[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 74 (Tuesday, June 3, 1997)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E1081-E1082]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




   USAID ADMINISTRATOR J. BRIAN ATWOOD ADDRESSES POST-CONFLICT PEACE 
                              TRANSITIONS

                                 ______
                                 

                          HON. LEE H. HAMILTON

                               of indiana

                    in the house of representatives

                         Tuesday, June 3, 1997

  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I would like to bring to my colleagues' 
attention an excellent article printed on May 27 in the Christian 
Science Monitor by U.S. Agency for International Development, 
Administrator J. Brian Atwood.
  In the article, Atwood outlines the difficulty in achieving 
successful post-conflict transitions from crisis to peace in countries 
including Guatemala, Angola, and Bosnia. He discusses the need for 
continued support from Congress for organizations such as the USAID's 
Office of Transition Initiatives [OTS], which is working to help these 
countries achieve and maintain peace in the wake of political 
transformation.
  The test of his article follows:

                  [From the Christian Science Monitor]

    Helping Countries Make The Transition From Crisis Is One of Our 
    Greatest Foreign Policy Challenges After The Conflict has Ended

                          (By J. Brian Atwood)

       No trend has been more closely scrutinized in the wake of 
     the cold war than the proliferation of crises.
       From Zaire to Bosnia to Rwanda, the international community 
     is reeling from a series of vicious civil wars, refugee 
     emergencies, and human catastrophes. The international system 
     structured around the cold-war diplomatic notions of 
     containment and detente is scrambling to adjust to the 
     demands of peacekeeping and humanitarian relief.
       One of the greatest challenges of this new world disorder 
     is how best to assist nations emerging from conflict. The 
     successful transition from crisis--the process of moving an 
     entire society from conflict to enduring peace--is an 
     extraordinarily difficult one. There are countless 
     instances--Liberia, Afghanistan, Angola--where promising 
     moves toward peace have quickly dissolved into shattered 
     cease-fires and renewed conflict.
       Nations emerging from conflicts confront daunting 
     obstacles. Their governments are usually weak or nonexistent, 
     and they often face corruption, rising public expectations, 
     and immature political leadership. They typically operate 
     with barely functioning economies, scant resources, scores of 
     former combatants lacking peacetime job skills, a 
     proliferation of land mines, and lingering tensions that can 
     quickly reignite into conflict.


                         Government's weakness

       Four years ago, when I came to the US Agency for 
     International Development (USAID)--the agency responsible for 
     delivering United States humanitarian and development 
     assistance abroad--the US government was poorly equipped to 
     help nations during the tenuous interlude between war and 
     peace. For foreign policymakers, this weakness was an 
     Achilles' heel in a world where failed states and sweeping 
     change were everyday realities.
       Donor conferences that commit millions of dollars but fail 
     to quickly address on-the-ground problems do little to create 
     an expectation of peace. In post-conflict situations, 
     opportunity is fleeting, and if people don't see instant 
     results, political violence and repression reemerge. I 
     remember former Secretary of State Larry Eagleburger telling 
     me, ``If USAID can't deliver that, we need something that 
     can.''
       The Clinton administration decided to try a new mechanism 
     to bring fast, direct, and overt assistance to priority 
     countries emerging from conflict.
       With the support of Congress, USAID's Office of Transition 
     Initiatives (OTI) was launched in early 1994 to help 
     countries move beyond conflict by addressing fundamental 
     needs of emergency rehabilitation and democratic development. 
     Since the office worked in crisis situations, it was given 
     special legal authorities attached to international disaster 
     assistance funding.


                         Early success stories

       The early results are promising: OTI has shown it is a 
     lean, flexible operation capable of targeting the key 
     bottlenecks that prevent post-crisis societies from moving 
     forward.
       In Guatemala, in support of the December 1996 peace 
     accords, OTI is helping implement the demobilization plan for 
     the Guatemalan rebel force, known as the Guatemalan National 
     Revolutionary Unity--or URNG. OTI helped build the eight 
     camps for URNG's demobilization and is providing training and 
     education at the camps.
       In Angola we have had a transition program to strengthen 
     compliance with that nation's post-civil-war peace agreement, 
     the Lusaka Protocol. OTI planned the demobilization centers 
     that were taken over by UN peacekeeping forces. OTI efforts 
     in Angola have been guided by the notion that security comes 
     first. Until people feel a degree of safety, they are not 
     ready for political development. That was a lesson of the 
     first, failed transition in Angola.
       The second time around, OTI supported mine awareness and 
     removal, civic training and demobilization activities for 
     excombatants, community self-governance, and a flow of 
     accurate, uncensored news.
       Almost 1.4 million Angolans have been reached by mine-
     awareness training and about 750 were trained in mine-removal 
     techniques. The result has been a significant reduction in 
     mine accidents, the reopening of large areas of the country 
     to commerce and agriculture, and, most important, the return 
     of refugees and displaced persons to their homes.
       In Bosnia we were on the ground to offer support when the 
     federation was formed. We subsequently built on that 
     experience to support the Dayton accords once they were 
     signed. OTI programs in Bosnia have directly targeted the 
     public disinformation campaigns that have fueled ethnic 
     tensions in that region and helped train journalists and 
     disseminate news that supports reconciliation.

[[Page E1082]]

       To all involved, it was clear that the same public media 
     that had been used as a powerful tool to provoke conflict 
     could be just as instrumental in promoting peace. There are 
     many difficult questions still ahead, but OTI was on the 
     ground early and, if this effort succeeds in keeping the 
     peace, this early contribution will have made a difference.


                          Steps for the future

       The challenge of the next century will be to maintain a 
     commitment to long term development and crisis prevention, 
     while at the same time developing fast and flexible 
     instruments that will allow us to take direct and positive 
     action in transitions or in situations where crisis is 
     imminent.
       Twenty years ago we might have directed the Central 
     Intelligence Agency to take covert actions in these 
     situations. Some would argue that in those days of East-West 
     conflict we were capable of using coercion and brute strength 
     to bring about the desired policy outcome. But the world has 
     changed.
       Today, our challenge is to develop overt mechanisms like 
     OTI to quickly advance our strategic interests and both 
     prevent crises and help nations more beyond conflict. The 
     overt mechanisms of the 1990s, unlike the covert efforts of 
     the 1960s, have to be transparent, democratic, and able to 
     stand the test of public scrutiny. The diplomatic and 
     development arms of US foreign policy must work side-by-side 
     to prevent crisis, to transit from crisis, and to produce 
     positive change.
       Idealistic? Perhaps. But does an indispensable nation have 
     any other choice?

     

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