[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 70 (Friday, May 23, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5112-S5122]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. LAUTENBERG (for himself, Mr. Leahy, Mr. Lugar, Mrs. 
        Feinstein, Ms. Mikulski, Mrs. Murray, Mr. Lieberman, Mr. 
        D'Amato and Mr. Moynihan):
  S. 804. A bill to restrict foreign assistance for countries providing 
sanctuary to indicted war criminals who are sought for prosecution 
before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia; 
to the Committee on Foreign Relations.


          The War Crimes Prosecution Facilitation Act of 1997

  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, today I am introducing legislation to 
create stronger incentives for the parties to the Dayton Peace 
Agreement to arrest indicted war criminals and transfer them to the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia [ICTY]. I am 
pleased that Senators Leahy, Lugar, Feinstein, Mikulski, Murray, 
Lieberman, D'Amato, and Moynihan are original cosponsors of this bill, 
which we believe will foster reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
in the long run.
  As a result of the horrifying extent of war crimes committed before 
and during the war in Bosnia, the U.N. Security Council, in May 1993, 
created the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
[ICTY]. One of only four international war crimes tribunals ever 
established, its mandate is to prosecute ``genocide, crimes against 
humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and violations of 
the laws and customs of war'' committed in the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia from January 1, 1991, until ``a date to be determined after 
restoration of peace.''
  When the parties to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia signed the 
Dayton Peace Agreement, they recognized that reconciliation could not 
occur unless war criminals were brought to justice. As such, they 
agreed to cooperate fully with ``the investigation and prosecution of 
war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law.'' 
All members of the international community are required by the tribunal 
statute to cooperate in ``the identification and location of persons,'' 
``the arrest or detention of persons,'' and ``the surrender or the 
transfer of the accused'' to the tribunal.
  With the exception of the Bosnian Muslims, however, the parties to 
the Dayton Peace Agreement have failed to arrest and transfer to the 
tribunal the vast majority of indicted war criminals in territory 
within their control. Though 74 persons have been indicted by the 4-
year-old tribunal, 66 of them remain at large. Let me repeat that. Of 
the 74 persons indicted for the most heinous crimes against humanity on 
European soil since World War II, 66 remain at large. Among these are 
the notorious Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and Bosnian Serb 
Army commander Ratko Mladic, both accused of genocide and crimes 
against humanity.
  Where are these and other war criminals finding sanctuary?
  Many of the indicted war criminals have been sighted living openly 
and freely in Croatia, the Croat-controlled areas of the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republika Srpska, and the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro).
  Last fall, one nongovernmental organization, the Coalition for 
International Justice, compiled a list of all public sightings of war 
criminals. For example, according to the coalition's research, Dario 
Kordic, one of the most widely recognized war criminals in the 
former Yugoslavia for his role in killings in Lasva Valley, was seen 
visiting his parents' apartment in Zagreb, Croatia. About the same 
time, Ivica Rajic, another highly sought after war criminal, was 
reportedly seen in a hotel in Split, Croatia.

  The list of public sightings of indicted war criminals goes on and 
on.

[[Page S5113]]

 Associated Press correspondent Liam McDowall reportedly located six 
Bosnian Croats indicted for war crimes living and working in the 
Bosnian Croat town of Vitez. And in perhaps the most egregious case to 
date, Boston Globe reporter Elizabeth Neuffer reportedly found Zeljko 
Mejakic--indicted for crimes committed as commander of Omarska camp 
where some 4,000 people were tortured to death and women were brutally 
raped--working as the deputy commander of the Prijedor police station 
in Republika Srpska.
  This list may not be entirely up to date now, but it illustrates 
graphically that many of the indicted war criminals could have been 
arrested easily if the authorities in control of the territory where 
they were located had chosen to do so. I believe that is still the case 
today. I ask unanimous consent that a list of sightings of indicted war 
criminals who remain at large be included in the Record at the end of 
my remarks.
  I know, Mr. President, that the act of apprehending and transferring 
indicted war criminals to the Hague presents a thorny problem for the 
United States. While some argue that American and NATO military 
personnel should do the job, the prevailing wisdom is that using our 
troops to arrest these indicted war criminals would be fraught with 
difficulties that could put our troops in danger. Others have raised 
the possibility that some type of international strike force could get 
the job done. Discussions about these options have been underway since 
NATO troops landed in the region 1\1/2\ years ago, but no action has 
been taken. Meanwhile war criminals continue to roam the region with 
impunity, and the clock ticks ever closer to the June 1998 withdrawal 
date for SFOR.
  If the international community concludes that it cannot use force to 
apprehend indicted war criminals, it must try another approach. Make no 
mistake about it: if indicted war criminals remain at large when the 
SFOR's mission ends, our prestige and credibility will be severely 
undermined. America may be able to protect NATO troops by not involving 
them in a mission to arrest indicted war criminals, but we cannot 
protect our reputation and that of NATO as a defender of democracy and 
human rights if indicted war criminals roam the region with impunity 
when our troops withdraw.
  Mr. President, since NATO is unwilling to arrest the indicted, my 
colleagues and I are recommending an approach which reinforces the 
obligation of the parties to the Dayton Agreement to arrest and 
transfer those indicted for genocide, rape, and other crimes against 
humanity to the Hague. To secure their cooperation, it imposes 
conditions on America's portion of the $5.1 billion in economic 
reconstruction funding to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Because parties to 
the Dayton Agreement sorely want Western assistance and the 
international acceptance it implies, this assistance provides us with a 
powerful lever. We ought to use it.
  Under our legislation, until the President certifies that a majority 
of war criminals have been arrested and transferred to the tribunal, no 
assistance--with the exception of assistance for humanitarian programs, 
democracy programs, and certain physical infrastructure projects that 
cross borders--could be provided to a sanctioned country or constituent 
entity. Similarly, U.S. executive directors of international financial 
institutions could not vote for assistance until the President makes 
the required certification.
  The President would have up to 6 months to make this certification. 
Once the certification is made, assistance could be provided for up to 
6 months. At the end of the 6-month waiver period, no assistance could 
be provided unless all indicted war criminals have been arrested and 
turned over to the ICTY. If a country or entity arrests and transfers 
to the Hague a majority of the indicted war criminals in territory 
under its effective control immediately, and the rest of them within 6 
months, assistance to that country or entity will not be affected.
  In other words, this legislation recognizes that even the parties to 
the Dayton Agreement may find it difficult to apprehend all indicted 
war criminals immediately, and therefore does not require them to 
complete the process all at once. Once a majority of the war criminals 
have been arrested and turned over, they are given up to 6 months to 
finish the job.
  Because our goal is to promote greater cooperation, democratic and 
humanitarian assistance will still be provided even in sanctioned 
countries or entities. Humanitarian assistance is defined to include 
food and disaster assistance and assistance for demining, refugees, 
education, health care, social services, and housing. Democratization 
assistance includes electoral assistance and assistance used in 
establishing the institutions of a democratic and civil society, 
including police training.
  However, assistance for projects in communities in which local 
authorities are harboring criminals or preventing refugees from 
returning home will be strictly limited to emergency food and medical 
assistance and demining assistance. And absolutely no assistance--
humanitarian or otherwise--can be provided to projects or organizations 
in which an indicted war criminal is affiliated or has a financial 
interest. These provisions are important to ensure that our assistance 
is not being used to prop up war criminals and that only communities 
that allow refugees to return are rewarded with assistance.
  This legislation recognizes that the realities of government control 
in the former Yugoslavia do not always conform to the arrangements in 
the Dayton Agreement. Recognizing that a constituent entity of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina may not control all areas within its border, and that 
Croatia or Serbia may have effective control of territory that reaches 
beyond their borders, the legislation holds a government or constituent 
entity responsible for indicted war criminals ``in territory that is 
under their effective control.'' As such, the legislation is not meant 
to impose sanctions on the Muslim-Croat Federation as a whole if an 
indicted war criminal remains in a Croat-controlled area of the 
Federation. Likewise, it would allow sanctions to be imposed against a 
country, such as Croatia, for failing to secure the apprehension of war 
criminals in areas of the Federation which it effectively controls.

  Mr. President, these measures are not intended to be punitive. I have 
made every effort to ensure that humanitarian assistance to the people 
in all parts of the former Yugoslavia will not be affected. I do not 
oppose reconstruction funding, and recognize that it is in our national 
interest to help rebuild this war-torn region. But I believe there is 
value in using bilateral and multilateral assistance as a carrot, to 
provide an incentive to the parties to arrest and turn war criminals 
over to the tribunal.
  Unless war criminals are brought to justice, reconciliation in Bosnia 
and Herzegovnia will remain an elusive goal and refugees and displaced 
persons will be unable to return to their homes. Though reconstruction 
assistance will help to rebuild ravaged economies, reconstruction 
without reconciliation will not be effective in ensuring long-term 
stability. Until the perpetrators of genocide are held accountable, 
victimized communities will continue to assign collective guilt and the 
cycle of hatred will be perpetuated.
  No infusion of money can wipe away the crimes of the past 6 years. 
Money alone is not enough. What is required is a genuine process of 
reconciliation, which can never occur unless war criminals are brought 
to justice.
  The Washington Post, in a February 1997 editorial, said it well:

       U.S. forces [cannot] fulfill their mission--bringing peace 
     to Bosnia--as long as war criminals remain at large. Lately, 
     it has become popular to focus on economic reconstruction as 
     the answer to Bosnia's troubles. But war didn't break out for 
     economic reasons, and economic aid alone can't secure the 
     peace. As long as alleged war criminal Radovan Karadzic and 
     his henchmen run things from behind the scenes, economic aid 
     actually will flow to the criminals. . . .

  Mr. President, we know that the threat of sanctions can work to 
effect cooperation with the War Crimes Tribunal. In the last year and a 
half, the administration has successfully leveraged assistance to 
Croatia to secure the transfer of two indicted war criminals to The 
Hague. But the process has been too long and drawn out. One of the war 
criminals voluntarily agreed to be sent to The Hague, and the other was 
in custody for more than 10 months before the Croatian Government 
transferred him to the tribunal.

[[Page S5114]]

 At this rate, it would take us some 66 years to bring all the indicted 
war criminals to The Hague. That's just too long. Stronger action must 
be taken.
  The World Bank is pumping hundreds of millions of dollars into 
Croatia and sending assessment teams to Republika Srpska. In fiscal 
year 1997, the Agency for International Development has set aside 
roughly $70 million for Republika Srpska, and it intends to do the same 
in fiscal year 1998. This bill requires the Administration to use these 
assistance programs to secure the speedy apprehension of war criminals, 
which is just as essential for reconciliation and long-term stability 
as reconstruction efforts--if not more so.
  No one has articulated the need for this legislation as well as 
Justice Goldstone, Former Chief Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda when he spoke 
at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum in January of 1997:

       Where there have been egregious human rights violations 
     that have been unaccounted for, where there has been no 
     justice, where the victims have not received any 
     acknowledgment, where they have been forgotten, where there's 
     been a national amnesia, the effect is a cancer in the 
     society. It's the reason that explains . . . spirals of 
     violence that the world has seen in the former Yugoslavia for 
     centuries . . .

  Justice Goldstone was right. What is required is a genuine process of 
reconciliation, which can never occur unless war criminals are brought 
to justice. Without reconciliation, the spiral of violence will only 
continue, and the military mission on which the American taxpayers have 
literally spent billions will be for naught.
  Secretary of State Albright will be traveling to Bosnia next week. 
She has assured me that the issue of war criminals will be raised at 
every opportunity, and I am confident that she will take a very tough 
stand, urging the parties to the Dayton Agreement to meet their 
commitments. But the U.S. Government has been urging compliance for 
over a year now with little success, and it's clear that we need to put 
more teeth into our position. Our bill does just that. It clearly 
states that the apprehension of war criminals is critical for 
reconciliation. It links U.S. assistance to progress on this issue, and 
it provides clear deadlines for progress in arresting and transferring 
indicted war criminals to The Hague.
  Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to cosponsor this legislation, 
which has been endorsed by the Coalition for International Justice, 
Human Rights Watch, Physicians for Human Rights, Action Council for 
Peace in the Balkans, and the International Human Rights Law Group. I 
ask unanimous consent that a copy of the legislation and a letter of 
endorsement from those organizations appear in the Record.
  America stands for justice and reconciliation throughout the world. 
We must stand up for those principles by ensuring that the war 
criminals of Bosnia are apprehended and the victims are heard.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                 S. 804

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``War Crimes Prosecution 
     Facilitation Act of 1997''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       The Congress finds the following:
       (1) In May 1993, the United Nations established the 
     International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
     (ICTY).
       (2) The mandate of the Tribunal is to prosecute ``genocide, 
     crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva 
     Conventions, and violations of the laws and customs of war'' 
     committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia from 
     January 1, 1991, until ``a date to be determined after 
     restoration of peace''.
       (3) Parties to the Dayton Agreement, as well as subsequent 
     agreements, agreed to cooperate fully with the 
     ``investigation and prosecution of war crimes and other 
     violations of international humanitarian law''. All members 
     of the international community are required by the Tribunal 
     Statute to cooperate in ``the identification and location of 
     persons'', ``the arrest or detention of persons'', and ``the 
     surrender or the transfer of the accused'' to the Tribunal.
       (4) Although 74 persons are under indictment by the 
     Tribunal, 66 remain at large, including 53 Bosnian and 
     Yugoslav Serbs, and 13 Bosnian and Croatian Croats.
       (5) Credible reports indicate that some of the indicted war 
     criminals are living in areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina that 
     are under the effective control of Croatia or Serbia-
     Montenegro. Many of the indicted war criminals have been 
     sighted living openly and freely in Croatia, the Croat-
     controlled areas of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
     Republika Srpska, and Serbia-Montenegro.
       (6) An estimated 2,000,000 persons have been forced from 
     their homes by the war, many of whom remain displaced and 
     unable to return to their homes, in violation of the Dayton 
     Accords, because their homes are in a jurisdiction controlled 
     by a different ethnic group.
       (7) The fighting in Bosnia has ceased for more than a year, 
     and international efforts are now focused on the economic 
     reconstruction and implementation of the civilian aspects of 
     the Dayton Accords.
       (8) The International Bank for Reconstruction and 
     Development, the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
     Development, the International Monetary Fund, and individual 
     donor countries, including the United States, have begun 
     disbursing funds toward meeting an identified goal of 
     $5,100,000,000 for reconstruction of Bosnia.

     SEC. 3. SENSE OF THE SENATE.

       (a) It is the sense of the Senate that--
       (1) reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be 
     achieved if indicted war criminals remain at large and 
     refugees and displaced persons are unable to return to their 
     homes;
       (2) reconstruction without reconciliation will not be 
     effective in ensuring stability in the long run because 
     absent individual accountability, victimized communities will 
     assign collective responsibility, thus perpetuating the cycle 
     of hatred; and
       (3) the Government of the United States should ensure that 
     multilateral and bilateral assistance is provided to parties 
     to the Dayton Agreement only if doing so would promote 
     reconciliation as well as reconstruction, including the 
     transfer of war criminals to the Tribunal, the return of 
     refugees and displaced persons, and freedom of movement.
       (b) It is further the sense of the Senate that the 
     Tribunal, consistent with its mandate, should continue to 
     investigate and bring indictments against persons who have 
     violated international humanitarian law.

     SEC. 4. RESTRICTIONS ON FUNDING.

       (a) Bilateral Assistance.--
       (1) In general.--No assistance may be provided under the 
     Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or the Arms Export Control Act 
     for any country described in subsection (d).
       (2) Application to prior appropriations.--The prohibition 
     on assistance contained in paragraph (1) includes the 
     provision of assistance from funds appropriated prior to the 
     date of enactment of this Act.
       (b) Multilateral Assistance.--The Secretary of the Treasury 
     shall instruct the United States executive directors of the 
     international financial institutions to work in opposition 
     to, and vote against, any extension by such institutions of 
     any financial or technical assistance or grants of any kind 
     to any country described in subsection (d).
       (c) Exceptions.--
       (1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), subsections (a) 
     and (b) shall not apply to the provision of--
       (A) humanitarian assistance;
       (B) democratization assistance; or
       (C) assistance for physical infrastructure projects 
     involving activities in both a sanctioned country and 
     nonsanctioned contiguous countries, if the nonsanctioned 
     countries are the primary beneficiaries.
       (2) Further limitations.--Notwithstanding paragraph (1)--
       (A) no assistance may be made available under the Foreign 
     Assistance Act of 1961 or the Arms Export Control Act for a 
     program, project, or activity in any country described in 
     subsection (d) in which an indicted war criminal has any 
     financial or material interest or through any organization in 
     which the indicted individual is affiliated; and
       (B) no assistance (other than emergency food or medical 
     assistance or demining assistance) may be made available 
     under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or the Arms Export 
     Control Act to any program, project, or activity in any area 
     in any country described in subsection (d) in which local 
     authorities are not complying with the provisions of Article 
     IX and Annex 4, Article II of the Dayton Agreement relating 
     to war crimes and the Tribunal, or with the provisions of 
     Annex 7 of the Dayton Agreement relating to the rights of 
     refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes of 
     origin.
       (d) Sanctioned Countries.--A country described in this 
     section is a country the authorities of which fail to 
     apprehend and transfer to the Tribunal all persons in 
     territory that is under their effective control who have been 
     indicted by the Tribunal.
       (e) Waiver.--
       (1) Authority.--The President may waive the application of 
     subsection (a) or subsection (b) with respect to a country if 
     the President determines and certifies to the appropriate 
     committees of Congress within six months after the date of 
     enactment of this Act that a majority of the indicted persons 
     who are within territory that is under the effective control 
     of the country have been arrested and transferred to the 
     Tribunal.
       (2) Period of effectiveness.--Any waiver made pursuant to 
     this subsection shall be effective for a period of six 
     months.
       (f) Termination of Sanctions.--The sanctions imposed 
     pursuant to subsection (a) or subsection (b) with respect to 
     a country shall

[[Page S5115]]

     cease to apply only if the President determines and certifies 
     to Congress that the authorities of that country have 
     apprehended and transferred to the Tribunal all persons in 
     territory that is under their effective control who have been 
     indicted by the Tribunal.

     SEC. 5. DEFINITIONS.

       As used in this Act:
       (1) Country.--The term ``country'' shall not include the 
     state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the provisions of this 
     Act shall be applied separately to its constituent entities 
     of Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina.
       (2) Dayton agreement.--The term ``Dayton Agreement'' means 
     the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina, together with annexes relating thereto, done at 
     Dayton, November 10 through 16, 1995.
       (3) Democratization assistance.--The term ``democratization 
     assistance'' includes electoral assistance and assistance 
     used in establishing the institutions of a democratic and 
     civil society.
       (4) Humanitarian assistance.--The term ``humanitarian 
     assistance'' includes disaster and food assistance and 
     assistance for demining, refugees, housing, education, health 
     care, and other social services.
       (5) Tribunal.--The term ``Tribunal'' means the 
     International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.

        Indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
                           Former Yugoslavia

       (List Compiled by the Coalition for International Justice)

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                   Name                      Title/Indicted for/Date               Charged with/Status
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Zlatko Aleksovski.....................  Croat--indicted on 11/10/95  g.v.--transferred to The Hague 4/28/97
                                            for killing Muslims in       by Croatian Government.
                                            Lasva Valley.
2. Stripo Alilovic.......................  Croat--indicted 11/10/95     g.v.--At Large.
                                            for killings in Lasva
                                            Valley.
3. Mirko Babic...........................  Serb--indicted 2/13/95 for   g.v.c.--At Large.
                                            crimes committed at
                                            Omarska.
4. Nenad Banovic.........................  Serb--indicted 7/21/95 for   g.v.c.--At Large.
                                            atrocities committed at
                                            Keraterm.
5. Pedrag Banovic........................  Serb--same as N. Banovic...  g.v.c.--At Large.
6. Tihomir Blaskic.......................  Croat--Indicted 11/10/95     In custody in the Netherlands--plead not
                                            for killings in Lasva        guilty--trial postponed 7--g.v.c.
                                            Valley.
7. Goran Borovinica......................  Serb--indicted 2/13/96 for   g.v.c.--At Large.
                                            expelling Muslims to
                                            various camps as well as
                                            killings and rapes in
                                            Omarska.
8. Mario Cerkez..........................  Croat--indicted 11/10/95     g.v.c.--At Large.
                                            for killings in Lasva
                                            Valley.
9. Ranko Cesic...........................  Serb--indicted 7/21/95 for   g.v.c.--At Large.
                                            atrocities committed in
                                            Brcko.
10. Zejnil Delalic.......................  Muslim--indicted 3/21/96     in custody at The Hague--joint trial
                                            for atrocities committed     with Delic, Mucic, and Landzo began in
                                            in Celebici.                 March of 1997--g.v.
11. Hazim Delic..........................  Muslim--same as Delalic....  same as Delalic--joint trial.
12. Djordje Djukic.......................  Serb--General--indicted /29/ was held at The Hague but released--
                                            96 for shelling Bosnian      Deceased.
                                            civilians.
13. Damir Dosen..........................  Serb--indicted 7/21/95 for   g.v.c.--At Large.
                                            atrocities committed at
                                            Keraterm.
14. Drazen Erdemovic.....................  Croat--indicted 5/29/96....  *Sentenced to 10 years*--v.c.
15. Dragan Fustar........................  Serb--Keraterm.............  g.v.c.--At Large.
16. Dragan Gagovic.......................  Serb--indicted 6/26/96 for   g.v.c.--At Large.
                                            crimes committed at Foca.
17. Zdarvko Govedarica...................  Serb--indicted 2/13/95 for   g.v.c.--Deceased.
                                            crimes committed at
                                            Omarska.
18. Momcilo Gruban.......................  Serb--indicted 2/13/95 for   g.v.c.--At Large.
                                            crimes committed at
                                            Omarska.
19. Gruban...............................  Unknown--indicted for        g.v.c.--At Large.
                                            crimes at Omarska--2/13/95.
20. Janko Janjic.........................  Serb--indicted 6/26/96 for   g.v.c.--At Large.
                                            crimes at Foca.
21. Nikica Janjic........................  Serb--indicted 7/21/95 at    g.v.c.--Deceased.
                                            Keraterm & 2/13/96 at
                                            Omarska.
22. Gojko Jankovic.......................  Serb--indicted 6/26/96 for   g.v.c.--At Large.
                                            crimes in Foca.
23. Goran Jelisic........................  Serb--Commander of Luka      g.v. Gen. c.--At large.
                                            camp at Brcko--indicted 7/
                                            21/95 for Genocide.
24. Drago Josipovic......................  Croat--indicted 11/10/95     g.v.c.--At Large.
                                            for killings in Lasva
                                            Valley.
25. Marinko Katava.......................  Serb--same as Josipovic....  g.v.c.--At Large.
26. Radovan Karadzic.....................  Serb--Party Leader--         g.v. Gen. c.--At Large..
                                            Indicted 7/25/95 and 11/16/
                                            95 for genocide in
                                            Srebrenica, and Sarajevo.
                                            Also charged with
                                            violations of laws of war
                                            and crimes against
                                            humanity.
27. Dusan Knezevic.......................  Serb--indicted 2/13/95 for   g.v.c. for both indictments--At Large.
                                            atrocities committed at
                                            Omarska 7/21/95 for crimes
                                            committed at Keraterm.
28. Dragan Kondic........................  Serb--indicted 7/21/95 for   g.v.c.--At Large.
                                            crimes committed at
                                            Keraterm.
29. Dario Kordic.........................  Croat--indicted 11/10/95     g.v.c.--At Large.
                                            for killings in Lasva
                                            Valley.
30. Milojica Kos.........................  Serb--indicted 2/13/95 for   g.v.c.--At Large.
                                            atrocities committed at
                                            Omarska.
31. Predrag Kostic.......................  Serb--same as Kos..........  g.v.c.--At Large.
32. Radomir Kovac........................  Serb--indicted 6/26/96 for   g.v.c.--At Large.
                                            crimes committed at Foca.
33. Dragan Kulundzija....................  Serb--indicted 7/21/95 for   g.v.c.--At Large.
                                            crimes committed at
                                            Keraterm.
34. Dragoljub Kunarac....................  Serb--indicted 6/26/96 for   g.v.c.--At Large.
                                            crimes committed at Foca.
35. Mirjan Kupreskic.....................  Croat--indicted 11/10/95     g.v.--At Large.
                                            for killings in Lasva
                                            Valley.
36. Vlatko Kupreskic.....................  Croat--Same as above.......  g.v.--At Large.
37. Zoran Kupreskic......................  Croat--Same as above.......  g.v.--At Large.
38. Miroslav Kvocka......................  Serb--indicted for Omarska.  g.v.c.--At Large.
39. Goran Lajic..........................  Serb--indicted for Keraterm  At Large: wrong person siezed in
                                            7/21/95.                     Germany--g.v.c.
40. Esad Landzo..........................  Muslim--indicted 3/21/96     In custody at the Hague--joint trial
                                            for crimes committed at      (see Delalic) began 3/10/97.
                                            Celebici.
41. Zoran Marinic........................  Croat--indicted 11/10/95     g.v.--At Large.
                                            for killings in Lasva
                                            Valley.
42. Milan Martic.........................  Serb--rebel Krajina leader   Rule 61 hearings have been held for
                                            indicted 7/25/95 for         Martic--v.--At Large.
                                            ordering cluster bomb
                                            attacks on Zajreb.
43. Zeljko Meakic........................  Serb--Commander of Omarska   At Large: wrong person seized in
                                            indicted 2/13/95.            Germany--g.v.c.
44. Slobodan Milijkovic..................  Serb--indicted 7/21/95 for   g.v.c.--At Large.
                                            crimes committed at
                                            Bosanski Samac.
45. Ratko Mladic.........................  Serb--Army Commander         g.v. Gen. c.--At Large.
                                            indicted 7/25/95 and 11/16/
                                            95 for genocide in
                                            Srebrenica and Sarajevo,
                                            charged with Crimes
                                            against humanity and
                                            violations of laws of war.
46. Mile Mrksic..........................  Serb--Yugoslavian Army--     Rule 61 hearings have been held for
                                            indicted 11/7/95 for         Mrksic--g.v.c.--At Large.
                                            killing 261 non-Serbs at
                                            Vukovar Hospital.
47. Zdravko Mucic........................  Croat--indicted 3/21/96 for  Joint trial (see Delalic) began in March
                                            crimes committed at          of 1997--g.v.
                                            Celebici.
48. Dragan Nikolic.......................  Serb--Commander of Susica    Rule 61 hearings have been held for
                                            camp in Bosnia--indicted     Nikolic--g.v.c.--At Large.
                                            11/4/94 for genocide.
49. Dragan Papic.........................  Croat--indicted 11/10/95     g.v.c.--At Large.
                                            for killings in Lasva
                                            Valley.
50. Nedjeljko Paspalj....................  Serb--indicted 2/13/96 for   g.v.c.--At Large.
                                            atrocities committed at
                                            Omarska.
51. Milan Pavlic.........................  Serb--same as above........  g.v.c.--At Large.
52. Milutin Popovic......................  Serb--same as above........  g.v.c.--At Large.
53. Dragoljub Prcac......................  Serb--same as above........  g.v.c.--At Large.
54. Drazenko Predojevic..................  Serb--same as above........  g.v.c.--At Large.
55. Mladen Radic.........................  Serb--same as above........  g.v.c.--At Large.
56. Miroslav Radic.......................  Serb--Yugoslavian Army--     g.v.c.--At Large.
                                            Indicted 11/7/95 for
                                            killing 261 non-Serbs.
57. Ivica Rajic..........................  Croat--indicted 8/29/95 for  g.v.--At Large.
                                            killings at Stupni Do.
58. Ivan Santic..........................  Croat--indicted for Lasva    g.v. indicted on 11/10/95--At Large.
                                            Valley.
59. Vladimir Santic......................  Croat--indicted for Lasva    g.v. indicted on 11/10/95--At Large.
                                            Valley.
60. Dragomir Saponja.....................  Serb--indicted 2/13/95 for   g.v.c. for both indictments--At Large.
                                            atrocities committed at
                                            Omarska also charged with
                                            Keraterm 7/21/95.
61. Zeljko Savic.........................  Serb--indicted for Omarska.  g.v.c. indicted on 2/13/95--At Large.
62. Dusko Sikirica.......................  Serb--indicted 7/21/95 for   g.v. Gen. c.--Camp Commander--At Large.
                                            crimes committed at
                                            Keraterm.
63. Blagoje Simic........................  Serb--indicted 7/21/95 for   g.v.c.--At Large.
                                            incidents of war crimes at
                                            Bosanski Samac.
64. Milan Simic..........................  Serb--same as above........  g.v.c.--At Large.
65. Pero Skopljak........................  Croat--indicted for Lasva    g.v.--At Large.
                                            Valley.
66. Vesselin Sljivancanin................  Yugoslavian Army--indicted   Rule 61 hearings have been held for
                                            11/7/95 for killings at      Sljivancanin--g.v.c.--At Large.
                                            Vukovar hospital.
67. Radovan Stankovic....................  Serb--indicted 6/26/96 for   g.v.c.--At Large.
                                            crimes committed at Foca.
68. Dusko Tadic..........................  Serb--indicted 2/13/95 for   Case in deliberation at The Hague--has
                                            murder, rape and torture     plead not guilty to charges--verdict
                                            at Omarska.                  will be given 5/7/97 g.v.c.
69. Miroslav Tadic.......................  Serb--indicted 7/21/95 for   g.c.--At Large.
                                            crimes committed at
                                            Bosanski Samac.
70. Nedjeljko Timarac....................  Serb--indicted 7/21/95 for   g.v.c.--At Large.
                                            crimes committed at
                                            Keraterm.
71. Stevan Todorovic.....................  Serb--indicted for killings  g.v.c.--At Large.
                                            at Bosanski Samac.
72. Zoran Vukovic........................  Serb--indicted 6/26/96 for   g.v.c.--At Large.
                                            crimes committed at Foca.
73. Simo Zaric...........................  Serb--indicted 7/21/95 for   g.c.--At Large.
                                            crimes committed at
                                            Bosanski Samac.
74. Dragan Zelenovic.....................  Serb--indicted 6/26/96 for   g.v.c.--At Large.
                                            crimes committed at Foca.
75. Zoran Zigic..........................  Serb--indicted 7/21/95 for   g.v.c. for both indictments--At Large.
                                            Keraterm and 2/13/95 for
                                            Omarska.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes--1. g.: Grave Breaches of the 1949 Geneva Convention. 2. v.: Violations of the Laws or Customs of War. 3.
  GEN.: Genocide. 4. c.: Crimes Against Humanity.


[[Page S5116]]

                           war criminal watch

       Information on the whereabouts of 37 of the 67 people 
     publicly indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for 
     the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) who are still at large:
       1. Nenad Banovic--Keraterm (Bosnian Serb)--Prijedor 
     (Bosnian Serb territory)--Frequents ``Express'' restaurant in 
     Prijedor. Lives at home in Prijedor. Twin brother to Predrag 
     Banovic (q.v.). One of the Banovic brothers was seen driving 
     a motor scooter in Prijedor in late November 1996 (Christian 
     Science Monitor, Nov. 28, 1996).
       2. Predrag Banovic--Keraterm (Bosnian Serb)--Prijedor 
     (Bosnian Serb territory)--Frequents ``Express'' restaurant in 
     Prijedor. Lives in Prijedor. Twin brother to Nenad Banovic 
     (q.v.). One of the Banovic brothers was seen driving a motor 
     scooter in Prijedor in late November 1996 (Christian Science 
     Monitor, Nov. 28, 1996).
       3. Mario Cerkez--Lasva Valley (Bosnian Croat)--Vitez 
     (Muslim-Croat Federation)--Commanded a Bosnian Croat brigade 
     in Vitez in 1993 and is still there (Tanjug, Nov. 13, 1995).
       4. Dragan Fustar--Keraterm (Bosnian Serb)--Prijedor 
     (Bosnian Serb territory)--Residence address listed on the 
     IFOR wanted poster was 41 First of May Street in Prijedor. A 
     journalist found Fustar's mother and wife both living there 
     in late November 1996. The number sign has been pulled from 
     the house. His mother and wife say that they live at 37 First 
     of May Street, even though the building is located between 39 
     and 43 First of May Street. He is now unemployed (Christian 
     Science Monitor, Nov. 28, 1996).
       5. Dragan Gagovic--Foca (Bosnian Serb)--Foca (Bosnian Serb 
     territory)--Chief of police in Foca (Sunday Times of London, 
     July 28, 1996).
       6. Gojko Jankovic--Foca (Bosnian Serb)--Foca (Bosnian Serb 
     territory)--Seen by a journalist at a Foca cafe while 
     ``French soldiers from IFOR * * * leant against a nearby wall 
     smoking cigarettes and paying no attention as Jankovic, 
     accompanied by bodyguards, casually ordered a drink.'' 
     (Sunday Times of London, July 28, 1996). Tried to get on the 
     ballot for municipal elections. OSCE spotted it and stopped 
     him.
       7. Goran Jelisic--Brcko (Bosnian Serb) indicted for 
     Genocide--Bijeljina (Bosnian Serb territory)--Interviewed in 
     his apartment in Bijeljina (DeVolkskrant [Amsterdam], Feb. 
     29, 1996). Knows the telephone number of Ratko Cesic, also 
     indicted for Brcko (De Volkskrant [Amsterdam], Feb. 29, 
     1996).
       8. Drago Josipovic--Lasva Valley (Bosnian Croat)--Vitez 
     (Muslim-Croat Federation)--A chemical engineer at the local 
     Vitezit explosives factory, he lives in his family home in 
     the village of Santici, just east of Vitez (Associated Press, 
     Nov. 9, 1996). Works as a chemical engineer in the Princip 
     munitions factory. May also be found at the local Croatian 
     Democratic Party headquarters, where his wife is president 
     (Washington Post, Nov. 27, page A21).
       9. Radovan Karadzic--Sarajevo and Srebrenica (Bosnian Serb) 
     indicted for Genocide--Pale (Bosnian Serb territory) Banja 
     Luka (Bosnian Serb territory)--Pale house--large house on a 
     mountainside--pointed out to Prof. Charles Ingrao on trip to 
     Pale (New York Times, Oct. 28, 1996). Has friend, Slavko 
     Rogulic, who runs gas station and hotel for him in Banja 
     Luka. Building a house in Koljani village near Banja Luka. 
     ``[M]akes little effort to conceal his daily movements'' 
     (Associated Press, Nov. 9, 1996).
       10. Marinko Katava--Lasva Valley (Bosnian Croat)--Vitez 
     (Muslim-Croat Federal)--Works as a labor inspector for the 
     Federation government at a desk in the town hall in Vitez, 
     and lives in a pleasant downtown apartment (Associated Press, 
     Nov. 9, 1996). Works in the town hall in Vitez as an 
     employment inspector. He may be at the pharmacy run by his 
     wife. The family telephone is printed on a sign in the 
     pharmacy window, and the Katavas live upstairs (Washington 
     Post, Nov. 27, 1996, page A21).
       11. Dragan Kondic--Keraterm (Bosnian Serb)--Prijedor 
     (Bosnian Serb territory)--Said to have connections with 
     special police in Ljubia. Hangs out almost every night at 
     ``The Pink'' bar in Prejedor.
       12. Dario Kordic--Lasva Valley (Bosnian Croat)--Zagreb, 
     Croatia--Numerous reports have him living in Zagreb. On or 
     about July 8, 1996, was photographed in front of an apartment 
     in Zagreb's Tresnjevka district on the 4th floor with no name 
     on the door; block is owned by the defense ministry (Globus 
     [Zagreb], as quoted in Reuters, July 10, 1996). Croatian 
     ambassador to the United States says the apartment belongs to 
     Kordic's parents, which means the Croatian government knows 
     where Kordic has been living (Washington Post, Nov. 11, 1996, 
     A28).
       13. Milojica Kos--Omarska (Bosnian Serb)--Omarska (Bosnian 
     Serb territory)--His brother Zheljko Kos owns the ``Europa'' 
     restaurant in Omarska, across the street from the Omarska 
     camp buildings; Milojica Kos frequently at the restaurant. 
     Otherwise, he is keeping a low profile in Omarska (Christian 
     Science Monitor, Nov. 28, 1996).
       14. Radomir Kovac--Foca (Bos Serb)--Foca Bosnian Serb 
     territory)--A journalist said at the IFOR press briefing on 
     Nov. 19, 1996, that Kovac was still working for the Foca 
     police. IPTF spokesman Aleksandar Ivanko replied, ``I heard 
     these reports. We can't confirm them. We have to take 
     [Bosnian Serb Interior] Minister Kijac at his word, and he 
     says nobody who as been indicted is working as a policeman in 
     his letter to Peter Fitzgerald, so for the time being we'll 
     take him at his word.''
       15. Mirjan Kupreskic--Lasva Valley (Bosnian Croat)--Vitez 
     (Muslim--Croat Federation)--Can be found at the grocery store 
     he and his cousin Vlatko Kupreskic (q.v.) run; he lives in 
     Pirici, just east of Vietz (Associated Press, Nov. 9, 1996). 
     Runs a grocery shop in Vitez not far from Marinko Katava's 
     (q.v.) wife's pharmacy (Washington Post, Nov. 27, page A21).
       16. Vlatko Kupreskic--Lasva Valley (Bosnian Croat)--Vitez 
     (Muslim-Croat Federation)--Can be found at the grocery store 
     he and his cousin Mirjan KUPRESKIC (q.v.) run; he lives in 
     Pirici, just east of Vitez (Associated Press, Nov. 9, 1996).
       17. Zoran Kupreskic--Lasva Valley (Bosnian Croat)--Vitez 
     (Muslim-Croat Federation)--Can be found at the grocery store 
     run by him, his brother Mirjan Kupreskic (q.v.) and their 
     cousin Vlatko Kupreskic (Q.v.) (Associated Press, Nov. 9, 
     1996). Runs a business in Vitez, not his brother Mirjan 
     Kupreskic's (q.v.) grocery shop. ``I have been advised not to 
     talk to the press by the guy in charge,'' he said. ``But call 
     my brother Mirjan. Maybe he will want to talk to you,'' 
     giving the telephone number and location of his brother's 
     shop (Washington Post, Nov. 27, page A21).
       18. Miroslav Kvocka--Omarska (Bosnian Serb)--Prijedor 
     (Bosnian Serb territory)--Works at Prijedor police station 
     (Reuters, Oct. 29, 1996). Put on leave (ABC World News 
     Tonight, Nov. 26, 1996). Put on one month's leave. Was the 
     Prijedor police duty officer as recently as Oct. 23, 1996, 
     but is on temporary leave (Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 
     28, 1996).
       19. Milan Martic--Zagreb rocket attack (CroSerb)--Banja 
     Luka (Bosnian Serb territory)--``[H]is place of residence has 
     been precisely located. . . .'' (Telegraf [Belgrade], Feb. 
     28, 1996). Believed living in Banja Luka (London Press 
     Association, Mar. 8, 1996). Said to have regular meetings 
     with Plavsic, et al. Attended a public event near Banja Luka 
     in July also attended by IFOR personnel (Human Rights Watch 
     press release, Nov. 8, 1996). Seen in Banja Luka on Nov. 5, 
     1996. Lives less than 100 meters from IFOR civilian affairs 
     center in Banja Luka (Human Rights Watch press release, Nov. 
     8, 1996). Gave a videotape interview from his office in Banja 
     Luka (ABC World News Tonight, Nov. 26, 1996).
       20. Zeljko Meakic [also spelled ``Mejakic'']--Omarska 
     (Bosnian Serb) indicted for Genocide--Omarska (Bosnian Serb 
     territory)--Deputy commander of Omarska police station 
     (Boston Globe, Oct. 31, 1996, page a6). Put on leave (ABC 
     World News Tonight, Nov. 26, 1996). Put on one month's leave. 
     On duty as recently as Oct. 20 (Christian Science Monitor, 
     Nov. 28, 1996).
       21. Slobodan Milijkovic--Bosanski Samac (Bosnian Serb)--
     Kragujevac, Serbia--Kragujevac is 60 miles southeast of 
     Belgrade (Time magazine, May 13, 1996).
       22. Ratko Mladic--Sarajevo and Srebrenica (Bosnian Serb) 
     indicted for Genocide--Han Pijesak (Bosnian Serb territory)--
     Belgrade, Serbia--Lives inside his headquarters (numerous 
     sources). Maintains an apartment in Belgrade.
       23. Milan Mrksic--Vukovar (Serb)--Banja Luka (Bosnian Serb 
     territory)--General in the JNA at the time of Vukovar; then 
     went to work for the Krajina Serbs. Reported to have been in 
     Banja Luka (New York Times, Jan. 5, 1996). Later, reported to 
     have retired and now living a solitary life in Belgrade 
     (Vreme, Apr. 6, 1996).
       24. Dragan Nikolic--Susica (Bosnian Serb)--Vlasenica 
     (Bosnian Serb territory)--Either in the Bosnian Serb Army or 
     the Bosnian Serb civilian government (Reuter, Feb. 16, 1996).
       25. Miroslav Radic--Vukovar (Serb)--In the Serbian 
     ``provinces''--Operates a private company ``in the 
     provinces'' of Serbia (Vreme, Apr. 6, 1996).
       26. Mladen Radic--Omarska (Bosnian Serb)--Prijedor (Bosnian 
     Serb territory)--Works at Prijedor police station (Reuters, 
     Oct. 29, 1996). Put on leave (ABC World News Tonight, Nov. 
     26, 1996). Put on one month's leave.
       27. Ivica Rajic--Stupni Do (Bosnian Croat)--Split, 
     Croatia--Lived in a Croatian-government owned hotel, believed 
     to be the Zagreb Hotel, but has since reportedly left Split 
     (Globus [Zagreb]; reported by Reuter, Oct. 23 and 24, 1996).
       28. Ivan Santic--Lasva Valley (Bosnian Croat)--territory 
     unknown--Santic was described as an engineer, the director of 
     the Sintevit plant in Vitez, and, at the time the crimes 
     occurred, the mayor of Vitez (Tanjug, Nov. 13, 1995). 
     Interviewed by Inter Press Service (Inter Press Service, Dec. 
     14, 1995). In 1994-95 (at least), Santic was Deputy Minister 
     of Industry and Energy in the Federation (Vjesnik [Zagreb], 
     June 20, 1994, and Vecernji List [Zagreb], Nov. 20, 1995). 
     Federation officials should know his address.
       29. Dusko Sikirica--Keraterm (Bosnian Serb) indicted for 
     Genodice--territory unknown--Tried to get on the ballot for 
     municipal elections. OSCE spotted it and stopped him. OSCE 
     should know his address.

[[Page S5117]]

       30. Blagoje Simic--Bosanski Samac (Bosnian Serb)--Bosanski 
     Samac (Bosnian Serb territory)--Highest-ranking public 
     official in Bosanski Samac, with an office in the town hall 
     (Boston Globe, Nov. 1, 1996, page a1).
       31. Pero Skopljak--Lasva Valley (Bosnian Croat)--Vitez 
     (Muslim-Croat Federation)--An official in the Bosnian Croat 
     Presidency (Tanjug, Nov. 13, 1995). ``Still lives in Vitez, 
     where he runs a print shop'' (Inter Press Service, Dec. 14, 
     1995). Now runs a local printing company from the ground 
     floor of his spacious home in Vitez (Associated Press, Nov. 
     9, 1996). Still runs the printing shop, though his wife says 
     he's rarely there (Washington Post, Nov. 27, page A21).
       32. Veselin Sljivancanin--Vukovar (Serb)--Belgrade, 
     Serbia--Reportedly had falling out with his superior, Gen. 
     Milan MRKSIC (q.v.), also indicted for Vukovar (New York 
     Times, Jan. 5, 1996). Promoted to full colonel and 
     transferred to Belgrade (Agence France-Presse, Feb. 16, 
     1996). Now head of the Center of Advanced Military Schools in 
     Belgrade (Svijet [Sarajevo], Apr. 25, 1996). Also referred to 
     as an instructor at the Center of Advanced Military Schools 
     in Belgrade (Vreme, Apr. 6, 1996).
       33. Radovan Stankovic--Foca (Bosnian Serb)-- Foca (Bosnian 
     Serb territory)--Working in the Bosnian Serb police in Foca 
     as of August, according to IPTF spokesman Aleksandar Ivanko. 
     In August, Stankovic walked into IPTF police station near 
     Sarajevo, but IPTF did not recognize his name. Local police 
     stopped him, asked to see his driver's license, recognized 
     his name, ordered him to come to a police station, whereupon 
     he fled--later to file a complaint with the IPTF alleging 
     that the Bosnian police fired shots at his car (Reuter, Nov. 
     8, 1996). In August, Stankovic filed a complaint against the 
     Bosnian police at an IPTF office. ``After being embarrassed 
     by the fact that journalists discovered five others indicted 
     on war-crime charges in the Serbian police force, U.N. 
     officials reacted by forbidding their monitors to discuss the 
     Stankovic case with reporters'' (New York Times, Nov. 9, 
     1996).
       34. Nedjeljko Timarac--Keraterm (Bosnian Serb)--Prijedor 
     (Bosnian Serb territory)--Works at Prijedor police station 
     (Reuters, Oct. 29, 1996). Put on leave (ABC World News 
     Tonight, Nov. 26, 1996). Put on one month's leave.
       35. Stevan Todorovic--Bosanski Samac (Bosnian Serb)--
     Bosanski Samac (Bosnian Serb territory)--Deputy of the local 
     office of Republika Srpska state security in Bosanski Samac; 
     works the night shift (7 p.m.-7 a.m.) (Boston Globe, Nov. 1, 
     1996, page a1). Lives in the village of Donja Slatina, a 3 
     minute, 30 second drive from American-staffed NATO base of 
     Camp Colt, with 1,000 soldiers. His commuter route is 
     routinely traveled by NATO patrols (Boston Globe, Nov. 1, 
     1996, page a1).
       36. Dragan Zelenovic--Foca (BosSerb)--Foca (Bosnian Serb 
     territory)--A journalist said at the IFOR press briefing on 
     Nov. 19, 1996, that Zelenovic was still working for the Foca 
     police. IPTF spokesman Aleksandar Ivanko replied, ``I heard 
     these reports. We can't confirm them. We have to take 
     [Bosnian Serb Interior] Minister Kijac at his word, and he 
     says nobody who has been indicted is working as a policeman 
     in his letter to Peter Fitzgerald, so for the time being 
     we'll take him at his word.''
       37. Zoran Zigic--Omarska and Keraterm (Bosnian Serb)--Banja 
     Luka (Bosnian Serb territory)--Believed to be in jail in 
     Banja Luka. Reported to be in a Bosnian Serb prison for an 
     unrelated murder (Christan Science Monitor, Nov. 28, 1996).
       Other information:
       1. Nikica Janjic--Omarska and Keraterm (Bosnian Serb)--
     Banja Luka (Bosnian Serb territory)--According to friends and 
     his father, he killed himself in September 1995 (Christian 
     Science Monitor, Nov. 28, 1996).
       Statistical summary:
       37 out of 67: 55.2% of the 67 indicted war criminals who 
     are still at large. 5 out of 5: 100% of war criminals who 
     have been indicted for Genocide.--John W. Hefferman, 
     Coalition for International Justice.
                                  ____


                     Bosnia Tolerates War Criminals

                           (By Liam McDowall)

       Vitez, Bosnia-Herzegovina (AP).--Locating war crimes 
     suspects in this Bosnian Croat town is easy. Finding someone 
     prepared to arrest them is tough.
       On a typical afternoon, Marinko Katava, who's wanted for 
     murder, can be found behind his desk in the town hall. Pero 
     Skopljak, the town's former chief of police, runs a local 
     printing store.
       The Kupreskic family--three of whose members are wanted for 
     their role in the murderous wartime campaign against their 
     Muslim neighbors--are usually at the grocery store they run.
       All have been indicted by the U.N. war crimes tribunal in 
     The Hague, Netherlands and listed on a widely-distributed 
     ``Wanted'' poster.
       The suspects aren't easy to see. A reporter who spoke by 
     telephone with the Kupeskics was met at the grocery by a 
     group of men who asked the reporter to leave. Skopljak's wife 
     made the same request at the printing shop, and fellow town 
     hall workers said Katava did not want to meet the visitor.
       But none of them take any precautions to guard against 
     arrest.
       Why should they?
       Nobody is looking for them. The unarmed U.N. police force 
     has no powers of arrest and the NATO-led peace force has no 
     mandate to hunt those indicted for their alleged roles in 
     Bosnia's war.
       Of the 74 men indicted by the tribunal--four Muslims, 16 
     Croats and 54 Serbs--only eight are in detention. Four 
     Muslims, two Serbs and one Croat are in The Hague, and one 
     Croat is being held in Croatia, pending extradition.
       Just the most famous war crimes suspects follow elaborate 
     security measures to make sure they won't be nabbed and 
     carried off to trial. They include Radovan Karadzic, who led 
     the Bosnian Serbs during the war, and his former military 
     commander Gen. Ratko Mladic, who was fired Saturday by 
     Karadzic's replacement, President Biljana Plavsic.
       ``Somehow the issue of detaining war criminals has fallen 
     into an institutional black hole,'' said Michael Steiner, a 
     top international peace administrator in Bosnia.
       The impotence of the international community was starkly 
     illustrated in August when an indicted Serb walked into a 
     U.N. police station near Sarajevo to file a complaint against 
     Bosnian police who had attempted to arrest him.
       The U.N. police did not recognize him and later said they 
     would have made no effort to detain him anyway, since it 
     wasn't their job.
       Stung by criticism, international peace administrators are 
     now compiling a list of war crimes suspects and their 
     whereabouts.
       They're hoping that with the U.S. elections over--along 
     with the chance that U.S. casualties could mar President 
     Clinton's reelection--Washington may be prepared to support a 
     new mission to go after some of the wanted men.
       But up to now, officials have displayed little zeal to 
     embroil any of the 43,000 soldiers of the NATO-led peace 
     force in the war crimes issue, wary of possible retaliation 
     by Bosnia's former warring parties.
       The peace force claims that during the past 11 months, not 
     one of its men has spotted a war crimes suspect. Spokesmen 
     now even deny their troops' sightings of Karadzic, which they 
     once confirmed.
       That leaves nabbing suspects up to Bosnian Muslim, Croat 
     and Serb authorities--and ``they will not do it,'' Steiner 
     said. It would be political suicide for any leader to hand 
     over suspects to The Hague.
       While the Muslim-led government in Sarajevo has in the main 
     cooperated in arresting and extraditing suspects, Bosnia's 
     Serbs and Croats have not.
       The two Serbs in custody were arrested abroad, and the 
     Croat in The Hague handed himself in after special conditions 
     were agreed upon in advance. The Croat being held in Croatia 
     was arrested by Croatian officials, not Bosnian Croats.
       Karadzic, accused of genocide and crimes against humanity 
     for the siege of Sarajevo and the presumed massacre of 
     thousands of Muslims after the fall of Srebrenica in July 
     1995, still controls the Serb-controlled half of Bosnia from 
     behind the scenes.
       Ostensibly forced out of office in July under the terms of 
     a U.S.-brokered deal, he makes little effort to conceal his 
     daily movements in his mountain stronghold of Pale, southeast 
     of Sarajevo. Confident of his security system and aware that 
     nobody is going to try and grab him, he drives past the 
     U.N. police station in Pale each day.
       Mladic lives just 8 miles from a big American base in 
     eastern Bosnia, keeping bees and goat in a heavily-guarded 
     compound in Han Pijesak. There was no unusual movement 
     reported around his compound on Saturday.
       U.N. officials told The AP that six indicted Serbs still 
     hold their police jobs: four in the northwestern town of 
     Prijedor and two in the southeastern town of Foca.
       Bosnian Croats are no more compliant. In Vitez, 50 miles 
     northwest of Sarajevo, at least six of the 14 Croats indicted 
     for their role in the expulsion and murder of Muslims from 
     the region remain at liberty.
       The Associated Press discovered that at least one of the 
     war crimes suspects wanted for murder, Marinko Katava, 
     continues to work as a labor inspector in the local 
     government.
       Katava--whose whereabouts, according to the tribunal and 
     the multinational peace force, is unknown--can be found 
     during working hours at town hall and at other times in his 
     pleasant downtown apartment.
       Mirjan Kupreskic and his cousin Vlatko Kupreskic, wanted 
     for their alleged role in a murderous campaign against Muslim 
     civilians, live in Pirici on Vitez's eastern flank and run a 
     small grocery in the center of town.
       Together with Zoran Kupreskic, Mirjan's brother, the three 
     are charged on several counts of war crimes. Their victims, 
     Muslim neighbors, included a four-month-old infant and a 75-
     year-old pensioner.
       Pero Skopljak, whom tribunal prosecutors accuse of 
     overseeing ``the inhumane treatment'' of Muslim civilians, 
     runs a printing company from the ground floor of his spacious 
     house in Vitez.
       Drago Josipovic, indicted for his role in the execution of 
     Muslim civilians, is a chemical engineer at the local Vitezit 
     explosives factory. He lives in his family house in the 
     village of Santici, just east of Vitez.
       The town's deputy policy chief, Marko Dundzer, told The AP 
     that he knew ``a few'' suspects remained in Vitez but didn't 
     know any of them personally.
       In spite of Bosnian Croat leaders' claims that they are 
     cooperating fully with the tribunal, Dundzer said he would 
     not attempt to arrest any suspect. ``I have received no 
     orders to do such a thing,'' he said.

[[Page S5118]]

     
                                  ____
                 [From the Boston Globe, Oct. 29, 1996]

              Bosnia's War Criminals Enjoy Peacetime Power

                         (By Elizabeth Neuffer)

       Prijedor, Bosnia-Herzegovina--It only takes a phone call to 
     nearby Omarska to discover the whereabouts of Zjelko Mejakic, 
     one of the West's most wanted indicted war criminals.
       ``Zejelko?'' says the operator at the town police station. 
     ``He's not here at the moment, but he'll definitely be here 
     later.''
       Mejakic, the Bosnian Serb former commander of the notorious 
     Omarska prison camp, is deputy police chief, despite his 
     indictment for genocide by the International War Crimes 
     Tribunal at the Hague. And he is not alone: Three indicated 
     war criminals work at the Prijedor police station, according 
     to United Nations and Bosnian Serb sources.
       Nearly a year after the Dayton peace accord for Bosnia 
     called for war criminals to be brought to justice, alleged 
     war criminals remain at large and in positions of power, many 
     ruling their communities as firmly in peace as they did 
     during the war.
       The net result, a Globe investigation has found, is that 
     some alleged war criminals are flourishing in peacetime. Some 
     are believed to have turned to organized crime, including 
     drug trafficking, counterfeiting and extortion.
       Others have kept their hold on communities, allegedly 
     intimidating political opponents and running protection 
     rackets, keeping their war records buried under new abuses of 
     power. Their reach appears to stretch beyond Bosnia: Several 
     war crimes witnesses interviewed in Germany said they have 
     been threatened there.
       ``Unfortunately, Dayton is only a piece of paper,'' said 
     Rev. Karlo Visaticki, a Roman Catholic priest in Serb-held 
     Banja Luka who holds local warloads responsible for the 1995 
     disappearance of a local priest. ``All the war criminals are 
     still in power.''
       The arrest and trial of alleged war criminals is seen as a 
     key element of peace here, allowing justice to break Balkan 
     cycles of revenge. Yet NATO peacekeepers, whose mandate bans 
     them from searching out war criminals, have yet to arrest any 
     of the more than 76 men indicted. Nor have former warring 
     parties turned over those charged.
       Under the Dayton accord, indicted war criminals are banned 
     from holding public or elective office. But in reality, many 
     still do: most notably, Gen. Ratko Mladic heads the Bosnian 
     Serb Army despite his indictment for overseeing the massacre 
     of thousands of Muslims from the UN ``safe haven'' of 
     Srebrenica. In fact, UN sources say Mladic has extended his 
     power base to include police in northwest Bosnia.
       Radovan Karadzic, the former Bosnian Serb leader widely 
     viewed as a prime architect of a conflict that killed scores 
     of thousands of people and created 2 million refugees, was 
     forced to step down, but still dictates Bosnian Serb policies 
     and lives in Bosnia with impunity despite his war crimes 
     indictment.
       Other less renowned indicated war criminals threaten peace 
     by continuing to control their communities. Prijedor, in 
     Serb-held Bosnia, and Mostar, in the Muslim-Croat Federation, 
     are two such places.


                                prijedor

       In 1993, Prijedor burst into the West's consciousness with 
     news of the Serb-run detention camps of Ornarska, Keraterm 
     and Trnopolje. Today, the camps are closed. But those who 
     operated them, beating, torturing, raping and killing Muslim 
     and Croat prisoners, still run Prijedor, according to Bosnian 
     Serbs and Western officials. To some, these men are war 
     heroes, who deserve to be in charge of the police station and 
     newspaper. But to opposition politicians, ethnic minorities 
     or dissidents of any kind, the presence of indicted and 
     alleged war criminals in power means peace brings no 
     guarantee of freedom.
       ``The only thing that has changed since Dayton is that 
     there is no shooting,'' said one of the few remaining Muslims 
     here, who asked not to be identified. Out of a prewar 
     population of about 45,000 Muslims, about 450 remain. ``We 
     continue to live in fear.''
       Three indicted war criminals accused of genocide for 
     ``ethnic cleansing'' at the Omarska camp are today Prijedor 
     policemen: shift commander Mladen ``Krkan'' Radic, former 
     camp commander Miroslav Kvocka and guard Nedjeljko Timarac.
       ``The worst shift in the camp was the one in which Mladen 
     Radic was in charge,'' recalled camp survivor Nusret Sivac in 
     a book about Ornarska and Trnopolje. ``One day * * * they 
     were beating and stomping over everyone, saying, `On St. 
     Peter's day, we'll light you as firewood, [rape] your Turkish 
     mothers!' and they kept their promise.''
       With these men in power in Prijedor--and Mejakic in the 
     police station in Ornarska--there can be no freedom of 
     speech, local Bosnian Serbs say.
       ``It's a pity these killers are still free,'' said one 
     Bosnian Serb from near Ornarska, who asked not to be 
     identified. ``Because it is still dangerous. Overnight, one 
     can lose one's life.''
       Learning of the presence of indicted war criminals on the 
     Prijedor force, Robert Wasserman, deputy commissioner of the 
     UN International Police Task Force, which monitors civilian 
     aspects of the Dayton accords, said the group would seek to 
     have the officers removed.
       ``We are outraged, and we will move immediately for the 
     removal of these people,'' he said. ``It seriously undermines 
     confidence in police in the country.''
       One alleged criminal who is still free is former Prijedor 
     police chief Simo Drljaca, whom UN and NATO officials expect 
     to be indicted this month for war crimes. Drljaca, sources 
     say, determined who was sent to prison camps and how they 
     were treated, including signing all the execution orders.
       Since the war, Drljaca has run Prijedor as if it were his 
     fiefdom. In addition to controlling officials from the mayor 
     on down. Drljaca is alleged by residents to have demanded 
     kickbacks for apartments and police protection of businesses. 
     Locally, his nickname is ``Mr. Ten Percent,'' for the rate he 
     demands from area bars and restaurants.
       Bosnian Serbs who don't toe the party line allege they had 
     to pay the police to avoid being evicted from their 
     apartments. Western officials say that residents who talked 
     to them later were threatened by Drljaca, called to the 
     police station for ``informative talks.''
       NATO officials attempted to reduce Drljaca's power a few 
     weeks ago, forcing Bosnian Serb authorities to remove him as 
     police chief after he threatened NATO peacekeepers with a 
     gun.
       ``He was God here,'' said one Western official in the 
     region. ``He controlled everything and everyone.''
       But last week, despite a new job as logistics adviser to 
     the minister of interior of the Serb half of Bosnia, Drljaca 
     was working as the Prijedor police station, still reachable 
     via his secretary there. ``Unfortunately,'' said one military 
     source, ``he's still pulling the strings here.''
       ``Oh, from now on I am going to be a good boy,'' Drljaca 
     said in a recent interview with the Globe, denying all 
     allegations. ``These charges are unjustified . . . but it 
     won't affect my personal life. I have protection. Any time of 
     day or night, I am ready to resist.''
       That alleged war criminals still run Prijedor is a powerful 
     disincentive for Muslim and Croat refugees who want to return 
     home.
       ``These criminals assaulted and killed and robbed us, and 
     now they are still in power?'' said Sefik Terzic, a 54-year-
     old Omarska survivor now in Germany. ``And this is where I am 
     supposed to return to? I'd rather kill myself than let them 
     finish the job they began four years ago.''


                                 MOSTAR

       Since the signing of the Dayton agreement last December, 
     the city of Mostar has become Bosnia's hub for organized 
     crime. Explosions routinely destroy cafes of owners unwilling 
     to pay protection money. Opposition figures are openly 
     harassed. Car theft and counterfeit rings abound. Ethnic 
     minorities are chased from their homes. An illegal drug 
     trade, from marijuana to cocaine, is flourishing. And lurking 
     behind all these developments. Bosnian government and Western 
     sources say, are two men accused of being war criminals: 
     Mladen ``Tuta'' Naletilic and Vinko ``Stela'' Martinovic.
       ``It's got to be the leaders in Mostar and in Bosnia who 
     are determined to get rid of this problem and put the scum 
     where they belong, behind bars,'' Sir Martin Garrod, the 
     European Union envoy to Mostar, told reporters in August, 
     naming Naletilic and Martinovic.
       Neither man has been indicted by the War Crimes Tribunal, 
     although files on their wartime activities have been sent to 
     the Hague. The Tribunal was alarmed after Nedzad Ugljen, a 
     Bosnian agent investigating the two men and cooperating with 
     the Tribunal, was assassinated in Sarajevo, according to 
     sources who read a letter sent by the Tribunal to Bosnian 
     officials.
       A look at the two men's alleged wartime and peacetime 
     careers reveals how fine a line there appears to be between 
     war crimes and organized crime in today's Bosnia.
       The old warlords have simply shifted their activities to 
     organized crimes.'' said Col. Pieter Lambrechste of the 
     European Union police in Mostar. ``And in this postwar 
     period, crime is flourishing.''
       So much so that FBI and Drug Enforcement Administration 
     investigators, drawn by the boom in organized crime, recently 
     visited Bosnia.
       According to Bosnian government and Western sources. Tuta 
     and Stela gained a stranglehold on Mostar in 1993, running 
     anti-terrorist units in the Bosnian Croatian Army that drove 
     minorities from the city and set up local detention camps.
       Tuta, a Canadian Croat who is close to Croatian Defense 
     Minister Gojko Susak, is described as having been the brains 
     behind the operation; Stela, who had a lengthy criminal 
     record before the war, the front man. ``Tuta gave the orders, 
     and Stela obeyed,'' said one Western official here.
       Officials allege that ``Stela'' Martinovic and his thugs--
     the ``ATG Mrmak,'' identifiable by their sunglasses and 
     shaved heads--drove out Muslims and Serbs from West Mostar, 
     killing and raping as they went. ``Our whole neighborhood was 
     kicked out by Stela's team,'' said Azra Hasanbegovic, 49, 
     now in East Mostar. ``My 74-year-old mother was badly 
     beaten with rifle butts . . . there were a lot of rapes.''
       Bosnian government sources allege that Tuta and Stela 
     established a prison camp at the local helicopter base. 
     Testimony from camp survivors, compiled by the Bosnian 
     government and delivered to the Hague, includes accounts of 
     people forced to eat feces,

[[Page S5119]]

     denied water under beating sun and made to watch their 
     children raped or killed.
       Even local Croats were not safe. Both Tuta and Stela 
     reportedly levied a ``war tax'' on those who refused to fight 
     the Muslims.
       Today, the two men continue to exercise power with 
     impunity. Stela prowls Mostar in his green Jaguar, Mercedes 
     600 or Mercedes 124; Tuta lives next door to Susak in the 
     village of Siroki Brijeg. Bosnian government sources allege 
     the two men are now involved in counterfeiting money, running 
     drugs, prostitution, smuggling cigarettes and protection 
     rackets.
       Western authorities say they are aware of the allegations, 
     but cannot prove them. But they do think the two hold sway 
     over Bosnian Croat police, who have done nothing about 50 
     cases so far this year involving the expulsion of Muslims 
     from their homes. Last week, a Muslim woman arrived home 
     after a two-hour absence to discover a Croatian family in her 
     apartment.
       ``No one Croat can survive in business or politics unless 
     he is in agreement with Tuta,'' said one Bosnian government 
     source.
       In recent weeks, leading political opposition figures in 
     Mostar have been threatened, shot at and beaten. In April, 
     Tuta physically attacked a leading Croatian government 
     critic, Slobodan Budak, at Zagreb's InterContinental Hotel.
       ``There is a climate of intimidation and fear in Mostar, 
     and people are frightened to stand up and express their views 
     as a result,'' said Garrod, the European Union envoy. 
     ``Unfortunately, people on all levels are not yet prepared to 
     demand that the guilty be brought to justice.''
       Previous Globe coverage and links are available on Globe 
     Online at http://www.boston.com.
 The keyword is Bosnia.
                                  ____

       Among alleged war criminals in Prijedor and Omarska.
       Momcilo ``Cigo'' Radanovic, Prijedor deputy mayor; Former 
     head of Bosnian Serb Army unit; allegedly extorted residents 
     by promising freedom for cash. ``The biggest crimes in 
     Kozarac were committed . . . under the command of Momcilo 
     (Cigo) Radanovic,'' charged a camp survivor, Nusret Sivac.
       Ranko Mijic, new Prijedor chief of police: Omarska camp 
     survivors say he was their chief interrogation officer.
       Simo Drljaca, previous Prejidor chief of police: Now 
     adviser to the ministry of interior. Allegedly determined who 
     went to camps; signed orders for executions. ``I became a 
     victim of his revenge,'' said D.E., a Croatian sent to 
     Keraterm. ``Shoving of police clubs into the anus and sitting 
     on broken beer bottles were only some of the maltreatments.''
       Mladen Radic, Prijedor police officer: Indicted by War 
     Crimes Tribunal. ``The guards formed a lane, we had to walk 
     through it. It was later explained that if Mladen winked his 
     eye or said, `Not this one,' the man would walk the lane 
     without being battered,'' said D.I., a former prisoner.
       Miroslav Kvocka, police officer: Indicted for war crimes. 
     Original commander of Omarska.
       Nedeljko Timarac, chief of forensics, Prijedor police: 
     Indicted for war crimes. At Omarska camp, he was ``a member 
     of the gang of Zoran Zigic, a multiple criminal. They are 
     responsible for many murders and rapes,'' said Nusrat Sevic.
       Zeljko Mejakic, Omarska deputy police commander: Indicted 
     for war crimes. Commander of Omarska camp. ``He interrogated 
     me four times,'' said Sefik Terzie, a survivor. ``He knocked 
     me with his fist. His mates knocked my teeth out.''
       Slobodan Kuruzovic, Prijedor newspaper editor: Indicted in 
     Croatia for war crimes. Was commander at Trnopoije camp.
                                  ____

                                                      May 6, 1997.
     Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg,
     Hon. Patrick J. Leahy,
     Committee on Appropriations,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Lautenberg and Senator Leahy: We are writing 
     to express our strong support and thanks for your 
     legislation, the ``War Crimes Prosecution Facilitation Act.''
       We are outraged that 66 of the 75 persons who have been 
     indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
     Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) for some of the worst crimes in this 
     half-century--including genocide, systematic rape and other 
     crimes against humanity--remain at large. As you know, many 
     of the indicted are living openly and comfortably in the 
     region, continuing to wield political and economic power.
       We are united in our concern that bilateral and 
     multilateral reconstruction assistance not strengthen and 
     enrich those indicted war criminals and the governments that 
     are failing to assist in their apprehension and transfer to 
     the Tribunal. It is essential to the peace process that we 
     carefully direct aid so as to encourage compliance with the 
     Dayton Agreement's core elements--apprehension of indicated 
     war criminals, freedom of movement, and return of refugees 
     and displaced persons--rather than strengthen those who are 
     flouting their sworn commitments to do so.
       We are particularly pleased that your legislation 
     recognizes the undeniable political realities of the region 
     and holds each Dayton signatory country responsible for the 
     actual extent of its authority and ability to assist the 
     Tribunal. Specifically, Croatia and Serbia have an obligation 
     not only to arrest indicted persons who are within their 
     borders but also to exercise their decisive political and 
     economic influence in the sections of Bosnia-Herzegovina they 
     effectively control to ensure that the indicted who are there 
     are arrested and sent to the Tribunal for trial.
       The continued presence of indicted war criminals in the 
     region and continued political and economic strength of their 
     protectors are the major obstacles to reform and 
     implementation of Dayton. Reconstruction will not be 
     successful--and U.S. tax dollars and those of other donors--
     will be wasted unless such assistance is provided in a manner 
     that supports reconciliation and the rule of law, rather than 
     rewards the very people most responsible for genocide and 
     ethnic cleansing.
       Thank you very much for your leadership and concern.
           Sincerely,
         Coalition for International Justice.
         Human Rights Watch.
         Physicians for Human Rights.
         Action Council for Peace in the Balkans.
         International Human Rights Law Group.

  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I am very pleased to be an original 
cosponsor of Senator Lautenberg's legislation, the War Crimes 
Prosecution Facilitation Act of 1997.
  Senator Lautenberg has consistently called for stronger action to 
bring war crimes in the former Yugoslavia to justice, and I appreciate 
his efforts and commend him for keeping the spotlight on this.
  I am not going to repeat what Senator Lautenberg has already said 
about why this legislation is needed. He has discussed it in detail. It 
is simply outrageous that people who are believed to be responsible for 
some of the most heinous crimes in this century have been living and 
traveling freely within the former Yugoslavia, their whereabouts a 
matter of public knowledge.
  My own view is that NATO forces, or some special contingent 
specifically constituted to capture war criminals, should go after 
these people. The longer we wait, the more powerless NATO appears, and 
the more convinced these people are that they have nothing to fear. But 
until that happens, at the very least, we should not give aid to 
governments that harbor war criminals, especially considering that they 
pledged to cooperate fully with the War Crimes Tribunal.
  That is the purpose of this legislation--to deny aid to governments 
of the former Yugoslavia until they arrest and turn over indicted war 
criminals who are within territory under that control, or to projects 
in communities whose local authorities are protecting war criminals or 
preventing refugees from returning home. Frankly, that should already 
be U.S. Government policy. There should be no need for this 
legislation. Since our goal is to promote reconciliation, the bill does 
make appropriate exceptions for humanitarian and other limited 
assistance.
  Mr. President, I want to again thank Senator Lautenberg for his 
leadership, I hope that the administration will respond by telling us 
that they are in agreement with this legislation and will conform their 
policy accordingly.
  By Mr. LUGAR (for himself and Mr. Harkin): S. 805. A bill to reform 
the information technology systems of the Department of Agriculture, 
and for other purposes; to the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and 
Forestry.


          THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE INFORMATION REFORM ACT

  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I rise to introduce legislation that will 
help Secretary of Agriculture Dan Glickman in his efforts to make USDA 
a more efficient user of taxpayer money. The Department of Agriculture 
has a long history of wasteful spending on information technology 
[IT]--telecommunications and computers. Over the past 10 years, USDA 
invested almost $8 billion on IT purchases that were often poorly 
planned, incompatible, and redundant. Recently Secretary Glickman 
lamented the stovepipe mentality that pervades USDA planning and 
purchases of information technology. That is, each agency of the 
Department protects its own turf and budget, and is reluctant to 
coordinate its IT planning and purchases with other agencies.
  The Secretary's observations are consistent with messages we have 
sent to USDA in years past. Five years ago, Senator Leahy and I warned 
that ``money invested by USDA in computer technology over the past 
several years has been spent without a clear understanding of what was 
being purchased

[[Page S5120]]

or what was operationally required to increase efficiency within the 
Department.'' We asked then Secretary Madigan to curtail computer 
purchases until a ``strategic plan or vision for Department 
reorganization is completed.'' We still await a final version of the 
current strategic plan.
  For over a decade, audits of USDA's IT purchases have uncovered the 
same root problems: inadequate control, planning, and direction of IT 
investments. Historically, USDA's administration has failed to exercise 
the authority to control the IT expenditures of its 30 agencies. These 
agencies' independent IT purchases have led to systems that are unable 
to communicate across the Department. This has impeded program delivery 
and resulted in a labyrinth of duplicative and incompatible systems 
that has wasted hundreds of millions of dollars.
  The 104th Congress passed the Clinger-Cohen Act, which requires 
performance and results-based management in IT planning and purchases 
throughout Government. Clinger-Cohen created the position of the Chief 
Information Officer [CIO], a high-level executive responsible for 
achieving program delivery through prudent and coordinated IT 
investments. The concept of CIO coordination of IT planning and 
purchases is already widespread in the private sector.
  To be successful, the CIO must have significant legal and budgetary 
authorities. The CIO at USDA has neither. Individual agencies, which 
control their own budgets, can ignore the CIO. Currently, USDA's CIO 
has the responsibility to coordinate IT investments across agencies, 
but lacks the planning and budgeting authority to meet this 
responsibility. Without such authority, the problems of the past are 
sure to continue.
  The legislation I introduce today builds on Clinger-Cohen by giving 
the CIO at USDA the legal and budgetary authorities necessary to manage 
IT across USDA's 30 agencies. This bill accomplishes three things. 
First, the CIO is given the legal and budget authorities necessary to 
sucessfully manage IT to benefit the Department as a whole. Second, the 
CIO is given subcabinet rank within USDA, and will report directly to 
the Secretary. Third, the CIO is given the authority to approve or 
disapprove all purchases for telecommunications and computers.
  One important provision of this bill transfers to the CIO 10 percent 
of all USDA agencies' appropriations for salaries and expenses, to be 
used for IT planning and purchases. This amount can be adjusted by the 
Secretary. When the CIO approves an expenditure, the funds are released 
back to the agency. My purpose in including this provision is to 
provide the CIO with sufficient authority to control IT throughout 
USDA. I understand that Secretary Glickman may prefer alternative 
methods of achieving this goal. I look forward to working with him to 
craft the best means of accomplishing our common objective, because I 
genuinely intend this legislation to be helpful to his efforts and want 
to be supportive.
  Secretary Glickman sincerely wants to change the stovepipe mentality 
that pervades decisionmaking among USDA's 30 agencies. The Secretary 
has expressed a desire to reform the planning and budgeting of IT 
expenditures. He has stated a desire to halt the pattern of 
uncoordinated planning and ill-advised purchases that has resulted in 
the waste of taxpayer dollars. I believe the Secretary agrees that we 
cannot afford the operating procedures which exist today.
  However, the challenge of effecting change in the long-standing 
pattern of stovepipe agencies operating on their own is formidable. By 
introducing this bill today, I offer my assistance to the Secretary in 
this difficult and heretofore elusive task.
  The intent of this legislation is to help the Secretary realize his 
vision of a common USDA spirit by allowing him to implement reforms 
across the entire Department of Agriculture. I look forward to working 
with him to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of IT purchases 
and in so doing improve delivery of USDA programs.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                 S. 805

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Department 
     of Agriculture Information Technology Reform Act''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings.
Sec. 3. Definitions.
Sec. 4. Powers and duties of Chief Information Officer.
Sec. 5. Procurement of outside consultants.
Sec. 6. Transfer of agency information technology funds.
Sec. 7. Review by Office of Management and Budget.
Sec. 8. Technical amendment.
Sec. 9. Termination of authority.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       Congress finds that--
       (1) the Office of Management and Budget estimates that the 
     Department of Agriculture will spend $1,100,000,000, 
     $1,200,000,000, and $1,250,000,000 for fiscal years 1996, 
     1997, and 1998, respectively, on information technology and 
     automated data processing equipment;
       (2) according to the Department, as of October 1993, the 
     Department had 17 major information technology systems under 
     development with an estimated life-cycle cost of 
     $6,300,000,000;
       (3) over the past decade, committees of Congress, the 
     General Accounting Office, the Office of Management and 
     Budget, and private consultants have repeatedly argued that 
     the Department's information technology decisions have been 
     made in piecemeal fashion, on an individual agency basis, 
     resulting in duplication, a lack of coordination, and wasted 
     financial and technological resources by the offices or 
     agencies of the Department and in hundreds of millions of 
     wasted dollars over the past decade;
       (4) the Department's role in agriculture in the United 
     States was substantially altered by the FAIR Act, although 
     the Department has yet to adequately assess fully the impact 
     the FAIR Act will have on the services the Department 
     provides to its customers;
       (5) decentralized, uncoordinated, and wasteful purchases 
     for information technology have continued at the Department 
     until recently when the Secretary imposed a moratorium on 
     purchases;
       (6) strong central and independent leadership, control, and 
     accountability is essential to coordinating planning and 
     eliminating wasteful purchases;
       (7) the Chief Information Officer should have a subcabinet 
     rank within the Department;
       (8) a single authority for Department-wide planning is 
     needed to ensure that the information technology architecture 
     of the Department is based on the strategic business plans, 
     information resources, management goals, and core business 
     process methodology of the Department;
       (9) information technology is a strategic resource for the 
     missions and program activities of the Department;
       (10) consolidating the budgetary authority for information 
     technology purchases is key to eliminating purchases that are 
     conducted in piecemeal fashion, on an individual office or 
     agency of the Department basis, resulting in duplication, a 
     lack of coordination, and wasted financial and technological 
     resources at the Department;
       (11) centralizing the authority and funding for planning 
     and investment for information technology in the Office of 
     the Chief Information Officer will--
       (A) provide the Department with strong and coordinated 
     leadership and direction;
       (B) ensure that the business architecture is based on 
     rigorous core business process methodology;
       (C) ensure that the information technology architecture of 
     the Department is based on the strategic business plans of 
     the offices or agencies of the Department and the missions of 
     the Department;
       (D) ensure that funds will be invested in information 
     technology only after the Chief Information Officer has 
     completed the planning and review of future business 
     requirements of the offices or agencies and developed an 
     information technology architecture that is based on the 
     business requirements; and
       (E) force the Department to act as a single enterprise with 
     respect to information technology, thus eliminating the 
     duplication and inefficiency associated with a single office- 
     or agency-based approach;
       (12) each office or agency of the Department should achieve 
     at least--
       (A) a 5 percent per year decrease in costs incurred for 
     operation and maintenance of information technology; and
       (B) a 5 percent per year increase in operational efficiency 
     through improvements in information resource management; and
       (13) information resource management should be supported by 
     a senior official of the Department who is committed to using 
     information technology as a process to facilitate the most 
     efficient administration of the program functions of the 
     Department by marshalling the necessary resources and the 
     commitment of high-level managers toward that end.

     SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act:

[[Page S5121]]

       (1) Agency information technology funds.--The term ``agency 
     information technology funds'' means 10 percent of the annual 
     fiscal year funds that are made available to each office or 
     agency of the Department for salaries and expenses.
       (2) Chief information officer.--The term ``Chief 
     Information Officer'' means the individual appointed by the 
     Secretary to serve as Chief Information Officer (as 
     established by section 5125 of the Information Technology 
     Management Reform Act of 1996 (40 U.S.C. 1425)) for the 
     Department.
       (3) Department.--The term ``Department'' means the 
     Department of Agriculture.
       (4) FAIR act.--The term ``FAIR Act'' means the Federal 
     Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 (Public Law 
     104-127).
       (5) Information resource management.--The term 
     ``information resource management'' means the process of 
     managing information resources to accomplish agency missions 
     and to improve agency performance.
       (6) Information resources.--The term ``information 
     resources'' means information and related resources such as 
     personnel, equipment, funds, and information technology 
     systems.
       (7) Information technology architecture.--The term 
     ``information technology architecture'' means an integrated 
     framework for evolving or maintaining existing information 
     technology and acquiring new information technology to 
     achieve the strategic business plans, information resources, 
     management goals, and core business process methodology of 
     the Department.
       (8) Information technology system.--The term ``information 
     technology system'' means a system of automated data 
     processing or telecommunications equipment or software 
     (including support services), information resource 
     management, or business process reengineering of an office or 
     agency of the Department.
       (9) Office or agency of the department.--The term ``office 
     or agency of the Department'' means, as applicable, each 
     current or future--
       (A) national, regional, county, or local office or agency 
     of the Department;
       (B) county committee established under section 8(b)(5) of 
     the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act (16 U.S.C. 
     590h(b)(5));
       (C) State committee, State office, or field service center 
     of the Farm Service Agency; and
       (D) a group of multiple offices and agencies of the 
     Department that are currently, or will be, connected through 
     common program activities and information technology systems.
       (10) Performance goal.--The term ``performance goal'' means 
     a target level of performance expressed as a tangible, 
     measurable objective, against which actual achievement can be 
     compared, including a goal expressed as a quantitative 
     standard, value, or rate.
       (11) Program activity.--The term ``program activity'' means 
     a specific activity or project of a program that is carried 
     out by 1 or more offices or agencies of the Department.
       (12) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary 
     of Agriculture.
       (13) Transfer or obligation of funds.--The term ``transfer 
     or obligation of funds'' means, as applicable--
       (A) the transfer of funds (including appropriated funds, 
     mandatory funds, and funds of the Commodity Credit 
     Corporation) from 1 account to another account of an office 
     or agency of the Department for the purpose of investing in 
     an information technology system of an office or agency of 
     the Department that exceeds $250,000 for any 1 order, or 
     aggregation of orders, for the same or similar items and 
     involves planning, providing services, or leasing or 
     purchasing of personal property (including all hardware and 
     software) or services for an information technology system of 
     an office or agency of the Department;
       (B) the obligation of funds (including appropriated funds, 
     mandatory funds, and funds of the Commodity Credit 
     Corporation) for the purpose of investing in an information 
     technology system of an office or agency of the Department 
     that exceeds $250,000 for any 1 order, or aggregation of 
     orders, for the same or similar items and involves planning, 
     providing services, or leasing or purchasing of personal 
     property (including all hardware and software) or services 
     for an information technology system of an office or agency 
     of the Department; or
       (C) the obligation of funds (including appropriated funds, 
     mandatory funds, and funds of the Commodity Credit 
     Corporation) for the purpose of investing in an information 
     technology system of an office or agency of the Department 
     that exceeds $250,000 for any 1 order, or aggregation of 
     orders, for the same or similar items and involves planning, 
     providing services, or leasing or purchasing of personal 
     property (including all hardware and software) or services 
     for an information technology system of an office or agency 
     of the Department, to be obtained through a contract with an 
     office or agency of the Federal Government, a State, the 
     District of Columbia, or any person in the private sector.

     SEC. 4. POWERS AND DUTIES OF CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER.

       Notwithstanding any other provision of law (except the 
     Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (Public Law 
     103-62), amendments made by that Act, and the Information 
     Technology Management Reform Act of 1996 (40 U.S.C. 1401 et 
     seq.)), in addition to the general authorities provided to 
     the Chief Information Officer by section 5125 of the 
     Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996 (40 
     U.S.C. 1425), the Chief Information Officer shall have the 
     following powers and duties within the Department:
       (1) Leadership in reorganization and streamlining 
     efforts.--The Chief Information Officer, in cooperation with 
     other persons such as the Chief Financial Officer and the 
     Executive Information Technology Investment Review Board (or 
     its successor), shall provide the strong central leadership, 
     planning, and accountability that is needed in light of the 
     substantial changes created by the FAIR Act and 
     reorganization and downsizing initiatives already commenced 
     within the Department.
       (2) Information technology systems and information resource 
     management.--The Chief Information Officer shall oversee the 
     development, implementation, and maintenance of all 
     information technology systems and information resource 
     management in the Department.
       (3) Department-wide information technology systems.--The 
     Chief Information Officer shall ensure that information 
     technology systems of the Department are designed to 
     coordinate the functions of the offices or agencies of the 
     Department on a Department-wide basis.
       (4) Information technology architecture.--The Chief 
     Information Officer shall establish, and exercise exclusive 
     authority over, an information technical architecture that 
     serves the entire Department based on the strategic business 
     plans, information resources, management goals, and core 
     business process methodology of the Department.
       (5) Coordination of information technology architecture and 
     agency strategic plans.--
       (A) In general.--The Chief Information Officer shall ensure 
     that the information technology architecture of the 
     Department clearly implements the strategic business plans, 
     and information resource management, of offices or agencies 
     of the Department regarding the needs and goals of program 
     activities of the Department.
       (B) Goals of the information technology architecture.--The 
     Chief Information Officer shall design and implement an 
     information technology architecture in a manner that ensures 
     that--
       (i) the information technology system of each office or 
     agency of the Department maximizes the effectiveness and 
     efficiency of mission delivery and information resource 
     management, and supports core business processes of the 
     Department;
       (ii) the information technology system of each office or 
     agency of the Department maximizes quality per dollar 
     expended;
       (iii) maximizes efficiency and coordination of information 
     technology systems between offices or agencies of the 
     Department;
       (iv) planning for, leases, and purchases of the information 
     technology system of each office or agency of the Department 
     most efficiently satisfy the needs of the office or agency in 
     terms of the customers served, program characteristics, and 
     employees affected by the system; and
       (v) information technology systems of the Department are 
     designed and managed to coordinate or consolidate similar 
     functions of the missions, and offices or agencies of the 
     Department, on a Department-wide basis.
       (6) Coordination and evaluation of information technology 
     systems of offices and agencies.--The Chief Information 
     Officer shall--
       (A) monitor the performance of the information technology 
     system of each office or agency of the Department;
       (B) evaluate the performance of the system on the basis of 
     applicable performance measurements; and
       (C) advise the head of the office or agency on whether to 
     continue, modify, or terminate the system.
       (7) Electronic fund transfers.--The Chief Information 
     Officer shall ensure that the information technology 
     architecture of the Department complies with the requirement 
     of section 3332 of title 31, United States Code, that certain 
     current, and all future payments after January 1, 1999, be 
     tendered through electronic fund transfer.
       (8) Field service centers.--The Chief Information Officer 
     shall ensure that the information technology architecture of 
     the Department provides for information technology systems 
     that are designed for field service centers--
       (A) to best facilitate the exchange of information between 
     field service centers and other offices or agencies of the 
     Department;
       (B) that integrate the operation of all existing 
     information technology systems of the Department to provide a 
     single point of service for program delivery;
       (C) that integrate the changed missions of the Department 
     in light of the FAIR Act and reorganization and downsizing 
     initiatives of the Department; and
       (D) that are cost effective.
       (9) Information technology system investments.--
       (A) In general.--The Chief Information Officer shall have 
     the exclusive authority to approve a transfer or obligation 
     of funds to be used for the purpose of investing in an 
     information technology system of the Department that exceeds 
     $250,000 and that applies to an office or agency of the 
     Department or has a Department-wide impact.

[[Page S5122]]

       (B) Conditions on approval of funding.--The Chief 
     Information Officer shall not approve the transfer or 
     obligation of funds with respect to an office or agency of 
     the Department unless the Chief Information Officer 
     determines that--
       (i) the information technology architecture of the 
     Department is complete;
       (ii) the funds will be transferred or obligated for an 
     information technology system that is consistent with, and 
     maximizes the performance of, the strategic business plans of 
     the office or agency of the Department and of the Department;
       (iii) ongoing projects and other acquisitions have been 
     reviewed to ensure that similar requirements, common 
     elements, and economies of scale are realized; and
       (iv) in coordination with the Chief Financial Officer, the 
     strategic business plan of the office or agency is complete.
       (C) Capital planning and investment control.--Before 
     approving a transfer or obligation of funds for an investment 
     under subparagraph (A), the Chief Information Officer shall 
     consult with the Executive Information Technology Investment 
     Review Board (or its successor) concerning whether the 
     investment--
       (i) meets the objectives of capital planning processes for 
     selecting, managing, and evaluating the results of major 
     investments in information systems; and
       (ii) links the affected strategic plan with the information 
     technology architecture of the Department.
       (D) Evaluation of investments.--The Chief Information 
     Officer shall adopt, and have exclusive authority to use, a 
     standard set of criteria to evaluate proposals for 
     information technology system investments that are applicable 
     to individual offices or agencies of the Department or have a 
     Department-wide impact. The criteria adopted shall include 
     considerations of Department-wide or Federal Government-wide 
     impact, visibility, cost, risk, consistency with the 
     information technology architecture, and maximization of 
     performance goals for program activities.
       (10) Use of budget process.--
       (A) In general.--The Chief Information Officer shall 
     develop, as part of the budget process, a process for 
     analyzing, tracking, and evaluating the risks and results of 
     all major capital investments made by an office or agency of 
     the Department for information systems.
       (B) Process.--The process shall cover the life of each 
     system and shall include explicit criteria for analyzing the 
     projected and actual costs, benefits, and risks associated 
     with the investments.
       (C) Control and oversight of budget.--The Chief Information 
     Officer shall exercise exclusive control over the budget of 
     the Office of the Chief Information Officer, including funds 
     appropriated to the Office, and agency information technology 
     funds that are annually transferred to the account of the 
     Chief Information Officer under section 6(a).
       (11) Compliance with omb criteria and oversight.--The Chief 
     Information Officer shall ensure compliance with all criteria 
     for an information technology architecture or information 
     technology investment that are established by the Office of 
     Management and Budget and under the Information Technology 
     Management Reform Act of 1996 (40 U.S.C. 1401 et seq.).
       (12) Evaluation of programs and investments.--
       (A) Requirement.--The Chief Information Officer, in 
     consultation with the Executive Information Technology 
     Investment Review Board (or its successor), shall evaluate 
     the information resources management practices of the offices 
     or agencies of the Department with respect to the performance 
     and results of the investments made by the offices or 
     agencies in information technology.
       (B) Direction for action.--The Chief Information Officer 
     shall issue to the head of each office or agency of the 
     Department clear and concise direction that the head of the 
     office or agency shall--
       (i) establish effective and efficient capital planning 
     processes for selecting, managing, and evaluating the results 
     of all of its major investments in information systems;
       (ii) determine, before making an investment in a new 
     information system--

       (I) whether the function to be supported by the system 
     should be performed by the private sector and, if so, whether 
     any component of the office or agency performing that 
     function should be converted from a governmental organization 
     to a private sector organization; or
       (II) whether the function should be performed by the office 
     or agency and, if so, whether the function should be 
     performed by a private sector source under contract or by 
     personnel of the office or agency;

       (iii) analyze the missions of the office or agency and, 
     based on the analysis, revise the office or agency's mission-
     related processes and administrative processes, as 
     appropriate, before making significant investments in 
     information technology to be used in support of those 
     missions; and
       (iv) ensure that the information security policies, 
     procedures, and practices are adequate.
       (13) Reporting.--The Chief Information Officer shall report 
     only to the Secretary.

     SEC. 5. PROCUREMENT OF OUTSIDE CONSULTANTS.

       (a) In General.--Consistent with section 3109 of title 5, 
     United States Code, the Chief Information Officer may procure 
     a private consultant who is an expert in--
       (1) planning and organizing information technologies in the 
     context of a business; and
       (2) coordinating information technologies with core 
     business plans and processes.
       (b) Report.--The Chief Information Officer shall submit the 
     evaluation by the consultant to the Committee on Agriculture 
     of the House of Representatives and the Committee on 
     Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry of the Senate.

     SEC. 6. TRANSFER OF AGENCY INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FUNDS.

       (a) In General.--Subject to subsections (b) and (c) and 
     notwithstanding any other provision of law, each office or 
     agency of the Department shall annually transfer agency 
     information technology funds to the account of the Chief 
     Information Officer.
       (b) Use and Availability of Funds.--Agency information 
     technology funds that are transferred to the account of the 
     Chief Information Officer--
       (1) may be used only for an activity described in section 
     4, 5, or 6 or the Information Technology Management Reform 
     Act of 1996 (40 U.S.C. 1401 et seq.) that the Chief 
     Information Officer determines will best serve the needs of 
     the Department; and
       (2) shall remain available until expended.
       (c) Adjustment of Funds Transferred.--The Secretary may 
     adjust the amount of funds transferred by an office or agency 
     under subsection (a) to reflect the actual or estimated 
     expenditure of the office or agency for information 
     technology systems for a fiscal year.
       (d) Multiple Offices and Agencies.--An office or agency of 
     the Department shall not be required to transfer more than 10 
     percent of the funds made available to the office or agency 
     for salaries and expenses in any fiscal year to the extent 
     that the office or agency participates in a program activity 
     that involves more than 1 office or agency of the Department.

     SEC. 7. REVIEW BY OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET.

       The Director of the Office of Management and Budget may 
     review any regulation or transfer or obligation of funds 
     involving an information technology system of the Department 
     based on criteria for a strategic business plan, information 
     technology architecture, or information technology 
     investment, established by the Office of Management and 
     Budget under the Government Performance and Results Act of 
     1993 (Public Law 103-62), amendments made by that Act, and 
     the Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996 (40 
     U.S.C. 1401 et seq.).

     SEC. 8. TECHNICAL AMENDMENT.

       Section 13 of the Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act 
     (15 U.S.C. 714k) is amended in the second sentence by 
     striking ``section 5 or 11'' and inserting ``section 4, 5, or 
     11''.

     SEC. 9. TERMINATION OF AUTHORITY.

       The authority under this Act (other than section 8) 
     terminates on March 31, 2002.
                                 ______