[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 65 (Friday, May 16, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4625-S4628]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                  NATO ALLIANCE MEMBERSHIP FOR ROMANIA

  Mr. COCHRAN. Madam President, last week I received a letter from the 
distinguished Senator from Indiana [Mr. Lugar] on the subject of a task 
force which he had been asked to chair convened by the Council on 
Foreign Relations on the subject of Russia, its neighbors, and an 
enlarging NATO.
  Senator Lugar's letter discusses the highlights of the findings and 
agreements that were reached by this impressive task force made up of 
experts on foreign policy and national security. I think it is 
important for the Senate to consider and review carefully the task 
force report and the information in that as we are beginning serious 
consideration now in the Foreign Relations Committee and soon in this 
Chamber proposals for the enlargement of NATO. We have already had 
other agreements which have been widely publicized this week--
the charter or the framework between Russia and the United States on 
the subject of NATO enlargement. So it is very timely, in my view, for 
us to begin to get all of the information and all of the viewpoints 
that we can from those who deserve respect on these issues so we will 
be fully advised as we are called upon to make decisions on proposals 
from the administration.

  In his letter, Senator Lugar points out that ``The Task Force reached 
a strong bipartisan consensus that the enlargement of NATO and improved 
NATO-Russia relations need not be incompatible.'' First he pointed out 
that the goal of this task force ``was to determine whether Russia's 
concerns could be managed and its internal transition bolstered without 
stopping or slowing NATO enlargement. The Task Force also looked,'' he 
said, ``at the security concerns of the Baltic states and Ukraine.''
  He says the Task Force ``agreed that it is in the United States 
interest to try to achieve both'' enlargement of NATO and a 
strengthening of NATO-Russian relations. So we also should ``negotiate 
from a position of strength and not allow the NATO Alliance to be held 
hostage in any manner by Moscow. We strongly caution,'' he said, the 
Task Force said, ``that NATO's core mission of collective defense of 
its members--both old and new--not be diluted in any manner.''
  Other highlights include an urging of the administration and NATO 
allies ``to take very specific steps, to reassure the Baltic states and 
Ukraine that they will not be left in a security no-man's land.''
  And in conclusion, he says the Task Force recommends endorsing 
``NATO's decision to add new, `full' members at the Madrid summit in 
July 1997, and suggests the Alliance remain open to the possibility of 
adding more new members in the future.''
  The Task Force said, and he quotes from their findings:

       We believe that the goal of NATO's enlargement with Russia 
     should not be to provide compensation for enlargement. 
     Rather, it should be to forge a new NATO-Russia relationship 
     that builds on opportunities offered by a new Europe, a 
     Russia in transition and an adapting NATO.

  The Task Force recommended also ``To engage Russia, negotiate a 
formal NATO-Russia charter,'' which is being done, ``and a consultative 
mechanism

[[Page S4626]]

that offers both sides incentives to cooperate on shared problems,'' 
and to ``Update Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty,'' which we 
approved this week.
  In conclusion, he points out that the Task Force suggests that we,

       Reject vigorously any efforts by Moscow to dictate the 
     terms of Baltic or Ukrainian relations with NATO. The Task 
     Force urges the administration and the Alliance to offer 
     special assurances to the three Baltic states and Ukraine, 
     including confirmation that NATO's open-door policy applies 
     to all Partnership for Peace states; increased efforts to 
     include all four countries in Partnership for Peace planning 
     and training exercises; affirmation that the United States 
     shares the aspirations of the Baltic states to become full 
     members of all European institutions; and conclusion of a 
     NATO-Ukraine agreement to deepen practical consideration over 
     the coming years.

  Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the full text of the 
letter from Senator Lugar and the media remarks that he made on May 5 
at the announcement of the task force findings and report be printed in 
the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                  U.S. Senate,

                                      Washington, DC, May 5, 1997.
     Hon. Thad Cochran,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Thad: There is no more important foreign policy issue 
     today than the future of European security. Our investments 
     now in Europe's future will make a dramatic difference to our 
     own security. NATO's decision to enlarge is a key element of 
     that investment.
       But so too is our investment in Russia's transition. Our 
     security and the security of every nation in Europe will be 
     affected by whether Russia succeeds or fails in becoming a 
     fully democratic state, at peace with its neighbors and 
     integrated into Europe. Yet Russia's leaders claim the 
     enlargement of NATO is a threat not only to Russian security 
     but also to the success of Russia's transformation.
       I was recently asked to chair a Council on Foreign 
     Relation's Task Force on the subject of ``Russia, Its 
     Neighbors, and an Enlarging NATO'', and to pull together some 
     of the best minds in the country to look at this dilemma. Our 
     goal was to determine whether Russia's concerns could be 
     managed and its internal transition bolstered without 
     stopping or slowing NATO enlargement. The Task Force also 
     looked at the security concerns of the Baltic states and 
     Ukraine, given their history with Russia, its anxiety about 
     their relations with NATO, and their strong desire for closer 
     ties with NATO.
       With NATO enlargement imminent, the premise behind this 
     Task Force's deliberations was not ``whether and when'' NATO 
     should expand, but ``how.'' We looked not only at how the 
     Alliance might engage Russia, but also at how the process of 
     enlargement, how NATO's own internal adaptation and how 
     conventional and nuclear arms control, could improve the 
     security climate across Europe, without dangerous concessions 
     to Russia.
       The Task Force reached a strong bipartisan consensus that 
     the enlargement of NATO and improved NATO-Russia relations 
     need not be incompatible, despite continued Russian 
     opposition to enlargement. We agreed that it is in the U.S. 
     interest to try to achieve both, so long as we negotiate from 
     a position of strength, and do not allow the NATO Alliance to 
     be held hostage in any manner by Moscow. The U.S. and the 
     Alliance can offer Russia reassurances about its security and 
     role in the new Europe that make sense on their own merits, 
     without compromising NATO's effectiveness or independence.
       In the process, however, we strongly caution that NATO's 
     core mission of collective defense of its members--both old 
     and new--must not be diluted in any manner. As discussions 
     with Russia proceed, the Task Force warns the Administration 
     and the Alliance to remain vigilant regarding Russian efforts 
     to step or stall expansion, to turn NATO into a social 
     club or debating society, or to have a veto over its 
     decisions. We also caution against trying to compensate 
     Russia for expansion with arms control or other 
     concessions.
       All NATO-Russia and U.S.-Russia political and security 
     arrangements must be reciprocal. We also urge the 
     Administration and our NATO allies to take very specific 
     steps in the coming months and years to reassure the Baltic 
     states and Ukraine that they will not be left in a security 
     no-man's land.
       The bipartisan Task Force brought together experts on 
     Europe and the former Soviet Union from government, think 
     tanks, universities, and the business community. Participants 
     included Robert Blackwill, former Principal Deputy Assistance 
     Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs and for 
     Political Military Affairs; Richard C. Holbrooke, former 
     Assistant secretary of State for European and Canadian 
     Affairs; William Kristol, Editor of The Weekly Standard 
     magazine; Thomas Pickering, former U.S. Ambassador to Russia, 
     Brent Scowcroft, former National Security Advisor; and Robert 
     Zoellick, former Counselor of the State Department and 
     Undersecretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs. 
     There was wide agreement among the Task Force participants 
     with the report's major findings and recommendations; 
     additional comments reflecting divergent positions are 
     presented in the report to help frame the dabate.
       The Task Force calls for a series of measures to address 
     Russia's concerns as NATO enlarges, but states ``we believe 
     that the goal of NATO's engagement with Russia should not be 
     to provide `compensation' for enlargement. Rather, it should 
     be to forge a new NATO-Russia relationship that builds on 
     opportunities offered by a new Europe, a Russia in transition 
     and an adapting NATO.''
       Among the Task Force's conclusions and recommendations.
       Endorses NATO's decision to add new, ``full'' members at 
     the Madrid summit in July 1997, and suggests the Alliance 
     remain open to the possibility of adding more new members in 
     the future. The report asserts that an expanded Alliance does 
     not threaten Russia; in fact Russia will benefit from 
     increased European stability.
       To engage Russia, negotiate a formal NATO-Russia charter 
     and a consultative mechanism that offers both sides 
     incentives to cooperate on shared problems. However, NATO-
     Russia arrangements must not: stop or slow expansion; give 
     Russia a veto over NATO decisions or dilute the effectiveness 
     of the North Atlantic Council; allow ``second class 
     citizens'' in the Alliance or exclude any Partnership for 
     Peace (PfP) participant from future membership consideration; 
     or preclude any Alliance member from calling for a meeting 
     without Russia present.
       Update Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty in a way 
     that: eliminates its current bloc-to-bloc character in favor 
     of national limits and reciprocal overall troop reductions 
     and does not make second-class citizens of the new NATO 
     members; does not isolate the Ukraine; does not impinge upon 
     NATO's future ability to extend a full security guarantee to 
     other potential members, and does not set an arbitrary 
     deadline for the conclusion of the treaty negotiations or 
     link them the NATO expansion timetable.
       Continue to reject vigorously any efforts by Moscow to 
     dictate the terms of Baltic or Ukrainian relations with NATO. 
     The Task Force urges the Administration and the Alliance to 
     offer special assurances to the three Baltic states and 
     Ukraine, including confirmation that NATO's open-door policy 
     applies to all PfP states, increased efforts to include all 
     four countries in PfP planning and training exercises; 
     affirmation that the U.S. shares the aspirations of the 
     Baltic states to become full members of all European 
     institutions; and conclusions of a NATO-Ukraine agreement to 
     deepen practical cooperation over the coming years.
       I attach a copy of the Task Force Report, along with my 
     summary of its findings and recommendations that I presented 
     at a recent press conference to mark the Report's 
     publication.
       I recommend both to your attention.
           Sincerely,


                                             Richard G. Lugar,

                                                     U.S. Senator.

Council on Foreign Relations NATO Task Force Press Conference: Remarks 
               by U.S. Senator Richard Lugar, May 5, 1997

       I am delighted to have had the opportunity to chair this 
     very distinguished Task Force on ``Russia, its Neighbors and 
     an Enlarging NATO'' and to present its findings to you today.
       I agreed to chair this group because there is no more 
     important foreign policy issue today than the future of 
     European security. Just as our investments during the Cold 
     War led directly to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
     Warsaw Pact, our investments now in Europe's future will make 
     a dramatic difference to our own security. NATO's decision to 
     enlarge is a key element of that investment. But so too is 
     our investment in Russia's transition. Our security and the 
     security of every nation in Europe will be affected by 
     whether Russia succeeds or fails in becoming a fully 
     democratic state, at peace with its neighbors, and integrated 
     into Europe. Yet Russia's leaders claim the enlargement of 
     NATO is a threat not only to Russian security, but also to 
     the success of Russia's transformation.
       The goal of the Task Force was to pull together some of the 
     best minds in the country to look at this dilemma and to 
     determine whether Russia's concerns could be managed and its 
     internal transition bolstered without stopping or slowing 
     NATO enlargement. We also looked at the security concerns of 
     the Baltic States and Ukraine, given their history with 
     Russia, its anxiety about their relations with NATO and their 
     strong desire for closer ties with NATO.
       With NATO enlargement imminent, the premise behind this 
     Task Force's deliberations was not ``whether and when'' NATO 
     should expand, but ``how.'' We looked not only at how the 
     Alliance might engage Russia, but also at how the process of 
     enlargement, how NATO's own internal adaptation and 
     conventional and nuclear arms control, could improve the 
     security climate across Europe, without dangerous concessions 
     to Russia.
       I am pleased to announce that we reached a strong 
     bipartisan consensus that the enlargement of NATO and 
     improved NATO-Russia relations need not be incompatible, 
     despite continued Russian opposition to enlargement. We 
     agreed that it is in the U.S.

[[Page S4627]]

     interest to try to achieve both, so long as we negotiate from 
     a position of strength, and do not allow the NATO Alliance to 
     be held hostage in any manner by Moscow. The U.S. and the 
     Alliance can offer Russia significant reassurances about its 
     security and role in the new Europe that make sense on their 
     own merits, without compromising NATO's effectiveness or 
     independence.
       In the process, however, we strongly caution that NATO's 
     core mission of collective defense of its members--both old 
     and new--must not be diluted in any manner. As discussions 
     with Russia proceed, the Task Force warns the Administration 
     and the Alliance to remain vigilant regarding Russian efforts 
     to stop or stall expansion, to turn NATO into a social club 
     or debating society, or to have a veto over its decisions. We 
     also caution against trying to compensate Russia for 
     expansion with arms control or other concessions. All NATO-
     Russia and U.S.-Russia political and security arrangements 
     must be reciprocal. We also urge the Administration and our 
     NATO allies to take very specific steps in the coming months 
     and years to reassure the Baltic states and Ukraine that they 
     will not be left in a security no-man's land.
       Let me now mention some of our specific recommendations. 
     For a more complete list, I call your attention to the short 
     ``Statement of the Task Force'' which covers the longer 
     report.
       First, the Task Force endorses NATO's decision to invite 
     new members to join the Alliance at the Madrid summit this 
     July, and its commitment that these will be full members, not 
     ``second-class citizens.''
       On future enlargement, we recommend that NATO affirm that 
     it remains open to the possibility of other new members. We 
     believe Alliance selection of future members should depend on 
     three factors: (1) The strategic interests of NATO members; 
     (2) the Alliance's perception of threats to security and 
     stability; and (3) future members' success in completing 
     their democratic transitions and in harmonizing their 
     political aims and security policies with NATO's.
       At the same time, we believe NATO should offer ideas to 
     draw Russia closer to the Alliance to deal with mutual 
     security concerns in a reciprocal fashion, to support 
     Russia's consolidation of a non-imperialist, stable 
     democracy, and to reassure Moscow that we don't seek to 
     isolate or weaken Russia.
       Specifically, we endorse efforts to negotiate a NATO-Russia 
     charter and a consultative mechanism that offers both sides 
     incentives to cooperate on shared problems. These could 
     include non-proliferation, aggressive nationalism, 
     territorial disputes, security and safety of nuclear weapons, 
     and peacekeeping.
       That said, we strongly caution the Administration and the 
     Alliance against even the appearance of trying to 
     ``compensate'' Russia for NATO enlargement or allowing Moscow 
     to weaken or hamstring the Alliance in any way. Specifically, 
     NATO-Russia arrangements must not:
       (1) stop or slow NATO enlargement;
       (2) NATO-Russia arrangements must not give Russia an actual 
     or de facto veto over NATO decision-making, or the ability to 
     stall or divide the Alliance;
       (3) NATO-Russia arrangements must not create ``second class 
     citizens'' in the Alliance or exclude any participant in the 
     Partnership for Peace program (PFP) from future consideration 
     for NATO membership;
       (4) NATO-Russia arrangements must not subordinate NATO to 
     any other decision-making body or organization;
       (5) NATO-Russia arrangements must not dilute the 
     effectiveness of the North Atlantic Council or preclude any 
     Alliance member from calling for a meeting without Russia 
     present.
       We also support adaptation of the Conventional Forces in 
     Europe Treaty in a way that will facilitate both NATO 
     enlargement and NATO-Russia cooperation, including 
     eliminating the bloc-to-bloc nature of the treaty in favor of 
     national limits and reducing the amount of equipment the 
     treaty permits all signatories.
       But we caution the Administration and NATO states, as 
     negotiations proceed, to ensure that all geographic limits 
     are reciprocal, and that future equipment limits do not make 
     de facto ``second class'' citizens of the new Alliance 
     members.
       We further caution against any agreement that would isolate 
     Ukraine or make it more vulnerable to Moscow's pressure. We 
     urge that the revised limits in no way impinge on NATO's 
     ability to extend a full security guarantee to other 
     potential members in the future.
       We also argue strenuously against setting an arbitrary 
     deadline for the conclusion of the negotiations or linking 
     such a deadline to the timetable for NATO enlargement.
       On the nuclear side, the linkage between NATO enlargement 
     and nuclear arms control is clearly more political than 
     strategic. That said, we believe the U.S.-Russian 
     arrangements with regard to START II and START III reached at 
     Helsinki have improved the climate for Russian acceptance of 
     the first tranche of enlargement as well as for Duma 
     ratification of START II, while advancing our own security 
     interests. This will not happen overnight, and probably not 
     before the Madrid Summit in July. But Helsinki represented a 
     good-faith effort on the part of the United States to address 
     some Russian and Duma concerns.
       Finally, with regard to the Baltic states and Ukraine, we 
     believe the Alliance must continue to reject vigorously any 
     efforts by Moscow to dictate the terms of these countries' 
     relations with NATO, and to exercise a veto over their future 
     membership.
       We urge the Administration and the Alliance to offer 
     reassurances to the Baltic states and Ukraine that they will 
     not be discriminated against as a result of their history 
     and geography. Such assurances could include:
       (1) confirmation that NATO's open door policy applies to 
     all Partnership for Peace states, including the Baltics and 
     Ukraine;
       (2) affirmation that the U.S. recognizes and shares the 
     aspirations of the Baltic states to become full members of 
     all the institutions of Europe including the EU and NATO, and 
     will assist them in this goal;
       (3) conclusion of a NATO-Ukraine agreement to deepen 
     practical cooperation over the coming years, particularly 
     until Ukraine decides whether or not it will eventually seek 
     Alliance membership; and
       (4) increased efforts to deepen the involvement of all four 
     countries with NATO through active participation in the 
     Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace.
       If we proceed in this manner, as recommended by the Task 
     Force, we believe the choice will ultimately be up to Russia 
     to accept the hand of cooperation NATO has offered and to 
     participate in crafting the new Europe, or to isolate itself.
       Our concluding point is that NATO enlargement and deeper 
     NATO-Russia relations both have value for the United States 
     and the Alliance if they are pursued properly. A zero-sum 
     debate about them therefore misses the point. The best 
     outcome for the United States is for both tracks to succeed. 
     This is also the best outcome for the Baltics and Ukraine 
     that may have to live between an enlarged NATO and Russia for 
     some time to come.
       Now, before I turn to your questions, I want to say just a 
     word about the deliberations of our group. We met four times 
     between December and March, here in Washington. Overall, I 
     was encouraged by the breadth of consensus we were able to 
     achieve, considering the different perspectives and 
     backgrounds of the individual participants. The caliber of 
     the group was exceptional--so exceptional in fact that, 
     during the course of our deliberations, four of our members 
     were tapped by President Clinton to join the administration 
     in the second term.
       But, as the attached additional comments and the one 
     dissent by General Scowcroft indicate, there were a couple of 
     important points where views differed significantly. I point 
     these out to you because I think they are instructive about 
     the larger debate in this country and the challenges we will 
     face when NATO enlargement comes up for ratification in the 
     Senate.
       The most controversial issue for our group was not what 
     should happen this summer at Madrid, but what should happen 
     thereafter to NATO and in Europe. Several of our members are 
     less confident than others that the time will ever be right 
     for a second, third or fourth tranche of NATO enlargement. 
     General Scowcroft and Bob Blackwill call for a formal 
     ``pause'' or breathing space after Madrid. A couple of other 
     members question the Report's support for the Baltic states' 
     aspirations to join NATO eventually.
       My own personal view is that it would be a huge mistake to 
     declare a formal pause in expansion after Madrid. This would 
     cede precisely the kind of veto over NATO's plans to Moscow 
     that the Report warns against. Making that pause permanent 
     would effectively draw a new line across Europe slightly 
     further east. It would relegate whole parts of Europe to a 
     permanent security gray-zone, and would undermine any 
     incentive those countries' leaders have to make the kinds of 
     democratic changes that Alliance membership demands.
       While I agree that NATO must proceed cautiously after 
     Madrid and take time absorbing the new members, it is 
     essential that the Alliance make clear at Madrid that the 
     first new members will not be the last. Such a pledge would 
     be particularly important for the Baltic states, which were, 
     after all, also captive nations throughout the Cold War.
       I endorse strongly all the cautions in the report that 
     NATO's effectiveness as a defensive alliance not be diluted 
     in any way. It is also essential that NATO's new members be 
     full members and not ``second class citizens.'' In that 
     regard, I want to close my comments today by lending my 
     personal endorsement to one of the notes Bob Zoellick 
     appended to the report. He cautions that between Madrid and 
     the formal ratification of enlargement by all sixteen NATO 
     parliaments, the new candidate members must enjoy all the 
     privileges Russia might receive through a NATO-Russia charter 
     and consultative arrangements. It would indeed be ironic, if 
     over the next 2 years, Russia enjoyed closer ties to the 
     Alliance than Poland.
       I welcome your questions now.

  Mr. COCHRAN. Madam President, I took time to comment and read some 
excerpts because in my view this is excellent work, and Senator Lugar 
ought to be strongly commended for his leadership not only in chairing 
this traffic force on these important issues but in his work on the 
Foreign Relations Committee in connection with NATO enlargement, United 
States-Russia relations which are the subject of this work.

[[Page S4628]]

  Madam President, I am pleased to cosponsor Senate Concurrent 
Resolution 5, which was introduced by Senator Roth, supporting the 
expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, because I believe 
the NATO alliance will be strengthened by including new members and 
that its capacity to contribute to stability and freedom will be 
enhanced by such expansion.
  Senate Concurrent Resolution 5 specifically mentions four nations: 
Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia, which should be 
considered for membership in the alliance, but I do not think the 
consideration of the Foreign Relations Committee should be limited to 
those countries. Serious consideration should also be given, in my 
opinion, to Romania, and maybe to others as well.
  The Romanian Government has a record of cooperation with the United 
States and Western nations. During the Persian Gulf crisis, for 
example, Romania supported U.N. resolutions imposing sanctions against 
Iraq and voted to authorize the United States and other nations to 
enforce the sanctions and liberate Kuwait. In 1993, Romania supported 
continuation of a 30-year U.N. embargo against Cuba, and its military 
forces participated in the U.N. action in Angola in 1995.
  Romania also supported the U.N. trade embargo against the former 
Yugoslavia, and following the Dayton accords, it deployed a 200-troop 
battalion to assist in the NATO-led IFOR mission. Romania has 
participated in many Partnership for Peace exercises and was the first 
nation to sign the Partnership for Peace framework document in 1994.
  The Romanian Government has sought entry into several Western 
economic and security alliances. In 1993, Romania became an associate 
member of the European Union, and in 1995, it submitted an application 
to become a full member of the EU. In 1994, Romania became a member of 
the Council of Europe.
  The people of Romania strongly support joining the NATO alliance. A 
recent European Commission poll of 20 Eastern and Central European 
nations shows a higher percentage of Romanians favoring membership in 
NATO than any other prospective new member's citizenry.
  Since the fall of Romania's Communist government in 1989, the people 
of Romania have made great progress to achieve the goal of democracy, 
by showing respect for the rule of law, moving to a free market 
economy, and imposing civilian control over the military. By the end of 
1996, Romania had completed a round of elections at all levels of 
Government, including both Parliamentary and Presidential elections. 
Observers from the Council of Europe classified the November 
Presidential elections ``reasonably fair and transparent,'' and it 
should be noted that they resulted in the first peaceful transfer of 
power since 1937. The current political situation is particularly 
remarkable when compared with the regime which held power in 1989.
  In addition to strengthening the elements common to democracies 
worldwide, the Romanians have directly confronted and worked to abate 
both internal and external ethnic conflicts. In March of this year, the 
Prime Minister outlined steps the Government will take to ease domestic 
ethnic tensions. In an effort to discourage ethnic conflict with 
the Hungarians living in Romania, the Government negotiated and signed 
a treaty with Hungary. The ruling party coalition includes the party 
most closely associated with ethnic Hungarians. I understand also that 
the Romanians are nearing the end of treaty negotiations with Ukraine 
over remaining border issues. Both of these cases demonstrate a 
willingness to settle disputes with its neighbors in a peaceful way. 
NATO Secretary General Solana has cited the programs that Romania, 
among other nations, has made toward resolving outstanding bilateral 
differences.

  Including Romania in NATO would enhance European security. Romania's 
military forces are among the largest in Europe. Of the countries 
currently being considered for NATO membership, only Romania and Poland 
have army, navy, and air force capabilities.
  On the day their Minister of Defense was sworn in, he declared that 
one of his administration's highest priorities would be to prepare 
Romania's military for interoperability with existing NATO structures. 
As a result, Romanians have undertaken strenuous efforts to update 
their military equipment and improve their ability to operate in 
concert with the forces of other nations.
  Perhaps the most concerted efforts of the Romanian people have been 
devoted to improving their economy. The results of the last election 
demonstrated a preference for leaders who favor privatization, freer 
markets, and a continuation of reform. Within 3 weeks of the decisive 
Presidential election, senior representatives from the International 
Monetary Fund, the European Union, and the World Bank traveled to 
Bucharest to finalize the details of a comprehensive reform package 
aimed at reducing inflation, cutting the deficit, and speeding 
privatization. This plan for reform--released in February--will be 
challenging for the Romanian Government and its people over the next 
few years, and the Government has planned certain countermeasures 
during the transition, such as a strengthening of the welfare program 
in anticipation of temporary unemployment. However, it appears that 
Romania is committed to this economic plan.
  In August 1996, the United States granted MFN status to Romania, and 
this year our Department of State reported that 80 percent of Romanian 
farming and 70 percent of retail sales are being generated by private 
enterprises. This spring the International Monetary Fund announced a 
$400 million loan to Romania. To supplement this IMF assistance and 
support the Government's reforms, the European Commission has pledged 
$140 million. Indicators such as these all offer assurance to foreign 
investors, whose contributions are important to the growth and 
stability of Romania's economy.
  Madam President, I am impressed and encouraged by the progress 
Romania has made, and I urge serious consideration of Romania for 
inclusion in NATO. I hope the Foreign Relations Committee will conduct 
a full and careful review of Romania's political, economic, and 
military strengths when it considers legislation on NATO expansion.
  Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. COVERDELL. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
order for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. COVERDELL. Madam President, are we in a period of morning 
business?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate is in a period for the transaction 
of routine morning business.
  Mr. COVERDELL. Madam President, is each Senator allowed a period of 5 
to 10 minutes to speak?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia would be permitted to 
speak for up to 10 minutes.

                          ____________________