[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 63 (Wednesday, May 14, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4461-S4466]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
Unanimous-Consent Agreement--H.R. 1122
Mr. HELMS. As in legislative session, Mr. President, I ask unanimous
consent that immediately following disposition of the Feinstein
amendment to H.R. 1122 during Thursday's session of the Senate, Senator
Daschle be recognized to offer an amendment and it be considered under
the following time agreement: 2\1/2\ hours under the control of Senator
Daschle or his designee, and 2\1/2\ hours under the control of Senator
Santorum or his designee.
I further ask unanimous consent that following the conclusion or
yielding back of time on the Daschle amendment, the Senate proceed to
vote on or in relation to the Daschle amendment without further action
or debate, with no amendments in order during the pendency of the
Daschle amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. HELMS. I thank the Chair.
Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. I yield 12 minutes to the distinguished Senator from
Michigan.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I thank my friend from Delaware.
First, let me congratulate the Senators from North Carolina and
Delaware, the chairman and ranking member of the Foreign Relations
Committee, for working together so speedily and quickly to bring this
treaty to the floor. It is a real feat. It is difficult to do this in
this length of time. The kind of bipartisan cooperation that this takes
really, I think, reflects great honor on this body.
There is one condition that I have some difficulty with that I want
to address some remarks to this afternoon, and that is condition 9,
which is now part of the resolution before the Senate.
Condition 9 requires the President to submit to the Senate for its
advice and consent the memorandum of understanding concerning successor
states to the ABM Treaty. In my view, this condition is probably
unconstitutional but certainly unwise. As a general rule, a condition
on a resolution of ratification is a stipulation which the President
must accept before proceeding to ratification of a treaty. And if the
President finds the condition unacceptable, he generally has but one
choice, which is to refuse to ratify the treaty. There is, however, a
generally recognized exception: If the condition is inconsistent with
or invades the President's constitutional powers, in which case the
condition would be ineffective and of no consequence. The restatement
of foreign relations law puts the matter this way:
The Senate has not made a practice of attaching conditions
unrelated to the treaty before it. If the Senate were to do
so and were to attach a condition invading the President's
constitutional powers, for example, his power of appointment,
the condition would be ineffective. The President would then
have to decide whether he could assume that the Senate would
have given its consent without the condition.
In this matter before us, condition 9 has no relation to the CFE
flank agreement. The condition, therefore, on that ground is improper.
It seeks to invade the President's constitutional powers to recognize
states and to implement treaties, and thus is probably
unconstitutional.
When the Senate deals with the important issue of advice and consent
to a treaty, I think it should limit itself to the treaty before it.
When we go beyond that, it seems to me we do not bring honor on this
institution, when we try to force the hand of the President in areas
beyond the immediate treaty that is being considered.
In a very ironic twist, condition 9 could imperil the continued
viability of the treaty that we are ratifying because if the ABM
Treaty, when it is multilateralized, needs to come back for
ratification, the same principle would apply to other treaties, of
which we have dozens. The same principle, if it applies to ABM, would
apply to CFE, the treaty before us.
Is this treaty binding on those other states, those other successor
states of the Soviet Union without coming back to the Senate? INF,
START I, probably dozens of treaties with the former Soviet Union which
have been multilateralized, which have been accepted by the successor
states, which we now, I hope, consider binding on those States and on
us, even though they have not been brought back to the Senate for
ratification, if the logic of condition 9 is correct, it would
undermine the viability, the efficacy of those other treaties that we
had with the former Soviet Union. It would call into question treaties
that I do not believe this body wants to call into question.
The reason that it does that is that condition 9 requires the
President to submit to the Senate for its advice and consent his
recognition of the Soviet Union successor states to the ABM Treaty. It
does provide an opportunity for opponents of the ABM Treaty to try to
defeat that memorandum of understanding as it relates to the successor
states. But in doing so, it jeopardizes the continuing viability of the
acceptance by those successor states of their obligations under the ABM
Treaty and, in terms of the point I am making, their obligations under
a number of other treaties which have been signed by the former Soviet
Union.
This outcome could undermine the reductions of former Soviet nuclear
weapons that our military has testified are so clearly in our national
security interests. Opponents of having successor states other than
Russia appear to worry about the potential difficulty of negotiating
changes or amendments to the ABM Treaty in order to permit deployment
of a national missile defense system in the future. Their notion
appears to be that while it may be straightforward for us to negotiate
required changes with Russia, it will somehow be more difficult to get
the other three successor states to agree to any changes. And according
to that view, rather than to give each of the other three states a
potential veto over changes to the ABM Treaty, it would be better to
prevent those successor states from ever joining the ABM Treaty as a
party.
[[Page S4462]]
That is what this condition is all about, but it is misguided from a
number of perspectives. First, the notion that Ukraine, Belarus, and
Kazakstan would obstruct any changes to the ABM Treaty but that somehow
Russia would be an easier negotiating partner flies in the face of
experience. In the negotiations at the Standing Consultative
Commission, it is Russia that has been the most challenging negotiating
partner, while Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus have been more amenable
to American proposals.
Furthermore, as the administration has pointed out on many occasions,
if the United States determines that there is the threat that requires
us to deploy a national missile defense system that would conflict with
the ABM Treaty, they would seek to negotiate changes with our treaty
partners to permit such a deployment. We would seek to adapt the treaty
to our security requirements. But if the Russians would not agree to
our proposed changes, then the administration would consider whether to
withdraw from the ABM Treaty, as is our right under the treaty's
provisions relating to our supreme national interests. That is the
prudent approach and the one that best serves our security.
Let me just give one other example of the implication of this
condition. In 1995, the United States recognized Ukraine as a successor
to the former Soviet Union for 35 nonarmed control treaties that we
previously had with the U.S.S.R. We did this without a Senate vote. So
now we presumably want the Ukraine to be bound by 35 treaties
previously negotiated. But there is no Senate vote ratifying that
treaty with Ukraine.
In a diplomatic note from the United States Embassy to the Government
of Ukraine dated May 10, 1995, the United States listed the 35
agreements that have continued in force with Ukraine and they include
such treaties as the incidents at sea agreement of 1972 with its
protocol, which our good friend from Virginia, Senator Warner,
negotiated when he was Secretary of the Navy. They included the
prevention of dangerous military activities agreement of 1989, which is
designed to prevent an accident or mistake from erupting into
hostilities. These are extremely important agreements and we should not
put those agreements in limbo, or in doubt, by setting this precedent
relative to the ABM Treaty.
I ask unanimous consent that the list of those 35 treaties that
Ukraine is hopefully bound by, through that note--but which we have not
ratified, vis-a-vis Ukraine--that that list and note be printed in the
Record at this time.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Embassy of the United States of America--Kiev, May 10, 1996
The Embassy of the United States of America presents its
compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine and
has the honor to refer to discussions between technical
experts of our two Governments concerning the succession of
Ukraine to bilateral treaties between the United States of
America and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in
light of the independence of Ukraine and the dissolution of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In conducting their
discussions, the experts took as a point of departure the
continuity principle set forth in Article 34 of the Vienna
Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties. In
examining the texts they found that certain treaties to which
the principle applied had since expired by their terms.
Others had become obsolete and should not be continued in
force between the two countries. Finally, after a treaty-by-
treaty review, which included an examination of the
practicability of the continuance of certain specific
treaties, they recommended that our two Governments agree no
longer to apply those treaties.
In light of the foregoing, the Embassy proposes that,
subject to condition that follows, the United States of
America and Ukraine confirm the continuance in force as
between them of the treaties listed in the Annex to this
Note.
Inasmuch as special mechanisms have been established to
work out matters concerning succession to bilateral arms
limitation and related agreements concluded between the
United States and the former Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, those agreements were not examined by the
technical experts. Accordingly, this Note does not deal with
the status of those agreements and no conclusion as to their
status can be drawn from their absence from the list
appearing in the Annex.
With respect to those treaties listed in the Annex that
require designations of new implementing agencies or
officials by Ukraine, the United States understands that
Ukraine will inform it of such designations within two months
of the date of this Note.
If the foregoing is acceptable to the Government of
Ukraine, this Note and the Ministry's Note of reply
concurring therein shall constitute an agreement between our
two Governments which shall enter into force on the date of
receipt by the Embassy of the Ministry's Note in reply.
The Embassy of the United States of America avails itself
of this opportunity to renew to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Ukraine the assurance of its highest
consideration.
Enclosure: Annex.
annex
Convention relating to the rights of neutrals at sea.
Signed at Washington July 22, 1854; entered into force
October 31, 1854.
Agreement regulating the position of corporations and other
commercial associations. Signed at St. Petersburg June 25,
1904; entered into force June 25, 1904.
Arrangements relating to the establishment of diplomatic
relations, nonintervention, freedom of conscience and
religious liberty, legal protection, and claims. Exchanges of
notes at Washington November 16, 1933; entered into force
November 16, 1933.
Agreement relating to the procedure to be followed in the
execution of letters rogatory. Exchange of notes at Moscow
November 22, 1935; entered into force November 22, 1935.
Preliminary agreement relating to principles applying to
mutual aid in the prosecution of the war against aggression,
and exchange of notes. Signed at Washington June 11, 1942;
entered into force June 11, 1942.
Agreement relating to prisoners of war and civilians
liberated by forces operating under Soviet command and forces
operating under United States of America command. Signed at
Yalta February 11, 1945; entered into force February 11,
1945.
Consular convention. Signed at Moscow June 1, 1964; entered
into force July 13, 1968.
Agreement on the reciprocal allocation for use free of
charge of plots of land in Moscow and Washington with annexes
and exchanges of notes. Signed at Moscow May 16, 1969;
entered into force May 16, 1969.
Agreement on the prevention of incidents on and over the
high seas. Signed at Moscow May 25, 1972; entered into force
May 25, 1972.
Agreement regarding settlement of lend-lease, reciprocal
aid and claims. Signed at Washington October 18, 1972;
entered into force October 18, 1972.
Protocol to the agreement of May 25, 1972 on the prevention
of incidents on and over the high seas. Signed at Washington
May 22, 1973; entered into force May 22, 1973.
Convention on matters of taxation, with related letters.
Signed at Washington June 20, 1973; entered into force
January 29, 1976; effective January 1, 1976.
Agreement on cooperation in artificial heart research and
development. signed at Moscow June 28, 1974; entered into
force June 28, 1974.
Agreement relating to the reciprocal issuance of multiple
entry and exit visas to American and Soviet correspondents.
Exchange of notes at Moscow September 29, 1975; entered into
force September 29, 1975.
Agreement concerning dates for use of land for, and
construction of, embassy complexes in Moscow and Washington.
Exchange of notes at Moscow March 20, 1977, entered into
force March 30, 1977.
Agreement relating to privileges and immunities of all
members of the Soviet and American embassies and their
families, with agreed minute. Exchange of notes at Washington
December 14, 1978; entered into force December 14, 1978;
effective December 29, 1978.
Memorandum of understanding regarding marine cargo
insurance. Signed at London April 5, 1979; entered into force
April 5, 1979.
The Agreement supplementary to the 1966 Civil Air Transport
Agreement, as amended by the Agreement of February 13, 1986.
Signed at Washington November 4, 1966; entered into force
November 4, 1966.
Agreement relating to immunity of family members of
consular officers and employees form criminal jurisdiction.
Exchange of notes at Washington October 31, 1986; entered
into force October 31, 1986.
Agreement concerning the confidentiality of data on deep
seabed areas, with related exchange of letters. Exchange of
notes at Moscow December 5, 1986; entered into force December
5, 1986.
Agreement relating to the agreement of August 14, 1987 on
the resolution of practical problems with respect to deep
seabed mining areas. Exchange of notes at Moscow August 14,
1987; entered into force August 14, 1987.
Declaration on international guarantees (Afghanistan
Settlement Agreement). Signed at Geneva April 14, 1988;
entered into force May 15, 1988.
Agreement on cooperation in transportation science and
technology, with annexes. Signed at Moscow May 31, 1988;
entered into force May 31, 1988.
Memorandum of understanding on cooperation to combat
illegal narcotics trafficking. Signed at Paris January 8,
1989; entered into force January 8, 1989.
Agreement on the prevention of dangerous military
activities, with annexes and agreed statements. Signed at
Moscow June 12, 1989; entered into force January 1, 1990.
Agreement on a mutual understanding on cooperation in the
struggle against the illicit traffic in narcotics. Signed at
Washington January 31, 1990; entered into force January 31,
1990.
[[Page S4463]]
Civil Air Transport Agreement, with annexes. Signed at
Washington June 1, 1990; entered into force June 1, 1990.
Agreement regarding settlement of lend-lease accounts.
Exchange of letters at Washington June 1, 1990; entered into
force June 1, 1990.
Agreement on cooperation on ocean studies, with annexes.
Signed at Washington June 1, 1990; entered into force June 1,
1990.
Agreement on expansion of undergraduate exchanges. Signed
at Washington June 1, 1990; entered into force June 1, 1990.
Agreement on scientific and technical cooperation in the
field of peaceful uses of atomic energy, with annex. Signed
at Washington June 1, 1990; entered into force June 1, 1990.
Memorandum of cooperation in the fields of environmental
restoration and waste management. Signed at Vienna September
18, 1990; entered into force September 18, 1990.
Memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the physical,
chemical and engineering sciences. Signed at Moscow May 13,
1991; entered into force May 13, 1991.
Memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the mapping
sciences, with annexes. Signed at Moscow May 14, 1991;
entered into force May 14, 1991.
Memorandum of cooperation in the field of magnetic
confinement fusion. Signed at Moscow July 5, 1991; entered
into force July 5, 1991.
Memorandum of understanding on cooperation in natural and
man-made emergency prevention and response. Signed at Moscow
July 30, 1991; entered into force July 30, 1991.
Memorandum of understanding on cooperation in housing and
economic development. Signed at Moscow July 30, 1991; entered
into force July 30, 1991.
Agreement on emergency medical supplies and related
assistance. Signed at Moscow July 30, 1991; entered into
force July 30, 1991.
Mr. LEVIN. If the logic of condition 9 were extended to Ukraine, all
those 35 treaties would be in limbo until we ratified the succession of
the treaties. And this list of treaties is just one case of the 12
successor states to the former Soviet Union. Condition 9 could cast
into doubt the effect of all of those treaties for all of those states.
I think the aim here, while it is aimed at ABM, does not hit ABM
because our ABM Treaty is not touched by this condition. Our treaty
relative to ABM, with Russia, is not affected by condition 9. Condition
9 does not refer to Russia. It is the other states that it refers to.
So our ABM Treaty with Russia is not affected. It is all the other
treaties which are undermined, with all the other successor states. It
is the arms control treaties and the nonarms control treaties which are
put in jeopardy, left in limbo by the logic of this condition. So,
while the aim is at the ABM Treaty, it misses that and, instead, hits
treaties that I believe this body wants to be binding on the successor
states to the Soviet Union.
What about the treaty before us, the CFE Treaty? Does this have to be
ratified with each of the successor states to the Soviet Union? If so,
we are putting this very treaty in limbo. This very CFE Treaty which we
are ratifying, by the logic of condition 9, is left in limbo as to the
other successor states, because there is no ratification of this treaty
relative to the other states.
Mr. President, I fail to understand the logic of the supporters of
condition 9 that appears to say that Russia is a successor state to the
former Soviet Union but the other states of the former Soviet Union can
only become successor states if the Senate ratifies that action. If the
Senate must ratify the succession of one state, then logically it
should ratify the succession of all. Thus this condition would cast
into doubt the continuing validity of Russia's obligations under the
numerous treaties that the United States had entered into with the
Soviet Union but which were not submitted to the Senate for
ratification subsequent to the breakup of the Soviet Union.
And it could cast into similar doubt other treaties with other
countries that have dissolved, such as former Czechoslovakia, or former
Yugoslavia, where the Senate has not ratified the succession of states
to those treaties.
We should also consider the impact of condition 9 on other arms
control agreements which successor states to the former Soviet Union
have joined. Since we are considering the resolution of ratification
for the CFE Flank Agreement, let us start with the underlying CFE
Treaty. It was ratified by the Senate in November 1991, prior to the
accession of successor states based on the Oslo document in June of
1992. In other words, it was after the Senate voted for ratification of
the CFE Treaty that the former successor states agreed on the
arrangement for joining the CFE Treaty.
The precedent that condition 9 would set would, if followed in other
cases, call into question whether those states are considered members
of and bound by the CFE Treaty until the Senate votes on their
succession to the treaty.
There is also the case of the intermediate-range nuclear forces, or
INF, Treaty signed between the United States and USSR. When the Soviet
Union dissolved into 12 successor states, 6 of those states had INF
facilities on their soil while the other 6 did not. All twelve are
successors to the INF Treaty, with six having obligations related to
their INF facilities and the other six having the obligation not to
have such facilities or INF missiles.
The logic of condition 9 would suggest that the successor states are
not parties to, or bound by, the INF Treaty unless and until the Senate
provides its advice and consent to their accession. I cannot imagine
any Member of the Senate wanting to cast doubt on the obligation of
these states to comply with the INF Treaty, but that is what condition
9 does when its logic extended to other treaties.
In a June 11, 1996, letter, then-Secretary of Defense William Perry
explained the Defense Department's concerns with a proposed provision
of law that was essentially the same as condition 9:
. . . this section runs counter to the successful U.S.
policy of involving within the framework of strategic
stability all states which emerged from the former Soviet
Union with nuclear weapons on their territory. Moreover,
Russia, Belarus, Kazakstan, and Ukraine perceive a clear link
between their participation in the START and INF Treaties and
the ABM Treaty. Casting doubt on their ability to be equal
partners in the ABM Treaty could poison our overall
relationship with these states and needlessly jeopardize
their compliance with their denuclearization obligations
under START I.
The logic of condition 9, when extended to other treaties, could well
lead the successor states to the former Soviet Union to reconsider
whether they are bound by these treaties as well as the ABM Treaty.
Such a move would be decidedly against our security interests.
I should point out, Mr. President, that the Congress itself urged the
President to discuss ABM Treaty issues ``with Russia and other
successor states of the former Soviet Union'' in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994. At that time there was no
question that there were other successor states to the former Soviet
Union with whom we would want to discuss possible changes to the ABM
Treaty. Section 232(c) of that Act states:
Congress urges the President to pursue immediate
discussions with Russia and other successor states of the
former Soviet Union, as appropriate, on the feasibility of,
and mutual interest in, amendments to the ABM Treaty to
permit--
clarification of the distinctions for the purposes for the
purposes of the ABM Treaty between theater missile defenses
and anti-ballistic missile defenses . . .
I find it strange that the Senate, after urging the President to
discuss the ABM Treaty with Russia and other successor states to the
former Soviet Union on demarcation, now would call into question
whether there are other successor states to the ABM Treaty without a
Senate ratification.
If a treaty must be submitted to the Senate for ratification of
successors to the former Soviet Union, or other countries, before it is
binding, then hundreds of our treaty commitments are in doubt. All of
this is because opponents of the ABM Treaty are trying to maim or kill
this one treaty.
Additionally, we should consider the impact of accepting condition 9
on other parliaments in other nations that may take this signal as an
invitation for them to reconsider their nation's treaty commitments. I
find it ironic that on an act of treaty ratification the Senate is on
the verge of creating a potential international treaty uncertainty.
There is no need for the Senate to drag in the ABM Treaty issue on
the CFE Flank Agreement resolution of ratification. The Senate will
have ample opportunity to debate the ABM Treaty when the administration
submits the ABM demarcation agreement to the Senate, as they have
committed to do. But this is neither the time nor the vehicle to try to
decide this issue.
Furthermore, this issue of the memorandum of understanding on
successor
[[Page S4464]]
states to the ABM Treaty is already connected to Senate consideration
on the demarcation agreement. The text of the demarcation agreement
states that the MOU on successor states will not go into effect until
the Agreed Statement on Demarcation goes into effect. So in effect, the
MOU cannot take effect until the Senate votes on the demarcation
agreement. Consequently there is no need for this condition and it
should not be included in this resolution of ratification.
Mr. President, thankfully, condition 9 is limited to the memorandum
of understanding concerning successor states to the ABM Treaty. It is
my fervent hope and expectation that the President will make clear in
his signing statement for the CFE Flank Agreement that this
extraordinary action is not a precedent. In that way he can limit the
damage that could otherwise flow from this unwise condition.
Mr. President, I am pleased that condition 5(f) dealing with
potential violations of the CFE Treaty in the Caucasus region has been
modified. I would have much preferred that it not make any reference to
any particular country.
More importantly, I am very concerned with the word ``secessionist''
in condition 5(f). The situation in this troubled area has a long and
unfortunate history, and I am disturbed that this condition would seek
to so characterize a conflict there.
Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I am pleased the administration has
decided not to contest condition 9 in the resolution of ratification
now before the Senate. That condition makes the advice and consent of
the Senate a condition precedent to the addition of parties to the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
Any agreement between the administration and the Government of Russia
or other states that were part of the Soviet Union which purports to
enlarge the ABM Treaty by adding new parties must be submitted to the
United States Senate and a resolution of ratification approved by the
Senate before it will have the force and effect of law.
There are important reasons why it is necessary for the Senate to
insist on its constitutional role in treaty making in this resolution.
The administration has announced its intent not to submit a memorandum
of understanding on succession to the Senate for advice and consent to
ratification, and it purports to transform the ABM Treaty from a
bilateral agreement into a multilateral accord.
The addition of new parties to the ABM Treaty clearly would have
serious national security implications for the United States. It would
make it much more difficult and time consuming to negotiate other
changes in the treaty that may be considered necessary in the future to
protect our security interests.
Unless the Senate insists on fulfilling its advice and consent
responsibilities with respect to the ABM Treaty, there may be a
mistaken view taken by the administration that a demarcation amendment
being negotiated now with Russia could likewise be the subject of an
executive agreement without the benefit of Senate ratification.
I am concerned that by our inaction the Senate could be forfeiting
its constitutional role in the making of treaties. It should be clear
that no treaty or material change in a treaty can be entered into by
our government without the consent of the Senate. That is what the
Constitution says, and that is what condition 9 says, and that is what
the Senate says today as it provides advice and consent to ratification
of the amendments to the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty.
Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, I rise today to express my support for
both the resolution of ratification to the Conventional Forces in
Europe Treaty flank agreement, and, more importantly, the manager's
amendment to condition 5 regarding compliance with the treaty by member
states in the Caucasus region. True, the manager's amendment does not
change the original language to the extent that I would desire, but I
do wish to thank Senator Helms and the staff of the Foreign Relations
Committee for being so open to my ideas and engaging in very full
negotiations. I also wish to thank Senators McConnell, Kerry, and
Sarbanes for providing such critical leadership on this issue.
Mr. President, it is indeed important that the United States respond
forthrightly to violations of the CFE Treaty. And considering this
deals with numerical limits on military equipment, the degree of
alleged violations is also important. But in executing such diligence,
I hope we do not assume too quickly that all alleged violations are, in
fact, true. That is why I applaud the inclusion of the request for a
report on alleged violations, to ensure that the United States does not
blindly enter a treaty which others may disregard.
But in requesting such reports, we must also be mindful of the impact
our actions may have upon the delicate fabric of ongoing negotiations
to which the United States is party. Specifically, Mr. President, I
refer to the OSCE negotiations, to which the United States is co-
chairman, regarding the future status of the Nagorno-Karabakh region.
To single out one nation for alleged violations, in this case Armenia,
without taking into account the full geo-political environment under
which that nation's government must operate, may subvert the very
process we think has been violated. Better, in my opinion, to err by
requesting too much information than not enough, and take into account
the region as a whole, and all the players in the current dispute. To
ensure we do not upend this ongoing process of peaceful resolution, we
should minimize giving credence to unverified allegations and cast as
wide a net as possible in requesting additional analysis.
Mr. President, Armenia has had a tough go of it in its short period
of independence. It is landlocked, its ethnic population is
geographically divided, and it has suffered egregiously in the past
from the crimes of others who condemned them simply because of their
heritage. Add on top of that a 70-year legacy of abuse and political
game playing by the Soviet Union, and it is understandable that Armenia
may find itself hard-pressed to execute the policies that we Americans
would like to see in a perfect world. But it is not a perfect world,
and sometimes we must understand the realities of a situation, and make
the best of it.
Therefore, Mr. President, I appreciate the willingness of the Foreign
Relations Committee chairman to work with me on making condition 5 more
inclusive of all potential threats to U.S. interests and the treaty's
viability. By taking a more evenhanded approach, hopefully no party to
the current negotiations will feel slighted. And, Mr. President, they
should not feel slighted at this point in the process. This condition
is meant to address violations to the CFE Treaty, not express an
opinion on the legitimacy of any party's negotiating position. Any
other interpretation is, in my opinion, a misunderstanding of the
condition's intent. Further, I do not believe that this will, or
should, be interpreted in any manner that would impugn the ability of
the United States to continue as co-chair to the OSCE negotiations. The
United States has energetically taken on this mantle of leadership, and
I reaffirm my support for this process.
Mr. President, both the viability of the CFE Treaty, and the
continued good-faith negotiations regarding the future status of
Nagorno-Karabakh are important United States interests. We can, and
must, work toward the success of both. I thank the chairman of the
Foreign Relations Committee for his leadership in these areas, and the
assistance of Senators Kerry and Sarbanes in bringing about this
amendment which I have cosponsored.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today to address Senate
consideration of the CFE Flank Agreement.
The Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty [CFE] entered into in 1990
is an outstanding arms control achievement, requiring the destruction
of over 50,000 items of heavy weaponry, including tanks, armored
personnel carriers, artillery pieces, and attack helicopters. The CFE
has helped to make the Europe of 1997 a far safer place than the Europe
of even just a few years ago, and in doing so has served American
national security interests well.
The implementation of CFE helps guarantee that a destabilizing
concentration of military equipment--or a massed military attack in
central Europe of the kind that has dominated strategic thinking in
Europe through two World Wars and a cold war--will
[[Page S4465]]
now be next to impossible for any nation or group of nations to
achieve.
But, as the flank agreement underscores, the treaty negotiated
between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in 1990 is not adequate to the
realities of the new European security environment.
To begin with, the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact no longer exist.
There are now Soviet successor states in the Baltics and the
Transcaucasus--the flank zones--with very different security and
political concerns. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the
Transcaucasus have been a region of almost singular instability. Russia
and the Ukraine, likewise, have different security orientations than
did the Soviet Union, as do the states of both central and western
Europe. NATO is undergoing a searching debate about the possibility of
enlargement. The Europe that the CFE must be relevant to in 1997 is
radically different than the Europe of 1990.
Thus, in ways unanticipated by its original negotiators, the issues
raised by the flank agreement touch on some of the most central and the
most sensitive security issues of the new European security
environment.
The history of the Transcaucasus since the breakup of the Soviet
Union have served as a grim reminder of the deadly subtleties of
rapidly changing regional geography. Civil war and ethnic strife has
been the rule, not the exception, in Nagorno-Karabagh, Osettia,
Abkhazia, Georgia, and, of course, Chechnya.
Stabilizing the military balance in the Transcaucasus and inculcating
confidence and security building measures, as the CFE Treaty does, is
critical for peace in the region.
Although not racked with the violence that has characterized the
Transcaucasus, the security concerns of the Baltic States in the
northern flank zone will prove to be central to future stability in
Europe, and the limits placed on threatening conventional weapons by
the CFE Treaty is a critical part of the security architecture of the
Baltics.
Likewise, the flank agreement also touches upon the sensitive topic
of Russian-Ukrainian ties, and the political and security relationship
between the two, and it addresses the role of Turkey between Europe,
the Middle East, and central Asia.
Last, the flank agreement has profound implications for Russian
nationalist sentiment, and may well have an impact on the future of
Russian domestic political development, and the dynamics of those
domestic factors which may influence either a cooperative or
confrontational Russian foreign policy.
In this sense, the flank agreement is also critical issue for the
debate over NATO enlargement that is just now beginning to come to a
simmer. In structuring the balance of forces between NATO and Russia,
the CFE and the flank agreement--what it says as well as how it is
implemented--will be at the heart of Russian perceptions and
assessments regarding the potential of an enlarged NATO.
In short, the CFE will play a central role in determining the future
course of peace and stability in Europe.
Notwithstanding the positive contributions of the CFE to U.S.
national security interests--and it is a treaty which I will be voting
for--I feel that I would be remiss in my duty as a Senator if I did not
also point out some general concerns that I have with the flank
agreement, as well as some specific concerns I have with the resolution
of ratification for this treaty as it was voted out of the Foreign
Relations Committee last week.
As I made clear in the Foreign Relations Committee hearing, I found
the way in which the flank agreement was negotiated--opening up an
already negotiated treaty for revision because of the reticence of one
party to live up to its commitments--deeply troubling.
Although I would agree with those who argue that it is necessary to
revisit international agreements when there has been a material change
in circumstances--and few would argue that the breakup of the Soviet
Union does not count on this score--treaties, by their very nature, are
only worthwhile if they are binding the minute they are signed.
The post-cold-war world may very well be more turbulent and fluid
than the world which we are used to, but I hope that the way in which
the flank agreement was opened for renegotiation--with one party not in
compliance with a treaty which they had signed--does not set a
precedent which will call into question other treaties which, after the
fact, a state may wish to change.
I think that it is important for the Senate to go on the record in
support of the binding nature of the treaty obligations which we and
other states enter into--obligations which should be opened for
renegotiation in only the most extreme of cases--even as we give our
support to this agreement.
Second, in changing the CFE flank equipment ceilings to meet Russian
security concerns, we must be careful to make sure that we have not
increased the insecurity felt by other states in or bordering the flank
zone.
In its original conception, the CFE Treaty was intended to make
Europe safe from the dangers of a big war between East and West. I
think that there is general agreement that CFE has been and will
continue to be effective in this respect.
But the CFE Treaty, as revised, must not become part of a European
security architecture in which Europe is made safe for little wars,
between the large and the small, or as a tool for intimidation used by
the strong against the weak.
If such a situation were to result from the flank agreement
revisions, Europe would be less stable and secure, not more.
Third, as several of my colleagues have already pointed out, the
inclusion of condition 9 regarding Senate advice and consent for the
multilateralization of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty is, I think,
unwarranted and unwise.
It is unwarranted because the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty is not
connected in any way with the CFE. It is unwise because it calls into
question whether the United States may attempt to reopen or
substantively change a treaty because some now perceive that it is in
our interests to do so.
There was an attempt to get this same language regarding the ABM
inserted into last year's defense authorization bill. That effort
failed. On its own, the Senate has already rejected this language. Now
there is an attempt to resurrect this language and attach it to this
treaty. The consideration of treaties is one of the highest
responsibilities of the Senate, and I am disappointed that some of my
colleagues have chosen to place petty politics above the interests of
U.S. national security.
The ABM Treaty is the diplomatic foundation of our intercontinental
ballistic missile reduction strategy. It was possible to negotiate and
ratify the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or START, and negotiate
START II because of the strategic groundwork laid in the ABM Treaty.
Abandoning or violating the ABM Treaty would threaten the strategic
ballistic missile reductions under these two treaties, which, when
implemented, would verifiably eliminate the intercontinental ballistic
missiles carrying two-thirds of Russia's nuclear warheads.
I would have preferred to have had the opportunity to eliminate this
condition from the final resolution of ratification, but,
unfortunately, it does not appear that we will have this opportunity.
In addition to these general concerns, I also have one specific
concern with the resolution of ratification for this treaty as it was
voted out of committee last week, which I hope that we will have an
opportunity to change.
I am concerned that condition 5 (F) of section 2 unfairly singles out
Armenia for a report on compliance with the CFE Treaty. In so doing,
this condition makes the treaty weaker, and less effective in
guaranteeing U.S. security interests in Europe, not more.
Although some of my Armenian friends might not want me to say this, I
do believe that there should be a report on Armenia's compliance with
the treaty. There have been some troubling questions raised in the
press and in our committee discussions regarding Armenian
transshipments of arms from Russia, and whether Armenia is in violation
of certain provisions of the CFE.
As I noted previously, this is a very sensitive part of the globe,
and one in which even a relatively small amount of heavy weaponry can
have tremendous impact on the balance of power. If
[[Page S4466]]
Armenia is in violation of the treaty, then appropriate measures should
be taken.
However, it is precisely the volatile nature of this region that
dictates that U.S. national security interests demand that we seek
compliance reports on the other states in the region as well. There are
questions regarding Azerbaijan's compliance with the CFE's Treaty
Limited Equipment (TLE) limits, for example, and recent experience with
civil war and ethnic strife in Georgia, Osettia, Chechnya, Abkhazia,
and elsewhere in the region all suggest that a condition calling for
region-wide compliance reports would be in order.
Indeed stigmatizing and isolating Armenia in this fashion may well
prove to be counterproductive. If the CFE Treaty is perceived as a tool
of one side or another in an already tense and volatile region, it will
have the effect of destroying confidence, not building it, and will
contribute to an atmosphere where the states of the region may seek to
build their armed forces, not lessen them.
This would be a grave mistake, and that is why I believe that
condition 5 (F) must be changed to call for compliance reports for the
other countries in the Transcaucasus as well. I urge my colleagues to
support the amendment offered to make just these changes when we vote
on this issue.
Even with these reservations, however, I find that the treaty merits
support. The CFE, with the revised flank agreement, provides an
invaluable tool for stabilizing European security and lessening
regional tension. I would urge all of my colleagues to join me in
voting in favor of this treaty.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I voted in committee to support the CFE
Flank Document and the accompanying resolution of ratification that was
reported favorably by the Committee on Foreign Relations last week.
Let me review a few of the issues that commanded committee concern.
The Flank Document and Relations Between Russia and Former Soviet
States
During committee consideration of the CFE Flank Document, members on
both sides of the aisle voiced concern over United States willingness
to serve as an intermediary in negotiations between Russia and other
former Soviet states to secure permission for temporary Russian troop
deployments on their soil or for revision of the Russian treaty-limited
equipment quotas set in the 1992 Tashkent Agreement. Paragraphs 2 and 3
of section IV of the Flank Document restate Russia's right to seek such
permission ``by means of free negotiations and with full respect for
the sovereignty of the States Parties involved''. A United States note
passed to the Russians, according to Undersecretary of State Lynn
Davis, said that the United States was ``prepared to facilitate or act
as an intermediary for a successful outcome in'' such negotiations.
United States officials state that Washington's offer to serve as an
intermediary between Russia and other Tashkent Agreement signatories
was for the purpose of leveling the playing field between Russia and
smaller countries.
Many of the conditions in the resolution of ratification seek to bind
the executive branch to its asserted purpose.