[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 76 (Thursday, June 5, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5305-S5309]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                             NATIONAL GUARD

  Mr. FORD. Mr. President, over the last few days, I have been reading 
in newspapers and hearing on radio and television about the Quadrennial 
Defense Review [QDR] and the so called National Defense Panel [NDP]. 
The QDR is supposed to be a comprehensive assessment of current 
military strategy and force structure, as well as outlining a vision 
for the future. However, experts have called this QDR ``A Cold War 
Relic'' and when it comes to the Army, I agree with them.
  I truly believe the citizens of Kentucky and the American people 
deserve the best national defense strategy the Nation can afford. Yet 
the Active Army wants to cling to their 10 divisions, while 
simultaneously calling for a new Base Closure Commission. This is 
especially ironic when you consider that during the 1995 Base Closure 
Commission, the Active Duty Army leadership insisted the Army could not 
afford to close any more bases. This was just 2 years ago. The Base 
Closure Commission said not to have another Commission until the year 
2001.
  Mr. President, I would urge my colleagues to read page 3-2 of the 
1995 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission's report to the 
President, which says `` * * * The Defense Department will be 
implementing the closures and realignments of the 1995 and prior 
Commissions through the end of this decade. The requirement in the 
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act that all Closures be completed 
within 6 years means that the closures

[[Page S5306]]

from the 1995 round will not be completed until 2001. For that reason, 
the Commission recommends that the Congress authorize another Base 
Closure Commission for the year 2001 similar to the 1991, 1993, and 
1995 Commissions.'' I understand this is still the view of our former 
colleague Alan J. Dixon, the Chairman of the 1995 Base Closure and 
Realignment Commission.
  The Active Army argues that they are going to cut the Active Force by 
15,000 men and women. But my colleagues shouldn't be fooled. When you 
look closely, you will see that the 15,000 troops the Army wants to cut 
are nothing more than ghosts. What you have are 15,000 positions in the 
Active Army that have been left empty the last few years.
  So the question remains: where does the Army plan to put these ten 
divisions--with no real reductions--if they close bases? How do they 
meet their budget target, while simultaneously protecting their general 
officer slots and keeping their 10 active divisions? Their answer? Cut 
the Army National Guard by approximately 38,000 people. That is a 10 
percent reduction of the entire Army National Guard Force Structure.
  This is the very same Army National Guard, Mr. President, that 
currently provides more than 55 percent of the ground combat forces, 45 
percent of the combat support forces and 25 percent of the Army's 
combat support units, while only using 2 percent of the Department of 
Defense budget.

  Why, my colleagues might ask, would the Active Duty Army leadership 
do such a thing? Well lets look. First, the Army leadership argues that 
the Guard divisions have no war fighting missions. This is true. But 
the Guard divisions have no war fighting missions because the Active 
Duty Army leadership has failed to give them a war fighting mission. 
And the reason they don't give them a war fighting mission is because 
then they would have to explain why they still wanted to keep 10 active 
duty divisions.
  Also the Active Army does not consider members of the Army National 
Guard as soldiers. Instead they treat the men and women of the Army 
National Guard with contempt. These Active Duty types seem to forget 
that the men and women of the Army National Guard have undergone the 
same training as the active duty forces. Fifty percent of the entire 
Army National Guard are men and women coming off active duty with the 
Army.
  The generals in the Active Army should look at their own figures 
regarding retention of their active duty members. The annual attrition 
of the Active Army is 36 percent, the attrition in the Army Reserve is 
34 percent, while the attrition in the Army Guard is only 18 percent.
  Perhaps what is most frustrating to me is the fact that the Active 
Army refused to consult with the Army Guard during the QDR. When asked 
about this oversight by the press, the Army spokesperson responded that 
``there is an Army Reserve colonel and a Guard colonel here in our 
offices. They get to weigh in on the issues.'' You don't need an 
extensive knowledge of military affairs to realize that a colonel 
doesn't pull much weight against a group of active duty Army generals 
protecting their turf.
  Mr. President, there should be no reason for the poor working 
relationship between the Active Army and the Army National Guard. I 
look at the strong working relationship between the Active Air Force 
and Air National Guard and wonder why can't the Army have this kind of 
relationship. I look at the great relationship the Active Duty Marine 
Corps has with its reserve units and wonder why not the Army and the 
Guard?
  Mr. President, Company A, 4th Tank Battalion, 4th Marine Division 
[REIN] which was deployed to Saudi Arabia in December 1990 is stationed 
at Fort Knox. This company of outstanding reservists was selected to 
lead the attack by the 6th Marine Regiment into the battle for Kuwait. 
This outstanding Marine Corps Reserve unit fought along side their 
active duty comrades and did a great job.
  They were able to work side by side with their active duty 
counterparts because the Marine Corps Reserves play a vital role in the 
Marine Corps military strategy and because the Marine Corps integrates 
both reserve training and education with their active counterparts.
  There are a number of plans I have been told about which could save 
more than $2.5 billion a year for the Army. They envision elimination 
of two Active Divisions. Two divisions could come out of Europe, and 
the Army could fly brigades from the United States to Europe on a 
rotational basis to serve a 3-month tour. The Army could take the 
equipment from these divisions and modernize Guard Divisions and give 
the Guard Divisions the war fighting missions of the two eliminated 
active divisions.
  Remember, Mr. President we have a Marine Corps that we can send 
anywhere in the world. We can do the same with the Army. Look at the 
101st, the 82d, the 10th Mountain, and the 3d Infantry Division. These 
are tough Active Duty Forces that the 15 enhanced National Guard 
Brigades and the 8 National Guard Divisions can support.
  Given these tight fiscal times, I hope all my colleagues remember 
that an Army Guardsman can be kept combat ready for an annual cost of 
$17,000, while an active duty soldier costs more than $80,000. The Army 
Guard, just like its Active Duty counterpart, is trained for combat.
  Up to this point, I have tolerated the Active Army's all-too-obvious 
bias. Yet the QDR represents the final straw. Some of my colleagues 
want to wait for the National Defense Panel to do their review and 
report to Congress. I was a cosponsor of the amendment that called for 
this panel. When Senator Bond and I agreed to cosponsor the amendment 
creating the Defense Panel, we did so only after we had received 
assurances that someone with a Guard background would be on the panel.
  Mr. President, the National Defense Panel has been turned into a 
joke. It is nothing more than a warmed-over version of the failed Roles 
and Mission Commission--a Commission that spent more money in 2 years 
than the Base Closure Commissions spent in 5 years.
  No one other than the outgoing Deputy Secretary of Defense has been 
interested in anything the Roles and Mission Commission reported and it 
should come as no surprise that this Commission also did not have a 
Guard representative. So what we have is a National Defense Panel 
appointed by the outgoing Deputy Secretary of Defense consisting of 
individuals from our cold war days who have no background in working 
day-to-day with the National Guard.
  Even my friend Senator McCain, an author of the amendment that 
created the National Defense Panel, expressed his disappointment with 
the lack of imagination in appointing the members of this Panel.
  I think it's high time we put a stop to this childish bickering 
between the Army and the National Guard. The Active Duty Army needs to 
get its act together and accept the National Guard as an equal partner 
so they all can be the best Army they can be.
  Mr. President, I ask unamious consent that the following articles, 
one from the National Guard magazine by Maj. Gen. Richard C. Alexander, 
be printed in the Record following my remarks, also that two articles 
from the Armed Forces Journal, May 1997, issue by former Congressman 
G.V. ``Sonny'' Montgomery and a second article by John G. Roos. I hope 
all my colleagues will read these articles.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

               [From the Armed Forces Journal, May 1997]

                     An Apples-to-Apples Comparison

             (By MG Richard C. Alexander, President, NGAUS)

       The Pentagon announced this month that a Virginia Army 
     National Guard rifle company has been notified to begin 
     training for possible deployment to Europe in support of 
     Operation Joint Guard, the Bosnia peacekeeping mission 
     formerly known as Joint Endeavor.
       Thousands of Guard members have deployed for this mission 
     over the past several months, many of whom already have 
     returned to home station. So, you may ask, what's the big 
     deal? The big deal is that should the unit actually deploy, 
     Virginia's C Company, 3d Battalion, 116th Infantry, would be 
     the first National Guard infantry unit to be mobilized by the 
     Department of Defense since the Vietnam War. It's fitting 
     that this unit, which once fell under the command of Gen. 
     Thomas ``Stonewall'' Jackson, might break the ice. I'm proud 
     of C Company, just as I am of all our units.

[[Page S5307]]

       At the same time, this newsworthy event adds poignancy to 
     an ongoing debate about the Department of the Army's failure 
     to include its National Guard combat troops in national 
     military strategy. To this day, none of the Guard's eight 
     combat divisions is in the nation's warfighting plans. The 
     question is not only why it has taken so long for the Army to 
     call up a Guard infantry unit, but also why Guard divisions 
     are completely excluded from the war fight? Haven't our 
     combat troops undergone the same training as our active-duty 
     brethren? Isn't the Guard's training and readiness ultimately 
     the responsibility of the active Army?
       In fact, under the provisions of Title 11, the Army 
     National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992, the Army 
     is supposed to provide 5,000 active-component advisors whose 
     primary responsibility is to ensure National Guard and 
     Reserve training standards are achieved. To date, the Army 
     has not met this congressional mandate.
       In this issue of National Guard Magazine, you will find 
     strong evidence, despite what some Army leaders say, that 
     Army Guard combat units can mobilize in time for war.
       Let me point out a comparison that exposes the weakness in 
     the active Army's straw man concerning the ability of Guard 
     units to successfully mobilize for war. During the Gulf War 
     mobilization, the 4th Tank Battalion, a United States Marine 
     Corps Reserve unit in the 4th Marine Division, successfully 
     transitioned from the M-60 to the M1-A1 Main Battle Tank in 
     just 45 days. The battalion trained, shot and qualified, then 
     deployed to the Gulf where it fought alongside its active 
     Marine Corps counterparts. Indeed, one of its companies 
     knocked out 35 of 36 Iraqi tanks in less than five minutes. 
     This is just one example of the success the Marine Corps has 
     had with putting all its units into the fight--by doctrine 
     and by training.
       The Army must be just as accountable for the relationship 
     it has with Army Guard combat units.
       In our Gulf War experience, the Tennessee Army Guard's 
     212th Engineer Company was the first American unit into Iraq 
     after the ground war began, breaching the way for allied 
     tanks. The 20th Special Forces Group, composed of National 
     Guard units from Alabama, Florida, Maryland, Mississippi and 
     Kentucky, completed their 90-day certification program in 
     half the time. And, of course, our National Guard artillery 
     units are legendary for their performance in the Gulf War, 
     with such standouts as Oklahoma's 1st Battalion, 158th Field 
     Artillery, (Multiple Launch Rocket System), which fired 
     record numbers of missiles on target.
       Those who pay close attention to national defense know the 
     Guard and Reserve units are dependent upon how they are 
     treated by their respective services. Army Guard members are 
     ready, willing and motivated to take on real-world missions, 
     if only given the chance. We've proven this in places like 
     the Sinai, and we're proving it countrywide everyday.
       The active Army leadership needs to be held accountable for 
     the Army Guard's overall performance. The Army must foster a 
     better working relationship among all of its officers and 
     enlisted personnel, active, Guard and Reserve. Army leaders 
     should not only be squelching myths about the Guard's combat 
     units, but taking the lead in promoting our successes on and 
     off the battlefield.
       My hat is off to the Marine Corps leadership for fully 
     integrating its reserve fighting units into its total combat 
     force. The Marine Corps reserve forces play a vital role in 
     the national military strategy. The Corps continues to 
     integrate both reserve component training and professional 
     military education with that of the active component.
       Needless to say, news about the 4th Tank Battalion's feats 
     during the Gulf War sparked a healthy competition within the 
     Corps' ranks. Last October, five years after the war, the 
     best tank crews from four Marine tank battalions--two active 
     duty and two reserve--were pitted against each other in a 
     showdown at Fort Knox's ultra-modern Yano Tank Range. Not 
     surprisingly, the 4th Tank Battalion's crew came out on top.
       To emphasize its policy of equal treatment between its 
     components, the Corps dropped the term ``reserve'' in 
     reference to its ``part-time'' soldiers. They train their 
     soldiers for combat, and they send their soldiers to combat. 
     They don't wallow in hypothetical arguments.
       It's time the active Army leadership followed suit.
                                  ____


  Ensuring the Strength of Our Future--The QDR and the Future of the 
                           Guard and Reserve

                  (By Hon. G.V. ``Sonny'' Montgomery)

       Someone recently asked me, ``Who's going to look out for 
     the National Guard and Reserve now that you've retired from 
     Congress?'' I thought about the question, in light of the 
     soon-to-be-released Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the 
     reality of today's changing defense environment, and the 
     answer was simple: The nation, led by my colleagues in 
     Congress, will safeguard the Guard and Reserve because the 
     Guard and Reserve so effectively help protect our nation.
       A public treasure, the National Guard is actually older 
     than the United States, first convening in the 13 original 
     colonies. Now, more than 220 years later, its two-fold 
     mission remains the same: to protect the state and to be a 
     part of the federal militia. From thwarting drug smugglers on 
     our southern and western borders to fighting on the front 
     lines in the Gulf War, today's guardsmen and reservists play 
     a vital role in protecting America's interests and citizens.
       A roadmap for the future of our defense requirements, the 
     QDR must assess threats to our nation and our military's 
     capability to meet them. This QDR intends to evaluate the 
     changing nature of conflict in the world today and whether it 
     is feasible for our services to fight and win two regional 
     Gulf War-sized conflicts nearly simultaneously.
       My colleagues in Congress, however, will continue to base 
     decisions to allocate funds less on the threat of regional 
     conflicts and more on meeting anticipated global 
     contingencies around the world. A keen eye will also be kept 
     on such potential flash points as China, North Korea, Iran, 
     Iraq, and possibly even Russia.
       I have heard some concerns voiced that QDR's bottom-up 
     review isn't appropriate given that many members of Congress 
     who will evaluate the report lack military backgrounds. In my 
     view, the process is still effective. Worldly in experience 
     and highly educated, men and women in Congress, regardless of 
     having served in wartime, possess the most important 
     quality--the power to listen--to the QDR commission, to 
     military experts, and most importantly, to the people they 
     serve--their constituents, the American people.
       When I was elected to Congress in 1967, more than 50 
     percent of the national budget went to the military. Now, 
     less than 20 percent of our nation's budget funds the 
     military. With the threat of further reductions of up to 
     40,000 active military personnel, the fate of our nation's 
     security--and of the Guard and Reserve--is in question.


                            more cuts ahead

       The Guard and Reserve have shared the pain of the overall 
     cutbacks, facing reductions in end strengths each year since 
     1980. With total active military personnel expected to shrink 
     by 21 percent from FY96 to FY98, selected Reserves are 
     expected to be reduced by 10 percent, and civilians (FTEs) 
     will shrink by 27 percent.
       These numbers seem staggering; we simply cannot set in 
     motion the bleeding of the nation's National Guard and 
     Reserve's fighting strength.
       A few things to consider: The Guard and Reserve are perhaps 
     one of the best values for the American taxpayer today. In 
     times of conflict, the Guard and Reserve participate equally 
     in the fighting force, side by side with their active-duty 
     counterparts. But personnel costs for Guard and Reserve are 
     only half as much as for the full-time military. And let's 
     remember that these citizen-soldiers are an important link 
     between the public and the professional military.
       Some have questioned whether the Guard and Reserve, in 
     their present forms, are still pertinent in today's changing 
     environment. But their existence has become more appropriate 
     than ever before, given the expanded domestic role they 
     fulfill. For example, just in the past few years alone, the 
     Guard and Reserve have been called to perform a wide range of 
     missions here at home, from reacting to the Los Angeles 
     riots, to supporting community rebuilding efforts in the 
     current aftermath of the Midwest flooding, to protecting our 
     borders in the drug interdiction program. These domestic 
     activities should not, however, take the place of combat 
     missions and combat support.
       The Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve, for 
     example, with the highest number of full-time technicians, 
     have done an excellent job of training and planning for 
     missions, sometimes a year or more in advance. While other 
     components have so far been prepared to move out despite 
     shorter planning cycles, they are moving to adopt the Air 
     Force's successful advance planning structure. Through proper 
     training, Guard and Reserve units are ready to deploy in a 
     reasonable time.
       As with anything, the role of the Guard and Reserve is only 
     as good as we make it. In the last 15 years, I worked with my 
     colleagues in Congress toward the billion-dollar package of 
     add-ons to fortify the Guard and Reserve. But today my 
     colleagues in Congress must be more vigilant than ever before 
     in protecting this extremely valuable national resource.


                           stem the drawdown

       I urge Congress to restore defense budget spending levels 
     to maintain our strength and capability to fight any conflict 
     or mission we encounter. We must also stem the massive 
     drawdown in the Total Force. We've gone about as far as we 
     can or should go.
       As a way of strengthening and preserving the Guard and 
     Reserve, I offer the following recommendations:
       The Department of Defense and all service branches must 
     continue to accept the role of their National Guard and 
     Reserve counterparts as part of the Total Force. This 
     includes assigning them more combat and combat support 
     missions.
       DoD must offer equitable benefits and enticements to gain 
     and retain the best men and women for our Guard and Reserve. 
     This includes expanding health care and dental benefits, 
     offering combat pay for overseas missions, and confirming 
     legislation to provide health care coverage for victims of 
     Gulf War Syndrome rather than waiting indefinitely for the 
     results of lengthy medical research.
       The active force must continue to play an important role in 
     improving training for the Guard and Reserve.

[[Page S5308]]

       Just as for active personnel, we must continue to provide 
     the same state-of-the-art, properly maintained equipment and 
     tools, and the proper personnel to sustain them. Further, we 
     must make Operations and Maintenance funds readily available 
     to keep that equipment in top fighting shape.
       Whatever the outcome of the QDR process, the Total Force--
     Active, Guard, and Reserve--will continue to provide for the 
     defense of this great nation and for the freedom of our 
     people.
                                  ____

       Enter Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs 
     Deborah Lee. At her direction, early last year the Institute 
     for Defense Analyses (IDA) was told to conduct a 
     comprehensive inquiry to determine how long it would take to 
     get the most complex type of division in the National Guard 
     force structure ready to deploy for combat. The Texas 
     National Guard's 49th Armored Division was selected as the 
     test unit, and the actual readiness conditions prevailing in 
     the 49th were used in establishing the study's baseline.
       Drawing on the expertise of officers from HQDA and the 
     Army's Training and Doctrine Command, Forces Command, and 
     other appropriate organizations, a seven-month study began 
     last July. Using relatively conservative planning assumptions 
     for such things as the availability of training areas and the 
     amount of training support that could be expected form 
     active-duty army elements, the IDA-led inquiry determined 
     that the 49th Division could achieve a validated readiness 
     status in 94 days and could get to either a port of 
     debarkation or an airhead in 132 days.
       Not surprisingly, when these conclusions made their way to 
     the Army staff early this year, they created more than a bit 
     of heartburn. As things now stand, active-duty Army officials 
     believe that the study results are probably flawed because--
     get this--the Active Army probably wouldn't be able to 
     deliver the types of training and other support that the 
     Active Army is supposed to provide to the National Guard 
     during the mobilization process. They're not sure though, 
     since there is no standard procedure for validating the 
     readiness status of a National Guard division; in fact, 
     there's no Army field manual that lays out the process by 
     which a division is supposed to mobilize and prepare for 
     deployment.
       It's ironic that while most elements of America's military 
     force structure would like nothing better than to find a 
     place to hide during QDR deliberations, the Army National 
     Guard is crying out for attention. But some National Guard 
     officials clearly feel that years of benign neglect have put 
     their divisions in a perilous position for QDR-prompted cuts. 
     With the IDA-led study results in hand, these officials vow, 
     they aren't about to disappear quietly.

   Unequal Partners--National Guard's Combat Divisions Remain Hidden 
                    Beneath Mantle of Benign Neglect

                           (By John G. Roos)

       Today's ``Total Army'' includes eight National Guard combat 
     divisions. This substantial slice of America's combat power 
     is in addition to the National Guard's 15 ``Enhanced 
     Readiness Brigades'' that presumably would be used to augment 
     active-duty forces in the event of an all-out national 
     emergency. But those eight divisions haven't attracted much 
     attention during the nearly completed Quadrennial Defense 
     Review (QDR), since they're not even included in America's 
     war plans.
       Ever since the contentious issue of Georgia's 48th Infantry 
     (Mechanized) Brigade's purported inability to achieve ready-
     for-deployment status during Desert Storm, Army planners have 
     shed away from relying on National Guard combat units to 
     augment active-duty Army forces during the early stages of a 
     conflict. In spite of the special attention the Army 
     continues to devote to its Enhanced Brigades in order to keep 
     them at relatively acceptable levels of combat readiness, 
     they still remain far from the tip of the spear in the 
     Service's deployment plans. But at least those Enhanced 
     Brigades do come into play at some point during Army 
     warfighting planning sessions. The same can't be said of the 
     eight National Guard divisions.
       In the wake of the ``come-as-you-are'' planning assumptions 
     that flowed from the Bottom-Up Review's short-notice, two-MRC 
     strategy, those eight divisions were deemed so unlikely to be 
     ready to deploy in time to make a difference in the conflicts 
     the Army would most likely face that they were quietly 
     flushed from Army war plans. The plug was pulled more than 
     five years ago, when former Army Chief of Staff General 
     Gordon Sullivan told the House Armed Services Committee that 
     it would take 365 days to prepare a National Guard division 
     for deployment to a combat arena. After the howls of protests 
     from National Guard leaders subsided, the Army revised its 
     estimate downward to 270 days. But that three month chop by 
     the Army headquarters staff did little to assuage the Guard's 
     leadership: Even a nine-month mobilization, training, and 
     deployment cycle, they argued, was blatantly pessimistic and 
     would continue to exclude National Guard divisions from the 
     Army's warfighting planning process.
  Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I join with my friend and cochair of the 
National Guard Caucus when I call the attention of my colleagues to an 
editorial found in today's issue of the Washington Times by Mr. Philip 
Gold, entitled ``The Army vs. The National Guard'' which I ask 
unanimous consent to be printed in the Record.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. BOND. This editorial outlines succinctly the issues facing the 
National Guard in the debate surrounding its force structure and its 
very future. I have said before and reiterate now in the strongest of 
terms, that rather than bill payer, the Guard's role should be vibrant, 
viable, and adequately funded by the Department of Defense.
  National Guard units from every State are, today, involved in 
operations domestically in their State roles, and globally in their 
national role. Recently, units from my home State have been involved in 
missions in accordance with United States directives in Bosnia, 
Hungary, the Persian Gulf, and continue to serve our interests there. 
Units from States which have experienced natural disasters have 
traditionally been the ``Cavalry to the rescue.'' Even the U.S. Air 
Force was a recipient of the National Guard's professional response 
when and A-10 aircraft which had crashed in a remote area was initially 
discovered by a National Guard Team involved in the search.
  With the fiscal constraints being imposed on our military force while 
simultaneously increasing their roles and missions, we need the Guard 
now, more than ever. We need it to be trained, we need it to be well 
equipped, and we need it funded.
  Mr. President I call upon all Senators to join with me and Senator 
Ford along with the other members of the National Guard Caucus in a 
pledge to insure the robust nature of the National Guard, a service 
from which we ask so much.


                               exhibit 1

               [From the Washington Times, June 5, 1997]

                    The Army vs. the National Guard

                            (By Philip Gold)

       The fracas was inevitable. Several weeks ago, the National 
     Guard's senior leadership concluded that they hadn't been 
     given a fair chance to make their case before the Quadrennial 
     Defense Review (QDR). They also concluded that the Army was 
     systematically lying to them about the extent of the Guard 
     reductions they wanted. So they requested a meeting with 
     Defense Secretary William Cohen and were told to ``go through 
     their chain of command.''
       So they did . . . through their other chain of command. 
     They went to the governors, who started writing the 
     president, cc: the Pentagon. That got Mr. Cohen's attention 
     and Mr. Cohen's attention--to adapt a venerable adage--
     started flowing downhill. As of this writing, the secretary 
     was ordered an Army/National Guard ``off-site'' at the 
     Pentagon (great place for an ``off-site'') to work it out the 
     first week in June. Also as of this writing, the Guard has 
     received seven contradictory letters from Mr. Cohen, army 
     secretary Togo West and senior army generals on structuring 
     the meeting. About the only thing that hasn't been suggested 
     is a United Nationals peacekeeping force in the room.
       Maybe not such a bad idea, given the acrimony on both 
     sides.
       Whatever the ``off-site'' producers, it won't last long. 
     The Army and the National Guard have been at it for 
     centuries. The Guard has survived through a combination of 
     domestic political savvy and foreign threats that seemed to 
     require a large reserve. But does this venerable (some would 
     say archaic) institution have any relevance to today's world 
     and tomorrow's missions?
       The answer is that the Guard has a greater relevance today 
     than during the Cold War--exactly the kind of relevance the 
     Founding Fathers envisioned when they elected to place the 
     preponderance of the nation's military strength in the state 
     militias.
       Three facts vindicate the Guard. First, the U.S. simply 
     cannot afford to maintain a large standing army. The force 
     that did Desert Storm is long-gone. Nor can the United States 
     afford to maintain large portions of the present force at 
     high readiness. Reserves are far cheaper, especially in a 
     world where mass armies are vanishing, and where those that 
     remain grow ever more obsolete and vulnerable to other forms 
     of American power.
       Second, the Guard and service reserves provide a de facto 
     ``people's veto'' on major foreign involvements. If a 
     president lacks the popular support to mobilize, he lacks the 
     popular support to go to war--and has better not do it.
       Third, the Guard is a classic ``dual use'' system, 
     available for foreign and domestic tasks. The Guard's 
     experience in domestic emergencies offers a capability of 
     major military significance. For example, the Guard, not the 
     standing Army, should be given the nuclear/biological/
     chemical weapons disaster relief mission. The standing Army 
     doesn't need this capability in peacetime, so it should be in 
     the part time forces.

[[Page S5309]]

     Given the likelihood of future terrorist actions on American 
     soil, the Guard, with thousands of sites around the country 
     and local expertise, offers a far superior means of deploying 
     this capability for domestic emergencies.
       Further--and this is not easy to say--the standing Army, is 
     an institution in profound disarray, trashed by scandal and, 
     in many ways, looking for work that will generate hard cash 
     and renewed respect. Almost inevitably, that points toward 
     more domestic missions, especially counter-terrorism in its 
     various aspects. One need not conjure up lurid thoughts of 
     military coups or images of an alienated, embittered officer 
     corps to understand that this is a bad idea. The less the 
     standing military is involved in domestic affairs, the 
     better. Not because they're evil people, but because their 
     professional methods and loyalties may do more harm than 
     good. The Founders knew it; the Army's domestic intelligence 
     activities during Vietnam proved it. To the extent that 
     military force may have to be used in this country in the 
     decades ahead, it ought to be the Guard, with its complex set 
     of responsibilities to and relationships with country, state, 
     and community.
       But the political and cultural justifications for the Guard 
     don't address one practical question: Can they be ready to do 
     the job? Obviously, the answer depends on what the job is and 
     what you mean by ready. Still, one thing is clear. There is 
     no inherent reason the Guard cannot perform adequately across 
     the range of its missions. The Marine Corps and the Air Force 
     have demonstrated what can be accomplished when reserves are 
     treated as assets, not rivals. New tools and methods, from 
     tank and cockpit simulators to computerized command post 
     exercises, offer training possibilities unimaginable even 10 
     years ago. High-priority units can be filled with people 
     willing to accept high levels of contractual obligation, 
     including extended active duty and early call-up. In short, 
     the Guard's proficiency is limited only by resources and 
     creativity--and by a standing Army that, for reasons of its 
     own, prefers not to acknowledge it.
       Again, that standing Army isn't evil. It's simply fighting 
     for its institutional life and soul. The current off-site, 
     and the next one, and the one after that, will no doubt 
     reflect the desperation of the struggle. But the Army should 
     not be permitted to sacrifice the Guard to protect its own 
     turf bowls. The current military situation, and the wisdom of 
     centuries, should preclude it.

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