[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 55 (Thursday, May 1, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3919-S3926]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                      CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

 Mr. KYL. Mr. President, everyone agrees that ridding the world 
of chemical weapons is a noble and worthy goal to pursue. These are 
weapons that no nation should have in its stockpile--and that includes 
the United States. By law, the U.S. stockpile will be destroyed whether 
or not the Chemical Weapons Convention [CWC] is ever ratified by the 
Senate. Opponents of the Convention support that action.
  Notwithstanding agreement on the goals of the CWC, we do not believe 
that this treaty can ever achieve the goals. It will not accomplish its 
objective of being global, verifiable, and effective ban on these 
weapons. Moreover, because of deficiencies in the treaty--which, by its 
terms, adopting parties must ratify wholesale without amendment--we 
believe the United States is better off without the CWC than with it. 
As a result, we could not support ratification absent certain 
certifications by the President prior to deposit of our instrument of 
ratification.
  Faced with the fact that the treaty is largely unverifiable, some 
ratification supporters argue that no treaty is 100 percent verifiable, 
and that, while not perfect, the CWC is better than nothing, especially 
since chemical weapons are so morally objectionable. Proponents further 
assert that the CWC is needed because it establishes an international 
norm that stigmatizes these weapons; that the CWC will bring us some 
intelligence we do not now have regarding the possession and 
manufacture of these weapons; and that it will provide trade benefits 
to U.S. chemical companies. Finally, they argue that we need to be a 
party to the treaty to protect our interests as details of 
implementation are worked out by the various parties.
  For the sake of argument, even assuming that these relatively modest 
benefits claimed for the treaty would in fact materialize, we believe 
these claimed benefits do not outweigh the costs.
  Opponents are convinced that the costs of ratifying the CWC outweigh 
the advanced benefits in several important respects, including the 
following: First, it would create a United Nations-style bureaucracy, 
25 percent of the cost of which must be paid for by U.S. taxpayers. 
Second, it would put American businesses under a financially 
burdensome, security-compromising, and quite possibly unconstitutional 
inspection regime. Third, it would exacerbate the chemical threat we 
face by undermining existing multilateral trade restrictions, 
sanctions, and embargoes the United States has placed on rogue 
countries like Iran and Cuba. Fourth, it would require information 
sharing that signatory nations, if so inclined, could use to advance 
their chemical weapons programs. Fifth, the convention would give the 
Nation with the largest CW stockpile--Russia--an excuse to abrogate the 
Bilateral Destruction Agreement [BDA] it entered into with the United 
States to destroy chemical weapons. And this is not hypothetical 
speculation--there are growing indications Russia does not intend to 
comply with the BDA, which is much more restrictive than the CWC. 
Sixth, the prospect of ratification would create--there are already 
signs that it is creating--a false sense of security that encourages 
the United States to let its guard down on defending against the use of 
chemical weapons against American troops. Seventh, it degrades the 
value of treaties and moral statements because all nations understand 
it is unenforceable.

  The CWC represents hope over reality. It makes people feel good to 
say they have done something about a class of weapons we all abhor. But 
signing this piece of paper is not going to solve the problem--and 
that's the problem. Hard problems can't be wished away with naive hopes 
and tough talk in the form of yet another international agreement, no 
matter how many other nations have signed on.
  If the United States is to make a unique moral statement as 
proponents urge, we shouldn't be stampeded into ratifying this treaty 
``because other nations have.'' The United States passed on joining the 
League of Nations even though, as with the CWC, it had promoted the 
League in the beginning and many other nations had decided to join it. 
Too often the international community has pronounced itself greatly 
pleased at solving the latest crisis with yet another treaty like the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 which outlawed war as an instrument of 
national policy. And too often, as here, disappointment has followed 
because of the disconnect between the good intentions and the hard 
reality. To the argument that we will look bad because it was our idea 
in the first place, opponents say that real respect is rooted in 
responsible, honest positions; and that U.S. leadership in taking a 
different approach will be rewarded in the long term.
  It is not possible to ban the manufacture and possession of chemical 
weapons, and we should not delude ourselves into thinking it is 
possible. What we can do is back up our demand that no one use chemical 
weapons, with international cooperation based on the will to punish 
violators so severely that use is deterred. That too is not easy; but, 
as the use of nuclear weapons has been deterred, so too can the use of 
chemical weapons be deterred if we have the will.


                         THE CWC IS NOT GLOBAL

  The original goal of the CWC was that it would ban the manufacture 
and use of chemical weapons by all the nations of the world. 
Unfortunately, the countries with chemical weapons that we are most 
concerned about--Iraq, Libya, Syria, and North Korea--have not yet 
signed the CWC, let alone ratified it. Pakistan, Iran, and Russia also 
have chemical weapons programs; while they have signed the agreement, 
they may not ratify. So, the nations that pose the most serious threat 
may never fall under the CWC's strictures.

  Nor is the CWC global in terms of the chemical substances it covers. 
While it prohibits the possession of many dangerous chemicals, two that 
it does not prohibit were employed with deadly effect in World War I: 
phosgene and hydrogen cyanide. But they are too widely used for 
commercial purposes to be banned, which speaks volumes about this 
treaty's impracticality.
  Nor does the CWC control as many dangerous chemicals as does an 
export control regime currently employed by 29 industrialized 
countries. The Australia Group regime already controls trade in 54 
chemicals that could be used to develop chemical weapons. Of the 54 
chemicals subject to the Group's export controls, 20 are not covered by

[[Page S3920]]

the CWC. That list of 20 includes potassium fluoride, hydrogen 
fluoride, potassium cyanide, and sodium cyanide, all used in making 
chemical weapons.
  Finally, there are news reports that Russia has produced a new class 
of binary nerve agents many times more lethal than any other known 
chemical agents. These agents are reportedly made from chemicals used 
for industrial and agricultural purposes and are not covered by the 
CWC. In February 1997, the Washington Times disclosed that under this 
program, ``the Russians could already produce pilot plant quantities of 
55 to 110 tons annually of two new nerve agents--A-232 and A-234. These 
agents can also reportedly be made from different chemical formulations 
allowing the agents to be produced in different types of facilities, 
depending on the raw material and equipment available. For example, one 
version of an agent can be produced using a common industrial solvent--
acetonitrile--and an organic phosphate compound that can be disguised 
as a pesticide precursor. In another version, soldiers need only add 
alcohol to a premixed solution to form the final CW agent.


                       THE CWC IS NOT VERIFIABLE

  The second original goal of the convention was that it was to be 
verifiable. CWC negotiators in Geneva were told by then-Vice President 
George Bush on April 18, 1984:

       For a chemical weapons ban to work, each party must have 
     confidence that the other parties are abiding by it. . . . No 
     sensible government enters into those international contracts 
     known as treaties unless it can ascertain--or verify--that it 
     is getting what it contracted for.

  As it turns out, however, the treaty fails to achieve this primary 
objective as well. A recently declassified portion of an August 1993 
National Intelligence Estimate reads:

       The capability of the intelligence community to monitor 
     compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention is severely 
     limited and likely to remain so for the rest of the decade. 
     The key provision of the monitoring regime--challenge 
     inspections at undeclared sites--can be thwarted by a nation 
     determined to preserve a small, secret program using the 
     delays and managed access rules allowed by the Convention.

  Former Director of the CIA, James Woolsey, said in testimony two 
years ago before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that:

       The chemical weapons problem is so difficult from an 
     intelligence perspective, that I cannot state that we have 
     high confidence in our ability to detect noncompliance, 
     especially on a small scale.

  The problem, of course, is that manufacture of the ingredients used 
in chemical weapons is so common, so universal, and so easy that the 
obstacles to verification are enormous. Processes involved in the 
production of pesticides, for example, are strikingly similar to the 
processes used to develop weapons like mustard gas. According to a 
January 1992 report by a team of analysts led by Kathleen Bailey of the 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

       Countries which have organophosphorus pesticide plants 
     could convert or divert production toward weapons material 
     without major effort. . . . Competent chemical engineers with 
     diversified experience could design equipment capable of 
     meeting minimum operating objectives. . . . Only a few 
     thousand dollars would be needed for piping and seals, 
     several hundred thousand dollars [would be needed] for 
     specialized equipment.

  Not only that, but different processes can be used to produce the 
same agent. Nations wishing to conceal the development of chemical 
agents can employ multiple processes. Therefore, unearthing a covert 
program under the CWC's provisions will be nearly impossible. It just 
doesn't take much money, much time, much space, or much security to 
produce chemical weapons.
  That adequate verification is illusory under this treaty is now 
widely acknowledged by technical experts and the U.S. intelligence 
community alike. Even supporters of the treaty--like former ACDA 
Director Ken Adelman--confirm that it is not verifiable. In his 
editorial endorsing the treaty, Mr. Adelman conceded this point up 
front stating, ``Granted, the treaty is virtually unverifiable. And, 
granted, it doesn't seem right for the Senate to ratify an unverifiable 
treaty.''

  We also have the experience of the U.N. team charged with inspecting 
Saddam Hussein's military establishment as proof of the difficulties of 
detection when a country is determined to develop these weapons. Even 
with the most intrusive searches--which hundreds of inspectors have 
conducted over five years in Iraq--evidence of weapons development has 
only belatedly been uncovered. It is likely that Iraq will continue to 
have a CW program and that the U.N. inspectors will continue to miss 
much of it even with intrusive inspection. The CWC's inspection regime 
pales in comparison to the regime in Iraq, and the treaty's 
verification provisions will not enable us to catch cheaters.
  Terrorist groups present a special problem because they can buy 
chemicals locally and manufacture weapons in very small spaces. In 
1995, the Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan produced sarin gas from 
components bought in Japan, and assembled this noxious agent in a room 
8 by 12 feet in size, using legitimately produced chemicals.
  In addition to the problems just outlined--of dealing with closed 
societies like Iraq, of sorting out the military from the commercial 
manufacture of chemicals, and of detecting CW activities that might 
take place in the smallest of nooks and crannies--concealment is also 
facilitated by the treaty itself because it allows ample time for 
inspected parties to hide what they are doing. Judge William Webster, 
former Director of the FBI and of the CIA, testified before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee that a facility producing chemical warfare 
agents could be cleaned up--without any trace of chemicals--in under 
nine hours. Judge Webster said:

       Because of the equipment needed to produce chemical warfare 
     agents can also be used to produce legitimate industrial 
     chemicals, any pharmaceutical or pesticide plant can be 
     converted to produce these agents. A nation with even a 
     modest chemical industry could use its facilities for part 
     time production of chemical warfare agents. Libyan Leader 
     Quadaffi, in a speech delivered in October, claimed that the 
     facility at Rabta is intended to produce pharmaceutical, not 
     chemical warfare agents. He proposed opening the complex for 
     international inspection. But within fewer than 24 hours, 
     some say 8\1/2\ hours, it would be relatively easy for the 
     Libyans to make the site appear to be a pharmaceutical 
     facility. All traces of chemical weapons production could be 
     removed in that amount of time.

  Therefore, the treaty fails to satisfy its two principal premises: it 
is neither global nor verifiable. Proponents concede this point to one 
degree or another, but argue that, on balance, it is still better than 
nothing. Opponents believe, to the contrary, that the treaty would 
actually create more problems than it solves.


                    WHAT HARM IN APPROVING THE CWC?

  Proponents say the deficiencies in the treaty are outweighed by the 
moral statement it makes in establishing an international norm against 
the possession of chemical weapons; by the trade benefits it will bring 
to U.S. chemical companies; and by marginal gains in intelligence if we 
become a party to the treaty.


                            Moral Statement

  By definition, to have the influence and weight of a moral statement, 
an action must be genuine. A treaty that cannot prevent those who sign 
on to it from cheating, and that, even if cheating were discovered, 
would not apply meaningful punishment to the violator--such a treaty is 
essentially hollow. History shows that hollow declarations are worse 
than none at all. A commitment honored more in the breach than the 
observance is not a moral statement; it fools no one and it deters no 
one.
  Proponents of ratification argue that at least this treaty would be a 
tool in the hands of diplomats who would attempt to dissuade cash-
strapped countries from selling chemicals to rogue nations to advance 
their CW programs. But, countries can easily ignore the treaty and 
export even the more dangerous chemicals because it is so difficult to 
verify compliance, and because there is no real enforcement mechanism. 
The CWC will be adhered to by nations that have no intention of doing 
what it prohibits --with or without the treaty--and will be ignored by 
those who choose to ignore it--whether or not they are parties. There 
simply is no effective enforcement--no ability to catch cheaters and no 
punishment, in any event.
  Under Article XII of the CWC, parties caught violating treaty 
provisions are simply threatened with a restriction or suspension of 
convention privileges.

[[Page S3921]]

 Those privileges are simply the right to participate in the treaty. At 
worst, a report will be sent to the U.N. General Assembly and the U.N. 
Security Council. With no predetermined sanctions in place to deter 
potential violators, the CWC is doomed to ineffectiveness.
  Finally, there already is an international norm against chemical 
weapons that is both global and verifiable. The 1925 Geneva Protocol 
outlaws the use--not the mere possession--of chemical weapons. In World 
War II, the Protocol was enforced by the allied leaders' threat to 
respond in kind to any chemical attack. But after Iraq used chemical 
weapons against its Kurdish population and Iranian soldiers in the late 
1980's, diplomats met to address this heinous war crime. These 
diplomats, faced with incontrovertible evidence of an Iraqi abrogation 
of the Geneva Protocol, were not able to agree on sanctioning Iraq and 
we could not even agree to list that country by name in a statement 
condemning the attack. If the world community could not muster the will 
to punish an obvious violation like that, how are the CWC participants 
going to summon the will to sanction a mere possessor or manufacturer 
of these weapons on evidence that may be much less conclusive than the 
proof of use by Iraq?

  Indeed, as in Hans Christian Andersen's fairy tale, the real moral 
statement may be in exposing the naked truth about this ineffectual 
document. It could be that, despite all the fine words about the 
treaty--or the emperor's fine clothes--there is actually nothing here.
  Given the United States' preeminent position as the sole remaining 
superpower after the end of the cold war, we should make a moral 
statement. We do it by destroying our own stocks--which we are doing; 
by admitting that the CWC is so flawed that it is not effective in its 
current form; by working to develop an effective enforcement regime for 
the Geneva Protocol; and by pushing forward with our bilateral CW 
destruction efforts with Russia and, perhaps, other nations.
  There are many multilateral treaties on the books--such as the Law of 
the Sea Treaty, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, and the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child--that make high moral statements which few pay attention to 
because the United States has not ratified them. There are currently 48 
treaties pending before the Senate. Because of the United States' 
preeminent position, our unilateral actions often speak louder than 
anything else. To return to the point I made at the outset: we already 
have a policy in place. Through Public Law 99-145, the United States is 
committed to destroying the bulk of its chemical weapons by the year 
2004. Through our actions we demonstrate U.S. leadership in ridding the 
world of chemical weapons.
  It matters how we make a moral statement. Papering over a problem 
with a treaty is not an effective moral statement. If everyone knows 
going into it that the CWC, despite its moral pretensions, is 
unverifiable and ineffective, this merely engenders cynicism about 
international treaties. The outrage that the use of these weapons stirs 
in us is undermined when we enter a treaty with a nod and a wink.


                              Public Harm

  The argument that the treaty may not be perfect but at least it does 
not do any harm is not only an exceedingly weak justification for the 
treaty, but an inaccurate one. There are significant public and private 
costs were we to participate in the CWC.
  First, it creates a new U.N.-type bureaucracy, a new international 
organization called the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons [OPCW], located in The Hague. The OPCW will oversee 
implementation of the treaty. Based on studies by the Congressional 
Office of Technology Assessment [OTA] and the General Accounting 
Office, total direct costs of the treaty to the U.S. taxpayer could 
reach $200 million annually. That includes the U.S. obligation to cover 
one-fourth of the operating budget of the OPCW. This year, the 
administration is requesting a total of nearly $130 million, of which 
$52 million is destined for the OPCW in The Hague.
  Moreover, Russia has said it will not ratify the CWC unless it is 
given a significant amount of Western aid to pay for the destruction of 
its chemical weapons. The figure often mentioned in this context is 
$3.3 billion. But when Russia realizes the magnitude of the 
undertaking, this may prove to be a drastic underestimation. After all, 
destruction of the United States chemical stockpile, which is smaller 
than that of Russia, will cost us at least $11 billion.


                        Harm to Private Industry

  Ratifying the treaty would harm U.S. industry in basically three 
ways: First, it imposes a costly new regulatory burden on American 
industry. Second, it is the first arms-control treaty in history that 
subjects private companies to inspections by agents of foreign 
governments, which could well portend a loss of trade secrets. Third, 
for the first time ever, U.S. citizens will be subject to a treaty that 
involves the reach of international authorities, raising significant 
constitutional issues. Unlike any treaty we have ever ratified, the CWC 
requires prosecution of individual American citizens for treaty 
violations. Its inspection regime poses a potential threat to the 
constitutional rights of U.S. citizens.


                           Regulatory Burden

  Every U.S. company that produces, processes, or consumes a scheduled 
chemical will be subject to new regulatory requirements, including a 
declaration burden. ACDA estimates that 3,000 to 8,000 companies will 
be affected, although the OTA estimated in 1992 that 10,000 companies 
would come under the CWC's strictures.
  The treaty entails routine inspections of specified chemical 
producers. ACDA acknowledges that many industries outside the chemical 
industry will be required to fill out forms and open their books to 
international inspectors, including:
  Sherwin-Williams Co., Safeway Stores, Inc., Quaker Oats Co., Kraft 
Foods Ingredients, Maxwell House Coffee Co., Conoco, Inc., Gillette 
Co., Strohs Brewery, ADM Corn Processing Division, Colgate-Palmolive 
Co., Xerox Corp., Castrol, Inc., General Motors Corp., Goodyear Tire & 
Rubber Co., Simpson Timber Co., Lockheed-Martin Corp., Kaiser Aluminum, 
and Browning Seed, Inc.
  For some companies, especially small- and medium-sized 
establishments, the production data reporting requirements in the CWC 
are budget busters. Depending on the types and numbers of controlled 
chemicals made or used by the company, these records can run $50,000 to 
$150,000 per year to maintain and report.
  The administration provided me with a list of 81 companies in Arizona 
that could be affected by the treaty because they utilize industrial 
chemicals limited by it. I contacted 25 of those companies to find out 
if it knew about the CWC and its ramifications for them. Many company 
officials were not aware of the treaty, or were aware of it only 
vaguely. Several reported back with calculations of what compliance 
would cost them. One Phoenix company estimates an annual cost of 
$70,000 a year to complete the treaty's reporting requirements. 
Officials at the company also told me that tracking the production and 
use of industrial chemicals back to 1946, as the treaty also requires, 
``would be impossible because such historical data no longer exists.'' 
According to a Tucson construction company, the costs don't end there. 
As its officials wrote to me: ``In order to state without reservations 
that we do or do not have in our possession any of the chemicals or 
their constituents, we would have to either hire a consultant versed in 
chemistry or put a chemist on our staff for the assurance and 
determination of our strict adherence.''
  Under the treaty, thousands of U.S. companies will be subject to 
routine inspections. When inspectors show up at its doorstep, one 
company said, ``we would be greatly concerned that such a visit might 
compromise confidential business information.''


               Potential Loss of Proprietary Information

  The greatest potential for loss of trade secrets is with the 
challenge inspections that the treaty allows. These challenges could 
occur at literally any building on U.S. territory--even a company that 
does not have a CWC reporting requirement. Sophisticated equipment, 
such as mass spectrometers, will be used by the international 
inspectors. They can glean proprietary information, such as the process 
used to

[[Page S3922]]

make a biotechnology product. Also, clandestine sampling and data 
collection by inspectors would be hard to detect and stop.

  In 1992, the OTA identified examples of proprietary information that 
could be compromised:
  The formula of a new drug or specialty chemical;
  A synthetic route that requires the fewest steps or the cheapest raw 
materials;
  The form, source, composition, and purity of raw materials and 
solvents;
  Subtle changes in pressure or temperature at key steps in the 
process;
  Expansion and marketing plans;
  Raw materials and suppliers;
  Manufacturing costs;
  Prices and sales figures;
  Names of technical personnel working on a particular subject; and
  Customer lists.
  Also according to OTA, the means by which sensitive business 
information could be acquired by foreign inspectors include the 
following:

       Manifests and container labels that disclose the nature/
     purity of the feedstock and the identity of the supplier.
       Instrument panels that reveal precise temperature and 
     pressure settings for a production process.
       Chemical analysis of residues taken from a valve or seal on 
     the production line.
       Visual inspection of piping configurations and 
     instrumentation diagrams that could allow an inspector to 
     deduce flow and process parameters.
       Audits of plant records.

  Clearly, while it is difficult to assess the potential dollar losses 
that may be associated with the compromise of proprietary business 
data, information gleaned from inspections and data declarations 
literally could be worth millions of dollars to foreign competitors, 
and U.S. companies have little recourse against frivolous inspections.
  Proponents of the treaty note that the Chemical Manufacturers 
Association (CMA) supports the agreement despite its inspection regime. 
Opponents note that the CMA represents about 190 of the 3,000 to 8,000 
companies likely to be affected by the treaty. Other trade associations 
representing a larger number of firms, like the Aerospace Industries 
Association of America [AIA], whose firms collectively are the second 
largest U.S. exporter of goods and services, the U.S. Business 
Information Committee, and the Small Business Survival Committee oppose 
the CWC.


                              Legal Issues

  The Senate Judiciary Committee hearing held on September 10, 1996, 
confirmed that there are serious legal difficulties associated with the 
CWC. The international inspections it requires may result in violations 
of the constitutional rights of the officers of U.S. firms, 
specifically their rights under the fifth amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution. Also, attempts to fix these legal shortcomings by 
changing the implementing legislation confront the problem of striking 
a balance between respect for the constitutional rights of American 
citizens, on the one hand, and the need for international inspectors to 
be as intrusive as possible, on the other hand. The administration 
believes the treaty strikes the right balance. I believe the treaty 
institutionalizes the worst of both worlds: an unverifiable treaty 
that, nevertheless, also infringes on U.S. citizens' constitutional 
rights. We get a company in Phoenix spending a lot of money opening up 
its premises and disclosing corporate information, in exchange for 
which we have no assurance at all that we can deter someone preparing 
noxious chemical agents halfway around the world.
  As Judge Robert Bork said in a recent letter to Senator Hatch that 
international inspectors collecting data and analyzing samples ``may 
constitute an illegal seizure'' under the takings clause of the fifth 
amendment. The U.S. Government owes a citizen just compensation, under 
this amendment, for an illegal seizure of intellectual property.
  Participating in the CWC could result in hundreds of millions of 
dollars lost to companies from industrial espionage undertaken during 
or as a result of the international inspection of their facilities. The 
OTA pointed out in a 1993 report that the chemical industry ``is one of 
the top five industries targeted by foreign companies and governments 
and that the problem of industrial espionage is growing.'' The OTA 
explained just how much is at stake for any given company: 
``Development and testing of a new pesticide,'' according to the OTA, 
``takes an average of 10 years and $25 million. Innovation in the 
pharmaceutical industry is even costlier.'' A new drug, estimates the 
OTA, requires an average of 12 years of research and an after-tax 
investment of roughly $194 million--estimated in 1990 dollars.'' And 
please keep in mind these figures do not include the lost revenues due 
to lost sales.
  Incidents of industrial espionage are not uncommon. The OTA study on 
the CWC also discussed the results of a survey of U.S. companies in 
which 8 of 11 firms responding reported attempts to misappropriate 
proprietary business information. The 8 affected companies reported a 
total of 21 incidents, 6 of which cost the companies $86.25 million.

  The CWC does not have a procedure for victimized companies to recover 
damages, or to punish any foreign inspectors who participated in the 
theft of proprietary information. In fact, the treaty explicitly 
prohibits a victimized company from taking legal action against the new 
international inspection organization. That leaves the U.S. Government 
to provide indemnity.
  A CWC proponent, Professor Barry Kellman of DePaul University, wrote 
in 1993 that ``loss or disclosure of confidential information of the 
Technical Secretariat--the agency created by the treaty--may have 
constitutional implications because trade secret owners are entitled to 
compensation'' when there are leaks of proprietary information as a 
result of government action. So, even treaty proponents say ``just 
compensation'' for takings under the U.S. Constitution may well come 
into play. We have not adequately considered what kind of a 
compensation commitment we are making through this treaty, and what 
kind of an obligation we are letting U.S. taxpayers in for if we ratify 
it.
  An Impossible Balance: Proponents acknowledge there may be legal 
problems with the treaty; however, the U.S. Senate cannot tinker with 
the treaty language. Article XXII says that ``the Articles of this 
Convention shall not be subject to reservations.'' Still, proponents 
claim that the legal problems can be fixed by carefully crafting the 
implementing legislation. Fixing the treaty in this way seems doubtful 
at best--at least if the intention is to leave the treaty as anything 
more than a fragile shell that will fall apart on the first occasion 
that someone objects to an inspection on U.S. soil. The administration 
has now agreed to require criminal warrants and a determination of 
probable cause for every nonvoluntary challenge inspection and to seek 
administrative search warrants for nonvoluntary routine inspections. 
How does this square with our international obligation to allow 
inspections to proceed? Constitutional fixes to the implementing 
legislation will not be compatible with the CWC's dependence on an 
intrusive inspection regime. This incompatibility means that we will 
have entered into a promise we know, under our Constitution, we will 
not be able to keep.
  Rest assured that we will probably be copied--and by nations that may 
have something to hide. If the United States argues that it can provide 
constitutional protections with implementing legislation, countries 
like Iran, China, or Russia, or any other participating nation will be 
able to point to what we've done and similarly modify their 
interpretation of the CWC to suit their own objectives.
  Nations of laws like the United States will both comply with the CWC 
and protect constitutional rights, while violators will use 
constitutional rights to get away with storing or building chemical 
weapons. A global ban on possessing chemical weapons that respects 
constitutional rights, therefore, can be violated at will. And, an 
airtight ban on possessing chemical weapons--if one were possible--
cannot protect constitutional rights. Pointing this out is not trying 
to have it both ways; rather, it is acknowledging the futility of 
pursuing this kind of solution.


              INTELLIGENCE GAINS FROM THE CWC ARE ILLUSORY

                               Terrorism

  A major advantage of this treaty, according to proponents, is that it 
will provide U.S. intelligence agencies with information they can use 
to protect

[[Page S3923]]

American citizens. One of the more extravagant claims of CWC proponents 
in the administration, in fact, is that participating in the CWC will 
help us fight terrorism. During his State of the Union Address in 
February, President Clinton said the CWC would ``help us fight 
terrorism.''
  His implication departs from the otherwise relatively objective and 
limited claims made for the treaty. It is unsubstantiated by any 
analysis or evidence. A declassified section of a Defense Intelligence 
Agency document of February 1996 states: ``Irrespective of whether the 
CWC enters into force, terrorists will likely look upon CW as a means 
to gain greater publicity and instill widespread fear. The March 1995 
Tokyo subway attack by Aum Shinrikyo would not have been prevented by 
the CWC.''
  A CIA report of May 1996, a portion of which has been declassified, 
makes the same point: ``In the case of Aum Shinrikyo, the CWC would not 
have hindered the cult from procuring the needed chemical compounds 
used in its production of sarin. Further, the Aum would have escaped 
the CWC requirement for an end-use certification because it purchased 
the chemicals within Japan.'' The CWC does not help deny terrorists 
easy access to nerve gas and other chemical weapons, among other 
reasons, because terrorists can simply obtain their chemicals in their 
own country for ostensibly legitimate purposes--they do not have to 
import them.

              Intelligence regarding nations' CW programs

  Nor will participating in what the columnist George Will called ``the 
Chemical Weapons Convention's impressively baroque, but otherwise 
unimpressive, scheme of inspection and enforcement'' add much to our 
knowledge of other countries' CW programs. Former Deputy CIA Director 
Richard Kerr said it is true that we will know a lot more about some 
countries, but only those ``that are least likely to develop and use 
these weapons.'' We will have gone to a lot of trouble and expense, in 
other words, to learn that Belgium is not violating the treaty. The 
costs are simply not worth the benefits we gain.

  Our real intelligence payoff, as a general matter, is in intrusive 
U.S. intelligence collection and sophisticated U.S. analysis, not in a 
group of international inspectors making spot inspections--looking for 
the proverbial needle in a haystack--and giving plenty of advance 
notice to anyone actually suspected of violating this treaty. In fact, 
the international inspectors themselves, according to former Deputy CIA 
Director Kerr, will have to rely on U.S. intelligence to be able to do 
their jobs. This compromises our own sensitive information and our own 
methods of collecting that information.
  Intelligence is difficult to gather in a closed society, and the case 
of United Nations scrutiny of Iraq, which actually used chemical 
weapons to kill thousands of Kurdish noncombatants in 1988, teaches a 
sobering lesson. The team of U.N. inspectors concentrating full-time on 
Iraq--which would not, of course, be the case with the OPCW inspectors 
who will have worldwide responsibilities--has uncovered some new 
developments in Saddam Hussein's chemical weapons program, but even 
their most thorough and sustained inspections have not found 
everything. Inspections under the CWC, under far less intensive 
circumstances, will not hamper a regime determined to have these 
frightful weapons.
  Proponents say over and over again that we are better off inside the 
treaty than outside, because of the store of data we will get out of 
the reporting regime and the inspection process. But where will this 
information come from? Being inside the treaty offers little insight 
into the actions of potential violators because: First, rogue states 
outside of the treaty will not be inspected by the OPCW; second, the 
treaty annex states that the OPCW cannot release to any nation 
information deemed to be confidential; third, while some OPCW 
inspectors will no doubt be Americans, the treaty annex on 
confidentiality states that inspectors are required to sign individual 
secrecy agreements with the OPCW, therefore they can't give American 
intelligence agencies any proscribed information. If we play by the 
rules, just where is this intelligence data going to come from?
  Finally, history shows that states are not very likely to call 
attention to treaty violations that intelligence-gatherers learn about 
because the diplomatic considerations frequently supersede treaty 
enforcement. Recall, for example, the phased-array radar station at 
Krasnoyarsk, in the then-Soviet Union, which violated the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty. Our intelligence reports were effectively 
ignored so as not to force the United States to take action against the 
Soviet Union for violating the treaty. We thought the higher priority 
was to maintain good relations with the Soviet Union, which would have 
become strained if we used our intelligence to expose that nation's 
violations. Russian violations of the Biological Weapons Convention, 
moreover, are noted each year in ACDA's Pell report on arms-control 
compliance, yet nothing is ever done to make Russia comply. 
Intelligence can be helpful until it reveals treaty violations, then it 
becomes submerged and subordinated to diplomatic considerations.


             CHEMICAL INDUSTRY NOT HARMED BY REJECTING CWC

  The third claim made by CWC proponents--based largely on the 
recommendations of the Chemical Manufacturers Association--is that 
there is financial harm in not ratifying this agreement. But the CMA's 
argument that we have to get on board this train or we will miss out, 
is just not true.
  The initial estimate from CMA claims that if the Senate fails to 
consent to ratification of the CWC, U.S. chemical companies will be 
subject to trade restrictions, which will place $600 million of annual 
chemical trade at risk. On the surface, CMA appears to have maintained 
a consistent estimate of the CWC's impact on U.S. chemical trade since 
the Senate first considered the treaty last September. Close 
examination of the facts, however, reveals that CMA's estimate has 
shrunk considerably over time and appears to overstate any potential 
negative impact of nonratification.
  CMA's initial estimate stated that $600 million of annual U.S. 
chemical exports would be placed at risk.
  When the President of the association met with me in February, he 
explained that CMA had refined its initial estimate and now believed 
$600 million in two-way trade would be affected, with only $281 million 
in annual exports of Schedule 2 chemicals placed at risk.
  In a letter to me on March 10, CMA revised its figures yet again, 
stating that the upper-bound estimate now indicated $227 million in 
annual U.S. Schedule 2 chemical exports would be jeopardized by 
nonratification.
  The $227 million represents about 0.38 percent of total U.S. chemical 
exports, indicating that if we accept CMA's figures at face value, over 
99.6 percent of U.S. chemical exports will be unaffected by failure to 
ratify the CWC. Even CMA's revised estimate appears to greatly 
overstate the impact of nonratification.
  More than half of CMA's export estimate is based on exports of one 
chemical--amiton. Amiton is a pesticide ingredient that is banned in 
the United States, Europe, Japan, and Canada--America's principal 
chemical export markets--but is widely exported to African states, a 
large number of which are not CWC signatories. While we may not be able 
to ascertain the exact percentage of U.S. amiton trade to non-CWC 
signatories, such trade likely constitutes the bulk of the overall 
amiton market and would be unaffected by CWC sanctions.

  CMA's upper-bound estimate that $426 million in U.S. chemical imports 
will be affected is also suspect. Over 50 percent of the import 
estimate is based on trade in one group of chemicals which CMA admits 
``may reflect broader chemical families,'' implying the estimate may 
include trade in related chemicals not restricted by the CWC. In 
addition, the U.S. has the most advanced chemical industry in the 
world. Although short term disruptions might occur if United States 
firms were unable to import certain chemicals, American industry would 
almost certainly be capable of producing the same chemicals currently 
purchased from abroad.
  In preparing its estimate, CMA used U.S. Government data on chemical 
trade and a complex methodology which includes estimates of growth in 
U.S. trade and worldwide GNP, as well

[[Page S3924]]

as other factors. CMA did not ask its own member companies--which 
collectively produce about 90 percent of all chemicals manufactured in 
the United States--to provide figures on chemical imports and exports. 
This would have given us a simple, reliable estimate of the actual 
impact of CWC nonratification. CMA claims its members consider this 
data to be confidential and would not provide it, although far more 
detailed accounting will be required under the CWC.
  Although CMA has publicly discussed possible business losses from 
nonratification, none of its member companies have informed their 
stockholders of any potential adverse impact.
  Since the administration pulled the treaty from Senate consideration 
in September 1996 none of the CMA's 193 members have filed an 8-K form 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC], notifying their 
stockholders of this potential adverse impact and none have discussed 
it in their annual 10-K filings.
  An 8-K filing is required to ``* * * report the occurrence of any 
material events or corporate changes which are of importance to 
investors or security holders and previously have not been reported by 
the registrant.''
  Form 10-K is the annual report most companies file with the SEC and 
provides a comprehensive overview of the firm's business.
  CMA claims none of its companies are legally required to file such 
forms due to uncertainty over whether the CWC will be ratified and 
since none of the firms will have more than 10 percent of its sales 
affected by nonratification. The SEC defines material changes as those 
that affect at least 10 percent of a company's sales. This admission 
further undermines their position that nonratification will be 
extremely detrimental to U.S. chemical companies.

  Finally, CMA has not determined the costs to its members for CWC 
implementation. The increased costs of complying with the treaty's 
reporting requirements and preparing for inspections are substantial. 
As I mentioned earlier, one Phoenix company estimates it will cost 
$70,000 per year to comply with the treaty's reporting requirements. In 
addition, companies will incur substantial costs to host inspections. 
The Department of Defense has estimated that the cost of hosting 
inspections of facilities engaged in highly proprietary activities like 
the production of advanced composite materials ``could be as high as 
$200,000 to $500,000.''
  When we add up the costs of complying with the CWC's regulatory 
burden, the costs of hosting inspections, the costs from the potential 
loss of confidential business information, and the loss of 
constitutional protections, its clear that the costs far outweigh the 
benefits of this treaty.


             FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICIES HARMED BY THE CWC

  To review, then, all three advantages claimed for this treaty--
stigmatizing chemical weapons all across the globe, increased 
intelligence, maintaining our competitive advantage in the chemical 
trade--are either nonexistent or so slight they hardly matter 
considering the serious negative consequences of ratifying this treaty. 
I would now like to briefly address the harm to our foreign and defense 
postures were we to accept this agreement in its current form.


               The CWC Creates a False Sense of Security

  I believe that we run the risk of reducing the priority of U.S. 
chemical defense programs if we sign on to a weighty moral statement 
and a complicated--but ineffective--effort to outlaw these 
objectionable weapons. The Department of Defense allocates less than 1 
percent of its budget to chemical and biological weapons defense 
activities, and yet annual funding for this area has decreased in real 
terms by over 22 percent since the Persian Gulf conflict, from $792 
million in fiscal year 1992 to $619 million requested for fiscal year 
1998. With chemical weapons defense programs already underfunded, the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikashvili, 
recommended in February 1996 that chemical and biological defense 
programs be slashed by over $1.5 billion through 2003. This 
recommendation was made only weeks before General Shalikashvili 
testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the 
Department of Defense [DOD] was committed to a robust chemical defense 
program. This is the kind of false sense of security induced by signing 
treaties such as the CWC.

  It should seem obvious that ratifying this treaty does not mean we 
will not face a chemical threat. Because of the proliferation of covert 
chemical capabilities, U.S. combat operations may expose military 
forces to lethal chemicals in the future. Any deficiencies in U.S. 
chemical protective, reconnaissance, and decontamination capabilities 
will exacerbate the likely casualties.
  This is not a theoretical problem. A 1996 GAO study found that 
deficiencies in U.S. chemical and biological defense training and 
equipment identified during Operation Desert Storm still remain.
  In testimony before the House Committee on National Security 
Committee, the GAO stated, ``The primary cause for deficiencies in 
chemical and biological weapons preparedness is a lack of emphasis up 
and down the line of command in DOD.'' The situation results from the 
``generally lower priority DOD--especially the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
and the war-fighting Commanders-in-Chief--assigns chemical and 
biological defense as evidenced by limited funding, staffing, and 
mission priority chemical and biological defense activities receive.''
  If history is any guide, we may well see those vulnerabilities 
increase. After the Biological Weapons Convention came into force in 
1972, the U.S. biological defense program withered, with funding cut by 
50 percent--not because defenses were outlawed by that treaty, but 
because of constant criticism by arms-control advocates who saw them as 
contrary to the spirit, although not the letter, of the Biological 
Weapons Convention.
  Given the administration's demonstrated lack of emphasis to chemical 
defenses, we can expect that when financial cuts are required to meet 
declining budgets, funds for hedging against violations of an allegedly 
comprehensive treaty will make an attractive target.


          Treaty Undermines Existing International Instruments

  Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons not only in 1988 against the 
Kurds, but earlier in the decade against the Iranian population in the 
Iran-Iraq war. It was in the wake of confirmation of Iraq's use of 
chemical agents in 1984 that the Australia Group was formed, to try to 
stop the military use of these substances. The Australia Group regime 
will be undercut by the more lenient CWC, as I have already indicated. 
And that is not the only international instrument that will be undercut 
by this treaty.


              U.S.-Russian Bilateral Destruction Agreement

  The U.S. approach to the problem posed by Russia--which does not 
belong to the Australia Group--has been to hammer out a bilateral 
agreement with that nation. The Bilateral Destruction Agreement of 1990 
requires both the United States and Russia to stop producing chemical 
weapons and to reduce their active stockpiles to no more than 5,000 
metric tonnes. The United States has begun to destroy its chemical 
weapons. Political turmoil in Russia has made ensuring Russian 
compliance difficult at best. Moscow has not even begun to reduce its 
stockpile, which is the largest in the world.

  Russia has signed the CWC but not yet ratified. Russian officials can 
now dangle before United States officials the possibility that the Duma 
will ratify the CWC some day, and in this way justify Moscow's current 
inaction. Indeed, there are indications that our push to ratify the CWC 
has moved the Russians toward outright renunciation of the BDA.
  Compliance with the BDA begins, of course, with truthful and complete 
declarations of chemical weapons data. ACDA's 1995 Pell report noted 
that Russia has refused to accept the BDA's key provisions and has 
``taken a minimalist approach to declaration requirements and 
verification costs of CW production facilities that is inconsistent 
with the CWC.'' To comply with the 1989 memorandum of understanding 
with us which led up to the BDA, Russia declared 40,000 metric tonnes 
of agent. This declaration has prompted

[[Page S3925]]

challenges of the veracity of Russian reporting.
  CIA Director James Woolsey said in June 23, 1994 testimony before the 
Foreign Relations Committee that the United States had ``serious 
concerns over apparent incompleteness, inconsistency and contradictory 
aspects of the data'' submitted by Russia under the memorandum of 
understanding. On August 27, 1993, Adm. William Studeman, acting CIA 
Director, wrote to Senator Glenn that ``We cannot confirm that the 
Russian declaration of 40,000 mt is accurate. In addition, we cannot 
confirm that the total stockpile is stored only at the seven sites 
declared by the Soviets.''
  Reports in the Washington Times (11-8-89) and Washington Post (11-9-
89) cite Defense Intelligence Agency estimates that the Soviet/Russian 
stockpile could be as large as 75,000 tons.
  Even more troubling are public reports in the Washington Times and 
Wall Street Journal that Russia has developed highly lethal binary 
chemical weapons. Dr. Vil Mirzayanov, former chief of 
counterintelligence at Russia's State Union Scientific Research 
Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology, also published his 
observations in the October 1995 Stimson Center Report No. 17. Dr. 
Mirzayanov reported that Russia has produced a new class of binary 
nerve agents many times more lethal than any other known chemical 
agents: the so-called novichok agents made from chemicals not covered 
by the CWC which are used for industrial or agricultural purposes. He 
further reported that Russia continued development of these highly 
lethal binary weapons despite signing the BDA in 1990.

  Dr. Mirzayanov states:

       First, I witnessed the duplicity of Soviet officials during 
     the CWC negotiations. Although the United States stopped 
     producing and testing chemical weapons and signed an 
     agreement with the Soviet Union to that effect in June 1990, 
     the USSR did not stop work.

  In a recent letter to me, Dr. Mirzayanov indicated that, to the best 
of his knowledge, as many as six novichok CW agents may have been 
developed. Dr. Mirzayanov feels so strongly about the threat from these 
new agents that he supports the CWC under the mistaken impression that 
the treaty will eliminate these weapons. Unfortunately, the chemicals 
used to make novichok agents are not controlled by the CWC, Russia has 
not ratified the treaty, and it's unlikely we would be able to detect 
illicit production of the component chemicals of these agents. Our 
intelligence community described this problem in a May 1995 national 
intelligence estimate which concluded that the production of new binary 
agents like the novichok chemicals, ``would be difficult to detect and 
confirm as a CWC-prohibited activity.''
  Clinton administration claims that the chemicals used to produce the 
novichok agents will simply be added to the CWC's list of controlled 
substances understate the danger and difficulty of this proposition.
  Should the United States learn the composition of such agents, it is 
unlikely we would seek to add these chemicals to the CWC annex since 
adding the compounds means making public the chemical structure of the 
agent, thereby undermining efforts to limit the spread of CW expertise 
and knowledge to rogue states.
  In addition, adding a chemical to the CWC annex is a long, convoluted 
process which could take up to 2 years and require the concurrence of 
two-thirds of CWC states parties.
  Finally, the component chemicals of the novichok agents may be so 
widely used for commercial purposes--like phosgene, which was used as a 
CW agent in World War I--that it may not be practical to add them to 
the lists of controlled chemicals.
  The actions of key Russian personnel highlight Russia's lack of 
commitment to the CWC itself. Lt. Gen. Anatoly Kuntsevich, former 
chairman of the Russian President's Committee on Conventional Problems 
of Chemical and Biological Weapons, was arrested on charges of selling 
military chemicals to Middle East terrorists. Col. Gen. S.V. Petrov 
openly alluded to the desirability of maintaining a chemical weapons 
capability in a Russian military journal entitled ``Military Thought.'' 
Both individuals are high-ranking military signatories to the ``U.S.-
Russian Work Plan for the Destruction of Russia's Chemical Weapons.''

  With that as our background, we should be very cautious about 
expecting Russia, even if its legislature should ratify the CWC, to 
take a new multilateral commitment on chemical weapons seriously.


              Proliferation Among Participants in the CWC

  The CWC's potential to facilitate proliferation is not limited to its 
pernicious effects on Australia Group controls. It may also undermine 
existing unilateral United States sanctions against Iran and Cuba. 
Chemical exports to Iran were embargoed by the Reagan administration on 
March 30, 1984. That embargo is still in force, as is the embargo 
against Fidel Castro declared in 1962. The United States imposed 
secondary sanctions last year on foreign companies that aid the oil 
industries of Iran or Libya.
  These kinds of embargoes and sanctions are prohibited among the 
family of nations that decide to join this convention. Article XI of 
the treaty provides that state parties shall:

     Not maintain among themselves any restrictions, including 
     those in any international agreements, incompatible with the 
     obligations undertaken under this Convention, which would 
     restrict or impede trade and the development and promotion of 
     scientific and technological knowledge in the field of 
     chemistry for industrial, agricultural, research, medical, 
     pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes.

  In other words, if the United States and Iran were to ratify the 
convention--as Cuba has already done--Teheran would have a powerful 
claim to override American-led restrictions in the chemical field.
  Article XI further specifies that states parties shall:

       Undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate 
     in, the fullest possible exchange of chemicals, equipment and 
     scientific and technical information relating to the 
     development and application of chemistry for purposes not 
     prohibited under this Convention.

  This provision repeats the mistake made in the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty--the so-called Atoms for Peace initiative--
under which ostensibly peaceful technology has been provided to nations 
who then diverted it to proscribed military purposes. Neither a United 
States trade embargo, nor legislation like the Helms-Burton bill, nor 
the Australia Group export control regime, nor any other arrangement 
can interfere with Teheran's or Havana's right to demand access to 
state-of-the-art chemical manufacturing capabilities.
  To those who ask, what's the harm of approving this treaty? I think 
it is now clear that the answer is, plenty. It does not erect a barrier 
against CW proliferation; in fact, as just noted, it increases the 
likelihood of proliferation. In this and all of the other ways I have 
described, the convention would be very detrimental to the interests of 
United States and its citizens--especially when compared to the anemic 
benefits of ratification.


                       IF NOT THE CWC, THEN WHAT?

  Opponents of the CWC are committed to meaningful efforts to prevent 
the use of chemical weapons. We should start with first principles.


                   Enforcing the 1925 Geneva Protocol

  An effective treaty should be global and verifiable. The 1925 Geneva 
Protocol is both: it covers all nations of concern to the United States 
and, because it outlaws the lethal use of chemical weapons, it is 
inherently verifiable. Victims of use have every reason to expose 
treaty violations, as the Iranians and the Kurds did. By definition, 
outlawing use is a more realistic goal than the CWC's goal of outlawing 
possession of these common substances. What is necessary--for both 
treaties--is effective enforcement. In World War II, the enforcement of 
the Geneva Protocol was the allied leaders' threat to retaliate in kind 
to any chemical attack. The Geneva Protocol was effective during that 
conflict. But it has not been well enforced outside of the context of a 
threat of retaliation in kind. Such threats fade in effectiveness as 
civilized nations grow more and more reluctant to contemplate ever 
using these abhorrent weapons.
  To make the Protocol more than a ``no first use'' agreement--in other 
words, to free it of its dependence on a credible threat of retaliation 
in kind--would require states that are party to

[[Page S3926]]

it impose strong sanction to any and all violations. This did not 
happen when Iraq used chemical weapons in the mid-1980's and later in 
the decade. Diplomats met in 1989 to address the gassing of the Kurds 
and, faced with incontrovertible proof of an abrogation of the Geneva 
Protocol, did not sanction Iraq. Many experts believe that the most 
productive measure to counteract chemical weapons is to develop 
meaningful international sanctions that could be added to the Geneva 
Protocol to give it teeth. Had a Geneva Protocol enforcement mechanism 
been in place and acted upon when Iraq first used its CW arsenal, 
Iraq's further refinement of a chemical war-fighting capability may 
have been slowed or even halted before Saddam threatened U.S. soldiers 
with these same weapons during the gulf war.
  This approach offers a significant advantage: it would resolve the 
verification issue. It is relatively easy to detect use as opposed to 
possession. It is likely that a nation on the receiving end of a 
chemical attack would welcome international inspectors to confirm that 
a violation has occurred and to garner worldwide condemnation of the 
perpetrator. The second advantage is that, as I earlier indicated, 
several of the nations we are most worried about--that have not 
ratified the CWC--have already ratified the Geneva Protocol. I am 
speaking of Cuba, Iraq, North Korea, and the former Soviet Union.


           Pressing Russia to Uphold its Existing Commitments

  In addition, the United States must make a high priority holding 
Russia to its commitments under the 1989 memorandum of understanding 
and the 1990 bilateral agreement to destroy chemical weapons. The 
current administration has not been forceful in making clear we expect 
compliance. Progress made between the two countries on this issue need 
not be wasted, if we really mean to do something about chemical 
warfare.


 Implementing the Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat Reduction Act 
                                (S.495)

  Finally, there are additional steps we can, and should, take. The 
Senate passed on March 20 the Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat 
Reduction Act (S. 495). This legislation provides a comprehensive 
package of domestic and international measures aimed at reducing 
chemical, as well as biological, weapons threats to the United States, 
its citizens, its armed forces and those of our allies. It sets forth 
practical and realistic steps to achieve this objective.
  The act fills important gaps in U.S. law by outlawing the entire 
range of chemical and biological weapons activities. Quite remarkably, 
the possession of chemical weapons is not today a criminal offense. S. 
495 corrects that untenable situation, and sets out still criminal, 
civil, and other penalties the spectrum of chemical and biological 
weapons related activities.
  The act will also strengthen and reinforce deterrence against the use 
of chemical and biological weapons. Strong controls on trade in these 
weapons, as called for in the legislation, will make it more difficult 
and raise the costs for rogue nations to acquire offensive chemical and 
biological weapons capabilities. Improvements in U.S. and allied 
chemical and biological defenses, also mandated by the act, will serve 
to devalue the potential political and military utility of these 
weapons by would-be opponents. And the requirement that tough sanctions 
be imposed against any nation that uses poison gas should reduce the 
chance that such weapons would be used in the first place.
  S. 495 recognizes that we can't go it alone when it comes to dealing 
with chemical and biological weapons threats. True, some things we can 
and should do on a unilateral basis. But sensible international action, 
focused on concrete and achievable measures, must likewise be an 
essential component of our strategy. The legislation encourages our 
allies and potential coalition partners to match our efforts and 
improve their military capabilities against chemical and biological 
weapons. The legislation also seeks multilateral agreement on 
enforcement mechanisms for the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

  The Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat Reduction Act thus 
provides a sensible and effective plan that CWC critics and proponents 
alike should support. By enacting and implementing the act, the United 
States will lead by example, and will underscore its commitment to 
bringing together like-minded friends and allies to make unthinkable 
the resort to chemical or biological weapons.


                               CONCLUSION

  Arms-control treaties, at the end of the day, are not a substitute 
for defense preparedness. A treaty as flawed as the Chemical Weapons 
Convention is worth less to our country than the unilateral actions the 
United States can and must take to ensure the protection and the 
survival of its citizens. The entry into force of the CWC--with or 
without American participation--will not bring us a world in which 
these terrible weapons are no longer manufactured or stockpiled. Nor 
can we say they will never be used. When words, diplomacy, and 
international documents signed with the best of intentions fail to 
protect populations from the threat of attack with these inhuman 
weapons, every nation falls back upon its ability to preempt or repel 
such an attack. It would be irresponsible to let down our guard in this 
respect, for history has shown us that treaties--even well-crafted 
ones--cannot replace the political and military will that are necessary 
to oppose acts of aggression.

                          ____________________