[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 63 (Wednesday, May 14, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4451-S4466]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]


               FLANK DOCUMENT AGREEMENT TO THE CFE TREATY

  Mr. SANTORUM. Mr. President, in executive session I ask unanimous-
consent the Senate now proceed to the consideration of Executive 
Calendar No. 2, the Treaty Doc. No. 105-5, the CFE Treaty.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       Treaty Document 105-5, Flank Document Agreement to the 
     Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the distinguished senior 
Senator from North Carolina.
  Mr. HELMS. I thank the Chair very much. Mr. President, may I ask that 
the unanimous-consent be stated as to time on this resolution of 
ratification?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are 1\1/2\ hours equally divided between 
the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and the ranking member.
  Mr. HELMS. Senator Byrd has some time, too?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. And an additional 30 minutes for Senator Byrd.
  Mr. HELMS. Very well. I do thank the Chair.
  Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may require.
  The Senate Foreign Relations Committee this past Thursday reported a 
treaty to amend the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty. The 
vote was unanimous.
  I have never hesitated to oppose, or seek to modify, treaties that 
ignore the best interests of the American people. As long as I am a 
Member of the U.S. Senate, I will be mindful of the advice and consent 
responsibilities conferred upon the Senate and the Senators by the U.S. 
Constitution. Therefore, I have never hesitated to oppose bad treaties 
and bad resolutions of ratification without hesitation. But when a 
treaty serves the Nation's interests, if it is verifiable, and if the 
resolution of ratification ensures the integrity of these two points 
for the life of the treaty, I unfailingly offer my support to it. That 
is why I support the treaty before us today.
  In that connection, let the record show that the pending treaty was 
signed on May 31, 1996, and was not submitted by the President to the 
Senate for our advice and consent April 7, 1997. With the bewildering 
delay in the delivery of this treaty, the administration demanded 
action by May 15, 1997, which is tomorrow.
  So, after wasting an entire year, the administration demanded that 
the Senate act on this treaty within 1 month's time. I believe it is 
obvious that the Foreign Relations Committee has been more than helpful 
in fulfilling its constitutional responsibilities to advise and 
consent.
  The treaty before us today is a modification of the treaty approved 
by the Senate in 1991. Specifically, it will revise the obligations of 
Ukraine and Russia in what is known as the flank zone of the former 
Soviet Union. In recognition of the changes having occurred since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the 30 parties to the CFE Treaty have 
agreed to modify the obligations of Ukraine and Russia.
  The 1991 CFE Treaty could not and did not anticipate the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, let alone the expansion of 
NATO to include Central and Eastern Europe countries. Consequently, 
recent years have been occupied with efforts to adapt the treaty to the 
new security environment of its members.
  Mr. President, in its essentials, the Flank Agreement removes several 
administrative districts from the old flank zone, thus permitting 
current flank equipment ceilings to apply to a smaller area. In 
addition, Russia now has until May 1999 to reduce its forces sufficient 
to meet the new limit.
  To provide some counterbalance to these adjustments, reporting 
requirements were enhanced and inspection rights in the zone increased.
  Mr. President, with the protections, interpretations, and monitoring 
requirements contained in the resolution of ratification, I recommend 
approval of this treaty because it sets reasonable limits and provides 
adequate guarantees to ensure implementation.
  However, the simple act of approving this treaty does not diminish 
the need for further steps by the U.S. Government to strengthen the 
security of those countries located on Russia's borders. If this 
agreement is not implemented properly, Russia will retain its existing 
military means to intimidate its neighbors--a pattern of behavior with 
stark precedents.
  As the Clinton administration is so fond of saying, this treaty is 
but a tool to implement the foreign policy of the United States. During 
the past 4 years, the Clinton administration has remained silent while 
Russia has encroached upon the territory and sovereignty of its 
neighbors. It was the lack of a foreign policy--not a lack of tools--
that allowed this to happen.
  I have confidence that the new Secretary of State will correct the 
course of our policies toward Russia, and I gladly support this treaty 
to aid the Honorable Madeleine Albright in that endeavor. The collapse 
of the Soviet Union was one of the finest moments of the 20th century. 
To allow even a partial restoration of the Soviet Union before the turn 
of the century would be a failure of an even greater magnitude.
  Mr. President, a final and related issue in the resolution of 
ratification is one upholding the prerogatives of the Senate in matters 
related to the ABM Treaty. During the past few years, the executive 
branch has sought to erode the Senate's constitutional role of advice 
and consent regarding treaties. In fact, the executive branch 
originally refused to submit for advice and consent the treaty that is 
before the Senate today. Through protracted negotiations, the Senate 
successfully asserted its proper role to advise and consent to new, 
international treaty obligations. Likewise, on revisions to the ABM 
Treaty, it is only through a legally binding mandate that we can ensure 
the proper, constitutional role of the U.S. Senate. I hope, Mr. 
President, that we can proceed to do that without delay. Mr. President, 
I ask for the yeas and nays on the resolution of ratification.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. HELMS. I believe the Senator from Delaware wishes to speak.
  Mr. BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from 
Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, let me begin by acknowledging what the 
Senator and chairman of the committee said, and that is that this 
treaty has been around a long time, and all of a sudden it came popping 
up here. Some of us, like the Senator from North Carolina and the 
majority leader and others, myself included, have felt it is a Senate 
prerogative to determine whether or not this flank agreement should be 
agreed to. It is an amendment to the treaty. The administration for a 
long time concluded it was not a prerogative of the Senate, and it was 
not necessary to submit this treaty.
  Some have asked, why are we acting so expeditiously on this treaty? 
Why is there this deadline? Two reasons: One, we waited a long time to 
agree we had the responsibility to accede to this or it could not 
occur, and, two, there is a real May 15 deadline by which all 30 
nations must ratify this agreement. If, in fact, they do not, the 
agreement will have to be reviewed by all of them.

[[Page S4452]]

  We are right now dealing with the enlargement of NATO, we are now 
dealing with the NATO-Russia Charter, and if it looks as though the 
United States is reneging on this flank agreement, it can just create a 
lot of confusion.
  Having said that, had I been chairman of the committee rather than 
the ranking member and had it been a Republican President, I probably 
would have spent more time chastising the administration than the 
distinguished Senator from North Carolina. He just rolled up his 
sleeves and said, ``OK, this is a necessary and important treaty,'' and 
didn't spend a lot of time in recriminations about why it took so long 
to get here. I thank him for that, and I thank him for the way in which 
he moved this. I doubt there is any treaty or change in a treaty as 
significant as this that has moved as rapidly through the Foreign 
Relations Committee with as studied an approach as under the leadership 
of my colleague from North Carolina.
  Mr. President, nearly 6 years ago, as chairman of the Subcommittee on 
European Affairs, I managed the ratification of the original CFE 
agreement for the then Democratic chairman of the committee. The treaty 
was, I believe then and I believe now, a monumental achievement, 
capping some two decades of negotiations between NATO and Warsaw Pact 
countries to establish a secure conventional military balance in 
Europe. I would argue, it was sort of the prelude to the undoing of our 
adversary at the time, the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.
  Mr. President, the treaty has succeeded as few other arms reduction 
measures have. Since 1992, it has fundamentally altered the military 
landscape from the Atlantic to the Urals, dramatically reducing the 
number of pieces of equipment that could be used to wage war.
  In the last 5 years, the CFE Treaty has resulted in the removal or 
destruction of more than 53,000 pieces of heavy equipment, including 
tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, attack helicopters, and 
combat aircraft.
  Since 1991, of course, the political face of Europe has changed 
dramatically. These developments had an impact on the relevance and 
potential durability of the CFE Treaty. Particularly effective were the 
so-called flank limits. To the average citizen out there, a flank limit 
is not much different than a flank steak or flank cut. The fact of the 
matter is, it has real significance; it is very important.
  The flank limits were included to prevent military equipment that was 
removed from Central Europe from being concentrated elsewhere. We set 
limits on how much equipment could be set on that inter-German border, 
which we necessarily focused on for so many years. As that equipment 
was removed or destroyed, what we did not want to have happen is to 
have the Soviets take that equipment and move it into the flanks, 
moving it on the Turkish border or moving it up by Norway and having a 
predominance of force accumulated there.
  After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia began to argue that 
the treaty, particularly the so-called flank limits, did not adequately 
reflect its security needs in the flank zone. We had placed limits on 
what type of equipment and how much could be placed in these flanks. 
Had I a map, I would reference it, but the fact of the matter is, we 
put limits on this. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia 
began to argue that the treaty, particularly the flank limits, did not 
adequately reflect its security needs in the flank zone.

  Put another way, all those folks in the Caucasus and Transcaucasus 
are now independent countries. When this was negotiated, they weren't 
part of the deal. They weren't part of the deal, and it was some Soviet 
general in Moscow deciding what could and could not be done in those 
countries.
  Now the Russians come back and say, ``Hey, wait, this isn't the deal 
we signed on to.'' Russell Long--a great Senator who the Senator from 
North Carolina remembers well, but not nearly as well as the Senator 
from West Virginia sitting behind me--one of Russell Long's many 
expressions used to be, ``I ain't for no deal I ain't in on.'' All of a 
sudden, the Russians realized that they had signed on to a deal that, 
in a strong way, they were no longer in on, as it related to what was 
left of the Soviet Union.
  Consequently, the NATO alliance agreed to negotiations on revising 
these flank limits, and the result was the agreement before us now 
known as the Flank Document that was signed by 30 states parties--a 
fancy term for saying 30 countries--to the treaty in Vienna on May 31, 
1996. Reiterating the point made by my friend from North Carolina, this 
was signed a year ago, 1996. I believe that our negotiators, while 
meeting some Russian concerns, did an excellent job of protecting the 
interests of this country and the democracies on the northern and 
southern flanks of the former Soviet Union.
  The CFE Flank Document removes some areas from what we call the old 
flank zone, but maintains constraints on equipment both in the new 
flank zone and in the old one. There are also limits on armored combat 
vehicles in each area that were removed from the old flank zone so as 
to prevent any tremendous concentration of equipment in any one place.
  We all are concerned about Russian troop deployments outside its 
borders, Mr. President. We cannot allow Moscow to coerce its 
independent neighbors into accepting the presence of foreign forces on 
their soil or into giving up their own rights to military equipment, 
which would now be folded into this total limit.
  But I believe the Flank Document and the resolution of ratification 
now before the Senate addresses these concerns and recognizes that 
sovereign countries must have the right to refuse Russian demands. 
Indeed, the chairman and I have found common ground on most of the 
issues in this resolution.
  There are a total of, if I am not mistaken, 14 conditions, Mr. 
President. Two of these conditions of ratification, however, I think 
are extraneous and give me some concern. Of the 14, there are only two 
that I would flag for my colleagues, and I am not going to move to 
strike either one of them. I am not going to move to do anything about 
it. I just want to make the point of why I think they are unnecessary 
or counterproductive.
  The first is condition 5, which includes a provision calling for a 
special report on possible noncompliance of the CFE Treaty by Armenia. 
I regret that this provision was included in the resolution at the 
insistence of the majority, but I am pleased that we have reached an 
agreement through the efforts of Senator John Kerry and Senator 
Sarbanes--and I am sure if they reached an agreement they must have run 
it by the distinguished Senator from West Virginia or it would not have 
been agreed to--to mitigate the one-sided nature of this original 
agreement.
  More troubling, though, is condition 9. I will not speak more about 
condition 5 in the interest of time. Condition 9 also is insisted upon 
by the majority, and I note from a brief discussion, while working out 
yesterday out of the Senate environs with my distinguished friend from 
Virginia, that he feels very strongly about, and I happen to disagree 
with him on it.

  Condition 9 requires the President to submit an agreement which will 
multilateralize the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to the Senate 
for advice and consent. Put another way, there is a condition placed on 
here, very skillfully, I might add, by my friends who have concerns 
about the ABM Treaty that has nothing to do with this flank agreement. 
I was of the view it should not be included as part of a condition to 
this treaty. I did not have the votes. I must say to my friend from 
North Carolina, it is not merely because I hope I am a gentleman that I 
am not attempting to remove the condition, I do not have the votes to 
remove the condition, so I am not going to attempt to do something that 
I know will not prevail. But, I would like to point out, the condition 
is titled ``Senate Prerogatives.'' The title is interesting but, I 
think, inaccurate.
  I take a back seat to no one when it comes to Senate prerogatives. As 
a matter of fact, it was the Byrd-Biden amendment attached to the INF 
Treaty. We have been jealous of the protection of our constitutional 
obligations and responsibilities. With all due respect, and it sounds 
self-serving, but I take a back seat to no one in the Senate in terms 
of protecting the constitutional obligations and responsibilities of 
the Senate. But in this case, I do not

[[Page S4453]]

think we have a prerogative to exercise, notwithstanding condition 9 is 
called ``Senate Prerogatives.''
  The issue involves two powers: recognition of successor states and 
the power to interpret and implement treaties, both of which are 
executive functions.
  Mr. President, it is undisputed that the President has the exclusive 
power, under the powers of article 2 of the Constitution, to recognize 
new states. I am not going to take a long time on this, so don't 
everybody worry I am in for a long constitutional discussion; I am only 
going to spend another 3 or 4 minutes, but I want to make the point for 
the Record. Under article 2, section 2 of the Constitution, the 
President and the Senate have a shared duty to ``make treaties.'' But 
once the treaty is made, it is the law of the land, and the President, 
under article 2, section 3, has the duty to take care that it is 
faithfully executed.
  In exercising this duty, it is for the President to determine whether 
a treaty remains in force, a determination that, of necessity, must be 
made whenever a state dissolves.
  So what are we talking about here? We had an ABM Treaty and CFE 
Treaty with the former Soviet Union. The Soviet Union dissolved. And 
the question remains, all those constituent countries that are now 
independent countries, is the President able to recognize Ukraine, for 
example, and, as a consequence, recognize the Ukrainians' assertion 
that they want to be part of the ABM Treaty? They were part of it when 
they were part of the whole Soviet Union, but as the constituent parts 
broke apart, the question was: As each individual country within that 
whole signs on to the continued commitment to ABM, does that require 
ratification by the United States Senate with each of them again? I 
would argue, and I will argue at a later date--I am sure we will hear 
more of this--that it does not require that. It is not a Senate 
prerogative.
  In the case before us, the ABM Treaty, the President has the power to 
declare whether Russia and the other New Independent States inherit the 
treaty obligations of the former Soviet Union, provided those states 
indicate a desire to do so and provided that the succession agreement 
effects no substantive change in the terms of the treaty.
  Both the Bush and Clinton administrations exercised this power 
following the breakup of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, 
and Ethiopia as it relates to other issues, not as it relates to ABM. 
Moreover, it bears emphasis that the two arms control treaties, the CFE 
Treaty and the INF Treaty, were multilateralized by the executive 
action without the advice and consent of the Senate. By definition, we 
are all here, we are not asking for multilateralization of the flank 
agreement. It is somewhat curious that we say ABM requires the Senate 
to have a treaty vote on every successor nation, but on CFE, which we 
all like and we have no substantive disagreement on, we are not asking 
for that.

  So the point I am making is that this condition has nothing to do 
with CFE and it is more about whether you like ABM or do not like ABM, 
not about who has what constitutional responsibility, I respectfully 
suggest.
  I agree with my colleagues on the other side of the aisle and the 
other side of the issue in one respect, that this is the subject of 
legitimate debate. But the debate, which I am confident we can win on 
the merits, can readily be conducted at another time on a more germane 
subject than a treaty that it has nothing to do with. Nonetheless, the 
majority insisted upon this extraneous condition, and I think I can 
count votes.
  I will never forget going to former Chairman Eastland as a young 
member of the Judiciary Committee asking for his support. He sat behind 
his desk, I say to the chairman of the committee, and said, ``Did you 
count?'' I didn't understand what he said.
  I said, ``I beg your pardon, Mr. Chairman?''
  He took that cigar out--I was asking to be chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Criminal Laws, because Senator McClellan had just 
passed away and, for years, it had been his job. It was a contest 
between me and another Senator.
  I was looking at him, and he said, ``Did you count?'' I seriously did 
not understand what he was saying. ``I beg your pardon?'' I said. I 
tried to be humorous. I said, ``Mr. Chairman, I don't speak Southern 
very well.'' He smiled and looked at me, and he took the cigar out of 
his mouth, and said, ``Son, when you have counted, come back and talk 
to me.''
  Well, I learned to count. The reason I am not contesting this now, as 
I said, I counted. I do not have the votes at this moment to remove 
condition 9 and still get this treaty up and out of here in time. So I 
will reserve that fight for another day.
  Despite the inclusion of condition 9, I will strongly support the 
flank agreement because of its integral role in protecting American 
interests in maintaining security and stability in Europe. Indeed, the 
Flank Document we will be voting on is an important bridge to the 
broader revision of the CFE Treaty now under discussion as we talk 
about the enlargement of NATO. Those talks will allow us to achieve 
further reductions in military equipment in Europe and ensure that the 
confidence-building measures embodied in the CFE Treaty remain in 
place.
  Mr. President, the CFE Treaty is just one component of the 
architecture of arrangements, including NATO, the Partnership for 
Peace, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, all of 
which are designed to ensure that in the post-cold war era, the 
European nations remain free and independent and are partners in a zone 
of security and prosperity.
  But by maintaining the integrity of the CFE Treaty, we maintain the 
forum in which an enlarged NATO will make clear to Russia that our 
objective is stability in Europe, not military intimidation. 
Ratification of the flank agreement is a modest but important step 
toward the new European security system.
  I urge my Senate colleagues to do two things--thank the chairman of 
the full committee for expediting this, and when we get very shortly to 
a vote on it, to vote their advice and consent to ratification.
  I thank again the chairman of the full committee.
  I reserve the remainder of my time.
  Mr. HELMS. I thank the Senator from Delaware.
  How much time do I have?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 41 minutes 42 seconds.
  Mr. HELMS. I yield 8 minutes to the distinguished Senator from 
Virginia [Mr. Warner].
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank my friend and colleague, the 
senior Senator from North Carolina. May I join others in urging that 
the Senate give its advice and consent to this very important treaty, a 
treaty brought forward by the leadership of the chairman and the 
distinguished ranking member at a critical time in the ever-increasing 
debates regarding Europe, whether it be NATO expansion or other issues.
  I was prepared today to go toe to toe with my good friend, the 
ranking member of this committee, the Senator from Delaware, on the 
question of condition 9. I have spent a good portion of my career in 
the Senate on the question of the ABM Treaty. I think it was a very 
wise addition to this particular resolution of ratification, a 
provision, condition 9, that addresses the issue of the 
multilateralization of the ABM Treaty.
  I go back to the Fiscal Year 1995 Defense Authorization Act, section 
232. It was my privilege to introduce that provision as an amendment to 
that bill. That provision provided:

       The United States shall not be bound by any international 
     agreement entered into by the President that would 
     ``substantively'' modify the ABM Treaty unless this agreement 
     is entered [into] pursuant to the treaty making power of the 
     President under the Constitution.

  That is section 232 of the Fiscal Year 1995 Defense Authorization 
Act. That is precisely, really a recitation, of what condition 9 
requires--follow the law of the land. President Clinton signed section 
232 into law, and yet, time and again, this President claims exemptions 
from the requirement to submit to the Senate agreements which clearly 
change the rights and obligations of the United States under the ABM 
Treaty.

[[Page S4454]]

  For years, I have joined a number in this Chamber, primarily the 
Republicans, in insisting that the ``demarcation'' agreement, which the 
administration is currently completing in negotiations with the 
Russians, represents again another ``substantive'' change to the ABM 
Treaty that must be submitted to the Senate. I am pleased that the 
administration has at long last acknowledged that very fact and has 
agreed to bring that demarcation agreement before this body for the 
advice-and-consent responsibility entrusted to the Senate by the 
Constitution.
  I, like the Senator from Delaware, was concerned about the use of the 
word ``prerogative'' in condition 9. I view the advice and consent role 
as an obligation of the U.S. Senate under the Constitution of the 
United States. It is an obligation that we must exercise in cases such 
as the demarcation and the multilateralization of the ABM Treaty.
  I ask my colleagues to indulge me just for a minute. I go back to May 
1972, a quarter of a century ago. As a much younger man, I was 
privileged to be a part of the delegation, headed by the President of 
the United States, that went to Moscow for the summit which culminated 
in the signing of SALT I, the ABM Treaty and other agreements. The 
particular matter for which I had primary responsibility was the 
Incidents at Sea Executive Agreement, which was also signed at that 
time.
  I had been in the Pentagon as Secretary of the Navy during the course 
of the negotiation of the ABM Treaty. As such, I have spent a good deal 
of my career, beginning with the inception of that treaty to date, in 
trying to analyze it and defend it. I think it is a valuable part of 
our overall arms control relationship with the then-Soviet Union and 
today Russia. But there is a limit to which that treaty should be 
applied to other activities that this Nation must now undertake--
activities that were not contemplated at the time the treaty was 
negotiated.
  One of those activities--and I do not know of a more important one--
is to protect the men and women of the Armed Forces when they are 
deployed abroad, and any number of civilians in their positions abroad, 
from the ever-growing threat of short-range ballistic missiles.
  Hopefully, this year we will forge ahead and finally clarify--
clarify--the misunderstandings about what the ABM Treaty was intended 
to do and what it was not intended to do on this issue. I have talked 
to so many of my colleagues who were in that delegation a quarter of a 
century ago who had a primary responsibility for the ABM Treaty. One 
after one they will tell you that they never envisioned at that time, 
from a technological standpoint, this new class of weapons, namely, the 
short-range ballistic missiles, and that that treaty was never intended 
to apply to those missiles.
  As the Senator from Delaware said, there will be another day on which 
we can have that debate on the issue of that treaty's application to 
the current research and development now underway to develop and deploy 
those systems desperately needed in the Armed Forces of the United 
States to protect us from the short-range threat, an ever-growing 
threat, which is proliferating across the world.
  The Foreign Relations Committee did precisely what it should have 
done: included in as condition 9 the protection of future debate on the 
ABM Treaty such that the U.S. Senate can make the decisions as to 
whether or not there are successions to the ABM Treaty by other 
nations.
  The ABM Treaty was contemplated, negotiated, and signed as a 
bilateral treaty. It was approved by the Senate as a bilateral treaty. 
It strains credibility for the administration to now argue that the 
conversion of that treaty from a bilateral to a multilateral treaty is 
not a ``significant'' change to warrant Senate advice and consent.
  At the time this treaty was negotiated, no one involved in the 
negotiations could ever have envisioned the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union in their lifetimes--much less within 20 years. Likewise, 
technical advances in the areas of both strategic offensive and 
defensive systems could not be adequately anticipated. That is why the 
treaty has provisions for amendment to adapt it to changing times 
circumstances, and technologies. I am personally of the view that this 
treaty should have been--and still needs to be--amended to allow the 
United States to protect its citizens, stationed abroad from short-
range ballistic missile attacks which were not contemplated 25 years 
ago. But I also strongly believe that any amendment which alters U.S. 
rights and obligations--any substantive changes--must be submitted to 
the Senate for advice and consent.
  We could argue for days about the international legal principles and 
requirements in this area. But one thing is clear--domestic law on this 
issue is unambiguous. Section 232 of the fiscal year 1995 Defense 
authorization bill, which I referred to earlier, clearly requires the 
President to submit for Senate advice and consent any international 
agreement which substantively modifies the ABM Treaty.
  It is clear that multilateralization would constitute a substantive 
change to the ABM Treaty. For 25 years, this has been a bilateral 
treaty. If new parties are added, the geographic boundaries, which 
govern many aspects of the treaty, would be changed. Existing U.S. 
rights under the treaty to amend it by bilateral agreement would be 
lost. The draft memorandum of understanding on succession, the three 
new states parties will be given full voting rights in the Standing 
Consultative Commission [SCC], the body which supervises treaty 
implementation and negotiates amendments to the treaty. According to 
the guidelines of the SCC, changes to the ABM Treaty can only be made 
through a consensus of the parties. That means that any one of these 
three new states parties could block United States efforts to amend 
this treaty to allow for effective missile defenses to deal with 
current threats--even if the Russians agree to the changes.
  The succession issue with the states of the former Soviet Union has 
been handled on a case-by-case basis. In the case of the CFE Treaty and 
the START I Treaty, the Senate specifically addressed the succession 
issue during consideration of the resolutions of ratification for those 
treaties. INF succession was handled without Senate involvement. It is 
clear that the matter of succession--far from being a legal absolute--
is, at best, a murky legal issue.
  The unique status of the ABM Treaty was highlighted in the 1994 
legislation requiring Senate advice and consent of any international 
agreement that ``substantively'' modifies the ABM Treaty. This is not 
the case for the hundreds of other treaties we had in effect with the 
former Soviet Union.
  Since the ABM Treaty reinterpretation debate of the late 1980's, the 
Democrats have insisted that any change to a treaty that differs from 
what was presented to the Senate at the time of ratification must be 
resubmitted to the Senate or the Congress for approval. 
Multilateralization of the ABM Treaty is not simply a reinterpretation 
of the treaty, it is a substantive change to the treaty text. By the 
Democrats own standards, such a change should clearly require Senate 
advice and consent.
  Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I appreciate very much the comments by the 
distinguished ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee. I must 
say for the record that I also enjoy the privilege of working with him. 
I think the committee has been more active in the last year or two than 
it has been for some time. But in any case, I am grateful to Senator 
Biden.
  Mr. President, the history of the succession agreements to the 
various treaties concluded between the United States and the Soviet 
Union further supports the case for Senate consideration of ABM 
multilateralization. In only one case was advice and consent not 
required for multilateralization on an arms control treaty. Because the 
INF Treaty carried the so-called negative obligation of not possessing 
any intermediate-range nuclear missiles, that treaty could be 
multilateralized without altering any treaty terms or imposing any new 
treaty rights or obligations on the United States or new parties.
  Multilateralization of the START I Treaty under the Lisbon Protocol, 
on the other hand, required Senate advice

[[Page S4455]]

and consent because this change had clear implications for the treaty's 
text and object and purpose. The Lisbon Protocol determined the extent 
to which countries other than Russia would be allowed to possess 
strategic nuclear weapons. Similarly, ratification of the Lisbon 
Protocol also effectively determined successorship questions to the 
Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NPT. Under that 
protocol, Belarus and other countries agreed to a legally binding 
commitment to join the NPT as nonnuclear weapons states. Thus when the 
Senate offered its advice and consent to the Lisbon Protocol, it 
approved successorship to both the INF and the START treaties.
  Finally, the Senate specifically considered the question of 
multilateralization of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in 
Europe under condition 5 of the resolution of ratification for the CFE 
Treaty.
  Under article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution, the Senate 
holds a co-equal treaty-making power. John Jay made one of the most 
cogent arguments in this respect, noting:

       Of course, treaties could be amended, but let us not forget 
     that treaties are made not only by one of the contracting 
     parties, but by both, and consequently that as the consent of 
     both was essential to their formation at first, so must it 
     ever afterwards be in order to alter . . . them.

  Now, my colleagues of the Senate may disagree on the wisdom of 
continuing the national strategy embodied in the ABM Treaty. Where I 
hope all of our colleagues could agree, however, is on the imperative 
of upholding the constitutional responsibilities of the Senate, as 
reposed in this body by the Founding Fathers.
  Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated:

       The accretion of dangerous power does not come in a day. It 
     does come, however, slowly, from the generative force of 
     unchecked disregard of the restrictions that fence in even 
     the most disinterested assertion of authority.

  I know the administration has demonstrated nothing if not disregard 
for the Senate's constitutional authority. The Senate's duty with 
regard to the issue of ABM multilateralization is, I believe, Mr. 
President, clear.
  I yield the floor.
  How much time does the distinguished Senator from Texas want?
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. I do not know what the time limitations are. At least 
10 minutes, in your range, or I could cut it back.
  Mr. HELMS. If the Senator could do with 8 minutes, I think I could 
cover everybody, and the distinguished President pro tempore.
  Mr. THURMOND. I need about 10 minutes. I can ask for extra time.
  Mr. HELMS. Why don't you proceed.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. I will be happy to yield to the distinguished 
Senator.
  Mr. HELMS. I say to Senator Thurmond, you have been yielded to by the 
distinguished Senator from Texas.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Would you like to go next, Mr. Chairman?
  Mr. THURMOND. Whatever suits you.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. After him, if I could have 8 to 10 minutes.
  Mr. HELMS. Yes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise in support of the CFE Flank 
Document resolution of ratification. My support of the CFE Flank 
Document is based largely upon the 14 conditions that the Foreign 
Relations Committee attached to the resolution of ratification. I am 
particularly pleased that the Foreign Relations Committee included 
condition 9, which deals with the Senate's prerogatives on 
multilateralization of the ABM Treaty. This has been an issue with 
which the Armed Services Committee has been deeply involved for many 
years.
  I would strongly oppose any effort to dilute or eliminate condition 9 
from the resolution of ratification. Condition 9 does not take a 
position, as such, on the ABM Treaty or treaty succession. It simply 
seeks to protect the Senate's prerogatives in case the treaty is 
substantively changed. I find it difficult to believe that any Member 
of this body would be opposed to this objective. In my view, it is a 
solemn and fundamental obligation of a Senator to consistently guard 
the rights and prerogatives of the Senate, regardless of which 
political party may occupy the White House at any given time.
   Mr. President, although international law is ambiguous on the 
question of treaty succession, the U.S. Constitution and statutory law 
is clear. As section 232 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
fiscal year 1995 states, ``the United States shall not be bound by any 
international agreement entered into by the President that would 
substantively modify the ABM Treaty unless the agreement is entered 
pursuant to the treaty making power of the President under the 
Constitution.'' This provision originated as an amendment sponsored by 
Senator Warner of Virginia and Senator Wallop of Wyoming, two of the 
Senate's foremost experts on the ABM Treaty.
  Notwithstanding the administration's assertion that treaty succession 
is an executive branch responsibility, or any argument that one might 
derive from international law, the real issue is simple and clear. Only 
one overarching question needs to be answered: Does multilateralization 
of the ABM Treaty constitute a substantive change to the treaty? If so, 
the President has no choice, under the law and the Constitution, other 
than to submit such an agreement to the Senate for advice and consent.
  Ironically, those who have asserted that the President does not need 
to submit the multilateralization agreement to the Senate for advice 
and consent have not even attempted to answer the one relevant 
question: Is it a substantive change or not? Instead they have chosen 
to base their views strictly on ambiguity-laden international law and a 
simple assertion of executive prerogative.
  If one carefully analyzes the issues associated with ABM Treaty 
multilateralization, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the 
ABM Treaty will indeed be modified in several substantive ways. The 
conferees to the fiscal year 1997 Defense Authorization Act recognized 
this in stating that ``the accord on ABM Treaty succession, tentatively 
agreed to by the administration, would constitute a substantive change 
to the ABM Treaty, which may only be entered into pursuant to the 
treaty making power of the President under the Constitution.'' This 
conference language, which was supported overwhelmingly on a bipartisan 
basis, was the culmination of 2 years of effort by several key Senators 
on the Armed Services Committee: I have been joined in this fight by 
Senator Lott of Mississippi, Senator Warner of Virginia, Senator--now 
Secretary of Defense--Cohen of Maine, and Senator Smith of New 
Hampshire, as well as other stalwart supporters of the Senate's 
prerogatives.

  Why would multilateralization of the ABM Treaty constitute a 
substantive change? First, because the basic strategic rationale for 
the treaty would be altered. The ABM Treaty was intended to be part of 
an overarching arms control regime for regulating United States-Soviet 
competition in strategic offensive forces. But under a multilateral ABM 
Treaty, some members will have neither strategic offensive nor 
strategic defensive forces, and hence no direct stake in the treaty's 
subject matter. Overall, the United States faces strategic and 
political circumstances that are vastly different than those that 
existed in 1972 when the ABM Treaty was signed. The Senate must 
carefully consider how these bear on the issue of treaty succession.
  Second, the ABM Treaty will change from a treaty between two equal 
parties to one in which different parties have different rights and 
obligations. Some states will be entitled to a deployed ABM system, 
others will not. The United States will also face four states rather 
than one at any future negotiation concerning the future of the treaty. 
This clearly diminishes the weight of the American vote in the Standing 
Consultative Commission and increases the complexity of seeking changes 
or clarifications to the treaty.
  Third, the actual mechanics of the ABM Treaty will be altered by 
multilateralization since the treaty is largely defined in terms of 
``national territory.'' Some items that are regulated by the treaty, 
including large phased array radars, are currently located outside the 
national territory of any of the states that plan to accede to the ABM 
Treaty. Also, those former Soviet States that opt not to stay in the 
treaty would be legally permitted to deploy an unlimited ABM system 
even though their national territory

[[Page S4456]]

was formerly covered by the treaty's definition of Soviet ``national 
territory.''
  Mr. President, these are only a few of the ways in which a 
multilateral ABM Treaty would constitute a substantive change from the 
original treaty. The evidence is overwhelming. For the Senate to do 
anything other than to insist on its right to provide advice and 
consent to such an agreement would be an abandonment of its rights and 
obligations. I urge my colleagues to stand together on this important 
constitutional prerogative of the Senate. The executive branch must not 
be permitted to circumvent the Senate on a matter of such fundamental 
importance.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Allard). The Senator from Texas is now 
recognized for 8 minutes.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman of 
the committee and, of course, the distinguished senior Senator from 
South Carolina.
  Mr. President, there is no Senate responsibility I take more 
seriously than the obligation we have to advise and consent on 
treaties. We are discussing two treaties today that mark the past and 
the future of arms control. It is interesting to me that they have 
become linked in the manner before us today. I commend the 
distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee for his 
vision in this effort.
  The Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty is a pillar of post-cold-war 
security in Europe. That treaty, over a decade in negotiation and 
finished by President Bush in 1990, solidified NATO's victory in the 
cold war by dramatically reducing the size of the conventional forces 
arrayed against each other.
  That treaty also restricted the areas on the flanks of Europe where 
the Soviet Union or its successors could place troops and equipment. 
This particular provision was one of the most difficult to negotiate 
because it was one of the most meaningful. By restricting the size of 
forces on Europe's northern and southern flanks, we greatly reduced the 
likelihood that the Soviet Union or its successors could conduct an 
effective assault on western forces.
  Because of the importance of this provision, it is with great 
reluctance that I support the changes to the agreement before us today, 
which will relax these flank restrictions.
  It is true that over 50,000 pieces of equipment limited by the CFE 
Treaty have been destroyed or removed since the treaty went into 
effect. Nevertheless, with the changes in the agreement regarding the 
flanks of Europe, we will all have to be watchful that we not slide 
back too far from the high standard we set for ourselves and for Russia 
in the original treaty.
  Mr. President, I will also say that we will have to reevaluate our 
actions when we learn the full details of the NATO-Russia agreement 
just announced today. For example, I am hopeful that we did not place 
unilateral restrictions on our own ability to deploy troops in the 
potentially expanded area of NATO responsibility in exchange for Russia 
support for NATO expansion. I light of the changes we are making to the 
CFE Treaty--permitting Russia to deploy forces in areas that have been 
off-limits until now--such a unilateral restriction on our own ability 
to move troops around Europe would be shortsighted indeed.
  Even with these reservations, though, I am willing to support the 
treaty document before us today because of condition 9, which will 
require the President to submit to the Senate for ratification any 
substantive changes to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. My 
support for an effective, global ballistic missile defense system 
greatly outweighs the concerns I may have with changes to the CFE 
Treaty.

  Mr. President, if the CFE Treaty is a forward looking treaty that 
reflects the new realities of post-cold-war Europe, the ABM Treaty is 
an outdated document that harkens back to an era that is thankfully 
behind us. The ABM Treaty was with the USSR. Now that the cold war is 
over it is restricting the inexorable march of technology, a technology 
that I am convinced will make ballistic missiles obsolete.
  The Clinton administration wants to bring new countries into this 
outmoded agreement. If the United States was limited in its ability to 
deploy an effective missile defense when the treaty was with Russia 
alone, how much more restricted will we find ourselves when there are 
half-a-dozen or more new members in this treaty?
  The document before us today does not prejudice the Senate's action 
regarding the ABM Treaty. It only says that if the President wishes to 
permit other countries to join this treaty, then the Senate must 
fulfill its constitutional role to advise and consent on such a change 
to the treaty. Colleagues will have the opportunity at that time to 
debate the merits of bringing new countries into the treaty or simply 
letting this treaty fade into the history it represents.
  While I support the latter, we aren't deciding that matter today. 
Today, we're simply asserting our prerogative to advise and consent on 
treaties. No Member of this body should be comfortable that any 
administration would want to make major modifications to a treaty 
without Senate approval.
  I urge my colleagues to support the resolution of ratification before 
us today and assert their rights as a Member of the U.S. Senate. I 
commend Senator Helms once again with the wisdom and leadership, a 
staunch defender always, of senatorial prerogatives and U.S. national 
security.
  I commend all of those who are going to stand for the rights of the 
Senate and therefore the people, to change any potential treaty that 
this country has committed itself to, because we will keep our treaty 
obligations and we must make sure that the people of our country are 
informed and support any changes in those treaties.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. I yield 12 minutes to the distinguished Senator from 
Massachusetts.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts is recognized 
for 12 minutes.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, before the Senate this afternoon is the 
task of taking the appropriate action, in fulfillment of the Senate's 
vital constitutional advice and consent responsibility and power, to 
adapt the Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE] Treaty to the constant 
change that affects our world--change which has been more sweeping and 
profound in Europe in the past 7 or 8 years than at any time in the 
preceding 40.
  In 1990, after years of grueling negotiations to control the 
historically unprecedented conventional weaponry arrayed on opposite 
sides of the Iron Curtain in Central Europe, the CFE was signed. It 
entered into force in November of 1992. The long, difficult journey 
that led to the CFE treaty included one failed effort--the Mutual and 
Balanced Force Reduction Treaty episode--where negotiators eventually 
had to throw up their hands and acknowledge defeat in their efforts. 
But fortunately that failure was not permitted to become permanent. 
With U.S. leadership, efforts recommenced, and the CFE is the result.
  The CFE treaty is the first in the post-World War II period to 
succeed in limiting and reducing conventional weaponry. While 
understandably strategic weapons treaty negotiations captured greater 
attention, since those negotiations addressed weapons of mass 
destruction each of which can annihilate great numbers of people and 
large cities, the CFE arguably addressed the greater threat to peace in 
Europe, because I believe it always was more likely that any conflict 
there would start as a conventional conflict. The CFE negotiating 
effort was successful in large part because it approached the issue of 
obtaining multilateral agreement to limitations of key offensive-
capable weapons systems on an alliance-to-alliance basis--addressing on 
the one side the armaments possessed by not only the Soviet Union but 
all the Warsaw Pact nations taken together, and on the other side the 
armaments possessed by all the NATO nations taken together.
  The CFE placed numerical limits on the numbers of five types of 
weapons systems critical to effective offensive operations which each 
alliance could possess in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals region of Europe 
where the Warsaw Pact confronted NATO: tanks; artillery pieces; armored 
combat vehicles; attack aircraft; and attack helicopters. It also 
contained sublimits based on

[[Page S4457]]

geographical regions--in realization of the fact that while a certain 
number of the covered items might not be a threat to peace or indicate 
diabolical intentions if spread evenly across the entire geography of 
each alliance, that same number if massed in a subregion could be 
threatening indeed and could indicate intentions to launch an attack or 
engage in other destabilizing behavior.

  The treaty has been a notable success. It has resulted in reductions 
of over 50,000 items of heavy military equipment, verified by an 
intrusive verification regime that has included nearly 3,000 on-site 
inspections conducted to date under treaty auspices. It has worked and 
worked well. It is not a prospective treaty about which we all must 
guess or predict. It is a here-and-now, real-world treaty that has 
resulted in tangible reduction in armaments and consequently in real 
reduction in the threat of conflict. It is a treaty that we would do 
well to preserve and protect.
  Its underlying premise remains valid. If buildups of a critical mass 
of the categories of treaty-limited equipment can be prevented, it will 
be very difficult for any nation to launch an attack against another 
with a significant prospect of success. And even if a nation seeks to 
flaunt the treaty's terms, and engage in a buildup of these weapons 
systems for the purpose either of conducting offensive military 
operations or engaging in a form of extortion, the treaty's 
verification procedures will reveal those efforts so that appropriate 
diplomatic and military responses can be made, and its terms give the 
other parties to the treaty the means to condemn violative activities 
and to enlist the community of nations in efforts to prevent escalation 
into conflict.
  The implementation and ongoing administration of every treaty result 
in cases of different interpretations and various disagreements, and 
the CFE Treaty is no exception. But the mechanisms included in the 
treaty for resolving such conflicts or disagreements have worked 
reasonably well. And one can presume that the treaty would have 
continued to make a significant contribution to the security of Europe 
and, in turn, of the globe in a relatively smooth manner had the world 
remained as it was when the treaty was negotiated and entered into 
force. But, of course, the world has not stood still. The Soviet Union 
imploded. The Warsaw Pact disintegrated. Some of the very nations and 
armies that stared across the Iron Curtain at NATO's forces and their 
key United States components have become great friends of the United 
States and other NATO nations. Several of these appear to be on the 
verge of becoming a part of NATO itself. That, of course, is a matter 
of considerable controversy which should be and I trust will be debated 
separately and thoroughly. But our focus today is or should be on the 
CFE treaty.

  In addition to the disappearance of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw 
Pact, and the realignment of some of the former pact nations with the 
North Atlantic Alliance, other components of the Eurasian security 
picture have changed dramatically. No longer is Russia's biggest 
concern the need to be ready for full-scale battle with NATO troops on 
the German and Benelux plains. Today ethnic conflict in some provinces 
and efforts of other provinces to obtain independence require much 
greater Russian attention. The ferment in the Middle East, and 
activities in Iran and Turkey south of the Russian Caucasus region also 
are of greater concern to Russia.
  Not surprisingly the alterations in Russia's view of its own security 
picture resulted in alterations in what it believed to be the vital 
disposition of its security forces. Other nations of the former Soviet 
Union, including Ukraine, and of the now-defunct Warsaw Pact were faced 
with unanticipated anomalies resulting from the new maps of Eurasia. 
The changes occurred in and affected primarily one of four zones to 
which the CFE Treaty applies, the so-called flank region which consists 
of Norway, Iceland, Turkey, Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova, 
Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and parts of Ukraine and Russia.
  To address the desires by Russia, Ukraine, and others to reallocate 
their forces, but to ensure that those reallocations protect the 
accomplishments and security provided by the CFE, the parties to the 
CFE Treaty negotiated the so-called flank agreement consisting of 
amendments to the original CFE treaty. The parties agreed to the flank 
agreement on May 31, 1996. It will enter into force if approved by all 
CFE Treaty party states by May 15, 1997.

  The agreement does not change numerical limits for either of the two 
major sides of the post-World War II European alignment. Instead, it 
adjusts the boundaries of the flank, providing Russia and Ukraine more 
flexibility than they had before with respect to deployment of 
equipment limited by the treaty.
  The flank agreement is in NATO's security interest, and, 
specifically, it is in the security interests of the United States. 
Without the adjustments it provides, it is likely Russia and possibly 
Ukraine would feel so impeded in their ability to meet their own 
national security requirements that they either would leave the treaty 
altogether or fail to comply with some of its provisions. The 
implications of neither of these outcomes would be acceptable, and 
would weaken or destroy the protections and added security offered by 
the CFE Treaty.
  The judgment that the flank agreement is in our national interest is 
not just a judgment of our diplomatic community. It is fully endorsed 
by our Armed Forces leadership. On April 29 of this year, Brig. Gen. 
Gary Rubus testified:

       In the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Flank 
     Agreement is militarily sound. It preserves the CFE treaty 
     and its contribution to U.S. and Allied military security. 
     The additional flexibility permitted Russia in the flank zone 
     does not allow a destabilizing new concentration of forces on 
     the flanks of Norway, Turkey and other States in that area. 
     Moreover, the agreement includes significant new safeguards, 
     including greater transparency and new constraints on flank 
     deployment:

  The benefits of this agreement are apparent. The Foreign Relations 
Committee last week approved the resolution of ratification by a 
unanimous vote of 17-0. I am confident that a great majority of 
Senators approve of the flank agreement. But I am very troubled by how 
some in the majority seem determined to transform the constitutional 
treaty advice and consent process into an obstacle course.
  The Foreign Relations Committee last week approved the resolution of 
ratification by unanimous vote. Mr. President, as the Foreign Relations 
Committee last week approved this by unanimous vote of 17 to 0, it 
doesn't mean that there were not some reservations. I just want to 
speak to them.
  I am confident that the great majority of our colleagues will support 
the Flank Agreement. But I am troubled by the way in which some have 
transformed the constitutional treaty advise and consent process into 
something of an obstacle course that involves things that aren't 
directly in the treaty.
  The conditions for ratification which the majority required before it 
would permit the Foreign Relations Committee and then the full Senate 
to perform the advice and consent role, fall into four rough 
categories. I find several of them--primarily those which the Senate 
appropriately and routinely attaches to treaties--beneficial and 
desirable. I find several others reflect a degree of fear and anxiety 
on the part of some Members, the basis for which I cannot ascertain--
but which, all things told, appear unlikely to do fundamental damage to 
what should be our objective here: To keep the CFE Treaty in operation 
in order to continue to derive its benefits to security in Europe and a 
reduction in the risk of conflict there.
  The third category, Mr. President, consists of a condition whose 
objective may have been desirable but which inadvertently or 
inadvisedly singles out one nation for implicit criticism when the 
kinds of actions it is implicitly criticized for taking may place it in 
the company of other nations in its region, and when it would be more 
appropriate to address these situations as a group so that all nations 
are held accountable to the same treaty standards. I speak of paragraph 
F of condition 5 which, in the form approved by the committee, singles 
out Armenia and requires a report directed solely at its activities and 
whether they comply with the terms of the treaty. I will address that 
matter separately, and will

[[Page S4458]]

offer an amendment to establish what I believe is an important balance 
and equity with respect to the entire Caucasus region.
  Then, Mr. President, there is condition 9 which forms a special 
category all its own. I understand why a Senator who has not been 
deeply involved in the Senate's processing of the CFE Flank Agreement 
may be puzzled by the fact that condition 9 pertains to the ABM Treaty. 
In fact, I have been involved in the effort to move the Flank Agreement 
to Senate approval, and I cannot discern a reasonable or defensible 
rationale to link the issue of multilateralization of the ABM Treaty to 
action on the CFE Flank Agreement except for the reason of taking 
something that ought to happen that is important to our security and 
linking it to something that is not necessarily yet thoroughly 
considered by the Senate.

  But even so, I do believe I understand what is going on here. 
Proposed condition 9 is hostage-taking, pure and simple. I think there 
are some who have a fundamental aversion to arms control agreements and 
want the United States to simply go it alone in the interdependent 
world of the last decade of the 20th century. Unfortunately they insist 
that unless the President concedes to their position on the unrelated 
issue of ABM multilateralization, they will refuse to let the United 
States ratify the CFE flank agreement.
  I readily agree that the issues surrounding the ABM Treaty are both 
vital and very controversial. The Committee on Foreign Relations, with 
the contribution of the Committee on Armed Services, should devote 
considerable time and energy to thoroughly exploring those issues, and 
then the Senate as a whole should carefully determine how to proceed 
with respect to them.
  But I want to register the strongest possible dissent from this 
tactic of hostage-taking. In my judgment these issues are separate and 
ought to be treated separately. Treaties are fundamentally different 
than bills on which this Congress acts on a daily basis. We ought to 
approach our advice and consent responsibility--a solemn constitutional 
duty--with more abstract side bar process. We should not load up 
resolutions of treaty ratification with essentially nongermane 
amendments.
  Further, purporting to resolve the complex and very important ABM 
issues by attaching a condition to a wholly unrelated treaty--and 
without thoroughly airing and deliberating on those issues at the 
committee level via hearings and other means--is risky and ill-advised. 
Because I understand the power of the majority, perhaps the most 
significant feature of which is its considerable control over 
determining whether and when the Senate will address important issues, 
and because I believe it is of great importance that this flank 
agreement be considered and acted on by the full Senate, and that the 
Senate do so prior to the May 15 deadline which is imminent, I did not 
seek because of my aversion to condition 9 to derail the Foreign 
Relations Committee's action on the resolution of ratification last 
week, but I expressed my concerns which were published as additional 
views in the committee's report on the resolution.

  Mr. President, as Senators, every one of us is sworn to uphold the 
Constitution. In my judgment that requires maintaining the separation 
of powers which plays so critical a part in maintaining the equilibrium 
of our unique form of government which has permitted it to survive and 
function successfully for over 200 years. Maintaining the separation 
requires a careful allegiance to preserving and protecting not only the 
constitutional obligations, responsibilities, and prerogatives of the 
legislative branch, and the Senate in particular, but also of the 
judicial and the executive branches.
  We in this Chamber are most accustomed, understandably, to rising to 
the defense of the responsibilities, role, and prerogatives of our own 
branch and our own Chamber. I have joined many times in such efforts. 
Indeed, the very fact that the CFE Flank Agreement is being considered 
by the Senate is attributable to an effort to assert that the Senate 
properly should act on that agreement under the treaty clause of the 
Constitution because it substantively alters the original CFE Treaty.
  Itis my view, and, I believe, the view of most Senators on both sides 
of the aisle who have carefully examined the issue, that the ABM 
Demarcation Agreement also makes a substantive change in a treaty to 
the ratification of which the Senate previously gave its advice and 
consent--thereby necessitating that U.S. ratification of the 
Demarcation Agreement can occur only if the Senate gives its advice and 
consent by means of the complete constitutional process.
  But the ABM Succession Agreement is a different matter entirely. It 
effects no substantive change in the ABM Treaty or any other treaty. It 
does one and only one thing: It codifies the status with respect to the 
treaty of the states which succeeded to the rights and obligations of 
the former Soviet Union. It is a function of the executive branch, not 
the legislative branch, to determine if new nations which descend from 
a dissolved nation inherit the predecessor nation's obligations such as 
those under a treaty. This is not a matter of defending a Senate right 
or obligation or prerogative; the Senate has no right, obligation, or 
prerogative to defend with respect to determination of succession.
  This principle has been illustrated on many occasions by its 
application. Recently, and of direct relevance, it has been applied in 
a number of circumstances with regard to the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union.
  I believe I understand the objective here, Mr. President, and I do 
not believe it is the defense of a nonexistent constitutional principle 
or a nonexistent constitutional right or prerogative of the Senate. 
This is a wolf in sheep's clothing--a maneuver by opponents of the ABM 
Treaty to gain strategic advantage in their quest to demolish the ABM 
Treaty. The objective is to give them one additional shot at killing 
the Treaty.
  I am prepared for the debate on the ABM Treaty. I look forward to 
thoroughly assessing whether this treaty continues to serve our 
Nation's security interests as I strongly believe it has well served 
those interests since its ratification. I look forward to examining in 
detail the probable reactions in Russia and elsewhere if we abandon the 
treaty.
  But let me return to an earlier point that ABM opponents have shown 
they are willing to ignore. The Senate is not currently debating the 
ABM Treaty. The matter that is before us today is the Conventional 
Forces in Europe Treaty Flank Agreement. Condition 9 is an unwise, 
unnecessary, destructive digression from what we should be doing here 
today. It is yet another example of distressing political expediency 
too often illustrated in this Chamber in recent years. Fortunately, 
that expediency rarely has sunk to the level of sacrificing a vital 
constitutional principle--such as the separation of powers--for the 
sake of tactical gain. But, Mr. President, let there be no mistake: It 
is sinking to that level today in condition 9.

  When we do such things, Mr. President, there is a price to be paid. 
Either we who serve here today will pay that price at a later time, or 
those who follow in our footsteps will pay that price. We disserve the 
Constitution we are sworn to uphold when we permit that to occur.
  I must remark, Mr. President, on the peculiar and troubling silence 
of the administration on this issue. The administration, by position 
and motivation, is best situated to defend the constitutional 
prerogatives and responsibilities of the executive branch. And yet, for 
some unknown reason, perhaps a tactical calculus, or exhaustion, or 
distraction--for some reason--the administration never even joined this 
issue. I say to the administration: Despite the appearances given by 
your silence and inaction on this issue, this truly does matter in the 
long run. And this administration, and others to follow it, will regret 
this day. Much more is being ceded here than the authority to decide 
what nations properly hold the obligations of the ABM Treaty that 
previously were held by the Soviet Union.
  Mr. President, I strongly support the ratification of the Flank 
Agreement. Before we vote on the resolution of ratification, I will 
offer the amendment I referenced earlier to address the Caucasus 
region, which I hope will be

[[Page S4459]]

approved. Then, despite the reservations about condition 9 I have 
enunciated, because of how important I believe the CFE Treaty is and 
will continue to be to European security and stability and therefore to 
world security and stability, I will vote to approve the resolution of 
ratification and urge all other Senators to do so.


             questions of treaty adherence in the caucasus

  Mr. President, the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty was 
negotiated to limit the numbers and geographical distribution in Europe 
of five key types of offensive-capable weapons systems. The treaty 
contains sublimits for portions of the Atlantic-to-the-Urals region 
covered by the treaty that apply to the five types of treaty-limited 
equipment.
  The treaty, when it was negotiated, was focused on the protracted 
cold war and the confrontation at the Iron Curtain that ran through 
Central Europe. Its design was to make it less likely that the cold war 
would turn hot, by making it more difficult to amass sufficient 
quantities of the weapons systems that would be needed for a successful 
attack of one side on the other, or, at the very least, to amass such 
weaponry without the other side being aware of the preparations for 
such an attack. The weapons limitations and the transparency are the 
treaty's keys.
  But as the astonishing events of the late 1980's and early 1990's 
unfolded, the entire structure of Europe changed in such a fashion as 
to be virtually unrecognizable. For the most part, this was a very 
welcome change. For the first time in 40 years, there was no tense 
face-off of the world's greatest armies at the Warsaw Pact/NATO border.
  But the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which was one of the most 
prominent of the changes in the region, removed the authority and 
control that had kept a lid on ethnic conflicts and territorial 
disputes in several regions of what had been the Soviet Union. Ancient 
tensions and hatreds soon began to bubble to the surface, and nowhere 
moreso than in the Caucasus region.
  The Russian province of Chechnya sought to secede from Russia. Ethnic 
Armenians in the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan sought to gain 
independence so they could align with Armenia. Abkhaz separatists in 
Georgia have fought a long-running civil war with the central 
government.
  Wars and revolutions are fought with weapons, of course. All parties 
to these conflicts have done all in their power to increase their 
firepower. Not surprisingly, these actions, when they involve treaty-
limited equipment, have implications for the CFE Treaty even though 
contending with such situations was not the primary purpose for which 
the treaty was negotiated.
  Responding to an allegation made publicly by a Russian Army general 
who now serves in the Duma, the majority included in the text of the 
resolution of ratification of the CFE flank agreement, as a part of 
condition 5 titled ``Monitoring and Verification of Compliance,'' 
paragraph F, which is a requirement that the President submit a report 
to the Congress regarding ``whether Armenia was in compliance with the 
treaty in allowing the transfer of conventional armaments and equipment 
limited by the treaty through Armenian territory to the secessionist 
movement in Azerbaijan.''
  Mr. President, wherever there are credible allegations or concerns 
that the provisions of any arms control treaty have been violated, 
those allegations or concerns should be explored thoroughly and the 
truth determined. That, certainly, applies in this case. However, I 
believe this portion of condition 5 is too limited in its scope, and 
because of that limitation, leaves the impression that the Senate is 
not as concerned about the effects on the treaty of arms transfer and 
acquisition actions in other areas of the Caucasus region.
  If we are to carefully examine alleged violations of treaty 
provisions in one specific location in this conflicted region, we 
should direct the same level of inquiry at all portions of the region. 
We know that arms buildups in other Caucasus locations have violated 
provisions of the CFE Treaty. Some of those violations, in fact, have 
been openly acknowledged.
  It is my belief that the Senate should address this matter directly, 
and do so by expanding the scope of the report that will be required by 
paragraph F of condition 5. Together with Senator Sarbanes, and with 
the support of several other Senators, I have prepared an amendment to 
do this. The amendment inserts a new subparagraph ii requiring that the 
President's report address ``whether other States Parties located in 
the Caucasus region are in compliance with the Treaty.'' The President 
also must indicate what actions have been taken to implement sanctions 
on any of these states found to be in violation.
  I believe this change will make this provision of the resolution of 
ratification more useful. Because the report the Congress will receive 
will give a more complete picture of the level of compliance with or 
violation of the CFE Treaty in the Caucasus region, the United States 
can formulate a response that will be more complete and suitable.


                           Amendment No. 279

 (Purpose: To require a compliance report on Armenia and other States 
                    Parties in the Caucasus region)

  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, the amendment that I send to the desk is an 
amendment that seeks very simply to create the equity and balance that 
I sought with respect to the question of Armenia.
  I believe that we have an agreement on this language. It will simply 
reflect that we ought to hold all nations in the area to the same 
standard.
  In my judgment, it is self explanatory. I believe it has been 
approved by both sides as a consequence of that.
  Mr. President, I send the amendment to the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Kerry), for himself, 
     Mr. Biden, Mr. Sarbanes, Mr. Abraham, and Mrs. Feinstein, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 279.

  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       Strike subparagraph (F) of section 2(5) and insert the 
     following:
       (F) Compliance report on armenia and other states parties 
     in the caucasus region.--Not later than August 1, 1997, the 
     President shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations 
     of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives 
     a full and complete classified and unclassified report 
     regarding--
       (i) whether Armenia was in compliance with the Treaty in 
     allowing the transfer of conventional armaments and equipment 
     limited by the Treaty through Armenian territory to the 
     secessionist movement in Azerbaijan;
       (ii) whether other States Parties located in the Caucasus 
     region are in compliance with the Treaty; and
       (iii) if Armenia is found not to have been in compliance 
     under clause (i) or, if any other State Party is found not to 
     be in compliance under clause (ii), what actions the 
     President has taken to implement sanctions as required by 
     chapter 11 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
     (22 U.S.C. 2295 et seq.; relating to assistance to the 
     independent states of the former Soviet Union) or other 
     provisions of law.

  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I believe we have an agreement on this 
particular amendment.
  I thank the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee 
for working, as he always does, in order to find a common ground in 
these matters.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment 
of the Senator from Massachusetts.
  The amendment (No. 279) was agreed to.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I yield 6 minutes to the distinguished 
Senator from New Hampshire, [Mr. Smith].
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire is recognized.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished 
chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee.
  Mr. President, I rise in strong support of the resolution of 
ratification reported by the Senate Foreign Relations

[[Page S4460]]

Committee. I want to specifically commend the distinguished chairman, 
Senator Helms, for his outstanding leadership in moving this resolution 
promptly and responsibly.
  I also want to commend the Foreign Relations Committee for including 
condition No. 9, which would require the administration to submit any 
agreement that would multilateralize the ABM Treaty to the Senate for 
advice and consent. This is an extremely important issue, Mr. 
President, and this provision ensures that the Senate retains its 
constitutional prerogatives to advise and consent on international 
treaties.
  By way of background, there is an existing statutory requirement, 
with precedent, that any substantive change to an international treaty 
must be submitted to the Senate for advice and consent, as prescribed 
under the Constitution.
  The Clinton administration has spent the better part of the past 4 
years negotiating changes to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile [ABM] 
Treaty. Foremost among these changes are a demarcation agreement that 
would restrict the performance of certain theater defense programs, and 
a multilateralization agreement that would expand the ABM Treaty to 
include the Republics of the former Soviet Union. It is this 
multilateralization agreement that condition No. 9 would address.
  Mr. President, condition No. 9 has become necessary because the 
administration refuses to submit the multilateralization agreement to 
the Senate for advice and consent. They have rightly conceded that both 
a demarcation agreement and the CFE flank limits agreement are 
substantive changes requiring approval of the Senate, but they 
adamantly refuse to submit multilateralization for approval.
  The administration asserts that the executive branch alone has the 
authority to recognize nations and determine the successor states on 
treaties whose participants no longer exist. They also argue that 
multilateralization is merely a clarification, not a substantive change 
to the ABM Treaty.
  It is a very significant change that will fundamentally alter both 
the nature of the treaty and the obligations of its parties. It is most 
certainly a substantive change, and as such, it must be submitted to 
the Senate for advice and consent.
  Mr. President, let me elaborate on exactly why a multilateralization 
agreement would represent a substantive change. The ABM Treaty was 
signed by the United States and the Soviet Union. It was premised on 
the policy of mutual assured destruction and it codified the bipolar 
strategic reality of the cold war. All negotiations on compliance and 
all discussions concerning amendments to the treaty were to be 
bilateral in nature, with any decisions being approved by each side. 
The negotiating ratio was 1 to 1, the United States versus the Soviet 
Union.

  However, one of these two parties has now ceased to exist. There is 
no longer a Soviet Union. If the treaty is multilateralized, and 
thereby expanded to include multiple parties on the former Soviet side, 
it will dramatically change this negotiating ratio, both theoretically 
and practically.
  Instead of the 1-to-1 ratio that the treaty was premised on, it will 
become at a minimum a 1-to-4 ratio, of the United States versus Russia, 
Khazakstan, Ukraine, and Belarus, and perhaps even a 1-to-15 ratio of 
the United States versus all 15 of the former Soviet Republics. We just 
don't know and the administration isn't saying.
  Under a multilaterlization agreement, each of these former Soviet 
Republics would have an equal say in negotiations, even though they 
clearly would have unequal rights and unequal equipment holdings. For 
instance, only the United States and Russia would be permitted to field 
an ABM system, but other nations would be free to deploy ABM radars and 
other related components of a system. Further, while the ABM Treaty 
prohibits defense of the territory of a nation, the term territory is 
being redefined to mean the combined territories of all former Soviet 
Republics who choose to join the treaty.
  What does this mean? It means that instead of the treaty applying to 
the territory of an individual nation, it applies to a number of 
nations, unevenly and in a manner that is very detrimental to the 
United States. For example, Russia could legally establish new early 
warning radars on the territory of other States, well beyond the 
periphery of Russia, while the United States is restricted to its own 
borders. Compounding this inequity, the territory and borders of the 
so-called former Soviet Union could change over time because the 
multilateralization agreement allows the admission of additional 
republics even after entry into force.
  The bottom line, Mr. President, is multilateralization would by 
definition and practice create a fundamental asymmetry in the ABM 
Treaty. Rather than having two parties with equal offensive strategic 
forces and defensive capabilities, this agreement would create a 
tremendous imbalance. For us to negotiate any changes to the treaty, 
such as an agreement to permit multiple sites or to change the 
location, we would now need to convince all the participating Republics 
of the former Soviet Union rather than just one.
  In essence, each of those countries would be able to veto our 
position at any time. And they would individually leverage the vote in 
the Standing Consultative Commission for more foreign aid, or trade 
recognition, or concessions on a variety of issues. Whenever we finally 
met any single Republic's demands, another could instantly leverage 
similar concessions. When would it end? Never. This scenario is very 
troubling. It is troubling there are people in the Senate who would be 
willing to accede to that kind of situation. At the very least, it will 
cause huge complications in our process for negotiating changes to the 
treaty.
  There can be no question, an agreement to multilateralize the ABM 
Treaty is a substantive change to the ABM Treaty, plain and simple. It 
must be submitted for advice and consent. Condition 9 merely says that 
before the CFE Flank Limits Agreement can take effect, the President 
must certify that he will submit the ABM Treaty multilateralization 
agreement to the Senate for advice and consent.
  Nothing in this condition will require any renegotiation of any 
provision of the CFE Flank Limits Agreement or, for that matter, 
require any renegotiation of any provision of the ABM Treaty 
multilateralization agreement. This condition will not affect any other 
country or any other treaty or the cause of strategic stability in any 
respect. That is a fact.
  Contrary to the parochial appeals of the administration, it is not 
going to kill NATO expansion. It will not kill START II. And it will 
not kill the CFE Treaty. In fact, all the President has to do is send 
us a letter this afternoon certifying he will submit the agreement to 
the Senate for advice and consent and we will be done with it. Case 
closed.
  I am pleased the Senate has seen fit, thanks to the tremendous 
leadership of Chairman Helms, to adopt this very important condition. 
Senator Helms, as he does so many times and often on the floor of the 
Senate and in private meetings on issues, stands sometimes alone. I am 
proud to be standing with him on this very important issue, and I think 
future generations will thank him for his leadership when we get to the 
point where this treaty does take effect. People will be thanking him 
for his leadership on the multilateralization issue.
  I thank the Chair.
  Mr. HELMS. I thank the Senator from New Hampshire. I assure him it is 
an honor to serve in the Senate with him.
  Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished Senator from 
Nebraska.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska.
  Mr. HAGEL. Mr. President, I am pleased to support this CFE Flank 
Treaty today. It is good for the security of the United States and the 
security of our NATO allies.
  This treaty modifies the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. This 
treaty was reached in 1990 before the breakup of the Soviet Union and 
the Warsaw Pact. The modifications in CFE flank restrictions contained 
in this treaty are reasonable, and we all should support them.
  Under Chairman Helms' guidance, the Foreign Relations Committee added 
a number of important conditions to this treaty. These conditions

[[Page S4461]]

clarify parts of the treaty that could be construed as granting special 
rights to Russia to intimidate its neighbors, but most importantly are 
the clarifications that nothing in the CFE Flank Treaty grants to 
Russia any right to continue its current violations of the sovereignty 
of several neighboring states.
  I am pleased that these clarifications were fully bipartisan 
conditions that received the support of our distinguished Foreign 
Relations ranking member, Senator Biden.
  There is, however, one remaining condition that caused some 
controversy. This is condition 9, which requires the President to 
submit to the Senate for ratification another treaty modification, the 
ABM multilateralization treaty. This is not a question of support or 
opposition to the ABM Treaty. This is purely a matter of the 
prerogative of the Senate, of whether or not to adhere to the clear 
intent of the Constitution of this country.
  During negotiations over the Chemical Weapons Convention, Senator 
Helms and Majority Leader Lott succeeded in convincing the President to 
submit to the Senate two out of three pending treaty modifications that 
the President had intended to implement as executive agreements. One of 
those treaty modifications, the CFE Flank Treaty now before us today, 
and another, the ABM Demarcation Treaty, is before the Foreign 
Relations Committee where it will receive serious consideration.
  Only one treaty modification has yet to be submitted to the Senate, 
the ABM multilateralization treaty agreed to in Helsinki by Presidents 
Clinton and Yeltsin. It is right to require that treaty to be submitted 
as well.

  Again, this issue is merely the constitutional obligation of each of 
us in this body to give our advice and consent on the ratification of 
treaties, not whether this treaty modification is good or bad.
  I again congratulate Chairman Helms, Senator Biden, and the 
distinguished majority leader. I am proud of the leadership they have 
shown on this treaty and on the constitutional prerogatives of the 
Senate.
  Mr. President, I yield my time.
  Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.
  Mr. HELMS. I have a little housekeeping function. I ask what I am 
about to do will not be charged to either side.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                 Unanimous-Consent Agreement--H.R. 1122

  Mr. HELMS. As in legislative session, Mr. President, I ask unanimous 
consent that immediately following disposition of the Feinstein 
amendment to H.R. 1122 during Thursday's session of the Senate, Senator 
Daschle be recognized to offer an amendment and it be considered under 
the following time agreement: 2\1/2\ hours under the control of Senator 
Daschle or his designee, and 2\1/2\ hours under the control of Senator 
Santorum or his designee.
  I further ask unanimous consent that following the conclusion or 
yielding back of time on the Daschle amendment, the Senate proceed to 
vote on or in relation to the Daschle amendment without further action 
or debate, with no amendments in order during the pendency of the 
Daschle amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. HELMS. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. I yield 12 minutes to the distinguished Senator from 
Michigan.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I thank my friend from Delaware.
  First, let me congratulate the Senators from North Carolina and 
Delaware, the chairman and ranking member of the Foreign Relations 
Committee, for working together so speedily and quickly to bring this 
treaty to the floor. It is a real feat. It is difficult to do this in 
this length of time. The kind of bipartisan cooperation that this takes 
really, I think, reflects great honor on this body.
  There is one condition that I have some difficulty with that I want 
to address some remarks to this afternoon, and that is condition 9, 
which is now part of the resolution before the Senate.
  Condition 9 requires the President to submit to the Senate for its 
advice and consent the memorandum of understanding concerning successor 
states to the ABM Treaty. In my view, this condition is probably 
unconstitutional but certainly unwise. As a general rule, a condition 
on a resolution of ratification is a stipulation which the President 
must accept before proceeding to ratification of a treaty. And if the 
President finds the condition unacceptable, he generally has but one 
choice, which is to refuse to ratify the treaty. There is, however, a 
generally recognized exception: If the condition is inconsistent with 
or invades the President's constitutional powers, in which case the 
condition would be ineffective and of no consequence. The restatement 
of foreign relations law puts the matter this way:

       The Senate has not made a practice of attaching conditions 
     unrelated to the treaty before it. If the Senate were to do 
     so and were to attach a condition invading the President's 
     constitutional powers, for example, his power of appointment, 
     the condition would be ineffective. The President would then 
     have to decide whether he could assume that the Senate would 
     have given its consent without the condition.

  In this matter before us, condition 9 has no relation to the CFE 
flank agreement. The condition, therefore, on that ground is improper. 
It seeks to invade the President's constitutional powers to recognize 
states and to implement treaties, and thus is probably 
unconstitutional.
  When the Senate deals with the important issue of advice and consent 
to a treaty, I think it should limit itself to the treaty before it. 
When we go beyond that, it seems to me we do not bring honor on this 
institution, when we try to force the hand of the President in areas 
beyond the immediate treaty that is being considered.
  In a very ironic twist, condition 9 could imperil the continued 
viability of the treaty that we are ratifying because if the ABM 
Treaty, when it is multilateralized, needs to come back for 
ratification, the same principle would apply to other treaties, of 
which we have dozens. The same principle, if it applies to ABM, would 
apply to CFE, the treaty before us.
  Is this treaty binding on those other states, those other successor 
states of the Soviet Union without coming back to the Senate? INF, 
START I, probably dozens of treaties with the former Soviet Union which 
have been multilateralized, which have been accepted by the successor 
states, which we now, I hope, consider binding on those States and on 
us, even though they have not been brought back to the Senate for 
ratification, if the logic of condition 9 is correct, it would 
undermine the viability, the efficacy of those other treaties that we 
had with the former Soviet Union. It would call into question treaties 
that I do not believe this body wants to call into question.
  The reason that it does that is that condition 9 requires the 
President to submit to the Senate for its advice and consent his 
recognition of the Soviet Union successor states to the ABM Treaty. It 
does provide an opportunity for opponents of the ABM Treaty to try to 
defeat that memorandum of understanding as it relates to the successor 
states. But in doing so, it jeopardizes the continuing viability of the 
acceptance by those successor states of their obligations under the ABM 
Treaty and, in terms of the point I am making, their obligations under 
a number of other treaties which have been signed by the former Soviet 
Union.
  This outcome could undermine the reductions of former Soviet nuclear 
weapons that our military has testified are so clearly in our national 
security interests. Opponents of having successor states other than 
Russia appear to worry about the potential difficulty of negotiating 
changes or amendments to the ABM Treaty in order to permit deployment 
of a national missile defense system in the future. Their notion 
appears to be that while it may be straightforward for us to negotiate 
required changes with Russia, it will somehow be more difficult to get 
the other three successor states to agree to any changes. And according 
to that view, rather than to give each of the other three states a 
potential veto over changes to the ABM Treaty, it would be better to 
prevent those successor states from ever joining the ABM Treaty as a 
party.

[[Page S4462]]

  That is what this condition is all about, but it is misguided from a 
number of perspectives. First, the notion that Ukraine, Belarus, and 
Kazakstan would obstruct any changes to the ABM Treaty but that somehow 
Russia would be an easier negotiating partner flies in the face of 
experience. In the negotiations at the Standing Consultative 
Commission, it is Russia that has been the most challenging negotiating 
partner, while Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus have been more amenable 
to American proposals.
  Furthermore, as the administration has pointed out on many occasions, 
if the United States determines that there is the threat that requires 
us to deploy a national missile defense system that would conflict with 
the ABM Treaty, they would seek to negotiate changes with our treaty 
partners to permit such a deployment. We would seek to adapt the treaty 
to our security requirements. But if the Russians would not agree to 
our proposed changes, then the administration would consider whether to 
withdraw from the ABM Treaty, as is our right under the treaty's 
provisions relating to our supreme national interests. That is the 
prudent approach and the one that best serves our security.
  Let me just give one other example of the implication of this 
condition. In 1995, the United States recognized Ukraine as a successor 
to the former Soviet Union for 35 nonarmed control treaties that we 
previously had with the U.S.S.R. We did this without a Senate vote. So 
now we presumably want the Ukraine to be bound by 35 treaties 
previously negotiated. But there is no Senate vote ratifying that 
treaty with Ukraine.

  In a diplomatic note from the United States Embassy to the Government 
of Ukraine dated May 10, 1995, the United States listed the 35 
agreements that have continued in force with Ukraine and they include 
such treaties as the incidents at sea agreement of 1972 with its 
protocol, which our good friend from Virginia, Senator Warner, 
negotiated when he was Secretary of the Navy. They included the 
prevention of dangerous military activities agreement of 1989, which is 
designed to prevent an accident or mistake from erupting into 
hostilities. These are extremely important agreements and we should not 
put those agreements in limbo, or in doubt, by setting this precedent 
relative to the ABM Treaty.
  I ask unanimous consent that the list of those 35 treaties that 
Ukraine is hopefully bound by, through that note--but which we have not 
ratified, vis-a-vis Ukraine--that that list and note be printed in the 
Record at this time.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

      Embassy of the United States of America--Kiev, May 10, 1996

       The Embassy of the United States of America presents its 
     compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine and 
     has the honor to refer to discussions between technical 
     experts of our two Governments concerning the succession of 
     Ukraine to bilateral treaties between the United States of 
     America and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 
     light of the independence of Ukraine and the dissolution of 
     the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In conducting their 
     discussions, the experts took as a point of departure the 
     continuity principle set forth in Article 34 of the Vienna 
     Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties. In 
     examining the texts they found that certain treaties to which 
     the principle applied had since expired by their terms. 
     Others had become obsolete and should not be continued in 
     force between the two countries. Finally, after a treaty-by-
     treaty review, which included an examination of the 
     practicability of the continuance of certain specific 
     treaties, they recommended that our two Governments agree no 
     longer to apply those treaties.
       In light of the foregoing, the Embassy proposes that, 
     subject to condition that follows, the United States of 
     America and Ukraine confirm the continuance in force as 
     between them of the treaties listed in the Annex to this 
     Note.
       Inasmuch as special mechanisms have been established to 
     work out matters concerning succession to bilateral arms 
     limitation and related agreements concluded between the 
     United States and the former Union of Soviet Socialist 
     Republics, those agreements were not examined by the 
     technical experts. Accordingly, this Note does not deal with 
     the status of those agreements and no conclusion as to their 
     status can be drawn from their absence from the list 
     appearing in the Annex.
       With respect to those treaties listed in the Annex that 
     require designations of new implementing agencies or 
     officials by Ukraine, the United States understands that 
     Ukraine will inform it of such designations within two months 
     of the date of this Note.
       If the foregoing is acceptable to the Government of 
     Ukraine, this Note and the Ministry's Note of reply 
     concurring therein shall constitute an agreement between our 
     two Governments which shall enter into force on the date of 
     receipt by the Embassy of the Ministry's Note in reply.
       The Embassy of the United States of America avails itself 
     of this opportunity to renew to the Ministry of Foreign 
     Affairs of Ukraine the assurance of its highest 
     consideration.
       Enclosure: Annex.


                                 annex

       Convention relating to the rights of neutrals at sea. 
     Signed at Washington July 22, 1854; entered into force 
     October 31, 1854.
       Agreement regulating the position of corporations and other 
     commercial associations. Signed at St. Petersburg June 25, 
     1904; entered into force June 25, 1904.
       Arrangements relating to the establishment of diplomatic 
     relations, nonintervention, freedom of conscience and 
     religious liberty, legal protection, and claims. Exchanges of 
     notes at Washington November 16, 1933; entered into force 
     November 16, 1933.
       Agreement relating to the procedure to be followed in the 
     execution of letters rogatory. Exchange of notes at Moscow 
     November 22, 1935; entered into force November 22, 1935.
       Preliminary agreement relating to principles applying to 
     mutual aid in the prosecution of the war against aggression, 
     and exchange of notes. Signed at Washington June 11, 1942; 
     entered into force June 11, 1942.
       Agreement relating to prisoners of war and civilians 
     liberated by forces operating under Soviet command and forces 
     operating under United States of America command. Signed at 
     Yalta February 11, 1945; entered into force February 11, 
     1945.
       Consular convention. Signed at Moscow June 1, 1964; entered 
     into force July 13, 1968.
       Agreement on the reciprocal allocation for use free of 
     charge of plots of land in Moscow and Washington with annexes 
     and exchanges of notes. Signed at Moscow May 16, 1969; 
     entered into force May 16, 1969.
       Agreement on the prevention of incidents on and over the 
     high seas. Signed at Moscow May 25, 1972; entered into force 
     May 25, 1972.
       Agreement regarding settlement of lend-lease, reciprocal 
     aid and claims. Signed at Washington October 18, 1972; 
     entered into force October 18, 1972.
       Protocol to the agreement of May 25, 1972 on the prevention 
     of incidents on and over the high seas. Signed at Washington 
     May 22, 1973; entered into force May 22, 1973.
       Convention on matters of taxation, with related letters. 
     Signed at Washington June 20, 1973; entered into force 
     January 29, 1976; effective January 1, 1976.
       Agreement on cooperation in artificial heart research and 
     development. signed at Moscow June 28, 1974; entered into 
     force June 28, 1974.
       Agreement relating to the reciprocal issuance of multiple 
     entry and exit visas to American and Soviet correspondents. 
     Exchange of notes at Moscow September 29, 1975; entered into 
     force September 29, 1975.
       Agreement concerning dates for use of land for, and 
     construction of, embassy complexes in Moscow and Washington. 
     Exchange of notes at Moscow March 20, 1977, entered into 
     force March 30, 1977.
       Agreement relating to privileges and immunities of all 
     members of the Soviet and American embassies and their 
     families, with agreed minute. Exchange of notes at Washington 
     December 14, 1978; entered into force December 14, 1978; 
     effective December 29, 1978.
       Memorandum of understanding regarding marine cargo 
     insurance. Signed at London April 5, 1979; entered into force 
     April 5, 1979.
       The Agreement supplementary to the 1966 Civil Air Transport 
     Agreement, as amended by the Agreement of February 13, 1986. 
     Signed at Washington November 4, 1966; entered into force 
     November 4, 1966.
       Agreement relating to immunity of family members of 
     consular officers and employees form criminal jurisdiction. 
     Exchange of notes at Washington October 31, 1986; entered 
     into force October 31, 1986.
       Agreement concerning the confidentiality of data on deep 
     seabed areas, with related exchange of letters. Exchange of 
     notes at Moscow December 5, 1986; entered into force December 
     5, 1986.
       Agreement relating to the agreement of August 14, 1987 on 
     the resolution of practical problems with respect to deep 
     seabed mining areas. Exchange of notes at Moscow August 14, 
     1987; entered into force August 14, 1987.
       Declaration on international guarantees (Afghanistan 
     Settlement Agreement). Signed at Geneva April 14, 1988; 
     entered into force May 15, 1988.
       Agreement on cooperation in transportation science and 
     technology, with annexes. Signed at Moscow May 31, 1988; 
     entered into force May 31, 1988.
       Memorandum of understanding on cooperation to combat 
     illegal narcotics trafficking. Signed at Paris January 8, 
     1989; entered into force January 8, 1989.
       Agreement on the prevention of dangerous military 
     activities, with annexes and agreed statements. Signed at 
     Moscow June 12, 1989; entered into force January 1, 1990.
       Agreement on a mutual understanding on cooperation in the 
     struggle against the illicit traffic in narcotics. Signed at 
     Washington January 31, 1990; entered into force January 31, 
     1990.

[[Page S4463]]

       Civil Air Transport Agreement, with annexes. Signed at 
     Washington June 1, 1990; entered into force June 1, 1990.
       Agreement regarding settlement of lend-lease accounts. 
     Exchange of letters at Washington June 1, 1990; entered into 
     force June 1, 1990.
       Agreement on cooperation on ocean studies, with annexes. 
     Signed at Washington June 1, 1990; entered into force June 1, 
     1990.
       Agreement on expansion of undergraduate exchanges. Signed 
     at Washington June 1, 1990; entered into force June 1, 1990.
       Agreement on scientific and technical cooperation in the 
     field of peaceful uses of atomic energy, with annex. Signed 
     at Washington June 1, 1990; entered into force June 1, 1990.
       Memorandum of cooperation in the fields of environmental 
     restoration and waste management. Signed at Vienna September 
     18, 1990; entered into force September 18, 1990.
       Memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the physical, 
     chemical and engineering sciences. Signed at Moscow May 13, 
     1991; entered into force May 13, 1991.
       Memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the mapping 
     sciences, with annexes. Signed at Moscow May 14, 1991; 
     entered into force May 14, 1991.
       Memorandum of cooperation in the field of magnetic 
     confinement fusion. Signed at Moscow July 5, 1991; entered 
     into force July 5, 1991.
       Memorandum of understanding on cooperation in natural and 
     man-made emergency prevention and response. Signed at Moscow 
     July 30, 1991; entered into force July 30, 1991.
       Memorandum of understanding on cooperation in housing and 
     economic development. Signed at Moscow July 30, 1991; entered 
     into force July 30, 1991.
       Agreement on emergency medical supplies and related 
     assistance. Signed at Moscow July 30, 1991; entered into 
     force July 30, 1991.

  Mr. LEVIN. If the logic of condition 9 were extended to Ukraine, all 
those 35 treaties would be in limbo until we ratified the succession of 
the treaties. And this list of treaties is just one case of the 12 
successor states to the former Soviet Union. Condition 9 could cast 
into doubt the effect of all of those treaties for all of those states.
  I think the aim here, while it is aimed at ABM, does not hit ABM 
because our ABM Treaty is not touched by this condition. Our treaty 
relative to ABM, with Russia, is not affected by condition 9. Condition 
9 does not refer to Russia. It is the other states that it refers to. 
So our ABM Treaty with Russia is not affected. It is all the other 
treaties which are undermined, with all the other successor states. It 
is the arms control treaties and the nonarms control treaties which are 
put in jeopardy, left in limbo by the logic of this condition. So, 
while the aim is at the ABM Treaty, it misses that and, instead, hits 
treaties that I believe this body wants to be binding on the successor 
states to the Soviet Union.
  What about the treaty before us, the CFE Treaty? Does this have to be 
ratified with each of the successor states to the Soviet Union? If so, 
we are putting this very treaty in limbo. This very CFE Treaty which we 
are ratifying, by the logic of condition 9, is left in limbo as to the 
other successor states, because there is no ratification of this treaty 
relative to the other states.
  Mr. President, I fail to understand the logic of the supporters of 
condition 9 that appears to say that Russia is a successor state to the 
former Soviet Union but the other states of the former Soviet Union can 
only become successor states if the Senate ratifies that action. If the 
Senate must ratify the succession of one state, then logically it 
should ratify the succession of all. Thus this condition would cast 
into doubt the continuing validity of Russia's obligations under the 
numerous treaties that the United States had entered into with the 
Soviet Union but which were not submitted to the Senate for 
ratification subsequent to the breakup of the Soviet Union.
  And it could cast into similar doubt other treaties with other 
countries that have dissolved, such as former Czechoslovakia, or former 
Yugoslavia, where the Senate has not ratified the succession of states 
to those treaties.
  We should also consider the impact of condition 9 on other arms 
control agreements which successor states to the former Soviet Union 
have joined. Since we are considering the resolution of ratification 
for the CFE Flank Agreement, let us start with the underlying CFE 
Treaty. It was ratified by the Senate in November 1991, prior to the 
accession of successor states based on the Oslo document in June of 
1992. In other words, it was after the Senate voted for ratification of 
the CFE Treaty that the former successor states agreed on the 
arrangement for joining the CFE Treaty.
  The precedent that condition 9 would set would, if followed in other 
cases, call into question whether those states are considered members 
of and bound by the CFE Treaty until the Senate votes on their 
succession to the treaty.
  There is also the case of the intermediate-range nuclear forces, or 
INF, Treaty signed between the United States and USSR. When the Soviet 
Union dissolved into 12 successor states, 6 of those states had INF 
facilities on their soil while the other 6 did not. All twelve are 
successors to the INF Treaty, with six having obligations related to 
their INF facilities and the other six having the obligation not to 
have such facilities or INF missiles.
  The logic of condition 9 would suggest that the successor states are 
not parties to, or bound by, the INF Treaty unless and until the Senate 
provides its advice and consent to their accession. I cannot imagine 
any Member of the Senate wanting to cast doubt on the obligation of 
these states to comply with the INF Treaty, but that is what condition 
9 does when its logic extended to other treaties.
  In a June 11, 1996, letter, then-Secretary of Defense William Perry 
explained the Defense Department's concerns with a proposed provision 
of law that was essentially the same as condition 9:

       . . . this section runs counter to the successful U.S. 
     policy of involving within the framework of strategic 
     stability all states which emerged from the former Soviet 
     Union with nuclear weapons on their territory. Moreover, 
     Russia, Belarus, Kazakstan, and Ukraine perceive a clear link 
     between their participation in the START and INF Treaties and 
     the ABM Treaty. Casting doubt on their ability to be equal 
     partners in the ABM Treaty could poison our overall 
     relationship with these states and needlessly jeopardize 
     their compliance with their denuclearization obligations 
     under START I.

  The logic of condition 9, when extended to other treaties, could well 
lead the successor states to the former Soviet Union to reconsider 
whether they are bound by these treaties as well as the ABM Treaty. 
Such a move would be decidedly against our security interests.
  I should point out, Mr. President, that the Congress itself urged the 
President to discuss ABM Treaty issues ``with Russia and other 
successor states of the former Soviet Union'' in the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994. At that time there was no 
question that there were other successor states to the former Soviet 
Union with whom we would want to discuss possible changes to the ABM 
Treaty. Section 232(c) of that Act states:

       Congress urges the President to pursue immediate 
     discussions with Russia and other successor states of the 
     former Soviet Union, as appropriate, on the feasibility of, 
     and mutual interest in, amendments to the ABM Treaty to 
     permit--
       clarification of the distinctions for the purposes for the 
     purposes of the ABM Treaty between theater missile defenses 
     and anti-ballistic missile defenses . . .

  I find it strange that the Senate, after urging the President to 
discuss the ABM Treaty with Russia and other successor states to the 
former Soviet Union on demarcation, now would call into question 
whether there are other successor states to the ABM Treaty without a 
Senate ratification.
  If a treaty must be submitted to the Senate for ratification of 
successors to the former Soviet Union, or other countries, before it is 
binding, then hundreds of our treaty commitments are in doubt. All of 
this is because opponents of the ABM Treaty are trying to maim or kill 
this one treaty.
  Additionally, we should consider the impact of accepting condition 9 
on other parliaments in other nations that may take this signal as an 
invitation for them to reconsider their nation's treaty commitments. I 
find it ironic that on an act of treaty ratification the Senate is on 
the verge of creating a potential international treaty uncertainty.
  There is no need for the Senate to drag in the ABM Treaty issue on 
the CFE Flank Agreement resolution of ratification. The Senate will 
have ample opportunity to debate the ABM Treaty when the administration 
submits the ABM demarcation agreement to the Senate, as they have 
committed to do. But this is neither the time nor the vehicle to try to 
decide this issue.
  Furthermore, this issue of the memorandum of understanding on 
successor

[[Page S4464]]

states to the ABM Treaty is already connected to Senate consideration 
on the demarcation agreement. The text of the demarcation agreement 
states that the MOU on successor states will not go into effect until 
the Agreed Statement on Demarcation goes into effect. So in effect, the 
MOU cannot take effect until the Senate votes on the demarcation 
agreement. Consequently there is no need for this condition and it 
should not be included in this resolution of ratification.
  Mr. President, thankfully, condition 9 is limited to the memorandum 
of understanding concerning successor states to the ABM Treaty. It is 
my fervent hope and expectation that the President will make clear in 
his signing statement for the CFE Flank Agreement that this 
extraordinary action is not a precedent. In that way he can limit the 
damage that could otherwise flow from this unwise condition.
  Mr. President, I am pleased that condition 5(f) dealing with 
potential violations of the CFE Treaty in the Caucasus region has been 
modified. I would have much preferred that it not make any reference to 
any particular country.
  More importantly, I am very concerned with the word ``secessionist'' 
in condition 5(f). The situation in this troubled area has a long and 
unfortunate history, and I am disturbed that this condition would seek 
to so characterize a conflict there.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I am pleased the administration has 
decided not to contest condition 9 in the resolution of ratification 
now before the Senate. That condition makes the advice and consent of 
the Senate a condition precedent to the addition of parties to the 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
  Any agreement between the administration and the Government of Russia 
or other states that were part of the Soviet Union which purports to 
enlarge the ABM Treaty by adding new parties must be submitted to the 
United States Senate and a resolution of ratification approved by the 
Senate before it will have the force and effect of law.
  There are important reasons why it is necessary for the Senate to 
insist on its constitutional role in treaty making in this resolution. 
The administration has announced its intent not to submit a memorandum 
of understanding on succession to the Senate for advice and consent to 
ratification, and it purports to transform the ABM Treaty from a 
bilateral agreement into a multilateral accord.
  The addition of new parties to the ABM Treaty clearly would have 
serious national security implications for the United States. It would 
make it much more difficult and time consuming to negotiate other 
changes in the treaty that may be considered necessary in the future to 
protect our security interests.
  Unless the Senate insists on fulfilling its advice and consent 
responsibilities with respect to the ABM Treaty, there may be a 
mistaken view taken by the administration that a demarcation amendment 
being negotiated now with Russia could likewise be the subject of an 
executive agreement without the benefit of Senate ratification.
  I am concerned that by our inaction the Senate could be forfeiting 
its constitutional role in the making of treaties. It should be clear 
that no treaty or material change in a treaty can be entered into by 
our government without the consent of the Senate. That is what the 
Constitution says, and that is what condition 9 says, and that is what 
the Senate says today as it provides advice and consent to ratification 
of the amendments to the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty.
  Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, I rise today to express my support for 
both the resolution of ratification to the Conventional Forces in 
Europe Treaty flank agreement, and, more importantly, the manager's 
amendment to condition 5 regarding compliance with the treaty by member 
states in the Caucasus region. True, the manager's amendment does not 
change the original language to the extent that I would desire, but I 
do wish to thank Senator Helms and the staff of the Foreign Relations 
Committee for being so open to my ideas and engaging in very full 
negotiations. I also wish to thank Senators McConnell, Kerry, and 
Sarbanes for providing such critical leadership on this issue.
  Mr. President, it is indeed important that the United States respond 
forthrightly to violations of the CFE Treaty. And considering this 
deals with numerical limits on military equipment, the degree of 
alleged violations is also important. But in executing such diligence, 
I hope we do not assume too quickly that all alleged violations are, in 
fact, true. That is why I applaud the inclusion of the request for a 
report on alleged violations, to ensure that the United States does not 
blindly enter a treaty which others may disregard.
  But in requesting such reports, we must also be mindful of the impact 
our actions may have upon the delicate fabric of ongoing negotiations 
to which the United States is party. Specifically, Mr. President, I 
refer to the OSCE negotiations, to which the United States is co-
chairman, regarding the future status of the Nagorno-Karabakh region. 
To single out one nation for alleged violations, in this case Armenia, 
without taking into account the full geo-political environment under 
which that nation's government must operate, may subvert the very 
process we think has been violated. Better, in my opinion, to err by 
requesting too much information than not enough, and take into account 
the region as a whole, and all the players in the current dispute. To 
ensure we do not upend this ongoing process of peaceful resolution, we 
should minimize giving credence to unverified allegations and cast as 
wide a net as possible in requesting additional analysis.
  Mr. President, Armenia has had a tough go of it in its short period 
of independence. It is landlocked, its ethnic population is 
geographically divided, and it has suffered egregiously in the past 
from the crimes of others who condemned them simply because of their 
heritage. Add on top of that a 70-year legacy of abuse and political 
game playing by the Soviet Union, and it is understandable that Armenia 
may find itself hard-pressed to execute the policies that we Americans 
would like to see in a perfect world. But it is not a perfect world, 
and sometimes we must understand the realities of a situation, and make 
the best of it.
  Therefore, Mr. President, I appreciate the willingness of the Foreign 
Relations Committee chairman to work with me on making condition 5 more 
inclusive of all potential threats to U.S. interests and the treaty's 
viability. By taking a more evenhanded approach, hopefully no party to 
the current negotiations will feel slighted. And, Mr. President, they 
should not feel slighted at this point in the process. This condition 
is meant to address violations to the CFE Treaty, not express an 
opinion on the legitimacy of any party's negotiating position. Any 
other interpretation is, in my opinion, a misunderstanding of the 
condition's intent. Further, I do not believe that this will, or 
should, be interpreted in any manner that would impugn the ability of 
the United States to continue as co-chair to the OSCE negotiations. The 
United States has energetically taken on this mantle of leadership, and 
I reaffirm my support for this process.
  Mr. President, both the viability of the CFE Treaty, and the 
continued good-faith negotiations regarding the future status of 
Nagorno-Karabakh are important United States interests. We can, and 
must, work toward the success of both. I thank the chairman of the 
Foreign Relations Committee for his leadership in these areas, and the 
assistance of Senators Kerry and Sarbanes in bringing about this 
amendment which I have cosponsored.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today to address Senate 
consideration of the CFE Flank Agreement.
  The Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty [CFE] entered into in 1990 
is an outstanding arms control achievement, requiring the destruction 
of over 50,000 items of heavy weaponry, including tanks, armored 
personnel carriers, artillery pieces, and attack helicopters. The CFE 
has helped to make the Europe of 1997 a far safer place than the Europe 
of even just a few years ago, and in doing so has served American 
national security interests well.
  The implementation of CFE helps guarantee that a destabilizing 
concentration of military equipment--or a massed military attack in 
central Europe of the kind that has dominated strategic thinking in 
Europe through two World Wars and a cold war--will

[[Page S4465]]

now be next to impossible for any nation or group of nations to 
achieve.
  But, as the flank agreement underscores, the treaty negotiated 
between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in 1990 is not adequate to the 
realities of the new European security environment.
  To begin with, the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact no longer exist. 
There are now Soviet successor states in the Baltics and the 
Transcaucasus--the flank zones--with very different security and 
political concerns. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the 
Transcaucasus have been a region of almost singular instability. Russia 
and the Ukraine, likewise, have different security orientations than 
did the Soviet Union, as do the states of both central and western 
Europe. NATO is undergoing a searching debate about the possibility of 
enlargement. The Europe that the CFE must be relevant to in 1997 is 
radically different than the Europe of 1990.
  Thus, in ways unanticipated by its original negotiators, the issues 
raised by the flank agreement touch on some of the most central and the 
most sensitive security issues of the new European security 
environment.
  The history of the Transcaucasus since the breakup of the Soviet 
Union have served as a grim reminder of the deadly subtleties of 
rapidly changing regional geography. Civil war and ethnic strife has 
been the rule, not the exception, in Nagorno-Karabagh, Osettia, 
Abkhazia, Georgia, and, of course, Chechnya.
  Stabilizing the military balance in the Transcaucasus and inculcating 
confidence and security building measures, as the CFE Treaty does, is 
critical for peace in the region.
  Although not racked with the violence that has characterized the 
Transcaucasus, the security concerns of the Baltic States in the 
northern flank zone will prove to be central to future stability in 
Europe, and the limits placed on threatening conventional weapons by 
the CFE Treaty is a critical part of the security architecture of the 
Baltics.
  Likewise, the flank agreement also touches upon the sensitive topic 
of Russian-Ukrainian ties, and the political and security relationship 
between the two, and it addresses the role of Turkey between Europe, 
the Middle East, and central Asia.
  Last, the flank agreement has profound implications for Russian 
nationalist sentiment, and may well have an impact on the future of 
Russian domestic political development, and the dynamics of those 
domestic factors which may influence either a cooperative or 
confrontational Russian foreign policy.
  In this sense, the flank agreement is also critical issue for the 
debate over NATO enlargement that is just now beginning to come to a 
simmer. In structuring the balance of forces between NATO and Russia, 
the CFE and the flank agreement--what it says as well as how it is 
implemented--will be at the heart of Russian perceptions and 
assessments regarding the potential of an enlarged NATO.
  In short, the CFE will play a central role in determining the future 
course of peace and stability in Europe.
  Notwithstanding the positive contributions of the CFE to U.S. 
national security interests--and it is a treaty which I will be voting 
for--I feel that I would be remiss in my duty as a Senator if I did not 
also point out some general concerns that I have with the flank 
agreement, as well as some specific concerns I have with the resolution 
of ratification for this treaty as it was voted out of the Foreign 
Relations Committee last week.

  As I made clear in the Foreign Relations Committee hearing, I found 
the way in which the flank agreement was negotiated--opening up an 
already negotiated treaty for revision because of the reticence of one 
party to live up to its commitments--deeply troubling.
  Although I would agree with those who argue that it is necessary to 
revisit international agreements when there has been a material change 
in circumstances--and few would argue that the breakup of the Soviet 
Union does not count on this score--treaties, by their very nature, are 
only worthwhile if they are binding the minute they are signed.
  The post-cold-war world may very well be more turbulent and fluid 
than the world which we are used to, but I hope that the way in which 
the flank agreement was opened for renegotiation--with one party not in 
compliance with a treaty which they had signed--does not set a 
precedent which will call into question other treaties which, after the 
fact, a state may wish to change.
  I think that it is important for the Senate to go on the record in 
support of the binding nature of the treaty obligations which we and 
other states enter into--obligations which should be opened for 
renegotiation in only the most extreme of cases--even as we give our 
support to this agreement.
  Second, in changing the CFE flank equipment ceilings to meet Russian 
security concerns, we must be careful to make sure that we have not 
increased the insecurity felt by other states in or bordering the flank 
zone.
  In its original conception, the CFE Treaty was intended to make 
Europe safe from the dangers of a big war between East and West. I 
think that there is general agreement that CFE has been and will 
continue to be effective in this respect.
  But the CFE Treaty, as revised, must not become part of a European 
security architecture in which Europe is made safe for little wars, 
between the large and the small, or as a tool for intimidation used by 
the strong against the weak.
  If such a situation were to result from the flank agreement 
revisions, Europe would be less stable and secure, not more.
  Third, as several of my colleagues have already pointed out, the 
inclusion of condition 9 regarding Senate advice and consent for the 
multilateralization of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty is, I think, 
unwarranted and unwise.
  It is unwarranted because the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty is not 
connected in any way with the CFE. It is unwise because it calls into 
question whether the United States may attempt to reopen or 
substantively change a treaty because some now perceive that it is in 
our interests to do so.
  There was an attempt to get this same language regarding the ABM 
inserted into last year's defense authorization bill. That effort 
failed. On its own, the Senate has already rejected this language. Now 
there is an attempt to resurrect this language and attach it to this 
treaty. The consideration of treaties is one of the highest 
responsibilities of the Senate, and I am disappointed that some of my 
colleagues have chosen to place petty politics above the interests of 
U.S. national security.
  The ABM Treaty is the diplomatic foundation of our intercontinental 
ballistic missile reduction strategy. It was possible to negotiate and 
ratify the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or START, and negotiate 
START II because of the strategic groundwork laid in the ABM Treaty. 
Abandoning or violating the ABM Treaty would threaten the strategic 
ballistic missile reductions under these two treaties, which, when 
implemented, would verifiably eliminate the intercontinental ballistic 
missiles carrying two-thirds of Russia's nuclear warheads.
  I would have preferred to have had the opportunity to eliminate this 
condition from the final resolution of ratification, but, 
unfortunately, it does not appear that we will have this opportunity.
  In addition to these general concerns, I also have one specific 
concern with the resolution of ratification for this treaty as it was 
voted out of committee last week, which I hope that we will have an 
opportunity to change.
  I am concerned that condition 5 (F) of section 2 unfairly singles out 
Armenia for a report on compliance with the CFE Treaty. In so doing, 
this condition makes the treaty weaker, and less effective in 
guaranteeing U.S. security interests in Europe, not more.
  Although some of my Armenian friends might not want me to say this, I 
do believe that there should be a report on Armenia's compliance with 
the treaty. There have been some troubling questions raised in the 
press and in our committee discussions regarding Armenian 
transshipments of arms from Russia, and whether Armenia is in violation 
of certain provisions of the CFE.
  As I noted previously, this is a very sensitive part of the globe, 
and one in which even a relatively small amount of heavy weaponry can 
have tremendous impact on the balance of power. If

[[Page S4466]]

Armenia is in violation of the treaty, then appropriate measures should 
be taken.
  However, it is precisely the volatile nature of this region that 
dictates that U.S. national security interests demand that we seek 
compliance reports on the other states in the region as well. There are 
questions regarding Azerbaijan's compliance with the CFE's Treaty 
Limited Equipment (TLE) limits, for example, and recent experience with 
civil war and ethnic strife in Georgia, Osettia, Chechnya, Abkhazia, 
and elsewhere in the region all suggest that a condition calling for 
region-wide compliance reports would be in order.
  Indeed stigmatizing and isolating Armenia in this fashion may well 
prove to be counterproductive. If the CFE Treaty is perceived as a tool 
of one side or another in an already tense and volatile region, it will 
have the effect of destroying confidence, not building it, and will 
contribute to an atmosphere where the states of the region may seek to 
build their armed forces, not lessen them.
  This would be a grave mistake, and that is why I believe that 
condition 5 (F) must be changed to call for compliance reports for the 
other countries in the Transcaucasus as well. I urge my colleagues to 
support the amendment offered to make just these changes when we vote 
on this issue.
  Even with these reservations, however, I find that the treaty merits 
support. The CFE, with the revised flank agreement, provides an 
invaluable tool for stabilizing European security and lessening 
regional tension. I would urge all of my colleagues to join me in 
voting in favor of this treaty.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I voted in committee to support the CFE 
Flank Document and the accompanying resolution of ratification that was 
reported favorably by the Committee on Foreign Relations last week.
  Let me review a few of the issues that commanded committee concern.


   The Flank Document and Relations Between Russia and Former Soviet 
                                 States

  During committee consideration of the CFE Flank Document, members on 
both sides of the aisle voiced concern over United States willingness 
to serve as an intermediary in negotiations between Russia and other 
former Soviet states to secure permission for temporary Russian troop 
deployments on their soil or for revision of the Russian treaty-limited 
equipment quotas set in the 1992 Tashkent Agreement. Paragraphs 2 and 3 
of section IV of the Flank Document restate Russia's right to seek such 
permission ``by means of free negotiations and with full respect for 
the sovereignty of the States Parties involved''. A United States note 
passed to the Russians, according to Undersecretary of State Lynn 
Davis, said that the United States was ``prepared to facilitate or act 
as an intermediary for a successful outcome in'' such negotiations. 
United States officials state that Washington's offer to serve as an 
intermediary between Russia and other Tashkent Agreement signatories 
was for the purpose of leveling the playing field between Russia and 
smaller countries.
  Many of the conditions in the resolution of ratification seek to bind 
the executive branch to its asserted purpose.