[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 56 (Monday, May 5, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3964-S3967]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Ms. SNOWE:
  S. 694. A bill to establish reform criteria to permit payment of U.S. 
arrearages in assessed contributions to the United Nations; to the 
Committee on Foreign Relations.
  S. 695. A bill to restrict intelligence sharing with the United 
Nations: to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
  S. 696. A bill to establish limitations on the use of funds for U.N. 
peacekeeping activities; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.


                   UNITED NATIONS REFORM LEGISLATION

  Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, today I am introducing a package of three 
bills which address the most critical issues affecting our relations 
with the United Nations. These are the U.S. arrearage in financial 
contributions to the United Nations, the sharing of U.S. intelligence 
with the United Nations, and U.S. contributions to U.N. peacekeeping 
activities.

  The United Nations Reform Act of 1997 is a bill that I have been 
working on for over a year in my former capacity as chair of the 
Foreign Relations Subcommittee on International Operations. With the 
United Nations now entering its second half-century, the question being 
raised is not whether the United Nations can continue its growth for 
another 50 years, but whether it can survive as an important 
international institution for the next 5.
  With a new Secretary of State who formerly served as U.N. Ambassador, 
with a new U.N. Ambassador who formerly served as a respected Member of 
Congress, and with a new U.N. Secretary General, I believe that we have 
a unique opportunity over the next 2 years to genuinely restore a 
bipartisan consensus on the United Nations within Congress and among 
the American people. That is the intent of this legislation, which sets 
reasonable and achievable reform criteria for the United Nations, 
linked to a 5-year repayment plan for the nearly $1 billion in

[[Page S3965]]

arrearages that have built up in the U.N. system over the past few 
years.
  The plan would set up a five-step annual process under which the 
President would each year have to certify that specific reform 
guideposts have been met at the United Nations, permitting the payment 
each year of one-fifth of outstanding U.S. arrearages.
  In the first year, the President would have to certify that a hard 
freeze zero nominal growth budget at the United Nations had been 
maintained and that budgetary transparency at the world body had been 
enhanced through opening up the United Nations to member State auditing 
and fully funding the new U.N. inspector general office.
  In the second year, the President would have to certify that U.S. 
representation had been restored to a key U.N. budgetary oversight 
body, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions 
[ACABQ].
  In the third year, the President would have to certify that a long-
standing U.N. peacekeeping reform goal had been achieved. This reform 
would ensure that the United States receives full credit or 
reimbursement for the very substantial logistical and in-kind support 
our military provides to assessed U.N. peacekeeping missions.
  In the fourth year, the President would have to certify that a 
significant reform in the United Nations' budget process had been 
achieved. This reform would be to divide the U.N. regular budget into 
an assessed core budget and a voluntary program budget. The source of 
much of the United Nations' problems stems from the fact that the 
United Nations' assessed budget is increasingly used for development 
programs and other activities that should not be included in our 
mandatory dues for membership. This reform can be achieved without a 
revision in the U.N. Charter.
  Finally, in the fifth year the President would have to certify that a 
major U.N. consolidation plan has been approved and implemented. This 
plan must entail a significant reduction in staff and an elimination of 
the rampant duplication, overlap, and lack of coordination that exists 
throughout the U.N. system.
  Clearly, there is an urgent need to turn around the United Nations' 
dangerous slide into constant crisis, which could ultimately threaten 
the organization's usefulness as an important tool for addressing world 
problems. I am convinced that this can only be achieved through the 
kind of bold reform agenda that is set forth in this legislation.
  Mr. President, I believe it is useful for us to look back on the 
original purpose of the United Nations, as it was envisioned 51 years 
ago. The United Nations was created from the ashes of World War II, 
with the hope of avoiding future world-wide conflagrations through 
international cooperation. The main focus for this mission was the 
Security Council, the only entity empowered under the U.N. Charter to 
act on the great questions of world peace. The General Assembly was 
intended to be a forum for debate on any issue that any nation wanted 
to bring before the assembled nations of the world. The U.N. 
Secretariat was to be a small professional staff needed to support the 
activities of the Security Council and General Assembly.
  The U.N. system was also to conduct specific activities in technical 
cooperation, such as those undertaken by the International Civil 
Aviation Organization and the International Telecommunications Union. 
Finally, the United Nations was to have an important role in responding 
to international humanitarian crises. Most critical is the work of the 
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, who today protects over 40 million 
of the world's most vulnerable men, women, and children--particularly 
women and children, who comprise 80 percent of the world's refugees.
  Regrettably, the United Nations system that exists today falls short 
of the intentions of its founders. There are two interrelated, 
fundamental problems with U.N. system. One is that there are those who 
attempted to use the world organization to advance agendas that frankly 
do not reflect world realities. The more the United Nations is used to 
transcend what some see as the harsh realities of the world and its 
Nation-State system, the less relevant the United Nations becomes to 
the real world in which we all live.
  Closely related has been the massive and uncoordinated growth of the 
United Nations and its specialized agencies. The U.N. General Assembly 
and its related bodies in the specialized agencies have used the tool 
of the budget to grow the U.N. bureaucracy far beyond what is needed to 
respond to real world problems. The small professional staff of the 
U.N. Secretariat now approaches 18,000--counting the proliferation of 
consultants and contract employees--and the staff of the U.N. system 
worldwide now exceeds 53,000.
  Too many nations simply do not find a compelling need for efficiency 
and budgetary restraint in the U.N. system. Of the U.N.'s 185 member 
nations, a near-majority 91 countries are assessed at the minimum .01 
percent rate, paying essentially nothing toward U.N. budget. The top 
ten assessed countries--United States, Japan, Germany, France, Russia, 
Britain, Italy, Canada, Spain and Brazil--are billed for 78 percent of 
the U.N. budget, with the United States, at 25 percent, paying nearly 
twice that of any other country. In just 10 years of supposed zero-
growth budgets, the U.N.'s budget has doubled. In the last 18 years the 
U.N.'s budget has tripled.

  There are those who argue that all of the U.N.'s problems come from 
the United States. But the United Nation's difficulties with the United 
States arise from these deeply rooted problems within the U.N. 
structure itself. Even many supporters of the United Nations have 
characterized today's U.N. system as bloated, inefficient, duplicative, 
and disorganized. For instance, Canadian businessman and six-time U.N. 
Under-Secretary-General Maurice Strong has stated that the United 
Nations ``could work better than it does today with less than half as 
many people.'' I believe it is significant, and encouraging, that the 
new Secretary General, Mr. Kofi Annan, has appointed Mr. Strong to be 
his top adviser on reform issues.
  The surprising thing is that among serious analysts of the United 
Nations there is remarkable agreement on what needs to be done. The 
U.N. system needs to be significantly reduced in size and needs true 
consolidation among its far-flung, duplicative elements. The budget 
process needs similarly dramatic reform. The United Nations needs to 
concentrate on a few key achievable missions--security, humanitarian 
relief, purely technical cooperation--and refrain from its 
proliferating exercises in internal nation-building and grandiose 
missions of global norm-setting. All of these basic reform needs have 
been addressed in the U.N. reform legislation I am introducing today.
  As complements to my U.N. reform bill, I am also introducing two 
U.N.-related bills which I sponsored in the last Congress. The first 
would protect U.S. intelligence information which is shared with the 
United Nations or any of its affiliated organizations by requiring that 
procedures for protecting intelligence sources and methods are in place 
at the United Nations that are at least as stringent as those 
maintained by countries with which the United States regularly shares 
similar types of information. This requirement may be waived by the 
President for national security purposes but only on a case by case 
basis and only when all possible measures for protecting the 
information have been taken.
  This legislation grew out of my concern about reports of breaches of 
U.S. classified material by the United Nations in 1993, 1994, and in 
1995 when the United Nations pulled out of Somalia. I am pleased to 
note that more attention is being paid by this body to the problems 
that can result when U.S. intelligence information is shared with 
international bodies. Condition 5 of the recently approved resolution 
of ratification for the Chemical Weapons Convention, which protects 
U.S. intelligence shared with the Organization for the Protection of 
Chemical Weapons, was based on my intelligence-sharing legislation.
  To complete the package of three bills, I am introducing today the 
International Peacekeeping Reform Act of 1997 which I also sponsored in 
the 104th Congress. Before any funds can be made available for U.N. 
peacekeeping activities, this legislation requires the President to 
certify to Congress that hostilities have ceased and all parties agree 
to a U.N. peacekeeping role, that

[[Page S3966]]

the percentage of the U.S. assessed share of the total cost of the 
operation does not exceed the percentage of the U.S. assessed share for 
the regular U.N. budget, and that adequate measures have been taken to 
protect U.S. intelligence information provided in support of the 
operation.
  Furthermore, my bill would require that, if the operation is to 
include units of the U.S. Armed Forces to carry out combat missions, 
the President must certify that the operation advances U.S. security 
interests, that U.S. participation is critical to the operation's 
success, that the units will be under the operational command and 
control of the U.S. armed forces, and that the U.S. military personnel 
will be fully protected by the Geneva Convention of 1949 governing the 
treatment of prisoners of war. This legislation requires the President 
to notify Congress of the intent to support an international 
peacekeeping operation at least 15 days before any vote of the United 
Nations Security Council to establish, expand or modify such an 
operation. If the President determines that an emergency exists which 
prevents him from meeting the 15-day advance notice requirement, the 
notice is to be provided in a timely manner, but no later than 48 hours 
after the Security Council vote.

  The three measures I am introducing today will, I believe, go a long 
way toward setting a new course in our relations with the United 
Nations. If we in Congress fail to rise to the challenge; if the U.N. 
attempts to defend an unsustainable status quo; if the Administration's 
new foreign policy team does not reach out to Congress to achieve a 
genuine bipartisan consensus on the need for U.N. reform; if the U.N.'s 
dangerous slide to expensive irrelevance continues, then we will have 
lost a unique opportunity for reform. If this should happen, it is not 
at all clear to me whether such an opportunity will soon return.
  Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to consider the legislation I am 
introducing today as the best course for restoring the bipartisan 
consensus in this country on the United Nations.
  Mr. Prsident, I ask unanimous consent that additional material be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                 S. 694

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``United Nations Reform Act of 
     1997''.

     SEC. 2. PAYMENT OF UNITED STATES ARREARAGES IN ASSESSED 
                   CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS.

       (a) Limitation.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, for each of the fiscal years 1998 through 2002, no funds 
     shall be available for obligation or expenditure to the 
     United Nations for the payment except under procedures of 
     United States assessed contributions to the United Nations 
     more than one year in arrears at the time of passage of this 
     Act under United States Government accounting except under 
     procedures under subsection (b);
       (b) Procedures for the Release of United States Arrearages 
     to the United Nations.--In accordance with procedures 
     applicable to reprogramming notifications under section 34 of 
     the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956, for each 
     fiscal year 1998 through 2002, the President may make 
     available for obligation or expenditure to the United Nations 
     an amount not to exceed 20% of United States assessed 
     contributions to the United Nations more than one year in 
     arrears at the time of passage of this Act under United 
     States Government accounting if on January 31 of each fiscal 
     year 1998 through 2002 the President determines and certifies 
     to the relevant committees of the Congress that the 
     applicable reform criteria for each fiscal year has been met.
       (c) Definitions.--As used in this section:
       (1) Relevant committees of the congress .--The term 
     ``relevant committees of the Congress'' means the Committee 
     on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of 
     the Senate and the Committee on International Relations and 
     the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
     Representatives.
       (2) Applicable reform criteria.--The term ``applicable 
     reform criteria'' means--
       (A) for fiscal year 1998 that the United Nations has 
     maintained a zero nominal growth budget in United States 
     dollar terms and has made all of its programs, offices and 
     activities open to auditing by the national auditing and 
     inspecting agencies of its member states to include, but not 
     be limited to the United States General Accounting Office and 
     the State Department Office of Inspector General, that the 
     United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services has been 
     fully funded at its request level, and that all products of 
     the Office of Internal Oversight Services relevant to United 
     Nations budgetary and administrative matters are available to 
     all United Nations member states;
       (B) for fiscal year 1999 that all criteria for fiscal year 
     1998 continue to be met and that United States representation 
     on the United Nations Advisory Committee on Administrative 
     and Budgetary Questions has been restored;
       (C) for fiscal year 2000 that all criteria for fiscal years 
     1998 and 1999 continue to be met and that procedures for 
     assessing contributions for United Nations peacekeeping 
     activities have been reformed to ensure that for all 
     logistical, in-kind, and non-cash aid provided by the United 
     States to support United Nations assessed peacekeeping 
     activities that the United States either receives from the 
     United Nations cash reimbursement for the full value of such 
     aid or credit toward the payment of assessed contributions 
     for peacekeeping operations;
       (D) for fiscal year 2001 that all criteria for fiscal years 
     1998 through 2000 continue to be met and that the United 
     Nations has divided its regular budget into a small ``core'' 
     assessed budget representing only those activities determined 
     by the General Accounting Office to be necessary for the 
     United Nations to maintain its existence under the terms of 
     the United Nations Charter and a voluntary ``program'' budget 
     that would include all United Nations programs, developmental 
     activities, regional activities, economic and social 
     activities, and related staff; and
       (E) for fiscal year 2002 that all criteria for fiscal years 
     1998 through 2001 continue to be met and that the United 
     Nations has approved and implemented systemwide structural 
     reform, entailing a significant reduction in staff, that 
     would eliminate all outdated activities and program 
     duplication and would encompass all relevant United Nations 
     specialized agencies.
                                                                    ____


                                 S. 695

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. RESTRICTIONS ON INTELLIGENCE SHARING WITH THE 
                   UNITED NATIONS.

       The United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (22 U.S.C. 287 
     et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     section:

     ``SEC. 13. RESTRICTIONS ON INTELLIGENCE SHARING WITH THE 
                   UNITED NATIONS.

       ``(a) Provisions of Intelligence Information to the United 
     Nations.--(1) No United States intelligence information may 
     be provided to the United Nations or any organization 
     affiliated with the United Nations, or to any official or 
     employee thereof, unless the President certifies to the 
     Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on International 
     Relations and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
     of the House of Representatives that the Director of Central 
     Intelligence (in this section referred to as the `DCI'), in 
     consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of 
     Defense, has required, and such organization has established 
     and implemented, procedures for protecting intelligence 
     sources and methods (including protection from release to 
     nations and foreign nationals that are otherwise not eligible 
     to receive such information) no less stringent than 
     procedures maintained by nations with which the United States 
     regularly shares similar types of intelligence information. 
     Such certification shall include a description of the 
     procedures in effect at such organization.
       ``(2) Paragraph (1) may be waived upon written 
     certification by the President to the appropriate committees 
     of Congress that providing such information to the United 
     Nations or an organization affiliated with the United 
     Nations, or to any official or employee thereof, is in the 
     direct national security interest of the United States and 
     that all possible measures protecting such information have 
     been taken, except that such waiver must be made for each 
     instance such information is provided, or for each such 
     document provided.
       (b) Periodic and Special Reports.--(1) The President shall 
     periodically report, but not less frequently than quarterly, 
     to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on 
     International Relations and the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the House of Representatives on the types and 
     volume of intelligence provided to the United Nations and the 
     purposes for which it was provided during the period covered 
     by the report. Such periodic reports shall be submitted to 
     the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the 
     Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives with an annex containing a 
     counterintelligence and security assessment of all risks, 
     including an evaluation of any potential adverse impact on 
     national collection systems, of providing intelligence to the 
     United Nations, together with information on how such risks 
     have been addressed.
       (2) The President shall submit a special report to the 
     Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on International 
     Relations and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
     of the House of Representatives within 15 days after the

[[Page S3967]]

     United States Government becomes aware of any unauthorized 
     disclosure of intelligence provided to the United Nations by 
     the United States.
       ``(c) Limitation.--The restriction of subsection (a) and 
     the requirement for periodic reports under paragraph (1) of 
     subsection (a) shall not apply to the provision of 
     intelligence that is provided only to, and for the use of, 
     appropriately cleared United States Government personnel 
     serving with the United Nations.
       ``(d) Delegation of Duties.--The President may not delegate 
     or assign the duties of the President under Secretary (a).
       ``(e) Relationship to Existing Law.--Nothing in this 
     section shall be construed to--
       ``(1) impair or otherwise affect the authority of the 
     Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence 
     sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure pursuant to 
     section 103(c)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 403-3(c)(5)); or
       ``(2) supersede or otherwise affect the provisions of title 
     V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et 
     seq.).''.
                                                                    ____


                                 S. 696

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``International Peacekeeping 
     Reform Act of 1997''.

     SEC. 2. LIMITATION ON THE USE OF FUNDS FOR UNITED NATIONS 
                   PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES.

       (a) Limitation.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, none of the funds made available to the Department of 
     State under the account ``Contribution for International 
     Peacekeeping Activities'' or any other funds made available 
     to the Department of State under any law to pay for assessed 
     or voluntary contributions to United Nations peacekeeping 
     activities shall be available for obligation or expenditure 
     to the United Nations to establish, expand in size, or modify 
     in mission a United Nations peacekeeping operations unless, 
     with respect to such peacekeeping operation--
       (1) the President submits a certification to the 
     appropriate congressional committees under subsection (c); 
     and
       (2) except as provided in paragraph (b), the President has 
     notified the appropriate congressional committees of the 
     intent to support the establishment of the peacekeeping 
     operation at least 15 days before any vote in the Security 
     Council to establish, expand, or modify such operation. The 
     notification shall include the following:
       (A) A cost assessment of such action (including the total 
     estimated cost and the United States share of such cost).
       (B) Identification of the source of funding for the United 
     States share of the costs of the action (whether in an annual 
     budget request, reprogramming notification, a rescission of 
     funds, a budget amendment, or a supplemental budget request.
       (b) Presidential Determination of Existence of Emergency.--
     If the President determines that an emergency exists which 
     prevented submission of the 15-day advance notification 
     specified in paragraph (a) and that the proposed action is in 
     the direct national security interests of the United States, 
     the notification described in paragraph (a) shall be provided 
     in a timely manner but no later than 48 hours after the vote 
     by the Security Council.
       (C) Certification to Congress.--The President shall 
     determine and certify to the Congress that the United Nations 
     Peacekeeping operation described under paragraph (a) meets 
     the following requirements:
       (1) The operation involves an international conflict in 
     which hostilities have ceased and all significant parties to 
     the conflict agree to the imposition of United Nations 
     peacekeeping forces for the purpose of seeking an enduring 
     solution to the conflict.
       (2) With respect to any assessed contribution to such 
     United Nations peacekeeping activity, the percentage of the 
     United States assessed share for the total cost of the 
     operation is no greater than the percentage of the United 
     States assessed share for the regular United Nations budget.
       (3) In the event that the provision of United States 
     intelligence information involving sources and methods on 
     intelligence gathering is planned to be provided to the 
     United Nations to support the operation, adequate measures 
     have been taken by the United Nations to protect such 
     information.
       (4) With respect to the participation in the operation of 
     units of the United States Armed Forces trained to carry out 
     direct combat missions--
       (A) the operation directly advances United States national 
     security interests,
       (B) the participation of such units is critical to the 
     success of the operation,
       (C) such units will be under the operational command and 
     control of the United States Armed Forces, and
       (D) any member of the United States Armed Forces 
     participating in the operation would have access to the full 
     protection of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment 
     of Prisoners of War (signed at Geneva, August 12, 1949) if 
     captured and held by combatants to other parties to the 
     conflict.
       (d) Definitions.--As used in this section:
       (1) the term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means 
     the Foreign Relations and Appropriations Committees of the 
     Senate and the International Relations and Appropriations 
     Committees of the House of Representatives;
       (2) the term ``adequate measures'' refers to the 
     implementation of procedures for protecting intelligence 
     sources and methods (including protection from release to 
     nations and foreign nationals that are otherwise not eligible 
     to receive such information) no less stringent than 
     procedures maintained by nations with which the United States 
     regularly shares similar types of intelligence information, 
     as determined by the Director of Central Intelligence upon 
     consultation with the Secretary of State and Secretary of 
     Defense; and
       (3) the term ``direct combat'' means engaging an enemy or 
     hostile force with individual or crew-served weapons while 
     being exposed to direct enemy fire, a high probability of 
     direct physical contact with the enemy or hostile force, and 
     a substantial risk of capture.

                          ____________________