[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 76 (Thursday, June 5, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5305-S5309]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
NATIONAL GUARD
Mr. FORD. Mr. President, over the last few days, I have been reading
in newspapers and hearing on radio and television about the Quadrennial
Defense Review [QDR] and the so called National Defense Panel [NDP].
The QDR is supposed to be a comprehensive assessment of current
military strategy and force structure, as well as outlining a vision
for the future. However, experts have called this QDR ``A Cold War
Relic'' and when it comes to the Army, I agree with them.
I truly believe the citizens of Kentucky and the American people
deserve the best national defense strategy the Nation can afford. Yet
the Active Army wants to cling to their 10 divisions, while
simultaneously calling for a new Base Closure Commission. This is
especially ironic when you consider that during the 1995 Base Closure
Commission, the Active Duty Army leadership insisted the Army could not
afford to close any more bases. This was just 2 years ago. The Base
Closure Commission said not to have another Commission until the year
2001.
Mr. President, I would urge my colleagues to read page 3-2 of the
1995 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission's report to the
President, which says `` * * * The Defense Department will be
implementing the closures and realignments of the 1995 and prior
Commissions through the end of this decade. The requirement in the
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act that all Closures be completed
within 6 years means that the closures
[[Page S5306]]
from the 1995 round will not be completed until 2001. For that reason,
the Commission recommends that the Congress authorize another Base
Closure Commission for the year 2001 similar to the 1991, 1993, and
1995 Commissions.'' I understand this is still the view of our former
colleague Alan J. Dixon, the Chairman of the 1995 Base Closure and
Realignment Commission.
The Active Army argues that they are going to cut the Active Force by
15,000 men and women. But my colleagues shouldn't be fooled. When you
look closely, you will see that the 15,000 troops the Army wants to cut
are nothing more than ghosts. What you have are 15,000 positions in the
Active Army that have been left empty the last few years.
So the question remains: where does the Army plan to put these ten
divisions--with no real reductions--if they close bases? How do they
meet their budget target, while simultaneously protecting their general
officer slots and keeping their 10 active divisions? Their answer? Cut
the Army National Guard by approximately 38,000 people. That is a 10
percent reduction of the entire Army National Guard Force Structure.
This is the very same Army National Guard, Mr. President, that
currently provides more than 55 percent of the ground combat forces, 45
percent of the combat support forces and 25 percent of the Army's
combat support units, while only using 2 percent of the Department of
Defense budget.
Why, my colleagues might ask, would the Active Duty Army leadership
do such a thing? Well lets look. First, the Army leadership argues that
the Guard divisions have no war fighting missions. This is true. But
the Guard divisions have no war fighting missions because the Active
Duty Army leadership has failed to give them a war fighting mission.
And the reason they don't give them a war fighting mission is because
then they would have to explain why they still wanted to keep 10 active
duty divisions.
Also the Active Army does not consider members of the Army National
Guard as soldiers. Instead they treat the men and women of the Army
National Guard with contempt. These Active Duty types seem to forget
that the men and women of the Army National Guard have undergone the
same training as the active duty forces. Fifty percent of the entire
Army National Guard are men and women coming off active duty with the
Army.
The generals in the Active Army should look at their own figures
regarding retention of their active duty members. The annual attrition
of the Active Army is 36 percent, the attrition in the Army Reserve is
34 percent, while the attrition in the Army Guard is only 18 percent.
Perhaps what is most frustrating to me is the fact that the Active
Army refused to consult with the Army Guard during the QDR. When asked
about this oversight by the press, the Army spokesperson responded that
``there is an Army Reserve colonel and a Guard colonel here in our
offices. They get to weigh in on the issues.'' You don't need an
extensive knowledge of military affairs to realize that a colonel
doesn't pull much weight against a group of active duty Army generals
protecting their turf.
Mr. President, there should be no reason for the poor working
relationship between the Active Army and the Army National Guard. I
look at the strong working relationship between the Active Air Force
and Air National Guard and wonder why can't the Army have this kind of
relationship. I look at the great relationship the Active Duty Marine
Corps has with its reserve units and wonder why not the Army and the
Guard?
Mr. President, Company A, 4th Tank Battalion, 4th Marine Division
[REIN] which was deployed to Saudi Arabia in December 1990 is stationed
at Fort Knox. This company of outstanding reservists was selected to
lead the attack by the 6th Marine Regiment into the battle for Kuwait.
This outstanding Marine Corps Reserve unit fought along side their
active duty comrades and did a great job.
They were able to work side by side with their active duty
counterparts because the Marine Corps Reserves play a vital role in the
Marine Corps military strategy and because the Marine Corps integrates
both reserve training and education with their active counterparts.
There are a number of plans I have been told about which could save
more than $2.5 billion a year for the Army. They envision elimination
of two Active Divisions. Two divisions could come out of Europe, and
the Army could fly brigades from the United States to Europe on a
rotational basis to serve a 3-month tour. The Army could take the
equipment from these divisions and modernize Guard Divisions and give
the Guard Divisions the war fighting missions of the two eliminated
active divisions.
Remember, Mr. President we have a Marine Corps that we can send
anywhere in the world. We can do the same with the Army. Look at the
101st, the 82d, the 10th Mountain, and the 3d Infantry Division. These
are tough Active Duty Forces that the 15 enhanced National Guard
Brigades and the 8 National Guard Divisions can support.
Given these tight fiscal times, I hope all my colleagues remember
that an Army Guardsman can be kept combat ready for an annual cost of
$17,000, while an active duty soldier costs more than $80,000. The Army
Guard, just like its Active Duty counterpart, is trained for combat.
Up to this point, I have tolerated the Active Army's all-too-obvious
bias. Yet the QDR represents the final straw. Some of my colleagues
want to wait for the National Defense Panel to do their review and
report to Congress. I was a cosponsor of the amendment that called for
this panel. When Senator Bond and I agreed to cosponsor the amendment
creating the Defense Panel, we did so only after we had received
assurances that someone with a Guard background would be on the panel.
Mr. President, the National Defense Panel has been turned into a
joke. It is nothing more than a warmed-over version of the failed Roles
and Mission Commission--a Commission that spent more money in 2 years
than the Base Closure Commissions spent in 5 years.
No one other than the outgoing Deputy Secretary of Defense has been
interested in anything the Roles and Mission Commission reported and it
should come as no surprise that this Commission also did not have a
Guard representative. So what we have is a National Defense Panel
appointed by the outgoing Deputy Secretary of Defense consisting of
individuals from our cold war days who have no background in working
day-to-day with the National Guard.
Even my friend Senator McCain, an author of the amendment that
created the National Defense Panel, expressed his disappointment with
the lack of imagination in appointing the members of this Panel.
I think it's high time we put a stop to this childish bickering
between the Army and the National Guard. The Active Duty Army needs to
get its act together and accept the National Guard as an equal partner
so they all can be the best Army they can be.
Mr. President, I ask unamious consent that the following articles,
one from the National Guard magazine by Maj. Gen. Richard C. Alexander,
be printed in the Record following my remarks, also that two articles
from the Armed Forces Journal, May 1997, issue by former Congressman
G.V. ``Sonny'' Montgomery and a second article by John G. Roos. I hope
all my colleagues will read these articles.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the Armed Forces Journal, May 1997]
An Apples-to-Apples Comparison
(By MG Richard C. Alexander, President, NGAUS)
The Pentagon announced this month that a Virginia Army
National Guard rifle company has been notified to begin
training for possible deployment to Europe in support of
Operation Joint Guard, the Bosnia peacekeeping mission
formerly known as Joint Endeavor.
Thousands of Guard members have deployed for this mission
over the past several months, many of whom already have
returned to home station. So, you may ask, what's the big
deal? The big deal is that should the unit actually deploy,
Virginia's C Company, 3d Battalion, 116th Infantry, would be
the first National Guard infantry unit to be mobilized by the
Department of Defense since the Vietnam War. It's fitting
that this unit, which once fell under the command of Gen.
Thomas ``Stonewall'' Jackson, might break the ice. I'm proud
of C Company, just as I am of all our units.
[[Page S5307]]
At the same time, this newsworthy event adds poignancy to
an ongoing debate about the Department of the Army's failure
to include its National Guard combat troops in national
military strategy. To this day, none of the Guard's eight
combat divisions is in the nation's warfighting plans. The
question is not only why it has taken so long for the Army to
call up a Guard infantry unit, but also why Guard divisions
are completely excluded from the war fight? Haven't our
combat troops undergone the same training as our active-duty
brethren? Isn't the Guard's training and readiness ultimately
the responsibility of the active Army?
In fact, under the provisions of Title 11, the Army
National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992, the Army
is supposed to provide 5,000 active-component advisors whose
primary responsibility is to ensure National Guard and
Reserve training standards are achieved. To date, the Army
has not met this congressional mandate.
In this issue of National Guard Magazine, you will find
strong evidence, despite what some Army leaders say, that
Army Guard combat units can mobilize in time for war.
Let me point out a comparison that exposes the weakness in
the active Army's straw man concerning the ability of Guard
units to successfully mobilize for war. During the Gulf War
mobilization, the 4th Tank Battalion, a United States Marine
Corps Reserve unit in the 4th Marine Division, successfully
transitioned from the M-60 to the M1-A1 Main Battle Tank in
just 45 days. The battalion trained, shot and qualified, then
deployed to the Gulf where it fought alongside its active
Marine Corps counterparts. Indeed, one of its companies
knocked out 35 of 36 Iraqi tanks in less than five minutes.
This is just one example of the success the Marine Corps has
had with putting all its units into the fight--by doctrine
and by training.
The Army must be just as accountable for the relationship
it has with Army Guard combat units.
In our Gulf War experience, the Tennessee Army Guard's
212th Engineer Company was the first American unit into Iraq
after the ground war began, breaching the way for allied
tanks. The 20th Special Forces Group, composed of National
Guard units from Alabama, Florida, Maryland, Mississippi and
Kentucky, completed their 90-day certification program in
half the time. And, of course, our National Guard artillery
units are legendary for their performance in the Gulf War,
with such standouts as Oklahoma's 1st Battalion, 158th Field
Artillery, (Multiple Launch Rocket System), which fired
record numbers of missiles on target.
Those who pay close attention to national defense know the
Guard and Reserve units are dependent upon how they are
treated by their respective services. Army Guard members are
ready, willing and motivated to take on real-world missions,
if only given the chance. We've proven this in places like
the Sinai, and we're proving it countrywide everyday.
The active Army leadership needs to be held accountable for
the Army Guard's overall performance. The Army must foster a
better working relationship among all of its officers and
enlisted personnel, active, Guard and Reserve. Army leaders
should not only be squelching myths about the Guard's combat
units, but taking the lead in promoting our successes on and
off the battlefield.
My hat is off to the Marine Corps leadership for fully
integrating its reserve fighting units into its total combat
force. The Marine Corps reserve forces play a vital role in
the national military strategy. The Corps continues to
integrate both reserve component training and professional
military education with that of the active component.
Needless to say, news about the 4th Tank Battalion's feats
during the Gulf War sparked a healthy competition within the
Corps' ranks. Last October, five years after the war, the
best tank crews from four Marine tank battalions--two active
duty and two reserve--were pitted against each other in a
showdown at Fort Knox's ultra-modern Yano Tank Range. Not
surprisingly, the 4th Tank Battalion's crew came out on top.
To emphasize its policy of equal treatment between its
components, the Corps dropped the term ``reserve'' in
reference to its ``part-time'' soldiers. They train their
soldiers for combat, and they send their soldiers to combat.
They don't wallow in hypothetical arguments.
It's time the active Army leadership followed suit.
____
Ensuring the Strength of Our Future--The QDR and the Future of the
Guard and Reserve
(By Hon. G.V. ``Sonny'' Montgomery)
Someone recently asked me, ``Who's going to look out for
the National Guard and Reserve now that you've retired from
Congress?'' I thought about the question, in light of the
soon-to-be-released Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the
reality of today's changing defense environment, and the
answer was simple: The nation, led by my colleagues in
Congress, will safeguard the Guard and Reserve because the
Guard and Reserve so effectively help protect our nation.
A public treasure, the National Guard is actually older
than the United States, first convening in the 13 original
colonies. Now, more than 220 years later, its two-fold
mission remains the same: to protect the state and to be a
part of the federal militia. From thwarting drug smugglers on
our southern and western borders to fighting on the front
lines in the Gulf War, today's guardsmen and reservists play
a vital role in protecting America's interests and citizens.
A roadmap for the future of our defense requirements, the
QDR must assess threats to our nation and our military's
capability to meet them. This QDR intends to evaluate the
changing nature of conflict in the world today and whether it
is feasible for our services to fight and win two regional
Gulf War-sized conflicts nearly simultaneously.
My colleagues in Congress, however, will continue to base
decisions to allocate funds less on the threat of regional
conflicts and more on meeting anticipated global
contingencies around the world. A keen eye will also be kept
on such potential flash points as China, North Korea, Iran,
Iraq, and possibly even Russia.
I have heard some concerns voiced that QDR's bottom-up
review isn't appropriate given that many members of Congress
who will evaluate the report lack military backgrounds. In my
view, the process is still effective. Worldly in experience
and highly educated, men and women in Congress, regardless of
having served in wartime, possess the most important
quality--the power to listen--to the QDR commission, to
military experts, and most importantly, to the people they
serve--their constituents, the American people.
When I was elected to Congress in 1967, more than 50
percent of the national budget went to the military. Now,
less than 20 percent of our nation's budget funds the
military. With the threat of further reductions of up to
40,000 active military personnel, the fate of our nation's
security--and of the Guard and Reserve--is in question.
more cuts ahead
The Guard and Reserve have shared the pain of the overall
cutbacks, facing reductions in end strengths each year since
1980. With total active military personnel expected to shrink
by 21 percent from FY96 to FY98, selected Reserves are
expected to be reduced by 10 percent, and civilians (FTEs)
will shrink by 27 percent.
These numbers seem staggering; we simply cannot set in
motion the bleeding of the nation's National Guard and
Reserve's fighting strength.
A few things to consider: The Guard and Reserve are perhaps
one of the best values for the American taxpayer today. In
times of conflict, the Guard and Reserve participate equally
in the fighting force, side by side with their active-duty
counterparts. But personnel costs for Guard and Reserve are
only half as much as for the full-time military. And let's
remember that these citizen-soldiers are an important link
between the public and the professional military.
Some have questioned whether the Guard and Reserve, in
their present forms, are still pertinent in today's changing
environment. But their existence has become more appropriate
than ever before, given the expanded domestic role they
fulfill. For example, just in the past few years alone, the
Guard and Reserve have been called to perform a wide range of
missions here at home, from reacting to the Los Angeles
riots, to supporting community rebuilding efforts in the
current aftermath of the Midwest flooding, to protecting our
borders in the drug interdiction program. These domestic
activities should not, however, take the place of combat
missions and combat support.
The Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve, for
example, with the highest number of full-time technicians,
have done an excellent job of training and planning for
missions, sometimes a year or more in advance. While other
components have so far been prepared to move out despite
shorter planning cycles, they are moving to adopt the Air
Force's successful advance planning structure. Through proper
training, Guard and Reserve units are ready to deploy in a
reasonable time.
As with anything, the role of the Guard and Reserve is only
as good as we make it. In the last 15 years, I worked with my
colleagues in Congress toward the billion-dollar package of
add-ons to fortify the Guard and Reserve. But today my
colleagues in Congress must be more vigilant than ever before
in protecting this extremely valuable national resource.
stem the drawdown
I urge Congress to restore defense budget spending levels
to maintain our strength and capability to fight any conflict
or mission we encounter. We must also stem the massive
drawdown in the Total Force. We've gone about as far as we
can or should go.
As a way of strengthening and preserving the Guard and
Reserve, I offer the following recommendations:
The Department of Defense and all service branches must
continue to accept the role of their National Guard and
Reserve counterparts as part of the Total Force. This
includes assigning them more combat and combat support
missions.
DoD must offer equitable benefits and enticements to gain
and retain the best men and women for our Guard and Reserve.
This includes expanding health care and dental benefits,
offering combat pay for overseas missions, and confirming
legislation to provide health care coverage for victims of
Gulf War Syndrome rather than waiting indefinitely for the
results of lengthy medical research.
The active force must continue to play an important role in
improving training for the Guard and Reserve.
[[Page S5308]]
Just as for active personnel, we must continue to provide
the same state-of-the-art, properly maintained equipment and
tools, and the proper personnel to sustain them. Further, we
must make Operations and Maintenance funds readily available
to keep that equipment in top fighting shape.
Whatever the outcome of the QDR process, the Total Force--
Active, Guard, and Reserve--will continue to provide for the
defense of this great nation and for the freedom of our
people.
____
Enter Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs
Deborah Lee. At her direction, early last year the Institute
for Defense Analyses (IDA) was told to conduct a
comprehensive inquiry to determine how long it would take to
get the most complex type of division in the National Guard
force structure ready to deploy for combat. The Texas
National Guard's 49th Armored Division was selected as the
test unit, and the actual readiness conditions prevailing in
the 49th were used in establishing the study's baseline.
Drawing on the expertise of officers from HQDA and the
Army's Training and Doctrine Command, Forces Command, and
other appropriate organizations, a seven-month study began
last July. Using relatively conservative planning assumptions
for such things as the availability of training areas and the
amount of training support that could be expected form
active-duty army elements, the IDA-led inquiry determined
that the 49th Division could achieve a validated readiness
status in 94 days and could get to either a port of
debarkation or an airhead in 132 days.
Not surprisingly, when these conclusions made their way to
the Army staff early this year, they created more than a bit
of heartburn. As things now stand, active-duty Army officials
believe that the study results are probably flawed because--
get this--the Active Army probably wouldn't be able to
deliver the types of training and other support that the
Active Army is supposed to provide to the National Guard
during the mobilization process. They're not sure though,
since there is no standard procedure for validating the
readiness status of a National Guard division; in fact,
there's no Army field manual that lays out the process by
which a division is supposed to mobilize and prepare for
deployment.
It's ironic that while most elements of America's military
force structure would like nothing better than to find a
place to hide during QDR deliberations, the Army National
Guard is crying out for attention. But some National Guard
officials clearly feel that years of benign neglect have put
their divisions in a perilous position for QDR-prompted cuts.
With the IDA-led study results in hand, these officials vow,
they aren't about to disappear quietly.
Unequal Partners--National Guard's Combat Divisions Remain Hidden
Beneath Mantle of Benign Neglect
(By John G. Roos)
Today's ``Total Army'' includes eight National Guard combat
divisions. This substantial slice of America's combat power
is in addition to the National Guard's 15 ``Enhanced
Readiness Brigades'' that presumably would be used to augment
active-duty forces in the event of an all-out national
emergency. But those eight divisions haven't attracted much
attention during the nearly completed Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR), since they're not even included in America's
war plans.
Ever since the contentious issue of Georgia's 48th Infantry
(Mechanized) Brigade's purported inability to achieve ready-
for-deployment status during Desert Storm, Army planners have
shed away from relying on National Guard combat units to
augment active-duty Army forces during the early stages of a
conflict. In spite of the special attention the Army
continues to devote to its Enhanced Brigades in order to keep
them at relatively acceptable levels of combat readiness,
they still remain far from the tip of the spear in the
Service's deployment plans. But at least those Enhanced
Brigades do come into play at some point during Army
warfighting planning sessions. The same can't be said of the
eight National Guard divisions.
In the wake of the ``come-as-you-are'' planning assumptions
that flowed from the Bottom-Up Review's short-notice, two-MRC
strategy, those eight divisions were deemed so unlikely to be
ready to deploy in time to make a difference in the conflicts
the Army would most likely face that they were quietly
flushed from Army war plans. The plug was pulled more than
five years ago, when former Army Chief of Staff General
Gordon Sullivan told the House Armed Services Committee that
it would take 365 days to prepare a National Guard division
for deployment to a combat arena. After the howls of protests
from National Guard leaders subsided, the Army revised its
estimate downward to 270 days. But that three month chop by
the Army headquarters staff did little to assuage the Guard's
leadership: Even a nine-month mobilization, training, and
deployment cycle, they argued, was blatantly pessimistic and
would continue to exclude National Guard divisions from the
Army's warfighting planning process.
Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I join with my friend and cochair of the
National Guard Caucus when I call the attention of my colleagues to an
editorial found in today's issue of the Washington Times by Mr. Philip
Gold, entitled ``The Army vs. The National Guard'' which I ask
unanimous consent to be printed in the Record.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. BOND. This editorial outlines succinctly the issues facing the
National Guard in the debate surrounding its force structure and its
very future. I have said before and reiterate now in the strongest of
terms, that rather than bill payer, the Guard's role should be vibrant,
viable, and adequately funded by the Department of Defense.
National Guard units from every State are, today, involved in
operations domestically in their State roles, and globally in their
national role. Recently, units from my home State have been involved in
missions in accordance with United States directives in Bosnia,
Hungary, the Persian Gulf, and continue to serve our interests there.
Units from States which have experienced natural disasters have
traditionally been the ``Cavalry to the rescue.'' Even the U.S. Air
Force was a recipient of the National Guard's professional response
when and A-10 aircraft which had crashed in a remote area was initially
discovered by a National Guard Team involved in the search.
With the fiscal constraints being imposed on our military force while
simultaneously increasing their roles and missions, we need the Guard
now, more than ever. We need it to be trained, we need it to be well
equipped, and we need it funded.
Mr. President I call upon all Senators to join with me and Senator
Ford along with the other members of the National Guard Caucus in a
pledge to insure the robust nature of the National Guard, a service
from which we ask so much.
exhibit 1
[From the Washington Times, June 5, 1997]
The Army vs. the National Guard
(By Philip Gold)
The fracas was inevitable. Several weeks ago, the National
Guard's senior leadership concluded that they hadn't been
given a fair chance to make their case before the Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR). They also concluded that the Army was
systematically lying to them about the extent of the Guard
reductions they wanted. So they requested a meeting with
Defense Secretary William Cohen and were told to ``go through
their chain of command.''
So they did . . . through their other chain of command.
They went to the governors, who started writing the
president, cc: the Pentagon. That got Mr. Cohen's attention
and Mr. Cohen's attention--to adapt a venerable adage--
started flowing downhill. As of this writing, the secretary
was ordered an Army/National Guard ``off-site'' at the
Pentagon (great place for an ``off-site'') to work it out the
first week in June. Also as of this writing, the Guard has
received seven contradictory letters from Mr. Cohen, army
secretary Togo West and senior army generals on structuring
the meeting. About the only thing that hasn't been suggested
is a United Nationals peacekeeping force in the room.
Maybe not such a bad idea, given the acrimony on both
sides.
Whatever the ``off-site'' producers, it won't last long.
The Army and the National Guard have been at it for
centuries. The Guard has survived through a combination of
domestic political savvy and foreign threats that seemed to
require a large reserve. But does this venerable (some would
say archaic) institution have any relevance to today's world
and tomorrow's missions?
The answer is that the Guard has a greater relevance today
than during the Cold War--exactly the kind of relevance the
Founding Fathers envisioned when they elected to place the
preponderance of the nation's military strength in the state
militias.
Three facts vindicate the Guard. First, the U.S. simply
cannot afford to maintain a large standing army. The force
that did Desert Storm is long-gone. Nor can the United States
afford to maintain large portions of the present force at
high readiness. Reserves are far cheaper, especially in a
world where mass armies are vanishing, and where those that
remain grow ever more obsolete and vulnerable to other forms
of American power.
Second, the Guard and service reserves provide a de facto
``people's veto'' on major foreign involvements. If a
president lacks the popular support to mobilize, he lacks the
popular support to go to war--and has better not do it.
Third, the Guard is a classic ``dual use'' system,
available for foreign and domestic tasks. The Guard's
experience in domestic emergencies offers a capability of
major military significance. For example, the Guard, not the
standing Army, should be given the nuclear/biological/
chemical weapons disaster relief mission. The standing Army
doesn't need this capability in peacetime, so it should be in
the part time forces.
[[Page S5309]]
Given the likelihood of future terrorist actions on American
soil, the Guard, with thousands of sites around the country
and local expertise, offers a far superior means of deploying
this capability for domestic emergencies.
Further--and this is not easy to say--the standing Army, is
an institution in profound disarray, trashed by scandal and,
in many ways, looking for work that will generate hard cash
and renewed respect. Almost inevitably, that points toward
more domestic missions, especially counter-terrorism in its
various aspects. One need not conjure up lurid thoughts of
military coups or images of an alienated, embittered officer
corps to understand that this is a bad idea. The less the
standing military is involved in domestic affairs, the
better. Not because they're evil people, but because their
professional methods and loyalties may do more harm than
good. The Founders knew it; the Army's domestic intelligence
activities during Vietnam proved it. To the extent that
military force may have to be used in this country in the
decades ahead, it ought to be the Guard, with its complex set
of responsibilities to and relationships with country, state,
and community.
But the political and cultural justifications for the Guard
don't address one practical question: Can they be ready to do
the job? Obviously, the answer depends on what the job is and
what you mean by ready. Still, one thing is clear. There is
no inherent reason the Guard cannot perform adequately across
the range of its missions. The Marine Corps and the Air Force
have demonstrated what can be accomplished when reserves are
treated as assets, not rivals. New tools and methods, from
tank and cockpit simulators to computerized command post
exercises, offer training possibilities unimaginable even 10
years ago. High-priority units can be filled with people
willing to accept high levels of contractual obligation,
including extended active duty and early call-up. In short,
the Guard's proficiency is limited only by resources and
creativity--and by a standing Army that, for reasons of its
own, prefers not to acknowledge it.
Again, that standing Army isn't evil. It's simply fighting
for its institutional life and soul. The current off-site,
and the next one, and the one after that, will no doubt
reflect the desperation of the struggle. But the Army should
not be permitted to sacrifice the Guard to protect its own
turf bowls. The current military situation, and the wisdom of
centuries, should preclude it.
____________________