[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 65 (Friday, May 16, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4625-S4628]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
NATO ALLIANCE MEMBERSHIP FOR ROMANIA
Mr. COCHRAN. Madam President, last week I received a letter from the
distinguished Senator from Indiana [Mr. Lugar] on the subject of a task
force which he had been asked to chair convened by the Council on
Foreign Relations on the subject of Russia, its neighbors, and an
enlarging NATO.
Senator Lugar's letter discusses the highlights of the findings and
agreements that were reached by this impressive task force made up of
experts on foreign policy and national security. I think it is
important for the Senate to consider and review carefully the task
force report and the information in that as we are beginning serious
consideration now in the Foreign Relations Committee and soon in this
Chamber proposals for the enlargement of NATO. We have already had
other agreements which have been widely publicized this week--
the charter or the framework between Russia and the United States on
the subject of NATO enlargement. So it is very timely, in my view, for
us to begin to get all of the information and all of the viewpoints
that we can from those who deserve respect on these issues so we will
be fully advised as we are called upon to make decisions on proposals
from the administration.
In his letter, Senator Lugar points out that ``The Task Force reached
a strong bipartisan consensus that the enlargement of NATO and improved
NATO-Russia relations need not be incompatible.'' First he pointed out
that the goal of this task force ``was to determine whether Russia's
concerns could be managed and its internal transition bolstered without
stopping or slowing NATO enlargement. The Task Force also looked,'' he
said, ``at the security concerns of the Baltic states and Ukraine.''
He says the Task Force ``agreed that it is in the United States
interest to try to achieve both'' enlargement of NATO and a
strengthening of NATO-Russian relations. So we also should ``negotiate
from a position of strength and not allow the NATO Alliance to be held
hostage in any manner by Moscow. We strongly caution,'' he said, the
Task Force said, ``that NATO's core mission of collective defense of
its members--both old and new--not be diluted in any manner.''
Other highlights include an urging of the administration and NATO
allies ``to take very specific steps, to reassure the Baltic states and
Ukraine that they will not be left in a security no-man's land.''
And in conclusion, he says the Task Force recommends endorsing
``NATO's decision to add new, `full' members at the Madrid summit in
July 1997, and suggests the Alliance remain open to the possibility of
adding more new members in the future.''
The Task Force said, and he quotes from their findings:
We believe that the goal of NATO's enlargement with Russia
should not be to provide compensation for enlargement.
Rather, it should be to forge a new NATO-Russia relationship
that builds on opportunities offered by a new Europe, a
Russia in transition and an adapting NATO.
The Task Force recommended also ``To engage Russia, negotiate a
formal NATO-Russia charter,'' which is being done, ``and a consultative
mechanism
[[Page S4626]]
that offers both sides incentives to cooperate on shared problems,''
and to ``Update Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty,'' which we
approved this week.
In conclusion, he points out that the Task Force suggests that we,
Reject vigorously any efforts by Moscow to dictate the
terms of Baltic or Ukrainian relations with NATO. The Task
Force urges the administration and the Alliance to offer
special assurances to the three Baltic states and Ukraine,
including confirmation that NATO's open-door policy applies
to all Partnership for Peace states; increased efforts to
include all four countries in Partnership for Peace planning
and training exercises; affirmation that the United States
shares the aspirations of the Baltic states to become full
members of all European institutions; and conclusion of a
NATO-Ukraine agreement to deepen practical consideration over
the coming years.
Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the full text of the
letter from Senator Lugar and the media remarks that he made on May 5
at the announcement of the task force findings and report be printed in
the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC, May 5, 1997.
Hon. Thad Cochran,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Thad: There is no more important foreign policy issue
today than the future of European security. Our investments
now in Europe's future will make a dramatic difference to our
own security. NATO's decision to enlarge is a key element of
that investment.
But so too is our investment in Russia's transition. Our
security and the security of every nation in Europe will be
affected by whether Russia succeeds or fails in becoming a
fully democratic state, at peace with its neighbors and
integrated into Europe. Yet Russia's leaders claim the
enlargement of NATO is a threat not only to Russian security
but also to the success of Russia's transformation.
I was recently asked to chair a Council on Foreign
Relation's Task Force on the subject of ``Russia, Its
Neighbors, and an Enlarging NATO'', and to pull together some
of the best minds in the country to look at this dilemma. Our
goal was to determine whether Russia's concerns could be
managed and its internal transition bolstered without
stopping or slowing NATO enlargement. The Task Force also
looked at the security concerns of the Baltic states and
Ukraine, given their history with Russia, its anxiety about
their relations with NATO, and their strong desire for closer
ties with NATO.
With NATO enlargement imminent, the premise behind this
Task Force's deliberations was not ``whether and when'' NATO
should expand, but ``how.'' We looked not only at how the
Alliance might engage Russia, but also at how the process of
enlargement, how NATO's own internal adaptation and how
conventional and nuclear arms control, could improve the
security climate across Europe, without dangerous concessions
to Russia.
The Task Force reached a strong bipartisan consensus that
the enlargement of NATO and improved NATO-Russia relations
need not be incompatible, despite continued Russian
opposition to enlargement. We agreed that it is in the U.S.
interest to try to achieve both, so long as we negotiate from
a position of strength, and do not allow the NATO Alliance to
be held hostage in any manner by Moscow. The U.S. and the
Alliance can offer Russia reassurances about its security and
role in the new Europe that make sense on their own merits,
without compromising NATO's effectiveness or independence.
In the process, however, we strongly caution that NATO's
core mission of collective defense of its members--both old
and new--must not be diluted in any manner. As discussions
with Russia proceed, the Task Force warns the Administration
and the Alliance to remain vigilant regarding Russian efforts
to step or stall expansion, to turn NATO into a social
club or debating society, or to have a veto over its
decisions. We also caution against trying to compensate
Russia for expansion with arms control or other
concessions.
All NATO-Russia and U.S.-Russia political and security
arrangements must be reciprocal. We also urge the
Administration and our NATO allies to take very specific
steps in the coming months and years to reassure the Baltic
states and Ukraine that they will not be left in a security
no-man's land.
The bipartisan Task Force brought together experts on
Europe and the former Soviet Union from government, think
tanks, universities, and the business community. Participants
included Robert Blackwill, former Principal Deputy Assistance
Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs and for
Political Military Affairs; Richard C. Holbrooke, former
Assistant secretary of State for European and Canadian
Affairs; William Kristol, Editor of The Weekly Standard
magazine; Thomas Pickering, former U.S. Ambassador to Russia,
Brent Scowcroft, former National Security Advisor; and Robert
Zoellick, former Counselor of the State Department and
Undersecretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs.
There was wide agreement among the Task Force participants
with the report's major findings and recommendations;
additional comments reflecting divergent positions are
presented in the report to help frame the dabate.
The Task Force calls for a series of measures to address
Russia's concerns as NATO enlarges, but states ``we believe
that the goal of NATO's engagement with Russia should not be
to provide `compensation' for enlargement. Rather, it should
be to forge a new NATO-Russia relationship that builds on
opportunities offered by a new Europe, a Russia in transition
and an adapting NATO.''
Among the Task Force's conclusions and recommendations.
Endorses NATO's decision to add new, ``full'' members at
the Madrid summit in July 1997, and suggests the Alliance
remain open to the possibility of adding more new members in
the future. The report asserts that an expanded Alliance does
not threaten Russia; in fact Russia will benefit from
increased European stability.
To engage Russia, negotiate a formal NATO-Russia charter
and a consultative mechanism that offers both sides
incentives to cooperate on shared problems. However, NATO-
Russia arrangements must not: stop or slow expansion; give
Russia a veto over NATO decisions or dilute the effectiveness
of the North Atlantic Council; allow ``second class
citizens'' in the Alliance or exclude any Partnership for
Peace (PfP) participant from future membership consideration;
or preclude any Alliance member from calling for a meeting
without Russia present.
Update Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty in a way
that: eliminates its current bloc-to-bloc character in favor
of national limits and reciprocal overall troop reductions
and does not make second-class citizens of the new NATO
members; does not isolate the Ukraine; does not impinge upon
NATO's future ability to extend a full security guarantee to
other potential members, and does not set an arbitrary
deadline for the conclusion of the treaty negotiations or
link them the NATO expansion timetable.
Continue to reject vigorously any efforts by Moscow to
dictate the terms of Baltic or Ukrainian relations with NATO.
The Task Force urges the Administration and the Alliance to
offer special assurances to the three Baltic states and
Ukraine, including confirmation that NATO's open-door policy
applies to all PfP states, increased efforts to include all
four countries in PfP planning and training exercises;
affirmation that the U.S. shares the aspirations of the
Baltic states to become full members of all European
institutions; and conclusions of a NATO-Ukraine agreement to
deepen practical cooperation over the coming years.
I attach a copy of the Task Force Report, along with my
summary of its findings and recommendations that I presented
at a recent press conference to mark the Report's
publication.
I recommend both to your attention.
Sincerely,
Richard G. Lugar,
U.S. Senator.
Council on Foreign Relations NATO Task Force Press Conference: Remarks
by U.S. Senator Richard Lugar, May 5, 1997
I am delighted to have had the opportunity to chair this
very distinguished Task Force on ``Russia, its Neighbors and
an Enlarging NATO'' and to present its findings to you today.
I agreed to chair this group because there is no more
important foreign policy issue today than the future of
European security. Just as our investments during the Cold
War led directly to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the
Warsaw Pact, our investments now in Europe's future will make
a dramatic difference to our own security. NATO's decision to
enlarge is a key element of that investment. But so too is
our investment in Russia's transition. Our security and the
security of every nation in Europe will be affected by
whether Russia succeeds or fails in becoming a fully
democratic state, at peace with its neighbors, and integrated
into Europe. Yet Russia's leaders claim the enlargement of
NATO is a threat not only to Russian security, but also to
the success of Russia's transformation.
The goal of the Task Force was to pull together some of the
best minds in the country to look at this dilemma and to
determine whether Russia's concerns could be managed and its
internal transition bolstered without stopping or slowing
NATO enlargement. We also looked at the security concerns of
the Baltic States and Ukraine, given their history with
Russia, its anxiety about their relations with NATO and their
strong desire for closer ties with NATO.
With NATO enlargement imminent, the premise behind this
Task Force's deliberations was not ``whether and when'' NATO
should expand, but ``how.'' We looked not only at how the
Alliance might engage Russia, but also at how the process of
enlargement, how NATO's own internal adaptation and
conventional and nuclear arms control, could improve the
security climate across Europe, without dangerous concessions
to Russia.
I am pleased to announce that we reached a strong
bipartisan consensus that the enlargement of NATO and
improved NATO-Russia relations need not be incompatible,
despite continued Russian opposition to enlargement. We
agreed that it is in the U.S.
[[Page S4627]]
interest to try to achieve both, so long as we negotiate from
a position of strength, and do not allow the NATO Alliance to
be held hostage in any manner by Moscow. The U.S. and the
Alliance can offer Russia significant reassurances about its
security and role in the new Europe that make sense on their
own merits, without compromising NATO's effectiveness or
independence.
In the process, however, we strongly caution that NATO's
core mission of collective defense of its members--both old
and new--must not be diluted in any manner. As discussions
with Russia proceed, the Task Force warns the Administration
and the Alliance to remain vigilant regarding Russian efforts
to stop or stall expansion, to turn NATO into a social club
or debating society, or to have a veto over its decisions. We
also caution against trying to compensate Russia for
expansion with arms control or other concessions. All NATO-
Russia and U.S.-Russia political and security arrangements
must be reciprocal. We also urge the Administration and our
NATO allies to take very specific steps in the coming months
and years to reassure the Baltic states and Ukraine that they
will not be left in a security no-man's land.
Let me now mention some of our specific recommendations.
For a more complete list, I call your attention to the short
``Statement of the Task Force'' which covers the longer
report.
First, the Task Force endorses NATO's decision to invite
new members to join the Alliance at the Madrid summit this
July, and its commitment that these will be full members, not
``second-class citizens.''
On future enlargement, we recommend that NATO affirm that
it remains open to the possibility of other new members. We
believe Alliance selection of future members should depend on
three factors: (1) The strategic interests of NATO members;
(2) the Alliance's perception of threats to security and
stability; and (3) future members' success in completing
their democratic transitions and in harmonizing their
political aims and security policies with NATO's.
At the same time, we believe NATO should offer ideas to
draw Russia closer to the Alliance to deal with mutual
security concerns in a reciprocal fashion, to support
Russia's consolidation of a non-imperialist, stable
democracy, and to reassure Moscow that we don't seek to
isolate or weaken Russia.
Specifically, we endorse efforts to negotiate a NATO-Russia
charter and a consultative mechanism that offers both sides
incentives to cooperate on shared problems. These could
include non-proliferation, aggressive nationalism,
territorial disputes, security and safety of nuclear weapons,
and peacekeeping.
That said, we strongly caution the Administration and the
Alliance against even the appearance of trying to
``compensate'' Russia for NATO enlargement or allowing Moscow
to weaken or hamstring the Alliance in any way. Specifically,
NATO-Russia arrangements must not:
(1) stop or slow NATO enlargement;
(2) NATO-Russia arrangements must not give Russia an actual
or de facto veto over NATO decision-making, or the ability to
stall or divide the Alliance;
(3) NATO-Russia arrangements must not create ``second class
citizens'' in the Alliance or exclude any participant in the
Partnership for Peace program (PFP) from future consideration
for NATO membership;
(4) NATO-Russia arrangements must not subordinate NATO to
any other decision-making body or organization;
(5) NATO-Russia arrangements must not dilute the
effectiveness of the North Atlantic Council or preclude any
Alliance member from calling for a meeting without Russia
present.
We also support adaptation of the Conventional Forces in
Europe Treaty in a way that will facilitate both NATO
enlargement and NATO-Russia cooperation, including
eliminating the bloc-to-bloc nature of the treaty in favor of
national limits and reducing the amount of equipment the
treaty permits all signatories.
But we caution the Administration and NATO states, as
negotiations proceed, to ensure that all geographic limits
are reciprocal, and that future equipment limits do not make
de facto ``second class'' citizens of the new Alliance
members.
We further caution against any agreement that would isolate
Ukraine or make it more vulnerable to Moscow's pressure. We
urge that the revised limits in no way impinge on NATO's
ability to extend a full security guarantee to other
potential members in the future.
We also argue strenuously against setting an arbitrary
deadline for the conclusion of the negotiations or linking
such a deadline to the timetable for NATO enlargement.
On the nuclear side, the linkage between NATO enlargement
and nuclear arms control is clearly more political than
strategic. That said, we believe the U.S.-Russian
arrangements with regard to START II and START III reached at
Helsinki have improved the climate for Russian acceptance of
the first tranche of enlargement as well as for Duma
ratification of START II, while advancing our own security
interests. This will not happen overnight, and probably not
before the Madrid Summit in July. But Helsinki represented a
good-faith effort on the part of the United States to address
some Russian and Duma concerns.
Finally, with regard to the Baltic states and Ukraine, we
believe the Alliance must continue to reject vigorously any
efforts by Moscow to dictate the terms of these countries'
relations with NATO, and to exercise a veto over their future
membership.
We urge the Administration and the Alliance to offer
reassurances to the Baltic states and Ukraine that they will
not be discriminated against as a result of their history
and geography. Such assurances could include:
(1) confirmation that NATO's open door policy applies to
all Partnership for Peace states, including the Baltics and
Ukraine;
(2) affirmation that the U.S. recognizes and shares the
aspirations of the Baltic states to become full members of
all the institutions of Europe including the EU and NATO, and
will assist them in this goal;
(3) conclusion of a NATO-Ukraine agreement to deepen
practical cooperation over the coming years, particularly
until Ukraine decides whether or not it will eventually seek
Alliance membership; and
(4) increased efforts to deepen the involvement of all four
countries with NATO through active participation in the
Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace.
If we proceed in this manner, as recommended by the Task
Force, we believe the choice will ultimately be up to Russia
to accept the hand of cooperation NATO has offered and to
participate in crafting the new Europe, or to isolate itself.
Our concluding point is that NATO enlargement and deeper
NATO-Russia relations both have value for the United States
and the Alliance if they are pursued properly. A zero-sum
debate about them therefore misses the point. The best
outcome for the United States is for both tracks to succeed.
This is also the best outcome for the Baltics and Ukraine
that may have to live between an enlarged NATO and Russia for
some time to come.
Now, before I turn to your questions, I want to say just a
word about the deliberations of our group. We met four times
between December and March, here in Washington. Overall, I
was encouraged by the breadth of consensus we were able to
achieve, considering the different perspectives and
backgrounds of the individual participants. The caliber of
the group was exceptional--so exceptional in fact that,
during the course of our deliberations, four of our members
were tapped by President Clinton to join the administration
in the second term.
But, as the attached additional comments and the one
dissent by General Scowcroft indicate, there were a couple of
important points where views differed significantly. I point
these out to you because I think they are instructive about
the larger debate in this country and the challenges we will
face when NATO enlargement comes up for ratification in the
Senate.
The most controversial issue for our group was not what
should happen this summer at Madrid, but what should happen
thereafter to NATO and in Europe. Several of our members are
less confident than others that the time will ever be right
for a second, third or fourth tranche of NATO enlargement.
General Scowcroft and Bob Blackwill call for a formal
``pause'' or breathing space after Madrid. A couple of other
members question the Report's support for the Baltic states'
aspirations to join NATO eventually.
My own personal view is that it would be a huge mistake to
declare a formal pause in expansion after Madrid. This would
cede precisely the kind of veto over NATO's plans to Moscow
that the Report warns against. Making that pause permanent
would effectively draw a new line across Europe slightly
further east. It would relegate whole parts of Europe to a
permanent security gray-zone, and would undermine any
incentive those countries' leaders have to make the kinds of
democratic changes that Alliance membership demands.
While I agree that NATO must proceed cautiously after
Madrid and take time absorbing the new members, it is
essential that the Alliance make clear at Madrid that the
first new members will not be the last. Such a pledge would
be particularly important for the Baltic states, which were,
after all, also captive nations throughout the Cold War.
I endorse strongly all the cautions in the report that
NATO's effectiveness as a defensive alliance not be diluted
in any way. It is also essential that NATO's new members be
full members and not ``second class citizens.'' In that
regard, I want to close my comments today by lending my
personal endorsement to one of the notes Bob Zoellick
appended to the report. He cautions that between Madrid and
the formal ratification of enlargement by all sixteen NATO
parliaments, the new candidate members must enjoy all the
privileges Russia might receive through a NATO-Russia charter
and consultative arrangements. It would indeed be ironic, if
over the next 2 years, Russia enjoyed closer ties to the
Alliance than Poland.
I welcome your questions now.
Mr. COCHRAN. Madam President, I took time to comment and read some
excerpts because in my view this is excellent work, and Senator Lugar
ought to be strongly commended for his leadership not only in chairing
this traffic force on these important issues but in his work on the
Foreign Relations Committee in connection with NATO enlargement, United
States-Russia relations which are the subject of this work.
[[Page S4628]]
Madam President, I am pleased to cosponsor Senate Concurrent
Resolution 5, which was introduced by Senator Roth, supporting the
expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, because I believe
the NATO alliance will be strengthened by including new members and
that its capacity to contribute to stability and freedom will be
enhanced by such expansion.
Senate Concurrent Resolution 5 specifically mentions four nations:
Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia, which should be
considered for membership in the alliance, but I do not think the
consideration of the Foreign Relations Committee should be limited to
those countries. Serious consideration should also be given, in my
opinion, to Romania, and maybe to others as well.
The Romanian Government has a record of cooperation with the United
States and Western nations. During the Persian Gulf crisis, for
example, Romania supported U.N. resolutions imposing sanctions against
Iraq and voted to authorize the United States and other nations to
enforce the sanctions and liberate Kuwait. In 1993, Romania supported
continuation of a 30-year U.N. embargo against Cuba, and its military
forces participated in the U.N. action in Angola in 1995.
Romania also supported the U.N. trade embargo against the former
Yugoslavia, and following the Dayton accords, it deployed a 200-troop
battalion to assist in the NATO-led IFOR mission. Romania has
participated in many Partnership for Peace exercises and was the first
nation to sign the Partnership for Peace framework document in 1994.
The Romanian Government has sought entry into several Western
economic and security alliances. In 1993, Romania became an associate
member of the European Union, and in 1995, it submitted an application
to become a full member of the EU. In 1994, Romania became a member of
the Council of Europe.
The people of Romania strongly support joining the NATO alliance. A
recent European Commission poll of 20 Eastern and Central European
nations shows a higher percentage of Romanians favoring membership in
NATO than any other prospective new member's citizenry.
Since the fall of Romania's Communist government in 1989, the people
of Romania have made great progress to achieve the goal of democracy,
by showing respect for the rule of law, moving to a free market
economy, and imposing civilian control over the military. By the end of
1996, Romania had completed a round of elections at all levels of
Government, including both Parliamentary and Presidential elections.
Observers from the Council of Europe classified the November
Presidential elections ``reasonably fair and transparent,'' and it
should be noted that they resulted in the first peaceful transfer of
power since 1937. The current political situation is particularly
remarkable when compared with the regime which held power in 1989.
In addition to strengthening the elements common to democracies
worldwide, the Romanians have directly confronted and worked to abate
both internal and external ethnic conflicts. In March of this year, the
Prime Minister outlined steps the Government will take to ease domestic
ethnic tensions. In an effort to discourage ethnic conflict with
the Hungarians living in Romania, the Government negotiated and signed
a treaty with Hungary. The ruling party coalition includes the party
most closely associated with ethnic Hungarians. I understand also that
the Romanians are nearing the end of treaty negotiations with Ukraine
over remaining border issues. Both of these cases demonstrate a
willingness to settle disputes with its neighbors in a peaceful way.
NATO Secretary General Solana has cited the programs that Romania,
among other nations, has made toward resolving outstanding bilateral
differences.
Including Romania in NATO would enhance European security. Romania's
military forces are among the largest in Europe. Of the countries
currently being considered for NATO membership, only Romania and Poland
have army, navy, and air force capabilities.
On the day their Minister of Defense was sworn in, he declared that
one of his administration's highest priorities would be to prepare
Romania's military for interoperability with existing NATO structures.
As a result, Romanians have undertaken strenuous efforts to update
their military equipment and improve their ability to operate in
concert with the forces of other nations.
Perhaps the most concerted efforts of the Romanian people have been
devoted to improving their economy. The results of the last election
demonstrated a preference for leaders who favor privatization, freer
markets, and a continuation of reform. Within 3 weeks of the decisive
Presidential election, senior representatives from the International
Monetary Fund, the European Union, and the World Bank traveled to
Bucharest to finalize the details of a comprehensive reform package
aimed at reducing inflation, cutting the deficit, and speeding
privatization. This plan for reform--released in February--will be
challenging for the Romanian Government and its people over the next
few years, and the Government has planned certain countermeasures
during the transition, such as a strengthening of the welfare program
in anticipation of temporary unemployment. However, it appears that
Romania is committed to this economic plan.
In August 1996, the United States granted MFN status to Romania, and
this year our Department of State reported that 80 percent of Romanian
farming and 70 percent of retail sales are being generated by private
enterprises. This spring the International Monetary Fund announced a
$400 million loan to Romania. To supplement this IMF assistance and
support the Government's reforms, the European Commission has pledged
$140 million. Indicators such as these all offer assurance to foreign
investors, whose contributions are important to the growth and
stability of Romania's economy.
Madam President, I am impressed and encouraged by the progress
Romania has made, and I urge serious consideration of Romania for
inclusion in NATO. I hope the Foreign Relations Committee will conduct
a full and careful review of Romania's political, economic, and
military strengths when it considers legislation on NATO expansion.
Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. COVERDELL. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the
order for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. COVERDELL. Madam President, are we in a period of morning
business?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate is in a period for the transaction
of routine morning business.
Mr. COVERDELL. Madam President, is each Senator allowed a period of 5
to 10 minutes to speak?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia would be permitted to
speak for up to 10 minutes.
____________________