[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 64 (Thursday, May 15, 1997)]
[House]
[Pages H2775-H2776]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
THE FAA AND AIRLINE SAFETY
(Mr. WOLF asked and was given permission to address the House for 1
minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. WOLF. Mr. Speaker, this past Sunday was Mother's Day and it was a
day to give thanks for our mothers and praise them and honor them. But
this past Sunday also was an important day to many in this Nation, but
for a more sinister reason. It was the one-year anniversary of the
ValuJet crash.
It was a crash that could have been avoided, Mr. Speaker, with either
smoke detectors and fire suppression systems or by prohibiting armed
oxygen canisters in some cargo holds. Transporting armed oxygen
canisters in unreachable holds is unlawful today, but as the recent
Continental Airlines incident indicates, the FAA's enforcement of these
regulations is weak.
The NTSB has recommended after the ValuJet crash that the FAA
promulgate rules requiring the installation of smoke detectors and fire
suppression systems. Similarly, NTSB made an urgent recommendation in
December following the TWA Flight 800 crash.
Today I am calling on the FAA to quickly, quickly promulgate and
implement regulations regarding the use of smoke detectors and fire
suppression systems in all passenger aircraft, as well as fuel tank
recommendations of the NTSB. Every Member of Congress who flies an
airplane or who represents anybody who flies an airplane ought to be
putting pressure on the FAA.
[From the LA Times, May 6, 1997]
Snail's Pace in Airliner Safety
FBI Director Louis J. Freeh has reiterated an idea
expressed by some federal officials since late last year:
that it was a catastrophic mechanical failure that brought
down TWA Flight 800 last July, killing all 230 aboard.
``The evidence is certainly not leading in the direction of
a terrorist act, It is in fact moving in the other
direction,'' Freeh said on a television news show Sunday. But
he stressed that no official conclusion on the cause of the
TWA disaster has been reached.
Such a slow pace is not unusual in these matters. It took
two years, for example, to officially rule that a bomb had
caused the explosion of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland,
in 1988.
Even without a final report, you might think that
corrective action would occur quickly. After all, the
National Transportation Safety Board, and now Freeh, has
emphasized the possibility that Flight 800 disintegrated
because a spark ignited a volatile air-fuel mixture in its
central fuel tank.
Well, here's the snail's-pace chronology that followed the
``urgent'' NTSB recommendations on Dee. 13 for changes that
it said could prevent an explosion of this kind: The Federal
Aviation Administration had 90 days to respond and announced
in February that it would issue a notice for public comment
in the Federal Register within 30 days. The notice finally
appeared in April, at which point another 90-day period
commenced. This means that the recommendations cannot be
acted on until July.
The Clinton administration and Congress ought to find a way
to shorten this process. If a streamlined process had been
mandatory, the implementation of one or more of the changes
to prevent central fuel tank explosions in more than 1,000
active U.S. commercial jets might already be underway.
[[Page H2776]]
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[From the Information Services Newswire Search, May 14, 1997]
Banned Oxygen Canisters Hauled on Continental Flight
(By Eun-Kyung Kim)
Washington (AP)--Federal investigators are trying to
determine how a Continental Airlines passenger jet ended up
carrying seven oxygen canisters in its cargo hold, a practice
outlawed following last year's ValuJet crash.
``We take this very seriously and we're investigating it
thoroughly,'' Eliot Brenner, a spokesman for the Federal
Aviation Administration, said Tuesday.
The oxygen generators, secured by safety caps, were in a
shipment of airline materials found by Continental workers 10
days after the flight to Houston from Los Angeles.
``With the caps, they were not in danger of going off,''
Brenner said. The canisters were not listed as part of the
shipment, he said.
The FAA reported the flight took place on April 15, but the
airline said it was a day later.
Chemical oxygen generators were banned as cargo in
passenger planes shortly after ValuJet Flight 592 crashed
into the Florida Everglades, killing all 100 people on board.
Investigators believe the May 11, 1996, disaster was caused
by a fire fueled by poorly packaged oxygen generators.
Air transport of the generators is now restricted to
compartments in cargo planes that the crew can reach during
the flight.
Houston-based Continental issued a statement Tuesday saying
the disarmed generators were shipped accidentally by a vendor
who failed to disclose they were hazardous.
``The airline immediately reported this occurrence to the
FAA when the shipment was discovered. In addition to our own
internal audit, Continental is working closely with the FAA
in its investigation to determine how this shipment
happened,'' the statement said.
Continental spokeswoman Karla Villalon declined to identify
the vendor, saying it is under investigation. She did not
know how many people were aboard the plane.
Continental, the vendor and its shipping agent could face
millions of dollars in fines if investigators conclude
hazardous material laws were violated, Brenner said.
Jim Hall, the chairman of the National Transportation
Safety Board, said the incident illustrated the need to
install smoke detectors and fire suppression equipment in the
cargo compartments of all passenger airliners.
``What this incident shows is that no matter what
regulations are passed, the threat of inadvertent placement
of hazardous materials on aircraft will always be with us,''
Hall said in a letter to Carol Hallett, president of the Air
Transport Association of America.
Hall voiced similar concerns in a letter Monday to
Transportation Secretary Rodney Slater.
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[From the Information Services Newswire Search, May 15, 1997]
Airlines to Install Cargo Area Fire Suppression Systems
(By Randolph E. Schmid)
Washington.--A year after the fiery crash of ValuJet Flight
592 the nations airlines are moving towards installing
firefighting equipment in their cargo holds.
But it could take years for all of the nation's airliners
to be protected.
The Air Transport Association announced Wednesday that the
airlines will begin installing the fire suppression
equipment, perhaps as early as this fall if government
approvals can be completed.
But getting the devices into all 3,000 airliners in service
could take four to five years, said Carol Hallett, president
of the airline trade group.
The Federal Aviation Administration, however, is planning
to complete a rule by the end of the year that will require
the installations within three years, according to
Transportation Department spokesman Bill Schulz. Already one
airline, Atlanta-based Delta, is moving ahead on its own, he
added.
Hallett said the installations take 200 man-hours or more
each and will be scheduled when airliners go in for major
maintenance, generally every 18 months to three years. She
estimated that it will cost about $400 million to install the
systems.
No final determination has been made on the cause of the
ValuJet crash last May 11 in Florida's Everglades, killing
all 110 aboard. But investigators believe that the disaster
resulted from a fire fueled by oxygen generators carried in
the plane's hold.
The airlines had agreed to install smoke detectors last
December at a meeting with Vice President Al Gore, but were
reluctant to commit to the additional fire suppression
systems because of fear that the chemical halon would be
banned, Hallett said.
But on Tuesday the ATA received a letter from the
Environmental Protection Agency advising that, if the systems
are installed, halon will be allowed to remain in use for the
life of the plane.
Based on that assurance, Hallett said, the airlines decided
to go ahead with the program.
The project covers the cargo containers beneath passenger
compartments, used to carry luggage. These so-called ``Type
D'' compartments are sealed and airlines have assumed that
any fire that broke out would be extinguished by lack of
oxygen. In the ValuJet case, however, the oxygen generators
helped fuel the blaze.
The ATA announcement comes just a day after disclosure that
similar banned oxygen cylinders were recently carried aboard
a Continental jet.
The generators, secured by safety caps, were in a shipment
of airline materials found by Continental workers 10 days
after the flight to Houston from Los Angeles. There was no
fire in this case.
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