]]
example, restricting the construction of defense
infrastructure or limiting the ability of NATO to deploy
necessary reinforcements;
(3) providing any international organization, or any
country that is not a member of NATO, with authority to
review, delay, veto, or otherwise impede deliberations and
decisions of the North Atlantic Council or the implementation
of such decisions, including with respect to the deployment
of NATO forces or the admission of additional members to
NATO; or
(4) impeding the development of enhanced relations between
NATO and other European countries that do not belong to the
Alliance by, for example, recognizing spheres of influence in
Europe.
SEC. 5. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATIVE PROJECTS WITH
RUSSIA.
(a) Policy of Section.--This section is enacted in order to
implement the policy set forth in section 2(3)(A).
(b) Establishment of Program of Ballistic Missile Defense
Cooperation With Russia.--The Secretary of Defense is
authorized to carry out a program of cooperative ballistic
missile defense-related projects with the Russian Federation.
(c) Conduct of Program.--The program of cooperative
ballistic missile defense-related projects with the Russian
Federation under subsection (b) may include (but is not
limited to) projects in the following areas:
(1) Cooperation between the United States and the Russian
Federation with respect to early warning of ballistic missile
launches, including the sharing of information on ballistic
missile launches detected by either the United States or the
Russian Federation, formalization of an international launch
notification regime, and development of a joint global
warning center.
(2) Technical cooperation in research, development, test,
and production of technology and systems for ballistic
missile defense.
(3) Conduct of joint ballistic missile defense exercises.
(4) Planning for cooperation in defense against ballistic
missile threats aimed at either the United States or the
Russian Federation.
(d) Dialogue With Russia.--The President should seek to
initiate a dialogue with the Russian Federation aimed at
exploring the potential for mutual accommodation of
outstanding issues between the two nations on matters
relating to ballistic missile defense and the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty of 1972, including the possibility of
developing a strategic relationship not based on mutual
nuclear threats.
(e) Annual Report.--Not later than January 1, 1998, January
1, 1999, and January 1, 2000, the President shall submit to
the Congress a report on the cooperative program under this
section. Each such report shall include the following:
(1) A description of the conduct of the program during the
preceding fiscal year, including a description of the
projects carried out under the program.
(2) A description of the status of the dialogue under
subsection (d) during the preceding fiscal year.
(3) A description of the funding for the program during the
preceding fiscal year and the year during which the report is
submitted and the proposed funding for the program for the
next fiscal year.
SEC. 6. RESTRICTION ON ENTRY INTO FORCE OF ABM/TMD
DEMARCATION AGREEMENTS.
(a) Policy of Section.--This section is enacted in order to
implement the policy set forth in section 2(3)(B).
(b) Restriction.--An ABM/TMD demarcation agreement shall
not be binding on the United States, and shall not enter into
force with respect to the United States, unless, after the
date of the enactment of this Act, that agreement is
specifically approved in a manner described in section 33(b)
of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2573(b)).
(c) Sense of Congress With Respect to Demarcation
Agreements.--
(1) Opposition to multilateralization of abm treaty.--It is
the sense of the Congress that until the United States has
taken the steps necessary to ensure that the ABM Treaty
remains a bilateral treaty between the United States and the
Russian Federation (such state being the only successor state
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that has deployed
or realistically may deploy an anti-ballistic missile defense
system) no ABM/TMD demarcation agreement will be considered
for approval for entry into force with respect to the United
States (any such approval, as stated in subsection (b), to be
effective only if provided in a manner described in section
33(b) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C.
2573(b))).
(2) Preservation of u.s. theater ballistic missile defense
potential.--It is the sense of the Congress that no ABM/TMD
demarcation agreement that would reduce the potential of
United States theater missile defense systems to defend the
Armed Forces of the United States abroad or the armed forces
or population of allies of the United States will be approved
for entry into force with respect to the United States (any
such approval, as stated in subsection (b), to be effective
only if provided in a manner described in section 33(b) of
the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2573(b))).
(d) ABM/TMD Demarcation Agreement Defined.--For the
purposes of this section, the term ``ABM/TMD demarcation
agreement'' means an agreement that establishes a demarcation
between theater ballistic missile defense systems and
strategic anti-ballistic missile defense systems for purposes
of the ABM Treaty, including the following:
(1) The agreement concluded by the Standing Consultative
Commission on June 24, 1996, concerning lower velocity
theater missile defense systems.
(2) The agreement concluded (or to be concluded) by the
Standing Consultative Commission concerning higher velocity
theater missile defense systems, based on the Joint Statement
Concerning the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty issued on March
21, 1997, at the conclusion of the Helsinki Summit.
(3) Any agreement similar to the agreements identified in
paragraphs (1) and (2).
(e) ABM Treaty Defined.--For purposes of this section, the
term ``ABM Treaty'' means the Treaty Between the United
States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, signed
at Moscow on May 26, 1972 (23 UST 3435), and includes the
Protocols to that Treaty, signed at Moscow on July 3, 1974
(27 UST 1645).
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 159, the
gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman] and the gentleman from Indiana
[Mr. Hamilton] each will control 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman].
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to bring before the House the European
Security Act of 1997. It is an important piece of legislation that will
once again give the Congress the opportunity to demonstrate our support
for prompt enlargement of the NATO alliance and our special concern for
the security of Romania and three Baltic States.
Furthermore, the legislation charts a course that will permit us to
enlarge NATO, as well as to achieve our vital national objectives in
the area of ballistic missile defense without disrupting relations with
Russia.
This bill takes as a starting point the fact that NATO will begin the
process of enlargement this summer consistent with the three laws that
we have enacted on this subject over each of the last 3 years. Poland,
Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia currently are the front
runners for admission in the first round of enlargement.
This bill identifies two problems with the way NATO enlargement is
proceeding: First, we are concerned that a number of countries may not
be properly considered for the first round of NATO enlargement, or may
be left out of the first round and can find themselves in a security
vacuum. Second, we worry that in the rush to mollify Russia,
concessions may be made that could jeopardize European security and the
effectiveness of NATO.
To reassure the countries that are not currently among the front
runners for admission to NATO, this bill designates four additional
countries to receive NATO enlargement assistance: Romania, Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania. The effect is to give these countries the same
status under United States law as Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic,
and Slovenia.
{time} 1715
This bill goes on to express the sense of Congress that Romania,
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania should be invited to join NATO as soon
as they can satisfy all of the relevant criteria.
With regard to Russia, the bill spells out concessions that we would
consider unacceptable. But then to make clear that the purpose of NATO
enlargement is not to emasculate Russia, as many in Moscow appear to
believe, the bill supports efforts to adapt the Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe Treaty, provided this is done in a way that does not
make the new NATO members any second class citizens or otherwise
jeopardize our security interests in Europe.
This bill supports adaptation of the CFE treaty because we know of no
better way to demonstrate to Russia our genuine belief that NATO
enlargement will enhance the security of all countries in Europe,
including Russia.
With regard to ballistic missile defense, the bill again demonstrates
that our objectives can best be achieved in the manner that enhances
Russia's security as much as our own.
This legislation, Mr. Speaker, has garnered widespread support since
it was first introduced back on April 24. It is supported by all of the
major organizations representing Americans of Central and Eastern
European descent, ranging from the Polish American Congress to the
Armenian Assembly and
[[Page H3709]]
the Joint Baltic-American National Committee.
Just this week, Mr. Speaker, it has been endorsed by the editors of
both the Washington Times and the Washington Post. If it can unite the
editors of those two newspapers, who agree on very little, surely it
can unite the Congress.
In that spirit, I urge my colleagues to join in supporting this
important measure.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, first I want to remind Members about the manner in which
this bill comes before us. There have been no hearings in the 105th
Congress on NATO enlargement. There have been no hearings on the bill.
There has been no consideration in the Committee on International
Relations or anywhere else of this bill. Now we have it under a closed
rule.
I think how the Congress handles important issues is important
because it contributes to the public perception of the Congress. We
talk a lot about the importance of the Democratic process in countries
before they come into NATO. We could very well use some Democratic
process in consideration of this bill.
The Committee on Rules has decided that on the most important foreign
policy issue of the year, probably, there will be one vote, up or down,
no amendments, on a bill that has had no process of review by the
committee of jurisdiction.
Second, I do not oppose the content of this bill. I plan to vote for
it. But I think Members should understand what the bill does and does
not do. It is neither a very helpful nor a harmful bill.
Contrary to what some may say in this debate, this bill does not pave
the way for another round of NATO enlargement. It does not provide
additional assistance. It does not provide different assistance. The
assistance that this bill would provide is exactly the same kind of
assistance that the administration is currently providing or planning
to provide.
Four countries, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, are designated
to receive assistance under the NATO Participation Act. But the
assistance authorities under that act duplicate existing authorities.
No U.S. assistance program, plan, or activity in these countries will
be changed because of this act. The bill amounts to a sense of the
Congress.
The Baltic States and Romania certainly deserve consideration for
NATO membership, but so do others who are not named. The message to the
four countries designated under the NATO Participation Act is that
``you have a leg up'' in the next round of NATO expansion. The message
to Bulgaria, to Slovakia, to Albania and to the others is, ``Sorry, you
lose.'' This bill says to them, ``No matter what you do, you are not
now on the list of NATO membership.''
The only meaningful change in authorities in this bill would be to
allow the administration to use Department of Defense funds for the
Regional Airspace Initiative in Eastern Europe, a program to modernize
air traffic control systems. Usually in the Congress we have a good
many Members at least who oppose raids on Defense Department funds for
foreign aid purposes. This would provide about $10 million a year from
the operations and maintenance accounts for what these committees view
as foreign assistance. While an air traffic control system in Central
Europe is useful, we should be clear here that this authority will mean
a further depletion in the defense budget.
On the question of the CFE flank agreement, the Senate has already
acted. The Senate acted by May 15 to provide its advice and consent.
The administration originally asked both the House and the Senate to
act on the flank agreement last August. The House in this case is a day
late and a dollar short. Its actions on the flank agreement are now
irrelevant.
On the question of the ABM treaty and ballistic missile defense, the
President will not be obliged to change his policy one iota. He already
is carrying out a cooperative program on ballistic missile defense with
Russia. He is already carrying out a dialog with Russia on the ABM
treaty. He has already agreed to submit the demarcation agreement under
the ABM treaty to the Senate for its advice and consent.
I do not approve of the way this bill came to the floor. As I
suggested, I really would prefer no bill at this time. NATO enlargement
is a complex process with huge stakes. It will not be easy to make it
work. It makes sense to let the process unfold gradually, and let a
consensus develop on which members should be admitted and in what
order.
My preference would be for the Congress not to try to dictate the
process by declaring favorites. There is something disturbing about
seeing Members champion certain countries, trying to push their
favorites to the front of the line.
But this bill is before us, and I do not wish to be recorded in
opposition to NATO expansion. The bill will be viewed in Europe and
certainly in Eastern Europe as an up-or-down vote on NATO enlargement.
I do not intend to be seen as a Member who opposes the aspirations of
the Baltic States and Romania. I think we would be better served if all
countries seeking NATO membership were designated under the NATO
Participation Act.
NATO enlargement, in my judgment, is going to happen. We have reached
a point of no return. I had and still have many questions about
enlargement, especially about costs and U.S. commitments. I do not
think we have had sufficient debate or consideration of NATO
enlargement.
I do believe that, if properly done, NATO enlargement can increase
the security of all of Europe and increase the chances that Europe will
not be the source of wars. NATO enlargement will certainly assure these
new democracies of central Europe and strengthen Democratic and market
reforms.
I do not think we have adequately considered the impact of
enlargement on NATO itself and on those countries not included in
enlargement. We certainly have not considered carefully enough the
costs of NATO enlargement and how to deal with the hostile reaction of
Russia. Much is going to depend on how we manage the process of
enlargement.
I support NATO enlargement because I believe that the risks of
proceeding with enlargement are less now than the risks of not going
forward. You cannot have the President of the United States talk again
and again about NATO enlargement, and have 16 governments support NATO
enlargement, without enlargement going forward. U.S. credibility and
NATO credibility would vanish if we tried to turn back now.
The question now is not whether to enlarge NATO but how to do it in a
responsible way. We do not want to antagonize Russia unduly. We do not
want to create a two-tiered NATO membership. We should not prejudge the
next steps.
We should let the process of NATO enlargement unfold. We should bring
in Members only when they are prepared and meet NATO criteria. We
should encourage all countries in Eastern Europe to meet NATO criteria,
not just a few. We should keep the process open and not create first,
second, and third tiers of candidates.
Neither the process under which we consider this bill nor the content
of the bill itself should make us especially proud. So far as I can
see, it is a foreign policy bill driven largely by domestic political
pressures. But neither is it a bad bill. I see no compelling reason to
vote against it. I do plan to vote for it.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for his supportive
remarks with regard to this important bill.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr.
Smith], distinguished chairman of the Subcommittee on International
Relations and Human Rights.
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to voice my strong
support for H.R. 1758.
The language before us is designed first and foremost to preserve the
effectiveness and the flexibility of NATO as a defensive alliance. For
nearly five decades the North Atlantic Alliance has served and advanced
the interests of the United States in Europe by preserving peace,
promoting economic prosperity, and advancing our shared principles of
democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.
[[Page H3710]]
Mr. Speaker, I would point out that the underlying legislation
provides important assistance to Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and
Romania as they pursue membership in the alliance irrespective of the
outcome of the NATO summit meeting scheduled to take place in Madrid in
early July.
Recently the ambassadors from each of these countries, as well as
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Slovakia,
appeared before the Helsinki Commission, which I co-chair along with
Senator D'Amato, and presented their government's case for NATO
membership. I believe, especially after hearing from each of the
ambassadors, that it would be an injustice of historic proportions if
we did not take advantage of the unique opportunity that we have today
to embrace these countries of the region that have demonstrably
committed themselves to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.
During President Constantinescu's short tenure, Romania has made very
impressive progress, and I believe deserves every ounce of
encouragement, support, and consideration in the lead-up to the July
NATO summit. Mr. Speaker, as one of those who has closely followed
developments in Romania since 1981, I would hope that Romania is
included among those invited to accession negotiations on full NATO
membership.
With respect to the Baltic States, I have seen no justification in
delaying similar negotiations with Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia.
Despite decades of Soviet domination and brutal repression, the
commitment of the Baltic peoples to freedom and democracy ultimately
triumphed over totalitarianism. Having persevered for 50 years and
overcome the odds by regaining their independence, the Baltic countries
deserve to be fully integrated into the West, including NATO, without
further delay.
Mr. Speaker, the important legislation before us is aimed at giving
further impetus to the enlargement of NATO. It is of critical
importance, in my view, that a genuine process be put into place to
ensure that emerging democracies not invited in Madrid join NATO but
that wish to join the alliance will be given every consideration, and
that there be a transparent and a real process for doing so. Platitudes
cannot substitute for process. The bill calls for the NATO leaders
assembled in Madrid to agree to such a process.
Frankly, Mr. Speaker, I remain very concerned over the recently
concluded negotiations undertaken by NATO Secretary General Solana that
resulted in the so-called Founding Act between NATO and the Russian
Federation. Part of my concern stems from the fact that the talks were
conducted against the backdrop of an artificial deadline suggested by
the Russians. It is of critical importance that the Founding Act in no
way undermine the effectiveness of NATO or reduce new members of the
alliance to second-class citizens.
I am particularly concerned about the seemingly one-sided nature of
the recently concluded negotiations, focusing as they have on Moscow's
security preoccupation, real or imagined. The pending legislation
identifies three specific security concerns that I urge the Clinton
administration to raise with the Russians until they have been
resolved.
The first concern stems from the fact that Russia has not agreed to
the international borders with several of her neighbors. Moscow has
purposefully dragged its feet on this important issue with the aim of
intimidating a number of the countries involved.
The second issue concerns the deployment of Russian forces on the
territory of other states. Today there are thousands of Russian troops
deployed in and around the Ukrainian port of Sevastopol. Russian troops
are likewise stationed in Moldova. The pending amendment calls for a
commitment from the Russian Federation to station its armed forces on
the territory of other states only with consent of such states and in
strict accordance with international law.
Finally, the bill calls for a commitment by the Russians to take
steps to reduce nuclear and conventional forces in Kaliningrad, where
Moscow has amassed a huge arsenal that poses a potential threat to the
Baltic States and to Poland.
{time} 1730
Mr. Speaker, the progress in resolving these outstanding issues would
go a long way to advance peace and stability throughout Europe, a
region of critical importance to our own security and to our own
economic and political interests.
I urge adoption of H.R. 1758 in the interests of maintaining the
effectiveness and the flexibility of NATO as a defensive alliance. I
urge strong support for the bill.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, how much time have we consumed?
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Inglis of South Carolina). The gentleman
from California [Mr. Lantos] has 22\1/2\ minutes remaining and the
gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman] has 21 minutes remaining.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 5 minutes.
Mr. Speaker, I rise as a strong supporter of NATO expansion. Two
weeks ago this past Sunday, I had the privilege in Bucharest of
delivering to President Goncz of Hungary and President Constantinescu
of Romania a letter by President Clinton. In this letter, President
Clinton congratulated the two Presidents and the two countries for
reaching an historic accommodation after centuries of bloodshed,
bitterness and wars.
The long-awaited period of reconciliation and peace between these two
important countries of central and Eastern Europe is now a reality. The
two Presidents jointly responded to our President, and the two
governments strongly favor their simultaneous invitation as NATO
members.
May I say, Mr. Speaker, that the debate in this country and in the
other 15 NATO countries basically comes down to whether in the first
round we should invite just three potential new members, Poland, the
Czech Republic, and Hungary, or whether we should invite four or five,
including Slovenia and Romania.
I strongly favor, as one who has spent a great deal of time over a
lifetime in that region, the simultaneous invitation to membership to
all five countries, with the clear understanding that a simultaneous
invitation to membership does not guarantee simultaneous acceptance
into NATO.
Such a formula, Mr. Speaker, would give us the best of all possible
worlds. It would avoid the public relations disaster of having some
countries invited and others not invited; it would avoid the backlash
that would surely take place in Romania, which has gone through free
and open and democratic elections, which has moved vigorously toward
privatization and the free market, and which recognizes the importance
of a free press and religious freedom. It now is as well qualified to
be invited as any of the other five.
Yet I think we must understand that, in terms of economic development
and other criteria, all five countries may not be ready to join NATO
simultaneously. Therefore, my recommendation: simultaneous invitation;
no guarantee of simultaneous admission.
I also believe, Mr. Speaker, that, should this formula not be
acceptable, the very least the NATO countries should do at their July
meeting is to designate a time certain when the second round of
countries will be invited to join NATO. Failure to do so would lead to
significant disappointments, a xenophobic backlash and a severe
destruction of the spirit which now permeates this region.
These five countries, in my judgment, are fully prepared to begin
negotiations in July, and with assistance from the existing NATO
contingent will be ready within the next 2 or 3 years to enter NATO as
full-fledged, fully equal members. This will be good for NATO, this
will be good for the new members, and, I underscore, it will be good
for Russia.
In the cold war days, the Soviet Union assumed that NATO is an
aggressive military alliance. Those of us who understood NATO
throughout argued that NATO is a defensive military alliance. It is a
force for stability, prosperity, democracy and freedom. Those are the
attributes in central and Eastern Europe that are beneficial to Russia,
and I strongly urge my colleagues to support simultaneous invitation to
all five countries mentioned, and I support the legislation of the
gentleman from New York.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
[[Page H3711]]
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Florida [Mr. Goss], the distinguished chairman of the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence.
(Mr. GOSS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished chairman of the
House Committee on International Relations, the distinguished gentleman
from New York [Mr. Gilman], and congratulate him on his successes
earlier today.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the European Security Act strongly.
Today we stand on the threshold of the July Madrid summit, where the
invitations to seek membership in NATO will be issued, and they are
sure to be among the most coveted invitations of the year. What this
means is that it is time for this Congress to offer not only words but
substantive measures designed to enhance the NATO enlargement process.
The Europe Security Act of 1997 is a strong statement in support of
expansion with concrete measures designed to improve the European
security environment. It reiterates this round of expansion cannot and
should not be the last; that all countries able to meet the
requirements for membership should be permitted to seek it. It also
seeks to ensure that those countries not included in the first tranche
are not left out in the cold, in some kind of a security vacuum.
H.R. 1758 seeks to do so by expanding the circle of countries
eligible for enlargement assistance. It also addresses concerns that my
colleagues and I have regarding the conventional forces in Europe and
includes language to discourage the administration from making further
agreements with nonmember states that will undercut the security of the
alliance. In other words, it says no to appeasement.
Still further, it is intended to enhance Europe security with
measures specifically designed to overcome legal and foreign policy
impediments to ballistic missile defense by holding the line on the
implementation of demarcation agreements negotiated with Russia and
proposals from the White House that would multilateralize the ABM
treaty.
The Europe Security Act will offer the opportunity to enhance U.S.
security from ballistic missile attack, something of interest to all of
us. In the end, the Europe Security Act is about consolidating the
process of democratization in the central and eastern Europe, about
ensuring that those countries that share our values and took the risks
associated with casting off the Soviet Union will be part of the new
European security order and enjoy the benefits of freedom.
Mr. Speaker, as the Madrid summit approaches, we know that a
difficult process still lies ahead, but it is absolutely certain that
enlargement is the right choice. We must not retreat from our world
leadership role, we must not forsake our allies, old or new. We have
dealt with Russia, the Ukraine and all the interested parties in the
past few years on this matter, and it is time to get on with it.
We have worked with the parliamentarians in the North Atlantic
Assembly. We have visited with the governments and the people on their
turf in Russia, the Ukraine, the Baltics, Hungary, Poland, the Czech
Republic, and many others. And, of course, we have been to our NATO's
home port and talked to them about this. This is not a new subject.
This is a subject whose time has come. I support this legislation and I
urge my colleagues to do so.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Massachusetts [Mr. Frank].
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, it is a terrible thing that
this central question of foreign policy comes before us under a closed
rule with only 1 hour.
I think the concept of NATO expansion is a reasonable one, but it is
not reasonable to go to the American taxpayer, in the light of a budget
deal, which will severely constrain spending both in the defense and
nondefense areas, and tell the American taxpayer that they will
continue to bear a disproportionate share of the cost of defending
Europe.
Everyone acknowledges that the expansion of NATO will cost money. The
more countries involved, the more money it will cost. That is not a
disqualification. But that cost should not be borne by the current
formula, which has the U.S. taxpayer subsidizing the nations of Western
Europe.
We talked about welfare reform last year. We did not go after the
real welfare. The real welfare is the United States taxpayer, 52 years
after the end of World War II, years after the Marshall plan succeeded,
continuing to subsidize Germany and England and France and Denmark and
Belgium. This bill assumes the status quo.
It is shocking that we were not allowed a chance to offer an
amendment to this bill that would say that, whether one is for or
against NATO expansion, we in the House do not want a continuation of
this subsidy by the American taxpayer of our wealthy allies in Western
Europe.
As the Western European nations struggle to meet their 3-percent
deficit deadline to get into the Euro, we can be sure they will start
cutting back on their military expenditures. And they will cut back on
their military expenditures secure in the hope that the American
Congress will again be suckered and bail them out.
What this bill does, erroneously in my judgment, is to assume that
status quo. I will vote ``no''. I might be supportive of NATO expansion
in some context, but this bill assumes an expansion of NATO under the
same terms.
The Washington Post editorial that the gentleman from New York talked
about referred to the need for more spending. Do not send the American
taxpayer once again to the defense of Europe when the European nations
are allowed to get a free ride.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Nevada [Mr. Gibbons].
Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Speaker, I have a question about this legislation
which I wish to direct to its principal sponsor, the distinguished
gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman], and chairman of the Committee on
International Relations.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GIBBONS. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I would be pleased to respond to the
questions of the distinguished gentleman from Florida.
Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Speaker, I note that the legislation states that
Romania, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania should be invited to become
full members of NATO at the earliest possible date upon complete
satisfaction of all relevant criteria. The legislation also provides
that these four countries are to be designated as eligible to receive
assistance under the NATO Participation Act effective 180 days after
the date of enactment.
Are these provisions intended to suggest that Congress believes that
Romania, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania should be kept out of the first
round of NATO enlargement this year and, instead, invited to join NATO
at a later date in a second or third round of enlargement?
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will continue to yield, I
can assure the gentleman that it is not our intention to push these
countries into any second or third round of NATO enlargement. The
purpose of this legislation is to support the efforts of Romania,
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to join NATO. We absolutely are not
trying to hold them back.
If at the summit meeting in Madrid this July the members of NATO
decide to invite Romania, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to begin
accession talks with the alliance as part of the first round of
enlargement, we will welcome that. And if they are not invited to join
in the first round, we will do all we can to make sure the door to the
alliance remains open to them. And that is the purpose of this
legislation.
Mr. GIBBONS. Why then does the legislation postpone for 180 days the
effective date of the designation of these countries under the NATO
Participation Act?
Mr. GILMAN. Well, that designation has to do with eligibility to
receive U.S. assistance. The 180-day period provided under the
legislation should not be read to suggest that we think it is necessary
to wait the entire 180 days before deciding whether to invite these
countries to join NATO.
Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman and esteemed chairman
for his clarification, and with the assurance he has provided, I will
be pleased to join him in support of this measure.
[[Page H3712]]
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for his interest in
the legislation.
{time} 1745
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished
gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Neal].
Mr. NEAL of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, sometimes this institution
suffers from collective amnesia. What we honor tonight in this concept
is what happened in Hungary in 1956, what happened in Czechoslovakia in
1968 with Alexander Dubcek, and what happened in Poland just a decade
ago. What we honor here today is a simple concept of those electricians
and that trade unionist from Gdansk, Lech Walesa, who turned events as
we proceeded to the next century, on their ear. Internationally we
honor the commitment that they made, and I assure Mr. Frank's
reservations about the manner in which costs are ascribed in these
particular instances, but we cannot turn our backs on the heroism.
And remember once again those Soviet tanks as they rolled into
Hungary and Czechoslovakia and Jaruzelski threatened to put down those
trade unionists. It represents the triumph of the human spirit nurtured
in this very institution.
I am pleased to lend my name in support of the concept of expanding
NATO to include these republics.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Inglis of South Carolina). The Chair
would point out that the gentleman from California [Mr. Lantos] has
14\1/2\ minutes remaining and the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman]
has 16 minutes remaining.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Pennsylvania [Mr. Fox], another member of our committee.
Mr. FOX of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, it was not long ago, December
1994, that the NATO summit, the United States expressed its interest in
expanding NATO in order to strengthen nations that share the U.S.
belief in democracy, continue the development of free market economies,
open the U.S. investment and trade, secure allies willing to share in
cooperative efforts on a range of global issues, and preserve a Europe
free from domination by any single power.
The enlargement we are discussing today will enhance stability by
providing NATO security guarantee for candidate states working to
construct viable democracies and free-market systems. H.R. 1758
declares that the door to membership in NATO should remain open to all
emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe and expresses the
sense of Congress that the bulk of nations in Romania should be
admitted to NATO and declares that Congress will not approve
international agreements that accord second class status to new
members. The bill declares the door to NATO should not close after the
first round of NATO enlargement this summer. Members left out of the
first round must be assured they will be considered for NATO membership
in the future.
So I rise in support of this important bill. NATO enlargement is
important to our country, it is important to world peace, and it is
important to the growth of human mankind.
I thank the gentleman very much for the opportunity to speak on
behalf of this legislation and to our chairman, the gentleman from New
York [Mr. Gilman], who has led this legislation forward.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the very distinguished
gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Oberstar].
Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Speaker, last year during consideration of the NATO
Enlargement Facilitation Act of 1996, the other body voted to designate
Slovenia along with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic as nations
that have made progress toward meeting NATO's criteria for new members.
And Slovenia certainly stands out as a sterling candidate for admission
to NATO, and I appreciate the support on the Democratic side and on the
Republican side of the committee in accepting the Senate amendment in
conference.
We are soon to witness the Madrid meeting that will discuss the
enlargement of NATO. I would urge the administration to keep uppermost
on their agenda Slovenia as a candidate for the first round of
expansion. Slovenia has moved successfully to privatize its economy.
Everything from banking to aviation has been privatized. They have
democratized their politics and their government. They have created 158
local governments and had local elections. They are a significant force
in the modernization of trade in the former East European areas and
deserve to be a member of NATO.
Mr. Speaker, I urge the administration to accept Slovenia in this
first round.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
California [Mr. Rohrabacher], another member of our committee.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, in the spirit of collegiality and civility,
I yield 1 additional minute to the gentleman from California [Mr.
Rohrabacher].
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California [Mr.
Rohrabacher] is recognized for 2 minutes.
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Speaker, I do appreciate this time, from the
gentleman from California [Mr. Lantos] in particular, because I am
providing a legitimate opposition to this bill.
Mr. Speaker, today I rise in opposition to H.R. 1758. I do not do so
with any type of situation where I have a problem in disagreeing with
the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman]. Mr. Gilman has my respect,
and I know he is pushing this bill; the gentleman from New York [Mr.
Solomon] is pushing for this bill. He has my respect. We worked
together on so many issues, but I think that it is important for us to
recognize the changes that have taken place in the world and for
America to take a realistic view of what is going to be happening, what
challenges we will face in the years ahead.
NATO did a good job in deterring a Soviet attack on Europe, but what
purpose does NATO serve now? Is it worth the expenditure of tens of
billions of limited American defense dollars? I do not think so. Europe
no longer poses and what is happening in Europe no longer poses a
national security threat to the United States of America. We need not
spend our limited defense dollars that we have today for the stability
of our European friends. They can pay for their own stability.
Why we were in NATO was because the Soviet Union, and a war with the
Soviet Union, was a threat to our national security. Staying in NATO
now wastes limited dollars that should be spent on American weapons
systems that will enable the United States to project power from the
continental United States. Spending money on NATO rather than spending
money on B-2 bombers or American aircraft carriers, or, yes, on a
missile defense system is a waste of money. We need not spend our
limited resources for stability in Europe, especially when it takes our
focus away from the real part of the world where the threat to American
security lies.
By focusing on Europe, we are taking away our focus from Asia, where
a belligerent, totalitarian, expansionist China is fast becoming a
threat to our national security and a threat to world peace. Let us
focus our efforts on strengthening our alliances in Asia, spending our
money so that we can deter war on Asia rather than wasting it on NATO,
which is a thing of the past.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes to respond to my
friend from California, Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Speaker, NATO has been the cornerstone of American security for
two generations. NATO has been the essence of our defense strategy vis-
a-vis our most formidable opponent since the end of the Second World
War, the Soviet Union, and it takes a great deal of naivete to assume
that new threats might not reemerge on the Eurasian continent aimed at
our allies and indeed the United States.
Expanding NATO and continuing to fund NATO perhaps in a more
proportional fashion, as my friend from Massachusetts recommends, is
very much in the American national security interests, and to send a
message at this stage that the United States wishes to cut back its
NATO commitment would be the most suicidally shortsighted gesture of
U.S. defense and foreign policy.
Mr. Speaker, I strongly urge my colleagues to reject the notions
presented by my good friend from California.
[[Page H3713]]
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New
York [Mr. Solomon], the distinguished chairman of the Committee on
Rules.
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from New York, the
chairman of the Committee on International Relations, for yielding me
this time. I commend him for bringing this measure to the floor in this
timely manner. And Mr. Speaker, I just hope that one of the greatest
Presidents this country has ever known is able to be watching this
debate here tonight because it is because of he, and his name was
Ronald Reagan from the gentleman's State, my good friend; it was
because of he and his policies of peace through strength back in the
1980's, backed by Republican and Democratic bipartisan support,
including the gentleman from California [Mr. Lantos] sitting over
there, a good Democrat, that brought down the Iron Curtain, that
brought down the Berlin wall, and saw peace breaking out and democracy
breaking out all over Eastern Europe in countries that the people
there, tens of millions of them, that were enslaved by deadly atheistic
communism that has no respect for life or human rights at all; those
people today have hope because they are now part of a sovereign nation.
Be it Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Romania, Slovenia, or Poland, or the
Czech Republic or Hungary, those people now have hope, the same kind of
hope that we Americans have enjoyed, and that is why we need to have
this bill on the floor here today.
My colleagues know we fought two world wars in this country, and we
fought a very expensive cold war, expensive to the American taxpayer
because we had to rebuild our strength, and we had to show the evil
empire, as Ronald Reagan said, that we would not tolerate this kind of
inhumane philosophy in this world, and that is why just before
President Clinton went to Helsinki to meet with President Yeltsin I
spoke with him for almost an hour to make sure that we Republicans were
speaking the same as the Democrat leadership and the same as the
President of the United States that we were going to keep that door
open for all countries formerly oppressed by this philosophy called
communism, that we would keep that door open for all of these sovereign
countries.
Mr. Speaker, President Clinton assured me that there will be no quid
pro quo with Yeltsin, that what was said in public would be what was
said in private and that those doors would be kept open to these
countries once they met the criteria.
And what is that criteria? That criteria is that these sovereign
nations, these new sovereign nations, must have advanced to
irreversible democracy, that they must have moved to a free market
economy, privatizing their industries, that they must live by the rule
of law and that they must respect human rights both within their
country and across their borders and that, finally, they must be able
to participate militarily. What this bill says is to those countries:
``You have previously been under Russian influence, that all of your
military is not able to communicate or inter-operate with our NATO
defense alliance,'' and this bill is meant to help those countries do
just that.
Mr. Speaker, that is why it is so important for us to pass this
legislation here today.
This is not spending money, I would say to my good friend from
Massachusetts. This is saving money because let me assure my colleagues
that once these countries are brought under the greatest defense
alliance in the history of the world that there will be no more wars in
that part of the world because what is that defense alliance? It says
that if Latvia is invaded by an outside military aggressor, that these
countries, including America, will come to their rescue to protect
their sovereignty. That is what this measure says.
And my colleagues know it is not just for these countries, Latvia,
Lithuania, and Estonia, and Romania and Slovenia, the Warsaw Pact
countries who have already met that criteria, but it is also for
Bulgaria and Slovakia and, yes, even Ukraine, and, yes, my colleagues,
even Russia. If Russia would meet this criteria, then they also could
become a part of NATO, and their boundaries would also be protected
from outside military aggression. That is how to guarantee peace in
that part of the world, and it is how to guarantee that U.S. soldiers
and sailors and marines and Air Force will never have to go into battle
in that part of the world again.
Mr. Speaker, that is why my colleagues need to come to this floor,
they need to support this legislation, they need to cast a vote for
Ronald Reagan and for the expansion of NATO, because that is how to
bring about peace in the world.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, before yielding to my friend from New York I
yield myself such time as I may consume. I would merely like to suggest
to the distinguished gentleman who has just spoken that in addition to
President Reagan, beginning with President Truman, all of our
Presidents, Republican and Democratic alike, deserve a great deal of
credit, as do Members of Congress who on a bipartisan basis have been
so strongly supportive of NATO through the decades.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from
New York [Mr. Engel].
{time} 1800
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend from California for
yielding me this time. I rise in strong support of this bill. I have
long been in favor of NATO expansion, and I am very pleased that we
finally seem to be moving forward.
Mr. Speaker, I think this bill states what is obvious: That NATO
expansion is a good thing, and that countries can join NATO if they
meet certain criteria. I think it is very important at this stage to
state that in July, we know that certain countries are going to be
admitted to NATO, and we want the Congress to go on record as saying
that once these countries are admitted to NATO, that the door does not
swing shut, that the door is open, that NATO expansion is still on the
table, that this Congress is in favor of the concept of expanding NATO.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of communism, the
Western world, the democratic world, the United States would be
foolhardy if it did not take advantage of the fact that these
countries, which were formerly Communist countries and dictatorships,
want to have free market economies, want to have democracy, and want to
be a part of the Western world, of the free world, of the democratic
world. It would make no sense for us not to bear the fruits of what
happened, and I think if we delay NATO expansion, that is exactly what
we would be doing.
No one is saying that countries should be admitted before they meet
the criteria. This is simply saying that Romania and the Baltic nations
can be considered when they meet the criteria, and again, if there are
other nations in Eastern Europe that can meet the criteria and want to
become NATO members, they too ought to be considered; that would be the
next logical step to this bill.
The bill also makes it clear that such enlargement of NATO does not
end at Russia. Indeed, we want to have cooperation with Russia. The
President, in the pact that he signed with Mr. Yeltsin, states that,
that Russia can be a partner with the West, but that Russia cannot have
a veto power over NATO expansion, and that Russia cannot dictate to
NATO how NATO expands or to which Nation an invitation is given to join
NATO.
So I think that on balance, this is a very, very good measure. It is
a measure that is very, very important. It is a measure that will go a
long way in guaranteeing democracy, free market economies, and peace as
we approach the 21st century.
I compliment the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman], the chairman
and my friend, for putting forth this measure.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Florida [Mr. Mica].
Mr. MICA. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from New York [Mr.
Gilman] for yielding me this time.
Quite frankly, I say to my colleagues, I regret that this bill picks
winners and losers in the quest to join NATO, as was pointed out by the
ranking member of the committee. I personally believe that Slovakia
should be
[[Page H3714]]
and should have been selected for NATO admission in the first round
last year, and certainly should be included this year. Unfortunately,
this whole process has become a popularity contest rather than a well-
considered international security consideration.
Let me submit for the Record comments relating to Slovakia's
readiness to join NATO. Nicholas Burns of the State Department said
April 17, 1997, ``The Slovak Republic has made impressive economic
progress in four years since independence, and is cooperating fully in
Partnership for Peace. We have also been gratified by the Slovak
Republic's contribution to peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and
Eastern Slavonia.''
Just a few days ago, Speaker Gingrich said in the Washington Times,
``I do not think there is any sense to exclude Slovakia.''
My grandfather was born in Slovakia and the Slovaks are a patient and
peaceful people. They have been free and independent for only 4 years.
They were oppressed for 1,000 years. They will wait patiently for a
little while longer to take their rightful place in NATO, and I hope
that we can support that effort in the future.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to my friend and
colleague, the gentleman from California [Mr. Capps]. Although he has
been with us only this term, he has already made great contributions to
the body.
Mr. CAPPS. Mr. Speaker, I know I will probably vote for this, but I
find it somewhat curious that this is probably the only debate we are
going to have, which will probably be the most important foreign policy
decision that this Congress will make this term, and we are doing it
within an hour right now, with very little preparation. This is
probably the only time we will be talking about this before the Madrid
summit, NATO summit in July.
I just think the ramifications of this are so profound, so deep, so
extensive, that I regret that we have to do it in this fashion. I know
for a new Member to come here and lecture other Members on how we ought
to be doing this is probably not very polite of me, but I think that
until we can trust the process that we are using, it is difficult to
restore the trust between the people and their representatives here.
Mr. Speaker, I just think by naming four more countries, we are
creating expectations among those countries. Also, there are other
candidates for NATO membership that are not included on this new list.
That means that they will understand what their position is relative to
the people who are on the list. I think we raise expectations, we
diminish expectations, we create a false euphoria.
So I have lots of problems not just with the bill, but with this
matter of proceeding. Because of my great respect for NATO, for the
timeliness of NATO expansion, as I say, and I want to associate myself
with the remarks of the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton], I will
probably vote for the bill, because I think it is a very important step
forward. However, I think procedurally, there is a lot lacking in the
way we have gone about it.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from
Pennsylvania [Mr. Weldon].
(Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania asked and was given permission to revise
and extend his remarks.)
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of
the legislation introduced by my colleague and friend the gentleman
from New York [Mr. Gilman], and I rise as one of the original
cosponsors of this legislation.
I want to speak to the issue of a new era of cooperation with Russia,
because there are perhaps some in this body and perhaps some in this
country, and perhaps others outside of this country who think that this
bill is attempting to undermine a new relationship with Russia and some
of the other former Soviet States. Nothing could be further from the
truth.
In fact, in this legislation, Mr. Speaker, is a specific provision
that allows us to begin a new era of engaging Russia, especially in the
area of missile defense.
Now, this is not necessarily a new area, because in the Committee on
National Security for the past several years we in fact have supported
funding for joint missile defense initiatives. But what this
legislation calls for is a formal process of working with Russia to
build a sense of understanding about what we are trying to accomplish.
It does not mean that we are going to reveal any secrets, it does
not mean that we are going to give the Russians any strategic
information; it means that we are going to build confidence and that we
are going to continue to work on programs like the RAMOS and the
follow-on to the agreed project, which engage our physicists and
scientists in new relationships that allow us to show Russia that
perhaps the old relationship that was best identified by the strict
interpretation of the ABM Treaty is perhaps not suitable for the
current relationship between our country and Russia.
In fact, Mr. Speaker, what is kind of interesting is, the Russians
have just participated in a 2-year study with us that has been funded
by our ballistic missile defense organization, headed up by Dr. Keith
Payne and Dr. Shoumikin on behalf of the Russian side, that in fact has
called for the possibility of a new bilateral relationship that would
allow for, instead of a process of mutually assured destruction upon
which we base our bilateral relationship, that we move into looking at
the possibility of asymmetrical deterrence, which means that we include
offensive missiles in an attempt to bring them down, and as we do so,
that we also discuss and perhaps look at changes to the ABM Treaty to
allow defensive systems to be put into place without creating a
destabilizing impact on our relationship. This bill lays the groundwork
for that to happen.
Unfortunately, Mr. Speaker, the administration seems to be going in
the opposite direction. I say that because recently at the Helsinki
summit there was an agreement to expand the ABM Treaty to include
demarcation provisions relative to theater missile defense systems.
Mr. Speaker, a number of us in this body, including a significant
number of Members of the minority party, have expressed their concern
through a bill that I introduced that said, this is the wrong time to
be expanding the ABM Treaty to include theater missile defense systems,
and this legislation puts the House on record expressing our concern in
that regard.
This legislation also, Mr. Speaker, identifies the strong concerns of
this body with the idea and the notion of multilateralizing the ABM
Treaty. Many of us think that that would hamper our ability to move
away from the strict interpretation of the ABM Treaty and comes at a
very inopportune time where Russia has, in fact, given us the
willingness in the form of a signal that they are now willing to talk
about moving into a posture away from relying on the ABM Treaty as our
key instrument in terms of our bilateral relationship.
I think this is extremely important, and yet at the same point in
time in approaching this new dialogue with Russia, we want to reassure
them that we are not about tweaking them. We are not in this bill
attempting to isolate Russia.
In fact, the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon] made a very
important point that he has made in my presence before Russians that
were here just a few short weeks ago. He said ultimately, we even
envision the day where Russia may be able to qualify for membership in
NATO. So in fact, I think that is a basic underlying premise here.
The question is how we get there, and in this era of emerging threats
from rogue nations and the threat of destabilization in the Russian
military relative to their offensive arms, North Korea and China
deploying long-range missiles, we can no longer rely on an outmoded ABM
Treaty. This bill allows us to move into a new era where in fact our
bilateral relationship is not just based on a strict ABM, but actually
allows us to move into a new era of relationship building on cooperate
missile defense and also looking at ways that we can in fact move away
from the strict interpretation that allowed us in the past to rely on a
theory of mutually destroyed destruction.
As the administration moves ahead with NATO expansion, we must make
every effort to assure Russia that we are pursuing this new arrangement
to enhance everyone's security, not to threaten them. This bill goes a
long way toward doing that by establishing a
[[Page H3715]]
program to pursue joint missile defense projects such as early warning
sharing and lay in a groundwork for the revival of United States-Russia
talks on the ABM Treaty and missile defense cooperation.
Mr. Gilman has stated that he believes it is essential that we take
proactive steps to build confidence with the Russians. NATO expansion
will not be a complete success if it results in a revival of tensions
between Russia and the United States. He believes this bill sets us on
the right course by establishing initiatives that set the tone for
long-term dialog and cooperation.
This bill makes clear our intent to work with the Russians, it states
our intention to ensure the fundamental security interests of the
United States and that of our NATO partners. While I believe that is
wholly appropriate, I think we want to clarify that point. As you know,
the bill states that no commitments should be made that would limit the
rights or impose responsibilities on new NATO members different from
those applicable to current NATO members--including the deployment of
nuclear weapons. That statement could be perceived by the Russians as a
sign that we intend to support the creation of a new threat at their
borders.
Mr. Gilman has stated that that is certainly not the intent of this
bill, nor is it in the administration's plans. In fact, the NATO
Council issued a statement on December 10, 1996, that its members have
``no intention, no plan, and no reason'' to deploy nuclear weapons on
the territory of the new member states. He also said that so far as he
is aware, no one in this House takes issue with that statement.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman
from the District of Columbia [Ms. Norton], my good friend and
distinguished colleague.
Ms. NORTON. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend for yielding me this time.
I come to the floor because I am amazed by the nature of this debate.
It is amazingly subdued when we consider the historic basis upon which
we are proceeding. It is almost a historical debate, because the
expansion of NATO may surely come to be as important as the creation of
NATO itself.
{time} 1815
Yet, this is being handled in an hour's worth of debate as just
another matter coming before the House of Representatives at the end of
a long day.
I have three concerns; domestic, the commitment of troops and burden-
sharing. I have to measure everything we do on this floor against the
Democratic sacrifices that are being agreed to by us all in the name of
deficit reduction.
On the matter of burdensharing, this bill does not pass that test. I
would feel much better about what we are doing here in this discussion
and debate if in fact we had come to some agreement about
burdensharing, a word that is virtually empty of content and meaning. I
would have thought that the pressures of deficit reduction could
produce some progress on burdensharing. There has been little. Instead,
we see burden expansion.
But perhaps I am most concerned about article 5 of the treaty itself,
and whether in fact this means that there may be the commitment of
troops to central Europe as a result of this expansion. That is an
issue of primary importance in a country which seems unwilling to
commit troops for very much anymore. I really wonder whether or not we
really mean, in a place where there has been much disagreement about
Bosnia, where there has been great trouble throughout the United
States, that we are now right in the middle of that.
Mr. Chairman, we fell into this expansion. It developed influenced by
the last campaign. There has been little debate in this country. The
American people do not recognize that they may right now, as this bill
is passed, be committing troops, if need be, to central Europe.
I can be convinced, and I will come to the floor this evening to say
as yet no one has even tried to convince me or the American people that
this historic commitment should be expanded this day, in June 1997.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the
gentleman from California [Mr. Cox], the distinguished chairman of our
policy committee.
Mr. COX of California. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for
yielding time to me.
Mr. Speaker, I rise to seek clarification concerning one provision of
the bill. Section 6(c) is entitled ``Opposition to Multilateralization
of ABM Treaty.'' It states the sense of the Congress that no agreement
demarcating the boundary between theater and antiballistic missile
defense will be considered until the United States has taken the steps
necessary to ensure that the ABM Treaty remains a bilateral treaty
between the United States and the Russian federation.
It is my understanding that this provision takes no position with
respect to whether such a demarcation agreement should be reached after
such steps are taken, or, indeed, whether the United States should take
steps to continue the ABM Treaty in force even if it is a bilateral
agreement limited to Russia and the United States.
Section 6(c), according to my understanding, simply makes absolutely
clear that the administration's rush to conclude an immediate
demarcation agreement must be stopped, and that no such demarcation
agreement should be concluded prior to resolution of the question of
Russia's successorship under the ABM Treaty; and finally, that, should
Russia not be deemed to have succeeded, then no such demarcation
agreement should be considered at all.
I would ask the gentleman, Mr. Speaker, is that his understanding?
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. COX of California. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman is correct. That is my
understanding as well.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I would conclude by suggesting that perhaps the
relatively calm and deliberate and judicious tone of this debate
reflects the bipartisan judgment of Congress of NATO's quintessential
importance during the past two generations to our security, and our
bipartisan commitment to the expansion of NATO.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. LANTOS. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I want to stress again what this legislation
intends. It is about achieving two of our vital national objectives,
enlarging NATO and defending our Nation against the risk of ballistic
missile attack in a way that does not upset our relations with Russia.
With regard to NATO enlargement, we are especially concerned that no
emerging democracies in central and eastern Europe be left in a
security vacuum, and the Baltic states in particular must be regarded
as strong contenders for NATO membership. For this reason, our
legislation designates these countries as being eligible to receive
transition assistance within the NATO Participation Act. I urge our
colleagues to support the measure.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to express my concerns about
H.R. 1758, the European Security Act. Critical issues related to NATO
enlargement have not been adequately thought through--unfortunately,
politics appears to have been put ahead of policy.
I am primarily concerned about the military and financial obligations
the United States will assume under an expanded NATO.
First, we need to think further about the military obligations
assumed by the United States in enlarging NATO. In bringing in new
members, we must not degrade the ability of the alliance to conduct
collective defense. We must guard both against this degradation, and
against the possibility that the U.S. burden to the defense of NATO
will increase by bringing in countries whose interoperability with
NATO--key to collective defense--is still a long way off.
Second, we have been presented with a number of estimates of the
financial costs of NATO enlargement--and those estimates vary widely.
The administration estimates a total cost of between $9 billion and
$12 billion over the 1997-2009 period, with a cost to the United States
of between $150 and $200 million.
The Congressional Budget Office estimates that--depending on how NATO
structures its forces after enlargement--costs will range from a low of
$61 billion to a high of $125 billion over 15 years--1996-2010, with a
U.S. share of $5 to $19 billion over the same period.
Which is the more accurate estimate?
Mr. Chairman, Congress needs more information on the financial costs
of enlargement in order to make an informed decision. Specifically:
[[Page H3716]]
What portion of these costs are due to developing the required
interoperability among new and old members?
What portion to developing infrastructure required by the enlargement
of NATO?
How will the on-going adaptation of alliance strategy and structures
impact on the costs of enlargement?
How will these costs be apportioned among the allies--old and new?
Mr. Chairman, until these questions are answered, there cannot be a
coherent policy that takes account of our resources and security
interests.
Mr. LaTOURETTE. Mr. Speaker, with the break-up of the Soviet Union
and the emergence of Russia and the Commonwealth of Newly Independent
States [CIS] of Eastern Europe, management of the post-cold-war
environment has proven to be a novel and challenging task. The
securities and certainties of the ``us versus them'' world are gone.
Today, traditional allegiances are blurred and future motives are
questioned. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], however, has
prevailed as the one remaining post-cold-war constant. As during the
cold war era, the NATO commitment to collective defense is the core of
the alliance. It is this guarantee to deter aggression that has
prompted the CIS to seek admittance into NATO. Realizing that Russia,
still armed with nuclear weapons, might one day become more unstable
and aggressive, NATO membership is highly prized. As one who supports a
stable and secure Eastern Europe through the expansion of NATO, I am
pleased that Congress has not let this situation go unnoticed. In fact,
the NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act of 1996--PL 104-208--was adopted
last Congress, which named Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and
Slovenia as having made the most progress toward meeting NATO
membership criteria. In keeping with this sentiment, I encourage my
colleagues to support the European Security Act of 1997 so that the
door to NATO is not closed after the first round of enlargement and
that additional European countries receive U.S. assistance for
transition into NATO. I would also like to encourage the members of
NATO to accept Slovenia into membership when it meets in Madrid this
July.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Inglis of South Carolina). All time has
expired.
Pursuant to House Resolution 159, the bill is considered read for
amendment.
Pursuant to the rule, the previous question is ordered.
The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was
read the third time.
Motion to Recommit
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to
recommit.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman opposed to the bill?
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. I am, Mr. Speaker.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to
recommit.
The Clerk read as follows:
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts moves to recommit the bill (H.R.
1758) to the Committee on International Relations with
instructions to report the bill back forthwith with the
following amendment:
At the end of the bill, add the following new section:
Sec. 7. Burdensharing.--It is the sense of the Congress
that the United States already pays more than a proportionate
share of the costs of the common defense of Europe, and that
the European members of NATO should pay the bulk of the costs
of NATO expansion which are incurred by existing NATO
members.''.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts (during the reading). Mr. Speaker, I ask
unanimous consent that the motion be considered as read and printed in
the Record.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Massachusetts?
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Frank]
is recognized for 5 minutes in support of his motion to recommit.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I offer this on behalf of
myself and the gentleman from California [Mr. Condit].
Mr. Speaker, there are differing views about NATO expansion. There
is, I think, great agreement in this Chamber that the cost of NATO
expansion should not be paid in the same formula in which existing and
past NATO costs have been paid.
As Members mentioned, NATO grew out of a time when the United States
had a degree of superiority in the world as a result of World War II
that was unparalleled probably in recent history. America was quite
generous in helping bring, among others, our European allies and our
former European enemies, it should not be forgotten, up to the current
level that they now enjoy. But we believe, and I think it is a widely
shared sentiment across this House, that it is no longer appropriate
for our European allies to accept a subsidy in the form of
disproportionately large payments by the United States.
What this motion to recommit says is that we believe that the
increased NATO costs that will come from expansion, there will have to
be military standardization and communication upgrades, that to the
extent they are borne by existing NATO members, the European members of
NATO should pick up the bulk of those costs.
In other words, we are not here trying to impose more costs on the
new NATO members. We are saying that the existing NATO members, wealthy
and prosperous and the beneficiaries, as they have been over all these
years, of our beneficence, and it may have been in our interests as
well as theirs; it was in our interests as well as theirs, but it was
our dollars much more than theirs, we ask that they now do more than
they have been doing.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. I yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend for yielding.
Mr. Speaker, on our part we think the gentleman from Massachusetts
makes an extremely valid point, and we are pleased to accept his
recommittal concern of burdensharing for the Democratic side.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I want to make this clear,
this should not be interpreted as an anti-NATO-expansion argument.
Indeed, I would tell those who are in favor of a full-fledged
unrestricted NATO expansion that it is in their interests to be
supportive of burdensharing.
Franklin Roosevelt was described once by John Kennedy in a phrase
that is very important for Members to remember. When John Kennedy began
the Alliance for Progress and he looked back to Franklin Roosevelt's
Good Neighbor Policy as a first step toward a recognition of mutual
interest, he said that Franklin Roosevelt was able to be a good
neighbor abroad because he was a good neighbor at home.
The American people will more willingly support international
engagement militarily, economically, and other sorts, if they feel they
are being treated fairly, if they do not think it is coming at their
expense.
The United States, I believe, is prepared to support foreign
assistance to people in need, to deal with disease and poverty and
economic development. But I think the American people understandably
say with regard to France and England and Germany and Denmark and
Belgium, and some of the wealthiest and most successful societies in
the world, countries that have already benefited greatly from our
generosity, that it is time for them not to subsidize us, but no longer
to be subsidized by us.
What the gentleman from California [Mr. Condit] and I seek to do in
this is to say, and I believe frankly it will underpin NATO expansion,
it will give the American people more willingness to support this,
because we have just done a budget deal. Defense spending will be
constrained, not as much as I would like, but it will be constrained.
Domestic spending will be constrained. It is simply inappropriate for
our allies to allow a disproportionate share of the funding to fall on
the American taxpayer.
We have one particular fear. The European nations have to, those that
are in the European Union, the majority of whom are in NATO, they have
to get their deficits down to 3 percent of their gross domestic
product. We are the only country that would meet the European Union's
definition, I think, right now.
There will be a strong temptation for them to do that by further
cutting their military expenditures. We need for them to understand
that they cannot do that in a way that shifts the burden to the United
States. It is entirely legitimate, yes, there will be
[[Page H3717]]
benefits to the United States, but there will be even more benefits for
Europe. Peace and security in the Czech Republic, in Hungary, and
Slovenia, and Romania and elsewhere will be of at least equal benefit
to our European allies; and under the current rules, they do not pay an
equal share.
Mr. Speaker, I would hope that we would be willing to adopt this, and
as I say, I believe it will strengthen the case for NATO expansion
among the American people.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Does the gentleman from New York [Mr.
Gilman] wish to be recognized on the motion to recommit?
Mr. GILMAN. I do, Mr. Speaker.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman] is
recognized for 5 minutes on the motion to recommit.
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GILMAN. I yield to the gentleman from Nebraska.
(Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.
Mr. Chairman, as chairman of the House delegation to the North
Atlantic Assembly, I can attest that European members do pay the bulk
of NATO costs now. While we believe that new members of NATO, as they
are added, should and will pay most of the cost of expansion, we agree
to that, we believe that would be the case. That is our expectation.
Beyond that, we agree that the existing 14 European countries should
pay and will pay the bulk of the expansion costs. Therefore, we agree
with and support the instructions offered by the gentleman from
Massachusetts [Mr. Frank].
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the previous question is
ordered on the motion to recommit.
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to recommit.
The motion to recommit was agreed to.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to the instructions of the House on
the motion to recommit, I report the bill, H.R. 1758, back to the House
with an amendment.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the amendment.
The Clerk read as follows:
At the end of the bill, add the following new section:
``SEC. 7. BURDENSHARING
``It is the sense of Congress that the United States already pays
more than a proportionate share of the costs of the common defense of
Europe, and that the European members of NATO should pay the bulk of
the costs of NATO expansion which are incurred by existing NATO
members.''
{time} 1830
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Inglis of South Carolina). The question
is on the amendment.
The amendment was agreed to.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third
reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read
the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the
table.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to section 3 of House Resolution
159, the text of H.R. 1758 will be appended to the engrossment of H.R.
1757, and H.R. 1758 is laid on the table.
____________________