[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 81 (Wednesday, June 11, 1997)]
[House]
[Pages H3706-H3717]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                     EUROPEAN SECURITY ACT OF 1997

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 159, I call up 
the bill (H.R. 1758) to ensure that the enlargement of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] proceeds in a manner consistent 
with United States interests, to strengthen relations between the 
United States and Russia, to

[[Page H3707]]

preserve the prerogatives of the Congress with respect to certain arms 
control agreements, and for other purposes, and ask for its immediate 
consideration.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The text of H.R. 1758 is as follows:

                               H.R. 1758

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``European Security Act of 
     1997''.

     SEC. 2. STATEMENTS OF POLICY.

       The Congress declares the following to be the policy of the 
     United States:
       (1) Policy with respect to nato enlargement.--(A) The 
     emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe that will 
     be invited to begin accession negotiations with the North 
     Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) at the NATO summit in 
     Madrid on July 8 and 9, 1997, should not be the last such 
     countries invited to join NATO.
       (B) The United States should seek to ensure that the NATO 
     leaders assembled in Madrid agree on a process whereby all 
     other emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe that 
     wish to join NATO will be considered for membership in NATO 
     as soon as they meet the criteria for such membership.
       (2) Policy with respect to negotiations with russia.--(A) 
     NATO enlargement should be carried out in such a manner as to 
     underscore the Alliance's defensive nature and demonstrate to 
     Russia that NATO enlargement will enhance the security of all 
     countries in Europe, including Russia. Accordingly, the 
     United States and its NATO Allies should make this intention 
     clear in the negotiations with Russia, including those 
     regarding adaptation of the Conventional Armed Forces in 
     Europe (CFE) Treaty of November 19, 1990.
       (B) In seeking to demonstrate to Russia NATO's defensive 
     and security-enhancing intentions, it is essential that 
     neither fundamental United States security interests in 
     Europe nor the effectiveness and flexibility of NATO as a 
     defensive alliance be jeopardized. In particular, no 
     commitments should be made to Russia that would have the 
     effect of--
       (i) extending rights or imposing responsibilities on new 
     NATO members different from those applicable to current NATO 
     members, including with respect to the deployment of nuclear 
     weapons and the stationing of troops and equipment from other 
     NATO members;
       (ii) limiting the ability of NATO to defend the territory 
     of new NATO members by, for example, restricting the 
     construction of defense infrastructure or limiting the 
     ability of NATO to deploy necessary reinforcements;
       (iii) providing any international organization, or any 
     country that is not a member of NATO, with authority to 
     review, delay, veto, or otherwise impede deliberations and 
     decisions of the North Atlantic Council or the implementation 
     of such decisions, including with respect to the deployment 
     of NATO forces or the admission of additional members to 
     NATO; or
       (iv) impeding the development of enhanced relations between 
     NATO and other European countries that do not belong to the 
     Alliance.
       (C) In order to enhance security and stability in Europe, 
     the United States should seek commitments from the Russian 
     Federation--
       (i) to demarcate and respect all its borders with 
     neighboring states;
       (ii) to station its armed forces on the territory of other 
     states only with the consent of such states and in strict 
     accordance with international law; and
       (iii) to take steps to reduce nuclear and conventional 
     forces in Kaliningrad.
       (D) As negotiations on adaptation of the Conventional Armed 
     Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty proceed, the United States 
     should engage in close and continuous consultations not only 
     with its NATO allies, but also with the emerging democracies 
     of Central and Eastern Europe, Ukraine, and the newly 
     independent states of the Caucasus region.
       (3) Policy with respect to ballistic missile defense 
     cooperation with russia.--(A) As the United States proceeds 
     with efforts to develop defenses against ballistic missile 
     attack, it should seek to foster a climate of cooperation 
     with Russia on matters related to missile defense. In 
     particular, the United States and its NATO allies should seek 
     to cooperate with Russia in such areas as early warning and 
     technical aspects of ballistic missile defense.
       (B) Even as the Congress seeks to promote ballistic missile 
     defense cooperation with Russia, it must insist on its 
     constitutional prerogatives regarding consideration of arms 
     control agreements with Russia that bear on ballistic missile 
     defense.

     SEC. 3. AUTHORITIES RELATING TO NATO ENLARGEMENT.

       (a) Policy of Section.--This section is enacted in order to 
     implement the policy set forth in section 2(1).
       (b) Designation of Additional Countries Eligible for NATO 
     Enlargement Assistance.--
       (1) Designation of additional countries.--Effective 180 
     days after the date of the enactment of this Act, Romania, 
     Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are each designated as 
     eligible to receive assistance under the program established 
     under section 203(a) of the NATO Participation Act of 1994 
     and shall be deemed to have been so designated pursuant to 
     section 203(d)(1) of such Act, except that any such country 
     shall not be so designated if, prior to such effective date, 
     the President certifies to the Committee on International 
     Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee 
     on Foreign Relations of the Senate that the country fails to 
     meet the criteria under section 203(d)(3) of the NATO 
     Participation Act of 1994.
       (2) Rule of construction.--The designation of countries 
     pursuant to paragraph (1) as eligible to receive assistance 
     under the program established under section 203(a) of the 
     NATO Participation Act of 1994--
       (A) is in addition to the designation of other countries by 
     law or pursuant to section 203(d)(2) of such Act as eligible 
     to receive assistance under the program established under 
     section 203(a) of such Act; and
       (B) shall not preclude the designation by the President of 
     other emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe 
     pursuant to section 203(d)(2) of such Act as eligible to 
     receive assistance under the program established under 
     section 203(a) of such Act.
       (3) Sense of the congress.--It is the sense of the Congress 
     that Romania, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania--
       (A) are to be commended for their progress toward political 
     and economic reform and meeting the guidelines for 
     prospective NATO members;
       (B) would make an outstanding contribution to furthering 
     the goals of NATO and enhancing stability, freedom, and peace 
     in Europe should they become NATO members; and
       (C) upon complete satisfaction of all relevant criteria 
     should be invited to become full NATO members at the earliest 
     possible date.
       (c) Regional Airspace Initiative and Partnership for Peace 
     Information Management System.--
       (1) In general.--Funds described in paragraph (2) are 
     authorized to be made available to support the implementation 
     of the Regional Airspace Initiative and the Partnership for 
     Peace Information Management System, including--
       (A) the procurement of items in support of these programs; 
     and
       (B) the transfer of such items to countries participating 
     in these programs.
       (2) Funds described.--Funds described in this paragraph are 
     funds that are available--
       (A) during any fiscal year under the NATO Participation Act 
     of 1994 with respect to countries eligible for assistance 
     under that Act; or
       (B) during fiscal year 1998 under any Act to carry out the 
     Warsaw Initiative.
       (d) Extension of Authority Regarding Excess Defense 
     Articles.--Section 105 of Public Law 104-164 (110 Stat. 1427) 
     is amended by striking ``1996 and 1997'' and inserting 
     ``1997, 1998, and 1999''.
       (e) Conforming Amendments to the NATO Participation Act of 
     1994.--Section 203(c) of the NATO Participation Act of 1994 
     is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``, without regard to the 
     restrictions'' and all that follows and inserting a period;
       (2) by striking paragraph (2);
       (3) in paragraph (6), by striking ``appropriated under the 
     `Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund' account'' and 
     inserting ``made available for the `Nonproliferation and 
     Disarmament Fund' '';
       (4) in paragraph (8)--
       (A) by striking ``any restrictions in sections 516 and 
     519'' and inserting ``section 516(e)'';
       (B) by striking ``as amended,''; and
       (C) by striking ``paragraphs (1) and (2)'' and inserting 
     ``paragraph (1)''; and
       (5) by redesignating paragraphs (3) through (8) as 
     paragraphs (2) through (7), respectively.

     SEC. 4. AUTHORITIES RELATING TO THE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL 
                   ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE.

       (a) Policy of Section.--This section is enacted in order to 
     implement the policy set forth in section 2(2).
       (b) Authority To Approve the CFE Flank Agreement.--The 
     President is authorized to approve on behalf of the United 
     States the Document Agreed Among States Parties to the Treaty 
     on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, 
     adopted in Vienna, Austria on May 31, 1996, concerning the 
     resolution of issues related to the Conventional Armed Forces 
     in Europe (CFE) Treaty flank zone.
       (c) Sense of Congress With Respect to CFE Adaptation.--It 
     is the sense of Congress that any revisions to the Treaty on 
     Conventional Armed Forces in Europe that may be agreed in the 
     ongoing CFE adaptation negotiations can enter into force only 
     if those revisions are specifically approved in a manner 
     described in section 33(b) of the Arms Control and 
     Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2573(b)), and no such approval 
     will be provided to any revisions to that Treaty that 
     jeopardize fundamental United States security interests in 
     Europe or the effectiveness and flexibility of NATO as a 
     defensive alliance by--
       (1) extending rights or imposing responsibilities on new 
     NATO members different from those applicable to current NATO 
     members, including with respect to the deployment of nuclear 
     weapons and the stationing of troops and equipment from other 
     NATO members;
       (2) limiting the ability of NATO to defend the territory of 
     new NATO members by, for

[[Page H3708]]

     example, restricting the construction of defense 
     infrastructure or limiting the ability of NATO to deploy 
     necessary reinforcements;
       (3) providing any international organization, or any 
     country that is not a member of NATO, with authority to 
     review, delay, veto, or otherwise impede deliberations and 
     decisions of the North Atlantic Council or the implementation 
     of such decisions, including with respect to the deployment 
     of NATO forces or the admission of additional members to 
     NATO; or
       (4) impeding the development of enhanced relations between 
     NATO and other European countries that do not belong to the 
     Alliance by, for example, recognizing spheres of influence in 
     Europe.

     SEC. 5. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATIVE PROJECTS WITH 
                   RUSSIA.

       (a) Policy of Section.--This section is enacted in order to 
     implement the policy set forth in section 2(3)(A).
       (b) Establishment of Program of Ballistic Missile Defense 
     Cooperation With Russia.--The Secretary of Defense is 
     authorized to carry out a program of cooperative ballistic 
     missile defense-related projects with the Russian Federation.
       (c) Conduct of Program.--The program of cooperative 
     ballistic missile defense-related projects with the Russian 
     Federation under subsection (b) may include (but is not 
     limited to) projects in the following areas:
       (1) Cooperation between the United States and the Russian 
     Federation with respect to early warning of ballistic missile 
     launches, including the sharing of information on ballistic 
     missile launches detected by either the United States or the 
     Russian Federation, formalization of an international launch 
     notification regime, and development of a joint global 
     warning center.
       (2) Technical cooperation in research, development, test, 
     and production of technology and systems for ballistic 
     missile defense.
       (3) Conduct of joint ballistic missile defense exercises.
       (4) Planning for cooperation in defense against ballistic 
     missile threats aimed at either the United States or the 
     Russian Federation.
       (d) Dialogue With Russia.--The President should seek to 
     initiate a dialogue with the Russian Federation aimed at 
     exploring the potential for mutual accommodation of 
     outstanding issues between the two nations on matters 
     relating to ballistic missile defense and the Anti-Ballistic 
     Missile Treaty of 1972, including the possibility of 
     developing a strategic relationship not based on mutual 
     nuclear threats.
       (e) Annual Report.--Not later than January 1, 1998, January 
     1, 1999, and January 1, 2000, the President shall submit to 
     the Congress a report on the cooperative program under this 
     section. Each such report shall include the following:
       (1) A description of the conduct of the program during the 
     preceding fiscal year, including a description of the 
     projects carried out under the program.
       (2) A description of the status of the dialogue under 
     subsection (d) during the preceding fiscal year.
       (3) A description of the funding for the program during the 
     preceding fiscal year and the year during which the report is 
     submitted and the proposed funding for the program for the 
     next fiscal year.

     SEC. 6. RESTRICTION ON ENTRY INTO FORCE OF ABM/TMD 
                   DEMARCATION AGREEMENTS.

       (a) Policy of Section.--This section is enacted in order to 
     implement the policy set forth in section 2(3)(B).
       (b) Restriction.--An ABM/TMD demarcation agreement shall 
     not be binding on the United States, and shall not enter into 
     force with respect to the United States, unless, after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, that agreement is 
     specifically approved in a manner described in section 33(b) 
     of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2573(b)).
       (c) Sense of Congress With Respect to Demarcation 
     Agreements.--
       (1) Opposition to multilateralization of abm treaty.--It is 
     the sense of the Congress that until the United States has 
     taken the steps necessary to ensure that the ABM Treaty 
     remains a bilateral treaty between the United States and the 
     Russian Federation (such state being the only successor state 
     of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that has deployed 
     or realistically may deploy an anti-ballistic missile defense 
     system) no ABM/TMD demarcation agreement will be considered 
     for approval for entry into force with respect to the United 
     States (any such approval, as stated in subsection (b), to be 
     effective only if provided in a manner described in section 
     33(b) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 
     2573(b))).
       (2) Preservation of u.s. theater ballistic missile defense 
     potential.--It is the sense of the Congress that no ABM/TMD 
     demarcation agreement that would reduce the potential of 
     United States theater missile defense systems to defend the 
     Armed Forces of the United States abroad or the armed forces 
     or population of allies of the United States will be approved 
     for entry into force with respect to the United States (any 
     such approval, as stated in subsection (b), to be effective 
     only if provided in a manner described in section 33(b) of 
     the Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2573(b))).
       (d) ABM/TMD Demarcation Agreement Defined.--For the 
     purposes of this section, the term ``ABM/TMD demarcation 
     agreement'' means an agreement that establishes a demarcation 
     between theater ballistic missile defense systems and 
     strategic anti-ballistic missile defense systems for purposes 
     of the ABM Treaty, including the following:
       (1) The agreement concluded by the Standing Consultative 
     Commission on June 24, 1996, concerning lower velocity 
     theater missile defense systems.
       (2) The agreement concluded (or to be concluded) by the 
     Standing Consultative Commission concerning higher velocity 
     theater missile defense systems, based on the Joint Statement 
     Concerning the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty issued on March 
     21, 1997, at the conclusion of the Helsinki Summit.
       (3) Any agreement similar to the agreements identified in 
     paragraphs (1) and (2).
       (e) ABM Treaty Defined.--For purposes of this section, the 
     term ``ABM Treaty'' means the Treaty Between the United 
     States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
     on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, signed 
     at Moscow on May 26, 1972 (23 UST 3435), and includes the 
     Protocols to that Treaty, signed at Moscow on July 3, 1974 
     (27 UST 1645).

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 159, the 
gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman] and the gentleman from Indiana 
[Mr. Hamilton] each will control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman].
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to bring before the House the European 
Security Act of 1997. It is an important piece of legislation that will 
once again give the Congress the opportunity to demonstrate our support 
for prompt enlargement of the NATO alliance and our special concern for 
the security of Romania and three Baltic States.
  Furthermore, the legislation charts a course that will permit us to 
enlarge NATO, as well as to achieve our vital national objectives in 
the area of ballistic missile defense without disrupting relations with 
Russia.
  This bill takes as a starting point the fact that NATO will begin the 
process of enlargement this summer consistent with the three laws that 
we have enacted on this subject over each of the last 3 years. Poland, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia currently are the front 
runners for admission in the first round of enlargement.
  This bill identifies two problems with the way NATO enlargement is 
proceeding: First, we are concerned that a number of countries may not 
be properly considered for the first round of NATO enlargement, or may 
be left out of the first round and can find themselves in a security 
vacuum. Second, we worry that in the rush to mollify Russia, 
concessions may be made that could jeopardize European security and the 
effectiveness of NATO.
  To reassure the countries that are not currently among the front 
runners for admission to NATO, this bill designates four additional 
countries to receive NATO enlargement assistance: Romania, Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania. The effect is to give these countries the same 
status under United States law as Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, 
and Slovenia.

                              {time}  1715

  This bill goes on to express the sense of Congress that Romania, 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania should be invited to join NATO as soon 
as they can satisfy all of the relevant criteria.
  With regard to Russia, the bill spells out concessions that we would 
consider unacceptable. But then to make clear that the purpose of NATO 
enlargement is not to emasculate Russia, as many in Moscow appear to 
believe, the bill supports efforts to adapt the Conventional Armed 
Forces in Europe Treaty, provided this is done in a way that does not 
make the new NATO members any second class citizens or otherwise 
jeopardize our security interests in Europe.
  This bill supports adaptation of the CFE treaty because we know of no 
better way to demonstrate to Russia our genuine belief that NATO 
enlargement will enhance the security of all countries in Europe, 
including Russia.
  With regard to ballistic missile defense, the bill again demonstrates 
that our objectives can best be achieved in the manner that enhances 
Russia's security as much as our own.
  This legislation, Mr. Speaker, has garnered widespread support since 
it was first introduced back on April 24. It is supported by all of the 
major organizations representing Americans of Central and Eastern 
European descent, ranging from the Polish American Congress to the 
Armenian Assembly and

[[Page H3709]]

the Joint Baltic-American National Committee.
  Just this week, Mr. Speaker, it has been endorsed by the editors of 
both the Washington Times and the Washington Post. If it can unite the 
editors of those two newspapers, who agree on very little, surely it 
can unite the Congress.
  In that spirit, I urge my colleagues to join in supporting this 
important measure.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, first I want to remind Members about the manner in which 
this bill comes before us. There have been no hearings in the 105th 
Congress on NATO enlargement. There have been no hearings on the bill. 
There has been no consideration in the Committee on International 
Relations or anywhere else of this bill. Now we have it under a closed 
rule.
  I think how the Congress handles important issues is important 
because it contributes to the public perception of the Congress. We 
talk a lot about the importance of the Democratic process in countries 
before they come into NATO. We could very well use some Democratic 
process in consideration of this bill.
  The Committee on Rules has decided that on the most important foreign 
policy issue of the year, probably, there will be one vote, up or down, 
no amendments, on a bill that has had no process of review by the 
committee of jurisdiction.
  Second, I do not oppose the content of this bill. I plan to vote for 
it. But I think Members should understand what the bill does and does 
not do. It is neither a very helpful nor a harmful bill.
  Contrary to what some may say in this debate, this bill does not pave 
the way for another round of NATO enlargement. It does not provide 
additional assistance. It does not provide different assistance. The 
assistance that this bill would provide is exactly the same kind of 
assistance that the administration is currently providing or planning 
to provide.
  Four countries, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, are designated 
to receive assistance under the NATO Participation Act. But the 
assistance authorities under that act duplicate existing authorities. 
No U.S. assistance program, plan, or activity in these countries will 
be changed because of this act. The bill amounts to a sense of the 
Congress.
  The Baltic States and Romania certainly deserve consideration for 
NATO membership, but so do others who are not named. The message to the 
four countries designated under the NATO Participation Act is that 
``you have a leg up'' in the next round of NATO expansion. The message 
to Bulgaria, to Slovakia, to Albania and to the others is, ``Sorry, you 
lose.'' This bill says to them, ``No matter what you do, you are not 
now on the list of NATO membership.''
  The only meaningful change in authorities in this bill would be to 
allow the administration to use Department of Defense funds for the 
Regional Airspace Initiative in Eastern Europe, a program to modernize 
air traffic control systems. Usually in the Congress we have a good 
many Members at least who oppose raids on Defense Department funds for 
foreign aid purposes. This would provide about $10 million a year from 
the operations and maintenance accounts for what these committees view 
as foreign assistance. While an air traffic control system in Central 
Europe is useful, we should be clear here that this authority will mean 
a further depletion in the defense budget.
  On the question of the CFE flank agreement, the Senate has already 
acted. The Senate acted by May 15 to provide its advice and consent. 
The administration originally asked both the House and the Senate to 
act on the flank agreement last August. The House in this case is a day 
late and a dollar short. Its actions on the flank agreement are now 
irrelevant.
  On the question of the ABM treaty and ballistic missile defense, the 
President will not be obliged to change his policy one iota. He already 
is carrying out a cooperative program on ballistic missile defense with 
Russia. He is already carrying out a dialog with Russia on the ABM 
treaty. He has already agreed to submit the demarcation agreement under 
the ABM treaty to the Senate for its advice and consent.
  I do not approve of the way this bill came to the floor. As I 
suggested, I really would prefer no bill at this time. NATO enlargement 
is a complex process with huge stakes. It will not be easy to make it 
work. It makes sense to let the process unfold gradually, and let a 
consensus develop on which members should be admitted and in what 
order.
  My preference would be for the Congress not to try to dictate the 
process by declaring favorites. There is something disturbing about 
seeing Members champion certain countries, trying to push their 
favorites to the front of the line.
  But this bill is before us, and I do not wish to be recorded in 
opposition to NATO expansion. The bill will be viewed in Europe and 
certainly in Eastern Europe as an up-or-down vote on NATO enlargement. 
I do not intend to be seen as a Member who opposes the aspirations of 
the Baltic States and Romania. I think we would be better served if all 
countries seeking NATO membership were designated under the NATO 
Participation Act.
  NATO enlargement, in my judgment, is going to happen. We have reached 
a point of no return. I had and still have many questions about 
enlargement, especially about costs and U.S. commitments. I do not 
think we have had sufficient debate or consideration of NATO 
enlargement.
  I do believe that, if properly done, NATO enlargement can increase 
the security of all of Europe and increase the chances that Europe will 
not be the source of wars. NATO enlargement will certainly assure these 
new democracies of central Europe and strengthen Democratic and market 
reforms.
  I do not think we have adequately considered the impact of 
enlargement on NATO itself and on those countries not included in 
enlargement. We certainly have not considered carefully enough the 
costs of NATO enlargement and how to deal with the hostile reaction of 
Russia. Much is going to depend on how we manage the process of 
enlargement.
  I support NATO enlargement because I believe that the risks of 
proceeding with enlargement are less now than the risks of not going 
forward. You cannot have the President of the United States talk again 
and again about NATO enlargement, and have 16 governments support NATO 
enlargement, without enlargement going forward. U.S. credibility and 
NATO credibility would vanish if we tried to turn back now.

  The question now is not whether to enlarge NATO but how to do it in a 
responsible way. We do not want to antagonize Russia unduly. We do not 
want to create a two-tiered NATO membership. We should not prejudge the 
next steps.
  We should let the process of NATO enlargement unfold. We should bring 
in Members only when they are prepared and meet NATO criteria. We 
should encourage all countries in Eastern Europe to meet NATO criteria, 
not just a few. We should keep the process open and not create first, 
second, and third tiers of candidates.
  Neither the process under which we consider this bill nor the content 
of the bill itself should make us especially proud. So far as I can 
see, it is a foreign policy bill driven largely by domestic political 
pressures. But neither is it a bad bill. I see no compelling reason to 
vote against it. I do plan to vote for it.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for his supportive 
remarks with regard to this important bill.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. 
Smith], distinguished chairman of the Subcommittee on International 
Relations and Human Rights.
  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to voice my strong 
support for H.R. 1758.
  The language before us is designed first and foremost to preserve the 
effectiveness and the flexibility of NATO as a defensive alliance. For 
nearly five decades the North Atlantic Alliance has served and advanced 
the interests of the United States in Europe by preserving peace, 
promoting economic prosperity, and advancing our shared principles of 
democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.

[[Page H3710]]

  Mr. Speaker, I would point out that the underlying legislation 
provides important assistance to Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and 
Romania as they pursue membership in the alliance irrespective of the 
outcome of the NATO summit meeting scheduled to take place in Madrid in 
early July.
  Recently the ambassadors from each of these countries, as well as 
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Slovakia, 
appeared before the Helsinki Commission, which I co-chair along with 
Senator D'Amato, and presented their government's case for NATO 
membership. I believe, especially after hearing from each of the 
ambassadors, that it would be an injustice of historic proportions if 
we did not take advantage of the unique opportunity that we have today 
to embrace these countries of the region that have demonstrably 
committed themselves to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.
  During President Constantinescu's short tenure, Romania has made very 
impressive progress, and I believe deserves every ounce of 
encouragement, support, and consideration in the lead-up to the July 
NATO summit. Mr. Speaker, as one of those who has closely followed 
developments in Romania since 1981, I would hope that Romania is 
included among those invited to accession negotiations on full NATO 
membership.
  With respect to the Baltic States, I have seen no justification in 
delaying similar negotiations with Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. 
Despite decades of Soviet domination and brutal repression, the 
commitment of the Baltic peoples to freedom and democracy ultimately 
triumphed over totalitarianism. Having persevered for 50 years and 
overcome the odds by regaining their independence, the Baltic countries 
deserve to be fully integrated into the West, including NATO, without 
further delay.
  Mr. Speaker, the important legislation before us is aimed at giving 
further impetus to the enlargement of NATO. It is of critical 
importance, in my view, that a genuine process be put into place to 
ensure that emerging democracies not invited in Madrid join NATO but 
that wish to join the alliance will be given every consideration, and 
that there be a transparent and a real process for doing so. Platitudes 
cannot substitute for process. The bill calls for the NATO leaders 
assembled in Madrid to agree to such a process.
  Frankly, Mr. Speaker, I remain very concerned over the recently 
concluded negotiations undertaken by NATO Secretary General Solana that 
resulted in the so-called Founding Act between NATO and the Russian 
Federation. Part of my concern stems from the fact that the talks were 
conducted against the backdrop of an artificial deadline suggested by 
the Russians. It is of critical importance that the Founding Act in no 
way undermine the effectiveness of NATO or reduce new members of the 
alliance to second-class citizens.
  I am particularly concerned about the seemingly one-sided nature of 
the recently concluded negotiations, focusing as they have on Moscow's 
security preoccupation, real or imagined. The pending legislation 
identifies three specific security concerns that I urge the Clinton 
administration to raise with the Russians until they have been 
resolved.
  The first concern stems from the fact that Russia has not agreed to 
the international borders with several of her neighbors. Moscow has 
purposefully dragged its feet on this important issue with the aim of 
intimidating a number of the countries involved.
  The second issue concerns the deployment of Russian forces on the 
territory of other states. Today there are thousands of Russian troops 
deployed in and around the Ukrainian port of Sevastopol. Russian troops 
are likewise stationed in Moldova. The pending amendment calls for a 
commitment from the Russian Federation to station its armed forces on 
the territory of other states only with consent of such states and in 
strict accordance with international law.
  Finally, the bill calls for a commitment by the Russians to take 
steps to reduce nuclear and conventional forces in Kaliningrad, where 
Moscow has amassed a huge arsenal that poses a potential threat to the 
Baltic States and to Poland.

                              {time}  1730

  Mr. Speaker, the progress in resolving these outstanding issues would 
go a long way to advance peace and stability throughout Europe, a 
region of critical importance to our own security and to our own 
economic and political interests.
  I urge adoption of H.R. 1758 in the interests of maintaining the 
effectiveness and the flexibility of NATO as a defensive alliance. I 
urge strong support for the bill.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, how much time have we consumed?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Inglis of South Carolina). The gentleman 
from California [Mr. Lantos] has 22\1/2\ minutes remaining and the 
gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman] has 21 minutes remaining.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 5 minutes.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise as a strong supporter of NATO expansion. Two 
weeks ago this past Sunday, I had the privilege in Bucharest of 
delivering to President Goncz of Hungary and President Constantinescu 
of Romania a letter by President Clinton. In this letter, President 
Clinton congratulated the two Presidents and the two countries for 
reaching an historic accommodation after centuries of bloodshed, 
bitterness and wars.
  The long-awaited period of reconciliation and peace between these two 
important countries of central and Eastern Europe is now a reality. The 
two Presidents jointly responded to our President, and the two 
governments strongly favor their simultaneous invitation as NATO 
members.
  May I say, Mr. Speaker, that the debate in this country and in the 
other 15 NATO countries basically comes down to whether in the first 
round we should invite just three potential new members, Poland, the 
Czech Republic, and Hungary, or whether we should invite four or five, 
including Slovenia and Romania.
  I strongly favor, as one who has spent a great deal of time over a 
lifetime in that region, the simultaneous invitation to membership to 
all five countries, with the clear understanding that a simultaneous 
invitation to membership does not guarantee simultaneous acceptance 
into NATO.
  Such a formula, Mr. Speaker, would give us the best of all possible 
worlds. It would avoid the public relations disaster of having some 
countries invited and others not invited; it would avoid the backlash 
that would surely take place in Romania, which has gone through free 
and open and democratic elections, which has moved vigorously toward 
privatization and the free market, and which recognizes the importance 
of a free press and religious freedom. It now is as well qualified to 
be invited as any of the other five.
  Yet I think we must understand that, in terms of economic development 
and other criteria, all five countries may not be ready to join NATO 
simultaneously. Therefore, my recommendation: simultaneous invitation; 
no guarantee of simultaneous admission.
  I also believe, Mr. Speaker, that, should this formula not be 
acceptable, the very least the NATO countries should do at their July 
meeting is to designate a time certain when the second round of 
countries will be invited to join NATO. Failure to do so would lead to 
significant disappointments, a xenophobic backlash and a severe 
destruction of the spirit which now permeates this region.
  These five countries, in my judgment, are fully prepared to begin 
negotiations in July, and with assistance from the existing NATO 
contingent will be ready within the next 2 or 3 years to enter NATO as 
full-fledged, fully equal members. This will be good for NATO, this 
will be good for the new members, and, I underscore, it will be good 
for Russia.
  In the cold war days, the Soviet Union assumed that NATO is an 
aggressive military alliance. Those of us who understood NATO 
throughout argued that NATO is a defensive military alliance. It is a 
force for stability, prosperity, democracy and freedom. Those are the 
attributes in central and Eastern Europe that are beneficial to Russia, 
and I strongly urge my colleagues to support simultaneous invitation to 
all five countries mentioned, and I support the legislation of the 
gentleman from New York.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

[[Page H3711]]

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Florida [Mr. Goss], the distinguished chairman of the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence.
  (Mr. GOSS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished chairman of the 
House Committee on International Relations, the distinguished gentleman 
from New York [Mr. Gilman], and congratulate him on his successes 
earlier today.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the European Security Act strongly. 
Today we stand on the threshold of the July Madrid summit, where the 
invitations to seek membership in NATO will be issued, and they are 
sure to be among the most coveted invitations of the year. What this 
means is that it is time for this Congress to offer not only words but 
substantive measures designed to enhance the NATO enlargement process.
  The Europe Security Act of 1997 is a strong statement in support of 
expansion with concrete measures designed to improve the European 
security environment. It reiterates this round of expansion cannot and 
should not be the last; that all countries able to meet the 
requirements for membership should be permitted to seek it. It also 
seeks to ensure that those countries not included in the first tranche 
are not left out in the cold, in some kind of a security vacuum.
  H.R. 1758 seeks to do so by expanding the circle of countries 
eligible for enlargement assistance. It also addresses concerns that my 
colleagues and I have regarding the conventional forces in Europe and 
includes language to discourage the administration from making further 
agreements with nonmember states that will undercut the security of the 
alliance. In other words, it says no to appeasement.
  Still further, it is intended to enhance Europe security with 
measures specifically designed to overcome legal and foreign policy 
impediments to ballistic missile defense by holding the line on the 
implementation of demarcation agreements negotiated with Russia and 
proposals from the White House that would multilateralize the ABM 
treaty.
  The Europe Security Act will offer the opportunity to enhance U.S. 
security from ballistic missile attack, something of interest to all of 
us. In the end, the Europe Security Act is about consolidating the 
process of democratization in the central and eastern Europe, about 
ensuring that those countries that share our values and took the risks 
associated with casting off the Soviet Union will be part of the new 
European security order and enjoy the benefits of freedom.
  Mr. Speaker, as the Madrid summit approaches, we know that a 
difficult process still lies ahead, but it is absolutely certain that 
enlargement is the right choice. We must not retreat from our world 
leadership role, we must not forsake our allies, old or new. We have 
dealt with Russia, the Ukraine and all the interested parties in the 
past few years on this matter, and it is time to get on with it.
  We have worked with the parliamentarians in the North Atlantic 
Assembly. We have visited with the governments and the people on their 
turf in Russia, the Ukraine, the Baltics, Hungary, Poland, the Czech 
Republic, and many others. And, of course, we have been to our NATO's 
home port and talked to them about this. This is not a new subject. 
This is a subject whose time has come. I support this legislation and I 
urge my colleagues to do so.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Massachusetts [Mr. Frank].
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, it is a terrible thing that 
this central question of foreign policy comes before us under a closed 
rule with only 1 hour.
  I think the concept of NATO expansion is a reasonable one, but it is 
not reasonable to go to the American taxpayer, in the light of a budget 
deal, which will severely constrain spending both in the defense and 
nondefense areas, and tell the American taxpayer that they will 
continue to bear a disproportionate share of the cost of defending 
Europe.
  Everyone acknowledges that the expansion of NATO will cost money. The 
more countries involved, the more money it will cost. That is not a 
disqualification. But that cost should not be borne by the current 
formula, which has the U.S. taxpayer subsidizing the nations of Western 
Europe.
  We talked about welfare reform last year. We did not go after the 
real welfare. The real welfare is the United States taxpayer, 52 years 
after the end of World War II, years after the Marshall plan succeeded, 
continuing to subsidize Germany and England and France and Denmark and 
Belgium. This bill assumes the status quo.
  It is shocking that we were not allowed a chance to offer an 
amendment to this bill that would say that, whether one is for or 
against NATO expansion, we in the House do not want a continuation of 
this subsidy by the American taxpayer of our wealthy allies in Western 
Europe.
  As the Western European nations struggle to meet their 3-percent 
deficit deadline to get into the Euro, we can be sure they will start 
cutting back on their military expenditures. And they will cut back on 
their military expenditures secure in the hope that the American 
Congress will again be suckered and bail them out.
  What this bill does, erroneously in my judgment, is to assume that 
status quo. I will vote ``no''. I might be supportive of NATO expansion 
in some context, but this bill assumes an expansion of NATO under the 
same terms.
  The Washington Post editorial that the gentleman from New York talked 
about referred to the need for more spending. Do not send the American 
taxpayer once again to the defense of Europe when the European nations 
are allowed to get a free ride.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Nevada [Mr. Gibbons].
  Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Speaker, I have a question about this legislation 
which I wish to direct to its principal sponsor, the distinguished 
gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman], and chairman of the Committee on 
International Relations.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GIBBONS. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I would be pleased to respond to the 
questions of the distinguished gentleman from Florida.
  Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Speaker, I note that the legislation states that 
Romania, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania should be invited to become 
full members of NATO at the earliest possible date upon complete 
satisfaction of all relevant criteria. The legislation also provides 
that these four countries are to be designated as eligible to receive 
assistance under the NATO Participation Act effective 180 days after 
the date of enactment.
  Are these provisions intended to suggest that Congress believes that 
Romania, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania should be kept out of the first 
round of NATO enlargement this year and, instead, invited to join NATO 
at a later date in a second or third round of enlargement?
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will continue to yield, I 
can assure the gentleman that it is not our intention to push these 
countries into any second or third round of NATO enlargement. The 
purpose of this legislation is to support the efforts of Romania, 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to join NATO. We absolutely are not 
trying to hold them back.
  If at the summit meeting in Madrid this July the members of NATO 
decide to invite Romania, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to begin 
accession talks with the alliance as part of the first round of 
enlargement, we will welcome that. And if they are not invited to join 
in the first round, we will do all we can to make sure the door to the 
alliance remains open to them. And that is the purpose of this 
legislation.
  Mr. GIBBONS. Why then does the legislation postpone for 180 days the 
effective date of the designation of these countries under the NATO 
Participation Act?
  Mr. GILMAN. Well, that designation has to do with eligibility to 
receive U.S. assistance. The 180-day period provided under the 
legislation should not be read to suggest that we think it is necessary 
to wait the entire 180 days before deciding whether to invite these 
countries to join NATO.
  Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman and esteemed chairman 
for his clarification, and with the assurance he has provided, I will 
be pleased to join him in support of this measure.

[[Page H3712]]

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for his interest in 
the legislation.

                              {time}  1745

  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished 
gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Neal].
  Mr. NEAL of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, sometimes this institution 
suffers from collective amnesia. What we honor tonight in this concept 
is what happened in Hungary in 1956, what happened in Czechoslovakia in 
1968 with Alexander Dubcek, and what happened in Poland just a decade 
ago. What we honor here today is a simple concept of those electricians 
and that trade unionist from Gdansk, Lech Walesa, who turned events as 
we proceeded to the next century, on their ear. Internationally we 
honor the commitment that they made, and I assure Mr. Frank's 
reservations about the manner in which costs are ascribed in these 
particular instances, but we cannot turn our backs on the heroism.
  And remember once again those Soviet tanks as they rolled into 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia and Jaruzelski threatened to put down those 
trade unionists. It represents the triumph of the human spirit nurtured 
in this very institution.
  I am pleased to lend my name in support of the concept of expanding 
NATO to include these republics.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Inglis of South Carolina). The Chair 
would point out that the gentleman from California [Mr. Lantos] has 
14\1/2\ minutes remaining and the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman] 
has 16 minutes remaining.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania [Mr. Fox], another member of our committee.
  Mr. FOX of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, it was not long ago, December 
1994, that the NATO summit, the United States expressed its interest in 
expanding NATO in order to strengthen nations that share the U.S. 
belief in democracy, continue the development of free market economies, 
open the U.S. investment and trade, secure allies willing to share in 
cooperative efforts on a range of global issues, and preserve a Europe 
free from domination by any single power.
  The enlargement we are discussing today will enhance stability by 
providing NATO security guarantee for candidate states working to 
construct viable democracies and free-market systems. H.R. 1758 
declares that the door to membership in NATO should remain open to all 
emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe and expresses the 
sense of Congress that the bulk of nations in Romania should be 
admitted to NATO and declares that Congress will not approve 
international agreements that accord second class status to new 
members. The bill declares the door to NATO should not close after the 
first round of NATO enlargement this summer. Members left out of the 
first round must be assured they will be considered for NATO membership 
in the future.
  So I rise in support of this important bill. NATO enlargement is 
important to our country, it is important to world peace, and it is 
important to the growth of human mankind.
  I thank the gentleman very much for the opportunity to speak on 
behalf of this legislation and to our chairman, the gentleman from New 
York [Mr. Gilman], who has led this legislation forward.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the very distinguished 
gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Oberstar].
  Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Speaker, last year during consideration of the NATO 
Enlargement Facilitation Act of 1996, the other body voted to designate 
Slovenia along with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic as nations 
that have made progress toward meeting NATO's criteria for new members. 
And Slovenia certainly stands out as a sterling candidate for admission 
to NATO, and I appreciate the support on the Democratic side and on the 
Republican side of the committee in accepting the Senate amendment in 
conference.
  We are soon to witness the Madrid meeting that will discuss the 
enlargement of NATO. I would urge the administration to keep uppermost 
on their agenda Slovenia as a candidate for the first round of 
expansion. Slovenia has moved successfully to privatize its economy. 
Everything from banking to aviation has been privatized. They have 
democratized their politics and their government. They have created 158 
local governments and had local elections. They are a significant force 
in the modernization of trade in the former East European areas and 
deserve to be a member of NATO.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge the administration to accept Slovenia in this 
first round.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Rohrabacher], another member of our committee.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, in the spirit of collegiality and civility, 
I yield 1 additional minute to the gentleman from California [Mr. 
Rohrabacher].
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California [Mr. 
Rohrabacher] is recognized for 2 minutes.
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Speaker, I do appreciate this time, from the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Lantos] in particular, because I am 
providing a legitimate opposition to this bill.
  Mr. Speaker, today I rise in opposition to H.R. 1758. I do not do so 
with any type of situation where I have a problem in disagreeing with 
the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman]. Mr. Gilman has my respect, 
and I know he is pushing this bill; the gentleman from New York [Mr. 
Solomon] is pushing for this bill. He has my respect. We worked 
together on so many issues, but I think that it is important for us to 
recognize the changes that have taken place in the world and for 
America to take a realistic view of what is going to be happening, what 
challenges we will face in the years ahead.
  NATO did a good job in deterring a Soviet attack on Europe, but what 
purpose does NATO serve now? Is it worth the expenditure of tens of 
billions of limited American defense dollars? I do not think so. Europe 
no longer poses and what is happening in Europe no longer poses a 
national security threat to the United States of America. We need not 
spend our limited defense dollars that we have today for the stability 
of our European friends. They can pay for their own stability.
  Why we were in NATO was because the Soviet Union, and a war with the 
Soviet Union, was a threat to our national security. Staying in NATO 
now wastes limited dollars that should be spent on American weapons 
systems that will enable the United States to project power from the 
continental United States. Spending money on NATO rather than spending 
money on B-2 bombers or American aircraft carriers, or, yes, on a 
missile defense system is a waste of money. We need not spend our 
limited resources for stability in Europe, especially when it takes our 
focus away from the real part of the world where the threat to American 
security lies.
  By focusing on Europe, we are taking away our focus from Asia, where 
a belligerent, totalitarian, expansionist China is fast becoming a 
threat to our national security and a threat to world peace. Let us 
focus our efforts on strengthening our alliances in Asia, spending our 
money so that we can deter war on Asia rather than wasting it on NATO, 
which is a thing of the past.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes to respond to my 
friend from California, Mr. Rohrabacher.
  Mr. Speaker, NATO has been the cornerstone of American security for 
two generations. NATO has been the essence of our defense strategy vis-
a-vis our most formidable opponent since the end of the Second World 
War, the Soviet Union, and it takes a great deal of naivete to assume 
that new threats might not reemerge on the Eurasian continent aimed at 
our allies and indeed the United States.
  Expanding NATO and continuing to fund NATO perhaps in a more 
proportional fashion, as my friend from Massachusetts recommends, is 
very much in the American national security interests, and to send a 
message at this stage that the United States wishes to cut back its 
NATO commitment would be the most suicidally shortsighted gesture of 
U.S. defense and foreign policy.
  Mr. Speaker, I strongly urge my colleagues to reject the notions 
presented by my good friend from California.

[[Page H3713]]

  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New 
York [Mr. Solomon], the distinguished chairman of the Committee on 
Rules.
  Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from New York, the 
chairman of the Committee on International Relations, for yielding me 
this time. I commend him for bringing this measure to the floor in this 
timely manner. And Mr. Speaker, I just hope that one of the greatest 
Presidents this country has ever known is able to be watching this 
debate here tonight because it is because of he, and his name was 
Ronald Reagan from the gentleman's State, my good friend; it was 
because of he and his policies of peace through strength back in the 
1980's, backed by Republican and Democratic bipartisan support, 
including the gentleman from California [Mr. Lantos] sitting over 
there, a good Democrat, that brought down the Iron Curtain, that 
brought down the Berlin wall, and saw peace breaking out and democracy 
breaking out all over Eastern Europe in countries that the people 
there, tens of millions of them, that were enslaved by deadly atheistic 
communism that has no respect for life or human rights at all; those 
people today have hope because they are now part of a sovereign nation. 
Be it Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Romania, Slovenia, or Poland, or the 
Czech Republic or Hungary, those people now have hope, the same kind of 
hope that we Americans have enjoyed, and that is why we need to have 
this bill on the floor here today.
  My colleagues know we fought two world wars in this country, and we 
fought a very expensive cold war, expensive to the American taxpayer 
because we had to rebuild our strength, and we had to show the evil 
empire, as Ronald Reagan said, that we would not tolerate this kind of 
inhumane philosophy in this world, and that is why just before 
President Clinton went to Helsinki to meet with President Yeltsin I 
spoke with him for almost an hour to make sure that we Republicans were 
speaking the same as the Democrat leadership and the same as the 
President of the United States that we were going to keep that door 
open for all countries formerly oppressed by this philosophy called 
communism, that we would keep that door open for all of these sovereign 
countries.
  Mr. Speaker, President Clinton assured me that there will be no quid 
pro quo with Yeltsin, that what was said in public would be what was 
said in private and that those doors would be kept open to these 
countries once they met the criteria.
  And what is that criteria? That criteria is that these sovereign 
nations, these new sovereign nations, must have advanced to 
irreversible democracy, that they must have moved to a free market 
economy, privatizing their industries, that they must live by the rule 
of law and that they must respect human rights both within their 
country and across their borders and that, finally, they must be able 
to participate militarily. What this bill says is to those countries: 
``You have previously been under Russian influence, that all of your 
military is not able to communicate or inter-operate with our NATO 
defense alliance,'' and this bill is meant to help those countries do 
just that.
  Mr. Speaker, that is why it is so important for us to pass this 
legislation here today.
  This is not spending money, I would say to my good friend from 
Massachusetts. This is saving money because let me assure my colleagues 
that once these countries are brought under the greatest defense 
alliance in the history of the world that there will be no more wars in 
that part of the world because what is that defense alliance? It says 
that if Latvia is invaded by an outside military aggressor, that these 
countries, including America, will come to their rescue to protect 
their sovereignty. That is what this measure says.
  And my colleagues know it is not just for these countries, Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Estonia, and Romania and Slovenia, the Warsaw Pact 
countries who have already met that criteria, but it is also for 
Bulgaria and Slovakia and, yes, even Ukraine, and, yes, my colleagues, 
even Russia. If Russia would meet this criteria, then they also could 
become a part of NATO, and their boundaries would also be protected 
from outside military aggression. That is how to guarantee peace in 
that part of the world, and it is how to guarantee that U.S. soldiers 
and sailors and marines and Air Force will never have to go into battle 
in that part of the world again.
  Mr. Speaker, that is why my colleagues need to come to this floor, 
they need to support this legislation, they need to cast a vote for 
Ronald Reagan and for the expansion of NATO, because that is how to 
bring about peace in the world.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, before yielding to my friend from New York I 
yield myself such time as I may consume. I would merely like to suggest 
to the distinguished gentleman who has just spoken that in addition to 
President Reagan, beginning with President Truman, all of our 
Presidents, Republican and Democratic alike, deserve a great deal of 
credit, as do Members of Congress who on a bipartisan basis have been 
so strongly supportive of NATO through the decades.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from 
New York [Mr. Engel].

                              {time}  1800

  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend from California for 
yielding me this time. I rise in strong support of this bill. I have 
long been in favor of NATO expansion, and I am very pleased that we 
finally seem to be moving forward.
  Mr. Speaker, I think this bill states what is obvious: That NATO 
expansion is a good thing, and that countries can join NATO if they 
meet certain criteria. I think it is very important at this stage to 
state that in July, we know that certain countries are going to be 
admitted to NATO, and we want the Congress to go on record as saying 
that once these countries are admitted to NATO, that the door does not 
swing shut, that the door is open, that NATO expansion is still on the 
table, that this Congress is in favor of the concept of expanding NATO.
  With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of communism, the 
Western world, the democratic world, the United States would be 
foolhardy if it did not take advantage of the fact that these 
countries, which were formerly Communist countries and dictatorships, 
want to have free market economies, want to have democracy, and want to 
be a part of the Western world, of the free world, of the democratic 
world. It would make no sense for us not to bear the fruits of what 
happened, and I think if we delay NATO expansion, that is exactly what 
we would be doing.
  No one is saying that countries should be admitted before they meet 
the criteria. This is simply saying that Romania and the Baltic nations 
can be considered when they meet the criteria, and again, if there are 
other nations in Eastern Europe that can meet the criteria and want to 
become NATO members, they too ought to be considered; that would be the 
next logical step to this bill.
  The bill also makes it clear that such enlargement of NATO does not 
end at Russia. Indeed, we want to have cooperation with Russia. The 
President, in the pact that he signed with Mr. Yeltsin, states that, 
that Russia can be a partner with the West, but that Russia cannot have 
a veto power over NATO expansion, and that Russia cannot dictate to 
NATO how NATO expands or to which Nation an invitation is given to join 
NATO.
  So I think that on balance, this is a very, very good measure. It is 
a measure that is very, very important. It is a measure that will go a 
long way in guaranteeing democracy, free market economies, and peace as 
we approach the 21st century.
  I compliment the gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman], the chairman 
and my friend, for putting forth this measure.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Florida [Mr. Mica].
  Mr. MICA. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from New York [Mr. 
Gilman] for yielding me this time.
  Quite frankly, I say to my colleagues, I regret that this bill picks 
winners and losers in the quest to join NATO, as was pointed out by the 
ranking member of the committee. I personally believe that Slovakia 
should be

[[Page H3714]]

and should have been selected for NATO admission in the first round 
last year, and certainly should be included this year. Unfortunately, 
this whole process has become a popularity contest rather than a well-
considered international security consideration.
  Let me submit for the Record comments relating to Slovakia's 
readiness to join NATO. Nicholas Burns of the State Department said 
April 17, 1997, ``The Slovak Republic has made impressive economic 
progress in four years since independence, and is cooperating fully in 
Partnership for Peace. We have also been gratified by the Slovak 
Republic's contribution to peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and 
Eastern Slavonia.''
  Just a few days ago, Speaker Gingrich said in the Washington Times, 
``I do not think there is any sense to exclude Slovakia.''
  My grandfather was born in Slovakia and the Slovaks are a patient and 
peaceful people. They have been free and independent for only 4 years. 
They were oppressed for 1,000 years. They will wait patiently for a 
little while longer to take their rightful place in NATO, and I hope 
that we can support that effort in the future.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to my friend and 
colleague, the gentleman from California [Mr. Capps]. Although he has 
been with us only this term, he has already made great contributions to 
the body.
  Mr. CAPPS. Mr. Speaker, I know I will probably vote for this, but I 
find it somewhat curious that this is probably the only debate we are 
going to have, which will probably be the most important foreign policy 
decision that this Congress will make this term, and we are doing it 
within an hour right now, with very little preparation. This is 
probably the only time we will be talking about this before the Madrid 
summit, NATO summit in July.
  I just think the ramifications of this are so profound, so deep, so 
extensive, that I regret that we have to do it in this fashion. I know 
for a new Member to come here and lecture other Members on how we ought 
to be doing this is probably not very polite of me, but I think that 
until we can trust the process that we are using, it is difficult to 
restore the trust between the people and their representatives here.
  Mr. Speaker, I just think by naming four more countries, we are 
creating expectations among those countries. Also, there are other 
candidates for NATO membership that are not included on this new list. 
That means that they will understand what their position is relative to 
the people who are on the list. I think we raise expectations, we 
diminish expectations, we create a false euphoria.
  So I have lots of problems not just with the bill, but with this 
matter of proceeding. Because of my great respect for NATO, for the 
timeliness of NATO expansion, as I say, and I want to associate myself 
with the remarks of the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton], I will 
probably vote for the bill, because I think it is a very important step 
forward. However, I think procedurally, there is a lot lacking in the 
way we have gone about it.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania [Mr. Weldon].
  (Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania asked and was given permission to revise 
and extend his remarks.)
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of 
the legislation introduced by my colleague and friend the gentleman 
from New York [Mr. Gilman], and I rise as one of the original 
cosponsors of this legislation.
  I want to speak to the issue of a new era of cooperation with Russia, 
because there are perhaps some in this body and perhaps some in this 
country, and perhaps others outside of this country who think that this 
bill is attempting to undermine a new relationship with Russia and some 
of the other former Soviet States. Nothing could be further from the 
truth.
  In fact, in this legislation, Mr. Speaker, is a specific provision 
that allows us to begin a new era of engaging Russia, especially in the 
area of missile defense.
  Now, this is not necessarily a new area, because in the Committee on 
National Security for the past several years we in fact have supported 
funding for joint missile defense initiatives. But what this 
legislation calls for is a formal process of working with Russia to 
build a sense of understanding about what we are trying to accomplish. 
It does not mean that we are going to reveal any secrets, it does 
not mean that we are going to give the Russians any strategic 
information; it means that we are going to build confidence and that we 
are going to continue to work on programs like the RAMOS and the 
follow-on to the agreed project, which engage our physicists and 
scientists in new relationships that allow us to show Russia that 
perhaps the old relationship that was best identified by the strict 
interpretation of the ABM Treaty is perhaps not suitable for the 
current relationship between our country and Russia.

  In fact, Mr. Speaker, what is kind of interesting is, the Russians 
have just participated in a 2-year study with us that has been funded 
by our ballistic missile defense organization, headed up by Dr. Keith 
Payne and Dr. Shoumikin on behalf of the Russian side, that in fact has 
called for the possibility of a new bilateral relationship that would 
allow for, instead of a process of mutually assured destruction upon 
which we base our bilateral relationship, that we move into looking at 
the possibility of asymmetrical deterrence, which means that we include 
offensive missiles in an attempt to bring them down, and as we do so, 
that we also discuss and perhaps look at changes to the ABM Treaty to 
allow defensive systems to be put into place without creating a 
destabilizing impact on our relationship. This bill lays the groundwork 
for that to happen.
  Unfortunately, Mr. Speaker, the administration seems to be going in 
the opposite direction. I say that because recently at the Helsinki 
summit there was an agreement to expand the ABM Treaty to include 
demarcation provisions relative to theater missile defense systems.
  Mr. Speaker, a number of us in this body, including a significant 
number of Members of the minority party, have expressed their concern 
through a bill that I introduced that said, this is the wrong time to 
be expanding the ABM Treaty to include theater missile defense systems, 
and this legislation puts the House on record expressing our concern in 
that regard.
  This legislation also, Mr. Speaker, identifies the strong concerns of 
this body with the idea and the notion of multilateralizing the ABM 
Treaty. Many of us think that that would hamper our ability to move 
away from the strict interpretation of the ABM Treaty and comes at a 
very inopportune time where Russia has, in fact, given us the 
willingness in the form of a signal that they are now willing to talk 
about moving into a posture away from relying on the ABM Treaty as our 
key instrument in terms of our bilateral relationship.
  I think this is extremely important, and yet at the same point in 
time in approaching this new dialogue with Russia, we want to reassure 
them that we are not about tweaking them. We are not in this bill 
attempting to isolate Russia.
  In fact, the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon] made a very 
important point that he has made in my presence before Russians that 
were here just a few short weeks ago. He said ultimately, we even 
envision the day where Russia may be able to qualify for membership in 
NATO. So in fact, I think that is a basic underlying premise here.
  The question is how we get there, and in this era of emerging threats 
from rogue nations and the threat of destabilization in the Russian 
military relative to their offensive arms, North Korea and China 
deploying long-range missiles, we can no longer rely on an outmoded ABM 
Treaty. This bill allows us to move into a new era where in fact our 
bilateral relationship is not just based on a strict ABM, but actually 
allows us to move into a new era of relationship building on cooperate 
missile defense and also looking at ways that we can in fact move away 
from the strict interpretation that allowed us in the past to rely on a 
theory of mutually destroyed destruction.
  As the administration moves ahead with NATO expansion, we must make 
every effort to assure Russia that we are pursuing this new arrangement 
to enhance everyone's security, not to threaten them. This bill goes a 
long way toward doing that by establishing a

[[Page H3715]]

program to pursue joint missile defense projects such as early warning 
sharing and lay in a groundwork for the revival of United States-Russia 
talks on the ABM Treaty and missile defense cooperation.
  Mr. Gilman has stated that he believes it is essential that we take 
proactive steps to build confidence with the Russians. NATO expansion 
will not be a complete success if it results in a revival of tensions 
between Russia and the United States. He believes this bill sets us on 
the right course by establishing initiatives that set the tone for 
long-term dialog and cooperation.
  This bill makes clear our intent to work with the Russians, it states 
our intention to ensure the fundamental security interests of the 
United States and that of our NATO partners. While I believe that is 
wholly appropriate, I think we want to clarify that point. As you know, 
the bill states that no commitments should be made that would limit the 
rights or impose responsibilities on new NATO members different from 
those applicable to current NATO members--including the deployment of 
nuclear weapons. That statement could be perceived by the Russians as a 
sign that we intend to support the creation of a new threat at their 
borders.
  Mr. Gilman has stated that that is certainly not the intent of this 
bill, nor is it in the administration's plans. In fact, the NATO 
Council issued a statement on December 10, 1996, that its members have 
``no intention, no plan, and no reason'' to deploy nuclear weapons on 
the territory of the new member states. He also said that so far as he 
is aware, no one in this House takes issue with that statement.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman 
from the District of Columbia [Ms. Norton], my good friend and 
distinguished colleague.
  Ms. NORTON. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend for yielding me this time.
  I come to the floor because I am amazed by the nature of this debate. 
It is amazingly subdued when we consider the historic basis upon which 
we are proceeding. It is almost a historical debate, because the 
expansion of NATO may surely come to be as important as the creation of 
NATO itself.

                              {time}  1815

  Yet, this is being handled in an hour's worth of debate as just 
another matter coming before the House of Representatives at the end of 
a long day.
  I have three concerns; domestic, the commitment of troops and burden-
sharing. I have to measure everything we do on this floor against the 
Democratic sacrifices that are being agreed to by us all in the name of 
deficit reduction.
  On the matter of burdensharing, this bill does not pass that test. I 
would feel much better about what we are doing here in this discussion 
and debate if in fact we had come to some agreement about 
burdensharing, a word that is virtually empty of content and meaning. I 
would have thought that the pressures of deficit reduction could 
produce some progress on burdensharing. There has been little. Instead, 
we see burden expansion.
  But perhaps I am most concerned about article 5 of the treaty itself, 
and whether in fact this means that there may be the commitment of 
troops to central Europe as a result of this expansion. That is an 
issue of primary importance in a country which seems unwilling to 
commit troops for very much anymore. I really wonder whether or not we 
really mean, in a place where there has been much disagreement about 
Bosnia, where there has been great trouble throughout the United 
States, that we are now right in the middle of that.
  Mr. Chairman, we fell into this expansion. It developed influenced by 
the last campaign. There has been little debate in this country. The 
American people do not recognize that they may right now, as this bill 
is passed, be committing troops, if need be, to central Europe.
  I can be convinced, and I will come to the floor this evening to say 
as yet no one has even tried to convince me or the American people that 
this historic commitment should be expanded this day, in June 1997.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Cox], the distinguished chairman of our 
policy committee.
  Mr. COX of California. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for 
yielding time to me.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise to seek clarification concerning one provision of 
the bill. Section 6(c) is entitled ``Opposition to Multilateralization 
of ABM Treaty.'' It states the sense of the Congress that no agreement 
demarcating the boundary between theater and antiballistic missile 
defense will be considered until the United States has taken the steps 
necessary to ensure that the ABM Treaty remains a bilateral treaty 
between the United States and the Russian federation.
  It is my understanding that this provision takes no position with 
respect to whether such a demarcation agreement should be reached after 
such steps are taken, or, indeed, whether the United States should take 
steps to continue the ABM Treaty in force even if it is a bilateral 
agreement limited to Russia and the United States.
  Section 6(c), according to my understanding, simply makes absolutely 
clear that the administration's rush to conclude an immediate 
demarcation agreement must be stopped, and that no such demarcation 
agreement should be concluded prior to resolution of the question of 
Russia's successorship under the ABM Treaty; and finally, that, should 
Russia not be deemed to have succeeded, then no such demarcation 
agreement should be considered at all.
  I would ask the gentleman, Mr. Speaker, is that his understanding?
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. COX of California. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman is correct. That is my 
understanding as well.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I would conclude by suggesting that perhaps the 
relatively calm and deliberate and judicious tone of this debate 
reflects the bipartisan judgment of Congress of NATO's quintessential 
importance during the past two generations to our security, and our 
bipartisan commitment to the expansion of NATO.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. LANTOS. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I want to stress again what this legislation 
intends. It is about achieving two of our vital national objectives, 
enlarging NATO and defending our Nation against the risk of ballistic 
missile attack in a way that does not upset our relations with Russia.
  With regard to NATO enlargement, we are especially concerned that no 
emerging democracies in central and eastern Europe be left in a 
security vacuum, and the Baltic states in particular must be regarded 
as strong contenders for NATO membership. For this reason, our 
legislation designates these countries as being eligible to receive 
transition assistance within the NATO Participation Act. I urge our 
colleagues to support the measure.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to express my concerns about 
H.R. 1758, the European Security Act. Critical issues related to NATO 
enlargement have not been adequately thought through--unfortunately, 
politics appears to have been put ahead of policy.
  I am primarily concerned about the military and financial obligations 
the United States will assume under an expanded NATO.
  First, we need to think further about the military obligations 
assumed by the United States in enlarging NATO. In bringing in new 
members, we must not degrade the ability of the alliance to conduct 
collective defense. We must guard both against this degradation, and 
against the possibility that the U.S. burden to the defense of NATO 
will increase by bringing in countries whose interoperability with 
NATO--key to collective defense--is still a long way off.
  Second, we have been presented with a number of estimates of the 
financial costs of NATO enlargement--and those estimates vary widely.
  The administration estimates a total cost of between $9 billion and 
$12 billion over the 1997-2009 period, with a cost to the United States 
of between $150 and $200 million.
  The Congressional Budget Office estimates that--depending on how NATO 
structures its forces after enlargement--costs will range from a low of 
$61 billion to a high of $125 billion over 15 years--1996-2010, with a 
U.S. share of $5 to $19 billion over the same period.
  Which is the more accurate estimate?
  Mr. Chairman, Congress needs more information on the financial costs 
of enlargement in order to make an informed decision. Specifically:

[[Page H3716]]

  What portion of these costs are due to developing the required 
interoperability among new and old members?
  What portion to developing infrastructure required by the enlargement 
of NATO?
  How will the on-going adaptation of alliance strategy and structures 
impact on the costs of enlargement?
  How will these costs be apportioned among the allies--old and new?
  Mr. Chairman, until these questions are answered, there cannot be a 
coherent policy that takes account of our resources and security 
interests.
  Mr. LaTOURETTE. Mr. Speaker, with the break-up of the Soviet Union 
and the emergence of Russia and the Commonwealth of Newly Independent 
States [CIS] of Eastern Europe, management of the post-cold-war 
environment has proven to be a novel and challenging task. The 
securities and certainties of the ``us versus them'' world are gone. 
Today, traditional allegiances are blurred and future motives are 
questioned. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], however, has 
prevailed as the one remaining post-cold-war constant. As during the 
cold war era, the NATO commitment to collective defense is the core of 
the alliance. It is this guarantee to deter aggression that has 
prompted the CIS to seek admittance into NATO. Realizing that Russia, 
still armed with nuclear weapons, might one day become more unstable 
and aggressive, NATO membership is highly prized. As one who supports a 
stable and secure Eastern Europe through the expansion of NATO, I am 
pleased that Congress has not let this situation go unnoticed. In fact, 
the NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act of 1996--PL 104-208--was adopted 
last Congress, which named Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and 
Slovenia as having made the most progress toward meeting NATO 
membership criteria. In keeping with this sentiment, I encourage my 
colleagues to support the European Security Act of 1997 so that the 
door to NATO is not closed after the first round of enlargement and 
that additional European countries receive U.S. assistance for 
transition into NATO. I would also like to encourage the members of 
NATO to accept Slovenia into membership when it meets in Madrid this 
July.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Inglis of South Carolina). All time has 
expired.
  Pursuant to House Resolution 159, the bill is considered read for 
amendment.
  Pursuant to the rule, the previous question is ordered.
  The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was 
read the third time.


                           Motion to Recommit

  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to 
recommit.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman opposed to the bill?
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. I am, Mr. Speaker.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to 
recommit.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts moves to recommit the bill (H.R. 
     1758) to the Committee on International Relations with 
     instructions to report the bill back forthwith with the 
     following amendment:

       At the end of the bill, add the following new section:
       Sec. 7. Burdensharing.--It is the sense of the Congress 
     that the United States already pays more than a proportionate 
     share of the costs of the common defense of Europe, and that 
     the European members of NATO should pay the bulk of the costs 
     of NATO expansion which are incurred by existing NATO 
     members.''.

  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts (during the reading). Mr. Speaker, I ask 
unanimous consent that the motion be considered as read and printed in 
the Record.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Massachusetts?
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Frank] 
is recognized for 5 minutes in support of his motion to recommit.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I offer this on behalf of 
myself and the gentleman from California [Mr. Condit].
  Mr. Speaker, there are differing views about NATO expansion. There 
is, I think, great agreement in this Chamber that the cost of NATO 
expansion should not be paid in the same formula in which existing and 
past NATO costs have been paid.
  As Members mentioned, NATO grew out of a time when the United States 
had a degree of superiority in the world as a result of World War II 
that was unparalleled probably in recent history. America was quite 
generous in helping bring, among others, our European allies and our 
former European enemies, it should not be forgotten, up to the current 
level that they now enjoy. But we believe, and I think it is a widely 
shared sentiment across this House, that it is no longer appropriate 
for our European allies to accept a subsidy in the form of 
disproportionately large payments by the United States.
  What this motion to recommit says is that we believe that the 
increased NATO costs that will come from expansion, there will have to 
be military standardization and communication upgrades, that to the 
extent they are borne by existing NATO members, the European members of 
NATO should pick up the bulk of those costs.
  In other words, we are not here trying to impose more costs on the 
new NATO members. We are saying that the existing NATO members, wealthy 
and prosperous and the beneficiaries, as they have been over all these 
years, of our beneficence, and it may have been in our interests as 
well as theirs; it was in our interests as well as theirs, but it was 
our dollars much more than theirs, we ask that they now do more than 
they have been doing.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. I yield to the gentleman from California.
  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend for yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, on our part we think the gentleman from Massachusetts 
makes an extremely valid point, and we are pleased to accept his 
recommittal concern of burdensharing for the Democratic side.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I want to make this clear, 
this should not be interpreted as an anti-NATO-expansion argument. 
Indeed, I would tell those who are in favor of a full-fledged 
unrestricted NATO expansion that it is in their interests to be 
supportive of burdensharing.
  Franklin Roosevelt was described once by John Kennedy in a phrase 
that is very important for Members to remember. When John Kennedy began 
the Alliance for Progress and he looked back to Franklin Roosevelt's 
Good Neighbor Policy as a first step toward a recognition of mutual 
interest, he said that Franklin Roosevelt was able to be a good 
neighbor abroad because he was a good neighbor at home.
  The American people will more willingly support international 
engagement militarily, economically, and other sorts, if they feel they 
are being treated fairly, if they do not think it is coming at their 
expense.
  The United States, I believe, is prepared to support foreign 
assistance to people in need, to deal with disease and poverty and 
economic development. But I think the American people understandably 
say with regard to France and England and Germany and Denmark and 
Belgium, and some of the wealthiest and most successful societies in 
the world, countries that have already benefited greatly from our 
generosity, that it is time for them not to subsidize us, but no longer 
to be subsidized by us.
  What the gentleman from California [Mr. Condit] and I seek to do in 
this is to say, and I believe frankly it will underpin NATO expansion, 
it will give the American people more willingness to support this, 
because we have just done a budget deal. Defense spending will be 
constrained, not as much as I would like, but it will be constrained. 
Domestic spending will be constrained. It is simply inappropriate for 
our allies to allow a disproportionate share of the funding to fall on 
the American taxpayer.
  We have one particular fear. The European nations have to, those that 
are in the European Union, the majority of whom are in NATO, they have 
to get their deficits down to 3 percent of their gross domestic 
product. We are the only country that would meet the European Union's 
definition, I think, right now.
  There will be a strong temptation for them to do that by further 
cutting their military expenditures. We need for them to understand 
that they cannot do that in a way that shifts the burden to the United 
States. It is entirely legitimate, yes, there will be

[[Page H3717]]

benefits to the United States, but there will be even more benefits for 
Europe. Peace and security in the Czech Republic, in Hungary, and 
Slovenia, and Romania and elsewhere will be of at least equal benefit 
to our European allies; and under the current rules, they do not pay an 
equal share.
  Mr. Speaker, I would hope that we would be willing to adopt this, and 
as I say, I believe it will strengthen the case for NATO expansion 
among the American people.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Does the gentleman from New York [Mr. 
Gilman] wish to be recognized on the motion to recommit?
  Mr. GILMAN. I do, Mr. Speaker.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman] is 
recognized for 5 minutes on the motion to recommit.
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GILMAN. I yield to the gentleman from Nebraska.
  (Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.
  Mr. Chairman, as chairman of the House delegation to the North 
Atlantic Assembly, I can attest that European members do pay the bulk 
of NATO costs now. While we believe that new members of NATO, as they 
are added, should and will pay most of the cost of expansion, we agree 
to that, we believe that would be the case. That is our expectation.
  Beyond that, we agree that the existing 14 European countries should 
pay and will pay the bulk of the expansion costs. Therefore, we agree 
with and support the instructions offered by the gentleman from 
Massachusetts [Mr. Frank].
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the previous question is 
ordered on the motion to recommit.
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to recommit.
  The motion to recommit was agreed to.
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to the instructions of the House on 
the motion to recommit, I report the bill, H.R. 1758, back to the House 
with an amendment.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       At the end of the bill, add the following new section:

     ``SEC. 7. BURDENSHARING

  ``It is the sense of Congress that the United States already pays 
more than a proportionate share of the costs of the common defense of 
Europe, and that the European members of NATO should pay the bulk of 
the costs of NATO expansion which are incurred by existing NATO 
members.''

                              {time}  1830

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Inglis of South Carolina). The question 
is on the amendment.
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third 
reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read 
the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the 
table.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to section 3 of House Resolution 
159, the text of H.R. 1758 will be appended to the engrossment of H.R. 
1757, and H.R. 1758 is laid on the table.

                          ____________________