[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 63 (Wednesday, May 14, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4471-S4478]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]



               Condition 3: Facilitation of negotiations

  Now, I am particularly interested in this condition.

       Condition (3) ensures that the United States will not be 
     party to any efforts by Russia to intimidate or otherwise 
     extract CFE Treaty concessions from its smaller neighbors.

  Let me interpolate right there for the moment with a rhetorical 
question.
  Why should we have to have a condition to ensure that the United 
States will not be party to any efforts by Russia to intimidate or 
otherwise extract CFE Treaty concessions from its smaller neighbors? It 
would seem to me that would be a given.
  Let me continue, and then I will yield to the distinguished ranking 
member.

       Indeed, this condition, along with much of the rest of the 
     resolution, is specifically designed to require the United 
     States to safeguard the sovereign rights of other countries 
     (such as Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) in their 
     dealings with the Russian Federation.

  Listen to this:

       The committee became alarmed, over the course of its 
     consideration of the CFE Flank Document, with several aspects 
     of the United States negotiating record. This condition 
     [condition No. 3] will ensure that the United States will 
     adhere to the highest principles in the conduct of 
     negotiations undertaken pursuant to the treaty, the CFE Flank 
     Document, and any side statements that have already been 
     issued or which may be issued in the future.

  Now, there are several questions that jump out at anyone who reads 
that paragraph.
  It makes reference to ``side statements.'' It uses the word 
``alarmed.'' There is a condition there that ensures that the United 
States will not be a party to any efforts by Russia to intimidate or 
otherwise extract CFE Treaty concessions from a smaller neighbor.
  Why do we have to have a condition to that effect? Is there some 
confusion about what the right position is that the United States 
should take? Is it not a given that the United States would not be a 
party to any efforts by Russia to intimidate concessions from its 
smaller neighbors?
  I yield to the distinguished Senator.
  Mr. BIDEN. Let me say, this all came about--and they are, obviously, 
as usual, very good, incisive and insightful questions.
  I think it is unnecessary because I think it is a given. But let me 
explain, in fairness, why we got to this point and why I thought it 
was--speaking only for myself--a clarification, although in some sense 
I thought it was a demeaning clarification. Let me explain.
  During the negotiations on the flank agreement, there was concern 
about what became referred to as a ``side agreement.'' That was, there 
was an issue that came up during the negotiations where a diplomatic 
note was passed, which is classified--I am not able to give you, but I 
can tell you from the committee testimony what it said--a note that was 
passed to the Russian representative dealing with the issue of the 
stationing of Russian troops on the soil of the countries you named.
  The Under Secretary of State, Lynn Davis, who appeared before the 
committee on April 29, was asked to explain. He went on to explain why 
a statement was made to the Russians. The statement made was that we 
would--this is the quote, in part--``the United States is prepared to 
facilitate or act as an intermediary for a successful outcome in 
discussions that could take place under the flank agreement and the CFE 
Treaty between Russia and other Newly Independent States.''
  The worry expressed by my friends in the Republican Party was that 
this reflected a possible inclination to try to mollify Russia and put 
American pressure on Moldova or Georgia or other states to accept 
Russian deployment of Russian forces on their soil.

  The concern was that the assertion made by the U.S. negotiators was a 
way of saying, do not worry, we are going to help you to get Russian 
troops placed in those regions.
  Lynn Davis, the Under Secretary said, no, that was never the 
intention of that ``side agreement,'' as it became referred to.
  I will quote what he said at the hearing to my friend from West 
Virginia. He said:

       We see this particular statement of our intentions as part 
     of the reassurance that we can make so that those countries 
     will feel that this is an agreement that continues to be in 
     their security interests. This statement of our intentions 
     makes clear that the commitment is predicated on an 
     understanding that any agreements between Russia and the 
     Newly Independent States must be done on a voluntary basis 
     with due respect for the sovereignty of the countries 
     involved, and our role here is indeed to reinforce that and 
     ensure that it is carried out.

  This was the concern that was expressed by my friends on the 
Republican side, that the United States intention to level the playing 
field between Russia and other Newly Independent States had not been 
seen that way by all concerned.

[[Page S4472]]

  So what was done--and the administration signed on to the condition--
was to make it crystal clear that this offer of an intermediary role 
was not for the purpose of using our influence or power to coerce them 
into accepting a demand or a suggestion from their Russian brethren.
  That is the context, I say to my friend, in which it came up. You 
used the phrase ``the committee became alarmed.'' Some in the committee 
were alarmed because of the wording of the ``side agreement.'' This was 
done to clarify what the administration says was their intent from the 
beginning but now locks in the stated interpretation by the 
administration of what that whole thing was all about.
  I hope I have answered the question, and I hope I have done it 
correctly.
  Mr. HELMS. You have done it correctly, I say to the Senator.
  Conditions 1, 2, and 3 of the resolution on ratification require the 
President to observe reasonable limits in the conduct of certain 
negotiations facilitated by the United States in support of the CFE 
Treaty. Specifically, this entails an obligation for the President to 
conduct his diplomacy in a manner that respects the sovereignty and 
free will of countries on the periphery of Russia that are under 
pressure by Russia to allow the establishment of military bases.
  In fact, I do not believe that the United States should be party to 
any negotiation which could result in allowing Russia to deploy its 
troops into the territory occupied by the Soviet Union for nearly 70 
years. Yet this is exactly the result contemplated by the Clinton 
administration if this resolution of ratification is not clear on this 
point. Conditions 1, 2, and 3 are clear on this matter.
  It is clear from this document that the Clinton administration has 
demonstrated a willingness to participate in negotiations that could 
actually result in the establishment of Russian military bases on the 
territory of other States with the endorsement--and even with the 
active assistance--of the United States. Is there anyone in the 
administration who is prepared to state that it would be in the United 
States' interest for Russia to establish military bases outside of its 
territory?
  The Clinton administration offers hollow assertions that Russian 
troops will not be deployed in other States without the freely given 
consent of the relevant government. Russia--still the largest military 
power in Europe--has used its armed forces in recent years in both 
Georgia and Azerbaijan with virtually no complaint from the Clinton 
administration.
  Russia uses its military presence in Ukraine and Moldova to influence 
the sovereign governments of those States while the Clinton 
administration remains silent. Russian Government officials have made 
open threats of military invasion against the Baltic States. Finally, 
less than 1 year ago, a bloody war in Chechnya was brought to an end. 
That war was characterized by wide scale Russian atrocities, the 
intentional targeting of civilians, and casualties possibly in excess 
of 100,000 people--mostly innocent men, women, and children. Do the 
administration's lawyers find that these incidents were with the freely 
given consent of the affected governments?
  Conditions 1, 2, and 3 set reasonable limits specifically tied to 
activities cited in paragraph IV (2) and (3) of the CFE Flank Document.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President--Madam President, I made the mistake of 
referring to the Presiding Officer as ``Mr. President" before I turned 
around. And I also made the mistake of referring to Under Secretary 
Davis as ``he.'' It is ``she.'' I knew that, and I apologize on both 
scores.
  Mr. BYRD. Well, Madam President, I came up, I suppose, at a time when 
political correctness did not make any difference. As far as I am 
concerned, it does not make any difference yet. And the pronoun ``he'' 
is inclusive. It was inclusive when I was a boy; it was inclusive when 
I became a man. It still is inclusive of the female. So I would not 
worry too much about that.
  Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, as the distinguished former majority 
leader knows, another former majority leader, Senator Baker, used an 
expression all the time. He would come to the floor, and he would say, 
``I ain't got no dog in that fight.''
  Mr. BYRD. I commend the committee for including that condition.
  I can understand how the committee would become alarmed. I think that 
it would have been well if all Senators could have been notified that 
there was--and maybe they were, I do not know, but I do not remember 
being notified except through my own staff that there was such a paper 
up in room 407 so that they could have gone up and examined it. I heard 
about it this afternoon, and I went up and looked at it.
  So I think the committee had a right to be alarmed. I congratulate 
the committee on including the condition which, as Mr. Biden has just 
said, locks it in, locks the administration in, so there will be no 
doubt that the United States will not be party to any efforts by Russia 
to intimidate or otherwise extract CFE Treaty concessions from its 
smaller neighbors.
  I would dare say, if the people in Azerbaijan or Armenia or Georgia 
should see that language, they would be alarmed also--they would be 
alarmed also. They would wonder, where does the United States stand? 
But the condition is there. And I again commend the committee on 
including it.
  Do the managers feel that U.S. policy is now clearly to protect the 
interests and rights of the newly sovereign nations of the Caucasus 
against intimidation and pressure tactics by the Russians regarding 
equipment that is covered by the flank agreement that we are 
considering here today?
  Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.
  Mr. BIDEN. I would say yes, as well, Madam President.
  Mr. BYRD. Madam President, how much time remains?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 6 minutes remaining.
  Mr. BYRD. Madam President, I thank all Senators. Especially I thank 
the manager and ranking manager on the committee.
  I shall vote for the treaty.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.
  Mr. HELMS. Will the Senator yield me 1 minute?
  Mr. BYRD. I yield 1 minute to the Senator.
  Mr. HELMS. I thank the Senator.
  During the past 4 years, the Clinton administration has remained 
silent while Russia has encroached upon the territory and sovereignty 
of its neighbors. It was the lack of a foreign policy--not a lack of 
tools--that allowed this to happen.
  I have confidence that the new Secretary of State will correct the 
course of our policies toward Russia, and I gladly support this treaty 
to aid the Honorable Madeleine Albright in that endeavor. The collapse 
of the Soviet Union was one of the finest moments of the 20th century. 
To allow even a partial restoration of the Soviet Union before the turn 
of the century would be a failure of an even greater magnitude.
  Senator Lott, I believe, is standing by.
  I thank the Senator.
  Mr. BYRD. I thank the distinguished Senator.
  I reserve the remainder of my time.
  Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, before the distinguished leader takes the 
floor, if I could just take 60 seconds of the 3 minutes I have 
remaining to comment on something the Senator from West Virginia said.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware is recognized.
  Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, the Senate has always been served well by 
the talent of the Senator from West Virginia and, most importantly, in 
making sure that we do our job responsibly.
  I would make only one 20-second explanation of why I think this 
treaty got less of a cover than any others.
  One was the way in which it was delayed and being presented and the 
timeframe. But a second reason is that people who followed this, which 
is a mistake to assume everyone should, people who follow this have 
been aware of what the terms of the agreement were since May of last 
year.
  I think many of us fell into the routine on Foreign Relations and 
Armed Services of thinking that its terms were well known. And it was 
widely accepted, the broad outlines of the treaty. But I think the 
Senator makes a very valid point and I, too, as ranking member of this 
committee, do not want

[[Page S4473]]

to be party to these expedited efforts to deal with very significant 
security issues relating to the United States.
  Mr. HELMS. Let us make a pact.
  Mr. BIDEN. We make a pact.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank both Senators.
  Mr. BIDEN. I reserve the remainder of my time, if I have any.
  Mr. LOTT. Madam President, could I inquire how much time is remaining 
for debate?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia has 5 minutes 
remaining. The Senator from Delaware has 2 minutes remaining.
  Mr. LOTT. Then I will yield myself time off my leader's time.
  Mr. BYRD. Do you need more time?
  Mr. LOTT. No. I thank the Senator from West Virginia.
  I am glad I was able to come to the floor, Madam President, and 
listen to this exchange. I always enjoy learning from the exchanges 
involving the senior Senators, like the Senators from West Virginia and 
North Carolina and Delaware. I wish all Members had been here for the 
last hour and heard this debate.
  I do want to take just a few minutes, as we get to the close of 
debate, to speak on the Chemical Forces in Europe flank agreement or 
resolution of ratification because I think it is very important. I wish 
we did have more time to talk about all of its ramifications, but I 
know the chairman and the ranking member have gone over the importance 
of this treaty earlier today.
  Madam President, we have an important treaty before us today 
modifying the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Agreement [CFE]. 
The Flank Document adjusts the CFE boundaries to reflect the collapse 
of the Soviet Empire, adds reporting requirements, and increases 
inspection provisions.
  Negotiations to modify the CFE Treaty began in 1995, because Russia 
threatened to violate the flank limits in the original treaty. The 
precedent of modifying a treaty to accommodate violations by a major 
signatory concerned many of us. We have also been concerned about how 
Russia intends to use the Flank Agreement to pressure countries on its 
borders--former Republics of the Soviet Union. Our concerns were 
dramatically heightened by the classified side agreement the 
administration reached to further accommodate Russian demands. This 
side agreement is available for all Senators to review in room S-407 of 
the Capitol.
  The concerns about the CFE Flank Agreement are shared by a number of 
states which have been subjected to Russian intimidation, pressure and 
subversion. States with Russian troops on their soil without their 
consent--Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia--have rightly expressed concern 
that the Flank Agreement must not undermine their sovereign right to 
demand withdrawal of those Russian forces. A fourth country, 
Azerbaijan, has been subject to Russian-sponsored coups and 
assassination attempts. They have been reluctant to approve the Flank 
Agreement without adequate assurances.
  The resolution of ratification before the Senate today addresses 
these concerns. The resolution includes a number of binding conditions 
which make clear to all CFE parties that no additional rights for 
Russian military deployments outside Russian borders are granted. The 
resolution ensures that United States diplomacy will not be engaged on 
the side of Russia but on the side of the victims of Russian policies. 
In addition, the 16 members of NATO issued a statement last week 
affirming that no additional rights are granted to Russia by the Flank 
Agreement. This statement was a direct result of the concerns expressed 
by other CFE parties and by the Senate.
  The resolution directly addresses the administration's side agreement 
in condition 3 which limits United States diplomatic activities to 
ensuring the rights of the smaller countries on Russia's borders. This 
resolution ensures the United States will not tacitly support Russian 
policies that have undermined the independence of Ukraine, Georgia, 
Moldova, and Azerbaijan. Finally, the resolution requires detailed 
compliance reports and lays out a road map for dealing with 
noncompliance in the future.
  The resolution of ratification also addresses important issues of 
Senate prerogatives. It clarifies that the Byrd-Biden condition, added 
to the INF Treaty in 1988, does not allow the administration to avoid 
Senate advice and consent on treaty modifications or amendments. The 
resolution addresses the issue of multilateralizing the 1972 ABM Treaty 
in condition 9. The administration has raised objections to this 
provision as they have to many previous efforts to assert Senate 
prerogatives on this point. This should be an institutional position--
not a partisan issue.
  For more than 3 years, Congress has been on the record expressing 
serious misgivings about the administration plan to alter the ABM 
Treaty by adding new signatories. Section 232 of the 1994 defense 
authorization bill states the issue clearly: ``The United States shall 
not be bound by any international agreement entered into by the 
President that would substantively modify the ABM Treaty unless the 
agreement is entered pursuant to the treaty making power of the 
President under the Constitution.''

  Efforts to address the multi- lateralization issue since then have 
resulted in filibusters and veto threats. It should not surprise anyone 
that the Senate selected this resolution of ratification to address the 
issue--just as Senators Byrd and Biden selected the resolution of 
ratification for the INF Treaty to address an ABM Treaty issue 9 years 
ago.
  Many of my colleagues are familiar with the issue of ABM multi- 
lateralization. Despite the often arcane legal arguments, the issue is 
not complicated. The Senate gave its advice and consent to the 1972 ABM 
Treaty as a bilateral agreement between the United States and the 
Soviet Union. The administration has proposed adding as many as four 
new signatories to the treaty and has negotiated limited treaty rights 
for those new signatories. The administration's proposal would define 
Russia's national territory to include these countries for purposes of 
the ABM Treaty. The administration's proposal would essentially define 
military equipment of these countries as belonging to Russia for 
purposes of the ABM Treaty. The administration's proposal would add new 
countries to the ABM Treaty but not grant them rights allowed the 
original signatories. This would mean that countries would have the 
power to block future U.S. amendments to the ABM Treaty--even though 
the new signatories would not have the same rights and obligations as 
the United States. The administration's proposed multilateralization 
would only address some of the military equipment covered under the 
original ABM Treaty--leaving a radar in Latvia, for example, outside 
the scope of the new treaty. Under the administration's proposal, the 
vast majority of states independent which succeeded the Soviet Union 
would be free to develop and deploy unlimited missile defenses--a 
dramatic change from the situation in 1972 when the deployment of 
missile defenses on these territories was strictly limited by the ABM 
Treaty.
  In part and in total, these are clearly substantive modifications 
which require--under U.S. law--Senate advice and consent. 
Multilateralization would alter the object and purpose of the ABM 
Treaty as approved by the Senate in 1972. Multilateralization, 
therefore, must be subject to the advice and consent of the Senate.
  The administration argues that it has the sole power to determine 
questions of succession. But that is not true. The Congressional 
Research Service opinion, quoted widely in this debate, recognizes that 
``International law regarding successor States and their treaty 
obligations * * * remains unsettled.'' It also notes that 
``international law does not provide certain guidance on the question 
of whether the republics formed on the territory of the former U.S.S.R. 
have succeeded to the rights and obligations of the ABM Treaty'' and 
that ``a multi- lateralization agreement could include matters that 
would alter the substance of the ABM Treaty and require Senate advice 
and consent.'' It is my understanding that this opinion was prepared a 
year ago by a lawyer who has not even seen the text of the proposed 
agreement.
  The administration's position does not recognize the arms control 
precedents followed in the last decade. Arms control treaties are 
different from

[[Page S4474]]

treaties on fisheries, taxes, or cultural affairs. START I was 
concluded with the Soviet Union but entered into force only after the 
Senate gave its advice and consent to the Lisbon Protocol apportioning 
the nuclear forces of the former Soviet Union among successor States. 
The Bush administration did not argue that Ukrainian SS-19 missiles 
were the property of Russia. Yet, the Clinton administration 
is essentially arguing that Ukrainian phased-array radars are Russian 
under the proposed ABM multilateralization agreement. The question of 
successor state obligations under the CFE Treaty was explicitly 
recognized by the Senate when we gave our advice and consent to that 
treaty. During our consideration, a condition was included in the 
resolution of ratification which specified procedures for the accession 
of new States Parties to the CFE Treaty. On the issue of ABM 
multilateralization, Congress has specifically legislated on our right 
to review the agreement. To my knowledge, that has not happened on any 
other succession issue. Clearly, ABM multilateralization is very 
different from routine succession questions which have been decided by 
the executive branch alone.

  Madam President, I agree with the administration on one important 
point. This is a constitutional issue. The White House has taken one 
position until today, and now the Senate has definitively taken 
another. Last January, I asked President Clinton to agree to submit 
three treaties for our consideration. the President has agreed to 
submit the ABM Demarcation agreement and the CFE Flank Agreement, which 
is before the Senate today. After he refused to submit ABM 
multilateralization, I said publicly that I would continue to press for 
the Senate prerogatives--because the Constitution, the precedents and 
the law are on our side. We do not prejudge the outcome of our 
consideration of ABM multilateralization. All we require is that the 
administration submit the agreement to the Senate. Yes, that requires 
building a consensus that may not exist today but such a consensus is 
necessary for a truly bipartisan national security policy. That is the 
issue before the Senate today.
  Late last week, the administration recognized the Senate's desire to 
review ABM multilateralization. They proposed replacing the 
certification in condition 9 with nonbinding ``sense of the Senate'' 
language. In exchange, Secretary Albright offered to send a letter 
assuring us that we could address multilateralization in an indirect 
way--as part of a reference in the ABM demarcation agreement. But this 
offer was logically inconsistent. It asked the Senate to simply express 
our view about a right to provide advice and consent to 
multilateralization--and then accept a letter that explicitly denied 
that right. Adding new parties to the ABM Treaty is a fundamentally 
different issue from the proposed demarcation limits on theater defense 
systems. The administration's offer would allow multilateralization 
regardless of Senate action on the demarcation agreement. Our position 
is simple: We want to review multilateralization through the ``front 
door'' on its own merits--not through the ``back door'' as a reference 
in a substantively different agreement.
  When the administration agreed to submit the CFE Flank Agreement for 
our advice and consent, we were asked to act by the entry into force 
deadline of May 15. We will act today even though the treaty was not 
submitted to the Senate until April 7--3 months after my request. We 
will act today even though we have a very full agenda--including comp 
time/flex time, IDEA, partial birth abortion and the budget resolution. 
We will fulfill our constitutional duty, we will address our concerns 
about policy toward Russia, and we will address the important issue of 
Senate prerogatives.
  I urge my colleagues to support the entire resolution of ratification 
reported by the Foreign Relations Committee--including condition 9 on 
ABM multilateralization.
  Madam President, I want to thank many Senators who have worked very 
hard and for quite some time on this treaty and on the ABM condition.
  I particularly would like to thank Chairman Helms, Senator Biden, 
Senator Gordon Smith, and their staffs for all the work they did to get 
this resolution before the Senate today. Also, I would like to thank 
Senators who helped in insisting on Senate prerogatives--Senator Warner 
and Senator McCain, Senator Smith, Senator Kyl, Senator Shelby, Senator 
Lugar, and Senator Hagel. A number of Senators on the committee and 
some not on the committee have been very much involved in this process. 
I commend them all.
  Senators have had concerns about how and why this agreement was 
negotiated, and we had concerns about a side deal the administration 
made with the Russians concerning the allocation of equipment under the 
treaty.
  The Senate has addressed these concerns decisively in this resolution 
of ratification. The resolution places strict limits on the 
administration's flank policy. It ensures that we will be on the side 
of the victims of Russian intimidation and that the United States will 
stand up for the independence of States on Russia's borders.
  Most important, this resolution addresses a critical issue of Senate 
prerogative, our right to review the proposed modifications to the 1972 
ABM Treaty. It was a decade ago that another ABM Treaty issue was 
brought in this body. That debate over interpretations of the ABM 
Treaty was finally resolved in the resolution of ratification for the 
INF Treaty in 1988.
  Today, we are resolving the debate over multilateralization of the 
ABM Treaty in this resolution of ratification. For more than 3 years 
now Congress and the executive branch have discussed back and forth the 
appropriate Senate rule in reviewing the administration's plan to add 
new countries to the ABM Treaty.
  Condition 9 requires the President to submit any multilateralization 
agreement to the Senate for our advice and consent. It does not force 
action here. It just says we should have that opportunity. We should be 
able to exercise that prerogative to review these changes. It ensures 
we will have a full opportunity to look at the merits of 
multilateralization in the future. I believe the Constitution and legal 
precedence are in our favor.
  Today, the Senate will act on the Conventional Forces in the Europe 
[CFE] Flank Agreement in time to meet the May 15 deadline. In spite of 
the limited time we had to consider the agreement and the very full 
schedule that we have had on the floor, we are meeting that deadline.
  I did have the opportunity to discuss this issue with our very 
distinguished Secretary of State yesterday, and we discussed the 
importance of this CFE Flank Agreement. Also, we talked about how we 
could properly and appropriately address our concerns about 
multilaterilization. I suspect that she probably had something to do 
with the decision to go forward with it in this form, and I thank her 
for that, and the members of the committee for allowing it to go 
forward in this form.
  Mr. BIDEN. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. LOTT. I am happy to yield to the Senator.
  Mr. BIDEN. I would like to publicly comment and compliment the 
Senator from Mississippi. The truth of the matter is that this treaty 
would not be before the Senate today as a treaty without the efforts of 
the majority leader. The executive believed that they can do this by 
executive agreement. They did not think they needed to submit this to 
the Senate, although I had been for several months explaining that I 
thought it should be treated as a treaty. It was not until the 
distinguished leader from Mississippi said, if it is not treated as a 
treaty, we have a problem.
  The truth of the matter is the reason it is here is because of the 
distinguished Senator from Mississippi. I thank him for that.
  Mr. LOTT. I thank the Senator for those comments. I did write to the 
President expressing my concerns in this area in January of this year, 
and other issues.
  When I had the opportunity to visit with Secretary Madeleine Albright 
before she was confirmed by the Senate, I had the temerity to read to 
her from the Constitution about our rights in the Senate in advice and 
consent, and she said, ``You know, I agree with you. I taught that at 
Georgetown University,'' and I believe she meant that.
  I think we are seeing some results of that, and I appreciate the fact 
that our prerogatives are being protected. We

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have had this opportunity to review it, debate it, and we will be able 
to take up other issues later on this year that are very important for 
Senate consideration. I think the process has worked. I urge my 
colleagues to support this resolution of ratification.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. BYRD. Madam President, how much time do I have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 5 minutes remaining.
  Mr. BYRD. I will take 30 seconds. I want to thank the majority 
leader, and I associate myself with the remarks of Senator Biden. I 
thank the majority leader in insisting that this come to the Hill as a 
treaty, which requires a supermajority in the Senate. I very much 
appreciate that.
  Madam President, I yield back the remainder of my time to Mr. Biden 
and Mr. Helms. They can yield it back or they can use it.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I have nothing more to say, which will 
surprise my colleagues, except that the distinguished Democratic 
leader, I am told, may wish to speak on leader's time for a few moments 
on this issue. Give me a minute to check on whether or not the 
distinguished leader, Mr. Daschle, wishes to speak.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Madam President, the Senate today is being presented 
with an opportunity that is as rare as it is important. For the second 
time in less than 3 weeks, the Senate is being asked to give its advice 
and consent on a major arms control treaty: the flank agreement to the 
Conventional Forces in Europe treaty.
  Late last month, the Senate had placed before it the Chemical Weapons 
Convention [CWC]. After much debate, the Senate resoundingly rebuffed 
several attempts by the treaty's opponents to scuttle it, and 
eventually passed CWC with the support of 74 Senators.
  Now many have questioned the length to which CWC opponents went in 
their efforts to kill or delay Senate consideration of this treaty. I 
share some of those concerns. However, in the end, when the Senate was 
finally allowed to take up the CWC treaty, I would argue that the 
ensuing floor debate on the CWC treaty represented the Senate at its 
best. Senators discussed honest disagreements on issues directly 
related to the CWC treaty, carefully weighed those discussions, and 
finally voted up or down on those issues and, ultimately, the treaty 
itself. In short, during the actual floor debate of the CWC treaty, we 
saw the Senate acting in a responsible and exemplary fashion.
  I am confident that if we had this same kind of debate on the CFE 
treaty, we would see the same result. In fact, the margin would 
probably be significantly greater for CFE than for CWC. I have listened 
carefully to the comments of my fellow Senators on for their views on 
this important agreement and have yet to hear a single Senator voice 
his or her opposition to the CFE treaty. This was true before the 
Foreign Relations Committee attached 13 CWC-related conditions and it 
is especially true after. As a result, Senate support for the CFE 
agreement itself probably exceeds the 74 who voted for the CWC.
  Unfortunately, the Senate is being prevented from considering the CFE 
treaty in the same fashion we considered the CWC. We are not being 
allowed to look at just the CFE treaty and issues directly related to 
it. Instead, the time for Senate consideration of the CFE treaty is 
likely to be spent largely on a wholly unrelated issue--the ABM treaty 
and opponents efforts to undermine it.
  Now, I understand this is an important issue to many members on the 
other side of the aisle. And, I know that Senators are well within 
their rights to attach unrelated matters to most types of legislation 
we consider
  However, I disagree with the proponents of the ABM condition on the 
merits and I especially disagree with them on their methods. On the 
merits, the administration's lawyers argue persuasively that the 
Constitution assigns the exclusive responsibility to the President to 
determine the successor states to any treaty when an original party 
dissolves, to make whatever adjustments might be required to accomplish 
such succession, and to enter into agreements for this purpose. 
Increasing the number of states participating in a treaty due to the 
dissolution of an original party does not itself constitute a 
substantive modification of obligations assumed. This is the view of 
the administration's lawyers. This is also the view of the nonpartisan 
Congressional Research Service in a legal review they conducted last 
year.
  As for their methods, I think it is both unfortunate and short-
sighted to use a treaty that is in our national security interests as a 
vehicle for advancing a totally unrelated political agenda. The 
principal sponsors of this condition have previously made no secret of 
the fact that they would like to see the United States walk away from 
the entire ABM treaty and immediately begin spending tens of billions 
of dollars to build a star wars type missile defense. With this act, 
they have now revealed the lengths they are willing to go to force 
their views on this Senate and this administration.
  Nevertheless, that is what has been done. Senators are now faced with 
a difficult choice: vote for this treaty in spite of the unacceptable 
ABM condition or against it because of the ABM language. This is an 
extremely close call for many of us.
  In the end, Madam President, we must support this treaty. We must do 
so for two reasons. First, the treaty is still fundamentally in our 
strategic interest. Failure to pass this treaty now could unravel both 
the CFE agreement as well as any future efforts to enhance security 
arrangements in Europe. Second, the administration, which must 
ultimately decide how to deal with the objectionable ABM condition, has 
indicated that we should vote for this treaty now and let them work out 
what to do about this provision later. It is for these reasons that I 
cast my vote in support of this treaty and urge my colleagues to do the 
same.
  Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, depending on the disposition of the 
chairman of the committee, I am prepared to yield back whatever time we 
have left and am ready to vote. The distinguished minority leader does 
not wish to speak on this at this moment.
  I yield back the remainder of my time.
  Mr. BYRD. Madam President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The yeas and nays have been ordered.
  Mr. LOTT. Madam President, if I could say for the Senators that will 
be coming over, this will be the last vote for the night so we can 
attend a very important dinner we have scheduled momentarily.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the resolution 
of ratification. On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 100, nays 0, as follows:

                       [Rollcall Vote No. 67 Ex.]

                               YEAS--100

     Abraham
     Akaka
     Allard
     Ashcroft
     Baucus
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Brownback
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Burns
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Cleland
     Coats
     Cochran
     Collins
     Conrad
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     Daschle
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Enzi
     Faircloth
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Frist
     Glenn
     Gorton
     Graham
     Gramm
     Grams
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Helms
     Hollings
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kempthorne
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     McCain
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nickles
     Reed
     Reid
     Robb
     Roberts
     Rockefeller
     Roth
     Santorum
     Sarbanes
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith (NH)
     Smith (OR)
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thomas

[[Page S4476]]


     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Torricelli
     Warner
     Wellstone
     Wyden
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Two-thirds of the Senators present having 
voted in the affirmative, the resolution of ratification is agreed to.
  The resolution of ratification, as amended, is as follows:
       Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring 
     therein),

     SECTION 1, SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS.

       The Senate advises and consents to the ratification of the 
     CFE Flank Document (as defined in section 3 of this 
     resolution), subject to the conditions in section 2.

     SEC. 2. CONDITIONS.

       The Senate's advice and consent to the ratification of the 
     CFE Flank Document is subject to the following conditions, 
     which shall be binding upon the President:
       (1) Policy of the united states.--Nothing in the CFE Flank 
     Document shall be construed as altering the policy of the 
     United States to achieve the immediate and complete 
     withdrawal of any armed forces and military equipment under 
     the control of the Russian Federation that are deployed on 
     the territories of the independent states of the former 
     Soviet Union (as defined in section 3 of the FREEDOM Support 
     Act) without the full and complete agreement of those states.
       (2) Violations of state sovereignty.--
       (A) Finding.--The Senate finds that armed forces and 
     military equipment under the control of the Russian 
     Federation are currently deployed on the territories of 
     States Parties without the full and complete agreement of 
     those States Parties.
       (B) Initiation of discussions.--The Secretary of State 
     should, as a priority matter, initiate discussions with the 
     relevant States Parties with the objective of securing the 
     immediate withdrawal of all armed forces and military 
     equipment under the control of the Russian Federation 
     deployed on the territory of any State Party without the full 
     and complete agreement of that State Party.
       (C) Statement of policy.--Prior to the deposit of the 
     United States instrument of ratification, the President shall 
     certify to the Senate that the United States and the 
     governments of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, 
     Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, 
     Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom have issued a 
     joint statement affirming that--
       (i) the CFE Flank Document does not give any State Party 
     the right to station (under Article IV, paragraph 5 of the 
     Treaty) or temporarily deploy (under Article V, paragraphs 1 
     (B) and C) of the Treaty) conventional armaments and 
     equipment limited by the Treaty or the territory of other 
     States Parties to the Treaty without the freely expressed 
     consent of the receiving State Party;
       (ii) the CFE Flank Document does not alter or abridge the 
     right of any State Party under the Treaty to utilize fully 
     its declared maximum levels for conventional armaments and 
     equipment limited by the Treaty notified pursuant to Article 
     VII of the Treaty; and
       (iii)the CFE Flank Document does not alter in any way the 
     requirement for the freely expressed consent of all States 
     Parties concerned in the exercise of any reallocations 
     envisioned under Article IV, paragraph 3 of the CFE Flank 
     Document.
       (3) Facilitation of negotiations.--
       (A) United States Action.--
       (i) In general.--The United States, in entering into any 
     negotiation described in clause (ii) involving the government 
     of Moldova, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, or Georgia, including the 
     support of United States intermediaries in the negotiation, 
     will limit its diplomatic activities to--
       (I) achieving the equal and unreserved application by all 
     States Parties of the principles of the Helsinki Final Act, 
     including, in particular, the principle that ``States will 
     respect each other's sovereign equality and individuality as 
     well as all the rights inherent in and concompassed by its 
     sovereignty, including a particular, the right of every State 
     to juridical equality, to territorial integrity, and to 
     freedom and political independence.'';
       (II) ensuring that Moldova, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and 
     Georgia retain the right under the Treaty to reject, or 
     accept conditionally, any request by another State Party to 
     temporarily deploy conventional armaments and equipment 
     limited by the Treaty on its territory; and
       (III) ensuring the right of Moldova, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, 
     and Georgia to reject, or to accept conditionally, any 
     request by another State Party to reallocate the current 
     quotas of Moldova, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, as the 
     case may be, applicable to conventional armaments and 
     equipment limited by the Treaty and as established under the 
     Tashkent Agreement.
       (ii) Negotiations covered.--A negotiation described in this 
     clause is any negotiation conducted pursuant to paragraph (2) 
     or (3) of Section IV of the CFE Flank Document or pursuant to 
     any side statement or agreement related to the CFE Flank 
     Document concluded between the United States and the Russian 
     Federation.
       (B) Other agreements.--Nothing in the CFR Flank Document 
     shall be construed as providing additional rights to any 
     State Party to temporarily deploy forces or to reallocate 
     quotas for conventional armaments and equipment limited by 
     the Treaty beyond the rights accorded to all States Parties 
     under the original Treaty and as established under the 
     Tashkent Agreement.
       (4) Noncompliance.--
       (A) In general.--If the President determines that 
     persuasive information exists that a State Party is in 
     violation of the Treaty or the CFE Flank Document in a manner 
     which threatens the national security interests of the United 
     States, then the President shall--
       (i) consult with the Senate and promptly submit to the 
     Senate a report detailing the effect of such actions;
       (ii) seek on an urgent basis an inspection of the relevant 
     State Party in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty 
     or the CFE Flank Document with the objective of demonstrating 
     to the international community the act of noncompliance;
       (iii) seek, or encourage, on an urgent basis, a meeting at 
     the highest diplomatic level with the relevant State Party 
     with the objective of bringing the noncompliant State Party 
     into compliance;
       (iv) implement prohibitions and sanctions against the 
     relevant State Party as required by law;
       (v) if noncompliance has been determined, seek on an urgent 
     basis the multilateral imposition of sanctions against the 
     noncompliant State Party for the purposes of bringing the 
     noncompliant State Party into compliance; and
       (vi) in the event that noncompliance persists for a period 
     longer than one year after the date of the determination made 
     pursuant to this subparagraph, promptly consult with the 
     Senate for the purposes of obtaining a resolution of support 
     for continued adherence to the Treaty, notwithstanding the 
     changed circumstances affecting the object and purpose of the 
     Treaty.
       (B) Authority of director of central intelligence.--Nothing 
     in this section may be construed to impair or otherwise 
     affect the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence 
     to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized 
     disclosure pursuant to section 103(c)(5) of the National 
     Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(5)).
       (C) Presidential determinations.--If the President 
     determines that an action otherwise required under 
     subparagraph (A) would impair or otherwise affect the 
     authority of the Director of Central Intelligence to protect 
     intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized 
     disclosure, the President shall report that determination, 
     together with a detailed written explanation of the basis for 
     that determination, to the chairmen of the Select Committee 
     on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives not 
     later than 15 days after making such determination.
       (5) Monitoring and verification of compliance.--
       (A) Declaration.--The Senate declares that--
       (i) the Treaty is in the interests of the United States 
     only if all parties to the Treaty are in strict compliance 
     with the terms of the Treaty as submitted to the Senate for 
     its advice and consent to ratification, such compliance being 
     measured by performance and not by efforts, intentions, or 
     commitments to comply; and
       (ii) the Senate expects all parties to the Treaty, 
     including the Russian Federation, to be in strict compliance 
     with their obligations under the terms of the Treaty, as 
     submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to 
     ratification.
       (B) Briefings on Compliance.--Given its concern about 
     ongoing violations of the Treaty by the Russian Federation 
     and other States Parties, the Senate expects the executive 
     branch of Government to offer briefings not less than four 
     times a year to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
     Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives on 
     compliance issues related to the Treaty. Each such briefing 
     shall include a description of all United States efforts in 
     bilateral and multilateral diplomatic channels and forums to 
     resolve compliance issues relating to the Treaty, including a 
     complete description of--
       (i) any compliance issues the United States plans to raise 
     at meetings of the Joint Consultative Group under the Treaty;
       (ii) any compliance issues raised at meetings of the Joint 
     Consultative Group under the Treaty; and
       (iii) any determination by the President that a State Party 
     is in noncompliance with or is otherwise acting in a manner 
     inconsistent with the object or purpose of the Treaty, within 
     30 days of such a determination.
       (C) Annual reports on compliance.--Beginning January 1, 
     1998, and annually thereafter, the President shall submit to 
     the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the 
     Speaker of the House of Representatives a full and complete 
     classified and unclassified report setting forth--
       (i) certification of those States Parties that are 
     determined to be in compliance with the Treaty, on a country-
     by-country basis;
       (ii) for those countries not certified pursuant to clause 
     (i), an identification and assessment of all compliance 
     issues arising with regard to the adherence of the country to 
     its obligations under the Treaty;
       (iii) for those countries not certified pursuant to clause 
     (i), the steps the United States has taken, either 
     unilaterally or in conjunction with another State Party--
       (I) to initiate inspections of the noncompliant State Party 
     with the objective of demonstrating to the international 
     community the act of noncompliance;

[[Page S4477]]

       (II) to call attention publicly to the activity in 
     question; and
       (III) to seek on an urgent basis a meeting at the highest 
     diplomatic level with the noncompliant State Party with the 
     objective of bringing the noncompliant State Party into 
     compliance;
       (iv) a determination of the military significance of and 
     border security risks arising from any compliance issue 
     identified pursuant to clause (ii); and
       (v) a detailed assessment of the responses of the 
     noncompliant State Party in question to actions undertaken by 
     the United States described in clause (iii).
       (D) Annual report on withdrawal of russian armed forces and 
     military equipment.--Beginning January 1, 1998, and annually 
     thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to 
     the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and to the 
     Speaker of the House of Representative on the results of 
     discussions undertaken pursuant to subparagraph (B) of 
     paragraph (2), plans for future such discussions, and 
     measures agreed to secure the immediate withdrawal of all 
     armed forces and military equipment in question.
       (E) Annual report on uncontrolled treaty-limited 
     equipment.--Beginning January 1, 1998, and annually 
     thereafter, the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit 
     to the Committees on Foreign Relations, Armed Services, and 
     the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and to the 
     Speaker of the House of Representatives a full and complete 
     classified and unclassified report regarding--
       (i) the status of uncontrolled conventional armament and 
     equipment limited by the Treaty, on a region-by-region basis 
     within the Treaty's area of application;
       (ii) the status of uncontrolled conventional armaments and 
     equipment subject to the Treaty, on a region-by-region basis 
     within the Treaty's area of application; and
       (iii) any information made available to the United States 
     Government concerning the transfer of conventional armaments 
     and equipment subject to the Treaty within the Treaty's area 
     of application made by any country to any subnational group, 
     including any secessionist movement or any terrorist or 
     paramilitary organization.
       (F) Compliance report on armenia and other parties in the 
     caucasus region.--Not later than August 1, 1997, the 
     President shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations 
     of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives 
     a full and complete classified and unclassified report 
     regarding--
       (i) whether Armenia was in compliance with the Treaty in 
     allowing the transfer of conventional armaments and equipment 
     limited by the Treaty through Armenia territory to the 
     secessionist movement in Azerbaijan;
       (ii) whether other States Parties located in the Caucasus 
     region are in compliance with the Treaty; and
       (iii) if Armenia is found not to have been in compliance 
     under clause (i), or, if any other State Party is found not 
     to be in compliance under clause (ii), what actions the 
     President has taken to implement sanctions as required by 
     chapter 11 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
     (22 U.S.C. 2295 et seq.; relating to assistance to the 
     independent states of the former Soviet Union) or other 
     provisions of law.
       (G) Report on destruction of equipment east of the urals.--
     Not later than January 1, 1998, the President shall submit to 
     the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the 
     Speaker of the House of Representatives a full and complete 
     classified and unclassified report regarding--
       (i) whether the Russian Federation is fully implementing on 
     schedule all agreements requiring the destruction of 
     conventional armaments and equipment subject to the Treaty 
     but for the withdrawal of such armaments and equipment by the 
     Soviet Union from the Treaty's area of application prior to 
     the Soviet Union's deposit of its instrument of ratification 
     of the Treaty; and
       (ii) whether any of the armaments and equipment described 
     under clause (i) have been redeployed, reintroduced, or 
     transferred into the Treaty's area of application and, if so, 
     the location of such armaments and equipment.
       (H) Definitions.--
       (i) Uncontrolled conventional armaments and equipment 
     limited by the treaty.--The term ``uncontrolled conventional 
     armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty'' means all 
     conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty 
     not under the control of a State Party that would be subject 
     to the numerical limitations set forth in the Treaty if such 
     armaments and equipment were directly under the control of a 
     State Party.
       (ii) Uncontrolled conventional armaments and equipment 
     subject to the treaty.--The term ``uncontrolled conventional 
     armaments and equipment subject to the Treaty'' means all 
     conventional armaments and equipment described in Article 
     II(1)(Q) of the Treaty not under the control of a State Party 
     that would be subject to information exchange in accordance 
     with the Protocol on Information Exchange if such armaments 
     and equipment were directly under the control of a State 
     Party.
       (6) Application and effectiveness of senate advice and 
     consent.--
       (A) In general.--The advice and consent of the Senate in 
     this resolution shall apply only to the CFE Flank Document 
     and the documents described in subparagraph (D).
       (B) Presidential certification.--Prior to the deposit of 
     the United States instrument of ratification, the President 
     shall certify to the Senate that, in the course of diplomatic 
     negotiations to secure accession to, or ratification of, the 
     CFE Flank Document by any other State Party, the United 
     States will vigorously reject any effort by a State Party 
     to--
       (i) modify, amend, or alter a United States right or 
     obligation under the Treaty or the CFE Flank Document, unless 
     such modification, amendment, or alternation is solely an 
     extension of the period of provisional application of the CFE 
     Flank Document or a change of a minor administrative or 
     technical nature;
       (ii) secure the adoption of a new United States obligation 
     under, or in relation to, the Treaty or the CFE Flank 
     Document, unless such obligation is solely of a minor 
     administrative or technical nature; or
       (iii) secure the provision of assurances, or endorsement of 
     a course of action or a diplomatic position, inconsistent 
     with the principles and policies established under conditions 
     (1), (2), and (3) of this resolution.
       (C) Substantive modifications.--Any subsequent agreement to 
     modify, amend, or alter the CFE Flank Document shall require 
     the complete resubmission of the CFE Flank Document, together 
     with any modification, amendment, or alteration made thereto, 
     to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification, if such 
     modification, amendment, or alteration is not solely of a 
     minor administrative or technical nature.
       (D) Status of other documents.--
       (i) In general.--The following documents are of the same 
     force and effect as the provisions of the CFE Flank Document:
       (I) Understanding on Details of the CFE Flank Document of 
     31 May 1996 in Order to Facilitate its Implementation.
       (II) Exchange of letters between the United States Chief 
     Delegate to the CFE Joint Consultative Group and the Head of 
     Delegation of the Russian Federation to the Joint 
     Consultative Group, dated July 25, 1996.
       (ii) Status of inconsistent actions.--The United States 
     shall regard all actions inconsistent with obligations under 
     those documents as equivalent under international law to 
     actions inconsistent with the CFE Flank Document or the 
     Treaty, or both, as the case may be.
       (7) Modifications of the cfe flank zone.--Prior to the 
     deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the 
     President shall certify to Congress that any subsequent 
     agreement to modify, revise, amend, or alter the boundaries 
     of the CFE flank zone, as delineated by the map entitled 
     ``Revised CFE Flank Zone'' submitted by the President to the 
     Senate on April 7, 1997, shall require the submission of such 
     agreement to the Senate for its advice and consent to 
     ratification, if such changes are not solely of a minor 
     administrative or technical nature.
       (8) Treaty interpretation.--
       (A) Principles of treaty interpretation.--The Senate 
     affirms the applicability to all treaties of the 
     constitutionally based principles of treaty interpretation 
     set forth in condition (1) in the resolution of ratification 
     of the INF Treaty, approved by the Senate on May 27, 1988.
       (B) Construction of senate resolution of ratification.--
     Nothing in condition (1) of the resolution of ratification of 
     the INF Treaty, approved by the Senate on May 27, 1988, shall 
     be construed as authorizing the President to obtain 
     legislative approval for modifications or amendments to 
     treaties through majority approval of both Houses.
       (C) Definition.--As used in this paragraph, the term ``INF 
     Treaty'' refers to the Treaty Between the United States of 
     America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 
     Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter Range 
     Missiles, together with the related memorandum of 
     understanding and protocols, done at Washington on December 
     8, 1987.
       (9) Senate prerogatives on multilateralization of the abm 
     treaty.--
       (A) Findings.--The Senate makes the following findings:
       (i) Section 232 of the National Defense Authorization Act 
     for Fiscal Year 1995 (Public Law 103-337) states that ``the 
     United States shall not be bound by any international 
     agreement entered into by the President that would 
     substantively modify the ABM Treaty unless the agreement is 
     entered pursuant to the treaty making power of the President 
     under the Constitution''.
       (ii) The conference report accompanying the National 
     Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 
     104-201) states ``. . . the accord on ABM Treaty succession, 
     tentatively agreed to by the administration, would constitute 
     a substantive change to the ABM Treaty, which may only be 
     entered into pursuant to the treaty making power of the 
     President under the Constitution''.
       (B) Certification required.--Prior to the deposit of the 
     United States instrument of ratification, the President shall 
     certify to the Senate that he will submit for Senate advice 
     and consent to ratification any international agreement--
       (i) that would add one or more countries as States Parties 
     to the ABM Treaty, or otherwise convert the ABM Treaty from a 
     bilateral treaty to a multilateral treaty; or
       (ii) that would change the geographic scope or coverage of 
     the ABM Treaty, or otherwise modify the meaning of the term 
     ``national territory'' as used in Article VI and Article IX 
     of the ABM Treaty.
       (C) ABM treaty defined.--For the purposes of this 
     resolution, the term ``ABM Treaty'' means the Treaty Between 
     the United States of America and the Union of Soviet

[[Page S4478]]

     Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic 
     Missile Systems, signed in Moscow on May 26, 1972, with 
     related protocol, signed in Moscow on July 3, 1974.
       (10) Accession to the cfe treaty.--The Senate urges the 
     President to support a request to become a State Party to the 
     Treaty by--
       (A) any state within the territory of the Treaty's area of 
     application as of the date of signature of the Treaty, 
     including Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia; and
       (B) the Republic of Slovenia.
       (11) Temporary deployments.--Prior to the deposit of the 
     United States instrument of ratification, the President shall 
     certify to the Senate that the United States has informed all 
     other States Parties to the Treaty that the United States--
       (A) will continue to interpret the term ``temporary 
     deployment'', as used in the Treaty, to mean a deployment of 
     severely limited duration measured in days or weeks or, at 
     most, but not years;
       (B) will pursue measures designed to ensure that any State 
     Party seeking to utilize the temporary deployments provision 
     of the Treaty will be required to furnish the Joint 
     Consultative Group established by the Treaty with a statement 
     of the purpose and intended duration of the deployment, 
     together with a description of the object of verification and 
     the location of origin and destination of the relevant 
     conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty; 
     and
       (C) will vigorously reject any effort by a State Party to 
     use the right of temporary deployment under the Treaty--
       (i) to justify military deployments on a permanent basis; 
     or
       (ii) to justify military deployments without the full and 
     complete agreement of the State Party upon whose territory 
     the armed forces or military equipment of another State Party 
     are to be deployed.
       (12) Military acts of intimidation.--It is the policy of 
     the United States to treat with the utmost seriousness all 
     acts of intimidation carried out against any State Party by 
     any other State Party using any conventional armament or 
     equipment limited by the Treaty.
       (13) Supplementary inspections.--The Senate understands 
     that additional supplementary declared site inspections may 
     be conducted in the Russian Federation in accordance with 
     Section V of the CFE Flank Document at any object of 
     verification under paragraph 3(A) or paragraph 3(B) of 
     Section V of the CFE Flank Document, without regard to 
     whether a declared site passive quota inspection pursuant to 
     paragraph 10(D) of Section II of the Protocol on Inspection 
     has been specifically conducted at such object of 
     verification in the course of the same year.
       (14) Designated permanent storage sites.--
       (A) Finding.--The Senate finds that removal of the 
     constraints of the Treaty on designated permanent storage 
     sites pursuant to paragraph 1 of Section IV of the CFE Flank 
     Document could introduce into active military units within 
     the Treaty's area of application as many as 7,000 additional 
     battle tanks, 3,400 armored combat vehicles, and 6,000 pieces 
     of artillery, which would constitute a significant change in 
     the conventional capabilities of States Parties within the 
     Treaty's area of application.
       (B) Specific report.--Prior to the agreement or acceptance 
     by the United States of any proposal to alter the constraints 
     of the Treaty on designated permanent storage sites, but not 
     later than January 1, 1998, the President shall submit to the 
     Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Speaker 
     of the House of Representatives a full and complete 
     classified and unclassified report setting forth--
       (i) a detailed explanation of how additional Treaty-limited 
     equipment will be allocated among States Parties;
       (ii) a detailed assessment of the location and uses to 
     which the Russian Federation will put additional Treaty-
     limited equipment; and
       (iii) a detailed and comprehensive justification of the 
     means by which introduction of additional battle tanks, 
     armored combat vehicles, and pieces of artillery into the 
     Treaty's area of application furthers United States national 
     security interests.

     SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

       As used in this resolution:
       (1) Area of application.--The term ``area of application'' 
     has the same meaning as set forth in subparagraph (B) of 
     paragraph 1 of Article II of the Treaty.
       (2) CFE flank document.--The term ``CFE Flank Document'' 
     means the Document Agreed Among the States Parties to the 
     Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) of 
     November 19, 1990, adopted at Vienna on May 31, 1996 (Treaty 
     Doc. 105-5).
       (3) Conventional armaments and equipment limited by the 
     treaty; treaty-limited equipment.--The terms ``conventional 
     armament and equipment limited by the Treaty'' and ``Treaty-
     limited equipment'' have the meaning set forth in 
     subparagraph (J) of paragraph 1 of Article II of the Treaty.
       (4) Flank region.--The term ``flank region'' means that 
     portion of the Treaty's area of application defined as the 
     flank zone by the map depicting the territory of the former 
     Soviet Union within the Treaty's area of application that was 
     provided by the former Soviet Union upon the date of 
     signature of the Treaty.
       (5) Full and complete agreement.--The term ``full and 
     complete agreement'' means agreement achieved through free 
     negotiations between the respective States Parties with full 
     respect for the sovereignty of the State Party upon whose 
     territory the armed forces or military equipment under the 
     control of another State Party is deployed.
       (6) Free negotiations.--The term `'free negotiations'' 
     means negotiations with a party that are free from coercion 
     or intimidation.
       (7) Helsinki final act.--The term ``Helsinki Final Act'' 
     refers to the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on 
     Security and Cooperation in Europe of August 1, 1975.
       (8) Protocol on information exchange.--The term ``Protocol 
     on Information Exchange'' means the Protocol on Notification 
     and Exchange of Information of the CFE Treaty, together with 
     the Annex on the Format for the Exchange of Information of 
     the CFE Treaty.
       (9) State party.--Except as otherwise expressly provided, 
     the term ``State Party'' means any nation that is a party to 
     the Treaty.
       (10) Tashkent agreement.--The term ``Tashkent Agreement'' 
     means the agreement between Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
     Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine 
     establishing themselves as successor states to the Soviet 
     Union under the CFE Treaty, concluded at Tashkent on may 15, 
     1992.
       (11) Treaty.--The term ``Treaty'' means the Treaty on 
     Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, done at Paris on 
     November 19, 1990.
       (12) United states instrument of ratification.--The term 
     ``United States instrument of ratification'' means the 
     instrument of ratification of the United States of the CFE 
     Flank Document.

  Mr. LOTT. Madam President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
resolution of ratification was agreed to and I move to lay that motion 
on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

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