[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 63 (Wednesday, May 14, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4471-S4478]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
Condition 3: Facilitation of negotiations
Now, I am particularly interested in this condition.
Condition (3) ensures that the United States will not be
party to any efforts by Russia to intimidate or otherwise
extract CFE Treaty concessions from its smaller neighbors.
Let me interpolate right there for the moment with a rhetorical
question.
Why should we have to have a condition to ensure that the United
States will not be party to any efforts by Russia to intimidate or
otherwise extract CFE Treaty concessions from its smaller neighbors? It
would seem to me that would be a given.
Let me continue, and then I will yield to the distinguished ranking
member.
Indeed, this condition, along with much of the rest of the
resolution, is specifically designed to require the United
States to safeguard the sovereign rights of other countries
(such as Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) in their
dealings with the Russian Federation.
Listen to this:
The committee became alarmed, over the course of its
consideration of the CFE Flank Document, with several aspects
of the United States negotiating record. This condition
[condition No. 3] will ensure that the United States will
adhere to the highest principles in the conduct of
negotiations undertaken pursuant to the treaty, the CFE Flank
Document, and any side statements that have already been
issued or which may be issued in the future.
Now, there are several questions that jump out at anyone who reads
that paragraph.
It makes reference to ``side statements.'' It uses the word
``alarmed.'' There is a condition there that ensures that the United
States will not be a party to any efforts by Russia to intimidate or
otherwise extract CFE Treaty concessions from a smaller neighbor.
Why do we have to have a condition to that effect? Is there some
confusion about what the right position is that the United States
should take? Is it not a given that the United States would not be a
party to any efforts by Russia to intimidate concessions from its
smaller neighbors?
I yield to the distinguished Senator.
Mr. BIDEN. Let me say, this all came about--and they are, obviously,
as usual, very good, incisive and insightful questions.
I think it is unnecessary because I think it is a given. But let me
explain, in fairness, why we got to this point and why I thought it
was--speaking only for myself--a clarification, although in some sense
I thought it was a demeaning clarification. Let me explain.
During the negotiations on the flank agreement, there was concern
about what became referred to as a ``side agreement.'' That was, there
was an issue that came up during the negotiations where a diplomatic
note was passed, which is classified--I am not able to give you, but I
can tell you from the committee testimony what it said--a note that was
passed to the Russian representative dealing with the issue of the
stationing of Russian troops on the soil of the countries you named.
The Under Secretary of State, Lynn Davis, who appeared before the
committee on April 29, was asked to explain. He went on to explain why
a statement was made to the Russians. The statement made was that we
would--this is the quote, in part--``the United States is prepared to
facilitate or act as an intermediary for a successful outcome in
discussions that could take place under the flank agreement and the CFE
Treaty between Russia and other Newly Independent States.''
The worry expressed by my friends in the Republican Party was that
this reflected a possible inclination to try to mollify Russia and put
American pressure on Moldova or Georgia or other states to accept
Russian deployment of Russian forces on their soil.
The concern was that the assertion made by the U.S. negotiators was a
way of saying, do not worry, we are going to help you to get Russian
troops placed in those regions.
Lynn Davis, the Under Secretary said, no, that was never the
intention of that ``side agreement,'' as it became referred to.
I will quote what he said at the hearing to my friend from West
Virginia. He said:
We see this particular statement of our intentions as part
of the reassurance that we can make so that those countries
will feel that this is an agreement that continues to be in
their security interests. This statement of our intentions
makes clear that the commitment is predicated on an
understanding that any agreements between Russia and the
Newly Independent States must be done on a voluntary basis
with due respect for the sovereignty of the countries
involved, and our role here is indeed to reinforce that and
ensure that it is carried out.
This was the concern that was expressed by my friends on the
Republican side, that the United States intention to level the playing
field between Russia and other Newly Independent States had not been
seen that way by all concerned.
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So what was done--and the administration signed on to the condition--
was to make it crystal clear that this offer of an intermediary role
was not for the purpose of using our influence or power to coerce them
into accepting a demand or a suggestion from their Russian brethren.
That is the context, I say to my friend, in which it came up. You
used the phrase ``the committee became alarmed.'' Some in the committee
were alarmed because of the wording of the ``side agreement.'' This was
done to clarify what the administration says was their intent from the
beginning but now locks in the stated interpretation by the
administration of what that whole thing was all about.
I hope I have answered the question, and I hope I have done it
correctly.
Mr. HELMS. You have done it correctly, I say to the Senator.
Conditions 1, 2, and 3 of the resolution on ratification require the
President to observe reasonable limits in the conduct of certain
negotiations facilitated by the United States in support of the CFE
Treaty. Specifically, this entails an obligation for the President to
conduct his diplomacy in a manner that respects the sovereignty and
free will of countries on the periphery of Russia that are under
pressure by Russia to allow the establishment of military bases.
In fact, I do not believe that the United States should be party to
any negotiation which could result in allowing Russia to deploy its
troops into the territory occupied by the Soviet Union for nearly 70
years. Yet this is exactly the result contemplated by the Clinton
administration if this resolution of ratification is not clear on this
point. Conditions 1, 2, and 3 are clear on this matter.
It is clear from this document that the Clinton administration has
demonstrated a willingness to participate in negotiations that could
actually result in the establishment of Russian military bases on the
territory of other States with the endorsement--and even with the
active assistance--of the United States. Is there anyone in the
administration who is prepared to state that it would be in the United
States' interest for Russia to establish military bases outside of its
territory?
The Clinton administration offers hollow assertions that Russian
troops will not be deployed in other States without the freely given
consent of the relevant government. Russia--still the largest military
power in Europe--has used its armed forces in recent years in both
Georgia and Azerbaijan with virtually no complaint from the Clinton
administration.
Russia uses its military presence in Ukraine and Moldova to influence
the sovereign governments of those States while the Clinton
administration remains silent. Russian Government officials have made
open threats of military invasion against the Baltic States. Finally,
less than 1 year ago, a bloody war in Chechnya was brought to an end.
That war was characterized by wide scale Russian atrocities, the
intentional targeting of civilians, and casualties possibly in excess
of 100,000 people--mostly innocent men, women, and children. Do the
administration's lawyers find that these incidents were with the freely
given consent of the affected governments?
Conditions 1, 2, and 3 set reasonable limits specifically tied to
activities cited in paragraph IV (2) and (3) of the CFE Flank Document.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President--Madam President, I made the mistake of
referring to the Presiding Officer as ``Mr. President" before I turned
around. And I also made the mistake of referring to Under Secretary
Davis as ``he.'' It is ``she.'' I knew that, and I apologize on both
scores.
Mr. BYRD. Well, Madam President, I came up, I suppose, at a time when
political correctness did not make any difference. As far as I am
concerned, it does not make any difference yet. And the pronoun ``he''
is inclusive. It was inclusive when I was a boy; it was inclusive when
I became a man. It still is inclusive of the female. So I would not
worry too much about that.
Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, as the distinguished former majority
leader knows, another former majority leader, Senator Baker, used an
expression all the time. He would come to the floor, and he would say,
``I ain't got no dog in that fight.''
Mr. BYRD. I commend the committee for including that condition.
I can understand how the committee would become alarmed. I think that
it would have been well if all Senators could have been notified that
there was--and maybe they were, I do not know, but I do not remember
being notified except through my own staff that there was such a paper
up in room 407 so that they could have gone up and examined it. I heard
about it this afternoon, and I went up and looked at it.
So I think the committee had a right to be alarmed. I congratulate
the committee on including the condition which, as Mr. Biden has just
said, locks it in, locks the administration in, so there will be no
doubt that the United States will not be party to any efforts by Russia
to intimidate or otherwise extract CFE Treaty concessions from its
smaller neighbors.
I would dare say, if the people in Azerbaijan or Armenia or Georgia
should see that language, they would be alarmed also--they would be
alarmed also. They would wonder, where does the United States stand?
But the condition is there. And I again commend the committee on
including it.
Do the managers feel that U.S. policy is now clearly to protect the
interests and rights of the newly sovereign nations of the Caucasus
against intimidation and pressure tactics by the Russians regarding
equipment that is covered by the flank agreement that we are
considering here today?
Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.
Mr. BIDEN. I would say yes, as well, Madam President.
Mr. BYRD. Madam President, how much time remains?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 6 minutes remaining.
Mr. BYRD. Madam President, I thank all Senators. Especially I thank
the manager and ranking manager on the committee.
I shall vote for the treaty.
I yield the floor.
Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.
Mr. HELMS. Will the Senator yield me 1 minute?
Mr. BYRD. I yield 1 minute to the Senator.
Mr. HELMS. I thank the Senator.
During the past 4 years, the Clinton administration has remained
silent while Russia has encroached upon the territory and sovereignty
of its neighbors. It was the lack of a foreign policy--not a lack of
tools--that allowed this to happen.
I have confidence that the new Secretary of State will correct the
course of our policies toward Russia, and I gladly support this treaty
to aid the Honorable Madeleine Albright in that endeavor. The collapse
of the Soviet Union was one of the finest moments of the 20th century.
To allow even a partial restoration of the Soviet Union before the turn
of the century would be a failure of an even greater magnitude.
Senator Lott, I believe, is standing by.
I thank the Senator.
Mr. BYRD. I thank the distinguished Senator.
I reserve the remainder of my time.
Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, before the distinguished leader takes the
floor, if I could just take 60 seconds of the 3 minutes I have
remaining to comment on something the Senator from West Virginia said.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware is recognized.
Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, the Senate has always been served well by
the talent of the Senator from West Virginia and, most importantly, in
making sure that we do our job responsibly.
I would make only one 20-second explanation of why I think this
treaty got less of a cover than any others.
One was the way in which it was delayed and being presented and the
timeframe. But a second reason is that people who followed this, which
is a mistake to assume everyone should, people who follow this have
been aware of what the terms of the agreement were since May of last
year.
I think many of us fell into the routine on Foreign Relations and
Armed Services of thinking that its terms were well known. And it was
widely accepted, the broad outlines of the treaty. But I think the
Senator makes a very valid point and I, too, as ranking member of this
committee, do not want
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to be party to these expedited efforts to deal with very significant
security issues relating to the United States.
Mr. HELMS. Let us make a pact.
Mr. BIDEN. We make a pact.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank both Senators.
Mr. BIDEN. I reserve the remainder of my time, if I have any.
Mr. LOTT. Madam President, could I inquire how much time is remaining
for debate?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia has 5 minutes
remaining. The Senator from Delaware has 2 minutes remaining.
Mr. LOTT. Then I will yield myself time off my leader's time.
Mr. BYRD. Do you need more time?
Mr. LOTT. No. I thank the Senator from West Virginia.
I am glad I was able to come to the floor, Madam President, and
listen to this exchange. I always enjoy learning from the exchanges
involving the senior Senators, like the Senators from West Virginia and
North Carolina and Delaware. I wish all Members had been here for the
last hour and heard this debate.
I do want to take just a few minutes, as we get to the close of
debate, to speak on the Chemical Forces in Europe flank agreement or
resolution of ratification because I think it is very important. I wish
we did have more time to talk about all of its ramifications, but I
know the chairman and the ranking member have gone over the importance
of this treaty earlier today.
Madam President, we have an important treaty before us today
modifying the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Agreement [CFE].
The Flank Document adjusts the CFE boundaries to reflect the collapse
of the Soviet Empire, adds reporting requirements, and increases
inspection provisions.
Negotiations to modify the CFE Treaty began in 1995, because Russia
threatened to violate the flank limits in the original treaty. The
precedent of modifying a treaty to accommodate violations by a major
signatory concerned many of us. We have also been concerned about how
Russia intends to use the Flank Agreement to pressure countries on its
borders--former Republics of the Soviet Union. Our concerns were
dramatically heightened by the classified side agreement the
administration reached to further accommodate Russian demands. This
side agreement is available for all Senators to review in room S-407 of
the Capitol.
The concerns about the CFE Flank Agreement are shared by a number of
states which have been subjected to Russian intimidation, pressure and
subversion. States with Russian troops on their soil without their
consent--Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia--have rightly expressed concern
that the Flank Agreement must not undermine their sovereign right to
demand withdrawal of those Russian forces. A fourth country,
Azerbaijan, has been subject to Russian-sponsored coups and
assassination attempts. They have been reluctant to approve the Flank
Agreement without adequate assurances.
The resolution of ratification before the Senate today addresses
these concerns. The resolution includes a number of binding conditions
which make clear to all CFE parties that no additional rights for
Russian military deployments outside Russian borders are granted. The
resolution ensures that United States diplomacy will not be engaged on
the side of Russia but on the side of the victims of Russian policies.
In addition, the 16 members of NATO issued a statement last week
affirming that no additional rights are granted to Russia by the Flank
Agreement. This statement was a direct result of the concerns expressed
by other CFE parties and by the Senate.
The resolution directly addresses the administration's side agreement
in condition 3 which limits United States diplomatic activities to
ensuring the rights of the smaller countries on Russia's borders. This
resolution ensures the United States will not tacitly support Russian
policies that have undermined the independence of Ukraine, Georgia,
Moldova, and Azerbaijan. Finally, the resolution requires detailed
compliance reports and lays out a road map for dealing with
noncompliance in the future.
The resolution of ratification also addresses important issues of
Senate prerogatives. It clarifies that the Byrd-Biden condition, added
to the INF Treaty in 1988, does not allow the administration to avoid
Senate advice and consent on treaty modifications or amendments. The
resolution addresses the issue of multilateralizing the 1972 ABM Treaty
in condition 9. The administration has raised objections to this
provision as they have to many previous efforts to assert Senate
prerogatives on this point. This should be an institutional position--
not a partisan issue.
For more than 3 years, Congress has been on the record expressing
serious misgivings about the administration plan to alter the ABM
Treaty by adding new signatories. Section 232 of the 1994 defense
authorization bill states the issue clearly: ``The United States shall
not be bound by any international agreement entered into by the
President that would substantively modify the ABM Treaty unless the
agreement is entered pursuant to the treaty making power of the
President under the Constitution.''
Efforts to address the multi- lateralization issue since then have
resulted in filibusters and veto threats. It should not surprise anyone
that the Senate selected this resolution of ratification to address the
issue--just as Senators Byrd and Biden selected the resolution of
ratification for the INF Treaty to address an ABM Treaty issue 9 years
ago.
Many of my colleagues are familiar with the issue of ABM multi-
lateralization. Despite the often arcane legal arguments, the issue is
not complicated. The Senate gave its advice and consent to the 1972 ABM
Treaty as a bilateral agreement between the United States and the
Soviet Union. The administration has proposed adding as many as four
new signatories to the treaty and has negotiated limited treaty rights
for those new signatories. The administration's proposal would define
Russia's national territory to include these countries for purposes of
the ABM Treaty. The administration's proposal would essentially define
military equipment of these countries as belonging to Russia for
purposes of the ABM Treaty. The administration's proposal would add new
countries to the ABM Treaty but not grant them rights allowed the
original signatories. This would mean that countries would have the
power to block future U.S. amendments to the ABM Treaty--even though
the new signatories would not have the same rights and obligations as
the United States. The administration's proposed multilateralization
would only address some of the military equipment covered under the
original ABM Treaty--leaving a radar in Latvia, for example, outside
the scope of the new treaty. Under the administration's proposal, the
vast majority of states independent which succeeded the Soviet Union
would be free to develop and deploy unlimited missile defenses--a
dramatic change from the situation in 1972 when the deployment of
missile defenses on these territories was strictly limited by the ABM
Treaty.
In part and in total, these are clearly substantive modifications
which require--under U.S. law--Senate advice and consent.
Multilateralization would alter the object and purpose of the ABM
Treaty as approved by the Senate in 1972. Multilateralization,
therefore, must be subject to the advice and consent of the Senate.
The administration argues that it has the sole power to determine
questions of succession. But that is not true. The Congressional
Research Service opinion, quoted widely in this debate, recognizes that
``International law regarding successor States and their treaty
obligations * * * remains unsettled.'' It also notes that
``international law does not provide certain guidance on the question
of whether the republics formed on the territory of the former U.S.S.R.
have succeeded to the rights and obligations of the ABM Treaty'' and
that ``a multi- lateralization agreement could include matters that
would alter the substance of the ABM Treaty and require Senate advice
and consent.'' It is my understanding that this opinion was prepared a
year ago by a lawyer who has not even seen the text of the proposed
agreement.
The administration's position does not recognize the arms control
precedents followed in the last decade. Arms control treaties are
different from
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treaties on fisheries, taxes, or cultural affairs. START I was
concluded with the Soviet Union but entered into force only after the
Senate gave its advice and consent to the Lisbon Protocol apportioning
the nuclear forces of the former Soviet Union among successor States.
The Bush administration did not argue that Ukrainian SS-19 missiles
were the property of Russia. Yet, the Clinton administration
is essentially arguing that Ukrainian phased-array radars are Russian
under the proposed ABM multilateralization agreement. The question of
successor state obligations under the CFE Treaty was explicitly
recognized by the Senate when we gave our advice and consent to that
treaty. During our consideration, a condition was included in the
resolution of ratification which specified procedures for the accession
of new States Parties to the CFE Treaty. On the issue of ABM
multilateralization, Congress has specifically legislated on our right
to review the agreement. To my knowledge, that has not happened on any
other succession issue. Clearly, ABM multilateralization is very
different from routine succession questions which have been decided by
the executive branch alone.
Madam President, I agree with the administration on one important
point. This is a constitutional issue. The White House has taken one
position until today, and now the Senate has definitively taken
another. Last January, I asked President Clinton to agree to submit
three treaties for our consideration. the President has agreed to
submit the ABM Demarcation agreement and the CFE Flank Agreement, which
is before the Senate today. After he refused to submit ABM
multilateralization, I said publicly that I would continue to press for
the Senate prerogatives--because the Constitution, the precedents and
the law are on our side. We do not prejudge the outcome of our
consideration of ABM multilateralization. All we require is that the
administration submit the agreement to the Senate. Yes, that requires
building a consensus that may not exist today but such a consensus is
necessary for a truly bipartisan national security policy. That is the
issue before the Senate today.
Late last week, the administration recognized the Senate's desire to
review ABM multilateralization. They proposed replacing the
certification in condition 9 with nonbinding ``sense of the Senate''
language. In exchange, Secretary Albright offered to send a letter
assuring us that we could address multilateralization in an indirect
way--as part of a reference in the ABM demarcation agreement. But this
offer was logically inconsistent. It asked the Senate to simply express
our view about a right to provide advice and consent to
multilateralization--and then accept a letter that explicitly denied
that right. Adding new parties to the ABM Treaty is a fundamentally
different issue from the proposed demarcation limits on theater defense
systems. The administration's offer would allow multilateralization
regardless of Senate action on the demarcation agreement. Our position
is simple: We want to review multilateralization through the ``front
door'' on its own merits--not through the ``back door'' as a reference
in a substantively different agreement.
When the administration agreed to submit the CFE Flank Agreement for
our advice and consent, we were asked to act by the entry into force
deadline of May 15. We will act today even though the treaty was not
submitted to the Senate until April 7--3 months after my request. We
will act today even though we have a very full agenda--including comp
time/flex time, IDEA, partial birth abortion and the budget resolution.
We will fulfill our constitutional duty, we will address our concerns
about policy toward Russia, and we will address the important issue of
Senate prerogatives.
I urge my colleagues to support the entire resolution of ratification
reported by the Foreign Relations Committee--including condition 9 on
ABM multilateralization.
Madam President, I want to thank many Senators who have worked very
hard and for quite some time on this treaty and on the ABM condition.
I particularly would like to thank Chairman Helms, Senator Biden,
Senator Gordon Smith, and their staffs for all the work they did to get
this resolution before the Senate today. Also, I would like to thank
Senators who helped in insisting on Senate prerogatives--Senator Warner
and Senator McCain, Senator Smith, Senator Kyl, Senator Shelby, Senator
Lugar, and Senator Hagel. A number of Senators on the committee and
some not on the committee have been very much involved in this process.
I commend them all.
Senators have had concerns about how and why this agreement was
negotiated, and we had concerns about a side deal the administration
made with the Russians concerning the allocation of equipment under the
treaty.
The Senate has addressed these concerns decisively in this resolution
of ratification. The resolution places strict limits on the
administration's flank policy. It ensures that we will be on the side
of the victims of Russian intimidation and that the United States will
stand up for the independence of States on Russia's borders.
Most important, this resolution addresses a critical issue of Senate
prerogative, our right to review the proposed modifications to the 1972
ABM Treaty. It was a decade ago that another ABM Treaty issue was
brought in this body. That debate over interpretations of the ABM
Treaty was finally resolved in the resolution of ratification for the
INF Treaty in 1988.
Today, we are resolving the debate over multilateralization of the
ABM Treaty in this resolution of ratification. For more than 3 years
now Congress and the executive branch have discussed back and forth the
appropriate Senate rule in reviewing the administration's plan to add
new countries to the ABM Treaty.
Condition 9 requires the President to submit any multilateralization
agreement to the Senate for our advice and consent. It does not force
action here. It just says we should have that opportunity. We should be
able to exercise that prerogative to review these changes. It ensures
we will have a full opportunity to look at the merits of
multilateralization in the future. I believe the Constitution and legal
precedence are in our favor.
Today, the Senate will act on the Conventional Forces in the Europe
[CFE] Flank Agreement in time to meet the May 15 deadline. In spite of
the limited time we had to consider the agreement and the very full
schedule that we have had on the floor, we are meeting that deadline.
I did have the opportunity to discuss this issue with our very
distinguished Secretary of State yesterday, and we discussed the
importance of this CFE Flank Agreement. Also, we talked about how we
could properly and appropriately address our concerns about
multilaterilization. I suspect that she probably had something to do
with the decision to go forward with it in this form, and I thank her
for that, and the members of the committee for allowing it to go
forward in this form.
Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. LOTT. I am happy to yield to the Senator.
Mr. BIDEN. I would like to publicly comment and compliment the
Senator from Mississippi. The truth of the matter is that this treaty
would not be before the Senate today as a treaty without the efforts of
the majority leader. The executive believed that they can do this by
executive agreement. They did not think they needed to submit this to
the Senate, although I had been for several months explaining that I
thought it should be treated as a treaty. It was not until the
distinguished leader from Mississippi said, if it is not treated as a
treaty, we have a problem.
The truth of the matter is the reason it is here is because of the
distinguished Senator from Mississippi. I thank him for that.
Mr. LOTT. I thank the Senator for those comments. I did write to the
President expressing my concerns in this area in January of this year,
and other issues.
When I had the opportunity to visit with Secretary Madeleine Albright
before she was confirmed by the Senate, I had the temerity to read to
her from the Constitution about our rights in the Senate in advice and
consent, and she said, ``You know, I agree with you. I taught that at
Georgetown University,'' and I believe she meant that.
I think we are seeing some results of that, and I appreciate the fact
that our prerogatives are being protected. We
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have had this opportunity to review it, debate it, and we will be able
to take up other issues later on this year that are very important for
Senate consideration. I think the process has worked. I urge my
colleagues to support this resolution of ratification.
I yield the floor.
Mr. BYRD. Madam President, how much time do I have remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 5 minutes remaining.
Mr. BYRD. I will take 30 seconds. I want to thank the majority
leader, and I associate myself with the remarks of Senator Biden. I
thank the majority leader in insisting that this come to the Hill as a
treaty, which requires a supermajority in the Senate. I very much
appreciate that.
Madam President, I yield back the remainder of my time to Mr. Biden
and Mr. Helms. They can yield it back or they can use it.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I have nothing more to say, which will
surprise my colleagues, except that the distinguished Democratic
leader, I am told, may wish to speak on leader's time for a few moments
on this issue. Give me a minute to check on whether or not the
distinguished leader, Mr. Daschle, wishes to speak.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. DASCHLE. Madam President, the Senate today is being presented
with an opportunity that is as rare as it is important. For the second
time in less than 3 weeks, the Senate is being asked to give its advice
and consent on a major arms control treaty: the flank agreement to the
Conventional Forces in Europe treaty.
Late last month, the Senate had placed before it the Chemical Weapons
Convention [CWC]. After much debate, the Senate resoundingly rebuffed
several attempts by the treaty's opponents to scuttle it, and
eventually passed CWC with the support of 74 Senators.
Now many have questioned the length to which CWC opponents went in
their efforts to kill or delay Senate consideration of this treaty. I
share some of those concerns. However, in the end, when the Senate was
finally allowed to take up the CWC treaty, I would argue that the
ensuing floor debate on the CWC treaty represented the Senate at its
best. Senators discussed honest disagreements on issues directly
related to the CWC treaty, carefully weighed those discussions, and
finally voted up or down on those issues and, ultimately, the treaty
itself. In short, during the actual floor debate of the CWC treaty, we
saw the Senate acting in a responsible and exemplary fashion.
I am confident that if we had this same kind of debate on the CFE
treaty, we would see the same result. In fact, the margin would
probably be significantly greater for CFE than for CWC. I have listened
carefully to the comments of my fellow Senators on for their views on
this important agreement and have yet to hear a single Senator voice
his or her opposition to the CFE treaty. This was true before the
Foreign Relations Committee attached 13 CWC-related conditions and it
is especially true after. As a result, Senate support for the CFE
agreement itself probably exceeds the 74 who voted for the CWC.
Unfortunately, the Senate is being prevented from considering the CFE
treaty in the same fashion we considered the CWC. We are not being
allowed to look at just the CFE treaty and issues directly related to
it. Instead, the time for Senate consideration of the CFE treaty is
likely to be spent largely on a wholly unrelated issue--the ABM treaty
and opponents efforts to undermine it.
Now, I understand this is an important issue to many members on the
other side of the aisle. And, I know that Senators are well within
their rights to attach unrelated matters to most types of legislation
we consider
However, I disagree with the proponents of the ABM condition on the
merits and I especially disagree with them on their methods. On the
merits, the administration's lawyers argue persuasively that the
Constitution assigns the exclusive responsibility to the President to
determine the successor states to any treaty when an original party
dissolves, to make whatever adjustments might be required to accomplish
such succession, and to enter into agreements for this purpose.
Increasing the number of states participating in a treaty due to the
dissolution of an original party does not itself constitute a
substantive modification of obligations assumed. This is the view of
the administration's lawyers. This is also the view of the nonpartisan
Congressional Research Service in a legal review they conducted last
year.
As for their methods, I think it is both unfortunate and short-
sighted to use a treaty that is in our national security interests as a
vehicle for advancing a totally unrelated political agenda. The
principal sponsors of this condition have previously made no secret of
the fact that they would like to see the United States walk away from
the entire ABM treaty and immediately begin spending tens of billions
of dollars to build a star wars type missile defense. With this act,
they have now revealed the lengths they are willing to go to force
their views on this Senate and this administration.
Nevertheless, that is what has been done. Senators are now faced with
a difficult choice: vote for this treaty in spite of the unacceptable
ABM condition or against it because of the ABM language. This is an
extremely close call for many of us.
In the end, Madam President, we must support this treaty. We must do
so for two reasons. First, the treaty is still fundamentally in our
strategic interest. Failure to pass this treaty now could unravel both
the CFE agreement as well as any future efforts to enhance security
arrangements in Europe. Second, the administration, which must
ultimately decide how to deal with the objectionable ABM condition, has
indicated that we should vote for this treaty now and let them work out
what to do about this provision later. It is for these reasons that I
cast my vote in support of this treaty and urge my colleagues to do the
same.
Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, depending on the disposition of the
chairman of the committee, I am prepared to yield back whatever time we
have left and am ready to vote. The distinguished minority leader does
not wish to speak on this at this moment.
I yield back the remainder of my time.
Mr. BYRD. Madam President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The yeas and nays have been ordered.
Mr. LOTT. Madam President, if I could say for the Senators that will
be coming over, this will be the last vote for the night so we can
attend a very important dinner we have scheduled momentarily.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the resolution
of ratification. On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered.
The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 100, nays 0, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 67 Ex.]
YEAS--100
Abraham
Akaka
Allard
Ashcroft
Baucus
Bennett
Biden
Bingaman
Bond
Boxer
Breaux
Brownback
Bryan
Bumpers
Burns
Byrd
Campbell
Chafee
Cleland
Coats
Cochran
Collins
Conrad
Coverdell
Craig
D'Amato
Daschle
DeWine
Dodd
Domenici
Dorgan
Durbin
Enzi
Faircloth
Feingold
Feinstein
Ford
Frist
Glenn
Gorton
Graham
Gramm
Grams
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Harkin
Hatch
Helms
Hollings
Hutchinson
Hutchison
Inhofe
Inouye
Jeffords
Johnson
Kempthorne
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Kohl
Kyl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lott
Lugar
Mack
McCain
McConnell
Mikulski
Moseley-Braun
Moynihan
Murkowski
Murray
Nickles
Reed
Reid
Robb
Roberts
Rockefeller
Roth
Santorum
Sarbanes
Sessions
Shelby
Smith (NH)
Smith (OR)
Snowe
Specter
Stevens
Thomas
[[Page S4476]]
Thompson
Thurmond
Torricelli
Warner
Wellstone
Wyden
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Two-thirds of the Senators present having
voted in the affirmative, the resolution of ratification is agreed to.
The resolution of ratification, as amended, is as follows:
Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring
therein),
SECTION 1, SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS.
The Senate advises and consents to the ratification of the
CFE Flank Document (as defined in section 3 of this
resolution), subject to the conditions in section 2.
SEC. 2. CONDITIONS.
The Senate's advice and consent to the ratification of the
CFE Flank Document is subject to the following conditions,
which shall be binding upon the President:
(1) Policy of the united states.--Nothing in the CFE Flank
Document shall be construed as altering the policy of the
United States to achieve the immediate and complete
withdrawal of any armed forces and military equipment under
the control of the Russian Federation that are deployed on
the territories of the independent states of the former
Soviet Union (as defined in section 3 of the FREEDOM Support
Act) without the full and complete agreement of those states.
(2) Violations of state sovereignty.--
(A) Finding.--The Senate finds that armed forces and
military equipment under the control of the Russian
Federation are currently deployed on the territories of
States Parties without the full and complete agreement of
those States Parties.
(B) Initiation of discussions.--The Secretary of State
should, as a priority matter, initiate discussions with the
relevant States Parties with the objective of securing the
immediate withdrawal of all armed forces and military
equipment under the control of the Russian Federation
deployed on the territory of any State Party without the full
and complete agreement of that State Party.
(C) Statement of policy.--Prior to the deposit of the
United States instrument of ratification, the President shall
certify to the Senate that the United States and the
governments of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany,
Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom have issued a
joint statement affirming that--
(i) the CFE Flank Document does not give any State Party
the right to station (under Article IV, paragraph 5 of the
Treaty) or temporarily deploy (under Article V, paragraphs 1
(B) and C) of the Treaty) conventional armaments and
equipment limited by the Treaty or the territory of other
States Parties to the Treaty without the freely expressed
consent of the receiving State Party;
(ii) the CFE Flank Document does not alter or abridge the
right of any State Party under the Treaty to utilize fully
its declared maximum levels for conventional armaments and
equipment limited by the Treaty notified pursuant to Article
VII of the Treaty; and
(iii)the CFE Flank Document does not alter in any way the
requirement for the freely expressed consent of all States
Parties concerned in the exercise of any reallocations
envisioned under Article IV, paragraph 3 of the CFE Flank
Document.
(3) Facilitation of negotiations.--
(A) United States Action.--
(i) In general.--The United States, in entering into any
negotiation described in clause (ii) involving the government
of Moldova, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, or Georgia, including the
support of United States intermediaries in the negotiation,
will limit its diplomatic activities to--
(I) achieving the equal and unreserved application by all
States Parties of the principles of the Helsinki Final Act,
including, in particular, the principle that ``States will
respect each other's sovereign equality and individuality as
well as all the rights inherent in and concompassed by its
sovereignty, including a particular, the right of every State
to juridical equality, to territorial integrity, and to
freedom and political independence.'';
(II) ensuring that Moldova, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and
Georgia retain the right under the Treaty to reject, or
accept conditionally, any request by another State Party to
temporarily deploy conventional armaments and equipment
limited by the Treaty on its territory; and
(III) ensuring the right of Moldova, Ukraine, Azerbaijan,
and Georgia to reject, or to accept conditionally, any
request by another State Party to reallocate the current
quotas of Moldova, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, as the
case may be, applicable to conventional armaments and
equipment limited by the Treaty and as established under the
Tashkent Agreement.
(ii) Negotiations covered.--A negotiation described in this
clause is any negotiation conducted pursuant to paragraph (2)
or (3) of Section IV of the CFE Flank Document or pursuant to
any side statement or agreement related to the CFE Flank
Document concluded between the United States and the Russian
Federation.
(B) Other agreements.--Nothing in the CFR Flank Document
shall be construed as providing additional rights to any
State Party to temporarily deploy forces or to reallocate
quotas for conventional armaments and equipment limited by
the Treaty beyond the rights accorded to all States Parties
under the original Treaty and as established under the
Tashkent Agreement.
(4) Noncompliance.--
(A) In general.--If the President determines that
persuasive information exists that a State Party is in
violation of the Treaty or the CFE Flank Document in a manner
which threatens the national security interests of the United
States, then the President shall--
(i) consult with the Senate and promptly submit to the
Senate a report detailing the effect of such actions;
(ii) seek on an urgent basis an inspection of the relevant
State Party in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty
or the CFE Flank Document with the objective of demonstrating
to the international community the act of noncompliance;
(iii) seek, or encourage, on an urgent basis, a meeting at
the highest diplomatic level with the relevant State Party
with the objective of bringing the noncompliant State Party
into compliance;
(iv) implement prohibitions and sanctions against the
relevant State Party as required by law;
(v) if noncompliance has been determined, seek on an urgent
basis the multilateral imposition of sanctions against the
noncompliant State Party for the purposes of bringing the
noncompliant State Party into compliance; and
(vi) in the event that noncompliance persists for a period
longer than one year after the date of the determination made
pursuant to this subparagraph, promptly consult with the
Senate for the purposes of obtaining a resolution of support
for continued adherence to the Treaty, notwithstanding the
changed circumstances affecting the object and purpose of the
Treaty.
(B) Authority of director of central intelligence.--Nothing
in this section may be construed to impair or otherwise
affect the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence
to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure pursuant to section 103(c)(5) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(5)).
(C) Presidential determinations.--If the President
determines that an action otherwise required under
subparagraph (A) would impair or otherwise affect the
authority of the Director of Central Intelligence to protect
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure, the President shall report that determination,
together with a detailed written explanation of the basis for
that determination, to the chairmen of the Select Committee
on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives not
later than 15 days after making such determination.
(5) Monitoring and verification of compliance.--
(A) Declaration.--The Senate declares that--
(i) the Treaty is in the interests of the United States
only if all parties to the Treaty are in strict compliance
with the terms of the Treaty as submitted to the Senate for
its advice and consent to ratification, such compliance being
measured by performance and not by efforts, intentions, or
commitments to comply; and
(ii) the Senate expects all parties to the Treaty,
including the Russian Federation, to be in strict compliance
with their obligations under the terms of the Treaty, as
submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to
ratification.
(B) Briefings on Compliance.--Given its concern about
ongoing violations of the Treaty by the Russian Federation
and other States Parties, the Senate expects the executive
branch of Government to offer briefings not less than four
times a year to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives on
compliance issues related to the Treaty. Each such briefing
shall include a description of all United States efforts in
bilateral and multilateral diplomatic channels and forums to
resolve compliance issues relating to the Treaty, including a
complete description of--
(i) any compliance issues the United States plans to raise
at meetings of the Joint Consultative Group under the Treaty;
(ii) any compliance issues raised at meetings of the Joint
Consultative Group under the Treaty; and
(iii) any determination by the President that a State Party
is in noncompliance with or is otherwise acting in a manner
inconsistent with the object or purpose of the Treaty, within
30 days of such a determination.
(C) Annual reports on compliance.--Beginning January 1,
1998, and annually thereafter, the President shall submit to
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives a full and complete
classified and unclassified report setting forth--
(i) certification of those States Parties that are
determined to be in compliance with the Treaty, on a country-
by-country basis;
(ii) for those countries not certified pursuant to clause
(i), an identification and assessment of all compliance
issues arising with regard to the adherence of the country to
its obligations under the Treaty;
(iii) for those countries not certified pursuant to clause
(i), the steps the United States has taken, either
unilaterally or in conjunction with another State Party--
(I) to initiate inspections of the noncompliant State Party
with the objective of demonstrating to the international
community the act of noncompliance;
[[Page S4477]]
(II) to call attention publicly to the activity in
question; and
(III) to seek on an urgent basis a meeting at the highest
diplomatic level with the noncompliant State Party with the
objective of bringing the noncompliant State Party into
compliance;
(iv) a determination of the military significance of and
border security risks arising from any compliance issue
identified pursuant to clause (ii); and
(v) a detailed assessment of the responses of the
noncompliant State Party in question to actions undertaken by
the United States described in clause (iii).
(D) Annual report on withdrawal of russian armed forces and
military equipment.--Beginning January 1, 1998, and annually
thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and to the
Speaker of the House of Representative on the results of
discussions undertaken pursuant to subparagraph (B) of
paragraph (2), plans for future such discussions, and
measures agreed to secure the immediate withdrawal of all
armed forces and military equipment in question.
(E) Annual report on uncontrolled treaty-limited
equipment.--Beginning January 1, 1998, and annually
thereafter, the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit
to the Committees on Foreign Relations, Armed Services, and
the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives a full and complete
classified and unclassified report regarding--
(i) the status of uncontrolled conventional armament and
equipment limited by the Treaty, on a region-by-region basis
within the Treaty's area of application;
(ii) the status of uncontrolled conventional armaments and
equipment subject to the Treaty, on a region-by-region basis
within the Treaty's area of application; and
(iii) any information made available to the United States
Government concerning the transfer of conventional armaments
and equipment subject to the Treaty within the Treaty's area
of application made by any country to any subnational group,
including any secessionist movement or any terrorist or
paramilitary organization.
(F) Compliance report on armenia and other parties in the
caucasus region.--Not later than August 1, 1997, the
President shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives
a full and complete classified and unclassified report
regarding--
(i) whether Armenia was in compliance with the Treaty in
allowing the transfer of conventional armaments and equipment
limited by the Treaty through Armenia territory to the
secessionist movement in Azerbaijan;
(ii) whether other States Parties located in the Caucasus
region are in compliance with the Treaty; and
(iii) if Armenia is found not to have been in compliance
under clause (i), or, if any other State Party is found not
to be in compliance under clause (ii), what actions the
President has taken to implement sanctions as required by
chapter 11 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
(22 U.S.C. 2295 et seq.; relating to assistance to the
independent states of the former Soviet Union) or other
provisions of law.
(G) Report on destruction of equipment east of the urals.--
Not later than January 1, 1998, the President shall submit to
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives a full and complete
classified and unclassified report regarding--
(i) whether the Russian Federation is fully implementing on
schedule all agreements requiring the destruction of
conventional armaments and equipment subject to the Treaty
but for the withdrawal of such armaments and equipment by the
Soviet Union from the Treaty's area of application prior to
the Soviet Union's deposit of its instrument of ratification
of the Treaty; and
(ii) whether any of the armaments and equipment described
under clause (i) have been redeployed, reintroduced, or
transferred into the Treaty's area of application and, if so,
the location of such armaments and equipment.
(H) Definitions.--
(i) Uncontrolled conventional armaments and equipment
limited by the treaty.--The term ``uncontrolled conventional
armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty'' means all
conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty
not under the control of a State Party that would be subject
to the numerical limitations set forth in the Treaty if such
armaments and equipment were directly under the control of a
State Party.
(ii) Uncontrolled conventional armaments and equipment
subject to the treaty.--The term ``uncontrolled conventional
armaments and equipment subject to the Treaty'' means all
conventional armaments and equipment described in Article
II(1)(Q) of the Treaty not under the control of a State Party
that would be subject to information exchange in accordance
with the Protocol on Information Exchange if such armaments
and equipment were directly under the control of a State
Party.
(6) Application and effectiveness of senate advice and
consent.--
(A) In general.--The advice and consent of the Senate in
this resolution shall apply only to the CFE Flank Document
and the documents described in subparagraph (D).
(B) Presidential certification.--Prior to the deposit of
the United States instrument of ratification, the President
shall certify to the Senate that, in the course of diplomatic
negotiations to secure accession to, or ratification of, the
CFE Flank Document by any other State Party, the United
States will vigorously reject any effort by a State Party
to--
(i) modify, amend, or alter a United States right or
obligation under the Treaty or the CFE Flank Document, unless
such modification, amendment, or alternation is solely an
extension of the period of provisional application of the CFE
Flank Document or a change of a minor administrative or
technical nature;
(ii) secure the adoption of a new United States obligation
under, or in relation to, the Treaty or the CFE Flank
Document, unless such obligation is solely of a minor
administrative or technical nature; or
(iii) secure the provision of assurances, or endorsement of
a course of action or a diplomatic position, inconsistent
with the principles and policies established under conditions
(1), (2), and (3) of this resolution.
(C) Substantive modifications.--Any subsequent agreement to
modify, amend, or alter the CFE Flank Document shall require
the complete resubmission of the CFE Flank Document, together
with any modification, amendment, or alteration made thereto,
to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification, if such
modification, amendment, or alteration is not solely of a
minor administrative or technical nature.
(D) Status of other documents.--
(i) In general.--The following documents are of the same
force and effect as the provisions of the CFE Flank Document:
(I) Understanding on Details of the CFE Flank Document of
31 May 1996 in Order to Facilitate its Implementation.
(II) Exchange of letters between the United States Chief
Delegate to the CFE Joint Consultative Group and the Head of
Delegation of the Russian Federation to the Joint
Consultative Group, dated July 25, 1996.
(ii) Status of inconsistent actions.--The United States
shall regard all actions inconsistent with obligations under
those documents as equivalent under international law to
actions inconsistent with the CFE Flank Document or the
Treaty, or both, as the case may be.
(7) Modifications of the cfe flank zone.--Prior to the
deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the
President shall certify to Congress that any subsequent
agreement to modify, revise, amend, or alter the boundaries
of the CFE flank zone, as delineated by the map entitled
``Revised CFE Flank Zone'' submitted by the President to the
Senate on April 7, 1997, shall require the submission of such
agreement to the Senate for its advice and consent to
ratification, if such changes are not solely of a minor
administrative or technical nature.
(8) Treaty interpretation.--
(A) Principles of treaty interpretation.--The Senate
affirms the applicability to all treaties of the
constitutionally based principles of treaty interpretation
set forth in condition (1) in the resolution of ratification
of the INF Treaty, approved by the Senate on May 27, 1988.
(B) Construction of senate resolution of ratification.--
Nothing in condition (1) of the resolution of ratification of
the INF Treaty, approved by the Senate on May 27, 1988, shall
be construed as authorizing the President to obtain
legislative approval for modifications or amendments to
treaties through majority approval of both Houses.
(C) Definition.--As used in this paragraph, the term ``INF
Treaty'' refers to the Treaty Between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter Range
Missiles, together with the related memorandum of
understanding and protocols, done at Washington on December
8, 1987.
(9) Senate prerogatives on multilateralization of the abm
treaty.--
(A) Findings.--The Senate makes the following findings:
(i) Section 232 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1995 (Public Law 103-337) states that ``the
United States shall not be bound by any international
agreement entered into by the President that would
substantively modify the ABM Treaty unless the agreement is
entered pursuant to the treaty making power of the President
under the Constitution''.
(ii) The conference report accompanying the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law
104-201) states ``. . . the accord on ABM Treaty succession,
tentatively agreed to by the administration, would constitute
a substantive change to the ABM Treaty, which may only be
entered into pursuant to the treaty making power of the
President under the Constitution''.
(B) Certification required.--Prior to the deposit of the
United States instrument of ratification, the President shall
certify to the Senate that he will submit for Senate advice
and consent to ratification any international agreement--
(i) that would add one or more countries as States Parties
to the ABM Treaty, or otherwise convert the ABM Treaty from a
bilateral treaty to a multilateral treaty; or
(ii) that would change the geographic scope or coverage of
the ABM Treaty, or otherwise modify the meaning of the term
``national territory'' as used in Article VI and Article IX
of the ABM Treaty.
(C) ABM treaty defined.--For the purposes of this
resolution, the term ``ABM Treaty'' means the Treaty Between
the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
[[Page S4478]]
Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic
Missile Systems, signed in Moscow on May 26, 1972, with
related protocol, signed in Moscow on July 3, 1974.
(10) Accession to the cfe treaty.--The Senate urges the
President to support a request to become a State Party to the
Treaty by--
(A) any state within the territory of the Treaty's area of
application as of the date of signature of the Treaty,
including Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia; and
(B) the Republic of Slovenia.
(11) Temporary deployments.--Prior to the deposit of the
United States instrument of ratification, the President shall
certify to the Senate that the United States has informed all
other States Parties to the Treaty that the United States--
(A) will continue to interpret the term ``temporary
deployment'', as used in the Treaty, to mean a deployment of
severely limited duration measured in days or weeks or, at
most, but not years;
(B) will pursue measures designed to ensure that any State
Party seeking to utilize the temporary deployments provision
of the Treaty will be required to furnish the Joint
Consultative Group established by the Treaty with a statement
of the purpose and intended duration of the deployment,
together with a description of the object of verification and
the location of origin and destination of the relevant
conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty;
and
(C) will vigorously reject any effort by a State Party to
use the right of temporary deployment under the Treaty--
(i) to justify military deployments on a permanent basis;
or
(ii) to justify military deployments without the full and
complete agreement of the State Party upon whose territory
the armed forces or military equipment of another State Party
are to be deployed.
(12) Military acts of intimidation.--It is the policy of
the United States to treat with the utmost seriousness all
acts of intimidation carried out against any State Party by
any other State Party using any conventional armament or
equipment limited by the Treaty.
(13) Supplementary inspections.--The Senate understands
that additional supplementary declared site inspections may
be conducted in the Russian Federation in accordance with
Section V of the CFE Flank Document at any object of
verification under paragraph 3(A) or paragraph 3(B) of
Section V of the CFE Flank Document, without regard to
whether a declared site passive quota inspection pursuant to
paragraph 10(D) of Section II of the Protocol on Inspection
has been specifically conducted at such object of
verification in the course of the same year.
(14) Designated permanent storage sites.--
(A) Finding.--The Senate finds that removal of the
constraints of the Treaty on designated permanent storage
sites pursuant to paragraph 1 of Section IV of the CFE Flank
Document could introduce into active military units within
the Treaty's area of application as many as 7,000 additional
battle tanks, 3,400 armored combat vehicles, and 6,000 pieces
of artillery, which would constitute a significant change in
the conventional capabilities of States Parties within the
Treaty's area of application.
(B) Specific report.--Prior to the agreement or acceptance
by the United States of any proposal to alter the constraints
of the Treaty on designated permanent storage sites, but not
later than January 1, 1998, the President shall submit to the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives a full and complete
classified and unclassified report setting forth--
(i) a detailed explanation of how additional Treaty-limited
equipment will be allocated among States Parties;
(ii) a detailed assessment of the location and uses to
which the Russian Federation will put additional Treaty-
limited equipment; and
(iii) a detailed and comprehensive justification of the
means by which introduction of additional battle tanks,
armored combat vehicles, and pieces of artillery into the
Treaty's area of application furthers United States national
security interests.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
As used in this resolution:
(1) Area of application.--The term ``area of application''
has the same meaning as set forth in subparagraph (B) of
paragraph 1 of Article II of the Treaty.
(2) CFE flank document.--The term ``CFE Flank Document''
means the Document Agreed Among the States Parties to the
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) of
November 19, 1990, adopted at Vienna on May 31, 1996 (Treaty
Doc. 105-5).
(3) Conventional armaments and equipment limited by the
treaty; treaty-limited equipment.--The terms ``conventional
armament and equipment limited by the Treaty'' and ``Treaty-
limited equipment'' have the meaning set forth in
subparagraph (J) of paragraph 1 of Article II of the Treaty.
(4) Flank region.--The term ``flank region'' means that
portion of the Treaty's area of application defined as the
flank zone by the map depicting the territory of the former
Soviet Union within the Treaty's area of application that was
provided by the former Soviet Union upon the date of
signature of the Treaty.
(5) Full and complete agreement.--The term ``full and
complete agreement'' means agreement achieved through free
negotiations between the respective States Parties with full
respect for the sovereignty of the State Party upon whose
territory the armed forces or military equipment under the
control of another State Party is deployed.
(6) Free negotiations.--The term `'free negotiations''
means negotiations with a party that are free from coercion
or intimidation.
(7) Helsinki final act.--The term ``Helsinki Final Act''
refers to the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe of August 1, 1975.
(8) Protocol on information exchange.--The term ``Protocol
on Information Exchange'' means the Protocol on Notification
and Exchange of Information of the CFE Treaty, together with
the Annex on the Format for the Exchange of Information of
the CFE Treaty.
(9) State party.--Except as otherwise expressly provided,
the term ``State Party'' means any nation that is a party to
the Treaty.
(10) Tashkent agreement.--The term ``Tashkent Agreement''
means the agreement between Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine
establishing themselves as successor states to the Soviet
Union under the CFE Treaty, concluded at Tashkent on may 15,
1992.
(11) Treaty.--The term ``Treaty'' means the Treaty on
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, done at Paris on
November 19, 1990.
(12) United states instrument of ratification.--The term
``United States instrument of ratification'' means the
instrument of ratification of the United States of the CFE
Flank Document.
Mr. LOTT. Madam President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the
resolution of ratification was agreed to and I move to lay that motion
on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
____________________