[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 74 (Tuesday, June 3, 1997)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E1079-E1080]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




   THE LEGACY OF THE MARSHALL PLAN: 50 YEARS LATER, THE WORLD STILL 
                                BENEFITS

                                 ______
                                 

                            HON. TOM LANTOS

                             of california

                    in the house of representatives

                         Tuesday, June 3, 1997

  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, this week the United States and the 
countries of Western Europe mark the 50th anniversary of the June 5, 
1947, Commencement Address at Harvard University by then Secretary of 
State George C. Marshall in which the idea of the Marshall Plan was 
first publicly discussed. That idea was an act of statesmanship, and 
its implementation was one of the greatest examples of bipartisan 
foreign policy.
  Secretary Marshall's address was given just 2 years after the end of 
World War II at a time when the economy of Europe was still in 
shambles. Many cities were in rubble, in most countries food was still 
rationed, and those factories that were still functioning were 
operating at only a fraction of their prewar levels. The decision by 
the Government of the United States to contribute to the rebuilding of 
Europe by sending money, equipment, and services was a major factor in 
accelerating Europe's recovery. It helped restore the confidence of the 
political and economic leaders of the countries of Western Europe, and 
it brought to Europe an infusion of American ideas--economic and 
management concepts, as well as political ideas. These have been major 
factors in the economic and political transformation of Europe.
  Mr. Speaker, just a few days ago, this House considered and adopted a 
resolution which I introduced with the cosponsorship of a number of my 
colleagues, House Concurrent Resolution 63, recommitting the United 
States to the principles of the Marshall Plan. Mr. Speaker, that 
resolution recognizes the wisdom and insight of Secretary Marshall's 
address and of the policy that resulted from it, and it recommits the 
United States to that wise policy first enunciated 50 years ago. I 
appreciate the wisdom of the House in rededicating our Nation to those 
principles.
  Mr. Speaker, the Washington Post Outlook Section in its issue of May 
25 published a brilliant essay by historian John Lukacs on the legacy 
of the Marshall Plan. Professor Lukacs is one of the most distinguished 
and articulate scholars of contemporary history, and he is the author 
of a number of important books on international politics in the second 
half of this century. He points out that the greatest importance of the 
Marshall Plan was not its contribution to European economic recovery, 
but the affirmation of an American commitment to the political and 
military security of Europe. We recognized through our unselfish 
implementation of the Marshall plan that our own Nation's future was 
linked with the security, prosperity, and democratic success of Europe. 
Mr. Speaker, I ask that the article by Professor Lukacs be placed in 
the Record and I urge my colleagues to give it careful, serious, and 
thoughtful attention.

                      The Idea That Remade Europe

                            (By John Lukacs)

       The fifth of June, 1947, was a milestone in the history of 
     the United States, and of what was soon thereafter called the 
     Western World. Fifty years ago, in a speech to Harvard 
     University's graduating class, Secretary of State George C. 
     Marshall announced the European Recovery Program, later known 
     as the Marshall Plan. It described the American government's 
     firm resolution to underwrite the economic recovery of 
     European countries damaged by the recently ended war and 
     threatened by the possible expansion of international 
     communism.
       The plan was a great success. It provided for generous 
     loans, outright gifts and the furnishing of American 
     equipment, eventually amounting to some $13 billion (or about 
     $88.5 billion in today's dollars) tendered to 16 countries 
     over five years between 1947 and 1952. West Germany was 
     included among the recipients when it became a state in 1948.
       The Marshall Plan was a milestone; but it was not a turning 
     point. The giant American ship of state was already changing 
     course. Two years before, the government and much of American 
     public opinion had looked to the Soviet Union as their 
     principal ally, even sometimes at the expense of Britain. But 
     by early 1947, the Truman administration had begun to 
     perceive the Soviet Union as America's principal adversary--a 
     revolution in foreign policy that has had few precedents in 
     the history of this country.
       In 1947, this was marked by three important events; the 
     announcement of the Truman Doctrine in March, committing the 
     United States to the defense of Greece and Turkey; the 
     announcement of the Marshall Plan in June; and the 
     publication in the July issue of Foreign Affairs of the 
     famous ``X'' article by George F. Kennan, then director of 
     the State Department's policy planning staff, who defined a 
     policy of Soviet ``containment.'' In a radical department 
     from American traditions, these three statements showed that 
     the United States was committed to defend a large part of 
     Europe, even in the absence of war.
       All this is true, but perhaps a whit too simple in 
     retrospect. The term ``Cold War'' did not yet exist, and 
     there was still hope that a definite break with the Soviet 
     Union--leading among other things to a hermetic division of 
     Europe--might be avoided. Marshall's speech suggested that 
     the offer was open to the states of Eastern Europe too, and 
     perhaps even to the Soviet Union. One reason for this 
     somewhat indefinite generosity was to maintain an American 
     presence in Eastern Europe, since the plan called for the 
     establishment of ties with the United States, including the 
     temporary presence of American administrators.
       That is why Stalin refused to countenance the Marshall Plan 
     from its inception. (As Winston Churchill had said, Stalin 
     feared Western friendship more than he feared Western 
     enmity.) Czechoslovakia provides a case in point. Ruled by a 
     coalition government in which the Communists were amply 
     represented but which was parliamentary and democratic, 
     Czechoslovakia still hoped to remain a possible bridge 
     between East and West. The first reaction of the Prague 
     government was to accept the offer of the Marshall Plan. 
     Moscow then ordered the government to refuse it, which it 
     did--instantly.
       This did not surprise officials in Washington, including 
     Kennan. By June, the division of Europe was already hardening 
     fast. The Iron Curtain (a phrase first employed 15 months 
     before by Churchill) was becoming a physical reality. Eight 
     months after Marshall's speech, the Communists took over 
     Prague. Soon after came the Russian blockade of West Berlin, 
     the Berlin airlift, the final separation of Western from 
     Eastern Germany, and the formation of NATO in early 1949. The 
     partition of Europe was frozen; the Cold War was on.
       So, generously offered and eagerly accepted, the Marshall 
     Plan was restricted to Western Europe. Within four years, the 
     economic and financial recovery of Western Europe was 
     advancing swiftly. It is interesting that the costs of the 
     American contribution to rebuilding Europe during those first 
     crucial years of the Cold War were about the same as the 
     costs of the materials it had given the Soviet Union during 
     World War II to help with the Allied victory. After 1947, not 
     a single European country went Communist that was not already 
     Communist in 1947--a situation that remained unchanged until 
     the dissolution of the Soviet Eastern European empire in 
     1989.
       But the economic effects of the Marshall Plan should not be 
     exaggerated. Its principal effect was political: a definite 
     sign of America's commitment to the defense of Western 
     Europe, and to maintaining an American presence there. Behind 
     the Marshall Plan, of course, was the habitual American 
     inclination to overrate economic factors, coupled with the 
     inclination to think in ideological terms, to be preoccupied 
     by the dangers of communism, rather than by the existence of 
     Russian nationalism, including the Russian military presence 
     in Eastern Europe. Despite the success of the Marshall Plan 
     and of Western European economic recovery, the proportion of 
     Communist voters in countries such as France and Italy did 
     not decrease from 1947 to 1953.
       The Marshall Plan left a more long-standing legacy than 
     recovery. It was one of the instruments of the 
     democratization of Western Europe, resulting in the emulation 
     and adoption of American ideas and institutions, such as 
     progressive income taxation, Social Security, near-universal 
     education and installment buying, all of which led to the

[[Page E1080]]

     gradual homogenization and rising prosperity of entire 
     peoples. It included giving credit to the masses, financially 
     and otherwise: ``On ne prete qu'aux riches''--credit is only 
     for the rich--was not just a French aphorism but the 
     established capitalist practice in Europe until about 1948.
       By the 1950s, the social structure of Western Europe was 
     starting to resemble that of the United States. Now, this 
     transformation is largely completed and the differences 
     between the United States and other democratic societies are 
     no longer mainly economic or social, but national and 
     cultural.
       The Truman administration was able to push the Marshall 
     Plan through a predominantly Republican Congress in 1947-48, 
     in which the main opponents of the European Recovery Program 
     were right-wing Republicans, the very people who accused 
     Truman and his government of being soft on communism. Most of 
     these people had been isolationists before and during the 
     first years of World War II. Their conversion to another kind 
     of internationalism (more precisely: supernationalism) was 
     easy. By 1956, the Republican party adopted a platform 
     calling for ``the establishment of American air and naval 
     bases all around the world''--proposed by a party that was 
     even then called ``isolationist'' by its opponents, wrongly 
     so.
       The Marshall Plan in 1947 was followed, less than two years 
     later, by the creation of NATO, an alliance that, for all its 
     merits, contributed to a political division of Europe lasting 
     for 40 years. With the retreat of the Russians from Eastern 
     Europe in 1989, the Cold War--and the partition of 
     Europe--came to an end. Some people called for a new 
     Marshall Plan for Eastern Europe and, perhaps, for Russia. 
     But this did not come about, for many reasons. In 1947, 
     the United States was the only economic superpower in the 
     world; 40 years later, this was no longer the case. In 
     1947, the countries of Western Europe were threatened by a 
     possible expansion of communism; the opposite was true of 
     Eastern Europe 40 years later. In 1947, the global 
     financial economy was in its embryonic stage; 40 years 
     later, principal investments abroad no longer required the 
     principal thrust of a government.
       But with all of these differences in mind, there remains 
     one similarity. History does not repeat itself, but some 
     historical conditions do. The main beneficial result of the 
     Marshall Plan was Western Europeans' confidence that the 
     United States was committed to maintaining their freedom. The 
     American commitment to Eastern Europe now is not clear. It is 
     suggested here and there by American actions, as in Bosnia, 
     but it is not a commitment. Yet it is in the interest of most 
     European countries--yes, including even Russia--that a new 
     division of Europe should not occur. The main instrument for 
     its avoidance may no longer be an Eastern European Marshall 
     Plan; but it is certainly not an extension of NATO.

     

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