[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 54 (Wednesday, April 30, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3852-S3853]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




[[Page S3852]]



   SENATE RESOLUTION 80--REGARDING TACTICAL FIGHTER AIRCRAFT PROGRAMS

  Mr. FEINGOLD (for himself and Mr. Kohl) submitted the following 
resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

                               S. Res. 80

       Whereas the Department of Defense has proposed to modernize 
     the United States tactical fighter aircraft force through 
     three tactical fighter procurement programs, including the F/
     A-18 E/F aircraft program of the Navy, the F-22 aircraft 
     program of the Air Force, and the Joint Strike Fighter 
     aircraft program for the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps;
       Whereas the General Accounting Office, the Congressional 
     Budget Office, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 
     Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, 
     and several Members of Congress have publicly stated that, 
     given the current Department of Defense budget for 
     procurement, the Department of Defense's plan to buy over 
     4,400 F/A-18 E/F aircraft, F-22 aircraft, and Joint Strike 
     Fighter aircraft at a total program cost in excess of 
     $350,000,000,000 is not affordable;
       Whereas the Congressional Budget Office estimates that 
     current tactical aircraft plan of the Department of Defense 
     could cost as much as $14,000,000,000 to $18,000,000,000 per 
     fiscal year over the period of fiscal years 2002 through 
     2020, not considering inflation, compared to current tactical 
     aircraft funding of about $2,800,000,000 per fiscal year;
       Whereas the Pentagon's current acquisition strategy would 
     require at least a 54.9 percent increase in annual 
     procurement spending over the next five years, rising from 
     $44,100,000,000 in fiscal year 1997 to $68,300,000,000 in 
     fiscal year 2002;
       Whereas the F/A-18 E/F, F-22, and the Joint Strike Fighter 
     tactical fighter programs will be competing for a limited 
     amount of procurement funding with numerous other aircraft 
     acquisition programs, including the Comanche helicopter 
     program, the V-22 Osprey aircraft program, and the C-17 
     aircraft program, as well as for the necessary replacement of 
     other aging aircraft such as the KC-135, the C-5A, the F-117, 
     and the EA-6B aircraft; and
       Whereas history shows that projection of the Department of 
     Defense regarding the number of aircraft that it will 
     procure, the rates at which those aircraft will be produced, 
     and the cost of those aircraft are rarely achieved, and in 
     fact frequently experience significant cost growth on the 
     order of 20 to 40 percent: Now, therefore, be it
       Resolved, That--
       (1) it is the sense of the Senate that the United States 
     cannot afford to carry out all three of the F/A-18 E/F 
     aircraft program, the F-22 aircraft program, and the Joint 
     Strike Fighter aircraft program at the proposed acquisition 
     levels;
       (2) the Department of Defense should reexamine its spending 
     priorities using more realistic assumptions of future 
     spending levels; and
       (3) the Department of Defense should develop an alternative 
     acquisition strategy that would provide the United States 
     with an effective, affordable tactical fighter force 
     structure.

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, on behalf of myself and my senior 
colleague, Senator Kohl of Wisconsin, I rise today to submit a 
resolution calling for the restoration of fiscal responsibility to the 
Department of Defense's plan to modernize and upgrade our tactical 
fighter force.
  The resolution I am submitting today, focuses on the Pentagon's 
current acquisition strategy for three new tactical fighter programs; 
the Air Force's F-22 Raptor, the Navy's F/A-18 E/F SuperHornet, and the 
multi-service joint strike fighter. Numerous experts, including the 
Congressional Budget Office and the General Accounting Office, have 
concluded that given our current fiscal constraint and likely spending 
parameters, the current acquisition strategy is unrealistic, unwise, 
and untenable.
  The administration's fiscal year 1998 proposal for defense spending 
provides $250 billion in budget authority. According to projections 
provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the overall DOD budget is 
expected to rise after fiscal year 1998 until reaching a plateau of 
$277.5 billion. That is pretty amazing.
  Amazingly, while all other areas of Government are cutting back, the 
Pentagon is anticipating a $27 billion peacetime increase over the next 
5 years.
  The overall defense budget is comprised of several individual 
budgets, including, among others, those for military personnel, 
operations and maintenance, military construction, and, of course, 
procurement, which relates to the purchasing of new aircraft, weapons 
systems, and technology.
  It is the procurement budget that I would like to focus on for a 
moment. The Pentagon's current procurement funding level for new 
weapons systems, ships, and aircraft in fiscal year 1997 is just over 
$44 billion.
  But under the Defense Department's current acquisition plan, in order 
to achieve the projected purchasing levels of new aircraft and ships, 
procurement funding will have to rise 55 percent, 55 percent Mr. 
President, over the next five years, until it reaches a level of $68.3 
billion.
  Every other title within the Pentagon's budget request--whether we 
are talking about quality of life issues for service personnel or 
spending on research and development--every other title remains 
relatively stagnant over the next 5 years.
  No other program within the Pentagon's budget is receiving the sort 
of dramatic increase the procurement budget is slated to receive.
  The need for additional procurement dollars--24 billion of them--is 
the result of the Pentagon's planned purchase of some 4,440 new 
tactical fighter airplanes at a total price tag of at least $350 
billion according to the Congressional Budget Office.
  The Defense Department argues that our fighter force is in need of 
modernization and that as a percentage of the overall defense budget, 
procurement spending is within historical norms.
  It is true, Mr. President, that the Pentagon's projections place our 
level of aircraft acquisition at or slightly below where we were in the 
1980's, in terms of as a percentage of the overall defense budget.
  But this omits the fact that the defense budget was an entirely 
different creature in the 1980's than it is today. Thus, when the 
Pentagon argues that the piece of the pie they are asking for today in 
terms of procurement spending is roughly the same as it was in the 
1980's, we must recognize that the size of the whole pie was profoundly 
greater than it is today.
  The procurement budget itself is comprised of a number of weapons 
systems and technology programs, but the Pentagon's acquisition 
strategy is dominated by the three tactical fighter aircraft proposals 
currently on the table.
  This strategy includes three separate programs, all very expensive, 
all the subject of questions raised by budgetary and aviation experts, 
and all scheduled to move forward at unrealistic procurement levels.
  We begin with the Navy's F/A-18 E/F SuperHornet program. This 
aircraft is the followup to the F/A-18 C/D, currently employed by both 
the Navy and the Marine Corps.
  The F/A-18 is an all-weather, multi-mission strike fighter, and the 
Navy currently has about 580 in its inventory. Although the C/D 
performed remarkably well in the gulf war and has the capability of 
achieving most of the Navy's requirements with some retrofitting, the 
Pentagon is currently asking for 1,000 of the expensive E/F airplanes, 
at a projected cost of about $42 million per airplane. The F/A-18 E/F 
program has a cumulative cost of at least $67 billion and up to $89 
billion according to the General Accounting Office.
  The second program belongs to the Air Force. It is the F-22 Raptor, a 
stealthy fighter intended to provide air superiority but at a 
extraordinary cost. This aircraft, which one Navy official referred to 
as ``gold-plated,'' will cost at least $71 million per airplane, with 
some estimates reaching over $100 million per aircraft. In all, the F-
22 program, slated to provide some 440 airplanes to the Air Force, will 
cost at least $70 billion.
  The final program is one which is truly still in infancy. The joint 
strike fighter, formally the Joint Advanced Strike Technology [JAST] 
Program, is actually still on the drawing board with two major 
contractors, Boeing and Lockheed Martin, dueling for what is expected 
to be at least a $219 billion contract--$219 billion, Mr. President. 
That is some contract. And given the Pentagon's porous record keeping 
its aviation programs on schedule and on target, the costs of this 
program will likely surpass the initial $219 billion figure. The JSF is 
intended to be a joint-service, multipurpose aircraft tailored to each 
of the service's individual needs. The Navy variant will have carrier 
landing and takeoff capabilities. The Marine Corps variant will have 
short takeoff and vertical-landing capability. In all, the Pentagon 
expects to purchase 3,000 joint strike fighters

[[Page S3853]]

over a 25-year period from 2005 through 2030. The Air Force would 
purchase about two-thirds of these planes, the Marine Corps about 640, 
and the Navy the remaining 300.

  The JSF program has thus far received mixed reviews. On one hand is 
the Pentagon's contention that these aircraft will be affordable 
because of commonality of components and high-volume production of an 
airplane capable of meeting each of the three services' differing 
operational requirements. On the other hand is the Pentagon's track 
record and the countless aviation programs that have promised so much 
in terms of cost savings and have delivered so little. In fact, the 
General Accounting Office estimates that the Pentagon's projections 
with respect to aircraft procurement typically have cost overruns of 20 
to 40 percent.
  This, Mr. President, provides an overview of the Pentagon's current 
acquisition strategy with respect to tactical fighter aircraft. And 
although the resolution I am submitting today focuses on tactical 
fighters, it is important to mention a few of the other programs on the 
Defense Department's wish list, as these programs will also be drawing 
on a limited procurement budget over the next few years.
  There is the V-22 Osprey--a tilt-rotor aircraft to be used for troop 
and cargo transport, amphibious assault, and special operations--being 
built primarily for the Marine Corps and Navy. This is a $46.6 billion 
program expected to produce some 523 aircraft.
  There is the Comanche reconnaissance and attack helicopter for the 
Army. The Pentagon expects to purchase close to 1,300 of these 
helicopters at a total price tag of $25 billion. And the Air Force is 
asking for 80 C-17 cargo and transport airplanes, at a procurement cost 
of over $18 billion.
  That Mr. President, is just the portion of the procurement budget 
related to aviation spending.
  The Navy, for example, is looking to increase the procurement of 
their surface ships, starting with another aircraft carrier, CVN-77, 
and 17 of the DDG-51 Arleigh Burke destroyers, as well as four new 
attack submarines. And in fiscal year 1999 the Navy would like to begin 
procurement of the new San Antonio-class amphibious landing ships for 
our Marine expeditionary forces.
  Mr. President, in recent months a number of respected experts on 
military spending have warned the Department of Defense of an impending 
fiscal disaster.
  The Congressional Budget Office, the General Accounting Office, 
Members of Congress on both sides of the aisle--even high-ranking 
Pentagon officials--have all forewarned that the Defense Department 
will not receive the procurement funding level it has projected and 
will not be able to sustain these tactical fighter purchases at their 
planned acquisition levels.
  Unless we take a step back right now, in 1997, we will undoubtably 
have what some have dubbed a train wreck, or maybe more appropriately, 
a shipwreck, in the next few years.
  I understand that many of my colleagues are either strong proponents 
or opponents of one or more of these individual fighter programs. The 
resolution I am submitting today does not target any one program for 
termination--it does not even suggest that one of the programs should 
be discontinued. The language in this resolution merely states that we 
do not have now, nor will we have, the necessary available funding to 
move forward with the purchasing of the number of fighter planes the 
Pentagon currently has scheduled and given that, the Pentagon should 
present to the Congress a more realistic acquisition strategy to take 
us into the next century.
  In just 2 weeks or so, on May 15, the Pentagon is scheduled to 
deliver a reassessment of our strategic blueprint for our Armed Forces, 
known as the quadrennial defense review, or the QDR.
  This is the first such reassessment since the 1993 Bottom-Up Review, 
and represents a collaborative effort on the part of the Secretary of 
Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the individual services to 
conduct a comprehensive review of our inventories and projected needs.

  The upcoming QDR presents the Pentagon a timely opportunity to 
reexamine its spending priorities and make a reasoned determination 
about what our tactical fighter force will realistically look like over 
the next 20 years. I am hopeful that the Pentagon will use this 
opportunity to present an acquisition strategy to the Congress that is 
affordable, tenable, and consistent with the goal of Congress to 
achieve a balanced Federal budget in the coming years.
  If not, I intend to offer the resolution I am submitting today, or a 
variant of it, as an amendment to the budget resolution or other 
legislation as part of an effort to force the Defense Department to 
understand the gravity of this situation. I hope such a step proves to 
be unnecessary.

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