[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 50 (Thursday, April 24, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3570-S3658]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
The Senate continued with the consideration of the convention.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending business before the Senate is
ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
The Senator from North Carolina has 1 hour and 20 minutes. The
Senator from Delaware has 46 minutes.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I yield 7 minutes to my friend from New
York.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. I thank the Chair.
May I ask my good friend if he didn't wish that the time be charged
to the Senator from Delaware?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time will be charged to the Senator from
Delaware.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. I thank the Chair. I thank my dear friend, the
chairman.
Mr. President, I rise in support of the resolution of ratification. I
will take just a moment of the Senate's time to put this matter in a
historical context.
Since its development by 19th century chemists, poison gas--as it was
known--has been seen as a singular evil giving rise to a singular cause
for international sanctions.
In May 1899, Czar Nicholas II of Russia convened a peace conference
at The Hague in Holland. Twenty-six countries attended and agreed upon
three conventions and three declarations concerning the laws of war.
Declaration II, On Asphyxiating or Deleterious Gases stated:
The Contracting Parties agree to abstain from the use of
projectiles the sole object of which is the diffusion of
asphyxiating or deleterious gases.
Article 23 of the Annex to the Convention added:
In addition to the prohibitions provided by special
Conventions, it is especially forbidden:
(a) To employ poison or poisoned weapons * * *
Our own Theodore Roosevelt called for a second peace conference which
convened in 1907. This time, 45 countries were in attendance at The
Hague, and reiterated the Declaration on Asphyxiating Gases and the
article 23 prohibition on poisoned weapons.
The Hague Conventions notwithstanding, poison gas was used in World
War I. Of all the events of the First World War, a war from which this
century has not yet fully recovered, none so horrified mankind as gas
warfare. No resolve ever was as firm as that of the nations of the
world, after that war, to prevent gas warfare from ever happening
again.
Declaring something to be violation of international law does not
solve a problem, but it does provide those of us who adhere to laws
mechanisms by which to address violations of them. In June 1925, the
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating,
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare was
signed in Geneva. This reaffirmed the Hague prohibition and added
biological weapons to the declaration.
In the Second World War that followed, such was the power of that
commitment that gas was not used in Europe. It was expected, but it did
not happen.
Then came the atom bomb and a new, even more important development in
warfare. In time it, too, would be the subject of international
conventions.
As part of the peace settlement that followed World War II, President
Roosevelt, with the British, Chinese, and French, set up the United
Nations. In 1957, within the U.N. system, the International Atomic
Energy Agency was established. The new agency fielded an extraordinary
new device, international inspectors, who began inspecting weapons
facilities around the world to ensure compliance. This was enhanced by
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which came into force in
1970, allowing inspectors to monitor declared nuclear sites. This was
an unheard of compromise of traditional sovereignty. It has not worked
perfectly. The number of nuclear powers, or proto-nuclear powers, has
grown somewhat. But only somewhat: around 10 in a world with some 185
members of the United Nations. And never since 1945 has a single atomic
weapon been used in warfare.
The Chemical Weapons Convention incorporates the advances in
international law and cooperation of which I have spoken; it extends
them. Its inspections can be more effective than the IAEA because of
the ability to conduct challenge inspections when violations of the CWC
are suspected.
If the Senate should fail--and it will not fail--to adopt the
resolution of ratification, it would be the first rejection of such a
treaty since the Senate in 1919 rejected the Treaty of Versailles, with
its provision for the establishment of the League of Nations. It would
be only the 18th treaty rejected by the Senate in the history of the
Republic.
Every living Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff over the past 20
years has called for ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Our beloved former colleague, Senator Bob Dole, has given his support
and asked us to do what I think we can only describe as our duty. The
President pleads.
Here I would note a distinction. In 1919, Woodrow Wilson could have
had the Versailles Treaty, we could have joined the League of Nations,
if only he had been willing to make a modicum of concessions to then-
chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and majority leader, Henry
Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts. Wilson was too stubborn; in truth, and it
pains an old Wilsonian to say so, too blind. Nothing such can be said
of President Clinton. In a month of negotiations with the current
chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and the current Republican
leader, the administration has reached agreement on 28 of 33
conditions. Only five proved unacceptable. And, indeed, sir, they are.
The President could not in turn ratify a treaty with those conditions.
Again to draw a parallel with 1919. During consideration of the
Treaty of Versailles, the Senate was divided into three primary camps:
those who supported the treaty; those who opposed the treaty, no matter
what shape or form it might take--known as ``irreconcilables'' or
``bitter enders''--and those who wanted some changes to the treaty,
most importantly led by Senator Lodge.
There are some modern day irreconcilables who oppose this Treaty for
the same reason they eschew international law: viewing it as an
assertion of what nice people do. Such a view reduces a magisterial
concept that there will be enforced standards to a form of wishful
thinking. A position which runs counter to a century of effort. Today I
would appeal to those Republicans who might compare themselves with
Senator Lodge. Unlike 1919, this President has heard your concerns and
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worked carefully to address them in the form the resolution of
ratification containing 28 conditions which is now before the Senate.
To fail to ratify the CWC would put us on the side of the rogue
states and relieve them of any pressure to ratify the convention
themselves. As Matthew Nimitz has argued, the United States has a
unique interest in international law because it cannot ``match the
Russians in deviousness or the Libyans in irresponsibility or the
Iranians in brutality * * *. [It is the United States] which stands to
lose the most in a state of world anarchy.''
The Chemical Weapons Convention builds on the laws of The Hague: a
century of arms control agreements. It bans chemical weapons--hideous
and barbaric devices--completely. International law can never offer
perfect protection, but we are primary beneficiaries of the protection
that it does provide. I urge my colleagues to support this important
treaty.
I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.
Might I ask? Does time run consecutively and is it divided equally?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes. It will be divided equally.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. I thank the Chair.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to my friend from
Minnesota.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota.
Mr. WELLSTONE. I thank the Chair.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a congressional fellow
from my office, Ashley Tessmer, be allowed in the Chamber during the
Chemical Weapons Convention debate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, the Chemical Weapons Convention goes
into force April 29 with or without U.S. participation. This, after
more than 100 years of international efforts to ban chemical weapons,
including the Hague Convention of 1889 and the Geneva Protocol of 1925
which placed restrictions on the use of chemical weapons. The history
of chemical weapons use is a long one--from 1915 with the German use of
chlorine gas in Belgium during World War I, to the Iraqi use of poison
gas to kill an estimated 4,000 people in the Kurdish village of Halabja
in 1988, and the very recent threat of chemical weapons use in the
Persian Gulf war.
These chemical weapons are dangerous--not only because of
intentional, but also accidental use. In Minnesota, I've listened to
many gulf war veterans who've told me about their experiences during
the conflict. Much is still unknown about chemical weapons use in the
gulf and there is great concern throughout the Minnesota veterans
community. I've seen the tragic effects of this when I've met with gulf
war veterans who went to the gulf in perfect health but became
seriously ill after they returned. While many are uncertain about the
causes of their illnesses, they suspect that exposure to toxic chemical
agents was a factor.
Mr. President, I want to tell my colleagues about a story I recently
heard concerning veterans who were part of the 477th Ambulance Company
who may have been exposed to toxic chemicals. After the war, a couple
of company members went exploring the area nearby and noticed a spill
on the floor of a warehouse. There's no way of knowing now exactly what
the substance was, but they are concerned about possible exposure to a
nerve agent. They were alarmed because even this kind of low-level
exposure can be a serious threat to our soldiers' safety and health.
The plea from the Minnesotan who told this story is, ``Please! Get
everyone to stop using this junk!'' Well, that is exactly what we are
trying to do, and ratifying the CWC is a vital step in that direction.
If we don't sign up, America's soldiers--and indeed, all Americans--
will be the worse for it.
Another Minnesotan who was a nuclear-biological-chemical warfare
specialist during the war talked about the panic and incorrect use of
protective equipment that occurred when there were scud alerts
accompanied by CBW alerts. There were soldiers who just couldn't handle
the threat of possible chemical attacks. And why should we be
surprised? The use of chemical weapons is inhuman and even the
perceived threat has to be psychologically damaging. These stories just
strengthen my resolve to do all I can to push for ratification of this
treaty.
Mr. President, we face a decision between taking a lead role in this
effort or standing on the sidelines--this decision should not be
difficult for the United States which historically has taken the lead
in arms control, seeking agreements that are in the national interest,
verifiable, and contribute to world peace. I repeat in the national
interest, verifiable, and contribute to world peace. And there is no
question in my mind that the CWC fully meets these standards.
To me, it is a great mystery why this treaty is not already ratified.
After all, Congress directed in 1985 that all U.S. chemical munitions
be destroyed by 1999--since amended to 2004. Subsequently in 1993, the
United States became one of the original signatories of the CWC, now
awaiting ratification by this body. It would seem that there's nothing
so dramatic as waiting until the last minute to make an obvious and
sensible decision. This international treaty takes a major step forward
in the elimination of the scourge of chemical weapons. As the world's
only superpower and leader in the fight for world peace, we must be out
front on this convention.
This treaty itself has a very interesting and solid bipartisan
history as well as strong popular support, and I am mystified as to why
some of my colleagues want to reject a treaty for which we are largely
responsible. The CWC was conceived during the Reagan administration,
crafted and signed during the Bush administration and further
negotiated during the Clinton administration. Former President Bush has
continued to proclaim strong support for ratification. Its bipartisan
creditials are thus impeccable. Legislators and national security
experts from both parties firmly support it. Former Secretary of State
James Baker argues that it is outrageous to suggest that either
Presidents Bush or Reagan would negotiate a treaty that would harm
national security. President Clinton sees the accord as building on the
treaty than bans nuclear tests in the atmosphere that President Kennedy
signed more than three decades ago. The Senate now needs to complete
the weapons-control work to which Presidents Kennedy, Reagan and Bush
and Clinton were and have been committed.
By at least restricting the manufacture, sale, and possession of
toxic chemicals capable of being used as weapons, the United States
makes it more difficult for rogue nations or terrorist organizations to
obtain the raw material for weapons. Ultimately, we then better protect
our soldiers and civilians. We should help lead the world away from
these graveyard gases, and not pretend they are essential to a solid
defense. Do we plan to use chemical weapons? No. Then do we lack the
courage to lead? I certainly hope not.
Mr. President, according to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright,
the United States is the only nation with the power, influence, and
respect to forge a strong global consensus against the spread of
weapons of mass destruction.
There is also support for this treaty from the armed services. I have
the unique perspective of serving on both the Foreign Relations
Committee and the Committee on Veterans' Affairs. I know that many
veterans organizations support this treaty--VFW, VVA, Reserve Officers
Association of U.S., American Ex-prisoners of War, AMVETS, Jewish War
Vets to name a few. What better testimony to its value? The treaty will
reduce world stockpiles of weapons and will hopefully prevent our
troops from being exposed to poison gases. And, for my colleagues who
are still not convinced on the merits of the treaty--over three
quarters of the American public--as much as 84 percent in a recent
poll, favors this treaty.
But why then are there opponents to this treaty? I cannot answer
that. I can only say that it is always easier to tear something down
than it is to build it. Ask ethnic minorities in Iraq--who
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were the victims of Saddam's chemical attacks--why there are opponents.
Ask Generals Schwartzkopf and Powell why there are opponents. According
to General Powell, this treaty serves our national interest--to quote
his comments at last week's Veterans' Affairs Committee hearing: ``For
us to reject that treaty now because there are rogue nations outside
the treaty is the equivalent of saying we shouldn't have joined NATO
because Russia wasn't a part of NATO.'' If we don't sign this treaty,
their will still be rogue nations. Ask the State Department, the
intelligence community, the chemical manufacturers who stand to lose as
much as $600 million in sales, why there are opponents to this treaty.
And ask our own gulf war veterans who lived with the fear of chemical
attack and may now be suffering the effects of exposure to chemicals
why there are opponents. They and I will never understand it.
Mr. President, ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention is
crucial to all nonproliferation efforts. If America's message to the
world is that the United States is not deeply concerned about the
production of weapons of mass destruction, then it will encourage rogue
states to either continue clandestine projects or to begin producing
these weapons that could imperil U.S. troops in future conflicts. Lack
of U.S. resolve on the CWC and the unraveling effect it would have on
other arms control treaties, would make it easier for rogue states in
two ways: they could more easily acquire chemical weapons materials and
more effectively hide their production programs. How can we best
protect the future of our children, our soldiers, our trade, our
country's position in the world? By ratifying this treaty.
I'm deeply puzzled as to why, when at long last the Senate is on the
verge of giving its advice and consent to CWC ratification, we are
being asked to consider treaty-killer conditions. Again, I remind my
colleague, this treaty has been more than 15 years in the making with
two Republican Presidents and one Democratic President involved in
negotiating and crafting the final product. It is the result of years
of bipartisan efforts. The CWC has been strongly endorsed by former
Secretary of State James Baker and former National Security Adviser
Brent Scowcroft--both of whom served Republican Presidents. It also
enjoys the support of our top commanders during the Persian Gulf war,
including General Schwarzkopf, who clearly recognize that it is in our
national interest to ratify the treaty.
While I do not question the motives and integrity of my colleagues
who support these four killer conditions, it is clear that they are not
a result of insufficient Senate scrutiny and debate. In fact, the CWC
has been before the Senate since November 1993, when it was submitted
by President Clinton. During the past 3\1/2\ years, the Senate has held
17 hearings on the treaty and the administration has provided the
Senate with more than 1,500 pages of information on the CWC, including
over 300 pages of testimony and over 400 pages of answers to questions
for the record. It is important to recall that in April 1996 the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations voted the treaty out of committee by a
strong bipartisan majority, 13 to 5. Why then, only 1 year later, are
we confronting four conditions, any of which will prevent us from
ratifying the treaty by April 29 when it will automatically go into
effect, and a fifth condition that is unacceptable and would undermine
the treaty?
Mr. President, I hope that all of my colleagues realize that the
United States will incur serious costs if we don't submit instruments
of ratification by April 29. Unless we join the convention now, the
United States will be barred from having a seat on the executive
council, the key decisionmaking body of the convention, for at least a
year and, perhaps, longer. We would thus be precluded from influencing
vital decisions to be made by the executive council regarding the
detailed procedures that will be followed under the convention.
Moreover, sanctions against U.S. companies--the requirement that they
obtain end-user certificates to export certain chemicals--will commence
on April 29 if we are not a convention party. If we still haven't
joined in 3 years, U.S. firms would be subject to a ban on trade in
certain chemicals. In addition, U.S. citizens won't be hired as
officials or inspectors by the body that will implement the convention
until the United States becomes a party to the CWC. And, even more
important than these costs to the United States, is the fact that
failure to ratify the treaty, which was produced because of U.S.
leadership, will have a negative impact on American leadership around
the world.
While I will never understand why we have come to such a pass, it is
crystal clear to me why we have to move to strike all five of these
conditions. Mr. President, permit me to briefly summarize each of the
five conditions and to spell out the key reasons why I'm unalterably
opposed to them:
CWC condition No. 29 on Russia precludes the United States from
joining the convention until Russia ratifies and satisfies other
specified conditions. This is a killer condition that would hold
hostage our ability to join the CWC to hardliners in the Russian Duma.
As the President put it, ``this is precisely backwards [since] the best
way to secure Russian ratification is to ratify the treaty ourselves.''
I couldn't agree more with the President, whose position parallels that
of Vil Myrzyanov, a Russian scientist who blew the whistle on the
Soviet Union's CW program and strongly backs the treaty. In a recent
letter to my distinguished colleague, Senator Lugar, he said ``Senate
ratification of the convention is crucial to securing action on the
treaty in Moscow.'' Unless, my colleagues join me in striking this
amendment, we'll be permitting Russian hardliners to decide our foreign
policy, while dimming prospects that Russia--which has the world's
largest stockpile of chemical weapons--will ratify the CWC. How can
this be in our national interest?
CWC condition No. 30 on rogue states bars the United States from
ratifying the CWC until all states determined to possess offensive
chemical weapons programs, including China, North Korea, Libya, Syria,
Iran, and Iraq, and other states deemed to be state sponsors of
terrorism, have ratified. This is a killer condition likely to prevent
the United States from ever joining the CWC. If this condition is not
struck we would be using the lowest common denominator as a principle
for determining our foreign policy. The United States would be placed
in the bizarre and embarrassing position of allowing the world's most
recalcitrant regimes to determine when we join the CWC, if ever. As
former Secretary of State James Baker has said: ``It makes no sense to
argue that because a few pariah states refuse to join the convention
the United States should line up with them rather than the rest of the
world.'' Makes no sense at all, which is precisely why I strongly
support striking this condition.
CWC condition No. 31 on barring CWC inspectors from a number of
countries such as Cuba, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, from ever entering
the United States as part of CWC inspection teams. This is an
unnecessary condition that has the potential to seriously hamstring CWC
implementation. To begin with, the United States already has the right
under the CWC to bar inspectors on an individual basis each year when
the CWC proposes its list of inspectors. If this condition is not
struck, it is likely to provoke reciprocity, resulting in other nations
blackballing all American inspectors. This would have the perverse
effect of undermining one of our main objectives in joining the treaty:
to ensure American inspectors take the lead in finding violations. In
addition, condition No. 31 would bar inspectors from a country like
China even if United States national security might be better served by
letting them confirm directly that the United States is not violating
the CWC, but fails to require rejection of inspectors from other
countries who might be known spies or have a record of improper
handling of confidential data. Because of these serious flaws, I urge
my colleagues to join me in voting to strike this condition.
CWC condition No. 32 which prohibits the United States from joining
the CWC until the President certifies that the parties to the
convention have agreed to strike article X and amend article XI. This
provision is an outright killer that will prevent the United States
from joining the Convention. Clearly the President can't make such a
certification prior to April, and likely won't ever be able to do so
since the
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Convention permits a single State party to veto such amendments.
Proponents of condition No. 32 wrongly contend that the Convention
requires the United States and other parties to share sensitive
technology that will assist such countries as Iran to develop offensive
CW capabilities.
In fact, Mr. President, neither article X nor article XI have such
requirements. Article X, which focuses mainly on assisting or
protecting convention member countries attacked, or facing attack, by
chemical weapons, provides complete flexibility for states to determine
what type of assistance to provide and how to provide it. One option
would be to provide solely medical antidotes and treatments to the
threatened state. This is precisely the option the President has chosen
under agreed condition No. 15 which specifies that the United States
will give only medical help to such countries as Iran or Cuba under
article X. Moreover, beyond medical assistance, the President has made
clear the United States will be careful in deciding what assistance to
provide on a case-by-case basis. In sum, there is no valid
justification for scrapping article X.
Opponents of the CWC contend that article XI, which addresses the
exchange of scientific and technical information, requires the sharing
of technology and will result in the erosion of export controls now
imposed by the Australia Group of chemical exporting countries, which
includes the United States. While this is plainly not the case, the
President under agreed condition No. 7 is committed to obtain
assurances from our Australia Group partners that article XI is fully
consistent with maintaining export curbs on dangerous chemicals.
Condition No. 7 also requires the President to certify that the CWC
doesn't obligate the United States to modify its national export
controls, as well as to certify annually that the Australia Group is
maintaining controls that are equal to, or exceed, current export
controls.
Mr. President, one final point regarding the Condition's proponents
concern that articles X and XI will require technology that will assist
other countries to develop offensive chemical weapons programs.
Exchanges of sensitive technology and information provided under terms
of both articles would be legally bound by the fundamental obligation
of treaty article I, which obligates parties never to ``* * * assist
encourage, or induce, in any, anyone to engage in any activity
prohibited to a State party under this convention.'' This would ban
assisting anyone in acquiring a chemical weapons capability.
I strongly urge my colleagues from both sides of the aisle to join me
in voting to strike this condition.
CWC condition No. 33 would prohibit the United States from ratifying
the CWC until the President can certify high confidence U.S.
capabilities to detect within 1 year of a violation, the illicit
production or storage of one metric ton of chemical agent. Since this
is an unachievable standard for monitoring the treaty, this is a killer
condition that would permanently bar U.S. participation in the CWC.
Mr. President, no one can deny that some aspects of the CWC will be
difficult to verify, nor can anyone affirm that any arms control
agreement is 100 percent verifiable. And, as Gen. Edward Rowny, who was
special adviser to Presidents Reagan and Bush, pointed out in the
Washington Post any chemical weapons treaty is inherently more
difficult to verify than a strategic arms treaty, under which missiles
and bombers can be observed by national technical means. For one thing,
chemical weapons can literally be produced in thousands of large and
small laboratories around the world. But the bottom line is one made
succinctly and clearly by General Rowny: ``If we are within the CWC,
well-trained and experienced American inspectors, employing an agreed
set of procedures, intensive procedures, will have an opportunity to
catch violaters. Outside the CWC, no such opportunity will exist.'' I
couldn't agree more. As in many other matters, the perfect is not only
unattainable but is also the enemy of the good. I hope than many of my
colleagues will see this issue in the same light and will join me in
voting to strike condition No. 33.
In conclusion, I want to stress that America has always been a leader
in international arms negotiations. America should continue this proud
tradition of leading the way. We as a nation have the opportunity to be
one of the world's leading guardians of the peace through the
application of this treaty; we can participate in safeguarding our
armed forces, our citizens, our children from the horrors of chemical
weapons; we can lessen the likelihood of chemical weapons being used
again in warfare.
But to make all this possible, we must have the perspicacity and
foresight to grab this fleeting opportunity, this historic moment where
we decide to join with other nations to improve the quality of life
worldwide and assure a safer, saner world. We have just celebrated
Earth Day--and I ask what better way to honor our planet is there than
by now ratifying a treaty that will protect and safeguard her people?
Mr. President, there is not a lot of time to go through such an
important issue, but I thought I would just draw from some very
poignant and personal discussion back in Minnesota that we have had
with gulf war veterans.
To quote one of the veterans who himself is really struggling with
illness which he thinks is based upon some exposure to chemicals during
his service in the war, he said, ``This is my plea. Please get everyone
to stop using this junk.''
I really do think that the more I talk to veterans with their service
in the gulf war fresh in their mind, many of whom are ill, many of whom
are struggling with illness, who were fine before they served in the
war and are not now and want to know what has happened to them, there
are two different issues. I have the honor of being on both the
Veterans' Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. One, on
the Veterans' Committee, is to get to the bottom of this and make sure
veterans get the care they deserve. But the other is when we have such
an important treaty, such a historically important agreement which is
in the national interest, which is verifiable and which contributes to
world peace and helps us get rid of this junk and is so important not
only to our soldiers-to-be but also to children and grandchildren, Mr.
President, I do not think there is any more important vote that we can
make than one of majority support for the Chemical Weapons Convention.
In my State of Minnesota, I know that people are overwhelmingly for
this agreement. People are under no illusion. They do not think it is
perfect, but they think it is an enormous step forward for all of
humankind, an enormous step forward for people in our country, an
enormous step forward for people in other countries as well. Since the
United States of America has taken a leadership position in the
international community, in the international arena, it would be, I
think, nothing short of tragic if we now were on the sidelines, if we
were not involved in the implementation of this agreement, if we were
not involved in exerting our leadership in behalf of this agreement.
I urge full support for this agreement, and I really do think I speak
for a large, engaged majority in Minnesota.
I thank the Chair.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no objection, time will be
deducted equally.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I withhold my suggestion of the absence of
a quorum. I yield 7 minutes to my friend from North Dakota.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, today the Senate will vote on the Chemical
Weapons Convention. President Reagan began the negotiations on this
treaty. President Bush signed it. And President Clinton sent it to the
Senate for our advice and consent.
We do a lot of things in this Chamber. Some of them are small and
rather insignificant. But we also do some very big and important things
and make some big and important decisions. The vote this evening on
this treaty is a very significant decision for the people of America
and also people around the world.
There are some who have opposed virtually all efforts in all cases to
limit arms. They vote against all of the arms
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control treaties, believing that they are not in our country's best
interests. I think they were wrong, and I think they have been proven
wrong in a number of areas.
In previous arms control agreements, we have achieved significant
success in reducing the nuclear threat against this country. I held up
in this Chamber--in fact, somewhere right near this spot--not too many
months ago a large piece of metal that I held up from that missile is
metal that comes from the scrap heap because the missile does not exist
any longer.
In the missile silo that existed, in the hole in the ground in the
Ukraine, that hole in the ground which contained a missile with a
warhead ensconced in that silo, there is now simply dirt. And in that
dirt are planted sunflowers--no missile, no silo--sunflowers.
Now, why are sunflowers planted where a missile was once planted, a
missile with a nuclear warhead aimed at the United States of America?
Because of an arms control agreement which required that that missile
be destroyed. So sunflowers exist where a missile once stood poised,
aimed at our country.
Arms control agreements have worked. This particular convention which
we will vote to ratify today would eliminate an entire class of weapons
of mass destruction.
One could come to the floor of the Senate today and hold up a vial of
sarin gas, and if one should drop that vial of gas on this desk and it
would break, those in this room might not be leaving the room; they
might not survive. If someone came here with a vial and a gas mask and
wore the mask and appropriate protective clothing, then they would
suffer no consequences.
My point is, who are the most vulnerable in our world when there is a
poison gas or chemical weapon attack? The population of ordinary
citizens is the most vulnerable. There are armies, if forewarned, that
can defend themselves against it, but the mass population of citizens
in our countries is extraordinarily vulnerable to the most aggressive
poison gas and chemical weapons known to mankind.
There are a lot of arguments that have been raised against this
convention, but none of them make much sense. Our country has already
decided to destroy our stockpile of poison gas and chemical weapons. We
have already made that decision. President Reagan made that decision.
We are in the process of finishing that job. The question before the
Senate is whether we will join in a treaty ratified already by over 70
other countries, whether we will decide to work to eliminate chemical
weapons and poison gas from the rest of the world, to decide that if
ever American men and women who wear a uniform in service of our
country go abroad or go somewhere to defend our country, they will not
be facing an attack by chemical weapons or poison gas.
That is what this debate is about. This is not a small or an
insignificant issue. This is an attempt by our country and others to
join together to ban an entire class of weapons of mass destruction.
Mr. President, I have spoken several times in this Chamber about the
vote that we are to take today. This vote is late. This debate should
have taken place long ago, but it did not. We pushed and agitated and
pushed and pushed some more to get it to the floor of the Senate
because we face a critical end date of April 29.
I commend those who finally decided to join with us and bring this to
the floor for a debate, but now as we proceed through several
amendments and then final passage, it is important for the future of
this country, for my children and the children of the world, that this
Senate cast a favorable vote to ratify the treaty that comes from this
convention. It will be a better world and a safer world if we do that.
I want to commend those who have worked on this in Republican and
Democratic administrations, those whose view of foreign policy is that
it is a safer world if we together, jointly, reduce the threats that
exist in our world. Yes, the threat from nuclear weapons. We have done
that in arms control treaties. Those treaties are not perfect, but we
have made huge progress. And now, also, the threat of chemical weapons
and poison gas.
I am proud today to cast a vote for a treaty that is very
significant, and I hope sufficient numbers of my colleagues will do the
same. I hope that the news tomorrow in our country will be that the
United States of America has joined 74 other countries in ratifying
this critically important treaty for our future.
Mr. President, I yield the floor and I make a point of order that a
quorum is not present.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time will be divided equally.
The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Chair recognizes the Senator from Vermont, who has an hour under
the agreement.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may need
under the hour reserved to the Senator from Vermont.
Mr. President, today the Senate will exercise its advice and consent
authority under article II, section 2, clause 2 of the United States
Constitution. We have to decide whether we will advise and consent to
the Chemical Weapons Convention that has been the product of
negotiations conducted by the Reagan, the Bush and the Clinton
administrations. If we advise and consent to it, then President Clinton
will be free to ratify the convention. If we do not, of course, he does
not have that power to do so.
Last week I did not object to the unanimous-consent agreement by
which the Senate is now finally able to consider the Chemical Weapons
Convention. I did comment at that time on the manner in which we are
proceeding. We have been forced to take the unusual step of discharging
this important treaty from the Foreign Relations Committee without the
benefit of committee consideration or a committee report. And, what is
most extraordinary, is that it is the Republican leadership for the
Republican majority that has insisted on this extraordinary procedure.
Last week we were required to discharge the Judiciary Committee from
any consideration of S. 495, a bill that was taken up last Thursday
with no committee consideration, no committee report, and an absolute
minimum of debate. In fact, the Senate was asked to consider a revised,
unamendable substitute version of the bill that was not made available
to us until that very afternoon. I raised concerns that it might, in
fact, serve to weaken criminal laws against terrorism. I daresay at
least 90 out of the 100 Senators who voted on S. 495 last week had not
read it and probably did not have much idea of what was in it.
I mention this because we have taken a lot of time for recesses this
year but we did not come up with a budget on April 15, even though the
law requires us to do so. The leadership decided not to bring one
before the Senate to vote on. Each one of us had to file our taxes on
April 15, or the IRS would have come knocking on the door, but even
though the law requires the leadership to bring up a budget bill, none
was. I am not suggesting we not bring up the Chemical Weapons
Convention now. It should have been brought up last September. But I
worry that the Senate is suddenly doing this, launching into issue
after issue, not following the kind of procedures that would enable us
to really know what we are talking about. I suggest that we should be
looking at the way we have done this.
In 1988 I chaired hearings on the threat of high-tech terrorism. I
continue to be concerned about terrorist access to plastique
explosives, sophisticated information systems, electronic surveillance
equipment, and ever more powerful, dangerous weapons. With the sarin
nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway system 2 years ago, we saw the use
of harmful chemicals to commit terrorist acts.
In our Judiciary hearings in 1988, 1991 and 1995, we heard testimony
on easily acquired, difficult to detect chemical and biological weapons
and explosions. On April 17, 1995, the date of the bombing of the
Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, we all learned how easy it is
for somebody, intent on terrorism, to concoct a lethal compound out of
materials as easily available as fertilizer.
[[Page S3575]]
So, for more than a decade I have raised issues about the threats of
nuclear, biological and chemical terrorism. I have worked with Members
on both sides of the aisle to minimize those threats. We have
cooperated on measures included in the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, and the Antiterrorism Act, passed in April of
last year. We have concurred on those. Assuming we advise and consent
today, and I think now that we will--I think some who wanted to hold it
up realize that this is not the kind of posture they want to be in,
especially as a party going into elections next year--but, assuming
that we advise and consent and the President can ratify it, I look
forward to working with Senator Hatch to promptly consider and report
implementing legislation that will continue the progress we are making
today.
I look forward to hearings in the Judiciary Committee on S. 610,
having that committee consider that measure and report it to the Senate
before the Memorial Day recess.
I do not expect the distinguished senior Senator from Utah, chairman
of the Judiciary Committee, to bottle up this measure or to deny the
Senate the benefit of our committee's views. I am going to try to get
something approaching regular order. We have not on anything else yet
this year, but maybe on this issue we could.
We have had the Chemical Weapons Convention before us since November
1993. As the April 28, 1997, deadline approaches--after which our lack
of ratification risks economic sanctions against our chemical industry
that would actually cost U.S. chemical companies hundreds of millions
of dollars--I hope the Republican majority will join with the President
and ratify it, and allow him to sign this treaty. I understand all
Democrats will vote for it. I hope enough Republicans will, too.
In fact, our good friend and former colleague, Senator Bob Dole,
endorsed ratification yesterday. I hope others are now going to follow
him, because, really, we are deciding whether the United States will be
a member of a treaty that goes into effect on April 29, with or without
us. No matter what we do on the floor of the Senate, this treaty goes
into effect on April 29. If we do not advise and consent, the United
States will be left on the outside of the world community, with states
like Iraq and Libya, which have refused to become parties to this
important arms control measure. It is a fascinating situation, Mr.
President. If we do not advise and consent, we can say we are standing
shoulder to shoulder with Iraq and Libya because we did not join the
chemical weapons treaty. This is one of the most ambitious treaties in
the history of arms control. It bans an entire class of weapons, which
have been one of the great scourges of the 20th century. In fact, this,
along with antipersonnel landmines, have been among the greatest
scourges of 20th century warfare. This treaty prohibits a full spectrum
of activities associated with the offensive use of chemical weapons,
including the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling and
assistance to anyone engaging in these activities.
The convention creates a comprehensive verification regime which
makes it easier to detect and monitor emerging chemical weapons
threats. The vigorous verification procedures established in this
treaty will help deter countries from developing chemical weapons, and
will make it more likely that cheaters are detected. Those nations that
do not ratify it, and we could be among them, will be subject to trade
sanctions. Nonparticipating nations will also face increasing
international pressure to comply, as their number dwindles to an
unsavory few. I hope the United States will not be one of those
unsavory few.
In the last day, I have heard preposterous statements from the Senate
floor about what damage this treaty will do to our national security,
about what a burden it will be on American business--the same
businesses that are hoping that we will advise and consent to it; about
how rogue states will suddenly produce unconstrained amounts of
chemical weapons to use on our soldiers. Others eloquently exposed
these charges for what they are: flat-out false.
What this debate is really about is how we monitor the rest of the
world to ensure the use of these weapons is deterred and minimized. For
we all know, the United States by law is committed to destroying our
own chemical stockpiles by 2004. We are doing this because we know that
these weapons have limited military utility and because civilized
people around the world agree their use is morally wrong. And the
United States is not going to use them.
So, how do we encourage other states to do what we are going to do
anyway? Should we go at it unilaterally or multilaterally? Do we want
American inspection teams to mount short notice inspections of
potential violators or not? Do we want international penalties to apply
to those who flout this treaty or not? Are we safer if the Russians
destroy their 40,000 tons of chemical weapons, or not? Do we join with
the 74 nations who have ratified this treaty, and the 162 countries
that have signed it, or not? Or, does the United States, the most
powerful nation in the history of the world, choose, somehow, to go it
alone, with all the problems that would entail?
Let us not forget that the United States had a primary role in
designing and shaping this treaty, from the time it was first proposed
by President Reagan. In recent weeks, the ranking member of the Foreign
Relations Committee, working in concert with the Clinton
administration, has worked very hard to address the concerns that some
Members of this body have. Yesterday we passed 28 declarations to the
resolution of ratification that provide even greater protections to
U.S. business, and our soldiers, and those who are concerned about
constitutional violations.
Shortly, we are going to vote to strike five other conditions that
opponents of the treaty say are necessary to address their concerns. I
hope that, rather than addressing their concerns, we address the
concerns of the United States. Those five conditions should be seen for
what they are, treaty killers, designed by those who have no desire to
see us participate in this treaty, no matter how many modifications we
make.
I want to speak briefly about two of the amendments. The
distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator
Helms, has been very insistent on them. They are important with respect
to this treaty, and also with respect to the issue of antipersonnel
landmines. That is a matter of special importance to me.
Proposed condition 29 would, among other things, prohibit the United
States from ratifying the treaty until Russia has done so. Proposed
condition 30 would prohibit the United States from ratifying the treaty
until all States having chemical weapons programs, including China,
North Korea, and Iraq, have ratified the treaty. In other words, we
would say that China, North Korea, and Iraq would determine the
timetable for the United States. Can you imagine that in any other
context? We would be screaming on this floor. Of course we would not
allow that to happen. These conditions would effectively prevent the
United States from ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention and allow
the world's most recalcitrant regimes to decide the rules of
international conduct.
To its credit, the administration strongly opposed these amendments.
It argues, and I agree, that we should ratify the treaty even before
Russia does, and even assuming that rogue States like Iraq and Libya
and North Korea do not. In other words, even if these other nations
which could easily produce chemical weapons do not join the treaty, the
United States should still do so. Why? Because, by ratifying the treaty
we isolate the rogue nations, we make it harder for them to produce and
use chemical weapons. And, were they then to do so, if all of us had
joined in this convention and they moved outside the convention, they
would suffer international condemnation and sanctions.
In support of this argument the administration has turned to some of
our most distinguished military and national security leaders. Let me
quote what they are saying about linking our ratification to Russia's
or to the actions of such nations as China and Iraq.
Gen. Brent Scowcroft and former CIA Director John Deutch say:
[U.S. failure to ratify] gives Russia--which has the
world's largest stock of chemical weapons--an easy excuse to
further delay its own accession to the CWC.
[[Page S3576]]
Former Secretary of State James Baker says:
[S]ome have argued that we should not contribute to the
treaty because states like Libya, Iraq and North Korea, which
have not signed it, will still be able to continue their
efforts to acquire chemical weapons. This is obviously true.
But the convention . . . will make it more difficult for
these states to do so. . . . It makes no sense to argue that
because a few pariah states refuse to join the convention,
the United States should line up with them, rather than the
rest of the world.
Secretary of Defense William Cohen says:
[T]he CWC will reduce the chemical weapons problem to a few
notorious rogues. . . .
And last, but certainly not least, Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf has said:
We don't need chemical weapons to fight our future wars.
And frankly, by not ratifying that treaty, we align ourselves
with nations like Libya and North Korea, and I'd just as soon
not be associated with those thugs in that particular battle.
I agree with General Schwarzkopf. I do not want to have the United
States lumped in with Libya and North Korea on the CWC.
By ratifying the treaty, we and the overwhelming majority of nations
establish the rules by which the conduct of nations is measured.
Will some nations violate the treaty? Perhaps. But that is no more
reason to oppose ratification than it would be to oppose passage of
other laws outlawing illegal conduct. We pass laws all the time,
criminal laws in this country, and treaties, that say what shall be a
crime or a violation of the treaty. We do not withhold passing them
because somebody might break that law. It is one of the main reasons we
do pass a law, to try to deter unacceptable conduct.
And by isolating the rogue nations, we pressure them to refrain from
producing or using chemical weapons. When they tire of being branded
outlaws, they may even join in ratifying the treaty and complying with
it themselves.
The arguments we hear on the floor from some today in opposition to
this also apply to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Not all nuclear powers
are signatories to that treaty. But the effect of the treaty is a
powerful disincentive on any state, signatory or not, from testing
nuclear weapons. We know there are some countries today that have
nuclear weapons. They have not signed the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, but
because the major countries have, it limits their own scope of
activity.
These treaties were the subject of many, many years of negotiations,
negotiations that went nowhere until the United States said that it
would renounce the use of chemical weapons, and stop nuclear testing.
And once the United States said that, then negotiations were pursued
vigorously. The treaties were signed within a few years time.
I commend the administration and other proponents of the CWC for
arguing so strongly and effectively in favor of ratification. The
President has made the case very, very well, and members of his
administration have too.
I would say with some irony though, this is precisely the argument
that I have been using on antipersonnel landmines. I could repeat
verbatim what the President, the White House staff, the Secretary of
Defense, General Schwarzkopf, and former Secretary Baker have said.
These arguments apply lock, stock, and barrel to the problem of
antipersonnel landmines. We all want Russia and China to be part of a
treaty banning antipersonnel landmines. But that is not going to happen
any sooner than Iraq is going to sign the chemical weapons treaty.
Their failure should not be used as an excuse for the United States
not to sign a treaty banning antipersonnel mines when 100 other
nations, including many that have produced and used landmines or have
been devastated by their effects, are ready to sign such a treaty.
When the administration on the one hand says we have to go forward
with the Chemical Weapons Convention--and I agree--even though some
countries, the worst ones have not yet joined, it is unfortunate that
the administration then turns around and says we cannot do the same
thing with antipersonnel landmines until everybody joins in.
No treaty is universal. In fact some treaties have taken effect with
only 20 signatories. But by establishing the international norm, the
rogue nations are isolated and pressure builds on them to sign. And
that is the only way.
So I ask, Mr. President, why does the administration argue one way on
chemical weapons but not follow through on its argument when it comes
to antipersonnel landmines? Landmines are just as indiscriminate.
Why, when many more American soldiers and many more innocent
civilians, Americans and others, have been killed and horribly maimed
by landmines than by chemical weapons?
The reason, of course, is we pushed for the Chemical Weapons Treaty
because we have already renounced our own use of chemical weapons, just
as we pushed for the Test Ban Treaty because we had renounced our own
nuclear tests. But we have not yet renounced our use of antipersonnel
landmines.
If we did do so, if the United States were to renounce its use of
antipersonnel mines, as so many other nations have done, including many
of our NATO allies, I guarantee that the administration would make
exactly the same arguments in support of a treaty banning those weapons
as it is making in support of the CWC.
They would say that we should not allow Russia, China, and others to
decide what the rules of international conduct should be. They would
say it makes absolutely no sense that because a few pariah nations
refuse to join a landmine ban the United States should line up with
them rather than the rest of the world. And they would say that a
treaty banning antipersonnel landmines would reduce the landmine
problem to a few notorious outlaws and make the world safer for all its
people. These are the arguments they made on the Chemical Weapons
Convention. They are right. They also would be right in making these
same arguments in support of a treaty banning antipersonnel landmines.
In fact, Mr. President, in a letter to the New York Times today by
Robert Bell, the Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control,
National Security Council, Mr. Bell wrote:
We will be in a much stronger position to make sure other
parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention do the same if we
are inside, not outside a treaty.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that that letter be printed in
the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the New York Times, Apr. 24, 1997]
U.S. Would Benefit From Chemical Treaty
(By Robert G. Bell)
To the Editor:
Re A.M. Rosenthal's ``Matter for Character'' (column, April
22), on the Chemical Weapons Convention, which the Senate
will vote on April 24:
Mr. Rosenthal says that Article 10 of the treaty should be
a ``deal breaker'' because it allegedly would give
``terrorist nations'' access to defensive technology that
would help them evade the defenses of responsible states.
Only countries that have joined the Chemical Weapons
Convention, renounced chemical weapons and destroyed their
stockpiles can request defensive assistance--and then only if
they are threatened with or under chemical attack. Further,
President Clinton has committed to the Senate in a binding
condition that the United States will limit our assistance to
countries of concern, like Iran or Cuba--should they ratify
and comply with the treaty--to emergency medical supplies.
And we will be in a much stronger position to make sure
other parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention do the same
if we are inside, not outside a treaty that will compel other
nations to do what we decided to do years ago: get rid of
chemical weapons.
Mr. LEAHY. I agree with Mr. Bell, and I know he worked tirelessly on
the CWC. But unfortunately, Mr. Bell, who I am sure is well motivated,
has not been willing to apply that same argument to antipersonnel
landmines. The Vice President will not apply that argument. Many of the
same people who are up here arguing for the Chemical Weapons Convention
make one argument for the Chemical Weapons Convention and turn that
argument completely around when it comes to antipersonnel landmines
even though we face a grave danger, every day, from antipersonnel
landmines.
There are 100 million of antipersonnel landmines in the ground in 68
countries, where every few minutes somebody is maimed or killed by
them. This is, in many ways, a greater danger
[[Page S3577]]
to innocent people than chemical weapons. And I wish the
administration, I wish Mr. Bell, I wish the Vice President, I wish
others who have not made their same arguments on antipersonnel
landmines that they do on chemical weapons will reconsider. Because,
like chemical weapons, antipersonnel landmines are weapons we do not
need.
What we do need are defenses against them, because, like chemical
weapons, they are easy and cheap to produce. They pose a grave threat
to our troops. They are the Saturday night specials of civil wars. They
kill or maim a man, woman or child every 22 minutes every day of the
year. They are aptly called weapons of mass destruction in slow motion.
In fact, they are the only weapon where the victim pulls the trigger.
They are a weapon where one Cambodian told me, in their country they
cleared their landmines with an arm and a leg at a time.
I am proud to support the President, the Vice President, and the rest
of the administration on the Chemical Weapons Convention. But I hope
that they will soon take the same position on antipersonnel landmines
and say, let us bring together the like-minded states--and there are
many who are ready to join in a treaty to ban them, join with them, and
then put the pressure on the other countries like Russia and China and
so on who will take longer to do it.
If American children were being torn to pieces every day on their way
to school, or while playing in their backyards, we would have made it a
crime long ago. It is an outrage that should shock the conscience of
every one of us.
So I am going to vote to advise and consent to the Chemical Weapons
Convention so the President can ratify it and to exert the leadership
necessary to help rid the world of the scourge of chemical weapons. I
look forward to ratification and to the implementation legislation to
make the treaty a reality.
And I will also continue to work to convince the administration this
is the kind of leadership we need if we are to rid the world of
antipersonnel landmines--a scourge every bit as horrifying as chemical
weapons, frankly, Mr. President, a scourge that is killing more people
today and tomorrow and last year and next year, and on and on, than
chemical weapons. We should be leading the world's nations to end the
destruction and death caused each day by landmines, not sitting on the
sidelines.
I will conclude, Mr. President, by quoting from a letter to President
Clinton signed by 15 of this country's most distinguished military
officers, including Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf; former Supreme Allied
Commander John Galvin; former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, David
Jones, and others. They said:
We view such a ban [on antipersonnel landmines] as not only
humane, but also militarily responsible.
I quote further:
The rationale for opposing antipersonnel landmines is that
they are in a category similar to poison gas. . . . they are
insidious in that their indiscriminate effects . . . cause
casualties among innocent people. . . .
They said further:
Given the wide range of weaponry available to military
forces today, antipersonnel landmines are not essential.
Thus, banning them would not undermine the military
effectiveness or safety of our forces, nor those of other
nations.
Mr. President, every single argument the administration has made in
favor of us joining the Chemical Weapons Convention could be made to
ask us to go to Ottawa to sign a treaty banning antipersonnel
landmines. Because by doing that, we would have 90 percent of the
nations of this world pressuring the remaining 10 percent, and that
pressure would be enormous.
I reserve the balance--
Mr. President, how much time is remaining to the Senator from
Vermont?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Twenty-seven minutes.
Mr. DODD. May I inquire, Mr. President, from the Senator from
Vermont, there are a couple of us here who have requested some time. In
fact, I know my colleague from California has made a similar request.
My colleague from Maryland also has. I ask if our colleague from
Vermont would be willing to yield us some time off his time. We could
make some remarks and maybe expedite this process.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I intend to be speaking again further on
this. I have 27 minutes remaining.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is a correction of the time. You
actually have 32 minutes left.
Mr. DODD. I needed 10 minutes.
Mrs. BOXER. If I could have 7 minutes, I would ask the Senator.
Mr. LEAHY. I will yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Connecticut, 7
minutes to the Senator from California, and withhold the balance of my
time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California.
Mrs. BOXER. Thank you very much.
I appreciate my friend from Connecticut allowing me to proceed. I may
not use the full 7 minutes. I will try to be very concise.
Mr. President, I rise in strong support for ratification of the
Chemical Weapons Convention. And I base my support on four main facts.
First, the Chemical Weapons Convention is in the national security
interests of the United States of America because it reduces the
likelihood that American soldiers or civilians will ever face a
chemical weapons attack.
We should not lose sight of why this is so important. The effects of
chemical weapons are so barbaric, so devastating, that we must do all
we can to ensure that they are never used again.
Chemical weapons are among the most horrible devices ever conceived.
If they do not kill their victims instantly, chemical weapons invade
the respiratory system making it unbearably painful to breathe. When
chemical weapons were used in Iraq by Saddam Hussein, against the
Kurds, eyewitnesses reported that the pain was so great that many
victims submerged themselves in nearby rivers to escape the spreading
gas.
Mr. President, we are a civilized Nation here. We must do all we can
to prevent this torture. And approving the CWC is a major step. I know
many of my colleagues had questions. I know that Senator Biden and
others have worked tirelessly to address those problems. And I feel
what we will have before us, if we defeat the killer amendments, the
five killer amendments, will lead us to a far more civilized world.
All signatory nations of the CWC agree never again to manufacture
chemical weapons, nor to use them in war. They agree to destroy all
existing stockpiles of chemical weapons. They agree to allow
inspections of chemical plants to verify that no weapons are being
manufactured illegally.
To those who say there are some nations who may not sign on, we know
that is so. I will say this: If we sign this treaty and we are a party
to it, it will be far more difficult for nonsignatory nations to
develop chemical weapons. This is the case because rogue states will
find it far more difficult to import the raw materials and
manufacturing equipment they need to develop chemical weapons.
Another reason, the second reason: If the United States fails to
ratify the convention, it will still go into effect, but it will be
weaker. It will be weaker because many nations will stay off this
treaty and, therefore, there will be fewer who are actually bound by
it. Also, our inspectors will not be on the team to go and search for
possible CWC violations. Our inspectors are among the best in the
world, and they will give us confidence as to the true state of
chemical weapons production. Why would we want to stay off a treaty
that will go forward that will not have our inspectors on those teams?
Third, failure to ratify will hurt American business. The CWC imposes
trade sanctions against nonsignatory nations that limit the ability of
their chemical industries to export many of their products overseas. It
could cost our companies hundreds of millions of dollars every year.
Now, opponents say that the CWC would impose additional regulations on
an already heavily regulated industry, our chemical industry. They
argue the convention will result in vast new compliance costs. But when
you take the compliance costs of $250,000 to $2 million for the entire
industry, that is a small price to pay compared to the hundreds of
millions of dollars that would be lost if sanctions were imposed.
The vast majority of the chemical industries strongly supports the
CWC. U.S. chemical companies advised the
[[Page S3578]]
Reagan and Bush administrations throughout the original CWC
negotiations. Leading U.S. chemical trade associations support the CWC.
They know the costs of compliance are small and the risks to industry
are great if we fail to ratify.
Fourth, failure to ratify will undermine our credibility, America's
credibility, in the world. Imagine a treaty that was brought forward by
Ronald Reagan, continued toward the goal line by George Bush, and now a
Democrat President, following a legacy of those two Republican
Presidents, wanting to take this over the goal line, and suddenly we
are going to back off. It seems to me our credibility is absolutely at
stake here. I believe we should not back away from this treaty. We
should pass it and defeat the killer amendments.
Mr. President, to those who raise all sorts of flags about this
treaty, we should understand this: We could always exercise our right
to withdraw from the convention on 90 days' notice. This right to
withdraw is guaranteed to all signatory nations by article XVI of the
CWC.
Mr. President, in closing, I thank the Senator from Vermont for his
generosity, and my friend from Connecticut. I join with them. The CWC
is in our national interests. It will enhance national security,
protect American jobs; it will help maintain our position of global
leadership; and, my friends, most important of all, it really will
protect the world from the most horrible, horrible weapons of our time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. DODD. Thank you, Mr. President. I thank my colleague from Vermont
for his generosity in yielding time.
Mr. President, yesterday I included some extensive remarks in the
Record regarding the overall treaty. I let those remarks speak for
themselves today.
First, I begin by commending our colleagues, the chairman of the
Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Helms; the ranking Democrat on the
committee, Senator Biden; the majority leader, Senator Lott; and the
minority leader, Senator Daschle, for working out the arrangements of
this treaty so we can come up for a vote prior to the April 29
deadline.
Let me also say, Mr. President, while there are disagreements--and
there will be over the ultimate decision of whether or not to support
the treaty--I think the debate and the process we have gone through has
been healthy. I suspect those who are deeply involved in the workings
of this treaty have improved it. So I commend all of our colleagues for
the work they have done on this particular effort. I think it is how
the Senate of the United States ought to conduct its business when it
comes to matters dealing with obligations to commit our country for
many years to come. It was no mistake that our Founding Fathers
required supermajorities to commit this Nation to international
arrangements, and the fact that we require supermajorities for
treaties, I think, is worthwhile.
Mr. President, I want to focus my attention, if I can, on the first
amendment that will be raised here. The amendment will strike a
condition in the treaty that has been included by Senator Helms. I am
going to oppose condition 30, which I believe will be the first vote we
will cast. This is the rogue states condition. I will explain what that
means and express why I think it ought to be struck from this treaty in
the brief time I have available to me.
Mr. President, we must ask only one question today. We must ask: Is
this treaty in the best interests of our country? That is our
obligation as Members of the U.S. Senate. That is the question which we
must address. This condition 30, the rogue states condition, I think,
is not in the best interests of the United States. I think it would
prohibit the United States from ratifying the Chemical Weapons
Convention. It would prohibit us, of course, from ratifying the
convention until nations such as North Korea, Libya, Syria and Iraq
ratify the treaty.
More than any of the other conditions we will vote on, Mr. President,
later today, this condition would delay indefinitely, in my view, the
ratification of this treaty. The so-called rogue states condition would
force the United States of America to wait until all of the pariah
states of the world ratify before we, ourselves, would accept the
treaty that we, ourselves negotiated.
There is a reason, Mr. President, that we use the words rogue and
pariah to describe these countries such as North Korea, Libya, Iran.
These are the nations that are the loners in the international arena
and who routinely disregard international opinion in pursuing their own
interests. These rogue nations, these renegade nations, have never
given weight to world opinion. There is no reason to expect that they
will have a change of heart any time soon. Waiting for these rogue
states to accept this treaty is literally like waiting for Godot.
Let it be known, then, that a vote against striking this condition
is, in my view, without any question whatever, a vote to prohibit U.S.
participation in the Chemical Weapons Convention. If we include, Mr.
President, this condition 30, the rogue states condition, we might as
well include a condition that requires ratification by every single
nation on Earth before we ratify, for these are, indeed, the very last
nations that would ever accept this treaty. That is because these
nations, these rogue nations, fear this treaty and the international
determination that it demonstrates.
Our country, Mr. President, has decided unilaterally to destroy its
aging chemical weapons stockpile by the year 2004. That is a decision
we have already made. Regardless of what other nations do, we have
decided to take ourselves out of the chemical weapons business
unilaterally, and yet the assumption under this faulty condition is
that we must not disarm until other nations with chemical weapons or
chemical weapons capability disarm as well.
We must be clear, Mr. President, that having agreed, ourselves, to
destroy our chemical weapons, this treaty deals with whether or not we
can act with the backing of the world to bring other nations to do the
same. As Secretary Albright has said very simply, ``This treaty is
about other nations' chemical weapons, not our own.'' We will destroy,
Mr. President, our weapons because they are no longer needed. So this
idea that we must wait for other nations to ratify this treaty, I
believe, is fatally flawed.
This convention would establish an international norm that will allow
us to pressure rogue states who decide they would rather keep and
enhance their chemical weapons stockpile. On the basis of what we now
know about the Persian Gulf war, that many thousands of this Nation's
troops may have been exposed to chemical agents, we must not pass up
the chance, in my view, to establish a norm that would have made it far
more difficult for Iraq to have the weapons in the first place.
Remember, Mr. President, there is no law that bars a nation from
building, stockpiling, upgrading, or transferring their chemical
weapons. In fact, when Iraq used chemical weapons against the Kurds, as
heinous an act as it was, the Iraqis did not even violate the Geneva
Protocol because they did not use the agents in an international
conflict.
What we need today, Mr. President, is a new agreement. This
convention goes much farther in establishing a basis for international
action against chemical weapons themselves.
I further object, Mr. President, to this rogue states condition
because we should not allow our foreign policy decisions to be dictated
by rogue states--by a Libya, a North Korea, and an Iraq. Let us
remember that the negotiating teams of President Reagan and President
Bush anticipated the likelihood that rogue nations would not accept
this treaty. That is why President Reagan's and President Bush's teams
included sanctions, when they wrote this treaty, against nations that
remained outside of this treaty. This condition 30, the rogue states
condition, insults those negotiating teams that worked so hard and with
such great foresight on this very treaty. It assumes that they were so
shortsighted that they did not anticipate that rogue nations would
oppose it. That is not the case. The truth, again, is that the
negotiators knew very well that these rogue nations would look upon
this treaty as something that they would have to oppose, so we and
other nations demanded that these renegade nations be penalized.
How ironic it is, Mr. President, that unless the United States
strikes this
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rogue states condition, we now will be penalized ourselves. Germany, I
point out, has already indicated its intent to impose the sanctions
against nonparticipants that this treaty mandates.
Let us be aware, Mr. President, we live in a new world. Scholars use
the words ``multipolar'' and ``post-nationalist'' to describe today's
world. Other nations are increasingly capable of taking action without
our leadership, regretfully I might add. Those who think this treaty
will not go into effect without our ratification are thinking of an
older world, of the days when the United States declined to participate
in the League of Nations and it failed as a result. Mr. President, that
was over three-quarters of a century ago. Let me assure my colleagues
that to the extent we isolate ourselves today, our country will pay a
price tomorrow.
The question before us this hour with this condition that will come
up shortly, is, will we allow a group of rogue, renegade nations to
disengage the United States from the international community on this
issue of chemical weapons?
Mr. President, when this Nation allows itself to be held back by the
shortsightedness, the evil of other nations, we make a huge mistake
indeed. President Reagan did not wait for other nations when he took
the first step forward on the matter of chemical weapons by declaring
that the United States would unilaterally destroy its chemical weapons
stockpile. President Reagan did not wait for other nations when he
initiated negotiations to ban chemical weapons from this Earth.
President Bush did not wait for other nations to sign this treaty.
Presidents Reagan and Bush did not follow others in making those
critical decisions. We led, as great nations must, and others have
fallen in behind us. Our Nation set the example. Now it is time for us
to set the example once again.
Finally, Mr. President, we must keep in mind that opponents of this
treaty argue both sides of the issue. On the one hand, they argue that
rogue states will reap great benefits from the technology and
intelligence available to them as participants in this treaty.
That argument assumes that these nations can't wait to participate in
this treaty. Yet, on the other hand, this condition that we will vote
on assumes that rogue states will avoid participating in this treaty.
If parties to this treaty pick up such a technological advantage, why
aren't these rogue nations crawling over themselves to ratify the
treaty? They should be the first in line if that is the case. Why then
do we need this condition?
The truth is, Mr. President, that rogue nations fear this convention
and this treaty. Waiting for them to ratify is absurd. No one expects
them to ratify, so we should at least become a party to a treaty that
will severely restrict the flow of chemicals to those nations, rather
than assisting them by a reluctance to move forward.
Mr. President, I urge the adoption of the amendment to strike, and I
urge the adoption of the treaty itself.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The chair recognizes the Senator from New
Mexico and asks, who yields time?
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield 7 minutes to my friend from New
Mexico.
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, first let me say that I believe the
Senate has done itself proud with reference to the debate and
participation of our Members in this series of debates and discussions
regarding this treaty. When you add to it the closed session we had
today, I think every Senator has had an ample opportunity to thoroughly
understand this situation. I believe when the day ends and you have
heard all of that, the overwhelming majority of the U.S. Senators are
going to vote to ratify this treaty. I believe they are going to do
that not because it is perfect, but because the world is better off and
we are better off if we have this treaty than if we don't.
Having said that, while the world has set about to perfect chemical
weapons, there is nothing new about this. In fact, I can remember, as a
very small boy, a great uncle who was a totally disabled American
veteran. He was an Italian immigrant taken into the First World War. He
served in the U.S. Army, and he was the victim of mustard gas. In that
war, the Germans used mustard gas, a chemical weapon on the front, on
the lines. Many Americans received toxic doses. In fact, this great
uncle of mine, as I indicated, collected veteran benefits for his
entire life for a total disability because of the mustard gas being
used in World War I.
Science has perfected weapons beyond mustard gas, and the world lives
under three scourges today. One is the possible proliferation of
nuclear weapons; another is the proliferation of chemical weapons, and
the third is the proliferation of biological weapons. Now, we have
attempted in the past, starting with President Eisenhower, to do
something about the proliferation of nuclear weapons. While we haven't
succeeded in totality, we have clearly succeeded beyond anything men of
that day thought. It was not perfect. There were those who wanted to
argue about it because it was not perfect, but we could not have ended
an entire era without Atoms for Peace and everything that came with it.
Having said that, let me suggest that we probably won't find a way to
enter into an international treaty on biological weapons. They are
principally weapons of terrorists.
Let me talk about this treaty and tell the Senate in my own way why I
am for it. First of all, I think it is an imperative. Even though it
was said before, I say this one more time. Frankly, the reason this
treaty exists is because we are trying--the United States of America--
to set in motion in the world a security and arms control treaty, and
the overreaching question is: Will we be better off or worse off if we
commit to its terms?
Now, this is not a treaty that is going to prevent terrorists from
using chemicals as weapons if they see fit. This is more of a treaty
that addresses itself to the military use of these kinds of drastic
weapons. Now, it is not perfect, but let me suggest the second
principle that everybody should know, including those Americans who
worry about this treaty: America has already committed to totally
destroying all of its chemical weapons. President Ronald Reagan, many
years ago, said, let's get rid of one kind of weapon, leaving only one
left over. President Bush also agreed to get rid of them. America is
now on a path to get rid of them in 10 years. All of this discussion
has not changed that. So when we talk about the dangers to America, it
should be understood that we have already decided that on our own. We
want to get rid of them either because we think that is in our best
interest--I would assume that is the case--and/or we think it is better
for the world that we not have any because we think the world may
follow our example.
Having said that, it seems to me that, with the United States having
agreed to destroy all of their weapons of this type, we ought to look
at the treaty and ask, is it apt to work its will on the rest of the
world quicker and better than if we didn't have it? In everything I
hear, everything I have read, in discussions with scientists that
worked on it, including some of the top scientists who negotiated this
agreement, they have all said that, even with its defects, the CWC is
more apt than not to bring the rest of the world to the same conclusion
that America has come to. They support that we might get to a point
where there are none of these weapons around sooner rather than later
if we have this treaty, as compared with no treaty.
There are all kinds of nuances that one can talk about as you look at
something as complicated as this. But I think, fundamentally, the issue
is: what is best for the United States after we have committed to
destroy our chemical weapons, is it better that we have the treaty or
not? From everything I can tell, the 28 conditions that have been
agreed upon are good clarifying language and many contain protections
to our private property rights that we may have assumed early on would
not be violated. But then we got concerned with the CWC and properly
so. Now, there is going to be some judicial process to be required
before inspections can occur. I believe we now will protect private
facilities as well as public facilities like our national laboratories
through requirements for search warrants as part of the language that
Senator Helms agreed on with our staff.
In summary, it seems to this Senator that if we join with other
countries and begin moving to implement this treaty,
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that we are better off with it than without it. Will it be difficult to
get everyone in the world to agree with our position--the civil
position of moral, decent leaders? I am not sure. But the question is,
will it be any easier, or are we apt to succeed better, without the
treaty? I am convinced that such is not the case.
Now, Mr. President, there are so many Senators to thank, but I say to
Jon Kyl, whose position I don't agree with, that I don't believe
anybody has done a better job on something as complicated as this since
I have been in the Senate, which is now 25 years. I compliment him for
that.
I yield the floor.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished
Senator from Maryland.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland.
Mr. SARBANES. I thank the able Senator from Delaware, and I commend
him for his extraordinary leadership with respect to the Chemical
Weapons Convention. I know personally of the time and effort he has
devoted to this cause. We are all in his debt.
Mr. President, it is now less than a week before a landmark treaty--
one which the United States led the world in negotiating--goes into
effect internationally. The Chemical Weapons Convention, signed by
President Bush on January 13, 1993, has now been ratified by 74
countries. The eyes of the world are upon the United States as we
decide whether or not to join them.
It would be a major mistake if this treaty were to go into effect
without us. Worse yet, if we fail to ratify, we could be jeopardizing
our best chance to eliminate the chemical weapons that some day would
be used against us.
This is a treaty that was advanced, negotiated, and signed by
Republican Presidents, with the encouragement, in 1989, of some 75 U.S.
Senators. What a mistake it would be if the Senate were to forfeit this
opportunity to protect American security, promote American interests
and preserve American leadership.
If we fail to ratify the CWC, we will have done just that. If the
Senate does not approve this historic treaty, our economic and security
interests will suffer. Despite widespread and continuing bipartisan
support for this treaty, despite support from some of our Nation's
outstanding military leaders--such as General Shalikashvili and former
Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell, Admiral Crowe,
General Vessey, and General Jones--some of my colleagues argue that
this convention does not serve our security interests.
The Chemical Weapons Convention is an unprecedented international
agreement designed to eliminate an entire class of weapons of mass
destruction. Unlike earlier protocols that prohibit only the use of
chemical weapons, this convention aims at stopping their production,
transfer, and storage by providing incentives for participation,
verification of compliance, and penalties for violation. The United
States is the only major industrialized country not to have ratified it
yet. Our participation is critical to its ultimate success.
This convention will not make the threat of chemical weapons
automatically disappear from the face of the Earth. But it will
constrain their proliferation and make it harder for rogue regimes and
terrorists to gain access to them. By increasing the legal, moral, and
financial costs of acquiring chemical weapons, it will deter covert
chemical weapons programs and increase the likelihood they will be
discovered.
There are three major reasons why this treaty will serve American
interests and why a failure to ratify it could have severe
repercussions.
First, the convention requires other nations to do something we
already plan to do--destroy chemical arsenals. Under a law first signed
by President Reagan, the United States will eliminate our current
stockpile of chemical weapons by the year 2004, independent of what
happens in this treaty. Our own military thinks that is a wise thing to
do, even on a unilateral basis. The convention will simply ensure that
others do the same.
In other words, this is not a debate over eliminating our own
chemical weapons. We are already programmed to do so. This is a
question of whether we can establish a regime that will require other
countries to destroy their chemical weapons and stop building new ones.
That is why Admiral Zumwalt had stated, militarily, this treaty will
make us stronger.
It is not enough, however, to ask other nations to ratify the treaty.
We must do so ourselves. Today, we have an opportunity to lead the
world in abolishing these terrible weapons, rather than providing
others with an excuse not to do so. If we do not adopt this treaty, or
if we add crippling amendments, we will have single-handedly undermined
the hope of ridding the world of this deadly scourge and of reducing
the threat to our own citizens.
The second major reason to ratify this treaty is that it will provide
us with better information about what other countries are doing in the
realm of chemical weapons. We know the verification regime is not
perfect. The verification regime is never perfect in any treaty. There
may be states that try to cheat on this agreement and others that
refuse to sign it. But if we are party to the treaty, we will have an
opportunity to investigate and sanction potential violations. We will
take part in the organization established to monitor implementation,
and we will help enforce its rules and procedures. As former CIA
Director James Woolsey noted, ``We will know more about the state of
chemical warfare preparations in the world with the treaty than we
would know without it.''
Moreover, once we ratify the treaty we will be in a better position
to do something about noncompliance. The CWC throws the force of world
public opinion behind the identification and exposure of violators. Any
violations that are discovered will be made widely known and receive
universal condemnation. We will be able to punish violators through
multilateral action, rather than going it alone, or trying to convince
the world that our suspicions are correct without revealing our
intelligence sources. As former Secretary of State Christopher
explained, ``By ratifying the Convention, we will add the force and
weight of the entire international community to our efforts.''
The third reason we must ratify this treaty is that a failure to do
so will put U.S. chemical manufacturers at a serious competitive
disadvantage. Once the CWC enters into force--which will happen next
Tuesday, with or without U.S. participation--chemical manufacturers in
countries that have not ratified will find themselves faced with
international economic sanctions. These companies will be required to
obtain end-user certificates for the sale of certain chemicals abroad,
and after 3 years, they will not be able to export those chemicals at
all. The United States will be treated on a par with rogue states, who
will no longer be trusted to conduct normal, commercial trade in
chemicals.
These dismal scenarios were certainly on the minds of the chief
executives of 53 of the Nation's largest chemical firms last August,
when they expressed their concern in a joint statement, warning: ``Our
industry's status as the world's preferred supplier of chemical
products may be jeopardized if the United States does not ratify the
Convention. If the Senate does not vote in favor of the CWC, we stand
to lose hundreds of millions of dollars in overseas sales, putting at
risk thousands of good-paying American jobs.'' American chemical
companies have indicated a willingness to comply with inspections under
the treaty because they are not conducting illegal activity, and
because they helped to design the treaty's inspection regime so that it
would not threaten legitimate business secrets or compromise
proprietary information.
Earlier this year, President Bush reaffirmed his support for
ratification, telling reporters the treaty should transcend
partisanship. ``I think it is vitally important for the United States
to be out front, not to be dragged, kicking, and screaming to the
finish line on that question. We do not need chemical weapons, and we
ought to get out front and make clear that we are opposed to others
having them.''
The CWC has been before the Senate for consideration for nearly 4
years now, providing ample opportunity for examination. Last year,
after exhaustive hearings and review, it was reported favorably by the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, but not brought to a vote on the
floor of the Senate.
[[Page S3581]]
Over the past few weeks a new series of hearings has been held, in
open and in closed session, and all perspectives have been thoroughly
aired. The administration has worked in good faith to negotiate a new
resolution of ratification that addresses the earlier concerns and
more, including 28 agreed conditions, declarations, statements, and
understandings. The remaining five conditions that have been proposed
will undercut and place in jeopardy the effectiveness of this treaty,
and I urge my colleagues to reject them.
The conditions to which the administration has already agreed will
resolve every legitimate concern that has been raised. I would urge my
colleagues not to vote for pending amendments that would require
renegotiation, delay, or abrogation of the CWC. If we don't take this
opportunity to begin abolishing these terrible weapons, we will rue the
day and have only ourselves to blame.
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today to express my strong
support for the Chemical Weapons Convention. I believe it is very much
in our national interests to ratify this treaty, after we strike five
conditions in the resolution of ratification.
Let me first express my respect and appreciation for the
distinguished ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee,
Senator Biden. He and his staff have really done the heavy lifting in
getting this treaty to the floor, including many long hours of
negotiations on the package of 28 agreed conditions.
I also want to express my respect for the opponents of this treaty,
including the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee
and the Senator from Arizona, Senator Kyl. I have worked well with
Senator Kyl on many issues, including, at the moment, our strong effort
to pass a Victims' Rights Amendment to the Constitution.
I know that in this debate these Senators are motivated by their
genuine and deeply felt concern for America's national security.
However, I must disagree with the view that we would be better off
without this treaty, or by passing a resolution of ratification that
essentially renders the treaty meaningless.
Mr. President, the threat of chemical weapons falling into the hands
of terrorists, or being used as a weapon of war by a rogue state, has
increased dramatically in recent years.
One need only reflect on the dangers faced by our military by Iraq's
incipient chemical weapons program during the gulf war, or the
tragedies our Nation has suffered with the bombing of the World Trade
Center, the Federal building in Oklahoma City, and the Olympic Park in
Atlanta, to fully appreciate the dangers posed by the proliferation of
chemical weapons. In each of these cases, the tragedy and loss of life
could have been magnified significantly had chemical weapons been used.
The people of Japan know this first-hand. The deadly sarin gas attack
carried out in the Tokyo subway system by the Aum Shunrikio cult was
testimony to the power of even a relatively small amount of chemical
weapons.
Chemical weapons are among the most barbaric of mankind's inventions.
They are so awful, that the United States, by act of Congress, has
decided to eliminate our own stocks of these weapons by 2004. They are
designed to kill and incapacitate by causing such effects as skin
blistering, blindness, lung damage, choking, nervous system disruption,
paralysis, or oxygen starvation. Because of the ease of their dispersal
over a wide area, chemical weapons are especially useful for targeting
civilian populations.
The Chemical Weapons Convention is the most far-reaching attempt ever
by the international community to control the spread of chemical
weapons. It bans for the first time the development, production, and
possession of chemical weapons and reinforces the international norm
against their use. Since we are destroying our own chemical weapons, it
only makes sense that we should want other nations to do so as well.
The convention requires all signatory states to declare and destroy
any chemical weapons and the facilities used to produce them. It
requires member states to submit annual reports on the production and
use of certain sensitive chemicals. This information, combined with our
own intelligence resources, will significantly improve our ability to
monitor and prevent illegal transfers and uses of such chemicals.
Once the CWC takes effect, it will make it much harder and more
costly for proliferators and terrorists to acquire chemical weapons. An
intrusive verification system will be set up to detect violations.
Sanctions will be imposed against nations that refuse to participate,
making it more difficult for them to acquire precursor chemicals for
poison gas and easier to monitor their efforts to do so.
The intelligence-sharing and global verification network that will
result from this treaty will increase the chances that terrorist
attacks involving chemical weapons can be prevented before they ever
occur--a net gain in the security of our troops and our citizens.
Now, a number of very serious concerns have been raised about the
CWC. I myself have shared some of these concerns. I will not speak to
every criticism of the treaty, but I want to address some of these
concerns now, because I believe very solid answers have been provided
to virtually all of them.
Verification: Critics of the CWC have complained that it is not
verifiable, and that it will be easy for nations who sign up to the
treaty to cheat without getting caught.
We must start with the proposition that no arms control agreement is
100-percent verifiable. But with the CWC, we will know far more about
who is trying to develop chemical weapons, where, and how than we would
without the treaty. That is why the intelligence community has
consistently testified that, while the treaty is not completely
verifiable, they regard it as a highly desirable tool that will enhance
our knowledge of chemical weapons programs and our ability to stop
them.
The CWC's verification regime requires routine inspections of all
declared facilities working with significant amounts of chemicals
listed by the treaty. In addition, any site, declared or not, may be
subject to short-notice challenge inspections if there are suspicions
that it is being used to produce or store banned chemicals.
The CWC also establishes significant trade restrictions on precursor
chemicals. These restrictions will make it more difficult for nations
who are not parties to the treaty to acquire these chemicals, and will
provide us with much more information than we currently have about who
is seeking to import such chemicals, and in what amounts.
So the concern about verification, while valid, I believe has been
more than adequately addressed. We must go into this treaty with our
eyes open, aware that it will not detect every violation. But why would
we deprive ourselves of the extremely useful tools and information this
treaty would provide on the grounds that they are not fool-proof? It
would be incredibly short-sighted to do so.
Sharing Defense Technologies: During one of the hearings in the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee earlier this month, the concern was
raised that Article X of the CWC would require the United States to
share advanced chemical defense technologies with rogue nations like
Iran, who may sign and ratify the treaty. If indeed the treaty required
that, there would be significant grounds for concern. But I believe the
concern is overstated.
In an April 22 letter to me, National Security Adviser Sandy Berger
makes it very clear that Article X of the CWC would impose no
obligation on the United States to assist Iran with its chemical
weapons defense capabilities.
I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Berger's letter be printed in the
Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. Berger makes clear that paragraph 7 of Article X,
which spells out the obligations of States Parties to assist others
threatened by chemical weapons, would require the United States to
provide nothing more than medical antidotes and treatments to any state
we deemed unreliable. We have the option to provide more advanced
assistance to those nations we trust, but no obligation.
The administration is so comfortable with this reading of the treaty,
that, in their negotiations with Senator Helms
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and with the Majority Leader's task force on the CWC, they have agreed
to a binding condition (number 15) that would ensure that the United
States will not provide any assistance other than medical assistance to
any rogue nation that becomes a party to the treaty.
Another concern about Article X is that paragraph 3, which calls for
parties to ``facilitate . . . the fullest possible exchange'' of
information and technology on protection against chemical weapons,
would require the United States to share such equipment with rogue
nations who sign and ratify the treaty.
The administration has made clear that the use of the words
``facilitate'' and ``possible'' in this paragraph mean that we will
determine whether any specific exchange is appropriate, and we will not
pursue those we deem inappropriate. In making these decisions, we will
do nothing to undermine our national export controls.
With these assertions in hand, I am satisfied that the United States
will in no way be obligated to provide chemical weapons technology to
any nation we deem to be untrustworthy.
Some have also raised the concern that Article X might induce other,
less conscientious nations, to supply rogue states with defense
technologies. But there is nothing that prevents those sales from
taking place today, with no CWC in effect.
With the CWC, the countries who make exchanges allowed in Article X
are legally bound by the treaty's overriding principle, stated in
Article I, that they can do nothing to ``assist, encourage, or induce,
in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State
Party under this Convention.''
In addition, the CWC would provide us with far more ability to
scrutinize any exchanges than we have today. The result is a net
increase, not decrease, in our knowledge of defense exchanges with
rogue nations, and our ability to address any compliance concerns that
may arise from these exchanges.
Cooperation on Chemical Technology: Another concern that has been
raised involves Article XI. Some have suggested that Article XI, which
deals with cooperation in chemical activities not prohibited by the
treaty, would require the United States to provide other nations with
access to our dual-use technologies and manufacturing secrets. Here
again, the concern is unwarranted.
Article XI does aim to ensure that parties to the treaty can conduct
legitimate chemical commerce, which is reasonable. But in his April 22
letter, Mr. Berger explains that this article does not require the
United States, or any U.S. company, to provide any confidential
business information to any foreign party.
As to the concern that Article XI will undercut export controls,
indeed, the reverse is true. Mr. Berger makes clear that the all U.S.
export controls now in effect are fully consistent with the CWC. In
addition, our allies in the Australia Group, all 28 of them, have
pledged to maintain all existing multilateral export controls, which
they agree are fully consistent with the CWC.
Here again, the problem identified by critics of the CWC would
actually be worse without the treaty. The CWC will allow us to better
monitor chemical commerce that occurs today without our knowledge. It
will also provide the basis for further multilateral efforts to control
exports, above and beyond our own existing export controls and those of
the Australia Group.
To address the concerns raised about Article XI, the Administration
has agreed to a binding condition (number 7) that the President must
certify now and on an annual basis that the Australia Group is
continuing to effectively control chemical exports and remains a viable
mechanism for doing so.
According to this condition, the President must also certify that
nothing in the CWC obligates the United States to weaken our own export
controls, and that each member of the Australia Group remains committed
to maintaining current export controls.
With this condition added to the resolution of ratification, I
believe concerns about Article XI can be laid aside.
In fact, the negotiations between the Administration and Senator
Biden on the one hand, and Senator Helms and the Lott task force on the
other, have been remarkably successful in addressing the concerns that
have been raised about the treaty.
In all, 28 conditions have been agreed to in these negotiations, on
subjects ranging from verification and Articles X and XI, to
Congressional prerogatives in providing funding for the OPCW; the
establishment of an inspector general at the OPCW; safeguards on
intelligence sharing; the Senate's role in reviewing future treaty
amendments; constitutional protections in the inspection of U.S.
facilities; our armed forces' continued ability to use non-lethal riot
control agents, such as tear gas; and maintaining robust U.S. chemical
defense capabilities.
With all of these conditions agreed to, there are only five areas
remaining in dispute. One would think we were near the point of a
virtually unanimous vote to ratify the CWC.
And yet, we still hear charges that the administration is
``stonewalling.'' That is simply not the case. Far from stonewalling,
the administration has worked very hard to address the Senate's
concerns. But it appears that some people simply do not to want to take
yes for an answer.
And so, we have five conditions in this resolution of ratification
which the Administration has identified as ``killer'' conditions. These
conditions would make our ratification of this treaty meaningless,
because they would either gut central provisions of the treaty, or set
up unachievable goals that must be met for us to deposit our
instruments of ratification. They should all be defeated.
Let me briefly address each of these killer conditions:
Condition 29 would prohibit the United States from ratifying the CWC
until Russia ratifies it and takes a series of other actions to comply
with past agreements.
Besides holding United States foreign policy hostage to a group of
hardliners in the Russian Duma, this condition ignores the fact that
the CWC provides precisely the tools that would be helpful in detecting
Russian violations of this and past treaties. It also gives Russia an
easy excuse to delay ratification itself. On the grounds of self-
interest, this condition shoots ourselves in the foot.
Condition 30 would prohibit the United States from ratifying the CWC
until rogue states such as North Korea, Libya, Syria, Iran, and Iraq
have ratified it. By accepting this treaty, we allow these rogue
regimes to set the standards of international conduct. It is the
equivalent of saying that we should not outlaw drug smuggling because
some people will still smuggle drugs.
By ratifying the CWC, the United States will make it easier to forge
international coalitions aimed at eliminating the chemical weapons
programs of these regimes, even through military force when necessary.
It will also set a standard for those nations to meet if and when their
current regimes are replaced by more responsible ones.
Condition 31 requires the United States to reject all CWC inspectors
from countries like Iran and China. This condition is unnecessarily
rigid. It would prevent us from allowing suspect states from seeing for
themselves that we are not violating the treaty. It would also
certainly result in American inspectors being excluded from inspections
in these countries.
A better approach would be to strike this language and enact
implementing legislation that would allow Congress a role in
determining which inspectors should be barred, which the CWC allows the
United States to do on a case-by-case basis.
Condition 32 would prohibit the United States from ratifying the CWC
until Article X is eliminated and Article XI is amended. This is
completely unrealistic and completely unnecessary. Articles X and XI
were included to reassure countries who signed the treaty that they
would not be prevented from developing chemical weapons defenses or
engaging in legitimate chemical commerce.
None of the 160 nations who have signed or 74 nations that have
ratified the treaty will agree to renegotiate these provisions at the
eleventh hour. It will simply result in our exclusion from the CWC--
which is clearly the intent.
As Gen. Brent Scowcroft, National Security Adviser to President Bush,
[[Page S3583]]
testified before the Foreign Relations Committee on April 9, 1997:
``Starting over. . .is pure fantasy. If we reject this treaty, we will
incur the bitterness of all our friends and allies who followed us for
10 years in putting this thing together. . . The idea that we can lead
out again down a different path I think is just not in the cards. We
have got to deal with the situation we face now, not an ideal one out
in the future.''
The concerns raised about Articles X and XI--which I shared--have
been more than adequately addressed by the agreed conditions. This is
what I mean about not wanting to take yes for an answer.
Condition 33 would prevent the U.S. from ratifying the treaty unless
the President can certify with ``high confidence'' that we would be
able to detect the production or storage of a single metric ton of
chemical agent.
This is an absurdly high standard. The intelligence community has
consistently said it could detect ``militarily significant'' cheating,
but the production of one ton of agent does not qualify.
But the tools created by the CWC will only enhance our abilities to
detect these violations. It would be foolish to kill the treaty with a
condition like this that makes the perfect the enemy of the good. This
condition is not about verification--it is about killing the treaty.
Tomorrow, each of these five amendments will be subject to a motion
to strike. Failing to strike them would be tantamount to killing the
treaty. I urge my colleagues to vote for each motion to strike. Those
who do not are essentially voting against ratification of the entire
CWC.
Mr. President, I think this debate really comes down to whether or
not one supports international arms control agreements. Many of the
criticisms of the CWC--such as that it would lull us to sleep, or that
it is not verifiable--were levied against all previous successful arms
control treaties, such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the
START treaty.
Those who worry that the United States will weaken its vigilance in
our efforts to guard against the threat of chemical weapons have
actually done us a service. I believe the intensity of this debate has
helped to ensure that we will never allow ourselves to believe that the
treaty by itself is enough. We will follow the course that President
Reagan did--a strong national defense and arms control agreements with
verification.
The CWC is not a panacea, and none of its proponents believes it is.
It will not by itself banish chemical weapons from the earth, but it
would result in the destruction of much of the world's chemical weapons
stocks, and provide us with a valuable set of tools that would
significantly strengthen our ability to monitor and defend against the
threat of chemical weapons.
Our failure to ratify this treaty would be a grave mistake. The
treaty will enter into force on April 29, with or without us. This is
the only treaty that there is, and it requires U.S. leadership to make
it work. Only by being a party to this convention can we make it
function to its fullest possible extent.
I believe every Member on this side of the aisle supports this
treaty. I urge my Republican colleagues to vote for ratification, after
voting to strike the five killer amendments.
Exhibit 1
The White House,
Washington, April 22, 1997.
Hon. Dianne Feinstein,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Feinstein: I am pleased that we were able to
talk last week about ratification of the Chemical Weapons
Convention, including the concerns which have been raised
about Articles X and XI of the treaty. I would like to take
the opportunity to elaborate further on these issues and set
the record straight.
Regarding Article X, concern has been expressed that this
provision might force us or other treaty parties to share
advanced chemical defense technologies and equipment with
rogue nations like Iran and to assist in the development of
CW defense capabilities. This simply is not the case.
First, only countries that have joined the CWC and
renounced CW can request assistance and only then if they are
threatened or attacked with CW. Indeed, the very purpose of
Article X is to encourage countries to join the CWC and
eliminate their CW programs by providing an assurance of
international assistance in the event that they are
threatened or attacked with CW by a non-party. For states in
good standing under the CWC that do qualify for Article X
aid, there is no requirement to provide high tech defenses or
even gas masks. The obligation to assist can be satisfied
with medical or humanitarian aid. Indeed, the President has
committed in an agreed condition on the Resolution of
Ratification (Condition #15) that the United States will only
give medical help to certain countries of concern, such as
Iran or Cuba, under Article X.
Second, with regard to the actions of other states, let me
point out that countries contemplating any exchanges under
Article X are legally bound by the fundamental obligation in
Article I of the treaty never ``to assist, encourage or
induce in any way anyone to engage in any activity
prohibited'' under the Convention. This means that all
relevant transfers must be subject to very close scrutiny,
especially with countries whose compliance may be in doubt.
We will use every instrument of U.S. diplomacy and leverage
at our disposal to ensure that transfers do not occur which
could undermine U.S. national security interests, including
the extensive verification and compliance provisions in the
Convention. As Secretary Cohen said on ``Meet the Press'' on
Sunday, we will be in a much better position to do this if we
are inside the treaty rather than outside. Frankly, other
countries will have little incentive to work with us to
ensure that inappropriate transfers do not occur if we have
not ratified ourselves.
Article XI encourages free trade in non-prohibited
chemicals among States that join the CWC and renounce any CW
capability. Some have charged that this provision might force
us or our chemical industry to share dual-use technologies
and manufacturing secrets with other countries. Such an
interpretation is totally at odds with the plain language of
the treaty. It also defies logic to suggest that a treaty
expressly devoted to eliminating chemical weapons somehow
requires its parties to facilitate the spread of chemical
weapons.
First, Article XI is explicitly subject to the fundamental
ban in Article I on assisting anyone in acquiring chemical
weapons. Moreover, in order to reinforce the treaty's
constraints against the transfer of dangerous technology, the
President has committed in agreed condition #7 in the
Resolution of Ratification to obtain official assurances from
our Australia Group partners at the highest diplomatic levels
that Article XI is fully consistent with maintaining strict
export controls on dangerous chemicals and that they are
committed to ensuring the Group remains an effective
mechanism for dealing with CW proliferation. I would note
that this condition also requires annual certification.
Second, with the CWC the countries undertaking exchanges
are legally bound by the fundamental obligations in Article
I. As Ron Lehman, former Arms Control Director under
President Bush, recently stated in testimony before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee: ``We made it very clear
throughout the negotiations that all of this was subject to
Article I, which is the fundamental obligation not to assist.
. . . But the most important, I think, telling fact in
support of the U.S. interpretation is the fact that after the
Convention was done so many of the usual list of suspects
were so unhappy that they did not get what they wanted in
these provisions.''
I would note, in conclusion, that renegotiation of Articles
X and XI of the CWC, as the Helms condition (#32) in the
Resolution of Ratification would require, is not a realistic
option. This treaty was intensively negotiated for more than
10 years. It has been signed by 162 countries and ratified by
74. As Brent Scowcroft recently testified, ``Starting over .
. . is pure fantasy. If we reject this treaty, we will incur
the bitterness of all of our friends and allies who followed
us for 10 years in putting this together . . . the idea that
we can lead out again down a different path I think is just
not in the cards. We have got to deal with the situation we
face now, not an ideal one out in the future.'' This is why
the Senate must vote to strike this Helms Condition.
I hope this information facilitates the Senate's
consideration of the CWC and look forward to a successful
vote in the coming days.
Sincerely,
Samuel R. Berger,
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The time will be
equally divided.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Amendment No. 47
(Purpose: To strike condition no. 30, relating to chemical weapons in
other states)
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
[[Page S3584]]
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Delaware [Mr. Biden] proposes an amendment
numbered 47.
On page 63, strike lines 8 through 20.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, this is condition No. 30. As was indicated
at the outset of the unanimous-consent agreement, the Senate has now
agreed to 28 of the 33 conditions that were attached to the treaty that
is before us today.
As I indicated at that time that I would be moving to strike five of
the conditions, any one of which--at least four of which--if adopted,
would essentially vitiate the treaty; would make our ratification
useless.
They are killer amendments. This is one of those amendments. Mr.
President, condition No. 30 would hold hostage our joining the Chemical
Weapons Convention to the condition that rogue states--several rogue
states, such as Iraq, Libya and North Korea--would have to sign and
ratify the treaty before we became party to the treaty.
This has a very perverse impact. The first impact is we wouldn't be
in the treaty. We would not have ratified the treaty, if we ratified
this condition. Second, it has a perverse impact. It would prevent the
United States from participating in the convention until a band of 2-
bit regimes that specialize in flaunting norms of civilized behavior
decide for us when we should be a member of this treaty. Seventy-four
nations have already signed onto it.
This condition turns the present global arrangement on its head.
Instead of the civilized nations of the world setting the rules, this
condition effectively let's the villains determine the rules of the
road and American policy. This condition ignores the critical fact that
regardless of what the rogue states do, regardless of whether we join
the CWC, or not, we have decided unilaterally to destroy our chemical
weapons stockpile.
We will not use chemical weapons to respond to a chemical weapons
attack. That is a judgment our military and our last Commander in Chief
and this one has made. Instead, we will rely on what General Schwarzkof
said, and General Powell, General Shalikashvili, and others will rely
upon our overwhelming nonchemical military capabilities to deter and
retaliate against the use of chemical weapons.
The best way to affect the behavior of these rogue states is to bring
to bear the combined weight of the civilized nations of the world to
isolate, sanction, and target those nations who would continue to
produce chemical weapons in defiance of the creation of this
international norm. But, Mr. President, first we have to establish the
norm. If the United States of America says we will not join unless the
bad guys join, then there is no reasonable prospect that such a norm
will be established.
As Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has noted, to say that we
should not have a CWC because there will be people out there who will
continue to produce chemical weapons, or who will cheat, is a little
bit like saying we should not have laws because people will break them.
We should not have laws against murder because we know people are going
to murder people. So have no laws against murder.
The point is that today there is nothing illegal--let's get this
straight--under international law about producing chemical weapons,
developing chemical weapons, or stockpiling chemical weapons. The
purported Libyan chemical weapons program is completely legal today.
The Iraqi chemical stockpile is completely legal today. In fact, there
is nothing in international law that prohibits the use of chemical
weapons internally. Like Saddam Hussein's poison gas attack against the
Kurds within Iraq, there is nothing illegal about having or using these
weapons in your own country. That will change once the CWC is in force.
To quote Gen. Colin Powell, ``For us to reject this treaty now
because there are rogue states outside that treaty is the equivalent of
saying that we should not have joined NATO because Russia wasn't part
of NATO.'' That is former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Colin Powell--
not me.
This treaty will establish standards by which to judge others. If it
is violated--that is, if the treaty is violated --it will provide the
basis for harsh action to punish and bring violators into compliance.
The opponents will say that norms are meaningless unless there is a
will to enforce those norms. They are right. But on that point, I would
point out that without a norm there is nothing to enforce.
The bottom line is this: With the treaty we will have more tools and
greater flexibility to act against those countries that threaten us and
their neighbors. Should we choose military action we would be able to
justify it as a measure taken to enforce the terms of a treaty to which
we and 160 other nations who are signatories--only 74 ratified--are
parties. North Korea is not. Libya is not. But 160 other nations have
signed, and we are going to say that we will not join unless North
Korea joins. As Gen. Colin Powell said, I am glad these folks weren't
around when NATO was starting up to say we are not going to have NATO
because Russia can't be a part.
Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time. I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from North
Carolina.
Mr. HELMS. I thank the Chair.
Mr. President, there is a lot of misunderstanding about this treaty.
It has been advertised implicitly--not explicitly, of course--as a
cure-all; as an end to the perils of chemical warfare. And a lot of
people think it will all be over, and we will not have any more danger.
The truth of the matter is that they will not do a thing in the world
to help the situation because the Chemical Weapons treaty--Convention,
as it has been called--is not a comprehensive ban. This treaty
contributes to the national security of the United States and the
American people, and that is what I am primarily interested in.
This treaty, it seems to me, must at a minimum affect those countries
possessing chemical weapons which pose a threat to the United States.
Accordingly, the United States should not become a party to this
treaty--many Senators feel--until those countries are also
participants. And no effort has been made to encourage them to come in.
We are standing alone, and they are going to go about their little
deviltry unmolested. Rogue states--like Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and
North Korea--clearly represent a threat to United States security and
the security of key United States allies. And not one of these
countries has ratified the CWC, and not one of them is likely to
ratify.
First, the intelligence people in our own country--we call it the
intelligence community--reported that all of these governments have
active aggressive programs to develop and produce chemical weapons.
In March 1995, I believe it was, regarding the nonproliferation
treaty, the Central Intelligence Agency released an unclassified
estimate that gave a troubling assessment of the likely impact that the
CWC would have upon the proliferation of chemical weapons.
This report said:
A number of states continue to pursue the development or
enhancement of a chemical weapons capability. Some states
have chosen to pursue a chemical weapons capability because
of relatively low cost, and the low technology required for
chemical weapons production. Moreover, they believe that a
CWC ability can serve as both a deterrent to enemy attack and
as an enhancement of their offensive military capability.
I am quoting. The report says:
Currently, at least 15 countries have an offensive CWC
program in some level of development, and the most aggressive
chemical weapons programs are in Iran, Libya, and Syria. The
CWC will continue to be a serious threat for at least the
remainder of this decade despite a number of armaments
control efforts, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Several countries have expressed concern, excluding Libya,
Syria and Iraq, which have so far refused to sign the CWC,
and some CW-capable countries that have signed the treaty
show no signs of ending their programs.
That was our intelligence community's assessment of the situation as
of 1995.
Mr. President, while the intent of the CWC is good, what it proposes
is to create a global chemical weapons ban, and it will not do any such
thing. It simply will not achieve any other of the goals. Thirty
percent of the countries with chemical weapons programs, including all
of those with what is called aggressive programs, have not yet signed
the treaty, let alone ratified it. Yet, these
[[Page S3585]]
countries have been and will continue to be the paramount chemical
weapons threat to the United States.
About 6 years ago, during Operation Desert Storm, the United States
was so concerned about Iraq's chemical weapons program that we focused
a huge percentage of long allied air attacks upon Saddam Hussein's
chemical weaponry. A facility 65 miles north of Baghdad was the nucleus
of Iraq's chemical weapons program, and a priority target during the
early days of the gulf war. I was amazed then that no one seemed to pay
much attention. And I am amazed now that no one seems to remember
General Schwarzkopf's remarks during a press briefing at that time in
Saudi Arabia. It was on February 27, 1991. Here is what he said:
The nightmare scenario for all of us would have been to go
through the Iraqi tank barrier, get hung up in this breach
right here and then have the enemy artillery rain chemical
weapons on the troops that were in the gaggle, in the breach
right here.
Pointing to specific points.
Well, the point is this. That nightmare scenario exists today since
Iraq has neither signed nor ratified this treaty.
Let us look at another rogue regime, North Korea. On March 18, 1996,
the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lt. Gen. Patrick
Hughes, forwarded to me a DIA assessment of North Korea's military
capabilities which underscored United States concern with the war-
fighting uses to which chemical weapons can be put.
Now, according to that study, and I am quoting, ``In any attack on
the South, P'yongyang could use chemical weapons to attack forces
deployed near the DMZ, suppress allied air power and isolate the
peninsula from strategic reinforcements.''
Now, in boasting that this treaty will make American soldiers free
from the threat of chemical weapons, the administration either has
forgotten or deliberately ignored the fact that North Korea has neither
signed nor ratified the CWC and the threat posed by North Korea and
Iraq and others here. Now over 30,000 United States troops face North
Korean troops armed and extensively trained with chemical weapons. Key
airfields and ports are within striking distance of North Korean
missiles, and with just a handful of chemical weapons North Korea could
force United States aircraft to withdraw from the Korean Peninsula to
Japan, and in fact in the near future North Korea may be even able to
strike air bases in Japan with chemical munitions. Without air support
and reinforcement, our ground forces and our South Korean allies would
be overwhelmed within days.
The threat to the United States forces in the Persian Gulf being
rotated from Iran and Iraq is no less troubling, Mr. President. The
bottom line, I guess, is that rogue states--if you will look at the
chart--see chemical weapons as the best means to offset the superior
conventional forces of the United States and its allies. These
countries continue to develop plans to use chemical weapons in the
event of war, and we must remember I think, Mr. President, that each of
these countries are state sponsors, Government sponsors, of terrorism
and may supply chemical weapons to terrorist groups.
So when the CWC enters into force, our troops will be no safer from
chemical attacks than they are today because the countries of greatest
concern have not acceded to this treaty. For the CWC to offer any
improvement, however modest, to the national security of the United
States, it must at a minimum, I think, affect those countries with
aggressive chemical weapons programs, those countries which have
hostile intentions toward the United States and the American people.
I urge Senators, please, to oppose this motion to strike this key
provision.
Have the yeas and nays been ordered on the motion?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. They have not.
Mr. HELMS. I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there is a sufficient second?
Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
Mr. HELMS. I thank the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield the distinguished Senator from
Massachusetts up to 10 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from
Massachusetts for 10 minutes.
Mr. KERRY. I thank the Chair. I thank the distinguished minority
manager.
We have now finally arrived at the first of a series of real
confrontations on this treaty, and we will vote shortly on this
striking of the first reservation. It really is not possible to
overemphasize the importance of each of these votes. There are four
votes, each of which would cripple this treaty. If there are 100
Members of the Senate prepared to vote for this treaty--and we know
there are not--but if there were and we subsequently were to adopt one
of these reservations, those 100 votes would be absolutely meaningless
because we would have denied ourselves the capacity for this treaty to
go into effect if we do not strike these reservations.
The fact is that the United States would be simply unable to ratify
now or at any time in the immediate future, and quite possibly never,
if the effort to strike any one of these four fails. That is the
gravity of what we are going to be doing in this Chamber in the course
of this afternoon.
The first of these conditions, condition 30, which the Senator from
Delaware has ably discussed, has been called, somewhat antiseptically,
``Chemical Weapons in Other States.'' The text is very short, and I
just want to quote it verbatim. It says:
Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of
ratification, the President, in consultation with the
Director of Central Intelligence, shall certify to the
Congress that countries which have been determined to have
offensive chemical weapons programs, including Iran, Iraq,
Syria, Libya, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,
China, and all other countries determined to be state
sponsors of international terrorism have ratified or
otherwise acceded to the convention.
Let me translate that into simple English. Under the terms of that
condition, we will hold ourselves hostage to the very outlaw, rogue
states that we seek to control by passing this convention. Under the
terms of that condition, we would in fact do nothing to change the
status quo.
The distinguished chairman of the committee said we have to hold on
to this amendment and defeat the treaty essentially because Iraq, Iran,
Libya, these countries have chemical weapons today. Well, if we do not
pass this treaty, nothing whatsoever will change with respect to the
threat versus the United States. Each and every one of those countries
will continue to produce and we will continue on the path that we have
been on for some years which is destroy our chemical weapons stocks.
Why? Because we have decided, and appropriately I believe, that we do
not need and do not intend to fight a war with chemical weapons.
Now, this particular reservation has a noble objective. I do not
think any of us would argue, the real objective is to get those rogue
states to get rid of their chemical weapons. We are all in favor of
that, if that is the real objective. But I respectfully suggest the
real objective is to come around through the back door and do through
the back door what they may not be able to do through the front door.
There is no Senator in this Chamber who does not hope that Iran, Iraq,
Syria, Libya, North Korea, China, Cuba, and Sudan, in fact, every
nation on Earth, is going to someday ratify the CWC. If that was the
case or it was about to happen or had happened, there would be a lot
less concern about how we are going to go about clarifying, inspecting,
or challenging during the course of this treaty. But that is not the
case. There is not one of those Senators who has drafted this
resolution who can look any other Senator in the eye in this Chamber
and say today that they believe that any of those rogue states are
about to ratify tomorrow, the next day, or the next day. That is not
going to come as any surprise to anybody here in the Chamber, Mr.
President.
There is not one who would do that. In fact, during most of the 10
years during which the Reagan administration and the Bush
administration negotiated over exhausting amounts of time and developed
this treaty, they developed it to structure sanctions that would apply
to trade in chemicals conducted by nations that do not ratify the
treaty.
[[Page S3586]]
Let me be clear about that. The primary purpose of the strict
requirements for challenge inspection and the process of tracking
precursor chemicals is not necessarily to keep track of the people that
we know are going to live up to this treaty. It is precisely to keep
track of the people that are most likely to break the treaty, and every
one of the experts has suggested that with respect to the rogue states
you are better off having that tracking process, the declarations of
sales, the ability to be able to track the fingerprint of chemicals
through the globe in order to be able to hold those countries
accountable.
That is the purpose of this treaty. So we have sort of a double
negative here. If we allowed this particular reservation to stand, not
only would we hold ourselves hostage to the very countries that we want
to have eliminate the weapons, but we also would eliminate the means
that we have created to be able to get them to eliminate those weapons.
So, Mr. President, I respectfully suggest this treaty was negotiated
and crafted precisely to apply the pressure of world opinion, the
diplomatic pressure, the economic pressure on the recalcitrant nations
whose leadership flaunts the civilized norm.
The Senator from North Carolina is absolutely correct. These nations
do have these materials. These nations will, I am convinced, in a
number of cases continue to produce them. But the issue is how you best
try to pressure them to reform their behavior. How do you make it as
difficult as possible for those nations to do that? How do you isolate
them in the greatest manner possible? Plainly speaking, the authors of
this amendment have to know the distinction between having those
mechanisms in place, which the Defense Department and others have all
said will help them more to be able to do the tracking, than not to
have them.
I want to emphasize also that there is an irony in this because some
of the people who are advocating that we wait until the rogue nations
turn around and change their mind are, frankly, the very same people
who usually say never give up any sovereignty of the United States to
another nation. Here we are turning over the entire sovereignty of the
United States to make a decision in our best interests to the very
rogue states that have indicated already no willingness to try to
adhere to these standards.
Second, the condition either fails to recognize or ignores
purposefully the reality that at midnight of next Tuesday, April 29, no
matter what the Senate does today, the Chemical Weapons Convention
takes effect with or without U.S. participation.
So the question of whether or not this convention is foolproof, is
absolutely the best convention in the world, really begs the issue. The
real question before the United States is are we better off with this
treaty in terms of protecting our security interests by being part of
the convention, within its organization able to change it, which has
already been ratified by 74 nations and signed by over 160? If we fail
to ratify, or if we fail to ratify by not taking out this reservation,
then where are we? We have joined the outlaw nations. We will have
joined the very nations that we want most to affect the behavior of.
I think it is important to note that some of our most respected
voices in this country with respect to military affairs and national
security affairs have all agreed that it is significant for the United
States to be able to not align itself with those nations. General
Schwarzkopf said:
I am very, very much in favor of the ratification of the
treaty.
And he said:
We don't need chemical weapons to fight our future wars.
And frankly, by not ratifying that treaty, we align ourselves
with nations like Libya and North Korea and I would just as
soon not be associated with those thugs in this particular
measure.
I think that is a pretty strong statement about precisely what this
reservation would have the effect of doing.
General Powell, who has already been quoted by my colleague, made it
very clear that we should not do this and made the analogy to NATO, to
our not joining NATO simply because Russia was not a member.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
Mr. BIDEN. I yield my colleague another 30 seconds.
Mr. KERRY. Former Assistant to President Reagan and Secretary of
State Jim Baker said:
Some have argued that we shouldn't commit to the treaty
because states like Libya, Iraq and North Korea, which have
not signed it, will still be able to continue their efforts
to acquire chemical weapons. This is obviously true, but the
convention, which will go into effect in April whether or not
we ratify it, will make it more difficult for those states to
do so by prohibiting the sale of materials to nonmembers that
can be used to make chemical weapons.
He said:
It makes no sense to argue that because of a few pariah
states refusing to join the convention, the United States
should line up with them rather than the rest of the world.
This is a bipartisan sentiment, Mr. President, and I hope the Senate
will recognize the gravity of the vote we are about to take.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Kempthorne). Who yields time? The Senator
from North Carolina.
Mr. HELMS. I have here, Mr. President, a group of editorial comments,
making, as Sam Ervin used to say, uncommon good sense, in opposition to
this treaty. I ask unanimous consent they be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the editorials were ordered to be printed
in the Record, as follows:
[From the Washington Post, Mar. 5, 1997]
No to the Chemical Arms Treaty
(By James Schlesinger, Caspar Weinberger, and Donald Rumsfeld)
The phrase ``damning with faint praise'' is given new
meaning by the op-ed by Brent Scowcroft and John Deutch on
the Chemical Weapons Convention [``End the Chemical Weapons
Business,'' Feb. 11]. In it, the authors concede virtually
every criticism made by those who oppose this controversial
treaty in its present form.
They acknowledge the legitimacy of key concerns about the
Convention: its essential unverifiability; its lack of global
coverage; the prospect that it will inhibit non-lethal use of
chemicals, including tear gas; and its mandating the transfer
of militarily relevant chemical offensive and defensive
technology to untrustworthy countries that become parties. It
is our view that these problems are inherent in the present
treaty.
Take, for example, Scowcroft and Deutch's warning against
cutting investment in chemical defensive measures.
Unfortunately, treaties such as the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC)--which promise to reduce the menace posed by
weapons of mass destruction but which cannot do so--
inevitably tend to diminish the perceived need and therefore
the support for defenses against such threats.
In fact, in December 1995, the then-vice chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended a reduction of more than
$800 million in investment on chemical defenses in
anticipation of the Convention's coming into force. If past
experience is a guide, there might also be a reduction in the
priority accorded to monitoring emerging chemical weapons
threats, notwithstanding Scowcroft and Deutch's call for
improvements in our ability to track chemical weapons
developments.
Scowcroft and Deutch correctly warn that the ``CWC [must]
not [be] exploited to facilitate the diffusion of CWC-
specific technology, equipment and material--even to
signatory states.'' The trouble is that the Chemical Weapons
Convention explicitly obligates member states to facilitate
such transfers, even though these items are readily
exploitable for military purposes. What is more, the treaty
commits member states not to observe any agreements, whether
multilateral or unilateral, that would restrict these
transfers.
In short, we believe that the problems with the Chemical
Weapons Convention in these and other areas that have been
identified by Brent Scowcroft and John Deutch clearly
demonstrate that this treaty would be contrary to U.S.
security interests. Moreover, in our view these serious
problems undercut the argument that the CWC's ``imperfect
constraints'' are better than no constraints at all.
The CWC would likely have the effect of leaving the United
States and its allies more, not less, vulnerable to chemical
attack. It could well serve to increase, not reduce, the
spread of chemical weapons manufacturing capabilities. Thus
we would be better off not to be party to it.
Notably, if the United States is not a CWC member state,
the danger is lessened that American intelligence about
ongoing foreign chemical weapons programs will be dumbed down
or otherwise compromised. This has happened in the past when
enforcement of a violated agreement was held to be a greater
threat to an arms control regime than was noncompliance by
another party. The United States and the international
community have been unwilling to enforce the far more easily
verified 1925 Geneva Convention banning the use of chemical
weapons--even in
[[Page S3587]]
the face of repeated and well-documented violations by Saddam
Hussein. What likelihood is there that we would be any more
insistent when it comes to far less verifiable bans on
production and stockpiling of such weapons?
As a non-party, the United States would also remain free to
oppose dangerous ideas such as providing state-of-the-art
chemical manufacturing facilities and defensive equipment to
international pariahs such as Iran and Cuba. And the United
States would be less likely to reduce investment in chemical
protective capabilities, out of a false sense of security
arising from participation in the CWC.
In addition, if the United States is not a CWC party,
American taxpayers will not be asked to bear the substantial
annual costs of our participating in a multilateral regime
that will not ``end the chemical weapons business'' in
countries of concern. (By some estimates, these costs would
be over $200 million per year.) Similarly, U.S. citizens and
companies will be spared the burdens associated with
reporting and inspection arrangements that might involve
unreasonable searches and seizures, could jeopardize
confidential business information and yet could not ensure
that other nations--and especially rogue states--no longer
have chemical weapons programs.
Against these advantages of nonparticipation, the purported
down-sides seem relatively inconsequential. First, whether
Russia actually eliminates its immense chemical arsenal is
unlikely to hinge upon our participating in the CWC. Indeed,
Moscow is now actively creating new chemical agents that
would circumvent and effectively defeat the treaty's
constraints.
Second, the preponderance of trade in chemicals would be
unaffected by the CWC's limitations, making the impact of
remaining outside the treaty regime, if any, fairly modest on
American manufacturers.
Finally, if the United States declines to join the present
Chemical Weapons Convention, it is academic whether
implementing arrangements are drawn up by others or not. In
the event the United States does decide to become a party at
a later date--perhaps after improvements are made to enhance
the treaty's effectiveness--it is hard to believe that its
preferences regarding implementing arrangements would not be
given considerable weight. This is particularly true since
the United States would then be asked to bear 25 percent of
the implementing organization's budget.
There is no way to ``end the chemical weapons business'' by
fiat. The price of attempting to do so with the present
treaty is unacceptably high, and the cost of the illusion it
creates might be higher still.
____
[From the Weekly Standard, Mar. 24, 1997]
Just Say No to a Bad Treaty
The United States Senate must decide by April 28 whether to
ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention. The press, the
pundits, and the Clinton administration have treated the
debate over the treaty as another in a series of battles
between ``internationalists'' and ``isolationists'' in the
new, post-Cold War era.
It isn't. What we really have here is the continuation of
one of this century's most enduring disputes. In the first
camp are the high priests of arms control theology, who have
never met an international agreement they didn't like. In the
second camp are those who take a more skeptical view of
relying on a piece of watermarked, signed parchment for
safety in a dangerous world.
The case for ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention is a
triumph of hope over experience. It is an attempt to reform
the world by collecting signatures. Some of the most
dangerous nations--Iraq, Syria, Libya, and North Korea--have
not ratified the convention and, for all we know, never will.
Some of the nations that are signatories, like Russia, China,
Iran, and Cuba, are manifestly unreliable and are already
looking for ways to circumvent the convention's provisions.
The convention's most prominent American defenders admit
that the agreement is probably not verifiable. And it isn't.
Chemical weapons can be produced in small but deadly amounts
in tiny makeshift laboratories. The nerve gas used by
terrorists to poison subway riders in Japan in 1995, for
instance, was produced in a 14 ft.-by-8 ft. room. No one in
the American intelligence community believes we would be able
to monitor compliance with an international chemical weapons
regime with any reasonable degree of confidence.
The Washington Post opines that these failings in the
convention--the very fact ``that the coverage of this treaty
falls short and that enforcement is uncertain''--are actually
arguments for ratifying it. Presumably, signature of a flawed
treaty will make all of us work harder to perfect it.
Great.
At the end of the day, the strongest argument proponents of
ratification can offer is that, whatever a treaty's manifest
flaws, it is better to have one than not to have one. How
could it be bad to have a treaty outlawing production of
chemical weapons, no matter how full of holes it may be?
Well, actually, such a treaty could be worse than no treaty
at all. We have pretty good evidence from the bloody history
of this century that treaties like the Chemical Weapons
Convention--treaties that are more hortatory than
mandatory, that express good intentions more than they
require any actions to back up those intentions--can do
more harm than good. They are part of a psychological
process of evasion and avoidance of tough choices. The
truth is, the best way of controlling chemical weapons
proliferation could be for the United States to bomb a
Libyan chemical weapons factory.
But that is the kind of difficult decision for an American
president that the Chemical Weapons Convention does nothing
to facilitate. Indeed, the existence of a chemical weapons
treaty would make it less likely that a president would order
such strong unilateral action, since he would be bound to
turn over evidence of a violation to the international
lawyers and diplomats and wait for their investigation and
concurrence. And as Richard Perle has recently noted, even
after Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons in flagrant
violation of an existing prohibition against their use, the
international bureaucrats responsible for monitoring these
matters could not bring themselves to denounce Iraq by name.
In the end, it would be easier for a president to order an
air strike than to get scores of nations to agree on naming
one of their own an outlaw.
The Chemical Weapons Convention is what Peter Rodman calls
``junk arms control,'' and not the least of its many
drawbacks is that it gives effective arms control a bad name.
Effective treaties codify decisions nations have already
made: to end a war on certain terms, for instance, or to
define fishing rights. Because they reflect the will of the
parties, moreover, the parties themselves don't raise
obstacles to verification.
But treaties whose purpose is to rope in rogue nations that
have not consented, or whose consent is widely understood to
be cynical and disingenuous, are something else again. They
are based on a worldview that is at best foolishly optimistic
and at worst patronizing and deluded.
One of the important things separating Reaganite
internationalism from the more starry-eyed Wilsonian version
is the understanding that treaties must reflect reality, not
hope. The Chemical Weapons Convention turns the clock back to
the kind of Wilsonian thinking characteristic of the Carter
administration. It is unfortunate that among its strongest
backers are some prominent Republicans who have served in key
foreign-policy positions. It is true that the origins of the
Chemical Weapons Convention date back to the Reagan years,
and the convention was carried to fruition by the Bush
administration. But let's be candid. In the Reagan years, the
treaty was mostly a sop to liberals in Congress, an attempt
to pick up some points for an arms control measure at a time
when Reagan was trying to win on more important issues like
the defense buildup and the Strategic Defense Initiative. And
President Bush pushed the treaty in no small part because he
had disliked having to cast a tie-breaking vote in the Senate
as vice president in favor of building chemical weapons.
Republicans today are under no obligation to carry out the
mistakes of their predecessors.
In one respect, the debate over the Chemical Weapons
Convention calls to mind the struggle for the party's soul
waged in the 1970s between Kissingerian detente-niks on one
side and the insurgent forces led by Ronald Reagan on the
other. Back then, conservative Republicans like Senate
majority leader Trent Lott knew without hesitation where they
stood. They should stand where they stood before, foursquare
with the ideas that helped win the Cold War, and against the
Chemical Weapons Convention.
____
[From the Arizona Republic, Mar. 9, 1997]
Chemical Pact
say no to this treaty
Make no mistake about it.
Those were the words of President Bill Clinton, referring
to the Chemical Weapons Convention in his State of the Union
address.
He said ratification of the CWC ``will make our troops
safer from chemical attack . . . we have no more important
obligations, especially in the wake of what we now know about
the Gulf War.''
Although all civilized nations can embrace the notion of
eliminating chemical weapons, it would, nevertheless, be a
mistake to ratify the CWC, signed by more than 160 nations--
including the United States during the Bush administration.
The treaty requires the destruction of chemical weapons
that signatories to the treaty own or possess, or weapons
anywhere under their jurisdiction; the destruction of
chemical weapons abandoned on the territory of another state;
the destruction of chemical-weapons production facilities;
the prohibition of riot-control agents as a method of
warfare--all reasonable and worthy goals.
Ever since 1675, when a French-German agreement not to use
poison bullets was concluded in Strasbourg, nations have
struggled with how to limit the terribly destructive nature
of chemical weapons, though none of the subsequent
international agreements prevented the use of chemical
weapons by warring factions.
In the 1980s, Iraq used chemical weapons, including nerve
gas, against Iran, clearly violating the 1925 Geneva
Protocol. But an international conference in Paris failed to
enforce or fortify the Geneva Protocol, proving the
difficulty is not a lack of law, but the failure to enforce
it.
Under terms of the CWC, for the first time in U.S. history,
private industry will be subject to foreign inspection, with
inspectors
[[Page S3588]]
being dispatched from an agency based in the Netherlands. In
addition, businesses must prove to the U.S. government and
international inspectors that they are not producing or
stockpiling chemical weapons, with non-compliance fines
reaching as high as $50,000 per incident.
Tucson's Sundt Corp. estimates that ``with five major
offices/warehouses/shops in two states, up to 35 job-site
offices utilizing subcontractors and suppliers in eight
states, the complete and final determination of what we have
in the way of compounds and their derivative, the interactive
relationships (with the list of chemicals) could involve the
cost of a chemist's or consultant's time amounting to
$50,000-$100,000 per annum, not including Sundt Corp.'s
administrative time.''
Under the terms of the treaty, inspections may be conducted
at any facility within a state party without probable cause,
without a warrant. Inspectors will be authorized under the
treaty to collect data and analyze samples. This could result
in the loss of proprietary information, or ``based upon the
depth of inspection, e.g. interviews with corporate
personnel, employees, vendors, subcontractors; review of
drawings, purchase orders, subcontracts; inspection and
review of internal and external correspondence; we feel that
it could be difficult to safeguard confidential business
information during this inspection,'' says the Sundt Corp.
The obligation to open on-site inspections raises clear
Fourth and Fifth Amendment concerns, inasmuch as no probable
cause need be shown while a foreign state will have the right
to a challenge inspection of a U.S. facility without the
grounds that are essential for a search warrant.
As Sen. Jon Kyl, R-Ariz., has pointed out, the CWC may
actually contribute to the proliferation of chemical
technology because of its requirement that the United States
share information with rogue nations, once they sign onto the
CWC.
Further, American technology that might actually enhance
the safety of U.S. troops--such as non-lethal immobilizing
agents--could be prohibited if the Senate ratifies the
convention in its present form.
The forces on both sides of this issue in Washington are
men and women of good will. But the CWC is not a good deal
for the United States. That is the message the Senate should
continue to send to Bill Clinton, in unmistakable terms.
____
[From the Wall Street Journal, Apr. 1, 1997]
The Bum's Rush
The debate over the Chemical Weapons Convention looks like
it's about to turn into a slugfest, notwithstanding last
week's spectacle of Jesse Helms and Madeleine Albright
holding hands. Intimations of the battle to come were heard
the week before last, when Democrats threatened to stall all
Senate actions unless a ratification vote is scheduled. The
Administration, meanwhile, is hyping April 29 as the drop-
dead date for ratification in the hope of getting the Senate
to shortchange the ``advise'' part of its advise-and-consent
responsibilities and rush to a vote before it has a chance to
review it properly.
Majority Leader Trent Lott, who hasn't let on how he will
vote, is the point man here. How he handles the treaty's
passage through the Senate will be an important test of his
leadership. While he has pleased Democrats by promising to
bring the treaty up when the Senate returns from recess in a
few days, that doesn't mean that he's going to ram a vote
down the Senate's throat, as the Administration hopes.
Senator Lott is perfectly capable of spotting a bum's rush
when he sees one, and he expressly made no promise for a vote
before April 29, the date the treaty goes into effect with or
without U.S. ratification. Despite Chicken Little warnings
from the White House, there is no deadline for ratification;
the U.S. can join as a full member at any time.
Before a ratification vote, there is plenty of time for a
vigorous, public examination. The best place to start is with
hearings, which Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Helms
has scheduled to begin on April 9. Senators, especially the
15 new ones who missed last year's hearings, deserve a chance
to understand exactly what they are being asked to vote on.
At the moment the focus is on political maneuverings instead
of where it should be: the content of the treaty.
For starters, Senator Helms could call the four former
Defense Secretaries who adamantly oppose the CWC: James
Schlesinger, Donald Rumsfeld, Casper Weinberger and Dick
Cheney. Ask them about the treaty's verifiability, and
they'll tell you it's impossible. (So, for that matter, will
the treaty's supporters, whose best argument is that the
treaty is flawed, but we ought to sign it anyway.) Douglas
Feith, a Reagan Administration chemical weapons negotiator,
likens enforcement to a drunk searching for his keys under a
lamppost because that's where the light is. Under the CWC,
members could look for chemical weapons in New Zealand or the
Netherlands, but not in North Korea or Libya or Iraq, which
have no intention of joining.
The former Defense Secretaries could also talk about
Articles X and XI, which would require American chemical
manufacturers to share their latest technology with fellow
signatories--including the likes of Iran and Cuba. Legal
scholars could offer some thoughts on the treaty's
requirement that American companies open their doors to
surprise inspections as to whether that squares with the
Constitution's protection of property rights and its ban on
search and seizure. CEOs could testify on the treaty's
regulatory burdens, not to mention the threat of industrial
espionage as inspector-spies snoop around their factories and
troll through their files. Intelligence experts could discuss
the impact on national security.
All this and more should emerge in hearings. In recent
days, Republicans and Democrats have come to agreement on 21
of 30 points of contention over the treaty. That progress
(which comes after weeks of Administration stonewalling, by
the way) is on relatively minor issues and doesn't extend to
the key concerns on verifiability, constitutionality or
national security. The Administration would like nothing
better than a perfunctory day or two of hearings on these
crucial matters followed by a quick transfer to the Senate
floor for a vote billed as ``for'' or ``against'' poison gas.
It should come as no surprise if it doesn't want Senators to
take too close a look: if they do, there's a good chance they
might not like what they see.
Mr. HELMS. I yield to the distinguished Senator from Arizona [Mr.
Kyl], such time as he may require. Does he have an estimate?
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, 10 minutes.
Mr. HELMS. Take a shot at it. I want to be through along about 3:30,
so we can vote.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. KYL. I also ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record a
number of op-ed pieces.
There being not objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the Washington Times, Mar. 4, 1997]
Don't Rush the Chemical Weapons Treaty
George Bush, James Baker, Brent Scowcroft--this is not
exactly a lineup one would expect to find on the side of the
Clinton White House. However, in the past few weeks, the
administration has drawn upon all available resources in the
hope of prevailing upon Congress to ratify the Chemical
Weapons Convention--and to do it at once. A deadline of April
29 looms ominously on the horizon, so we are told, by which
time the treaty goes into effect, having already been
ratified by the necessary 65 countries. If the United States
does not ratify by then, we will be left out in the cold with
other non-signing ne'er-do-wells, and the world will laugh at
this failure of American leadership. For heavens' sake, this
is a treaty the United States itself negotiated! How can we
possibly not ratify it?
Hold the horses here. As critics of the treaty including
four past secretaries of defense have pointed out, it's not
at all clear that it is in the interest of the United States
to ratify the CWC, at least not until a number of problems
associated with it have been resolved. The famous deadline of
April 29 is basically of the administration's own making and
ought not intimidate anyone. Of the 65 countries needed to
trigger the treaty to take effect, the last one, Hungary, did
so in November, and only after consultation with the White
House, which told Budapest to go ahead.
In point of fact, as Michael Waller notes on today's Op-ed
page, Russian Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin specifically
warned Vice President Gore in a letter against rushing the
process with other countries before ratification by the two
most important signatories, Russia and the United States.
Disregarding Mr. Chernomyrdin's warning, the Clinton
administration pressed ahead in order to try to force the
Senate's hand.
President Clinton and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
argue that non-ratification by the United States by April 29
will mean that we will be shut out from the regime's
executive board. This is highly unlikely to happen,
especially given that the United States is being asked to
pony up a full 25 percent of the budget for enforcement.
That's $52 million this year.
The fact of the matter is that the CWC may be in just as
much trouble in the Senate now as it was back in the fall,
when then-secretary of State Warren Christopher decided to
postpone the debate for lack of support. For one thing, this
Senate is more con- servative than the previous one, and for
another, numerous concerns have not been addressed. It
redounds to the credit of Republicans that they have
declared themselves willing to work with the
administration to iron out these difficulties, but there
is a very long way to go. Sen. John Kyl of Arizona tells
The Washington Times' editorial page, ``I believe we have
an obligation to try to get as close as possible to making
the treaty workable. And we'll see how far we can get.''
Mr. Kyl, however, points to some serious problems. For one
thing, it is not global. Iran and Libya, for instance, have
not signed, and China and Russia have not ratified it. Should
we be concerned about chemical weapons in Belgium and
Holland? Of course not. They are not the problem. For
another, the treaty is not adequately verifiable. Even the
Clinton administration admits as much. And third, much like
the Atoms for Peace program, it will spread the knowledge of
a potentially lethal technology to countries that could make
dangerous use of it. Add to these concerns the huge
regulatory burden the treaty will impose on American chemical
companies, in effect an
[[Page S3589]]
unfunded mandate, as well as the constitutional problems with
spot checks by international inspectors.
There may be ways out of these problems without sending the
treaty back to the drawing board. One would be for the Senate
ratification resolution (a document that accompanies all
international treaties ratified by the Senate) to posit a set
of conditions that must be fulfilled before the United States
formally joins the CWC regime. A creative solution might be,
for instance, to say that the CWC regulatory burden should
not be imposed on American companies at least until such a
time as the treaty has been ratified by countries that are
key to its effectiveness--say, Russia, China and Iran.
On Friday, Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott informed
administration negotiators that they will have to deal
directly with the staff of Sen. Jesse Helms' Foreign
Relations Committee, which is indeed where the responsibility
belongs. Mr. Helms has some other issues outstanding with the
administration, including State Department reorganization. If
the CWC is truly as important as the White House claims it
is, there's little time to be lost in getting the White House
to work on the legitimate problems of this treaty.
____
[From the Wall Street Journal, Feb. 13, 1997
The Chemical Weapons Coverup
(By J. Michael Walker)
President Clinton had hardly completed his first year in
office when Sen. William Cohen (R., Maine) suspected that the
administration was covering up ominous Russian military
developments. Mr. Cohen introduced legislation requiring the
president ``to tell us and the American people what the
Russian military was doing and what the implications were for
American and Allied security.'' The Pentagon made the
information available to Congress--but withheld it from the
public. Mr. Cohen complained that the report ``was classified
from cover to cover, even though much of the report did not
warrant being restricted by a security classification.''
``Perhaps,'' Mr. Cohen surmised in a speech on the Senate
floor, ``the administration was worried about being
embarrassed given its acquiescence to Russian military
adventures.'' Whatever the reason, he said, ``the decision to
classify the report from the cover to cover has prevented
Congress from conducting a complete public debate about
Russian actions and the administration's policy toward
Russia, and it has prevented the American people from
becoming fully informed on these matters.''
Eerily Resonant
Mr. Cohen's criticisms of the administration to which he
now belongs seem eerily resonant. The issue today is the
administration's campaign to win Senate ratification of the
Chemical Weapons Convention. Intended to abolish all chemical
weapons world-wide, the CWC contains many loopholes, legal
discrepancies and weak enforcement mechanisms that render it
ineffective. In particular, there is every reason to believe
that Russia has continued work to develop deadly new chemical
weapons that would skirt the treaty's requirements.
Hungary recently became the 65th country to ratify the CWC,
tripping a mechanism that puts the treaty into effect April
29 with or without the ratification of Russia, China and the
U.S. Thus the administration is pushing hard for ratification
by that date, though it had put the CWC on hold last
September over concerns that the CWC might unnecessarily
burden U.S. industry. American companies would be subject to
new regulations and would be compelled to open their records
to foreign inspectors. Firms having nothing to do with
chemical weapons--wineries, breweries, distilleries, food-
processing companies and manufacturers of electronics and
soaps--could be forced to reveal trade secrets to the
inspectors, to the benefit of foreign competitors.
In its zeal to ratify the CWC, the administration has been
distorting and even concealing vital information about the
treaty. Written exchanges between key senators and the
executive branch show grave inconsistencies and worse in the
selling of the CWC:
Verification questions
Many senators are worried that the U.S. lacks the
capability to verify other countries' compliance with the
CWC. This disquiet is fueled in part by the rather vague
assessments by Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director
John Holum and other officials, who repeatedly have reassured
the Senate that the CWC is ``effectively verifiable.''
Indeed, proponents say CWC will provide an added tool for
intelligence collection.
But intelligence reports demonstrate it is insufficient,
even though intelligence chiefs have given the CWC their
obligatory endorsement. In 1994, then-CIA Director R. James
Woolsey told senators that ``the chemical-weapons problem is
so difficult from an intelligence perspective that I cannot
state that we have high confidence in our ability to detect
noncompliance, especially on a small scale.'' And a May 1995
National Intelligence Estimate stated that production of new
classes of chemical weapons ``would be difficult to detect
and confirm as a CWC-sponsored activity.''
Clandestine production
Several countries--notably including Russia--maintain
clandestine chemical weapon programs designed to elude
detection. The administration virtually ignored reports of
Moscow's continuing covert development and production of
binary nerve agents, and made no visible attempt to induce
Moscow to terminate the programs--until last week, when the
Washington Times made public a classified Pentagon report.
The report described Foliant, the code name of a supersecret
program begun under the Soviets to develop nerve agents so
lethal that microscopic amounts can kill. One of those
substances is A-232 of the Novichok class of binary weapons,
which were designed to circumvent future bans on such agents.
The Pentagon report says the chemical formulas are not
defined in the CWC lists. Therefore, Novichok weapons
technically are not banned under the treaty. The
administration counters that they are banned ``in spirit,''
but as with all its arms control agreements, Moscow has been
banking on the technicality and the camouflage.
Russian military scientists and journalists revealed the
program, but Russian officials were not alone in trying to
cover it up. The leaked Pentagon report's low level of
classification--secret as opposed to top secret--suggests
that protecting intelligence sources and methods was not the
objective of the secrecy. Rather, it appears the facts were
simply too inconvenient for the administration's purposes.
Nearly all the leaked information had appeared in the press
long before. In September 1992, Vil Mirzayanov, a dissident
Russian scientist who worked for 26 years on the clandestine
programs, wrote an article in Moscow News describing the
existence and nature of Novichok, and the specific intent to
circumvent the CWC. More details emerged over the next two
years as authorities persecuted--but never disputed--Mr.
Mirzayanov. One of Russia's top binary weapons scientists,
Vladimir Ugiev, revealed the existence of A-232--which he
personally developed--in an interview with the magazine
Novoye Vremya in early 1994. And in May 1994 Mr. Mirzayanov
wrote about A-232 and other substances in an article for this
page. Along with these first-person accounts came additional
revelations of both programs in the Baltimore Sun and other
publications.
Backed by letters from Sens. Bill Bradley (D., N.J.) and
Jesse Helms (R. N.C.), U.S. Ambassador Thomas Pickering held
a Moscow news conference in January 1994 defending Mr.
Mirzayanov for ``telling the truth about an activity which is
contrary to treaty obligations.'' Yet in Washington,
officials kept silent. Only the embarrassment of last week's
Washington Times report has spurred the administration to ask
Russia to stop.
Weapons destruction
The U.S. and other nations have repeatedly offered to help
Moscow destroy the tens of thousands of tons of declared
chemical agents in its arsenals. A legal base toward this
goal in the 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement. Visiting
Bonn last spring, Mr. Holum of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency learned that Moscow was planning to
withdraw from the BDA, and wrote a May 21 cable to Washington
with the news. Lawmakers who asked to see the cable were told
for weeks that it did not exist. Senate sources say. Sen. Jon
Kyl (R., Ariz.), a member of the Select Committee on
Intelligence, wasn't allowed to read the cable until the eve
of the expected September ratification vote, when he was
shown only a redacted version.
Chernomyrdin letter to Gore
Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin sent a letter to
Vice President Al Gore on July 8, 1996, warning that if the
CWC went into effect before Russia's ratification, Moscow
probably wouldn't ratify it. The letter was faxed all around
Washington, but when Sen. Helms, chairman of the Foreign
Relations Committee, asked the administration for a copy, the
administration classified it.
strategy backfired
The Clinton administration had hoped to present the Senate
with a fait accompli: that's why it encouraged Hungary and
other nations to ratify the treaty and automatically trigger
its implementation. Yet the White House strategy seems to
have backfired. After Hungary set the CWC in motion, the
upper house of the Russian Parliament voted down a long-
awaited law that would establish the legal basis for
chemical-weapons destruction. Just as the administration
began its new CWC sales pitch, the Pentagon was forced to
explain why it had done nothing for four years to convince
Moscow to terminate its clandestine binary weapons program.
And with former Sen. Cohen settling in at the Pentagon,
others in the administration still hide behind their paper
shield of secrecy.
____
[From the Wall Street Journal, Feb. 19, 1997]
A Dangerous Treaty
Among the many good reasons why the Senate should not
ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention is a substance known
as A-232. This highly lethal nerve agent was concocted by a
Russian scientific team precisely for the purpose of
circumventing the terms of the CWC, which both the U.S. and
Russia have signed but not yet ratified. A-232 would escape
scrutiny under the treaty because it is made from
agricultural and industrial chemicals that aren't deadly
until they are mixed and therefore don't appear on the CWC's
schedule of banned chemicals.
[[Page S3590]]
The world has known about A-232 since the May 1994
publication on this page of an article by a Russian
scientist, who warned how his colleagues were attempting to
camouflage their true mission. It is now the subject of a
classified Pentagon paper, reported in the Washington Times
earlier this month, on the eve of what is shaping up to be an
escalation of the battle joined in September over
ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
The Administration was forced to sound the retreat then,
pulling the treaty from consideration when it became clear
that the Senate was preparing to vote it down. Now it's
trying again, this time in full cry about the urgency for
U.S. ratification before April 29, the date it goes into
effect. For now, Senator Jesse Helms has kept the treaty tied
up in the Foreign Relations Committee, making the sensible
argument that the new Senate ought first to focus on matters
of higher priority than ramrodding through a controversial
treaty that merits careful deliberation.
The Administration, meanwhile, is mounting a full-court
press, with the president offering a plea for ratification in
his State of the Union address ``so that at last we can begin
to outlaw poison gas from the earth.'' This is an admirable
sentiment--who isn't against making the world safe from the
horrors of poison gas?--but it's far from the reality. In
fact, ratification would more likely bring the opposite
result.
Article XI is one of the key danger areas. It would
obligate U.S. companies to provide fellow signatories with
full access to their latest chemical technologies,
notwithstanding American trade or foreign policy. One country
delighted at the prospect of upgrading its chemical industry
is China, which, upon signing the CWC, issued a declaration
saying, ``All export controls inconsistent with the
Convention should be abolished.'' No doubt Cuba and Iran, to
name two other signatories, share the same sentiment. The
Russian team that came up with A-232 no doubt could
accomplish much more with the help of the most up-to-date
technology from the U.S.
Verification is an insurmountable problem, and no one--not
even the treaty's most ardent supporters--will promise that
the treaty can be enforced. In the administration's
obfuscating phrase, the CWC can be ``effectively verified.''
Yet if chemical weapons are easy to hide, as A-232 proves,
they are also easy to make. The sarin used in the poison-gas
attack on the Tokyo subway was created not in a fancy lab but
in a small, ordinary room used by Aum Shinri Kyo's amateur
chemists. The treaty provides for snap inspections of
companies that make chemicals, not of religious cults that
decide to cook up some sarin in the back office. The CWC
wouldn't make a whit of difference.
Those snap inspections, by the way, could turn into a huge
burden on American businesses, which would have to fork out
millions of dollars in compliance costs (though the biggest
companies no doubt would watch the heaviest burden fall on
their smaller competitors).
More than 65 countries have already ratified the CWC,
including most U.S. allies. But somehow we don't think the
world is more secure with Australia and Hungary committed to
ridding the world of chemical weapons when such real threats
as Libya, Iraq, Syria and North Korea won't have anything to
do with the CWC. How can a treaty that professes to address
the problem of chemical weapons be credible unless it
addresses the threat from the very countries, such as Syria
and Iraq, that have actually deployed these weapons?
With or without the CWC, the U.S. is already committed to
destroying its chemical weapons by 2004. That doesn't mean
the rest of the world shares any such commitment; what
possible peaceful purpose does Russia have in the clandestine
production of A-232? Instead of pushing a treaty that can't
accomplish its impossible goals, the Administration would be
better advised to use its clout, rather than that of some
planned U.N.-style bureaucracy, in getting the Russians to
stop making nerve gas.
It's hard to find a wholehearted advocate of the treaty.
The gist of the messages from most of its so-called champions
is that it's a poor deal, but it's the best on offer. But
their cases have acknowledged so many caveats that it's hard
to see how they've reached such optimistic conclusions. The
biggest danger of ratification is that it would similarly
lull the U.S. and other responsible nations into the false
belief that they are taking effective action against the
threat of chemical weapons. The case for this treaty strains
belief too far.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, the condition we have before us right now is
whether or not the United States will be a party to a meaningful
treaty, that is to say a treaty that covers nations that it needs to
cover. It will not do us any good if we are a party to a treaty, paying
25 percent of the costs, to inspect ourselves. Right now, the countries
that have ratified this treaty are not the countries that are of
concern to us. They do not have weapons. As a matter of fact, right now
the countries that are parties have nothing to inspect. The United
States, if it believes this treaty is ultimately going to have any
positive effect, that is to say if it has significant verification
features, and if it is global in the sense that most of the countries
of the world that have chemical weapons are parties to it, and if it is
enforceable--at that point in time the United States presumably could
get something out of this treaty. In the meantime, the only thing we
get out of it is the opportunity to pay a lot of money, as I say, to
inspect ourselves. Because the countries that need to be inspected are
not yet in it.
Specifically, 74 countries have ratified the treaty and they are the
countries of least concern to the United States. The three countries
that have the largest amount of chemical weapons in the world--Russia
and China and the United States--are not parties, nor are any of the
so-called rogue countries of the world.
Many of these countries have no intention of signing onto the treaty.
North Korea, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Sudan have all refused to sign the
treaty. Others, such as Cuba and Iran, have signed the treaty but have
not yet ratified it. In the meantime, some of these countries, such as
Iraq, continue to stockpile and develop chemical weapons.
So, the question is, will the United States enter this treaty at a
time when it is meaningless, or will we, instead, use our entry as a
prod to cause other countries of the world that need to be parties to
be parties. For the treaty to offer any potential improvement, however
modest, to the national security interests of the United States, I
think at a minimum it must affect those countries with aggressive
chemical weapons programs and which have hostile intentions toward the
United States. Let me just outline briefly who these--who some of these
countries are.
North Korea--North Korea's program involves the stockpiling of a
large amount of nerve gas, blood agents, and mustard gas. And it is
capable of producing much more, according to our intelligence sources.
Its armed forces have the ability to launch large-scale chemical
attacks using mortars, artillery, multiple rocket launchers, and Scud
missiles. And it is presently developing a new generation of medium-
range ballistic missiles that will be able to carry chemical warheads.
North Korea has neither signed nor ratified the Chemical Weapons
Convention.
Iraq--despite the most intrusive inspection and monitoring regime in
the history of the world, Iraq has retained a chemical weapons
production capability and continues to hide details and documents
related to its chemical weapons program. The U.N. Special Commission
believes that Iraq continues to hide chemical agents, precursors, and
weapons. Iraq admitted in 1995 that it had produced over 500 tons of a
lethal nerve gas agent before the Gulf war. The U.N. inspectors had
previously been unable to uncover evidence of this, despite a more
rigorous inspection regime than even those mandated by the Chemical
Weapons Convention verification regime. As noted, Iraq has neither
signed nor ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Iran--Iran has been producing chemical weapons at a steadily
increasing rate since 1984 and now has a stockpile of choking, blister
and blood agents of over 2,000 tons. It also may have a small stockpile
of nerve agent. It has the ability to produce an additional 1,000 tons
of chemical agents per year.
It has signed but not ratified the CWC. Even so, and this is
critical, Iran's chemical weapons program is among the largest in the
Third World. It has continued to expand, even since Tehran signed the
CWC. And the Central Intelligence Agency believes that Iran has no
intention of abiding by the terms of the CWC.
Iran is making improvements to its chemical capabilities that suggest
it has made a long-term commitment to its chemical program. I repeat,
the CIA believes that Iran has no intention of abiding by the terms of
the CWC. It is the most active state sponsor of international
terrorism. It is directly involved in planning and directing terrorist
attacks. And it could supply chemical weapons to a number of terrorist
groups. Iran has not ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Syria has produced chemical weapons since the mid-1980's. The CIA
believes that it is likely that Syria's chemical weapons program will
continue to expand. Syria can indigenously produce
[[Page S3591]]
nerve agents and mustard gas, and is stockpiling both agents. It may
have produced chemical warheads for its Frog and Scud missiles for use
against Israeli cities. Syria has not signed nor ratified the Chemical
Weapons Convention.
Libya--Libya has produced at least 100 tons of chemical agents,
including mustard and nerve gas. Libya is capable of delivering its
chemical weapons with aerial bombs, and may be working to develop a
chemical warhead for ballistic missiles. It also possesses cruise
missiles. Libya has neither signed nor ratified the Chemical Weapons
Convention.
Mr. President, the point is, unless these countries are party to this
treaty, whatever benefits the treaty has are essentially meaningless.
This is one of the reasons why former Defense Secretary Dick Cheney
said this, in a letter he wrote about a week ago. He said:
Those nations most likely to comply with the Chemical
Weapons Convention are not likely to ever constitute a
military threat to the United States. The governments we
should be concerned about are likely to cheat on the CWC,
even if they do participate.
In effect, [he wrote] the Senate is being asked to ratify
the CWC even though it is likely to be ineffective,
unverifiable, and unenforceable. Having ratified the
convention, we will then be told we have ``dealt with the
problem of chemical weapons'' when in fact we will have not.
But, ratification of the CWC will lead to a sense of
complacency, totally unjustified given the flaws in the
convention.
Finally, to the point. The Senator from Massachusetts said that we
are somehow holding ourselves hostage to the rogue states. Precisely
the opposite is the case. We decide when to join this convention, not
because the administration says there is an automatic deadline under
which we have to do so, but when we say it will matter. When we are not
having to pay 25 percent of the costs of a meaningless convention, in
effect 25 percent of the costs to inspect ourselves. Mr. President,
$200 million a year to help this U.N.-style bureaucracy, in addition to
putting the businesses of the United States through all the hoops they
are going to have to go through in order to comply with this
convention.
I have written to my constituents the names of companies on the list
supplied to us by the Government as potentially required to comply with
the reporting requirements of the convention. They write back to me
saying it would cost them $50,000, $70,000, or more than $100,000 a
year, just to fill out the forms.
What we are saying is, instead of putting our businesses through the
expense and hassle of having to comply with this when nobody in the
United States has any intention of violating this treaty--these
companies back in Arizona have no intention of producing chemical
weapons--instead of submitting ourselves to that intrusive bureaucratic
regulation and expense, not to mention the expense to the U.S.
taxpayer, let us be involved in this when it means something; that is
to say, when the countries we really care about are involved in it.
Finally, to the point that we are somehow associating ourselves with
thugs by not joining, I find that really an argument that is, really--
Mr. HELMS. Insulting?
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I don't want to use the word insulting, but
it has no persuasive force, let's put it that way.
Does this mean if a country like Iran or Cuba, for example, signs up,
that we would be associating with lesser thugs? Actually, don't the
proponents of the treaty want us to associate with thug nations, if
this is going to mean anything? Don't we want all of those countries in
the treaty with us?
Somehow, under their logic, we don't want to associate with these
thugs. Yet, they want to pass a treaty that, presumably, if it is going
to mean anything, has these thugs in it, in which case we are
associating with them.
Obviously, the point is not whether we are associating with thugs. I
don't think that any of us can fail to make appropriate distinctions
here. The fact of the matter is, those thug nations, if this treaty is
to mean anything, ought to be part of the organization and, at that
time, the United States then could participate in a meaningful way.
Until those thugs are a part of this treaty, we are just wasting our
time and money and putting a lot of our citizens to an awful lot of
unnecessary hassle.
The point of this condition is to make a point, to make the point
that the countries that really matter are not even going to be governed
by this treaty. It is one of the reasons why this treaty, in the end,
cannot be supported.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? The Senator from North
Carolina.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, allow me to inquire of the distinguished
colleague, does he have somebody ready to go now? I do, if he does not.
Mr. BIDEN. Why don't you go ahead?
Mr. HELMS. I believe I have an hour and 6 minutes that I saved a
while ago. I yield 10 minutes of that to the distinguished Senator from
Texas.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas is recognized.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman of
the Foreign Relations Committee for his leadership on this issue, for
talking about this treaty so that all of America is beginning to see
what the issues are.
I hope to be able to support the Chemical Weapons Convention as
strengthened by the resolution of ratification introduced by the
chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee.
Before I address this resolution, I want to draw our attention to the
remarkable events in Lima, Peru. The Peruvian Armed Forces and police
conducted a bold, daytime raid and rescued 71 of the 72 hostages being
held by a terrorist group for 4 months. As part of the operation, the
Peruvian Army used riot control agents to stun the terrorists and
rescue the hostages.
I would caution my colleagues, regardless of where they come out on
this treaty, that the actions of the Peruvian Armed Forces that
resulted in minimal loss of life among the hostages were quite possibly
a violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which expressly forbids
the use of riot control agents as a method of warfare.
I make this point because this treaty has many things in it that we
must think about very carefully. I believe the proposals the
distinguished Senator from North Carolina has offered in the resolution
before us will turn a flawed treaty into an effective, verifiable tool
of American foreign policy. We are talking about safeguards that ensure
the treaty will be something that America can support, knowing that we
are protected, both in our constitutional rights and in the security of
our country.
One of the amendments before us today would take away one of the very
important elements of protection about which I speak. The amendment I
am referring to does not require that the Director of the CIA certify
that the countries which have been determined to have offensive
chemical weapons, like Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, North Korea, China--
have ratified the convention. We want to make sure that those countries
are going to come under the auspices of this convention. I think it is
important that we have those safeguards.
So, I hope my colleagues will support the resolution, the underlying
resolution, rather than the amendments that are being put forward.
I am glad the Senate is taking the opportunity to improve this
treaty. Our constitutional responsibility to advise and consent on
treaties is one of the most important that we have. Unfortunately, we
have gotten into the bad habit of all consent and no advice. When it
comes to that, we cannot let that happen. That is why we are here. That
is why the Constitution requires two-thirds of our body to ratify any
treaty that America would participate in.
Mr. President, international treaties extend the full faith and
credit of the United States, and they become the law of our land when
they are ratified. So the United States cedes a little sovereignty with
every treaty the Senate ratifies. That is why the framers of our
Constitution wanted to be very careful that two-thirds of the Senate
would be needed to ratify any treaty that would become the law of our
land.
Like no other treaty before it, the Chemical Weapons Convention will
make this loss of sovereignty apparent to thousands of Americans at
thousands of companies who will be faced with new Government
regulations or be subject to searches and seizures of
[[Page S3592]]
their property by teams of international inspectors. These are the
practical effects this treaty will have on ordinary Americans.
As many as 670 companies in my home State of Texas will be directly
affected by this treaty. Only a handful of these companies are actually
in the chemical industry. Many others use small amounts of chemicals
for legal, nonmilitary purposes. But according to this treaty, they
will be required to submit business information to a new United
Nations-style international organization that will monitor this treaty,
or they will have to open their property to inspections by teams of
international inspectors.
Because of the way this treaty will affect ordinary Americans, it is
a profound departure from previous arms control treaties which were
really limited to military contractors and installations. That is why
we must look so carefully at this treaty. If we are going to impose
this burden on ordinary Americans, then we must make sure that the
benefits outweigh the costs.
First, let me say, without qualification, that chemical warfare is
reprehensible and it deserves uniform condemnation. I am proud that the
United States has already decided to destroy any chemical weapons that
we might have with or without this treaty. But, Mr. President, it is
also our responsibility to make sure that we have defenses against any
country that might use chemical weapons in order to be sure that we are
not unilaterally disarming ourselves.
I support the 1989 and 1990 agreements between the United States and
Russia that ban the production of chemical weapons and require both
countries to destroy their stockpiles. Those two agreements were backed
up by tough onsite inspections in which each side can watch the other
destroy the weapons.
Unfortunately, neither the Geneva Protocol against chemical weapons
use nor the two agreements that we have signed with Russia are actually
being enforced.
When the Government of Iraq used chemical weapons against its own
citizens in the 1980's, the United Nations could not even agree upon a
resolution condemning Iraq.
The two Russian agreements are dead, too. The Russian Prime Minister
told Vice President Gore in July 1996 that both agreements have
outlived their usefulness. It appears that the Russians do not intend
to honor these agreements. I remind my colleagues that Russia has the
world's largest stockpile of chemical weapons, and this is not a
trivial matter.
So, Mr. President, we have three good, tough, supposedly enforceable
international agreements to restrict the use of and destroy chemical
weapons. But those agreements have failed. So now we are here today to
consider another agreement, even tougher, that involves more countries,
and we hope it will work where others have failed.
Mr. President, I think we have to address three key questions when we
are talking about not only destroying our chemical weapons but sharing
the technology that we have for defending against them.
My first question: Will this treaty achieve the desired objective, an
objective we all want, and that is to rid the world of chemical
weapons?
I do not think so. Even the most ardent supporter of the treaty knows
that this is not going to rid the world of chemical weapons. We know
that there are outlaw regimes producing chemical weapons as we speak
that have no intention of signing or ratifying this treaty.
Iraq is one example. Iraq makes a mockery of international
agreements. The Government of Iraq has used chemical weapons against
its own people, for Heaven's sake. Who among us believes that a
government that would do this would honor an agreement when it has
already used these weapons on its own people?
Even worse, this treaty as written actually encourages the spread of
chemical weapons technology among the countries that are parties to it
because articles X and XI require treaty participants to share their
chemical weapons defense technologies and prohibits countries from
placing restrictions on commerce in chemicals that can be used for
weapons purposes.
Mr. President, I think what we see here is good-intentioned, but we
are talking about restricting ourselves from producing chemical
weapons, which we want to do, and we are talking about sharing our
defenses against chemical weapons with countries that may be
represented in international inspection groups that would come into our
businesses and could easily give this information back to the countries
who are not signatories.
That is why these amendments are so important, so that every one of
these countries that has chemical weapons will be a party to this
agreement, so that at least we would know that we have some ability to
sanction these countries when they are not able to show us that they
are complying.
Mr. President, my second question is: Can we determine with
reasonable accuracy that the other countries that have signed the
treaty will honor it, as we certainly will? We all remember President
Reagan's words, ``trust but verify.'' We need the ability to verify.
This is a treaty that I am afraid there is no way we could really
verify. In fact, even the supporters admit that you cannot really
verify it. We are trying to strengthen it so that we will have at least
some ability. But then it comes into question, are we going to exercise
those abilities?
I think one of the concerns that I have is that we know that
countries with whom we trade, countries with whom we have good
relations, are actually selling the equipment to make nuclear weapons
to these countries that are rogue nations, that are terrorist states,
right now as we speak. Germany is. Russia is. China is.
What are we doing about it? What are we doing? We are not standing up
and saying, there are consequences to that action, because we do not
want to rock the boat in some other area of foreign policy.
Mr. President, if we are not going to stand up when countries with
whom we are trading and with whom we have friendly relations are this
very day selling nuclear weapons or nuclear capabilities to rogue
nations, like Iran and Iraq, how could we ever say that this treaty
would be verifiable and that all of the signatories would comply with
this treaty and that we would in fact do anything if they were not?
Mr. President, my third question is: Can we protect the
constitutional rights of ordinary Americans affected by the treaty who
are engaged in activities that have nothing to do with the production
of chemical weapons? I think this is one of the most important issues--
the constitutional right against an unreasonable search or seizure.
The protections offered by the chairman of the Foreign Relations
Committee, Mr. Helms, is a first step. But we are going to have to hold
on to the protections that have been put in the bill by the committee
because the fourth amendment to the Constitution is a pillar of the
Bill of Rights. It protects the rights of our people against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Yet this agreement, the chemical
weapons treaty, would allow people to come in, international groups, to
inspect our companies, not companies that are making chemical weapons--
we do not do that--but companies that use chemicals for any other
myriad of purposes, to get their trade secrets or our defense
mechanisms against the chemical weapons that we may have to face one
day.
Mr. President, I am just very worried that we would disarm ourselves
and lose the ability to protect ourselves against a rogue nation that
will not sign and ratify this treaty.
The amendments offered today would take away the protections that are
now in the resolution against that happening because the resolution
says all of these rogue nations must be a party to the agreement so
that at least we would have the mechanisms to go in and try to find
these chemical weapons. Yet, you know even the best effort that we have
been able to make in finding chemical weapons in Iraq have failed.
Right now our international agreements allow us to look in Iraq for
chemical weapons. We have not found any. And yet all of the inspectors
in the international group that are trying to find those weapons have
not been able to do it, but they say they know they are there. They are
sure that they are there. So the verifiability becomes a real issue.
[[Page S3593]]
Mr. President, I think that the committee has done an excellent job
of protecting the interests of Americans in this treaty. I hope that we
can keep the safeguards so that all of us can vote for this treaty. I
would like to because I respect the people who are for the treaty.
I have the greatest regard for President Bush. I think he is a
wonderful man. He would never leave the United States of America
defenseless. But you know, if Senator Kyl and Senator Helms had not
stood up, one of the safeguards that President Bush put in the treaty
would have been taken out, and that is the use of tear gas by our
forces in wartime, because President Bush made sure that we said right
up front, yes, we will use tear gas because we would rather use tear
gas than bullets.
President Clinton disagreed with that. He said, no, we would not use
tear gas. But because of the efforts of Senator Helms and Senator Kyl,
we have been able to agree on that issue.
So, Mr. President, I hope to be able to support this treaty. I thank
the distinguished chairman of the committee for allowing me to speak
and for his leadership. I would like to be able to support it, but I
will not support this treaty without the safeguards to the security of
America. That is my first responsibility.
Thank you, Mr. President.
Mr. HELMS. I thank the Senator.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. I yield 10 minutes to my colleague from Indiana.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana is recognized for 10
minutes.
Mr. LUGAR. I thank the Chair.
I thank the distinguished Senator from Delaware.
Mr. President, the objective of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the
debate that we are involved in now, is leadership, a question of
leadership by our country.
We can take a look at all the exceptions and the negative views, but
the very positive force I think we want to stress in framing this issue
is, the United States of America, our statesmen, President Ronald
Reagan, George Bush, now President Bill Clinton, and many who have
worked with them in the Armed Forces and in statecraft, recognize that
our country has a very substantial problem in the world; namely, that
of chemical weapons.
We came to a determination on our part that these weapons were
unreliable, unstable, dangerous, and so dangerous, as a matter of fact,
that we did not wish to employ them--we wished to destroy them. We have
been doing that as a nation.
Our dilemma is that other nations, primarily Russia, with substantial
stores much greater than our own, but a variety of other nations,
purportedly have these weapons. Our problem is to convince other
nations in the world that we all ought to be about the task of ending
production of these weapons, ending possession, storage, ending any
vestige of them.
Now, in order to do that, we have to bring other nations into this
with us. Therefore, we have offered leadership now for many years. We
have convinced 74 other nations that have already ratified the Chemical
Weapons Convention that they ought to be with us in this quest. I make
that point at the outset, Mr. President, because the motion before the
Senate is to strike a condition added, at least to this treaty, that
would say we ought to forgo our leadership, we ought to really forget
what our objective has been for years. I presume we ought to forget we
are in the process of destroying all of our own chemical weapons and
simply hope that others might proceed.
As a matter of fact, if we do not ratify this convention this
evening, others will proceed, but they will proceed without us. Our
diplomacy with Russia will be severely impaired. As a result, even
though we are working with Russia now--as a matter of fact, to help
them destroy chemical weapons--through reasons the world will find hard
to understand, we will have denied the very treaty we have asked others
to join us in. It makes no sense.
Let me say with all due respect to those who formulated the idea that
we should not ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention unless the so-
called rogue states--named as North Korea, Libya, Syria, Iran, and
Iraq--join, must have really stayed up nights trying to think of some
way to throw us off course. I presume they felt that our antipathy to
some of these states would be such that we would say if they are not
going to be a part of it, we ought not to be a part of it, we ought to
simply go after them in a unilateral way. Let me examine that for a
moment, Mr. President.
The Senator from Delaware and the Senator from Massachusetts have
talked about law, about legitimacy. As a matter of fact, our Nation
does have the mobility to be an enforcer. In the event we feel our
security is threatened, our President might, in fact, consider a
military action against a nation that offered a security threat to us.
But let us examine the implications if our President decides to do
this. If he is going to act unilaterally without benefit of
international law--and international law does count because other
nations understand the implications of that cooperation and the binding
that brings--if we are going to contemplate solo strikes without
benefit of international law, then we will have to think about
overflight rights, about the problems of our pilots if our aircraft are
down, about a number of implications in which we count upon cooperation
of nation-states. International law does count. It makes a difference
that there is a law against this, and that the United States acts with
other nations and with their backing to enforce that, and that we shall
have to do.
Much has been said about lack of military will or lack of political
will, but, Mr. President, I have seen very little of that in this
Chamber during this debate. We are serious about this.
Mr. President, let me add just as a topical matter, because the
Members of the Senate who have been watching local television at least
in the last half-hour appreciate that in northwest Washington, in the
downtown area near the B'nai B'rith headquarters, a vial of chemical
material or biological material is present that authorities of the
police and fire department and special persons in the Washington, DC,
area have now picked up this material, and people in the B'nai B'rith
headquarters are being decontaminated. A suggestion is that it may be
anthrax, a very deadly biological weapon.
It was not long ago on this floor, Mr. President, that the Nunn-
Lugar-Domenici Act was debated and we talked then in terms of
attempting to bring Department of Defense resources into play with the
cities of this country--Washington, DC, being prominent among them,
Atlanta, GA, Denver, CO, and 23 other cities have been named--so that
in the event there should be anthrax, which was specifically mentioned
in the debate, we were prepared to move. That is leadership, Mr.
President. We saw the threat and we prepared to move upon it. We have
done so.
Now, we will do so with regard to the international scene. But the
treaty gives us the basis of international law. To suggest for a
moment, Mr. President, we ought to be deterred from our leadership by
whether Iraq joins, whether Iran is involved, whether North Korea
should ever be involved, is to stretch credibility really to the
breaking point. These nations are irrelevant to our membership and our
leadership. They are irrelevant to our standing for international law
and our ability to act, and to act decisively. That must be our
standard, Mr. President. With imagination, one will think of all sorts
of hobgoblins that can be thrown up to make an interesting debate, but
debate is leadership, and debate is decisive political will, and the
debate is our ability to convince other nations of the world they
should come with us, that we are reliable, that we stay the course,
that our word is good, administration after administration.
Mr. President, this is the reason we should vote to strike this
amendment, this condition, from the convention immediately, decisively.
It has been a point, clearly, a parliamentary procedure, and that our
failure to do so, as a matter of fact, jeopardizes the entire treaty.
It is improbable, if not impossible, our Nation would ever join, would
ever follow through on our leadership, if we were to wait upon states
[[Page S3594]]
that are irrelevant to the whole proposition.
I conclude, Mr. President, by saying obviously, threats in those
states are not relevant. We must be decisive. We need going for us
international law, enhancement of our intelligence that the intrusive
inspections and all of the trade accounts will give to us, so that when
we strike, we will strike accurately and completely and bring the
security to the world that this treaty attempts to promote.
Mr. HELMS. I yield such time as the Senator from Arizona may consume.
Mr. KYL. I will be very brief to a matter of news interest here in
the Washington, DC, area. People might be watching this on a different
channel of their television, viewing the ambulances and people
attempting to assist, and at least two people who appear to have been
exposed to some kind of chemical agent. My understanding is that
Senator Lugar has just discussed this matter briefly, as well. This
occurred at or near a B'nai B'rith facility here in Washington, DC.
I think that while neither side in this debate would want to use an
unfortunate incident to bolster their case, and while our first concern
ought to be for the people who may have been exposed to some agent
here--and we all certainly hope there is no harm done and that if, in
fact, it was not accidental that the perpetrators are dealt with in the
appropriate fashion--I think it is also an inappropriate place to make
the point that contrary to those who assert that the Chemical Weapons
Convention deals with this problem, it does not. We should be very,
very clear about that.
There are reasons for proponents to suggest that this Chemical
Weapons Convention should be supported. There are arguments of
opponents as to why that should not be the case. But I hope that we do
not have people arguing on the floor of the Senate here that the
Chemical Weapons Convention will deter terrorists, that somehow this
will make us safer from terrorist attack, because it cannot fulfill
that noble goal. We will literally be buying on to something that
cannot come to pass if the treaty proponents try to sell it on that
basis.
As a matter of fact, there is specific declassified intelligence
information directly on this point. I will quote that before the
chairman resumes his time. A declassified section of the Defense
Intelligence Agency document of February 1996, with specific reference
to the Tokyo subway attack by terrorists at that time said:
Irrespective of whether the Chemical Weapons Convention
enters into force, terrorists will likely look upon CW as a
means to gain greater publicity and instill widespread fear.
The March 1995 Tokyo subway attack by Aum Shinrikyo would not
have been prevented by the Chemical Weapons Convention.
In May of 1996, another CIA report, a portion of which has been
declassified, contains this statement:
In the case of Aum Shinrikyo the Chemical Weapons
Convention would not have hindered the cult from procuring
the needed chemical compounds used in the production of
sarin. Further, the Aum Shinrikyo would have escaped CWC
requirement for an end use certification because it purchased
the chemicals within Japan.
There are some additional things we can quote. The point I am making
is that reasonable people can differ about the pros and cons of this
treaty. That will be reflected in the vote on the treaty here. I hope
that Americans do not get the idea that we will be safe from terrorist
attack or even significantly safer by the adoption of this Chemical
Weapons Convention. Terrorist attacks are not what it was designed to
deal with. I hope that point is crystal clear.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.
Mr. HELMS. I thank the Senator for that explanation. I think it was
very timely.
I yield 12 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Oklahoma [Mr.
Inhofe], following which I suggest we vote.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma is recognized.
The Senator from North Carolina has 4\1/2\ minutes remaining on the
amendment.
Does the Senator wish to yield from your resolution time?
Mr. HELMS. In that case, I misunderstood the statement of the
Parliamentarian.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina, do you yield
the remaining time of the amendment or from the resolution time?
The Senator from Oklahoma is recognized for 12 minutes.
Mr. INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. President. I will probably not take the 12
minutes.
The Senator from Arizona is exactly right. I think even the strongest
opponents of the ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention have
said this is not going to affect terrorist activities. Obviously, by
the very title ``terrorists'' they are not going to be complying with
this.
I have to say I feel the same way about these countries that we are
discussing right now. The condition which is under debate at this time
is whether or not to strike that portion with regard to Iran, Syria,
Libya, North Korea, and China. It would be, if we were only concerned
about those countries that have signed or have ratified or have an
expressed intention to ratify, that would be very nice, because we
would be talking about Canada, the Fiji Islands, Costa Rica, and
Singapore, Iceland. That is not where the threat is. The threat is the
rogue nations. That is what we are talking about right now.
I will for a moment bring this up to date by quoting a couple of
things. General Schwarzkopf, during a press conference in Riyadh said:
,The nightmare scenario for all of us would have been to go
through this [the Iraqi tank barrier], get hung up in this
breach right here, and then have the enemy artillery rain
chemical weapons down on the troops that were in the gaggle
in the breach right here.
General Hughes said:
In any attack in the south, Pyongyang could use chemical
weapons to attack forces deployed near the DMZ, suppress
allied air power, and isolate the peninsula from strategic
reinforcement.
Four days ago in a Seoul, North Korea, newspaper there was an article
quoting very high North Korean officials as saying they now have
adequate chemical weapons to annihilate South Korea. This is going on
as we speak. So we are talking about nations that are not going to be
our friends. These are the ones that, whether they are signatories, or
whether they ratify or not, it doesn't make too much difference. It
tickles me when they talk about, ``Russia is going to do that.'' Last
night, I was on a talk show and we finally agreed that on the 1990
Bilateral Destruction Agreement, they have been found in noncompliance
of that, and of the START I, of the Conventional Forces in Europe. Even
though my opponent denied it was the INF, in fact, they were. In the
1995 Arms Control Disarmament Agency report, it says they were not in
compliance with that; the ABM Treaty, they have not been in compliance
with that.
But let's assume if a country like Russia doesn't comply when they
ratify, what about these rogue nations? I can tell you for sure that
those proponents of the ratification have gone to every extent possible
to make it look like--or to make us believe that the Reagan
administration, if they were here today, would be in support of this
Chemical Weapons Convention. I can assure you that they would not.
Coincidentally, I happened to be on a talk show--``Crossfire''--with a
very fine gentlemen, Ken Adelman. He had been in the Reagan
administration. We found out, after he gave his testimonial as to why
we should ratify--and he admitted it was not verifiable nor is it
global, but he still thought we should do it--that Mr. Adelman might be
prejudiced by his membership on two boards of directors, the
International Planning and Analysis Center and on Newmeyer and
Associates. These companies, which he directs, have clients in many
foreign countries, including China and Japan, and they represent
companies that deal in chemicals such as those from the UpJohn Co.
People say this is just chemicals. It is not just chemical companies we
are talking about. In this chemical association that gets so much
attention, it represents 192 chemical companies. These are the large
ones, the giants. There are some 4,000 other companies, and you can
expand it beyond purely chemical companies to some 8,000 other
companies, most of whom are opposed to this, because they would be shut
out in the competition.
I think the whole thing on this particular amendment is whether or
not this would have any positive effect on the rogue nations if we
should ratify
[[Page S3595]]
the Chemical Weapons Convention. I don't think there is anybody here
who is so naive to think that, voluntarily, if they are a part of it,
they would reduce their chemical behavior. I think those of us in this
room can argue and debate that.
So I go back to the people who are the real authorities. You have
heard Dick Cheney quoted several times on the floor, in his letter that
we have quoted several times. He said, ``Indeed some aspects of the
present convention--notably, its obligation to share with potential
adversaries, like Iran, chemical manufacturing technology that can be
used for military purposes in chemical defense equipment--threaten to
make this accord worse than having no treaty at all.'' That is Dick
Cheney, not some guy that read a couple of articles and determined it
was wrong. What is he talking about? He is talking about something that
will be debated here shortly, and we will get into that in more detail.
Part of article X says, ``The technical secretariat shall establish not
later than 180 days after entry into force of this contract, and
maintain for the use of any requesting state party, a data bank
containing freely available information concerning various means of
protection against chemical weapons, as well as such information as may
be provided by states' parties.''
Well, I can remember in the Armed Services Committee when Schwarzkopf
was here. I said:
General, you are in support of the Chemical Weapons
Convention.
I read that, and then I will read a transcript, because I think
everybody who might be basing their vote on what General Schwarzkopf
said, here is a transcript from that meeting:
Senator Inhofe. Do you think it wise to share with
countries like Iran our most advanced chemical defensive
equipment and technology?
General Schwarzkopf. Our defensive capabilities?
Senator Inhofe. Yes.
General Schwarzkopf. Absolutely not.
Senator Inhofe. Well, I'm talking about sharing our
advanced chemical defensive equipment and technologies, which
I believe under article X (they) would be allowed to (get).
Do you disagree?
General Schwarzkopf. As I said, Senator, I'm not familiar
with all the details--you know--you know, a country,
particularly like Iran, I think we should share as little as
possible with them in the way of our military capabilities.
I am not critical of General Schwarzkopf. It is a very complicated
thing. I don't know how many people read the whole thing. I haven't,
but I read enough to know, as far as our treatment with rogue nations,
I would not want to be ratifying this contract unless they ratified it.
Then I would not trust them any more than we would trust Russia, and if
they do ratify, I question if they will honor it.
One of the other conditions we are going to talk about is, should we
do it, should we put in a requirement that they would have to ratify
before we will. Well, we had that requirement 2 years ago when I voted
against the START II treaty. They said we have to do it before Russia
because they won't ratify unless we do. Guess what, Mr. President, they
still haven't ratified.
Lastly, to kind of express the urgency of this, former Secretary of
Defense, James Schlesinger, said, ``To the extent that others learn
from international sharing of information on chemical warfare defenses,
our vulnerability is enhanced rather than diminished. Finally, this
treaty in no way helps shield our soldiers from one of battlefield's
deadliest killers. As indicated earlier, only the threat of effective
retaliation provides such protection.''
What he is saying there is not that we would use chemical weapons,
but by the fact that we are not a party to this treaty is one that
would at least offer some type of a deterrent. So I think, Mr.
President, when you look and read of the hostility that is over there--
James Woolsey said, in 1993:
More than two dozen countries have programs to research or
develop chemical weapons, and a number have stockpiled such
weapons, including Libya, Iran, and Iraq--
Three of the countries we are talking about:
The military competition in the always volatile Middle East
has spurred others in the region to develop chemical weapons.
We have also noted a disturbing pattern of biological weapons
development following closely on the heels of the development
of chemical weapons.
Mr. President, the threat is there, and we know that other countries
can sell their technology, as well as their systems, to rogue nations.
We know Russia has done this, to specifically Iran and other nations,
not when they sold their technology, but also their equipment. So it is
a very scary thing to think that we might be putting ourselves in a
position that would increase our exposure to the threat of chemical
warfare and would increase the proliferation of chemical weapons in the
Middle East.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I believe time has expired. Parliamentary
inquiry.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.
Mr. HELMS. If the Chair will refresh my memory, a motion to table is
not in order, is that correct?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time would have to be yielded back on the
amendment in order for a motion to table to be in order. The unanimous-
consent agreement does not appear to preclude a motion to table.
Mr. HELMS. How much time remains, Mr. President?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Currently, the Senator from North Carolina
would have 4 minutes 27 seconds on the amendment. The Senator from
Delaware would have 2 minutes 37 seconds.
Who yields time?
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, how much time remains for me?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator controls 2 minutes 37 seconds.
Mr. BIDEN. I yield myself the remaining time. I will speak to a
couple of points. With regard to Ken Adelman, I am sure our colleague
from Oklahoma didn't mean to impugn his motivation by suggesting for
whom he worked. I would not suggest that of Mr. Rumsfeld because of
where he works now, that it caused him to have that view. Ken Adelman--
although I disagree with him most of the time, he was an able member of
the administration. He was viewed as a hawk at the time he was here.
For the record, I am sure there was no intention to do that?
Mr. INHOFE. If the Senator will yield, I made it very clear before my
remarks that I hold him in the highest of esteem. However, the fact
remains that he does work for those companies that have an interest,
and that could be a conflict of interest. I think that could be drawn
by anyone.
Mr. BIDEN. I thank the Senator for making clear what he meant. I
didn't think that's what he meant. I was hoping that is not what he
meant, but it is what he meant. That could be said about almost
everybody who testified before our committee, for and against this
treaty, and I really, quite frankly, think that the leaders for and
against this treaty in the last two administrations are men and women
of integrity who would have no conflict. They are consistent with what
they did within those administrations.
Let me point out a few things. It seems interesting to me that here
we are, the very people--our very colleagues who want to have a
provision saying that we want all these rogue nations in the treaty
before we get into the treaty, argue in the alternative, that these
nations in the treaty mean the treaty is worthless. Translated, very
simply, they are not for this treaty under any circumstance, whether or
not these nations are in the treaty or out of the treaty. I also point
out that--in the interest of time, I will not be able to point it out
in detail--every argument against this treaty made thus far on the
floor today, I respectfully suggest, is made worse by not being in the
treaty, by not having the treaty. I find it, quite frankly,
interesting.
My time is up. I hope my colleague will not move to table. We agree
not to attempt to amend any of these conditions. I hope we will have a
vote up or down. Apparently, it is not in the agreement. If he chooses
to do it, I guess he has the right.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I shall not move to table. I will yield
back such time as I may have.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time having been yielded back, the
question is on agreeing to amendment No. 47.
[[Page S3596]]
The yeas and nays have been ordered.
The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
The result was announced--yeas 71, nays 29, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 46 Ex.]
YEAS--71
Abraham
Akaka
Baucus
Biden
Bingaman
Bond
Boxer
Breaux
Bryan
Bumpers
Byrd
Chafee
Cleland
Coats
Cochran
Collins
Conrad
D'Amato
Daschle
DeWine
Dodd
Domenici
Dorgan
Durbin
Feingold
Feinstein
Ford
Frist
Glenn
Gorton
Graham
Gregg
Hagel
Harkin
Hatch
Hollings
Inouye
Jeffords
Johnson
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Kohl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lugar
McCain
Mikulski
Moseley-Braun
Moynihan
Murray
Nickles
Reed
Reid
Robb
Roberts
Rockefeller
Roth
Santorum
Sarbanes
Smith Gordon H
Snowe
Specter
Stevens
Torricelli
Warner
Wellstone
Wyden
NAYS--29
Allard
Ashcroft
Bennett
Brownback
Burns
Campbell
Coverdell
Craig
Enzi
Faircloth
Gramm
Grams
Grassley
Helms
Hutchinson
Hutchison
Inhofe
Kempthorne
Kyl
Lott
Mack
McConnell
Murkowski
Sessions
Shelby
Smith Bob
Thomas
Thompson
Thurmond
The amendment (No. 47) was agreed to.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. BIDEN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Brownback). The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. Parliamentary inquiry.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. May we please have order.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I withdraw my inquiry I did not make.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware withdraws his
inquiry. Who seeks time?
Mr. LOTT addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi, the majority
leader.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, can I get time off the manager's time from
the bill?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LOTT. I do still have my leader time. If I need that, we can use
that also.
Mr. President, I had planned on and had hoped to be able to speak
after all of the votes on the motions to strike because I did not in
any way want to distract from those motions to strike. I have hopes
that at least some of them might actually be defeated, particularly the
one with regard to inspectors coming into the United States from some
of the so-called rogue countries, but I think it is important we go
ahead and state our positions at this point. Everybody has made their
case. It is time to make decisions and to move on. I want to start by
thanking Senator Helms for his cooperation. Without his cooperation, we
would not be here today. His cooperation guaranteed that we were able
to develop a process that was fair, that allowed us to get S. 495 up
and voted on last week, that all of the remaining issues in
disagreement would have an opportunity to be debated, considered and
voted upon.
He really has done an excellent job. There is no question that he
continues to have great reservations about this legislation. But his
efforts and the efforts of Senator Kyl from Arizona have been nothing
short of heroic. They have been tenacious. They have done their
homework. They have made excellent statements both here and in our
closed session earlier today. I think they should be commended for what
they have done. In fact, their work and their success has contributed
greatly to the likelihood that this treaty actually will pass. That had
not necessarily been their intent, but they wanted to make sure, if it
did pass, they wanted it to pass in the best possible form.
I also thank the Democratic leader for his courtesies as we worked
through a very complicated unanimous-consent agreement. We were watched
over very carefully by the Senator from West Virginia. I thank the
Senator from Delaware, [Mr. Biden] for his cooperation and his
patience, and I think the fact that we have all sort of kept cool heads
and been careful how we proceeded has served us well.
Mr. President, our Constitution is unique in the power it grants the
Senate in treaty making. Article II, section 2 states the President
``shall have the power, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur.''
The Senate's coequal treaty making power is one of our most important
constitutional duties. All 100 Senators have approached this duty very
seriously in examining the Chemical Weapons Convention, as we should.
We have participated in and we have listened to hearings laying out the
arguments for and against the convention. We have looked closely at
many provisions of the convention and have sought the advice and
counsel of experts and former policymakers. We read many articles and
we have heard the arguments making the case for and against it.
Before addressing my views on the convention itself, I should like to
share with my colleagues a brief history of the Senate's action on this
convention, how we got to where we are today.
The Chemical Weapons Convention was signed by the United States as an
original signatory on January 13, 1993, in the last days of President
Bush's administration. For reasons that remain unclear, it was 10
months before President Clinton sent the convention to the Senate. In
his transmittal letter, dated November 23, 1993, President Clinton
wrote:
I urge the Senate to give early and favorable consideration
to the convention and to give advice and consent to its
ratification as soon as possible in 1994.
Let me remind my colleagues that for the next 11 months, until the
103d Congress adjourned on December 1, 1994, the Senate majority leader
was George Mitchell and the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee
was Claiborne Pell.
Despite Democratic control of the White House and the Senate, the
Senate did not consider the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1994.
In late 1995, Senate Democrats began a filibuster on the State
Department authorization bill to force action on the CWC. On December
7, 1995, an agreement was reached providing for the convention to be
reported out of the Foreign Relations Committee by April 30, 1996. The
committee honored that agreement, and the convention was placed on the
Executive Calendar.
That is where matters stood when I became majority leader on June 12,
1996. Only 6 days later, before I had a chance to get my sea legs at
all, there began a filibuster once again by the Senate Democrats to
force Senate action on the convention.
To allow critical national defense legislation to proceed, we worked
with Senators on both sides of the aisle, and again we reached an
agreement guaranteeing a vote by September 13, 1996.
In the weeks preceding the vote, opponents and proponents of the
convention made their case to Senators. On September 6, 1996, I
requested the declassification of certain key judgments of the
intelligence community relating to key aspects of the convention. On
September 10, the administration partially complied with that request,
and certain intelligence judgments were made public. I ask unanimous
consent that the exchange of letters on the intelligence judgments be
printed in the Record.
Mr. President, I understand the Government Printing Office estimates
it will cost $1,288 to print these letters in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
U.S. Senate,
Office of the Majority Leader,
Washington, DC, September 6, 1996.
President William Jefferson Clinton,
The White House,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. President: I am writing to ask your cooperation
and support for Senate efforts to obtain information and
documents directly relevant to our consideration of the
Chemical Weapons Convention.
As you know, the Senate is currently scheduled to consider
the Convention on or before September 14, 1996 under a
unanimous consent agreement reached on June 28, 1996.
Immediately prior to the Senate agreement on the Convention,
I stated, ``With respect to the Chemical Weapons Convention,
the Majority Leader and the Democratic Leader
[[Page S3597]]
will make every effort to obtain from the administration such
facts and documents as requested by the Chairman and ranking
member of the Foreign Relations Committee, in order to pursue
its work and hearings needed to develop a complete record for
the Senate . . .''
I regret to inform you that your administration has not
been fully cooperative in Senate efforts to obtain critical
information. Chairman Helms wrote to you on June 21, 1996--
prior to the Senate setting a date for a vote on the
Convention--and asked eight specific questions. Chairman
Helms also requested the provision and declassification of
documents and a cable relating to critical issues of Russian
compliance with existing chemical weapons arms control
agreements and with the Chemical Weapons Convention.
On July 26, 1996, having received no response to his
earlier letter, Chairman Helms reiterated his earlier request
and asked additional questions concerning the apparent
Russian decision to unilaterally end implementation of the
1990 U.S.-Russian Bilateral Destruction Agreement on chemical
weapons. Chairman Helms also asked for specific information
and documents concerning Russian conditions for ratification
of the Chemical Weapons Convention, as well as other
information important to our consideration of the Convention.
While Chairman Helms did receive responses to his letters on
July 31 and on August 13, his request for declassification of
documents was refused and the answers to many of his
questions were incomplete.
During a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing on
June 17, 1996, Senator Kyl asked for a specific document--a
cable written in Bonn, Germany by Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency (ACDA) Director Holum concerning current
Russian government positions on the Bilateral Destruction
Agreement, ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention
and on U.S. assistance for the destruction of Russian
chemical weapons. On numerous occasions, Senator Kyl was told
the document did not exist. Finally, on July 26, Senator Kyl
was able to see a redacted version of the document under
tightly controlled circumstances but the document has not
been made available to Chairman Helms or other Senators.
Mr. President, the unanimous consent agreement of June 28,
1996, was entered into in good faith, and based on our
understanding that the administration could and would be
fully forthcoming in the provision of information and
documents to enable the Senate to fulfill its constitutional
responsibilities. Numerous judgements of the United States
intelligence community deserve as wide a circulation as
possible--particularly since they are distinctly different
than some public statements made by officials of your
Administration concerning the Convention.
Accordingly, I respectfully request that you reconsider
your refusal to declassify critical documents and consider
the declassification of important intelligence community
judgements--consistent with the need to protect intelligence
sources and methods. Specifically, I request that you act
immediately to declassify the May 21, 1996, cable written by
ACDA Director Holum and the July 8, 1996, letter from Russian
Prime Minister Chernomyrdin to Vice-President Gore, and
consider immediately declassification of the paragraphs from
which the attached statements are excerpted--all drawn from
documents produced by the Central Intelligence Agency and the
Defense Intelligence Agency on the Russian chemical weapons
program, the verifiability of the Chemical Weapons
Convention, the effect of the Convention on the chemical
weapons arsenals of rogue states, and the relevance of the
Convention to acts of terrorism committed with chemical
weapons.
I make these requests to enable the Senate to fully prepare
for its consideration of the Chemical Weapons Convention. I
am certain you would agree it is necessary for the Senate to
have complete and usable information in order fulfill our
constitutional obligations and to responsibly meet the terms
of the current unanimous consent agreement. Because the
unanimous consent agreement calls for the Senate to vote on
the Chemical Weapons Convention by September 14, 1996, I
respectfully request that you respond to my declassification
requests no later than the close of business on Tuesday,
September 10, 1996. With best wishes, I am
Sincerely,
Trent Lott.
____
The White House,
Washington, September 10, 1996.
Hon. Trent Lott,
Majority Leader, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Leader: The President has asked that I respond to
your letter regarding Senate consideration of the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC).
On behalf of the President, I would like to thank you for
your cooperation and leadership in scheduling a Senate vote
on this vital treaty which, as you know, has been before the
Senate since November 1993. The CWC, which was negotiated
under President Reagan and concluded and signed under
President Bush, is an important element of our bipartisan
efforts over the years to address two of the most important
threats facing us in the post Cold War era: the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism.
I was concerned by your letter and regret that you believe
that the Administration has not been fully cooperative with
Senate efforts to obtain critical information. I want to
assure you that the Administration remains eager and
committed to continuing to assist the Senate in developing a
complete record for its consideration prior to floor action
on the CWC, as stated in the June 28, 1996, unanimous consent
agreement.
During the almost three years the Convention has been
before the Senate, the Administration has worked very hard to
ensure that the Senate has been fully informed on the
Convention and that all its questions have been answered. Our
efforts to inform the Senate have included testimony at 13
hearings, including testimony by many Cabinet officials. We
have conducted dozens of briefings for members and staff by
representatives of key agencies, including yesterday's
productive session with the Arms Control Observer Group. The
President has appointed two Special Advisors on the CWC, to
address Senate questions and concerns as part of the
ratification process. Former Representative Martin Lancaster
served in this capacity in 1995 and Dr. Lori Esposito Murray
currently holds this position. On behalf of the President,
they have personally briefed every Senate office, offered
individual briefings to every member of the Senate and
personally briefed over 40 Senators.
In addition, we have answered over 300 questions for the
record. Senator Helms has asked many of these questions and
we have always responded to his concerns. For example, we
have not only provided Senator Helms our database of
companies likely to be affected by the CWC, but we have also
provided him a list of chemical companies we have determined
unlikely to be affected by the CWC. Overall, the
Administration has provided the Senate with over 1500 pages
of information on the CWC--over 300 pages of testimony, over
500 pages of answers to Senate letters and reports, over 400
pages of answers to Senate questions for the treaty record
and over 300 pages of other documentation.
With regard to Senator Helms' most recent letters, the
President and I both personally responded to Senator Helms,
first on July 31 and then again on August 13; these responses
included detailed attachments that answered a series of
specific questions asked by Senator Helms.
The Administration has repeatedly offered to make relevant
classified information available to the Senate through
classified briefings and reports. I explained to Senator
Helms in my response to his most recent letters that, while I
regretted we could not declassify the documents he requested,
we remained eager to brief the Senator and any of his
colleagues, as well as cleared staff, at the earliest
possible time, both on those documents as well as on other
concerns. Such a briefing was provided to Senator Kyl but, to
date, Senator Helms has not responded to these offers.
We have carefully reviewed your request for
declassification of the May 21, 1996 cable written by ACDA
Director Holum, the July 8, 1996 letter from Russian Prime
Minister Chernomyrdin and selected paragraphs from various
intelligence community documents. I regret that we cannot
declassify the May 21, 1996 Holum Cable or the letter from
Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin to Vice President Gore
because these documents have been properly classified
pursuant to E.O. 12958; they contain sensitive diplomatic
information regarding high-level, ongoing negotiations, the
disclosure of which may affect our ability to negotiate in
confidence. In addition, the correspondence you requested is
between the highest levels of the United States and Russian
governments, and was exchanged with the expectation that it
would be kept in the strictest confidence. As you know, an
essential element of the Executive Branch's conduct of
foreign relations is the protection of the confidentiality of
high level, sensitive diplomatic discussions and
correspondence.
After a careful review of the paragraphs of the
intelligence documents that you requested be declassified, we
have determined they were properly classified. However, we
have been able to declassify a portion of the material
without risk to sources and methods and it is attached.
The sentences and paragraphs that are still classified
remain so because they contain information which could
place sources and methods at risk. In several cases,
declassification of requested materials also would reveal
information about U.S. force vulnerabilities. The
paragraphs from which most of the judgments were extracted
remain classified because it is difficult to identify
clearly the source paragraphs. Therefore, granting
paragraph release authority could inadvertently permit
release of intelligence which would be damaging to
declassify.
I would like to reaffirm personally the Administration's
commitment to brief you or any other Senator and cleared
staff on the documents discussed above under appropriate
classification at any time before the Senate debate on the
CWC. As you know, a high-level Administration team briefed
Senators and staff on the CWC, including many of the issues
raised in your letter, on Monday, September 9, 1996. We
remain committed to continuing to assist the Senate as it
prepares to vote on advice and consent to ratification on
this vital Convention.
[[Page S3598]]
As part of this continuing effort, I have attached a
detailed response which includes the declassified material.
Sincerely,
Anthony Lake,
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.
Responses to Issues Raised by Majority Leader Lott
The issues addressed in the attachment to your letter
concern chemical weapons proliferation challenges we must
address, with or without the CWC. The CWC provides concrete
measures that will raise the costs and risks of engaging in
CW-related activities. The CWC also will improve our
knowledge about CW activities worldwide. This is why the CWC
has been strongly supported by both President Bush and
President Clinton.
Since the CWC was submitted to the Senate in 1993, the
Intelligence Community has kept the Senate fully informed of
its judgments regarding the Convention. During the past three
years, the Intelligence Community has produced two NIEs and
numerous other reports, testified in numerous public and
executive session hearings, answered dozens of intelligence
questions for the record and provided a number of briefings
on precisely the issues you raise in the attachment to your
letter, as well as many others.
Intelligence Community judgments on the CWC are not at odds
with Administration policy. In fact, Intelligence Community
judgments play an integral role in the formation of policy
regarding the Chemical Weapons Convention. The following
responses regarding the issues raised in the attachment to
your letter may help clarify this.
1. novel agents
New chemicals of concern and novel agents are covered under
the CWC; it is incorrect to assert that because an agent is
not on the Schedules it is not subject to the CWC. The CWC
captures new chemicals of concern and novel agents under the
definition of a ``chemical weapon'' and prohibits the
development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention,
use and direct or indirect transfer to anyone of chemical
weapons. Concerns that new chemicals of concern and novel
agents were being used to violate the CWC would provide a
basis for bilateral consultation and challenge inspection
under Article X of the Convention. It would not be necessary
to show that such chemicals are listed in the Schedules of
the Convention to exercise this option.
Furthermore, the CWC explicitly provides for expanding the
lists of chemicals subject to declaration and verification as
new CW agents are identified and to improve verification
procedures and equipment as new technology emerges and
experience is gained.
As regards our chemical defense capabilities, the
Department of Defense Counterproliferation Program is, with
Congress' support, already aggressively pursuing an effective
response to ensure that our troops are the best protected and
best equipped fighting force for operations in a nuclear,
biological, or chemical environment. The National Defense
Authorization Act for FY 94 led to the formation of the Joint
Nuclear Biological and Chemical (NBC) Defense Board, the
Joint Services Integration Group and the Joint Services
Material Group. These boards, which have representatives from
the Services, Joint Staff and OSD, are working to identify
the needs of the military for chemical/biological defense and
are providing input to the Defense Acquisition Board process
through the Secretary of Defense.
The U.S. military is well aware that it may be called upon
to operate in a hostile environment in which chemical weapons
may be used or threatened to be used. Though U.S. chemical
equipment is second to none, we understand the need to
continually improve our capabilities. Through the Defense
Acquisition Board process, the military is taking steps to
ensure these improvements continue. The Administration's
budget request for FY 97 for our chemical defense programs is
$505 million.
In this context, the following paragraph from NIE 95-9/I of
May 1995 is hereby declassified: ``Production of new binary
agents would be difficult to detect and confirm as a CWC-
prohibited activity.''
2. Russian Intentions Regarding Chemical Weapons
It is important to keep in mind, when discussing Russian
intentions regarding chemical weapons, that there is not yet
in force a treaty obligation prohibiting the possession of
chemical weapons against which we can measure compliance. The
CWC will establish such a prohibition and, most importantly,
the new tools to pursue any concerns we may have about
suspected CW activities, whether in Russia or any other State
Party. As the Intelligence Community has testified, the CWC
will provide us with access to information not otherwise
available which will help us in our efforts to detect, deter
and, if necessary, punish violations of the CWC.
Regarding the views of the Russian leadership, President
Yeltsin and other senior government officials have repeatedly
expressed support for the CWC. We will expect Russia and all
other Parties to adhere to all the Convention's provisions
including those concerning CW development and production. The
Russian Government has recently reaffirmed its commitment to
become an original Party to the CWC and announced it is
seeking speedy submission of the Convention to the Parliament
for ratification.
In this context, the following paragraph from NIE 95-9/I of
May 1995 is hereby declassified:
``President Yeltsin has publicly endorsed CW disarmament
and supported ratification and implementation of CW arms
control agreements to which Russia is a signatory. The extent
to which Yeltsin has attempted to enforce his will on the
bureaucracy is not clear. He may not be aware of the scope of
ongoing CW activities, or if he is aware, he may be unable to
control them. We cannot exclude the possibility that Yeltsin
approves of an offensive CW capability and will support a
covert program once the CWC enters into force. He may accept
the military's argument about the need to retain a CW
capability. Moreover, being subjected to far more
bureaucratic pressure to sustain the program than to do away
with it, he may find it easier to give way to military
arguments.''
It should be noted, however, that detailed information on
the views of key individuals is limited and insufficient to
document with confidence their current personal and
professional positions for maintaining CW programs.
3. Verification
No treaty is 100 percent verifiable. While the Intelligence
Community has indicated that CW development and production is
and will remain difficult to distinguish from legitimate
commercial activities, they have simultaneously noted the
importance of acquiring the CWC as a new collection tool to
aid their efforts to monitor CW proliferation, which we must
do, with or without the CWC.
The CWC's verification provisions constitute the most
comprehensive and intrusive verification regime every
negotiated, covering virtually every aspect of a CW program,
from development through production and stockpiling.
The CWC's declaration provisions will improve the U.S.
ability to obtain information about other countries' CW
efforts. These provisions will facilitate detection and
monitoring of prohibited activities by providing the U.S.
access to certain information about declarations of CW
production facilities and storage sites as well as relevant
chemical industry facilities and activities.
The CWC's inspection provisions permit access to both
declared and undeclared facilities and locations, thus making
clandestine CW production and stockpiling more difficult,
risky and expensive. Routine inspections will enhance
deterrence and detection of clandestine product by monitoring
activities and relevant chemical industry facilities. These
inspections will increase the cost and the risk of carrying
out illicit chemical weapons activities.
Challenge inspections will further enhance deterrence and
detection of prohibited activities by providing States
Parties with the right to request an international inspection
at any facility or location in another State Party in order
to clarify and resolve a potential compliance concern. As the
scope and size of a program increases, it is more likely that
illicit activities will be detected. Challenge inspections
are but one part of the CWC's comprehensive verification
regime which, in its totality, complements our ongoing
intelligence monitoring effort in this area. As former DCI
Woolsey testified before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on June 23, 1994:
``The CWC will, however, strengthen our ability to deal
with the problem that we confront with or without the
Convention: the requirement to discover what states are
developing and producing chemical weapons when these
activities are difficult to distinguish from legitimate
commercial endeavors. The isolation and adverse attention
that nonsignatories will draw upon themselves may spur
greater multinational cooperation in attempting to halt
offensive CW programs.
``In sum, what the Chemical Weapons Convention provides the
Intelligence Community is a new tool to add to our collection
tool kit. It is an instrument with broad applicability, which
can help resolve a wide variety of problems. Moreover, it is
an universal tool which can be used by diplomats and
politicians, as well as intelligence specialists, to further
a common goal: elimination of the threat of chemical
weapons.''
In this context, the following paragraphs from NIE 93-32J/I
of August 1993 are hereby declassified:
``The capability of the Intelligence Community to monitor
compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention is severely
limited and likely to remain so for the rest of the decade.''
``The key provisions of the monitoring regime--challenge
inspections at undeclared sites--can be thwarted by a nation
determined to preserve a small, secret program using the
delays and managed access rules allowed by the convention.''
4. Terrorism
The CWC will increase the difficulty for terrorists and
proliferators of acquiring chemical weapons and significantly
improve our law enforcement ability to investigate and
prosecute chemical terrorists even before chemical weapons
are used. Japan serves as an example of the importance of
this treaty and its implementing legislation in combating the
terrorist threat. Within 10 days of the poison gas attacks in
the Tokyo subways, the Japanese enacted the CWC implementing
legislation. The Japanese completed ratification of the CWC a
month later.
No treaty is foolproof. However, the CWC and its
implementing legislation will provide
[[Page S3599]]
significant benefits in dealing with the threat of chemical
terrorism. Implementing legislation will strengthen our legal
authority to investigate and prosecute persons who commit
acts prohibited by the treaty. It will also make the public
more aware of the threat of chemical weapons and of the fact
that the acquisition of such weapons is illegal .
The following are among it significant benefits:
Investigation. The proposed U.S. implementing legislation
contains the clearest, most comprehensive and internationally
recognized definition of a chemical weapon available. The
definition contained in the implementing legislation will
enable an investigator to request a search warrant on the
basis of reasonable suspicion of illegal chemical weapons
activity (such as production of chemical weapons agent),
rather than suspicion of an attempt or conspiracy to use a
weapon of mass destruction, as under current U.S. law. By
providing law enforcement officials and prosecutors an
actionable legal basis for investigating the development,
production, transfer of acquisition of chemical weapons, CWC
implementing legislation improves prospects for detection,
early prosecution and possibly even prevention of chemical
terrorism in the United States.
Prosecution. The proposed U.S. implementing legislation
will also aid prosecution. Because possession of a chemical
weapon (whether or not it is intended to be used) would be
prohibited under the Convention, it would also be illegal
under the CWC implementing legislation and thus would provide
a sufficient basis for prosecution. Currently, prosecutors
must rely on legislation intended for other purposes, such as
a law against conspiracy to use a weapon of mass destruction.
Penalties. Under the proposed U.S. implementing
legislation, any person who knowingly engages in prohibited
CW-related activities far short of actual use of a chemical
weapon could be subject to the maximum punishment of life in
prison or any term of years. In contrast, under existing U.S.
legislation, equivalent penalties require proof of use or an
attempt or conspiracy to use a weapon of mass destruction.
Thus, it would be difficult under current law for prosecutors
to prove that a violation of the law has occurred unless a
scheme to use chemical weapons is well advanced.
Trade Controls. The proposed U.S. implementing legislation
would also supplement existing export/import control laws and
regulations by strictly controlling the import and export of
those chemicals posing the greatest risk (listed in Schedule
1 of the CWC) and also regulating the production,
acquisition, retention, transfer or use of such chemicals
within the U.S. Fines of up to $50,000 could be imposed for
unlawful production, acquisition, transfer, etc. of such
chemicals.
Emergency Authority. The proposed U.S. implementing
legislation contains authority to seize, forfeit and destroy
chemical weapons. This important provision protects the
constitutional rights of property owners while allowing law
enforcement officials to seize and destroy a chemical weapon
under exigent circumstances (i.e. where harm is imminent or
likely). This provides additional authority to prevent a
potential catastrophe and save lives.
Public Awareness. Tips by concerned private citizens are
the lifeblood of successful police investigations.
Ratification of the CWC and enactment of its implementing
legislation will ensure, due to reporting and inspection
requirements and penalties for violations, that private
companies and concerned citizens are more alert to and more
likely to report any suspected chemical weapons-related
activities.
The nonproliferation provisions of the CWC will deny
terrorists easy access to chemical weapons by requiring
Parties to eliminate national stockpiles and by controlling
international transfers of certain chemicals than can be used
to make chemical weapons. In particular, the CWC requires
Parties to cease transfers of certain CW agents and CW
precursor chemicals to non-Parties and restrict such
transfers to Parties. In addition, reporting is required on
anticipated production levels of Schedule 1, 2 and 3
chemicals and anticipated imports and exports of Schedule 1
and 2 chemicals. These measures will help restrict access to
key chemicals, while also helping to alert law enforcement
and other government officials to suspicious activities.
Finally, one of the key tools in combating terrorism is
early intelligence. The CWC will provide access to
international declaration and inspection information and will
strengthen the intelligence links between the United States
and the international community that will help us detect and
prevent chemical attacks. By tying the United States into a
global verification network and strengthening our
intelligence sharing with the international community this
treaty can be an early warning that is essential for
combating terrorism.
In this context, the following paragraph from DIA PC-1563-
4-96 of February 1996 is hereby declassified:
``Irrespective of whether the CWC enters into force,
terrorists will likely look upon CW as a means to gain
greater publicity and instill widespread fear. The March 1995
Tokyo subway attack by the Aum Shinrikyo would not have been
prevented by the CWC.''
I would also invite your attention to the following
conclusions concerning the impact of the CWC contained in the
May 1996 report issued by the Director of Central
Intelligence Interagency Committee on Terrorism entitled
``Aum Shinrikyo: Insights to the Chemical and Biological
Terrorist Threat'':
``The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is designed to
regulate and monitor the procurement, production, and use of
some chemicals used in CW production with varying degrees of
intrusiveness, depending on which of the three Schedules of
Chemicals a compound is listed. Within five years of the
CWC's entry into force, transfer of all Schedule 1 and 2
chemicals to non-States Party will be banned, and transfer of
Schedule 3 chemicals to non-States Party will require end-use
certificates. In addition, all sites within a State Party are
subject to challenge inspections initiated by another State
Party with substantive information that illegal activities
are taking place by the government or any other group. The
Convention's provisions probably would make it more difficult
and costly for terrorists to acquire CW by increasing the
risk of detection, but a determined group could circumvent
the provisions.
``The CWC mandates that each State Party establish national
laws to prohibit anyone on its territory or any citizen
abroad from developing, producing, stockpiling, acquiring or
using CW. Each State Party must develop and pass national
legislation to ensure the implementation of all CWC
obligations and provisions. Depending on the quality of the
legislation and its enforcement, the institution of
these laws would help establish a political and legal
basis for the prosecution of a terrorist group.
``In the case of Aum Shinrikyo, the CWC would not have
hindered the cult from procuring the needed chemical
compounds used in its production of sarin. Further, the Aum
would have escaped the CWC requirement for an end-use
certification because it purchased the chemical within
Japan.''
5. Rogue States
The Administration recognizes the possibility that not all
States Parties may comply with their CWC obligations
immediately upon the Convention's entry into force. However,
information acquired through the CWC's declaration and
inspection provisions will supplement our national
intelligence resources and place us in a better position than
we are now to deter and detect clandestine chemical weapons
programs. Moreover, unlike any previous arms control
agreement, the CWC provides a range of punitive measures
including trade sanctions that can be imposed against a Party
to the treaty who fails to meet its treaty obligations.
In short, as former DCI Woolsey and other intelligence
officials have pointed out, the CWC will provide a useful
tool in our inventory of means to stem the worldwide
expansion of chemical weapons capabilities and to assist in
monitoring CW programs worldwide, whether inside or outside
the CWC.
____
U.S. Senate,
Office of the Majority Leader,
Washington, DC, January 8, 1997.
Hon. William Jefferson Clinton,
President of the United States,
The White House, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. President: Following our phone conversation, I
arranged a meeting later today with your Acting National
Security Adviser, Sandy Berger, to discuss the Chemical
Weapons Convention. Before that meeting however, I wanted to
inform you personally of how your Administration's actions on
critical arms control issues have complicated efforts to work
cooperatively.
As you know, many Members of the 104th Congress have
expressed concern over the security implications of certain
arms control positions taken by your Administration. The
security concerns are aggravated by your Administration's
unwillingness to seriously consider our views on the
appropriate Constitutional role of the Senate in providing
advice and consent on treaties. I would point to three
important issues: demarcation limits to the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty of 1972 (ABM Treaty); multilateralization of
the ABM Treaty; and flank limits to the Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe Treaty of 1990 (CFE Treaty). In each of
these cases, your Administration has negotiated substantive
modifications of the treaties, and then taken questionable
legal positions that render Senate advice and consent an
option that can be ignored rather than a constitutional
obligation that must be fulfilled.
Congress has legislated on the proposed demarcation limits
and the proposed multilaterization of the ABM Treaty. Section
232 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1995 (P.L. 103-337) addresses both issues. It states ``the
United States shall not be bound by any international
agreement entered into by the President of the United States
that would substantively modify the ABM Treaty unless the
agreement is entered into pursaunt to the treaty making power
of the President under the Constitution.''
Section 235 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1996 (P.L. 104-106) addresses demarcation and
states ``any international agreement that would limit the
research, testing, or deployment of missile defense systems,
system upgrades, or system components that are designed to
counter modern theater ballistic missiles in a manner that
would be more restrictive than the compliance criteria
specified in paragraph 1 should be entered into only pursuant
to the treaty making powers of the President under the
constitution.''
The position of Congress concerning the substantive
modifications your Administration has sought to the ABM
Treaty is clear:
[[Page S3600]]
Senate advice and consent is needed for their entry into
force. Despite this clear position, your Administration
continues to argue that Senate advice and consent is not
necessary in the case of multilateralization, and is but one
among several options you might choose in the case of
demarcation. This is unacceptable.
With specific reference to the Agreed Statement on
Demarcation reached last summer, section 406 of the
Department of State and Related Agencies Appropriations Act,
1997 (P.L. 104-208) prohibits expending funds on the Standing
Consultative Commission ``unless the President provides to
the Congress a report containing a detailed analysis of
whether * * * the Agreed Statement regarding Demarcation
agreed to by the Standing Consultative Commission on June 24,
1996 * * * will require the advice and consent of the Senate
of the United States.'' The report submitted on your behalf
did not answer this question.
Finally, the May 31, 1996 Conventional Forces in Europe
flank agreement contains negotiated amendments and
significant changes to the 1990 CFE Treaty. Yet, again your
Administration has taken the legal position that Senate
advice and consent is not necessary.
Mr. President, I have pledged to work with you in a
bipartisan fashion on a wide range of challenges facing our
country. Nowhere is such cooperation more important than in
foreign policy and national security. But bipartisanship must
be a two-way street. Your Administration has now re-started a
public campaign to gain Senate advice and consent for the
Chemical Weapons Convention. As you seek bipartisan
cooperation, you must understand our expectation for such
cooperation on ABM multilateralization, ABM demarcation, and
CFE flank limits.
Senate advice and consent arms control treaties after their
negotiation and after their substantive modification is not
an option--it is a requirement of our Constitution. I am sure
you understand that it will be very difficult to explore the
possibility of Senate action on the Chemical Weapons
Convention without first addressing legitimate security and
Constitutional concerns on other important arms control
issues. I stand ready to work with you and your national
security team in a comprehensive manner to address arms
control issues in the 105th Congress. With best wishes, I am,
Sincerely,
Trent Lott.
____
U.S. Senate,
Office of the Majority Leader,
Washington, DC, March 18, 1997.
Hon. William Jefferson Clinton,
President of the United States, The White House, Washington,
DC.
Dear Mr. President: As you know, we have been working in
good faith to try to establish a process under which the
Senate might consider a resolution of ratification for the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
As we consider the next steps in this process, I want to
remind you of two problems that remain unresolved. First, on
January 8, 1997, I wrote to you expressing concerns about
your administration's approach to a number of critical arms
control issues, including demarcation limits and
multilateralization of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of
1972 (ABM Treaty) and about the flank limits to the
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty of 1990 (CFE
Treaty). To date, I have not received a response. Each of
these significant treaty modifications are subject to the
constitution's shared treaty making power and, accordingly,
cannot enter into force until receiving the advice and
consent of the United States Senate.
Second, I have repeatedly pointed out that the CWC is
currently under consideration by the Committee on Foreign
Relations. Accordingly, it is essential that you and your
administration honor the publicly-stated commitments to work
closely and expeditiously with Chairman Helms on issues
before the Committee, including the presentation of a plan to
reorganize U.S. foreign affairs agencies. Until that occurs,
Chairman Helms has made it clear to me that he is unlikely to
consider next steps in the CWC process.
As I have said privately and publicly, bipartisanship must
be a two-way street. I look forward to hearing from you soon
on these important issues. With best wishes, I am,
Sincerely,
Trent Lott.
____
The White House,
Washington, March 25, 1997.
Hon. Trent Lott,
Majority Leader, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Leader: The President has asked me to reply to
your letter concerning the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
and the role of the Senate under the Constitution in giving
its advice and consent to treaties. Our staffs have held some
discussions on this matter, but I want to address in more
detail each of the three treaty issues you raise in the
letter: the CFE flank agreement, ABM multilateralization and
ABM/TMD demarcation.
CFE Flank Agreement
On May 31, 1996, the United States, our NATO allies, Russia
and the 13 other States Party to the CFE Treaty approved a
document in Vienna culminating more than two years of
intensive negotiations on the CFE flank issue. The
centerpiece of this agreement was a realignment of the CFE
map (depicting the territory of the former USSR in the CFE
area), which has the effect of reducing the size of the flank
zone. The CFE parties had deliberately not included this map
as part of the Treaty when it was signed in 1990, and the
Bush Administration did not submit the map to the Senate in
1991 as part of the formal documents for advice and consent.
Accordingly, legal counsels in the Clinton Administration's
national security agencies determined last year that a change
to the map does not constitute a formal amendment to the
Treaty.
At the same time, we determined that a realignment of the
map did constitute a change in a ``shared understanding''
formed with the Senate at the time the Senate gave its advice
and consent to the Treaty. That ``shared understanding''
established that the Treaty would be applied and interpreted
on the basis of the original map. According to the 1988
``Biden Condition'' on treaty interpretation (which was
attached by the Senate to its resolution of ratification for
the INF Treaty), Senate consent or congressional approval is
required to change a shared understanding.
When the Administration submitted the CFE flank document
for legislative approval last August, we were faced with a
time-urgent situation: by its own terms, the document
required all States parties to confirm their approval by
December 15; yet very little time remained before the
adjournment sine die of the 104th Congress. In this
circumstance we chose to seek statutory approval by both
houses, as is explicitly permitted under the Biden Condition.
We now face a complex situation. At the Lisbon OSCE Summit
in December, the 30 States party to the CFE Treaty agreed to
extend the deadline for confirmation of approval to May 15,
1997. In recent months, it has become evident that the flank
agreement underpins the new negotiations in Vienna on ``CFE
adaptation,'' which in turn underpins NATO's efforts to
define the new security environment in Europe as NATO
enlarges. In addition, both adaptation of the CFE Treaty and
the admission of new states to NATO will be effected through
agreements that will be submitted for the advice and consent
of the Senate. The situation and timing is therefore
different from when the Administration submitted the CFE
flank agreement for legislative approval last August.
Accordingly, the Administration is prepared, without
prejudice to its legal position vis-a-vis the approval
options we believe are available to us, to seek Senate advice
and consent to the flank Document provided the Senate will
act on this crucial matter before May 15.
MOU on ABM Succession
As noted in the President's November 25, 1996 report to
Congress submitted in accordance with Section 406 of the FY
1997 State Appropriations Act (the ``Livingston Report''--
hereafter referred to as ``the Report''), executive
agreements recognizing the succession of new States to the
treaty rights and obligations of their predecessors have
traditionally not been treated as treaty amendments or new
treaties requiring Senate advice and consent. Rather, they
have been treated as the implementation of existing treaties,
which is recognized as an exclusively Presidential function
under the Constitution. The Report elaborates the specific
reasons why this conclusion applies in the case of the June
24, 1996 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on ABM Succession
reached ad ref between the United States, Russia, Ukraine,
Belarus and Kasakstan in the Standing Consultative Commission
(SCC). It also explains why the MOU does not constitute a
substantive modification of the ABM Treaty.
In dealing with matters of succession, a key U.S. objective
has been to reconstitute the original treaty arrangement as
closely as possible. This was true with respect to the
elaboration of the ad ref MOU as well and, accordingly, the
MOU works to preserve the original object and purpose of the
ABM Treaty. We hope that the breakthrough on ABM/TMD
demarcation achieved at the Helsinki Summit will set the
stage for a meeting at which all parties would sign this MOU.
The Administration continues to believe that the agreement
does not require the advice and consent of the Senate, or any
other form of congressional approval, to enter it into force.
____
The White House,
Washington, April 24, 1997.
Hon. Trent Lott,
Majority Leader, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Leader: During Senate ratification proceedings on
the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), concerns have been
raised over Article X, which provides for certain types of
defensive assistance in the event that a State that has
joined the treaty and renounced any chemical weapons (CW)
capability is threatened with or suffers a chemical weapons
attack, and Article XI, which encourages free trade in non-
prohibited chemicals among states that adhere to the CWC.
Some have suggested that these Articles could result in the
CWC promoting, rather than stemming, CW proliferation despite
States Parties' general obligation under Article I ``never
under any circumstances . . . to assist, encourage or induce,
in any way, anyone to engage in any
[[Page S3601]]
activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.''
To respond to these concerns, the Administration has worked
closely with the Senate to develop conditions relating to
both Articles that have now been incorporated in the
resolution of ratification (Agreed Conditions #7 and 15).
These two conditions would substantially reinforce and
strengthen the treaty by: prohibiting the United States under
Article X from (a) providing the CWC organization with funds
that could be used for chemical weapons defense assistance to
other States Parties; and (b) giving certain states that
might join the treaty any assistance other than medical
antidotes and treatment; and requiring the President to (a)
certify that the CWC will not weaken the export controls
established by the Australia Group and that each member of
the Group intends to maintain such controls; (b) block any
attempt within the Group to adopt a contrary position; and
(c) report annually as to whether Australia Group controls
remain effective.
With respect to the latter condition, I am pleased to
inform you that we have now received official confirmations
from the highest diplomatic levels in each of the 30
Australia Group nations that they agree that the Group's
export control and nonproliferation measures are compatible
with the CWC and that they are committed to maintain such
controls in the future.
While supporting these guarantees and safeguards, you
expressed the concern on Sunday that nations might still try
to use Article X or XI to take proscribed actions that could
undercut U.S. national security interests, notwithstanding
the best efforts of U.S. diplomacy to prevent such actions. I
am, therefore, prepared to provide the following specific
assurance related to these two Articles:
In the event that a State Party or States Parties to the
Convention act contrary to the obligations under Article I
by:
(A) using Article X to justify providing defensive CW
equipment, material or information to another State Party
that could result in U.S. chemical protective equipment being
compromised so that U.S. warfighting capabilities in a CW
environment are significantly degraded;
(B) using Article XI to justify chemical transfers that
would make it impossible for me to make the annual
certification that the Australia Group remains a viable and
effective mechanism for controlling CW proliferation; or
(C) carrying out transfers or exchanges under either
Article X or XI which jeopardize U.S. national security by
promoting CW proliferation:
I would, consistent with Article XVI of the CWC, regard
such actions as extraordinary events that have jeopardized
the supreme interests of the United States and therefore, in
consultation with the Congress, be prepared to withdraw from
the treaty.
Sincerely,
Bill Clinton.
Mr. LOTT. On September 12, the day the Senate was scheduled to begin
debate on the convention, Secretary of State Christopher called me and
asked that the vote be canceled. I quizzed him. I wanted to make sure
that was what the administration was asking and that I would be able to
come out to the floor of the Senate and explain that is why it was
being done. It was canceled because it was clear, in my opinion, the
convention was likely to be rejected at that time by the Senate.
I acceded to the Secretary's request. We canceled the vote, and it
went back to the Foreign Relations Committee calendar at the end of the
104th Congress.
In January of this year, the President and his national security
advisers made it clear that the Chemical Weapons Convention remained a
top priority. On January 8, 1997, I wrote to the President explaining
some of our arms control priorities, including the submission of three
significant treaty modifications for advice and consent: The ABM
Demarcation Agreement, the ABM Multilateralization Agreement and the
flank agreement to the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. The
administration had previously refused to submit these treaties for
Senate ratification.
I wrote at that time.
Bipartisanship is a two-way street. Your administration has
now restarted a public campaign to gain Senate advice and
consent for the Chemical Weapons Convention. As you seek
bipartisan cooperation, you must understand our expectation
for such cooperation on ABM multilateralization, ABM
demarcation and CFE flank limits.
On March 18, I again wrote the President reminding him that I had not
received a response to that January 8 letter. I also pointed out that
``it is essential that you and your administration honor the publicly
stated commitments to work closely and expeditiously with Chairman
Helms on issues before the committee, including the presentation of a
plan to reorganize the U.S. foreign affairs agencies.
From the beginning of the 105th Congress, I made clear as best I
could to all who would listen in the administration that bipartisanship
could not mean forcing the Senate into acting on administration-chosen
priorities if we did not likewise have an opportunity to consider
issues that are important to the Senate, in fact, issues we think have
long since been sent to us for action with regard to arms control
treaties.
We stated that we thought it was vital that we get State Department
reorganization and real reform at the United Nations. This was not a
quid pro quo but a simple statement of reality. Working in a
cooperative fashion, as we must, means that both sides have to be
forthcoming on issues in these foreign policy very important, critical
areas.
Let me briefly review the status of each of these three related
issues. On the arms control treaties, the administration did reconsider
their positions very carefully and they came back and agreed to send
the Conventional Forces in Europe Flank Agreement to the Senate for
advice and consent. Hearings have already been scheduled on this
treaty, and I expect a resolution of ratification to be before the full
Senate in the near future. President Clinton agreed to submit the
agreed statement on demarcation to the Senate for advice and consent.
This treaty, agreed to in principle between Presidents Clinton and
Yeltsin at the Helsinki summit, will provide the Senate an opportunity
to consider the administration's approach toward negotiating
constraints on our defensive systems pursuant to the administration's
interpretation of the ABM Treaty. I am sure we will have quite an
interesting and lively debate on that, but certainly we should take
advantage of our responsibilities to do just that. Along with many of
my colleagues, I have expressed grave doubts about the wisdom of this
administration's approach in that area. Now, however, we have a full
opportunity to debate the policy and this treaty in the ratification
process.
The President still does not agree that they should send forward the
treaty dealing with multilateralization. We think the Constitution
requires it; his lawyers disagree. We will continue to press the
administration to accept our position in this area, and they understand
we should keep talking about it.
If this provision is contained in the final agreement that is
submitted to the Senate for advice and consent in connection with
demarcation, it will give us an opportunity to debate it.
On U.N. reform, our now Secretary of State Madeleine Albright asked
that we begin to actually meet and talk about U.N. reform; that we meet
with a U.N. presiding officer; that he come and visit with us. He did.
We have started a process between the House and Senate, Republicans and
Democrats, our chairmen and ranking members, to take a look at what
should be done with regard to the arrearages we may or may not owe, how
can we deal with the U.S. assessment at the United Nations that could
be fairer, and we are working from a comprehensive Republican document
as a basis for the discussions. I think we see some action already
occurring. The Secretary General has been working at it, and I think he
understands we are very serious about U.N. reform.
On State Department reorganization, I am very pleased that the
administration has proposed, I think, some major changes. Chairman
Helms, and many others, have worked to streamline our foreign policy
bureaucracy, and now it looks like we are going to have a chance to do
that.
The Agency for International Development, the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency and the U.S. Information Agency were started and
organized during the cold war. Barely more than a year ago, President
Clinton vetoed a bill which would have mandated the dismantling of only
one foreign affairs agency. Last week, however, thanks to the efforts
of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and the involvement of the
President, the President agreed to abolish both the USIA and ACDA and
to fold many of AID's functions into the State Department. This will
make our scarce resources go farther, increase coordination and help
ensure American interests, not bureaucratic interests, are behind our
foreign policy decisionmaking.
[[Page S3602]]
On each of these parallel issues--and I call them parallel, that is
the way they have always been discussed--we have made progress. I think
it is important that we realize that. Thanks to the persistence of the
chairman and thanks to a Secretary of State that is working with us
now, we have made progress with U.N. reform, with State Department
reorganization, and the fact we will be able to consider these
treaties. No serious observer can claim that we have not moved forward
in these areas.
There have been important changes in the Chemical Weapons Convention
over the past few months. Last September, I worked closely with
Senators Helms, Kyl and others in opposition to the treaty. Had we not
canceled the vote, I would have voted against it, and I believe that it
would have failed.
In the aftermath of that debate, some in the White House blamed
political motivations. The President said it was partisan politics
involving America's security. But, fortunately, calmer heads have
prevailed this year. The administration did come to the table and they
have negotiated with us. They recognize the legitimate concerns that
were ignored last year. So we have engaged in a process of member-and-
staff-level discussions that have had a major impact on this
convention.
There are 28 agreed items in this resolution of ratification that
were not there last September. Senator Kyl, Senator Helms, and Senator
Biden have been working together on this. They reached agreements. Some
of them Senator Biden said, ``Yes, we should do this,'' and the
administration didn't particularly agree. Others in the administration
said, ``Yes, we should do it,'' and some of our colleagues did not
agree with it. There has been a give and take, but real progress has
been made.
Many of these items have addressed the concerns that have been cited
by opponents as reasons to oppose the CWC last year. I have gone over
some of the letters, some of the memos I have received--and I have
received a lot of them--and point by point has been addressed, maybe
not 100 percent, maybe not to their total satisfaction, but progress
has been made. I will not go down the whole list of 28, but I want to
list some of the more critical ones where real progress has been made.
First, on search and seizure, condition 28 requires search warrants
for all involuntary searches of American facilities. We were worried
about a constitutional problem here. Now it has been addressed.
Second, on our ability to use riot control agents, condition 26
ensures that the U.S. policy since 1975 remains in effect. Our military
can use nonlethal agents, such as tear gas, to rescue downed pilots.
Certainly, that should have been in there all along. I don't know why
there was resistance to it, but it has been addressed.
Third, on intelligence sharing, condition 5 places strict limits on
all U.S. intelligence shared with the international organization
established under the CWC.
Fourth, on maintaining robust chemical defenses, condition 11
mandates a series of steps including negotiations with our allies,
planning for chemical weapons in war game scenarios and high-level
leadership of the U.S. Army's Chemical School.
Fifth, on information sharing, an area that has worried me the most
and right up until this very moment, progress has been made in two
ways. First, with regard to these articles X and XI, condition 7 makes
crystal clear that nothing in the CWC undermines U.S. export control
laws, and that the informal Australia Group export controls will
continue. Condition 15 helps to ensure that defensive assistance under
the convention will be strictly limited. So I invite my colleagues who
may still have some doubts to look at these conditions--conditions 7
and 15--dealing with information sharing and how we have restrictions
on the defensive assistance.
Sixth, on financing Russian implementation, which I think is a
ridiculous idea personally on its face, but condition 14 precludes the
United States from making any commitment to finance Russia's chemical
weapons destruction program in an effort to secure Russian ratification
of CWC.
Seventh, conditions 1, 17, 6, and 20 preserve Senate prerogatives in
this and in future treaties. They preserve our right to pass
reservations to treaties, to ratify future amendments to the CWC and to
make clear the executive branch cannot commit to appropriations in
advance of congressional action.
Eighth, on noncompliance, condition 13 requires a series of steps to
be taken by the United States in the event of noncompliance by a party
to the convention. Condition 13 mandates unilateral actions and
requires the United States to seek a series of multilateral actions to
deal with CWC violations.
Ninth, conditions 3 and 22 address financial concerns about the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons set up under this
convention. One sets a binding limit on the U.S. assessment to ensure
we are not creating another international entitlement program, and the
other requires an independent inspector general be created to increase
accountability of the OPCW.
Finally, condition 10 requires an annual report of condition that,
for the first time in arms control, shifts the burden of proof to
making the administration certify compliance. As previous experience
has demonstrated, the arms control bureaucracy has refused to find
clear evidence of noncompliance. This condition will change and will
ensure our vigilance on monitoring issues.
Each of these conditions makes the resolution before us today a
better document, there is no doubt about it, certainly better than the
document we were considering last fall. Each of these changes addresses
concerns raised by treaty opponents last year and addresses my own
concerns. In addition, the Senate is considering this convention in a
manner agreed to by all 100 Senators. We first considered, and passed,
as I said earlier, S. 495, the Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat
Reduction Act of 1997 sponsored by Senator Kyl. We are considering the
resolution of ratification drafted by Senator Helms. Think about that.
We are considering that resolution that he drafted and that he had in
the committee. That is what we brought to the floor, and the process
requires that motions to strike be offered to take provisions out. Much
progress has been made, and many Senators have been cooperative.
But there should be no mistake, serious problems remain with this
convention. Unfortunately, key protections in the resolution of
ratification may be stricken out in our debate today, and we will have
some more votes in a few minutes.
Condition 33 on verification requires the President to certify the
same standard of verification developed under the Reagan-Bush
administrations--high confidence in detecting militarily significant
violations in a timely manner. Detecting the production and stockpiling
of chemical weapons may be more difficult than detecting the existence,
obviously, of nuclear-armed warheads.
But I will vote to retain the verification standard that has served
our country well in previous arms control agreements. I understand why
my colleagues might not agree with that and they might vote in a way
that would lower this verification standard, but it is a serious
problem.
Condition 30, which we just voted on, I think should have been kept
in the document.
Condition 29 conditions U.S. participation in the convention upon
demonstrated actions by the country with the largest chemical weapons
arsenal on Earth--Russia. Russia has not implemented the Bilateral
Destruction Agreement signed in 1990. Russia has not submitted accurate
data on chemical weapons. That is a real concern, and we have reason to
believe they are devoting resources now to develop new chemical agents
which are outside the scope of CWC. I support retaining this condition
because I believe it makes sense to expect Russia to live up to past
agreements before entering into new ones.
I strongly support condition 31 which would require the President to
exercise the power given in the verification annex to the convention to
bar inspectors from terrorist states and from states which have
violated U.S. proliferation law, particularly, I hope and think that we
can defeat the motion to strike here. It is not a killer amendment and
we ought to retain the right to bar those inspectors.
Finally, there is the most serious question of articles X and XI,
whether
[[Page S3603]]
these provisions on information sharing will increase the likelihood
of, in fact, chemical weapons proliferation. Over the past few weeks, I
made it clear to the administration as best I could the legitimate
concerns about the impact of articles X and XI had to be addressed more
than what was in the condition. I support delaying our ratification
until the CWC is renegotiated to deal with these articles. For obvious
reasons, the administration does not want to do that, and probably the
majority of the Senate would not want to do that.
But this very morning, I received a letter from President Clinton
which I think is significant. The President made specific assurances
that the United States would exercise its right to withdraw from the
convention if any one of three things occurred: If countries used
``article X to justify providing defensive chemical weapons equipment,
material, or information to another state party that could result in
U.S. chemical protective equipment being compromised. . .'';
If countries use article XI to justify chemical transfers which
undermine the Australia Group.
If countries carried ``out transfers or exchanges under either
article X and XI which jeopardize U.S. national security by promoting
chemical weapons proliferation;
These are specific and probably unprecedented. Yes, it is a letter.
It is not in the document, but it is signed by the President of the
United States in very strong language that, frankly, I was pleased but
somewhat surprised that he agreed to say, I will withdraw after
consultation with the Senate. If any one of these things happen, he is
the President and his assurances in foreign policy must make a
difference. They address countries even justifying transfers where
there is concern. They address transfers which promote chemical weapons
proliferation.
Mr. President, I think this is a very important document. I have made
that letter available to our colleagues. I have more copies.
Every Member has struggled with one fundamental question: Are we
better off with or without this convention? In my mind, there is no
easy answer. I want to know that my children and our country will be
better off, and that we will be better able to deal with chemical
weapons with it, but I have my doubts.
Experts, whose opinions I respect deeply, are divided on the
question. Over the last 2 weeks, I have had many conversations to
discuss this convention. I spoke with Presidents Bush and Ford. I
talked with my good friend, former Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney,
former Secretary of Defense Cap Weinberger, Steve Forbes, former
Secretary of State James Baker, Jim Schlesinger, Colin Powell,
uniformed military officers--a great variety of people. I met with
leaders of groups that are deeply opposed and well informed about the
treaty's flaws. I talked with President Clinton, Secretary Albright,
and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Shalikashvili.
Republican Senators, with long experience in national security
matters, are divided. On this issue, reasonable people can and do
disagree, and reasonable people will vote on opposite sides.
After our negotiations, hearings, and discussions, it is time to make
decisions--decisions that will be important to the future of our men
and women in uniform, and the future security of our country.
I have decided to vote in support of the Senate giving its advice and
consent to the Chemical Weapons Convention. I will do so not because I
believe it will end the threat posed by chemical weapons or rid the
world of poison gas. I will do so not because I believe this treaty is
verifiable enough or even enforceable enough. And I will not do so
because I believe there are no additional proliferations concerns
related to articles X and XI.
I will vote for the convention because I believe there will be real
and lasting consequences to the United States if we do not ratify the
convention. In a very real sense, the credibility of commitments made
by two Presidents of our country--one Republican and one Democrat--is
at stake.
I will vote for the convention because the judgment of the most
senior former and current military commanders believe it will make our
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines more safe in potential
battlefields and less likely to face the horrible prospect of chemical
weapons.
I will vote for the convention because I believe the United States is
marginally better off with it than without it. It will provide new
tools to press signatories for compliance. It will enable us to gain
access to sites and information we are currently unable to examine.
Through the important and enlightening debate we have had over the
past few months, I am convinced the convention will bring new focus and
energy to this administration's nonproliferation efforts. We have
certainly heightened the awareness and knowledge of the concerns we
have. One year ago, few of us even knew about the Australia Group. Now
we have committed ourselves and the administration to keeping the
Australia Group as a viable tool to limit access to chemicals and
technology.
Yes, the CWC may give legal cover to proliferators in Teheran or in
Beijing. But they have undertaken such efforts in the past and no doubt
will do it again in the future.
I believe our allies in Europe are more likely to join with us in
isolating Iran if we are a party to this convention than if we reject
it tonight. They have made it clear that they hope we will ratify it,
whether it is Canada or whether it is Britain or our European allies or
Japan.
I believe this convention will increase the cost of covert chemical
weapons programs, and it will increase our chances of detecting such
programs.
I think there is a long list of good reasons why we should do this
today. I have struggled with it. I would like to take just a minute, if
I can, to talk on a personal note.
Many people in the media have tended to say, well, you know, this is
going to determine the fate of various and sundry Senators and tell a
lot about leadership. It has been exaggerated.
I have talked to a lot of Senators one on one. Not one of them--not
one of them--has said that they would vote on it on any basis other
than what is best for our country.
The way the Senate works, we debate these issues--we read, we study,
we argue, we go back and forth. We set up a fair process, and then we
come to a conclusion. We make a decision. We vote on it. And I do not
think it is fair to exaggerate any one Senator's role in this whole
effort.
I think the Senate should be complimented today for the way it has
handled this. I think that Madison, and others, placed their faith in
this institution. And I think it has worked well.
The efforts of Senator Helms and Senator Kyl have been heroic. They
have done a magnificent job. Others that have supported the convention
have done their part, too.
I think that this process has helped the Senate as an institution to
exercise the leadership assigned to it by the Constitution. And that, I
submit, is the only real test of leadership that truly matters.
I urge the adoption and ratification of this treaty.
Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.
Mr. HELMS. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. HELMS. We have a small difficulty which can be remedied in short
order. Without going into a great deal of detail, we are trying to
adjust the time back to have accommodated the majority leader and his
remarks.
So I ask unanimous consent that--how much time did we agree to?
Mr. BIDEN. That the remaining time that the chairman have be 35
minutes, the remaining time under the control for the Senator from
Delaware be 15 minutes, and I believe Senator Leahy has 14 minutes
anyway, and that be the remaining time on the bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. HELMS. I thank the Chair.
[[Page S3604]]
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who seeks time?
Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.
Mr. HELMS. How many minutes?
Mr. BURNS. Ten or less.
Mr. HELMS. Ten minutes.
Mr. BURNS. Or less.
Mr. HELMS. I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Montana.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Montana is recognized for 10
minutes.
Mr. BURNS. Mr. President, I thank Senator Helms, the chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
History has to be recorded that this has probably been the most ever-
changing and cloudy situation that we have faced here in the U.S.
Senate. Some in this body have changed their minds as they have tried
to read the public opinion polls, and even some of those who have
served in the administration have done the same--the history, as it was
articulated here by the majority leader, of getting caught up in
Presidential politics in 1996.
But basically what it was, it was most of us sitting down and reading
the words and trying to make a decision based on what we think is best
for our country. No matter the winds that blow in politics or in public
opinion, this issue must be considered and decided on its merits. There
is just too much at stake. The President has written a letter to the
majority leader. If you will read the words real carefully, you could
even say you could argue both sides of the issue on that letter alone.
But I rise today to express my opposition to this Chemical Weapons
Convention treaty.
There are several reasons why I have chosen to oppose the treaty.
Some would say that it is verifiable. I am not fully convinced of that,
yet. Some would say that it does not hinder or break the Constitution.
I think I would question that. When it comes to sovereignty of the
United States, I would say that very much was in jeopardy. However, I
will focus my concerns with article XI and my fears that this article
will compromise both the United States and the citizens that live here.
Article XI of the Chemical Weapons Convention treaty prohibits
countries from denying others access to dual-use chemicals--that means
chemicals that can be used in any manner--processes, and technology. In
effect, mandating access to and sharing of materials and the methods of
making chemical weapons. By legitimizing commerce in dangerous, dual-
use chemicals and processes the CWC will increase, not reduce, the
ability of countries to acquire chemical weapons.
Second, Mr. President, article XI gives states the treaty right to:
Facilitate and have the right to participate in, the
fullest possible exchange of chemicals, equipment, and
scientific and technical information relating to the
development and the application of chemistry for [peaceful]
purposes . . .
Have we not had enough experience over nuclear problems of this
world, just with one country that is on this planet?
Third, transferring chemical-related technologies and material to
members of the CWC such as Cuba, Iran, India, Pakistan, and China will
help them establish and/or improve their chemical weapons programs.
This is because there is very little difference between the legitimate
commercial chemical processes and those processes used to make chemical
weapons.
Article XI also legitimizes trade in dangerous dual-use chemicals.
The treaty right will be used by countries such as China, India, and
Russia to override Western objections to their provision of sensitive
chemicals and production technologies to countries such as Iran. China
and India already supply Iran with such chemicals, but the CWC will
legitimize this trade and allow these countries to expand the volume of
commerce conducted in dual-use chemicals.
Mr. President, I take a moment to focus on the fact that by ratifying
this treaty, Iran will be permitted to have access to our chemical
secrets, to have the ability to obtain chemical information from other
rogue nations. If ratified, we are allowing a nation that we have
confirmed, we have confirmed as a terrorist nation, one that is the
primary suspect in numerous terrorist attacks against the United
States, and one that calls for the destruction of this country to get
more information, not less, on deadly chemicals.
How many in this body think that if allowed this information, Iran
will, of its own accord, destroy these potentially deadly weapons and
not use them against United States citizens around the world? I think
that is a legitimate question. How many in this body really think that
the United States will be in a more secure position? Finally, how can
we in clear conscience give them this information when American men and
women have been murdered by their actions?
Mr. President, for this reason, I cannot vote for the passage of this
treaty.
I have heard all the reasons why we would be just a tiny bit better
off being part of the convention. Well, this Senator thinks you have to
be a bigger part. It falsely promises security to our Nation, and would
betray those U.S. citizens who have died by the hand of terrorists. I
urge my fellow colleagues to contemplate what I have stated here. I
urge a ``no'' vote on ratification of this treaty. This is not an easy
decision but is a decision where the majority of people who serve in
this body have read and have made their decision on what is actually in
it and not the emotion of the times. I urge them to read it and vote
accordingly.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.
Mr. HELMS. I yield to the Senator from Oklahoma.
Privilege of the Floor
Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Jeff Severs
be permitted privileges of the floor for the duration of the debate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Amendment No. 48
(Purpose: To strike condition no. 29, relating to Russian elimination
of chemical weapons)
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for
its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The bill clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Delaware [Mr. Biden] proposes an amendment
numbered 48.
Beginning on page 61, strike line 21 and all that follows
through line 7 of page 63.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, this amendment strikes condition 29. I will
speak to this in a moment, but I yield as much time of the half-hour
that I control as my friend from Indiana desires to discuss this.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana is recognized.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I thank the Chair and I thank the
distinguished Senator from Delaware. The condition that we move to
strike, condition 29, would prohibit the United States from ratifying
the Chemical Weapons Convention until the President certifies that
Russia has done the following:
Ratified the CWC, complied with the 1990 bilateral
destruction agreement, fulfilled its obligations under the
1989 Wyoming memorandum of understanding, and ceased all
chemical weapons activities.
Mr. President, two arguments against this condition prevailed, at
least on the last vote that we had. I cite the first important argument
is simply that this is a killer amendment. Senators need to know that a
vote to leave this in the convention effectively terminates the
convention. Senators cannot have it both ways.
I simply indicate, in his very important statement, the majority
leader, Senator Lott, referencing a particular condition that he found
appealing, indicated it was not a killer amendment. But, in fact, this
one is a killer amendment. Therefore, there is a crucial reason to vote
to strike it.
Second, Mr. President, once again we are talking about American
leadership. It is in our interest, clearly, to get Russia's attention
to the chemical weapons problem. We have decided unilaterally in this
country that chemical weapons are not useful to us in our defense,
largely because we cannot necessarily guard our own troops against the
fallout and against the problems they create. So we are destroying
them.
Russia always had greater stocks than we have. They still do. It has
been in our interest to work with the Russians. In the Cooperative
Threat Reduction Act, so-called Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act, we have worked
with the
[[Page S3605]]
Russians in a first instance to assist them in the techniques of
destroying chemical weapons in Russia. There are seven very large sites
that need to be dealt with. We are dealing now with the Russians at the
first.
Mr. President, I speak today from a personal experience of last
October when it was my privilege to accompany the then Secretary of
Defense, William Perry, and my colleagues Senator Sam Nunn and Senator
Joe Lieberman, in a visit to Russia, specifically to the Defense
Department of Russia and to military persons involved in weapons of
mass destruction. Perhaps equally importantly, Mr. President, it was my
privilege to go with my colleagues from America to the Russian Duma. On
that particular day, our first attempt was to attempt to gain some
understanding by members of the Duma about the importance of the START
II treaty and its ratification. While we were there, we visited with
the relevant committees comparable to our Foreign Relations and our
Armed Services Committee about the Chemical Weapons Convention.
The Russians--in what we characterize as the Russian administration,
the executive branch, and the legislative branch, the Duma--made
identical points to us, that the START II treaty was coupled in
consideration with the expansion of NATO. They said this is a political
issue. These two are joined together.
With regard to the Chemical Weapons Convention, they made the clear
distinction that it was not political, it was not involved with either
NATO or START II or other arrangements. As a matter of fact, they
perceived it was in the interests of Russia to ratify the treaty. They
also pointed out that Russia has very little money, that at this
particular point in history Russian taxes are not being paid with
regularity. The soldiers are not being paid, or at least their
paychecks are often delayed. As a result, they pointed out that arms
control expenses were a very great problem for them. I think we
understand that. That is not a sufficient reason for Russia to dodge
its responsibilities. But it was a reason offered as to why they had
postponed consideration.
In addition, Mr. President, they have postponed consideration because
despite our leadership from the very beginning, our leadership to
destroy our own chemical weapons, then to try to sign up all the
nations of the world to destroy theirs, and to make this an
international law project, the Russians read our press and they
understood that we had had difficulty last December in ratifying this
convention. So they simply were curious as to whether we were serious
now. Well, we are, Mr. President. I simply say that the question that
is before the Senate should not be delay or perhaps failure to ratify
the treaty, because we are waiting on Russia. Our leadership is
imperative. We are the country that is leading the world. We are the
country that is leading Chemical Weapons Convention matters. Our
citizens of the United States take that seriously. Mr. President, a
large majority of Americans want us to act. They believe the U.S.
Government ought to do everything possible, and they recognize, as do
most Senators, that this convention is unlikely to get that job done
very swiftly but they do recognize it is an advance, it is a
constructive step. To offer as a reason why we would not proceed that
we are waiting for Russia, or hoping that two agreements that are
specified in the condition might somehow come to fulfillment is to miss
the entire point of the leadership that is involved and the persuasion
we must have.
Mr. President, I believe it is important, as soon as we ratify this
convention, for the President of the United States to press on
President Yeltsin his responsibility to gain ratification. At the
Helsinki summit meeting recently, President Yeltsin assured our
President he would offer that leadership. He assured our President he
understood the responsibility of the Russians. He also asked our
President to do his duty to help get the job done here. In fairness,
our President has been fulfilling that responsibility, as did Senator
Dole yesterday, as have President Bush and President Ford, as they have
come forward as Presidents who understand, and as the majority leader
understands. In his statement today, he mentioned one reason for voting
for this treaty is the fact that two Republican administrations have
made a commitment. An American word means something. Our leadership has
continuity and staying power. It does not flip one way or another,
depending upon Iraq or Russia.
Mr. President, I simply say, once again, American leadership is at
stake. We are looking at a killer amendment. This condition must be
struck. I ask Senators to vote aye when the roll is called.
I thank the Chair.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, before I plead on this amendment, I have
been around this place for quite a while. Before I came to the Senate
as a Senator, I had the honor of serving with two Senators as
administrative assistant. Time after time, at the conclusion of long
arduous debate and votes on various issues, a parting ``thank you'' is
made to the staff people who did most of the work. I talked to Senator
Biden and told him I want to do it now before we begin to sign off. He
suggested that I go first.
Admiral Nance, sitting back there, with the white hair, that young
man, he and I were boyhood friends back in Monroe. Adm. James W. Nance,
the chief of staff of the Foreign Relations Committee; Tom Klein; Mark
Theissen; Steve Biegun; Marshall Billingslea--particularly Marshall
Billingslea--Colleen Noonan; Beth Wilson, and the rest of the Foreign
Relations Committee staff.
Senator Kyl has three remarkable young people: David Stephens, John
Rood, and Jeanine Esperne. Senator Craig has Yvonne Bartoli and Jim
Jatras.
I want to thank, in particular, some people from the outside who
helped enormously in our trying to build a case to protect the American
people from the extravagances of this treaty. But that is neither here
nor there, but I want to thank those four great former Secretaries of
Defense who came up--Dick Cheney; Cap Weinberger; Don Rumsfeld; James
Schlesinger; the marvelous Jeane Kirkpatrick; Steve Forbes, who came
down from New York; Richard Perle; Frank Gaffney; Doug Feith, and Fred
Clay. I also want to include the retired flag and general officers.
I know that when I am driving home in a few hours from now, I will
think of others. Just speaking for all of us, I want to thank them all.
I know Senator Biden wants to do the same thing on his side.
I yield the floor.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I thank the chairman. I apologize because I
may have to augment this. Although it is a very good idea to do it now,
I was preparing to do it later, so I may leave somebody out, and I may
amend this.
Let me begin by thanking a young man, who came over from my personal
staff to the Foreign Relations Committee and I think maybe Mr.
Billingslea may have thought he was his cousin, they spent so much time
together in the last couple of months, and that is Puneet Talwar. He
has done a great deal of the heavy lifting for me on this, along with
Ed Levine, from the Intelligence Committee, who is now working with me.
Ed Hall, the minority staff director; John Lis; the young man--well, he
has been with me so long that he is getting old--Brian McKeon, who is
counsel for the minority; Frank Januzzi; Dawn Ratliff; Kathi Taylor;
Ursula McManus, who we kept up late at night writing memos and other
things on our behalf; Casey Adams; Bill Ashworth, a former long-time
staff member of the Foreign Relations Committee and Senator Pell's
staff; David Schanzer, who worked with me on the Judiciary Committee;
Mary Santos; Kimberly Burns; Jennette Murphy; Larry Stein; Randy
DeValk; Sheila Murphy, all leadership staff persons who have worked
with me.
I have left out some, but I will augment this with the staff members
of the Intelligence Committee, the Appropriations Committee, the
Judiciary Committee, and the Armed Services Committee. They all played
major rolls.
The hearings that the distinguished chairman had on this treaty this
time around were, I think, among the best hearings--even though I
didn't always agree with the witnesses--that I have participated in in
my 25 years. The cast of characters were the luminaries of previous
administrations, as well as
[[Page S3606]]
this administration. We had the who's who of the foreign policy
establishment, literally. These people were particularly helpful to me,
which is going to sound strange. He was up in the gallery, but I am
referring to General and former Ambassador Rowny, a close friend and, I
think, neighbor of the chairman. I know he is much more philosophically
compatible with the chairman than with me, but we found ourselves on
the same side of this issue. Everybody wondered why Bob Dole changed
his mind--not changed his mind, but why Bob Dole concluded that the
conditions that were added to the treaty sufficiently corrected its
defects. It is my understanding that General Rowny bumped into Bob Dole
in a coffee shop at the Watergate Hotel. I can see the distinguished
Senator from Arizona wishing he had been at that coffee shop. But there
was Gen. Brent Scowcroft, one of the most respected people in this
town, Adm. Elmo Zumwalt; John Deutch; Fred Webber and his staff at the
Chemical Manufacturers Association; Gen. Colin Powell; Amy Smithson of
the Stimson Center; John Isaacs; Brad Roberts, Institute for Defense
Analysis; Barry Kellman, DePaul Law School; Ron Lehman of the Reagan
and Bush administrations. I am leaving a number of people out who I
will add later.
I thank them all for contributing to this debate. I want to make a
personal thanks, if I may, Mr. Chairman and Mr. President, to one of
the most competent staff people I have ever dealt with in the
administration, Bob Bell, who works for Sandy Berger and who also, I
think, did an incredibly good job here, and Lori Murray, also of that
staff. Bob Bell is a walking encyclopedia, who negotiated with the Lott
committee. He is a man who has the ability to understand very complex
notions and put them into language everybody can understand. He has
done an admirable job. There are other people to thank.
Mr. LUGAR. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. BIDEN. Yes.
Mr. LUGAR. I would like to ask if he would include Kenneth Myers and
Kenny Myers, on my staff and the staff of the Intelligence Committee,
who have been invaluable.
Mr. BIDEN. The answer is I would absolutely like to do that. The
statement I was going to introduce has a paragraph about that.
I express my deep appreciation to Senator Lugar, with whom I have
talked every day for the past few months as we have tried to move the
ball forward in this treaty. He was very committed. He is truly the
Senate's leading expert on the treaty and, I think, one of the leading
experts in this country on foreign policy. We would not have gotten
this far without his efforts. Perhaps the reason he is as good as he is
that he has a father and son team working for him, Kenneth and Kenny
Myers. I envy Ken Myers, Senator Lugar's long-time staff aide, because
he gets to work with his son, Kenny Myers, every day. The only thing I
found, Mr. Chairman, in my meetings with them is that, like with my
sons, I occasionally observe that the son knew more than the father. So
my compliments to both of them.
The bottom line of all this--and I assume this was one of the
intentions of the Senator from North Carolina, the chairman--is that
regardless of the final outcome of each of these remaining amendments
and the treaty, this has been done fairly and honorably. Everyone has
kept their word. We said we would negotiate in good faith; we both did.
All of the staff members involved acted in the same way.
Lastly--and I hope this doesn't come out the wrong way--I want to
thank the chairman of the full committee for the honorable way in which
he has dealt with this entire matter. I mean that sincerely.
I yield the floor.
Mr. HELMS. I thank the Senator. I will add two things. One, I hope
Bob Dole stays out of those coffee shops from now on. I am going to see
if the distinguished ranking member would mention probably the most
prominent player in this game. He didn't, but I will, because I had the
honor of escorting her to North Carolina--the new Secretary of State,
Madeleine Albright. I don't always agree with her, nor she with me. But
she is a great lady and she is doing a good job for this country. I
thank her.
Mr. President, one of the many fine people who contributed to the
Chemical Weapons Convention is no longer among us. Mrs. Sherry Stetson
Mannix, a retired U.S. Air Force lieutenant colonel, joined the U.S.
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 1984 and became its top expert
on chemical weapons. She helped negotiate the treaty, and then she
became a resource person for Members and staff of the Senate as we
began to consider whether to give our advice and consent to
ratification.
Lieutenant Colonel Mannix was dying of cancer in 1994, when the
Foreign Relations and Intelligence Committees first held hearings on
the CWC. Despite being in terrible pain, Lieutenant Colonel Mannix
faithfully and effectively managed the process of responding to our
committees' questions for the Record.
Sherry Mannix was only 44 years old when she died in early 1995. She
had hoped to live long enough to see this convention ratified. We were
unable, Mr. President, to grant that last wish. But Sherry Mannix kept
faith with us, with her comrades in the U.S. Armed Forces, and with her
country. Now we have the opportunity to keep faith with her, and with
all our military personnel who long for ratification of this convention
as a step toward curbing the menace of chemical weapons.
Mr. HELMS. What is the pending business, Mr. President?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment offered by the Senator from
Delaware.
Mr. HELMS. Which is?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. No. 48.
Mr. HELMS. I yield to the distinguished Senator from Arizona [Mr.
Kyl] for whatever time he may require.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I will, at a later time, join in thanking the
various staff and other people who have been so useful in ensuring a
good debate. I think the Senate has gotten very serious about this
matter. As the majority leader said earlier, as a result of the
application of various Members of the Senate, a great deal of progress
has been made in trying to bring the sides closer together in getting a
treaty that, if it is entered into, will be more in the interest of the
United States than as originally submitted.
There are a couple of conditions, however, in the resolution of
ratification which we believe ought to be a part of this treaty before
the President submits those articles for ratification, signifying the
U.S. entry into the treaty. One of the most important is the one before
us at this moment. There is a motion to strike this condition from the
resolution of ratification. We believe that this condition should
remain. As the majority leader earlier said, he believes this condition
should remain. Here is what it provides: Prior to depositing the U.S.
instrument of ratification, the President must certify four things:
First, that Russia is making reasonable progress on implementing the
1990 bilateral destruction agreement entered into between the United
States and Russia. Second, that outstanding compliance related to the
1989 Wyoming memorandum of understanding have been resolved to U.S.
satisfaction. Third, that Russia has deposited its articles of
ratification of the conventional weapons agreement. Fourth, that it is
committed to foregoing any weapons development.
Those are four important conditions, if our partner, Russia, and the
United States are to effectively utilize the Chemical Weapons
Convention. The reason is, first of all, because Russia is the world's
largest possessor of chemical weapons. It has anywhere from 60 to 70
percent of the world's chemical stocks. For the Chemical Weapons
Convention to be global, in the sense that it covers the weapons, and
to be effective, it should involve the country with the largest
inventory of chemical weapons.
Now, Russia has signed the Chemical Weapons Convention, but has
indicated that it will not ratify, at least at this time and, as a
matter of fact, in a communication to the Vice President of the United
States, one of the Russian leaders, Chernomyrdin, said, in effect, that
Russia would prefer that the two parties, if they are going to come
into the treaty, come in at the same time rather than one preceding the
other,
[[Page S3607]]
and, therefore, said that it would be integral to Russian entry that
the United States entered first, which is what we are about to do.
I think these four commitments by Russia are integral to the success
of the Chemical Weapons Convention if we are to have a truly global
ban. That is why this condition 29 should remain a part of the
resolution of ratification.
Quickly, to the four points: First, reasonable progress in
implementing the 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement. Reasonable
progress simply means that we are continuing to work on complying with
it. That is what the Russians agreed to do when they entered into this
agreement in June 1990. This is an agreement between President Bush and
President Gorbachev.
By the way, when proponents of this treaty speak of it as a Reagan-
Bush-Clinton treaty, I point out the fact that the treaty was different
in the Reagan and early Bush years than it is now. One of the
underpinnings of the treaty was that this bilateral destruction
agreement between Russia and the United States would be in place and
would be enforced and would be complied with by the two parties. This
agreement was designed specifically to ban the production of chemical
weapons, their agents, the destruction of chemical weapons agents, to
provide for onsite inspections of CW facilities, and require data
declarations.
The Bilateral Destruction Agreement is central to the CWC before us
today. Without it the Chemical Weapons Convention is a much weaker
treaty than it would otherwise be. The CWC was negotiated with the
assumption that the United States and Russia would both destroy and
verify destruction of their stockpiles under the Bilateral Destruction
Agreement. But Russia has not implemented the Bilateral Destruction
Agreement, and it appears that it has no intention of doing so.
Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, in this letter to Vice President
Gore that I mentioned before, essentially stated that the Bilateral
Destruction Agreement and the 1989 Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding
have outlived their usefulness insofar as Russia is concerned.
The Chemical Weapons Convention before us today is no substitute for
the Bilateral Destruction Agreement. Under the Bilateral Destruction
Agreement, the inspectors of Russian facilities would not be
international inspectors. They would be U.S. professional inspectors,
and there would be more frequent inspections. The United States would
have guaranteed access to data declarations, none of which would be the
case under the CWC.
So it is important that Russia at least indicate to us that it is
making reasonable progress to implement the BDA before we enter into
force CWC.
Second, the resolution says there should be compliance with the 1989
Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding. Without getting into a lot of
detail, I will simply note that this memorandum of understanding was
essentially an agreement between the two states that we would exchange
data on how much chemical weapons we had and to provide the information
on the status for binary weapons programs.
To comply with this declaration, the United States has given
information to the Russians. Russia declared a 40,000 metric ton agent
stockpile. However, present reports and other information allege that
the Defense Intelligence Agency estimates that the former Soviet--now
Russian--stockpile could be as large as 75,000 tons. Russia has refused
to provide information on the status of its binary weapons program.
And, according to the former Director of Central Intelligence Jim
Woolsey, ``The data we have received from Russia makes no reference to
binary chemical weapons or agents. That is contrary to our
understanding of the program that was initiated in the former Soviet
Union.''
There are additional indications of activity on the part of the
Russians, all of which suggest that they are not in compliance with
this 1989 memorandum of understanding.
Our second point in this condition is getting compliance with that.
Third, we want the Russians to ratify this treaty at the same time
that we do. That is what they want to do. We believe that will be a
preferable course of action to the United States entering into the
treaty causing the Russians to be concerned that we would set up the
rules of the treaty, in effect, in a way that would be amicable to
their interests, thus perhaps causing them never to enter into the
treaty.
A CWC without Russia, furthermore, means that over 50 percent of the
world's known chemical weapons stockpile will be outside of the treaty
regime. Should the United States ratify the CWC absent Russian
participation or the involvement of other states that have weapons, the
treaty's intrusive verification schemes would, for all intents and
purposes, be focused solely on the United States, the only nation
likely to declare integral weapons inventory. In effect, we would be
paying 25 percent of the cost of the treaty to verify our own
compliance.
Finally, Russian commitment to forego a chemical weapons capability.
This is central to the meaning of the CWC. If Russia is not willing to
do this, obviously their intentions are not to comply with CWC.
We have evidence of the so-called Novichok class of nerve agents that
is more lethal than any other known chemical agent in the world.
According to Jane's Land-Based Air Defense 1997-98, Russia is
developing three new nerve agents, two of which are eight times as
deadly as the VX nerve agent stockpiled by Iraq.
Mr. President, Russia's new chemical agents do not depend on
stockpiles that are on the CWC list of scheduled chemicals, according
to sources. Thus, inspectors will neither be prepared nor allowed to
look for them, nor will Russia be precluded from importing these
components. A declassified portion of a May 1995 national intelligence
estimate states ``Production of new binary agents would be difficult to
detect and confirm as a CWC-prohibited activity.''
In conclusion, in light of these ongoing activities and related
United States intelligence estimates, it is reasonable to condition
United States ratification of the CWC to the President certifying that
Russia is committed to foregoing chemical weapons capability or other
activity contrary to the purpose of the convention weapons treaty.
For those reasons, Mr. President, I join the distinguished majority
leader and the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee in urging
that we not strike this condition from the resolution of ratification.
Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry: How much time is
under the control of the Senator from Delaware?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Seventeen minutes.
Mr. BIDEN. I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished Senator from
Michigan. Next, I will let people know that I understand Senator Inhofe
is going to speak in opposition to this motion to strike. Then I would
like to yield, just to let people know, 5 minutes to the distinguished
Senator from Virginia.
That is for informational purposes. I am not asking UC.
I now yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Michigan.
Mr. HELMS. I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, it isn't always that our top military
officials so strongly and jointly agree that an arms control treaty is
in our national security interest. But in the case of the chemical
weapons treaty before the Senate today, that strong support has been
expressed over and over and over again.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Shalikashvili, speaking on
behalf of the Chiefs of each of the services and the combatant
commanders, urged the Senate to ratify this treaty because it would
make it less likely that our troops will face chemical weapons. Their
position is not based on politics or public opinion polls; it is based
on their military judgment.
The acting head of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, has said that
this treaty will give us additional tools to inspect for chemical
weapons that we otherwise would not have.
[[Page S3608]]
The United States, under former President Bush, led the way to the
negotiation of this treaty. It would represent a tragic blow to
American leadership were the Senate to reject a treaty negotiated and
supported by three Presidents. If we don't lead the way, if and when
the day comes that we must act militarily to eliminate a country's
chemical weapons, the credibility of and support for, that effort will
be undermined by our lack of clean hands and our refusal to ratify a
treaty that makes it less likely those weapons will be created to begin
with.
The CWC destroys stockpiles that could threaten our troops; it
significantly improves our intelligence capabilities, and it creates
new international sanctions to punish those states that remain outside
of the treaty. If we fail to ratify the convention, we will imperil our
leadership in the entire area of nonproliferation, perhaps the most
vital security issue of the post-cold-war era.
Relative to condition 29 that is before us, there is a motion to
strike this condition that has been made by the Senator from Indiana.
It is based on many grounds. But the first ground that he points out,
which seems to me is the foremost ground even before we get to the
details of this condition, is that this condition is a killer
condition. If this condition stays in this resolution, it kills this
ratification resolution because it makes it conditional on somebody
else ratifying.
Do we want to make our ratification conditional upon these other
events? Do we want to give Russia the power to decide our participation
in the leadership of this crucial treaty? The President has said--I am
here quoting him--``This is precisely backwards. The best way to secure
Russian ratification is to ratify the treaty ourselves. Failure to do
so will not only give hard-liners in Russia an excuse to hold out but
also to hold onto their chemical weapons.''
Do we want Russia to ratify? Clearly we do. General Shalikashvili,
who has so strongly supported the ratification of this treaty, has
testified before us in the Armed Services Committee as follows: ``The
most significant advantage derived from the convention is the potential
elimination of chemical weapons by state parties.'' He went on to say,
``Eventual destruction of approximately 40,000 tons of declared Russian
chemical weapons will significantly reduce the global chemical
threat.''
That is why General Shalikashvili has said, among other reasons, that
the ratification of this treaty will make it less likely that our
troops would ever face chemical weapons because the largest declared
stockpile by Russia must be destroyed under this treaty. General
Shalikashvili, Chairman of our Joint Chiefs, speaking for each of the
chiefs and our combatant commanders, says that destruction of 40,000
tons of declared chemical weapons by Russia is the most significant
advantage to this treaty.
What does our ratification have to do with Russian ratification? I
would suggest here that we listen to a number of voices. But one of
them is a Russian voice--a Russian scientist who blew the whistle
actually on the Soviet Union chemical weapons program. His name is Vil
Myrzyanov. He is a high-level Russian scientist. This is what he said
about the relationship in a letter that he wrote to Senator Lugar.
``Senate ratification of the convention is crucial to securing action
on the treaty in Moscow.''
Our ratification, he is telling us--this is an inside voice--is
critical to getting the Duma to ratify this treaty. And getting the
Duma to ratify this treaty is, in the eyes of General Shalikashvili,
the single most important advantage of the treaty because then 40,000
declared tons of chemical agents, the largest stockpile in the world,
will be destroyed and less available for leakage, less available to any
potential sale or disposition to others adversely or inadvertently.
So our leadership is important to a safer world. This is a treaty
that we helped to draft, negotiated, and now it is before us to ratify.
But our leadership is also important to ratification of this treaty
inside of Russia.
The decision of whether the United States ratifies this convention is
for this body, the United States Senate to decide--not the Russian
Duma. We should strike this killer condition.
The purpose of both the Bilateral Destruction Agreement and the
Wyoming MOU was to help make progress towards achieving a CWC.
Now that we have the CWC complete, the BDA and the Wyoming MOU are
less relevant. We can enter the CWC without the BDA being implemented.
The BDA does not go as far as the CWC. BDA would permit both sides to
keep 5,000 tons of chemical agent. The BDA does not permit challenge
inspections.
The CWC requires complete destruction of all chemical weapons, and
provides for challenge inspections to any facility suspected of a
violating suspected of violating the CWC.
If the CWC is ratified by the United States--which this killer
condition would prohibit--and by Russia--it is entirely possible that
the United States and Russia can finish negotiations on the BDA and let
it enter into force.
If the United States does not ratify this convention, there is little
chance Russia will ratify it and there is no chance for this BDA ever
entering into force.
If we want Russia to ratify the CWC--and surely we must--then we
should ratify the CWC--which, in turn requires us to strike this
condition.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina is recognized.
Mr. HELMS. I thank the Chair.
Mr. President, I am going to abbreviate my statement in the interest
of time, hoping that we can help Senators get out a little bit earlier,
including the distinguished occupant of the Chair.
Mr. President, this condition is very important. It forbids the
deposit of the United States instrument of ratification until Russia
has made significant progress in implementing the 1990 Bilateral
Destruction Agreement and has resolved concerns over its incomplete
data declarations under the Wyoming memorandum of understanding,
ratified the convention and has committed to forgo the clandestine
maintenance of chemical weapons production capability.
That sounds like a lot but more than anything else it is a
measurement of how Russia is playing games in terms of not doing things
to live up to its agreement.
I have the highest hope that Russia one day will have a free
enterprise economy and all the rest of it, but such commitments by
Russia are absolutely imperative and essential to the success of this
CWC, this treaty, in securing a truly global ban on possession and use
of chemical weapons. If Russia continues to drag its feet, this
convention will be worth almost nothing. And for my part, as one
Senator, I am extremely concerned that Russia, the country that
possesses the largest and the most sophisticated chemical weapons
arsenal in the world, has refused consistently to agree to implement
its commitments to eliminate its chemical weapons stockpile despite the
1990 United States-Russian Bilateral Destruction Agreement.
Now, put any face on it you want, but if Russia fails to do that,
then Russia is telling this Senate, this Government, the American
people, we don't care what you want; we are going our way. And that is
a pretty dangerous position for Russia to take in terms of world peace.
This coupled with the Russian withdrawal from the BDA and the Russian
Parliament rejection of the chemical weapons destruction plan portend
ominous things to come in terms of Russia's ratification of this
treaty.
Now, I hope Senators are aware, and if they are not aware, that they
will become aware, that Russia is by far and away the world's largest
possessor of chemical weapons. If the United States in eliminating its
own chemical stockpile could assure that Russia also destroyed its
stockpile through the Bilateral Destruction Agreement, 99 percent of
the world's chemical arsenal would be eliminated independently of this
treaty. So that gives you some idea of the enormity of this situation
which has been passed over and over and over. I think enough is enough.
Now, of course, Russia has signed the CWC but it has not ratified
this treaty. Evidence has come to light recently, by the way,
suggesting that Russia may not pursue ratification of this treaty in
the near term and does not intend to abide by the CWC even if it
ratifies it.
I just want Senators to understand what they are doing. It is all
very well
[[Page S3609]]
and good to succumb to the imaginative suggestion that we are doing
something about chemical weapons when we pass this treaty. We are not.
It is not going to do one bit of good until the United States is able
to persuade some other people to do things that they have already
agreed to do. So the danger is how the American people are being misled
by those who have endorsed this treaty into believing that something is
being done about chemical weaponry.
I hope, if we do nothing else in our opposition to this treaty, we
can make the American people aware that nothing is being done for their
safety by this treaty. I wish it were different. I wish I did not have
to stand here and say this. But those are the facts. This treaty is
absolutely useless in terms of giving the American people any security
at all.
According to a May 6, 1996, letter from the DIA, the
Defense Intelligence Agency, to the chairman of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence:
There are several factors affecting Russia's actions
regarding its CW programs and arms control commitments.
Russian officials probably believe they need a CW capability
to deter other nations from chemical warfare. They cite a
potential threat from purported CW programs in the United
States, other Western nations, and several countries on or
near Russia's borders.
Now, the DIA continued:
In addition, Russian officials believe that dismantling the
CW program would waste resources and rob them of valuable
production assets. They maintain that the CW production
facilities should not be destroyed but be used to produce
commercial products.
Well, la-de-da. Every nation that has some ulterior motives with
chemical weapons can say the same thing.
Moreover, these officials do not want to see their life's
work destroyed, their jobs eliminated, and their influence
diminished.
And here we are probably going to ratify this treaty in spite of the
great concern about the views of Russia's senior military leadership on
the Chemical Weapons Convention and on the elimination of Russia's
chemical warfare capability in general.
On numerous instances, the United States has received indications
that key elements within the Russian Government staunchly oppose the
CWC. Back in 1994, October 25, Dr. Lev Fyodorov--I never met him, do
not know how to pronounce his name--head of the Union for Chemical
Security, told Interfax news service that key officers from the Russian
Ministry of Defense had spoken against the treaty during the Russian
Duma defense committee's closed hearings on October 11 1994.
Now, my concerns about the two Russian generals responsible for
Russia's chemical warfare elimination program have been well documented
in a series of letters to President Clinton, and I ask unanimous
consent that these letters be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC, October 25, 1995.
The President,
The White House
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. President: I take no offense at your declaration
to the effect that I am irresponsibly delaying consideration
of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Both of us know that this
is not so. Moreover, the CWC is a treaty which in my view
must not be seriously considered by Congress unless and until
the issue of verification can be resolved.
There is no disagreement that the production stockpiling
and use of chemical and biological weapons is inherently
abhorrent, and especially by rogue regimes. Yours is the
second Administration with which I have raised compelling
questions about verification, Russian compliance, Russian
binary weapons programs--and the cost of the Chemical Weapons
Convention.
If and when we receive satisfactory answers to these
concerns, there would be a substantial increase in the
probability of this treaty's being reported out of the
Foreign Relations Committee for formal consideration by the
Senate.
I was astounded to learn, as surely you were, that the
former Chairman of the [Russian] President's Committee on
Conventional Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons,
Lieutenant General Anatoliy Kuntsevich, is now under the
house arrest for his having delivered 1,800 pounds of
military chemicals to terrorists in the Middle East in 1993.
What's more, the Russian intelligence service asserts that
General Kuntsevich attempted to sell 5 tons of military
chemicals to the same buyers a year later, in 1994. He was
caught in the act.
Needless to say, the arrest of this key Russian negotiator
of the Chemical Weapons Convention on trafficking charges--
for dealing in the very same chemical agents he was
supposedly trying to control--calls into question the
integrity of every provision of the Chemical Weapons
Convention. It certainly lends credibility to concerns about
he trustworthiness of Russian declarations regarding its own
current chemical and biological programs, its stockpiles, and
the sincerity of the Russians' willingness, and ability, to
abide by the CWC and other agreements.
General Kuntsevich's role in chemical weapons dates to the
1980s. As Deputy Commander of Soviet Chemical Forces, he was
honored as a hero of Socialist Labor in 1981. In 1988, he
became a member of the Soviet delegation to the United
Nations Conference on Disarmament, which negotiated the CWC.
In 1991, he received the Lenin Prize for his work on binary
chemical weapons. Through his many years as a negotiator for
the Soviet/Russian governments, Kuntsevich won a number of
concessions on the Chemical Weapons Convention and follow-on
provisions to the Bilateral Destruction Agreement. Moreover,
he was responsible for Russia's dubious declarations under
the Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding.
While General Kuntsevich is said to have been removed by
President Yeltsin in April 1994, concern remains that the
General may have conspired to negotiate significant loopholes
in the agreements with the obvious intent of enabling him and
others to engage in chemical trafficking with impunity--and
possibly to permit Russia to evade its obligations.
I respectfully request a thorough analysis of the
negotiating record of the CWC and the Bilateral Destruction
Agreement in order to review the role of General Kuntsevich
in securing various provisions and concessions. I regard this
analysis to be essential to any credible review.
Furthermore, I need to know General Kuntsevich's role in
the provision of questionable data declarations under the
Wyoming Memorandum. Has he been allowed to retain contacts
with the Yeltsin government since his removal?
There are three other questions, Mr. President, that simply
must be answered:
(1) When did the U.S. government learn of General
Kuntsevich's role in trafficking chemical weapons and other
corrupt practices?
(2) Were you aware of his activities, and his arrest, while
you were urging the Congress to move forward on the
ratification of the CWC?
(3) If General Kuntsevich has been under house arrest since
April 1994, what could explain the timing of the Russian
government's revelations regarding his activities?
The Russian government should be urged to accelerate and
complete its investigation of General Kuntsevich. I do hope
you will obtain from the Russian government a full accounting
of precisely what was sold and to whom, and how Russian
export controls were circumvented. Additionally, what
precautions, if any, have been taken to prevent such future
incidents from occurring?
Obviously, unless and until these concerns and those raised
previously have been addressed, it would not be fair to the
security and safety of the American people even to consider
moving the Chemical Weapons Convention out of Committee.
Respectfully,
Jesse Helms.
____
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC, October 30, 1995.
Dear Colleague: I am confident that you were astonished, as
I was, that Russia's former chief negotiator for the Chemical
Weapons Convention is now under house arrest for trafficking
in the very military chemicals he purportedly was seeking to
control. Apparently, General Kuntsevich in 1993 sold 1,800
pounds of chemical agents to terrorists in the Middle East.
He was caught attempting to sell another 5 tons a year later.
Many of us have consistently raised concerns regarding the
verifiability and enforceability of the Chemical Weapons
Convention. This most recent incident makes it demonstrable
that the CWC, even had it been in effect, would have been
helpless to interdict illicit trade in chemicals. (General
Kuntsevich is alleged to have transferred chemicals not
listed in the chemicals annex of the CWC, and those chemicals
went to a country that was not even a signatory to the
Convention. He was caught red-handed by traditional, national
law enforcement means, not by some global policing
mechanism.)
Furthermore, had General Kuntsevich not been caught, it is
conceivable that he and/or his cronies may have worked their
way into
[[Page S3610]]
the administrative body of the CWC, and would then have
access to a plethora of information regarding the chemical
programs of all signatories, and forewarning of all short-
notice inspections to be conducted under the Convention.
The attached letter that I sent to President Clinton
underscores my concerns arising from the arrest of General
Kuntsevich. Given Kuntsevich's influence over the negotiating
process of the CWC, and his responsibility for overseeing the
destruction of his own personal empire under the U.S.-Russian
Bilateral Destruction Agreement, I have requested a thorough
review of the negotiating record of both agreements.
I bring this new incident to your attention as the Senate
continues its discussion of issues surrounding the Chemical
Weapons Convention. General Kuntsevich's activities and
arrest highlight the many legitimate concerns we all share
regarding how best to guard against the threat that chemical
weapons pose to our nation's security.
Respectfully,
Jesse Helms.
____
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC, June 21, 1996.
The President,
The White House,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. President: I was gratified to note your
Administration's decision to impose sanctions against
Lieutenant General Anatoliy Kuntsevich, former Chairman of
the [Russian] President's Committee on Conventional Problems
of Chemical and Biological Weapons. (I had written to you on
October 25, 1995 regarding his having been arrested on
charges of selling military chemicals to Middle East
terrorists.)
Disturbing information about General Kuntsevich's
activities prompted my concerns about whether the U.S. can
believe Russian declarations regarding: (1) its current
chemical and biological programs and stockpiles; (2) its
willingness to abide by the 1990 U.S.-Russian Bilateral
Destruction Agreement (BDA); and (3) its intent to ratify the
Chemical Weapons Convention.
General Kuntsevich was, after all, one of the most senior
officers in Russia's chemical weapons program. Indeed, in
1994 it was he who signed, in conjunction with Colonel
General S.V. Petrov, the U.S.-Russian work plan for the
destruction of Russia's chemical weapons.
At that time, your National Security Advisor assured me
that General Kuntsevich was acting independently of the
Russian government. I was also told that his actions in no
way called into question the willingness of Russia to abide
by its commitments to eliminate its stockpile of chemical
weapons. However, it subsequently came to my attention that
yet another high-ranking Russian general, General Petrov, has
openly alluded to the desirability of maintaining a chemical
weapons capability. General Petrov, the other signatory to
the 1994 Work Plan, expressed his views in the November-
December 1994 edition of the official Russian Military
Journal, Military Thought. Such a belief, stated publicly by
a key Russian officer, prompts concern that key elements
within the Russian government may not even intend to
implement the BDA, ratify the CWC--or abide by either
agreement.
Most troubling to me, however, are rumors that have begun
to circulate that Russia no longer favors implementation of
the six-year old Bilateral Destruction Agreement. I further
understand that Russia will not seek to ratify the Chemical
Weapons Convention in the near future, and that the United
States has been told to delay its own ratification
indefinitely--or risk the possibility that Russia will never
ratify the CWC.
I am concerned that nearly a month has elapsed and the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee has yet to be notified of
such an ominous change in Russian policy towards the
destruction of its chemical arsenal.
Accordingly, I respectfully request immediate
declassification of any documents or cables pertaining to the
aforementioned issues, including cable number 607329
dispatched from Bonn on May 21, 1996, and their being
provided to the Committee. I also respectfully request
detailed, and unclassified responses to the following
questions:
(1) Has the intelligence community conducted any assessment
identifying Russian officials believed to oppose
dismantlement of Russia's chemical weapons stockpile, or who
oppose Russian ratification of the CWC? Please declassify
these reports provide them to the Committee.
(2) The Central Intelligence Agency stated in a report in
March, 1995, that ``some CW-capable countries that have
signed the CWC show no signs of ending their programs.'' Does
the intelligence community believe that Russia intends to
forgo all aspects of its chemical weapons program?
(3) Is it the case that Russia has not yet constructed even
a pilot chemical weapons destruction facility? Is it also
true that the Shchuch'ye Implementation Plan exists only on
paper, and that the plan does not yet even include such
rudimentary components as baseline data, engineering survey
data, or a site feasibility study? How many years will
finalization of these critical elements of the Russian
destruction program take?
(4) On June 23, 1994, the then-Director of Central
Intelligence, R. James Woolsey, stated that the U.S. had
``serious concerns over apparent incompleteness,
inconsistency and contradictory aspects of the data''
provided to the United States by Russia regarding its
chemical weapons program. How will Russian withdrawal from
the BDA affect U.S. efforts to resolve questions regarding
``contradictions'' in Russia's declarations about its
chemical weapons stockpile? Is the Administration prepared to
challenge immediately the veracity of Russian reporting under
the CWC if Russia provides data which mirrors that provided
to the United States under the 1989 Wyoming Memorandum of
Understanding?
(5) Dr. Vil Mirzayanov, former chief of counterintelligence
at the State Union Scientific Research Institute for Organic
Chemistry and Technology, has alleged that Russia has
produced a new class of binary nerve agents five to eight
times more lethal than any other known chemical agent, and
that work may be continuing on these chemical weapons. Is the
Administration satisfied that the Russian Federation has
indeed ceased the development and/or production of all
offensive chemical weapons agents?
I will appreciate your assistance in resolving these
questions which concern issues which so directly impact on
the national security of the United States.
Respectfully,
Jesse Helms.
____
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC, July 26, 1996.
The President,
The White House
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. President: When I wrote to you on June 21
regarding perhaps the most significant, ominous shift in
Russian arms control policy since the end of the Cold War, I
respectfully requested, among other things, information from
the Administration concerning reports that Russia will not
implement the six-year old U.S.-Russian Bilateral Destruction
Agreement (BDA) or pursue ratification of the CWC in the near
future.
Mr. President, since writing to you, my concerns as to
whether Russia intends to implement the BDA and ratify the
CWC have been confirmed beyond peradventure. To be specific:
Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin wrote to Vice President
Gore on July 8, stating officially that both the BDA and the
Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) have outlived their
usefulness to Russia. Moreover, it has been established that
Prime Minister Chernomyrdin (1) linked Russian ratification
of the CWC to U.S. agreement to a Joint Statement linking
ratification by the United States to Russian ratification,
(2) stated that the American taxpayers must pay the cost of
the Russian destruction program, and (3) linked ratification
to U.S. acquiescence to Russia's position on conversion of
its chemical weapons facilities.
Even more disturbing is the report that the Prime Minister
declared that if the CWC enters into force without Russia, it
will be impossible for Russia ever to ratify the treaty.
Mr. President, the Russian Federation appears to anticipate
that due to intense U.S. diplomatic lobbying the CWC may
enter into force this summer. I am concerned that U.S.
efforts at inducing nations to ratify the treaty, and bring
it into force before the views of the United States Senate
have been expressed on the CWC, have virtually ensured that
neither the United States nor Russia will have a hand in
finalizing the 37 uncompleted implementation procedures of
the treaty. Once 65 countries have ratified, all manner of
detailed guidelines affecting the CWC's verification regime,
ranging from the conduct of inspections to the safeguarding
of samples transferred for analysis off-site, will be
finalized rapidly.
Prime Minister Chernomyrdin's letter was clear: ``Speaking
candidly,'' he wrote ``I shall say that the Convention's
entry into force without Russia would hamper its ratification
with us.'' On July 22, 1996, the Russian delegation in The
Hague repeated this position, stating that ``the entry into
force of the Convention without Russia, to be perfectly
candid, would hamper its ratification in our country.''
Since Russia is bound to know that the treaty will enter
into force without Russia's participation, is it not evident
that Russia is preparing a diplomatic exit strategy from the
CWC?
The Senate needs to be informed by the Administration
precisely how Russian withdrawal from the BDA and the Wyoming
MOU will affect U.S. efforts to resolve questions concerning
Russia's various declarations about its chemical weapons
stockpile.
The Director of Central Intelligence, James Woolsey,
testified on June 23, 1994, that the U.S. had ``serious
concerns over apparent incompleteness, inconsistency and
contradictory aspects of the data'' submitted by Russia under
the Wyoming MOU.
So, Mr. President, if Russia is now refusing to answer any
more questions about the size of its chemical weapons
stockpile or its binary weapons program (which it has failed
to mention at all), does this not cast doubt as to whether
Russia will ever fully disclose its chemical weapons
activities? Is the Administration prepared to challenge
immediately the veracity of Russian reporting under the CWC
if Russia provides data which mirrors that provided to the
United States under the Wyoming MOU?
Additionally, given that the bilateral inspection regime
(under the BDA) was to have substituted for multilateral
inspections under the CWC, does Russian withdrawal
[[Page S3611]]
from the BDA lower the intelligence community's already poor
level of confidence in its ability to monitor Russian treaty
compliance?
Mr. President, I respectfully reiterate my request for
detailed, and unclassified responses to the questions I asked
of you on June 21, 1996. I also will appreciate your
providing to the Committee:
(1) the Chernomyrdin letter of July 8, 1996, which I
understand must be unclassified since it was transmitted by
facsimile around Washington on unsecured lines;
(2) all assessments by the intelligence community
discussing the views of Prime Minister Chernomyrdin towards
the BDA, the CWC, and any assessments as to whether he favors
complete elimination of Russia's chemical weapons arsenal;
(3) the draft Joint Statement and all relevant documents
supplied by Russia to Vice President Gore prior to the
President's Moscow Summit;
(4) a detailed assessment of discrepancies in Russia's
Wyoming MOU data and the results of any bilateral discussions
regarding those discrepancies;
(5) a detailed assessment by the intelligence community of
the impact that non-implementation of the BDA and Wyoming MOU
will have upon the U.S. ability to monitor Russian compliance
with the CWC;
(6) a detailed estimate of the additional cost to the
United States of implementing the CWC without the BDA in
place;
(7) an estimate of the total cost of destroying Russia's
chemical weapons stockpile; and
(8) all documents relating to any discussions with or
assurances made to Russia by the Administration regarding
U.S. assistance to the Russian destruction program.
In closing, Mr. President, I should note for the record
that the unanimous consent agreement in the Senate (to
proceed to consideration of the CWC on or before September
14, 1996) is predicated entirely upon the administration's
providing ``such facts and documents as requested by the
Chairman and ranking minority member of the Foreign Relations
Committee.''
I hope we can work together on this matter. I will
appreciate your assistance in resolving these questions
concerning issues which so directly impact on the national
security of the United States and the American people.
Respectfully,
Jesse Helms.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, we are all aware of how the administration
has refused, refused to provide the Senate, despite my repeated
requests, my repeated entreaties to them, to give us an updated
assessment of the Russian position regarding the BDA and the CWC.
Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin wrote to Vice President Gore on
July 8, 1996 stating that both the BDA and the 1989 Wyoming memorandum
of understanding have outlived their usefulness to Russia, don't you
see. Moreover, the Prime Minister, one, tied Russian ratification of
this treaty, the CWC, to United States agreement to a joint statement
linking ratification by the United States to Russian ratification; two,
stated that the American taxpayers--get this--the American taxpayers
must pay the cost of the Russian destruction program; and three, he
linked ratification to United States acquiescence to Russia's position
on conversion of its chemical weapons facilities. The shift in Russian
arms control policy, you see, will have important ramifications.
First, the minimalist approaches taken by Russia in its data
declaration on the Wyoming memorandum of understanding will go
unresolved. Russia has stated that the total size of its stockpiled
chemical weapons is equivalent to 40,000 tons of agent. This
declaration is absolutely untrue. The Director of Central Intelligence,
James Woolsey, testified before the Foreign Relations Committee on June
23, 1994, that the United States had ``serious concerns over apparent
incompleteness, inconsistency and contradictory aspects of the data''
submitted by Russia under the Wyoming MOU. On August 27, 1993, Adm.
William Studeman, Acting Director of Central Intelligence, wrote to
Senator Glenn stating:
We cannot confirm that the Russian declaration of 40,000 mt
is accurate. In addition, we cannot confirm that the total
stockpile is stored only at the seven sites declared by the
Soviets...
Articles in both the Washington Post and the Washington Times alleged
that the Defense Intelligence Agency has estimated the Soviet stockpile
could be as large as 75,000 metric tons.
Omissions in Russia's MOU data declarations have clear implications
for how Russia will interpret the various provisions of the CWC.
Because the BDA mandates annual updates to the Wyoming MOU, Russian
withdrawal from the BDA may also signal that Russia will henceforth
refuse to entertain any additional United States questions about the
size of its chemical weapons stockpile or its binary weapons program.
Senators should be concerned that Russia may intend to provide to the
OPCW data which mirrors that provided under the Wyoming MOU. This
would, in this Senator's view, serve as a clear indicator that Russia
intends to violate the CWC.
Second, Russia has consistently refused to provide information on the
status of its binary chemical weapons program. On June 23, 1994, then-
Director of Central Intelligence James Woolsey declared that ``the data
we have received from Russia makes no reference to binary chemical
weapons or agents. That is contrary to our understanding of the program
that was initiated by the former Soviet Union.''
Dr. Vil Mirzayanov, former chief of counterintelligence at the State
Union Scientific Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and
Technology, has stated that the Russian Federation may continue work on
novel nerve agents far more lethal than any other known chemical
agents--substance A-230, substance 33, and substance A-232. In an
article in the Wall Street Journal on May 25, 1994, Dr. Mirzayanov
wrote:
It is very easy to produce binary weapons without detection
under the guise of agricultural petrochemicals. The products
easily pass all safety tests and become registered with the
government as legitimate commercial products. The plant
receives a license for production and goes into operation.
Neither the firm's leaders, its staff, nor international
inspectors know that the chemicals are a component of a new
binary weapon.
As the public talks toward banning chemical weapons
progressed, the more intense became Russia's secret
development and testing of binary weapons... our laboratories
created Substance A-230, a weapon about which I can only say
that its killing efficiency surpassed any known military
toxin by a factor of five to eight.
...Two more major achievements took place in 1990 and 1991.
First, a binary weapon based on a compound code-named
Substance 33 passed site tests and was put into production
for the Soviet army.
...The second development was the synthesis of a binary
weapon based on Substance A-232, a toxin similar to A-230.
This new weapon, part of the ultra-lethal ``Novichok'' class,
provides an opportunity for the military establishment to
disguise production of components of binary weapons as common
agricultural chemicals; because the West does not know the
formula, and its inspectors cannot identify the compounds.
...Fifteen thousand tons of Substance 33 have been produced
in the city of Novocheborksarsk... But our generals have told
the U.S. that Novocheborksarsk is turning out another
substance known as VX.
Dr. Mirzayanov and other dissident Russian scientists have claimed
that Russia's binary weapons program has been specifically crafted to
evade detection under the verification regime of the CWC. They allege
that components for the binary agents have been given legitimate
commercial applications, that they are not covered under the CWC's
schedules, and that OPCW inspectors will not know what they are
examining when they come across such chemicals. The United States
should not ratify the CWC until Russia agrees to forgo this abhorrent
program.
Third, the BDA provides for United States on-site inspections of
Russian storage, destruction and production facilities, combined with
data declarations. The United States can expect to gain real monitoring
benefits from the CWC only if the Bilateral Destruction Agreement [BDA]
is implemented. This agreement provides for United States on-site
inspections of Russian storage, destruction and production facilities.
Without the BDA, the United States will be forced to verify Russian CWC
compliance based upon a smaller number of inspections than anticipated
under the bilateral arrangement, with inspections of Russian sites by
the OPCW rather than by United States personnel, and with no guaranteed
United States access to detailed inspection data. In other words, the
intelligence community's already poor confidence level in its ability
to monitor Russian treaty compliance will fall even lower.
Fourth, Russian insistence on excluding several of its chemical
weapons-related facilities from the BDA's definition of ``chemical
weapons production facility,'' and hence from the CWC's definition,
relates directly to its desire to maintain a clandestine chemical
weapons production capability. The
[[Page S3612]]
United States refusal to accede to the Russian position, which would
have--in turn--strengthened the Russian case for facility conversions
under the CWC, may be a primary reason that Russia has refused to
implement the BDA. We should not, under any circumstance, allow Russia
to exclude its chemical weapons facilities from inspection.
Moreover, without the bilateral agreement the OPCW will increase the
size of its international inspectorate and purchase of additional
equipment. This will drive up vastly the expected costs of the regime.
Further, the CWC requires States Parties to pay for monitoring of their
chemical weapons production, storage, and disposal facilities.
Mr. President, I guess we ought to respond once more--it is an
exercise in futility, but we ought to keep responding to that old
litany that we have heard this day about making the United States
ratification of the CWC contingent upon Russia's acting first.
Let us look at a little bit of history. This Senate approved the
START II treaty amidst a clamor of claims by the administration that a
failure to act was preventing Russian approval of that treaty. Does
anybody hear anything familiar about that? More than 15 months have
passed and the Russian Duma still has not approved START II. Instead,
the Russian leadership rendered ratification of the START II treaty
contingent upon United States acquiescence to Russian interpretation
of, get this, the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and now the
Chemical Weapons Convention is being tied to NATO enlargement and other
issues.
Mr. President, surely, surely, Senators will not fail to refuse such
linkages, and the best way to do it is to require, to stipulate
unmistakably that Russia must act in good faith and ratify the Chemical
Weapons Convention first. Indeed, in his letter to Vice President Gore,
the Prime Minister of Russia stated that the United States should wait
for Russia.
I urge Senators to reject that motion to strike.
I yield the floor. I do not know who has been waiting the longest.
Mr. WARNER. I think the Senator from Oklahoma, Mr. President, has
been waiting longer than I. I will follow him.
Mr. HELMS. I did not see anybody over here.
Mr. LEVIN. Senator Warner is going to get part of our time.
Mr. INHOFE. I think Senator Warner should go ahead since we are going
back and forth across the aisle.
Mr. LEVIN. I yield 5 minutes to Senator Warner.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan yields to the
Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I was asked by a reporter my view of the
distinguished majority leader's role in this very important debate, and
I replied, without hesitation, that the tougher the issue, the closer
the division within the ranks of the Senate and most particularly
within our party, the tougher the leadership challenge. I am proud to
join others in saying our leader has met that challenge.
Likewise, my distinguished colleague and friend from day one in the
Senate, the senior Senator from North Carolina, together with Senators
Kyl and Smith and Inhofe, have met the challenge. They have ensured
that the Senate has conducted a full and thorough debate on this
treaty, and they have been instrumental in achieving the 28 conditions
which have been adopted by the Senate. Those conditions have improved
the document which the President submitted to the Senate in 1993.
There is a clear division within the ranks of Republicans on this
issue, and it has been a conscientious and thoughtful process by which
each has reached his or her position.
Now, Mr. President, to go to the subject itself. I will not go into
the details of this treaty. I would like to speak to the broader issue.
I first learned of chemical weapons at the knee of my father who was
a surgeon in the trenches in World War I. He described to me in vivid
detail how he cared for the helpless victims of that weapon.
On through my years on the Armed Services Committee, where I was the
point man in the 1980's to drive through the legislation for binary
chemical weapons because I wanted this country to be prepared to deter
the use of those weapons. And, then, through the Reagan-Bush era, our
Nation has come full circle, and decided to lead in the effort to
eliminate these weapons. Whether that can be done I know not, nor does
anyone. But we cannot turn back now from that leadership role.
This treaty does not meet my full expectations. But I think we can
fight better in the arena, in the ring, to improve this treaty than
were we to stay outside and peer over the ropes. It is for that reason
that I shall cast my final vote in support of this convention.
I recall the ABM Treaty. I was in Moscow as a part of President
Nixon's team, as Secretary of the Navy. The drafters of that treaty put
their minds to dealing with the threat at that period of time. They
never envisioned, nor could they envision, a decade or two decades
hence, what the scientific community might produce. Therein we have
made a mistake as a nation by not adapting that treaty over time to
deal with technological developments. I shall continue to fight very
vigorously to see that that treaty does not become written in stone so
as to block the efforts of our Nation to properly defend itself against
attack from short-range missiles.
I cite that as an example, because technology is outpacing what the
best minds in this Nation can draft--whether it is a treaty or a law.
We have to look upon this treaty--as we should look upon all treaties--
as a living document, a document that must be changed by the
conscientious efforts of the signatories to this treaty. It must be
changed to meet the advancements of technology in the area of chemical
weapons; it must be changed to address the concerns that have been
raised during this debate.
Like our Constitution--a document that has lived and survived so that
we, the United States, are the oldest continuously functioning form of
democratic republic on Earth--this convention must be a living
document. Our Constitution has been amended. It shall be amended,
perhaps, in the future. Because it is a living document. It has adapted
to the many changes we have witnessed as a nation.
This treaty must be regarded as a living document and it is incumbent
upon this President and his successors thereafter to work
conscientiously, within the arena, to see that it is strengthened.
The work in this debate has gone far to show that it is a living
document. Under the leadership of Senator Helms and Senator Lott we
have already brought about a number of changes. The Senate may effect
further changes as the evening progresses. But the important thing we
must keep in mind is that this document must be regarded as one that
has to be improved. And it is the leadership of the United States that
must step forward to achieve that goal.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bennett). The Senator from North Carolina.
Mr. HELMS. May I ask the distinguished Senator from Oklahoma how much
time he believes he will need?
Mr. INHOFE. May I have 6 minutes?
Mr. HELMS. I yield 7 minutes to the Senator.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina has 5 minutes
remaining on the amendment.
The Senator is recognized for the remainder of the time.
Mr. INHOFE. I inquire of the Senator from North Carolina if he has
other Senators requesting time?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina has 5 minutes
remaining.
Mr. HELMS. Yes. I think I have some time over in one corner.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has time on the resolution, if he
wishes. There are 5 minutes remaining on the motion.
Mr. HELMS. I understand that. I have 5 minutes. Then he would like 2
minutes. So take it out of the other pot.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma is recognized for up
to 2--up to 7 minutes.
Mr. INHOFE. Are you sure that's right?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes.
[[Page S3613]]
Mr. INHOFE. I thank the Senator from North Carolina. I do want to
address this particular amendment. Before I do, I have three articles,
and I ask unanimous consent to have them printed in the Record after my
remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. INHOFE. The first one is a Wall Street Journal editorial of
September 9, 1996. I will just read the last paragraph.
Ultimately the treaty's most pernicious effect is that it
would lull most responsible nations into the false belief
that they'd ``done something'' about the chemical weapons
problem and that it now was behind them. Yes, the world would
be a better place without chemical weapons. But this treaty's
attempt to wave them away isn't going to make that happen.
The other two, one by Frank Gaffney, Jr. and the other by Douglas
Feith, address the regulation problems that would come from this to
literally thousands of companies throughout America. In fact, the
Commerce Department guidance on recordkeeping for affected businesses
runs more than 50 pages.
Mr. President, you have run companies. You know one of the major
reasons we are not globally competitive here in the United States is
that we are overregulated. There is a tremendous cost to these
regulations. If the requirements exceed 50 pages, imagine what the
companies would have to do.
Mr. President, in a way I think the other side of this has perhaps
used the wrong argument. There is an argument they are overlooking, and
that is it does not seem to make a lot of difference whether Russia
ratifies this or not because, as we have said several times during the
course of this debate, they ratified a lot of treaties, including the
1990 Biological Weapons Destruction treaty, the ABM Treaty--that goes
all the way back to the 1970's--the START I, CFE, INF. And while they
have ratified these, they have not complied.
There are three steps you go through. One is you have to sign them.
Second, you ratify them. But, third, you have to comply. And they have
been found out of compliance. I cannot imagine why we would expect that
they would comply with this one if they ratified it if they have not
complied with the previous ones.
The distinguished Senator from Michigan quoted, somewhat extensively,
Gen. John Shalikashvili, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as
saying that this would have the effect of reducing the proliferation of
chemical weapons.
I would only say, trying not to be redundant, if that is the case,
then you are taking his word over four previous Secretaries of Defense:
Dick Cheney, James Schlesinger, Don Rumsfeld, and Cap Weinberger, all
four of whom said this would have the effect of increasing the
proliferation of chemical weapons and their use in the Middle East.
But, one of the statements that was made by the distinguished Senator
from Michigan I thought was interesting. He said, if I got it right,
and correct me if I am wrong: ``The single most important reason to
ratify the treaty is to encourage Russia to ratify it.'' Again, if they
do, it really does not seem to make that much difference because of
their past history on what they have done.
I would like to clear up something because I think we have gone
through a lot of debate on this issue. It has been clearly implied by
both Republicans who are supporting the ratification of the Chemical
Weapons Convention as well as Democrats who are supporting it that this
was started in the Reagan administration and that Ronald Reagan was in
support of a chemical weapons treaty.
I happened to run across something here that I am going to read.
These are the conditions--I am going to save the best one until last--
the conditions under which Ronald Reagan said he would agree to the
ratification of a chemical weapons convention.
First, the condition was that strategic defense initiative and
theater missile defense systems would be deployed and operational as
one safeguard against cheating.
As we know, currently we do not have those in place.
No. 2, that the Chemical Weapon Convention's international executive
council would consist of 15 members, including the United States as one
of the five permanent members, just like the U.N. Security Council. The
current treaty gives us a 41-member executive council, each with 2-year
terms, and no permanent members; hence, no veto.
Third, that the United States would have absolute veto power over all
CWC decisions. Obviously, in this one there is no veto power.
Obviously, the President would not have supported this.
President Reagan also, even though it is not on my list, verbally
indicated on more than one occasion that one of his conditions would be
that we would not have to incur the financial responsibility, in the
United States, of other countries complying with it. In fact, right now
our compliance costs on this convention appear to be, according to the
Foreign Relations Committee report, $13.6 billion and the cost of
Russia complying with this would exceed that.
It has been stated on this floor many times that Russia has somewhere
between 60 and 70 percent of all the chemical weapons in the world, so,
obviously it would be more than that. What is Russia going to do? Are
they going to comply? Let us say they go ahead and ratify. If they
ratify it, you know, everyone in this Chamber knows, that they are
going to look to the United States to pay for their obligation under
the treaty. That is what they are doing on START II. In fact, I have to
go back and make that statement also, that we are hearing this same
argument all over again right now that we heard 2 years ago. Mr.
President, 2 years ago we stood in this Chamber and they said: If we
don't ratify this, Russia won't ratify it. Here it is 2 years later and
Russia has not ratified it.
So I think this is a very significant requirement, the fact that
Ronald Reagan said--and this is a direct quote, coming out of his
committee at the time--for ratification, ``All Soviet obligations of
previous arms control agreements would have to be corrected.'' And we
have five such agreements that have not been corrected to date.
So, I hope no one stands on the floor the rest of the evening and
talks about how Ronald Reagan would have ratified this Chemical Weapons
Convention.
Exhibit 7
[From the Wall Street Journal, Sept. 9, 1996]
Poisons for Peace
The greatest misperception about the Chemical Weapons
Convention, which comes before the Senate this week for
ratification, is that it can't do any harm and might do some
good. Former Reagan defense official Fred Ekle aptly calls
this mind-set ``poisons for peace.'' Who could possibly be
against making the world safe from the horrors of poison gas?
In fact, this treaty would make the horrors of poison gas an
even greater possibility.
The first problem is that many of the nations we have cause
to worry about most aren't about to sign. What good is a
treaty that doesn't include Iraq or Libya or Syria or North
Korea? Somehow knowing that New Zealand and the Netherlands
have both ratified it doesn't help us sleep more soundly.
Worse, the treaty would give all signatories access to our
latest chemical technology, since Article XI enjoins
signatories from keeping chemicals, information or equipment
from one another. This means not only countries such as China
and Russia, but also Cuba and Iran, which have both signed.
In other words, forget about the trade embargoes and forget
about foreign policy. The treaty would require the U.S. to
facilitate the modernization of the chemical-weapons industry
in a host of countries that just might use them.
The second problem is verification. No one, not even its
most ardent supporters in the Administration, is naive enough
to claim that the treaty is verifiable. Chemical weapons are
easy to make and easy to hide. The sarin that was used in the
attack in the Tokyo subway last year was concocted in an 812
room. Instituting snap inspections of companies that make or
use chemicals isn't going to stop a future Aum Shinri Kyo.
Nor is it going to stop a determined government.
In addition, the inspection and reporting procedures
required under the treaty would be a huge burden on American
business, which of course would become even more nervous
about industrial espionage. Senator Jon Kyl estimates that
up to 10,000 American companies would be affected at a
cost approaching $1 billion a year. Every company that
uses or produces chemicals would fall under the long arm
of the treaty--companies like Pfizer and Quaker Oats and
Strohs Brewery and Maxwell House Coffee and Goodyear Tire.
Dial Corp., which uses 5,000 different chemicals to
produce an array of household products, estimates that it
will have to spend $70,000 a year to meet the treaty's
reporting requirements.
The small number of chemical companies that make the lethal
stuff would of course be covered, too, and much has been made
of the
[[Page S3614]]
treaty's endorsement by the Chemical Manufacturers
Association, which represents just 190 member companies and
had a hand in formulating the treaty's verification
procedures. The industry is already very heavily regulated,
and the treaty's inspection and reporting requirements
wouldn't be much of an additional burden. It also can't hurt
that the treaty would increase its members' trading and sales
opportunities thanks to Article XI.
The list of problems with the treaty goes on and on.
Constitutional scholar Robert Bork raises the possibility
that the verification requirements might violate the
Constitution's ban on search and seizure, and its property
rights guarantees. The Pentagon isn't happy with it since,
under the Clinton Administration's interpretation, it would
prohibit the military from using non-lethal chemical agents.
It's not hard to imagine a scenario in which the Army is
forced to shoot people because it's not permitted to use tear
gas.
Ultimately the treaty's most pernicious effect is that it
would lull responsible nations into a false belief that
they'd ``done something'' about the chemical weapons problem
and that it now was behind them. Yes, the world would be a
better place without chemical weapons. But this treaty's
attempt to wave them away isn't going to make that happen.
____
[From the Washington Times, Sept. 4, 1996]
Impending CWC Debate
(By Frank Gaffney, Jr.)
There is a certain irony to the timing of the looming
Senate debate on the Chemical Weapons Convention. After all,
in a sense this treaty was the direct result of one of Saddam
Hussein's earlier genocidal operations against the Kurds of
Northern Iraq. It came about after the abysmal 1989
conference in Paris where scores of nations could not being
themselves even to cite--let along condemn or sanction--the
Iraqi government for its use of chemical weapons against its
own people, let alone the Iranian military. Such attacks
directly violated the existing ``international norm'' on
chemical warfare: the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of
chemical weapons.
In a bid to deflect criticism for the international
community's failure to enforce one relatively verifiable arms
control treaty, the politicians and diplomats decided to
negotiate a new, utterly unverifiable agreement. After four
years of further negotiations in Geneva, a brand new
``international norm'' against chemical warfare was minted:
the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
Now, readers of this column learned last week that, quite
apart from the problems with this treaty from the standpoint
of its verifiability and enforceability, there are a number
of questions that have been posed about how the CWC has been
affected by Russian bad faith and other changed circumstances
since the United States signed up in 1993. Such questions
were supposed to have been answered before the Senate
considered this accord on or before Sept. 14. As the answers
are inconvenient (for instance, confirmation that Moscow is
welching on a 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement and
demanding that the West pay the estimated $3.3 billion it
will take Russia to dismantle its vast chemical arsenal), it
has employed its favorite tactic with regard to congressional
information requests: Stonewall.
Since that column was written, however, the
administration's machinations on behalf of the Chemical
Weapons Convention have, as Alice said of Wonderland, become
``curiouser and curiouser.'' This is particularly evident in
the Clinton teams's efforts to dissemble about what the CWC
won't do--and what it will.
For example, the administration convened a series of
briefings for Senate staffers over the August recess. In
these lopsided sessions, a gaggle of 15 or more executive
branch officials harangued three of four folks from Capitol
Hill, in some cases for hours on end. Unfortunately, the
briefers repeatedly misled the staffers--notably with respect
to the costs of the CWC to American taxpayers and to
thousands of American companies. Among other things, the
administration is significantly low-balling the U.S. portion
of the expenses associated the new U.N.-style international
bureaucracy created to gather data and conduct inspections.
Clinton officials have also minimized the likely loss of
proprietary data when a company's sensitive facility is
gone over for up to 84 hours by inspectors who will be,
likely as not, detailed from foreign commercial espionage
organizations.
Incredibly, even some of the companies at greatest risk
appear to be susceptible to the administration's
disinformation on this score. Take, for example, an Aug. 7
letter to Sen. Richard Lugar from the Pharmaceutical Research
and Manufacturers of America (PhARMA), a trade association
for some of the nation's most cutting-edge biotech firms.
Clinton officials reportedly induced PhARMA's president to
tell the treaty's top Senate cheerleader that it supported
the CWC with the promise that the administration would not
allow the CWC's verification protocol to be extended to the
existing (and similarly unmonitorable) Biological Weapons
Convention.
PhARMA's members clearly understand an important reality:
If, under the biological weapons treaty, America's
pharmaceutical manufacturers were subjected to a reporting
and inspection regime similar to that of the CWC, they could
lose their shirts. After all, on average these companies
invest 12 years and some $350 million to produce a new
breakthrough drug. Trial inspections suggest that a single
on-site, inspection by a trained intelligence operative could
greatly reduce, if not wipe out, the competitive advantage
acquired at such a high price.
The only problem with PhARMA's stance is, that many of its
member companies will find themselves subjected to precisely
that danger under the terms of CWC. So might a great many
other companies having nothing to do with chemical weapons
and in industries as diverse as automotive, food processing,
electronics, alcohol distilling and brewing, oil refining,
soap and detergents, cosmetics, textiles and paint and tire
manufacturers. Among the companies listed on a recent Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency list of businesses ``likely''
to be affected by the CWC's various requirements are: Eli
Lilly, Sherwin-Williams, Nutrasweet, Jim Beam, Archer Daniels
Midland, Lever Brothers, Kaiser Aluminum, Goodyear Tire and
Rubber, Xerox Raythoen and Conoco. If the trade associations
representing these major American businesses are operating
under illusions similar to PhARMA's their member companies
may wish to join the call for a ``time-out'' on Senate action
on the CWC.
Some senators may be tempted to ignore the administration's
stonewalling of legitimate and troubling questions relevant
to the CWC that have been posed by their own leadership. Some
may consider the administration's understanding of the
treaty's associated costs and its inflating of the claims
benefits to be business as usual for the Clinton team. It is,
however, very much to be hoped that at least 34 members of
the U.S. Senate will refuse to tolerate such behavior and,
insist that consideration of the Chemical Weapons Convention
be postponed until corrective action can be taken and,
failing that, that the convention be defeated outright.
____
[From the San Diego Union-Tribune, Sept. 8, 1996]
``Open up in the Name of the . . . Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons?''
(By Douglas J. Feith)
The Chemical Weapons Convention would be the first arms
control agreement to reach into the lives of non-military
U.S. businesses and impose costs and regulatory burdens.
It would oblige the government to adopt implementing
legislation to compel a wide range of American businesses--
including tire, paint, pharmaceutical, fertilizer and
electronics manufacturers, distillers, food processors and
oil refiners--to keep special records. (The Commerce
Department guidance on record-keeping for affected businesses
runs more than 50 pages.)
Affected businesses would be forced to submit to routine
and possibly ``challenge'' inspections by officials of an
international organization--the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The warrantless inspections,
which may run afoul of U.S. constitutional rights under the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments, could jeopardize important
private proprietary information.
The regulatory cost is just one of a number of flaws. In
the final analysis, what the CWC amounts to is a general
declaration, a statement of disapproval of chemical weapons
that would be made sincerely only by the world's law-abiding
nations. The treaty would accomplish little more than the
typical United Nations General Assembly resolution. Such
rhetorical exercises are not necessarily bad or useless, but
they do not amount to a whole lot.
We would favor paying a substantial price for a ban on
chemical weapon possession if such a ban covered the relevant
countries and it could be made effective through reliable
detection of illegal production and stockpiling. But such
results hardly seem likely. We tend to think of the Chemical
Weapons Convention this way: Even a price you may be willing
to pay for a new car will appear ridiculously high if you
learn that the car cannot be made to drive.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from
Massachusetts.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I strongly support this treaty, and I
strongly urge the Senate to ratify it.
In a sense, this debate is as old as America. Two centuries ago, with
our independence newly won, the Founding Fathers urged us to beware of
``entangling foreign alliances.'' They wrote into the Constitution a
requirement that any treaty with foreign nations must be confirmed by a
two-thirds vote of the Senate.
By any rational standard, this treaty meets that test.
Nevertheless, the treaty is being opposed by an entrenched band of
foreign policy ideologues and isolationists who think the United
Nations is the enemy and who say the arms race should be escalated, not
restricted. History proved their ilk wrong once before, when they sank
the League of Nations in the 1920's. And it will prove them wrong again
with far more drastic consequences than World War II, if they prevail
today.
We cannot let that happen. The Senate should reject the remaining
killer
[[Page S3615]]
amendments, and give this treaty the two-thirds vote it needs and
deserves.
The 29-year-old pursuit of a chemical weapons treaty has finally
reached its moment of truth in the U.S. Senate. Few votes cast in this
Congress or any Congress are likely to be more important.
The effort to achieve this treaty was launched in 1968, and its
history is genuinely bipartisan. It has moved forward under Republican
and Democratic Presidents alike. In 1968, the final year of the Johnson
administration, international negotiations began in Geneva to build on
the 1925 Geneva Protocol and try to reduce the production of chemical
weapons.
In the 1970's, President Gerald Ford had the vision to take that
initiative a major step forward during intense international
negotiations.
President Ronald Reagan advanced it to the next stage with his
efforts on arms control in the 1980's. And President Bush deserves high
praise for embracing the ideal of eliminating chemical weapons, for
making it a serious worldwide effort, and at long last bringing it to
the stage where it was ready to be signed. In one of his last acts in
office, George Bush signed the treaty, on January 13, 1993.
President Clinton formally submitted the Chemical Weapons Convention
to the Senate for its advice and consent later that year. Now, it's our
turn. Today, the Senate can and should join in this historic endeavor
to rid the world of chemical weapons. We can bestow a precious gift on
generations to come by freeing the world of an entire class of weapons
of mass destruction.
The chemical weapons treaty bans the development, production,
stockpiling, and use of toxic chemicals as weapons. Previous agreements
have merely limited weapons of mass destruction. But the Chemical
Weapons Convention sets out to eliminate them from the face of the
earth.
The United States has already taken many steps unilaterally to
implement a ban of our own. As long ago as 1968, this country ordered a
moratorium on chemical weapons production.
When President Bush signed the treaty on behalf of the United States,
he also ordered the unilateral destruction of the U.S. stockpile of
these weapons. Regardless of the treaty, the United States is
destroying its chemical weapon stockpile.
Today culminates many years of work and compromise. The Senate has
held 17 hearings on the convention. Every issue has been exhaustively
analyzed. The result is the shoot-out that the leadership has arranged
today on this series of killer amendments.
Bipartisan negotiations have achieved agreement on 28 amendments to
the treaty, none of which go to the heart of the treaty and many of
which help to clarify it.
But five major issues have not yet been settled. The five amendments,
on which we are voting today, seek to settle differences of opinion the
wrong way. They are killer amendments. I hope the Senate will note
``no'' on all of them. If any of them passes, it will doom our
participation in the treaty, and relegate us to the company of outlaw
regimes like North Korea and Libya, who also reject the treaty.
Two of the killer amendments condition our participation on whether
other nations--Russia, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and China--have already
become participants. Essentially, they would hand over U.S. security
decisions to those nations.
A third killer amendment arbitrarily excludes all representatives
from certain other countries from participating in verification
inspections. This amendment ignores the ability that the treaty already
gives us to reject any inspectors we believe are not trustworthy.
A fourth killer amendment omits and alters other key parts of the
treaty that deal with the export of certain materials. Its proponents
fear that rogue nations may gain valuable technology from us.
Nothing in the convention requires the United States to weaken its
export controls. Experts in the chemical industry, trade organizations,
and government officials have worked to ensure that nothing in the
treaty threatens our technology and industrial power.
The fifth killer amendment places an unrealistically high standard of
verification on the treaty. It requires the treaty verification
procedures to accomplish the impossible, by being able to detect small,
not militarily significant, amounts of dangerous chemical meterials.
No international agreement can effectively police small amounts of
raw materials that might possibly be used in chemical weapons
production. Every effort is being made and will be made to make the
detection procedures as effective as possible. It is hypocritical for
opponents to attempt to scuttle this treaty because they feel it does
not go far enough.
The overwhelming majority of past and present foreign policy
officials, military leaders, large and small businesses, Fortune 500
companies, Nobel laureates, veterans organizations, religious groups,
environmentalists and public interest groups are united in their strong
support of the convention. It is a practical international agreement
with practical benefits for the United States, and the United States
should be a part of it.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, how much time do I have on this amendment?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware has 5 minutes 45
seconds.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, unless there is someone in opposition, I
yield as much time of the remaining time that my colleague from
Pennsylvania would like to the Senator from Pennsylvania, Senator
Specter.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania is recognized.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I would like to reserve 30 seconds of
whatever my time is.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. SPECTER. I thank my colleague from Delaware for yielding the
time.
Mr. President, on the pending issue, having studied the conditions as
to what is sought here by way of preliminary action by Russia before
ratification should occur by the United States, it is my strong view
that we really ought not to play Gaston and Alphonse with the Russians
to require them, as article C does, for Russia to deposit their
ratification before the United States ratifies.
I think that that sets up a condition which is just not reasonable.
If they took the same position, as Alphonse and Gaston, no one would
ever enter the door.
With respect to the other conditions which are set forth here, all of
the substantive matters would be superseded by the Chemical Weapons
Convention, that the requirements set forth in this treaty would impose
more obligations on Russia than are contained in these instruments.
And under instrument A, where it is talked about, an agreement
between the United States and Russia, that was never formalized into an
agreement because all terms were never agreed to by the parties, so
that this is not a condition which adds any measure of safety to the
United States since all of the requirements imposed on Russia in these
collateral arrangements would be superseded and more stringent
requirements would be added by the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Mr. President, I compliment my colleagues on both sides for what I
believe has been a very, very constructive debate in the highest
tradition of the U.S. Senate. I compliment the distinguished chairman
of this committee, Senator Helms, for his determination.
And it is noted that some 28 of the 33 conditions have been agreed
to. Even beyond those conditions, the President today, in writing to
the distinguished majority leader, has articulated further safeguards
which would be present so that in sum total we have an agreement which,
while not perfect, advances the interest of arms control.
In my capacity as the chairman of the Senate Veterans Committee, I
have chaired hearings on the issue of the gulf war syndrome where there
is evidence that our veterans in the gulf were damaged by chemical
substances, not conclusively, but that is the indication, and that had
such a treaty been in effect, again, not conclusive, but a strong
indication, that our troops might have been saved to some extent.
And certainly if we intend to take a firm stand on a moral plane, the
United States has to be a part of this covenant to try to reduce
chemical weapons. And this treaty goes a substantial way.
[[Page S3616]]
And the search and seizure provisions are adequate to protect
constitutional rights, a field I have had substantial experience with
as a district attorney, so that there will have to be a criminal
standard of probable cause.
Taken as a whole, with the additions by the President today--even
though it had been made a part of the Record, I ask unanimous consent
that, following my comments, the President's letter to Senator Lott be
printed in the Record.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. SPECTER. All factors considered, this is a treaty which ought to
receive Senate ratification.
Exhibit 1
The White House,
Washington, April 24, 1997.
Hon. Trent Lott,
Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Leader: During Senate ratification proceedings on
the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), concerns have been
raised over Article X, which provides for certain types of
defensive assistance in the event that a State that has
joined the treaty and renounced any chemical weapons (CW)
capability is threatened with or suffers a chemical weapons
attack, and Article XI, which encourages free trade in non-
prohibited chemicals among states that adhere to the CWC.
Some have suggested that these Articles could result in the
CWC promoting, rather than stemming, CW proliferation despite
States Parties' general obligation under Article I ``never
under any circumstances . . . to assist, encourage or induce,
in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a
State Party under this Convention.''
To respond to these concerns, the Administration has worked
closely with the Senate to develop conditions relating to
both Articles that have now been incorporated in the
resolution of ratification (Agreed Conditions #7 and 15).
These two conditions would substantially reinforce and
strengthen the treaty by:
Prohibiting the United States under Article X from (a)
providing the CWC organization with funds that could be used
for chemical weapons defense assistance to other States
Parties; and (b) giving certain states that might join the
treaty any assistance other than medical antidotes and
treatment.
Requiring the President to (a) certify that the CWC will
not weaken the export controls established by the Australia
Group and that each member of the Group intends to maintain
such controls; (b) block any attempt within the Group to
adopt a contrary position; and (c) report annually as to
whether Australia Group controls remain effective.
With respect to the latter condition, I am pleased to
inform you that we have now received official confirmations
from the highest diplomatic levels in each of the 30
Australia Group nations that they agree that the Group's
export control and nonproliferation measures are compatible
with the CWC and that they are committed to maintain such
controls in the future.
While supporting these guarantees and safeguards, you
expressed the concern on Sunday that nations might still try
to use Article X or XI to take proscribed actions that could
undercut U.S. national security interests, notwithstanding
the best efforts of U.S. diplomacy to prevent such actions. I
am, therefore, prepared to provide the following specific
assurance related to these two Articles:
In the event that a State Party or States Parties to the
Convention act contrary to the obligations under Article I
by:
(A) using Article X to justify providing defensive CW
equipment, material or information to another State Party
that could result in U.S. chemical protective equipment being
compromised so that U.S. warfighting capabilities in a CW
environment are significantly degraded;
(B) using Article XI to justify chemical transfers that
would make it impossible for me to make the annual
certification that the Australia Group remains a viable and
effective mechanism for controlling CW proliferation; or
(C) carrying out transfers or exchanges under either
Article X or XI which jeopardize U.S. national security by
promoting CW proliferation:
I would, consistent with Article XVI of the CWC, regard
such actions as extraordinary events that have jeopardized
the supreme interests of the United States and therefore, in
consultation with the Congress, be prepared to withdraw from
the treaty.
Sincerely,
Bill Clinton.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware has 1 minute
remaining.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, let me just take the minute to say the
following: If you do not like this treaty and you are not for it, vote
against it. If you think this treaty makes sense, vote for my
amendment, because if this treaty contains this provision, it is dead.
This is a so-called killer amendment.
So those of you who have concluded you are not going to vote in the
final analysis for this treaty, vote no. Those of you who have decided
you want to vote for this treaty--to cut through it all--vote yes. I
mean, it really is that basic, because if my motion fails to strike,
this treaty is dead.
I yield back the remainder of my time, if my colleague from North
Carolina is prepared to yield back his time. I am prepared to vote.
Mr. HELMS. The yeas and nays have been ordered?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The yeas and nays have been ordered. All time
has expired.
The question occurs on agreeing to amendment No. 48 offered by the
Senator from Delaware. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk
will call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber
desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 66, nays 34, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 47 Ex.]
YEAS--66
Akaka
Baucus
Biden
Bingaman
Boxer
Breaux
Bryan
Bumpers
Byrd
Chafee
Cleland
Coats
Cochran
Collins
Conrad
D'Amato
Daschle
DeWine
Dodd
Domenici
Dorgan
Durbin
Feingold
Feinstein
Ford
Frist
Glenn
Gorton
Graham
Gregg
Hagel
Harkin
Hatch
Hollings
Inouye
Jeffords
Johnson
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Kohl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lugar
McCain
Mikulski
Moseley-Braun
Moynihan
Murray
Reed
Reid
Robb
Roberts
Rockefeller
Roth
Sarbanes
Smith Gordon H
Snowe
Specter
Stevens
Torricelli
Wellstone
Wyden
NAYS--34
Abraham
Allard
Ashcroft
Bennett
Bond
Brownback
Burns
Campbell
Coverdell
Craig
Enzi
Faircloth
Gramm
Grams
Grassley
Helms
Hutchinson
Hutchison
Inhofe
Kempthorne
Kyl
Lott
Mack
McConnell
Murkowski
Nickles
Santorum
Sessions
Shelby
Smith Bob
Thomas
Thompson
Thurmond
Warner
The amendment (No. 48) was agreed to.
Mr. LEAHY. I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. BIDEN. I move to lay it on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, how much time is reserved for the Senator
from Vermont?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 14 minutes remaining on the
resolution.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, for the benefit of my colleagues, I will be
very brief. Mr. President, I appreciate efforts of the Senator from
Utah to get order, and that is no more than I could expect for somebody
that bears certain similarities to the Senator from Vermont.
Earlier, the distinguished Senator from Delaware read a long list of
staff and Senators and others who deserve praise for getting us as far
as we are. The name of the distinguished Senator from Delaware is
notably absent, and I think that those who support the CWC owe a debt
of gratitude to the Senator from Delaware. In the customary practice,
he left his own name off, but if I might add his name to the record and
put it in.
Mr. President, I am, as you know, a supporter of the CWC. Again, I
compliment what we have done. As in the test ban treaty, when countries
were not coming forward, the United States unilaterally banned their
own tests and then other countries joined us--not every country that
has nuclear capability, but other countries did join us--and we brought
the pressure forward for a test ban treaty.
The United States took an initiative with chemical weapons. We banned
our own use, unilaterally. When we did that, other countries joined us.
Not all countries, but other countries, most countries, joined us.
Now if we vote to advise and consent on this treaty we will have
pressure, the pressure of the most powerful Nation on Earth, joined by
all these other countries, pressure on the few rogue countries who have
not done that. I say that, Mr. President, because there is one other
weapon, a weapon that kills
[[Page S3617]]
and maims far more people than chemical weapons. That is the weapon of
antipersonnel landmines. There are 100 million landmines in over 65
countries today. As one person told me, in their country, they clear
these landmines an arm and a leg at a time. Every 22 minutes an
innocent civilian--almost always a civilian--is killed or injured by an
antipersonnel landmine. The United States should now do the same thing
they did.
The United States should do the same thing we did with chemical
weapons. We should move unilaterally, ban our own use, ban our own
export, ban our own production of antipersonnel landmines, expand on
the Leahy legislation already passed by the House and Senate. Do that
and then join with like-minded nations. There are tens of like-minded
nations that have already done that.
Join with them, agree, together, that this is what we will do. It
will not be every nation. It will not be some of the nations most
needing to do this like Russia and China, but we will have the same
moral suasion that we have with the chemical weapons convention. We can
do it with chemical weapons and should. Now let us follow exactly the
same step, join with the Canadians and others and do it with
antipersonnel landmines. This country is capable of it. It would be a
moral step. It would be a dramatic step that would help the innocent
civilians who die from that.
I withhold the balance of my time and yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, we all know full well that this
administration has already testified that the CWC is ``effectively
verifiable.'' The Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
John Holum, testified on March 22, 1994, that ``the treaty is
effectively verifiable'' and that the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy, Walter Slocombe, made similar claims on May 13, 1994.
However, just because administration officials have declared the CWC to
be ``effectively verifiable'' does not make it so.
Indeed, by making such claims the Clinton administration has done
great violence to the standard of ``effective verification'' developed
and refined by the Reagan and Bush administrations as a key criteria
for arms control treaties. The definition of ``effective verification''
was first offered to the Foreign Relations Committee by Ambassador Paul
Nitze during hearings on the INF Treaty in 1988 and subsequently
further refined on January 24, 1989, by ACDA's Director, Maj. Gen.
William Burns, and again in January 1992 by Secretary of State James
Baker. The components of effective verification, as defined during
testimony, are: (1) a ``high level of assurance'' in the intelligence
community's ability to detect (2) a ``militarily significant''
violation in (3) a ``timely fashion.'' That definition is the one used
in this condition.
This yardstick of ``effective verification'' has been the standard
against which every arms control treaty for the last decade has been
measured. It should be the standard against which the CWC is measured
as well.
For any arms control treaty to be effective it must be verifiable.
When Vice President George Bush put forward the first U.S.-sponsored
text for the CWC, he told negotiators in Geneva on April 18, 1984,
that:
For a chemical weapons ban to work, each party must have
confidence that the other parties are abiding by it. . . . No
sensible government enters into those international contracts
known as treaties unless it can ascertain--or verify--that it
is getting what it contracted for.
I could not agree more.
In my view, this standard cannot be met by the CWC. On March 1, 1989,
then-Director of Central Intelligence [DCI] William Webster stated that
monitoring the CWC ``is going to be costly and difficult, and,
presently, the level of confidence is quite low.'' On January 24, 1989,
Director Burns noted that ``verification of any chemical ban is going
to be extremely difficult.'' ACDA's section 37 report on the CWC,
submitted on March 18, 1994, states that the CWC's verification
provisions, together with National Technical Means [NTM], ``are
insufficient to detect, with a high degree of confidence, all
activities prohibited under the Convention.'' Then-DCI Woolsey
testified on June 23, 1994 that ``I cannot state that we have high
confidence in our ability to detect noncompliance, especially on a
small scale.''
Most significantly, declassified portions from the August 1993 NIE
note:
The capability of the intelligence community to monitor
compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention is severely
limited and likely to remain so for the rest of the decade.
They key provision of the monitoring regime--challenge
inspections at undeclared sites--can be thwarted by a nation
determined to preserve a small, secret program using the
delays and managed access rules allowed by the Convention.
With respect to military significance, General Shalikashvilli
testified on August 11, 1994 that:
In certain limited circumstances, even one ton of chemical
agent may have a military impact . . . With such variables in
scale of target and impact of chemical weapons, the United
States should be resolute that the 1 ton limit set by the
Convention will be our guide.
The bottom line is that a stockpile of 1 ton of chemical agent can
prove of military significance. Unclassified portions of the NIE on
U.S. monitoring capabilities indicate that it is unlikely that the
United States will be able to detect or address violations in a timely
fashion, if at all, when they occur on a small scale. And yet, even
small-scale diversions of chemicals to chemical weapons production are
capable, over time, of yielding a stockpile far in excess of a single
ton. Moreover, few countries, if any, are engaging in much more than
small-scale production of chemical agent. For example, according to
today's Washington Times, Russia may produce its new nerve agents at a
pilot plant in quantities of only 55 to 110 tons annually.
In other words, the intelligence community has low confidence in its
ability to detect in a timely fashion the covert production of chemical
weapons which could produce militarily significant quantities. We
should not cheapen the norm of effective verifiability by claiming that
the CWC meets this standard--for it patently does not.
In conclusion, verification of the CWC is plagued by the fact that
too many chemicals are dual-use in nature. Chemicals used to make pen
ink can be used to make deadly agent. It is impossible to monitor every
soap, detergent, cosmetic, electronics, varnish, paint, pharmaceutical,
and chemical plant around the world to ensure that they are not
producing chemical weapons, or that toxic chemicals are not being
diverted to the production of weapons elsewhere. Countries such as
Russia are well aware that if they ratify the CWC, they can cheat with
impunity. Indeed, on May 6, 1996 the Defense Intelligence Agency
informed the chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
that Russia intends to maintain the capability to produce chemical
weapons, regardless of whether or not it ratifies the CWC.
The Senate, therefore, should not agree to this treaty until U.S.
intelligence capabilities have caught up with President Clinton's
Wilsonian idealism.
Finally, I will say a word or two about the counter-arguments we have
heard on this condition. Patently ignoring the conclusions of the Joint
Chiefs, the administration has claimed that the right standard for
detecting violations is not 1 metric ton, but a ``large-scale,
systematic effort by a potential adversary to equip its armed forces
with a militarily significant chemical warfare capability * * *'' It is
absurd to say that if the intelligence community has high confidence in
its ability to detect ``any large-scale, systematic effort by a
potential adversary to equip its armed forces with a military
significant chemical warfare capability * * *'' the CWC is effectively
verifiable.
I have no doubt that it would be difficult to conceal the existence
of a program the scope and size of the former Soviet Union's for
example. But not one of the countries that currently envisions a need
for chemical weapons intends to wage World War III and conquer Western
Europe. Not one.
Again, let me reiterate just how ridiculous this argument is.
Nobody--not Russia, China, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, India, Pakistan,
Egypt, or North Korea--is engaged in a large scale effort.
Indeed, such a certification is inherently contradictory since a
country desirous of developing a militarily significant stockpile of
chemical agent
[[Page S3618]]
need not engage in a large-scale, systematic effort. The Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvilli, testified
before the Armed Services Committee on August 11, 1994, that:
Even one ton of chemical agent may have a military impact .
. . With such variables in scale of target and impact of
chemical weapons, the United States should be resolute that
the 1 ton limit set by the Convention will be our guide.
In other words, the production of 1 militarily significant ton of
agent does not require a large-scale program. To knock-out every key
logistical node in Saudi Arabia, Saddam Hussein needs only a handful of
SCUD's with chemical warheads. He does not need an elite force of
infantry trained in chemical-environment combat.
Accordingly, the intelligence community's confidence in its ability
to detect the annual production of 1 metric ton in a timely fashion is
the benchmark question by which the Senate should assess the
verifiability of the CWC. I urge the Senate to reject this motion to
strike and to uphold President Reagan's standard of effective
verifiability.
Mr. President, I ask that Senator Shelby of Alabama be recognized
next for 10 minutes. Does the Senator have somebody?
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, if I could ask a parliamentary inquiry. A
lot of our colleagues are looking to determine when the final vote will
take place. It is my understanding that the Senator from Delaware has
the option to move to strike three more conditions--one relating to
intelligence verification, one relating to inspectors, and one relating
to articles X and XI. On each of those motions of the Senator from
Delaware, there is an hour reserved, equally divided, is that correct?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
Mr. BIDEN. The attempt is being made, as we speak, to reduce the time
on those amendments. I respectfully suggest that on the next amendment
that I am going to move--my intention was to move to strike the
intelligence provision--or verification, I should say, No. 33, and that
instead of an hour equally divided on that amendment, I respectfully
suggest we have 20 minutes equally divided on that amendment. Is that
all right with the Senator?
Mr. HELMS. That will be fine, from this point. I will consume a few
minutes.
Mr. BIDEN. In other words, the Senator has already spoken on the
intelligence issue. The time he has spoken on it would be taken out of
the 10 minutes that we are about to agree to on the amendment I have
not yet sent to the desk. The Senator was under the impression I
already sent the amendment to strike.
Amendment No. 49
(Purpose: To strike condition No. 33, relating to effective
verification)
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for
its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Delaware [Mr. Biden] proposes an amendment
numbered 49.
Beginning on page 65, strike line 25 and all that follows
through line 3 of page 67.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the time
consumed by the Senator from North Carolina in his previous speech be
deducted from the 10 minutes of time allotted to his side, and that 10
minutes remain on the side of the Senator from Delaware on this
amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mr. HELMS. Reserving the right to object.
Mr. BIDEN. I ask unanimous consent that there be a total of 20
minutes on this amendment equally divided.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Who yields time?
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, on this amendment, of my 10 minutes, I will
yield 7 minutes to the Senator from Rhode Island. But prior to doing
that, let me say briefly what this amendment does.
This amendment strikes a condition in the treaty that sets a
verification standard that, if it were in the treaty, would not be able
to be met; therefore, it would kill the treaty. I will not speak more
at this time.
I yield to the Senator from Rhode Island.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island is recognized.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, just a moment. I must leave the Chamber for
a few minutes. After the Senator from Rhode Island has concluded, I ask
unanimous consent that the Senator from Alabama be recognized to
consume our 10 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Rhode Island.
Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I strongly support the Chemical Weapons
Convention, a treaty which serves our national security interests in a
number of ways. U.S. ratification would help set an international
standard that would put political pressure on outlaw nations to rid
themselves of chemical arsenals. This treaty will also give our
intelligence community valuable new tools to combat illicit production
of deadly chemicals, even among nations that do not ratify the
convention.
Mr. President, ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention by the
Senate this evening would continue our Nation's proud tradition of
leadership in the field of international security. We took the lead in
the formation of NATO, on the containment of communism, and on the
defeat of Iraqi aggression in the Persian Gulf. This evening, we can
again assert our irreplaceable leadership by participating in an effort
to ban chemical weapons around the world.
Mr. President, condition No. 33, which we are now debating, must be
stricken in order for the United States to participate in the CWC.
Condition No. 33 requires that the President--these are the conditions
of condition No. 33--the President of the United States must certify
with ``a high degree of confidence'' that our intelligence community
can detect ``militarily significant'' violations of the convention.
Now, Mr. President, what does ``militarily significant'' mean? It is
defined as 1 metric ton or more of these chemical weapons.
Mr. President, this condition is simply impossible to achieve. This
condition would bar the U.S. participation in the CWC forever. We must
understand that the convention seeks to ban chemical weapons. These
weapons, by their very inherent composition, are extremely difficult to
detect in relatively small quantities, such as a ton. This truth has
been known from the beginning, and no one, Mr. President, has alleged
that the CWC will eliminate chemical weapons from the face of the
Earth.
If an individual wants to build a chemical weapon somewhere in a
small shack or a cave in some remote area of the world, he or she will
always be able to do so, regardless of the outcome of this vote. No
treaty, no matter how it is written, will ever be able to stop such an
occurrence. Our inability to verify fully the CWC is not a result of
any flaws in the convention. It is due to the innate difficulty in
monitoring chemical weapons and their components.
Mr. President, I also question the definition of ``militarily
significant quantity,'' as being 1 metric ton or more of chemical
weapons agent. Although 1 metric ton can certainly do a lot of damage,
particularly in a terrorist attack, I will defer to military experts to
consider what is military significant. In testimony to the Senate, Gen.
John Shalikashvili stated that tonnage is not the only factor to
consider in assessing the military capacity of these weapons. To
transform an illicit chemical stockpile into something militarily
useful, an adversary must have vast supplies of these weapons, and he
must have an infrastructure for handling them and must have troops
trained in the use of these weapons.
It is these more complex activities--the training of the troops, for
example--that the Chemical Weapons Convention, together with our
intelligence resources, will be able to verify. As Gen. Brent Scowcroft
has testified to the Foreign Relations Committee, under the CWC, it
will no longer be possible for a country to buy a few pounds of these
chemicals from
[[Page S3619]]
various sources around the world to amass an abnormal supply of
chemicals. Our intelligence community has, in fact, indicated on a
number of occasions that this convention will provide another tool to
the U.S. inventory of ways to stem worldwide expansion of chemical
weapons capabilities. In brief, the Chemical Weapons Convention will
supplement--it will not replace, but it will add to--ongoing efforts to
monitor chemical weapons production worldwide.
Now, critics of this treaty claim it is unverifiable, that we will
not be able to catch adversaries abroad who cheat. But they also allege
that the CWC's verification regime, while too weak to catch those
cheaters abroad, is too intrusive for American industry. In other
words, it won't let us find anything abroad, but it is too intrusive
for other nations as far as inspection in the United States. They can't
have it both ways.
The fact is that the Chemical Weapons Convention's verification
tools--in other words, how to determine whether there are weapons in
other countries--go beyond those of other arms control treaties that we
have approved in the Senate in the past. No treaty will ever be able to
verify totally a ban on chemical weapons. Condition No. 33 is
impossible to meet. The condition that is in this, which we are seeking
to strike, is an impossible condition to meet. It serves no purpose
other than to prevent U.S. participation in the Chemical Weapons
Convention treaty. So I urge my colleagues to support the motion to
strike this amendment.
I thank the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama is recognized.
Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I rise to address the issue of
verification, and in opposition to the motion to strike condition No.
33 contained in the resolution of ratification, relating to effective
verification.
I have a number of serious concerns with respect to the Chemical
Weapons Convention.
As chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, however, I have a
particular responsibility to ensure that any treaty ratified by this
body can be effectively verified by the intelligence community.
If it cannot be verified, the CWC could become the means by which CWC
member states, such as China and Iran, expand and enhance--rather than
renounce--their CW capabilities.
In negotiating the INF Treaty, ratified in 1988, President Reagan set
forth an eminently reasonable standard to guide the negotiation and
implementation of arms control agreements. ``Trust,'' he said, ``but
verify.''
But I am afraid that the critical, second part of President Reagan's
formula seems to have been forgotten with respect to this treaty. The
CWC, and especially the verification regime, is based on the triumph of
hope and trust over experience and history.
In its efforts to obtain ratification, the administration has--if I
may borrow a phrase from a former vice-chairman of the committee,
Senator Moynihan--``defined verification down.''
Condition No. 33 to the resolution of ratification seeks to correct
that problem.
It conditions deposit of the U.S. instrument of ratification on a
Presidential certification to Congress that the treaty is effectively
verifiable.
This term, as used in the resolution, contains the following
elements, based on the traditional definition of ``effective
verification'':
A ``high degree of confidence'' in our ability to detect,
``Militarily significant violations''--meaning one metric ton or more
of chemical agent--
``In a timely fashion,''--meaning detection within 1 year--and
Detection of ``patterns of marginal violation over time.''
Effective verification is ultimately a political judgment that must
be made by the President and his national security advisors. However, a
key input to this decision is the judgement of the intelligence
community.
It is currently impossible to reconcile the above definition of
``effective verification'' with the intelligence community's own
statements over the past 4 years, which is why condition 33 calls for a
new Presidential certification.,
I would like to briefly restate the intelligence community's key
conclusions as to the verifiability of the CWC, as set forth in
recently declassified material from the National Intelligence Estimate
of August 1993:
The capability of the Intelligence Community to monitor
compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is
severely limited and is likely to remain so for the rest of
the decade.
Our intelligence community is the most capable in the world today. It
enjoys extensive resources, and employs an impressive variety of assets
to collect information affecting our national security.
Yet with all of the sophisticated assets at our disposal, we cannot
be confident of verifying this treaty.
And some of the most promising new intelligence methods which might
have improved this score over the last 4 years, have been significantly
underfunded by this administration.
We should look to the certification required by condition 33 as an
opportunity for the President to tell us of his plans to invest in
improvements to our technical collection capabilities to enable
effective verification.
Therefore I strongly support condition 33 of the resolution of
ratification, and oppose the motion to strike.
While most will acknowledge that we do not have the technical
intelligence capabilities currently in place to provide effective
verification, the proponents of the treaty place great stock in the
contribution of the verification mechanisms contained in the treaty.
For example, the creation of the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons [OPCW], and the ability of OPCW inspectors to carry
out challenge inspections of suspected violations, are cited as
evidence for a mechanism of effective verification.
Yet in an unclassified excerpt from the 1993 NIE on verification, the
intelligence community states that:
The key provision of the monitoring regime--challenge
inspections at undeclared sites--can be thwarted by a nation
determined to preserve a small, secret program by using the
delays and managed access rules allowed by the convention.
Those, Mr. President, are not my words. Those are the words of the
intelligence community describing its ability to monitor compliance
with the treaty before us.
I should point out to my colleagues, in light of the fact that the
National Intelligence Estimate from which I have quoted is dated August
1993, that the Acting Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet,
and other intelligence officials have confirmed on numerous occasions
that the key judgments cited above are unchanged.
In an open hearing on February 5 of this year, I asked George Tenet,
the acting Director of Central Intelligence, about the verifiability of
the CWC. Our discussion went, in part, as follows:
Acting Director Tenet said: ``We can never guarantee that a power
that signs up to this agreement won't cheat. These . . . chemical and
biological developments are small, they are easily hidden. They are not
like big nuclear developments that have big signatures that everybody
understands.''
I replied: ``In other words, it will be fairly easy to cheat some,
wouldn't it?''
Acting Director Tenet responded: ``It will be easy to cheat, Mr.
Chairman.''
Mr. President, the treaty before us today is deficient in many
respects: both in what it does, and in what it fails to do.
As chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, I must therefore
conclude that the greatest flaw with the CWC is that, absent a
certification of effective verification, we cannot even know if it is
doing what it is supposed to be doing, and we cannot know the extent to
which it is failing to do what it should do: This treaty is
unverifiable.
Therefore, I support condition No. 33, and oppose the motion to
strike.
If I have any time left, I yield it to the distinguished Senator from
Colorado.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.
Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I thank the chairman for yielding to me.
Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the motion to strike condition
33, relating to effective verification.
As a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, I believe
I have a responsibility to ensure that this treaty can be effectively
verified by the intelligence community.
[[Page S3620]]
If the CWC cannot be verified to ensure that it will, in fact,
eliminate the scourge of chemical weapons, then what is the point of
ratifying it?
In fact, the CWC may well make things worse, not better, Some
signatory countries like China and Iran will use the technology-sharing
provisions of titles X and XI, combined with the cloak of international
respectability they gain by joining the CWC, to advance their CW
programs and exports.
Condition 33 of the resolution of ratification seeks to address the
verifiability problem, by requiring the President to certify to the
Congress that the CWC is effectively verifiable before submitting the
U.S. instrument of ratification.
Mr. President, we have all heard what the intelligence community said
about the verifiability of the CWC in its National Intelligence
Estimate of August 1993, but I think this judgment is worth repeating:
The capability of the Intelligence Community to monitor
compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is
severely limited and likely to remain so for the rest of this
decade.
If that judgment has changed, the President should be able to provide
the necessary certification. But as we well know, and as the Acting
Director of the CIA George Tenet has confirmed on several occasions,
that judgment has not changed. With all the assets at our disposal, the
intelligence community still cannot verify compliance with this treaty.
The Senate has already discussed the classified aspects of our
intelligence and verification capabilities in considerable detail in
closed session, and I cannot add anything to that debate now.
What I would like to do, is provide an example of the way in which a
determined proliferator can evade, and deflect, what is perhaps the
most extensive scrutiny ever imposed on an unoccupied nation in
peacetime. I am referring, of course, to Iraq.
Iraq is exhibit A for a number of propositions. First, Iraq is the
very model of a rogue state. It is a country that has not only
developed chemical and biological weapons [CBW], and come within a
hair's breadth of producing a nuclear device, but has actually used
chemical weapons against Iran, and against its own citizens.
Second, as a nonsignatory to the CWC, Iraq is an example of those
countries that will not be constrained by the CWC, and will proceed
apace with the production of chemical weapons.
Third, and this is the point I wish to focus on, Iraq is the most
current example of the effectiveness--or the lack thereof--of even the
most intrusive international monitoring.
Treaty supporters point to the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons [OPCW]--and especially the ability of OPCW inspectors
to carry out challenger inspections of suspected violations--as a means
of effective verification.
Yet the intelligence community concludes, in an unclassified excerpt
from the 1993 NIE, that:
The key provision of the monitoring regime--challenge
inspections at undeclared sites--can be thwarted by a nation
determined to preserve a small, secret program by using the
delays and managed access rules allowed by the convention.
Acting CIA Director Tenet reiterated that judgment in a letter to
Senator Kyl, dated March 26, 1997.
In the 6 years since the end of the Persian Gulf war, weapons
inspectors from the U.N. Special Commission [UNSCOM] have combed Iraq
in search of nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile production and
storage sites--inspectors armed with powers far greater than those of
OPCW inspectors, I might add.
Despite this extraordinary level of scrutiny, Iraq is believed to
retain: chemical weapon precursors and production equipment, and
possibly large quantities of deadly VX agent and munitions; BW
cultures, production equipment, agent and weapons. These stocks can be
used to create a large stockpile in a matter of days; and an
operational SCUD missile capability, including support vehicles,
launchers, fuel, operational missiles, and, most alarming of all,
possible chemical or biological warheads.
Last, Iraq retains nuclear weapons blueprints, machine-tools, and
know-how; is believed to be continuing its nuclear weapons design work;
and probably has the ability to create a nuclear weapon--if it obtains
fissile materials--with very little warning.
Mr. President, I am not reciting this information in order to
criticize UNSCOM. I commend Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, and the dedicated
UNSCOM inspectors, for their persistence in the face of determined
Iraqi resistance and intimidation.
But if these are the results of 6 years of international monitoring
of Iraq--a pariah country, defeated in war, and subjected to massive
invasions of its national sovereignty--then I wonder what the OPCW
inspectors, with their far more limited powers, can realistically hope
to accomplish in other countries?
As a final note, I should remind my colleagues that before the gulf
war, Iraq was a member in good standing of the International Atomic
Energy Commission, or IAEA, subject to all the usual IAEA inspections
and safeguards.
Yet Saddam Hussein was within months of having a nuclear weapons
capability on August 2, 1990, when he invaded Kuwait. Had Saddam waited
until he had a nuclear device, Kuwait might yet be the 19th province of
Iraq--and tens of thousands of people, including thousands of American
soldiers, might have died.
Mr. President, I believe that our experience with Iraq demonstrates
the intractable problems posed by the verification of the CWC.
Supporters of the treaty say, ``But we have learned from our experience
with Iraq, and we will do better next time.'' I cannot join them in
that optimistic conclusion.
If the President of the United States cannot certify that this treaty
can be effectively verified, as defined in condition 33, then the
Senate should not ratify this treaty.
I oppose the motion to strike condition 33.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield the remainder of the time to the
Senator from Nebraska.
Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I rise today in support of striking
condition 33 from the resolution of ratification of the Chemical
Weapons Convention. Condition 33 would bar the United States from
ratifying the convention until the President can certify with high
confidence that we have the capability to detect, within 1 year of a
violation, the illicit production or storage of a single metric ton of
chemical agent. As the authors of this condition fully realize, this
standard is unattainable and would effectively bar the United States
from participation in the CWC forever.
Mr. President, I do not come to the floor as the vice chairman of the
Intelligence Committee to say to my colleagues that this treaty is
absolutely verifiable. The distinguished chairman of the committee
indicated that Mr. Tenet, Acting Director of Central Intelligence, said
it will be difficult to verify and quoted him as saying it would be
easy to cheat. What he did not do, regrettably, is go on with the
follow-on quote. The next sentence in his answer was, ``But, in the
absence of the tools the convention gives us, it will be much harder
for us to apprise you''--meaning the committee--``and apprise the
military and policymakers of where we think we are in the world with
regard to these developments.''
Let me be clear. The United States has made a decision that we are
going to destroy our chemical weapons and try to lead the world in the
elimination of chemical weapons. That is what this policy is all about.
We didn't have this treaty presented to us. We made a conscious
decision to eliminate our own chemical weapons and then try to develop
a regimen that enables us to identify and detect as much as possible.
Our Director of Central Intelligence, as well as our military, has
indicated to us that this treaty will increase the identification that
we are able to do and increase the likelihood that we will be able to
end up with the result being that we have no chemical weapons in any
military arsenal on this planet.
No treaty is absolutely verifiable. Condition 33 make verification
more difficult by setting a level of identification, we do not need to
benefit from the convention. Far more important to our security are the
improvements to our identification efforts we stand to gain under the
CWC.
Verification is a political decision made by policymakers. To make
this
[[Page S3621]]
decision, our intelligence agencies will need to provide evidence to
support a conclusion made by policymakers. The benefits we will receive
under the CWC come from our increased ability to identify whether a
nation is developing, producing, and storing chemical weapons. Under
the CWC's routine and challenge inspections, we will be better able to
identify the storage and destruction of declared chemical weapon
stocks. We will also be better able to identify a nation's attempt to
develop the infrastructure to handle chemical weapons and any military
training in the use of these weapons.
U.S. intelligence officials have stated that the CWC will add to
their monitoring tools to counter the chemical weapons threat. Data
declarations will provide evidence of compliance or non-compliance,
routine inspections make it more difficult and costly to use legitimate
facilities to produce chemical weapons, and challenge inspections will
give the United States the opportunity to seek further indications and
evidence under the CWC.
In addition, the CWC will help stymie chemical weapons development by
non-signatory, rogue nations by restricting trade in key precursor
chemicals to non-parties. Acquisition efforts for chemicals,
technology, and equipment by non-signatories will provide tip-offs to
pursue compliance concerns with parties who may be the source of the
materials.
These are real benefits to our identification efforts that will help
ensure the safety of our troops and citizens. However, if we impose an
impossible standard of verification and fail to ratify the CWC, we will
lose these benefits.
Further, condition 33 creates an arbitrary definition of what is a
``militarily significant'' amount of chemical weapons. This condition
deems one metric ton of chemical weapons to be a threat to our
military. But General Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, has testified that ``a militarily significant quantity of
chemical weapons is situationally dependent.'' It depends on the
terrain, the weather, the number of troops, the type of chemicals used,
how the chemicals are delivered, and the chemical weapons defensive
system of the targeted forces. He stated that, ``The quantity is
totally scenario dependent, and it would be difficult to cite a
specific amount as militarily significant.''
During the Iran-Iraq war, both sides used tens of tons against each
other without altering the course of the war. The Defense Department
found that it would take several hundred to a thousand tons to
seriously disrupt U.S. logistics in a war; and the United States's own
stockpile of chemical weapons, which we are committed to destroy with
or without the CWC, is about 30 thousand tons. One metric ton of
chemical weapons, while still posing a horrible threat under some
conditions, in no way is a militarily significant threat to our
national security.
Without the CWC, chemical weapons production and stockpile on a small
or grant scale will still be an acceptable practice. Under the CWC, not
only will this no longer be acceptable, but we will have additional
tools in our arsenal to identify chemical weapons programs. Since we
will have to monitor this threat whether or not we join the CWC, our
security interests are improved under the treaty rather than without
it.
This condition must be removed from the resolution if the United
States is to participate in the Chemical Weapons Convention. Therefore,
Mr. President, I support striking condition 33 from Executive
Resolution 75.
Mr. President, and colleagues, I believe strongly that this
particular condition, regardless of how you feel about the treaty, sets
an unrealistic level of requirement for verification, and under no
circumstances are we going to be able to verify a ton of chemical
weapons under the evaluations of the military. We do not need to accept
this kind of arbitrary standard.
Mr. President, regardless of whether or not you are going to vote for
or against this treaty in the end, I urge my colleagues to vote to
strike condition 33.
Mr. BIDEN. I yield myself 1 minute on the time left.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Sessions). The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, let's get this straight. Verification is
about whether or not we can know whether or not our security interests
are going to be put in jeopardy. A useful chemical weapons capacity
requires a lot more than just whether or not you can produce illicit
chemical weapons. It requires a delivery system, infrastructure,
storage, and use of chemical weapons. It includes defense preparations,
extra security around the storage areas, and training and exercising of
troops who will use those weapons. It goes on and on.
The ability to put together a chemical weapons capability to go
undetected that will diminish our security is not real.
I yield back the time and ask unanimous consent that we defer a vote
on this amendment at this moment, that we turn to my next motion to
strike, which will relate to inspectors, condition 31, that there be 10
minutes equally divided on condition 31, that vote on condition 33 and
on condition 31 be stacked after the conclusion of the debate on
condition 31, with 15 minutes on the first vote, 10 minutes on the
second vote, and with 1 minute intervening.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Without objection, it is so ordered.
Amendment No. 50
(Purpose: To strike condition no. 31, relating to the exercise of right
to bar certain inspectors)
Mr. BIDEN. I send an amendment to the desk.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The bill clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Delaware [Mr. Biden] proposes an amendment
numbered 50.
Beginning on page 63, strike line 21 and all that follows
through line 4 of page 65.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, let me also say for the benefit of my
colleagues that we are trying to accommodate schedules. I thank the
Senators from Arizona and Georgia, who were running around trying to
get their agreement. At the completion of the two rollcall votes--we
are trying to get additional time on one amendment relating to articles
X and XI, and we have an hour set aside for it now and we hope to
reduce that time. At the conclusion of that vote we would then go to
final passage, although there probably may be a few minutes intervening
because each has some time left. That is the objective. Some are trying
to catch planes and trains and the like.
Mr. President, let me suggest quickly what this does. The amendment
that I sent to the desk strikes a condition which unilaterally says at
the front end we will not allow any inspector from such states as
China, Iran, and Iraq, et cetera, if they are signatories to the
treaty. If they have deposited their instruments of ratification, now
they are in the deal. We are saying, if they are in, we will not allow
any inspector from their countries to be any part of a team that would
inspect U.S. facilities.
The intention is obvious, and it is laudable. The intention is to
keep the bad-guy inspectors out because we are worried that what they
would do is send over an intelligence officer as part of that
inspection team, learn all secrets from us and take them back home. It
is not likely that can happen anyway. But let's assume it did.
The intelligence community says this is a very bad idea. The reason
it is a bad idea if we do that, Mr. President, is every other country
will issue a blanket rejection of any U.S. inspectors. We are the class
of the field. You have heard all day--and in the closed session--my
colleagues expressing their concern about verification. The more we
have American inspectors involved, the more likely we are to be able to
detect wrongdoing because we are the class of the field. We don't want
to be excluded across the board from being on any inspection team. So,
therefore, this is intended to do something good but is extremely
counterproductive. It is counterproductive, and the intelligence
community says so as well.
But beyond that, it is unnecessary. There is a provision. In the
interest of time--we were going to have an hour of debate; I was going
to put all of this out to you--but in this treaty there is a provision
now that says the United States, or any other country, can at any time
strike an inspector. The way this works, as most of our colleagues
[[Page S3622]]
know, is when there is going to be a challenge inspection, or a routine
inspection, there is a list of inspectors. They give the names. As few
as 3 and as many as 15 inspectors are going to show up on the doorsteps
of X, Y, Z company, and they list their names and their country. Guess
what? Our intelligence community from the time those names are given--
it is like a jury pool. The Presiding Officer was a Federal prosecutor.
It is like a grand jury. Every country submits inspectors that they
want participating. Their committee picks inspectors from each of the
countries. They sit in one town and one city. When an inspection comes
up, they say ``You, you, you, and you, go and inspect.'' They have to
submit those names. Our intelligence community, when that pool is
picked, will do a background check on every one of those guys and
women. They know their names. So they can, in fact, go out there and
say--we can say, or the intelligence community can say--``Look, he is
on that inspection group. Strike him. We don't want him.'' You can do
that. The only time we can't strike is when--I have a smart staff here.
In the late hours they think they are humorous.
You are fired.
[Laughter.]
I am only kidding. That is a joke; a little levity at this time.
As my distinguished friend on the Intelligence Committee, formerly of
my staff, wrote, ``They can't strike when they are on the plane.'' You
have to give 24 hours notice you don't want So and So in there.
So the point is you can already strike anybody. We do this in a
blanket way. We knock the class of the field out of the inspection
process. We don't want to do that. With all due respect, this is not a
thoughtful amendment. This is counterproductive.
I ask for the yeas and nays on this amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, have the yeas and nays been ordered on the
previous amendment? If not, I would ask for the yeas and nays on the
previous amendment as well.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, if I have any time left on this, I reserve
it, and I will yield the floor now for my colleague from Arizona.
Mr. KYL. I thank the Senator.
Mr. President, Senator Helms had intended to present these remarks,
and he cannot be here right at this moment. Therefore, I am going to
proceed to deliver his remarks and then also yield to the majority
leader should he wish to make a remark or two about this condition.
If ratified, Mr. President, the Chemical Weapons Convention would
provide inspectors from foreign countries unprecedented access to U.S.
facilities, both commercial and Government-related. Inspectors would be
permitted to interview site personnel, inspect records, photograph
onsite apparatus, take samples, record readings of plant equipment, and
use instruments to monitor processes. The risk that trade secrets or
national security secrets could be stolen during inspection is very
high.
First, proprietary information is often the basis for a chemical
company's competitive edge. Industrial espionage can enable a
competitor to obtain at a minimal cost information that its originator
acquired only through an enormous investment of time and money, thereby
erasing the company's competitive advantage. For this reason, the theft
of trade secrets can cripple even a giant company and can be fatal to a
smaller enterprise.
Second, because chemicals covered by the CWC are used in a variety of
aerospace activities, from the manufacture of advanced composites and
ceramics to additives for paints and fuels, dozens of defense
contractors are targeted for routine inspections under the CWC. That
means that when we are talking about proprietary information, we may
also be talking about national security information.
A company such as Lockheed Martin, Courtalds Aerospace, Hercules,
Raytheon, and the Hexcel Corp. will be forced to allow foreign
nationals access to their facilities, employees, and records. Our
national laboratories further could be inspected under this treaty, as
will Government facilities.
Previous national trial inspections conducted in the United States in
preparation for the CWC revealed that inspections under the treaty are
an extremely dangerous threat to sensitive information. Soil and water
samples were collected in the vicinity of rocket propellant production
facilities on one such inspection. They were analyzed at the Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory. Using modern techniques, analysts were
able to discern classified information about the formulation of the
rocket propellant and the process used to make it.
Finally, Mr. President, China and others likely intend to use CWC
inspections for espionage purposes. They should not be allowed to do
that. The officials of the preparatory commission for the Organization
of the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the OPCW, have stated that all
of the Chinese inspectors were directed to volunteer for the
organization and that these inspectors have direct ties to China's
defense chemical warfare program. Accordingly, and the point of this
condition, the Senate should uphold this provision which would direct
the administration to exercise a United States treaty right--as the
Senator from Delaware pointed out, we have this right under the
treaty--we are simply directing the President to exercise this right to
bar inspectors from China, which has an active industrial espionage
program and has violated United States nonproliferation laws, from
entering the United States to engage in these inspections. In addition,
it would prevent inspectors from countries which are hostile to the
United States and are state sponsors of terrorism--Iran, Iraq, Syria,
Libya, Sudan, North Korea, and Cuba--from participating in these
inspections.
Mr. President, I do not think this is an unreasonable provision.
There is no downside to the provision, only the positive potential that
fewer trade and national security secrets would be handed over to
countries that are openly hostile to the United States.
Therefore, I urge the Senate to reject the motion to strike.
At this time I yield the remaining time to the distinguished majority
leader.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is recognized.
Mr. LOTT. Could I inquire about how much time is remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are 1\1/2\ minutes.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I have already stated my position. I do
think we should vote to ratify this convention, but I think we should
defeat this motion to strike. This is not a killer amendment. This is
very serious, where we are just saying that we should have the ability,
the President should have the ability, to bar these inspectors from
these countries that have violated U.S. nonproliferation laws. You are
talking about inspectors from so-called, as the Secretary of State has
called them, ``rogue nations'' that want to come in here and get into
finding information that could help them to further contribute to
proliferation.
So I urge the Senate on this motion to vote to defeat the motion to
strike. We should have the ability, we should as a matter of fact I
think require that we bar these inspectors from coming into this
country when they are contributing to the problem all over the world.
So I yield the remainder of my time.
Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. I yield myself 30 seconds off my time on the bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized for 30 seconds.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, two very quick points. The companies named
by my distinguished friend, including Hercules, which is headquartered
in my State, that are supposedly worried, they support this treaty.
Hercules supports this treaty. They are not worried about this being
trouble.
Second, this is not a killer, but it rips the heart out of our
inspection regime, and I would not be objecting, I say to the majority
leader, I would not be seeking to take it out if it gave the President
the option. It gives the President no option. It requires him--it
[[Page S3623]]
requires him--to ban. And what it does again, I say to my colleagues,
it then says they will ban us. We have the class of the field doing the
inspection. It is not a smart thing to do, in my humble opinion.
I yield the floor.
Vote on Amendment No. 49
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the question is on
agreeing to amendment No. 49. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The
clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk called the roll.
The result was announced--yeas 66, nays 34, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 48 Ex.]
YEAS--66
Akaka
Baucus
Biden
Bingaman
Boxer
Breaux
Bryan
Bumpers
Byrd
Chafee
Cleland
Coats
Cochran
Collins
Conrad
D'Amato
Daschle
DeWine
Dodd
Domenici
Dorgan
Durbin
Feingold
Feinstein
Ford
Frist
Glenn
Gorton
Graham
Hagel
Harkin
Hatch
Hollings
Inouye
Jeffords
Johnson
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Kohl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lugar
McCain
Mikulski
Moseley-Braun
Moynihan
Murray
Reed
Reid
Robb
Roberts
Rockefeller
Roth
Santorum
Sarbanes
Smith (OR)
Snowe
Specter
Stevens
Torricelli
Wellstone
Wyden
NAYS--34
Abraham
Allard
Ashcroft
Bennett
Bond
Brownback
Burns
Campbell
Coverdell
Craig
Enzi
Faircloth
Gramm
Grams
Grassley
Gregg
Helms
Hutchinson
Hutchison
Inhofe
Kempthorne
Kyl
Lott
Mack
McConnell
Murkowski
Nickles
Sessions
Shelby
Smith (NH)
Thomas
Thompson
Thurmond
Warner
The amendment (No. 49) was agreed to.
Amendment No. 50
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order--the Senator from
Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. I am sorry to interrupt the Chair. You were going to say 1
minute for explanation, is that correct, equally divided?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, the purpose of my amendment is to strike a
provision in the bill that requires the President to disallow an
inspector from any of a number of countries, from Russia to Iran.
There is in the treaty already the ability of the United States to
strike any inspector. The inspectors must be named before an inspection
takes place. The reason why we do not want a blanket exemption is, if
we blanket exempt all those folks, they will blanket exempt any U.S.
inspector.
We want inspectors in the bad guy's country. We do not want to do
this. It is counterproductive.
Mr. KYL addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, let met summarize the argument the majority
leader and I made in opposition to the motion to strike this condition.
The treaty currently provides for the President to say that he does
not want inspectors from certain countries coming into the United
States. There is a reason for that. What we are doing is directing him
only in two cases to, in advance, say, these are the countries covered:
Those countries that sponsor state terrorism, pursuant to our
definition of that, and China because of its violation of another law.
So it is only those countries that have violated American law and who
are the state-sponsored terrorists who can be denied inspectors in the
United States.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time has expired. Under the previous
order, the question now occurs on agreeing to the Biden amendment No.
50. They yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
The result was announced--yeas 56, nays 44, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 49 Ex.]
YEAS--56
Akaka
Baucus
Biden
Bingaman
Boxer
Breaux
Bryan
Bumpers
Byrd
Chafee
Cleland
Cochran
Collins
Conrad
D'Amato
Daschle
Dodd
Dorgan
Durbin
Feingold
Feinstein
Ford
Frist
Glenn
Graham
Harkin
Hollings
Inouye
Jeffords
Johnson
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Kohl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lugar
Mikulski
Moseley-Braun
Moynihan
Murray
Reed
Reid
Robb
Rockefeller
Roth
Sarbanes
Snowe
Specter
Stevens
Torricelli
Wellstone
Wyden
NAYS--44
Abraham
Allard
Ashcroft
Bennett
Bond
Brownback
Burns
Campbell
Coats
Coverdell
Craig
DeWine
Domenici
Enzi
Faircloth
Gorton
Gramm
Grams
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Hatch
Helms
Hutchinson
Hutchison
Inhofe
Kempthorne
Kyl
Lott
Mack
McCain
McConnell
Murkowski
Nickles
Roberts
Santorum
Sessions
Shelby
Smith Bob
Smith Gordon H
Thomas
Thompson
Thurmond
Warner
The amendment (No. 50) was agreed to.
Mr. HELMS. I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. BIDEN. I move to lay it on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. BIDEN. As I understand, there is 1 hour remaining on the last
amendment of the Senator from Delaware to strike condition 32, is that
correct?
The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator is correct.
Mr. BIDEN. It is my understanding the Senator from Delaware has
control of an additional 8 minutes on the bill?
The VICE PRESIDENT. Fifteen minutes.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I have spoken to the majority on this. The
distinguished Senator from Virginia has been waiting around patiently
all day and I keep bumping him. I want to yield up to 5 minutes of my
time on the bill to him at this moment, and then I will move, with
permission of the chairman, to the last condition.
I yield to the Senator from Virginia.
The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. ROBB. I thank my friend and colleague from Delaware.
Mr. President, there's not much left to say about ratification of the
CWC--even here in the Senate. We've had seventeen formal hearings on
the topic over the last two years--both open and closed--and as a
member of all three national security committees, I have participated
in most of them. In addition, the salient features have been discussed
in countless meetings and fora that have that have been widely reported
in both print and broadcast media. Finally, for everyone involved, the
moment of truth has arrived and we will cast what will certainly be one
of the most important votes of the 105th Congress.
Mr. President, I have been committed to ratification for some time,
but I know some of our colleagues have had reservations. There is no
question that respected opponents of ratification have raised important
and legitimate questions. But those questions have been thoroughly and
painstakingly answered by the proponents, including and I believe that
our failure to ratify this chemical weapons convention today would
represent a serious setback for the United States and the entire
international community and unquestionably would be viewed as a failure
of leadership by the world's indispensable nation.
I will not repeat all of the arguments that have been made. In his
news conference earlier today the majority leader framed the essential
question. And he repeated it here on the Senate floor earlier this
afternoon. And I certainly commend him for the way he responded. He
asked will we be better off with or without the treaty--for me that is
not a close call.
I believe we will be much better off, by any measure I can think of,
if we ratify the convention.
I hope that the 28 conditions that we agreed to yesterday, and the
additional reassurances provided by the President today, will insure
that at least two-thirds of our colleagues reach the same conclusion.
The United States is getting out of the chemical weapons business
with or without an international agreement--and because over 70 other
nations have already ratified the convention, it goes into effect on
April 29th, regardless of
[[Page S3624]]
what we do. The only matter we'll decide tonight is whether we'll be
able to participate and shape banning the use, development, production,
and stockpiling of chemical agents, or be cast with the pariah states
that will face increasing difficulty due to permanent trade
restrictions on non-CWC members.
If we want to play a leading role in at least reducing the likelihood
that poison gas will be used against us or the rest of the
international community, we have no choice but to ratify this
convention.
Of course, there are no absolutes when it comes to arms control
verification, but through the most far-reaching, extensive, and
intrusive inspection procedures ever agreed to, the CWC represents a
clear step in the right direction.
I do not question the patriotism of any of our colleagues who oppose
ratification, but I belive we owe a special debt of gratitude to those
statesmen who might find some partisan or ideological advantage in
opposing ratification, but who put our country's interest first in
supporting it.
In that regard, I'd like to single out our former colleague and
Majority Leader, Bob Dole, who now joins the Presidents of both parties
who negotiated, signed, and submitted the convention for ratification,
as well as a distinguished galaxy of present and past top-level
national security leaders.
And, I would like to conclude by commending Senator Biden, the
ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee, and Senator Lugar, a
longstanding expert in the area of arms control, for their leadership
and tenacity these last few weeks. Due to their tireless efforts, I
hope we will have the votes to ratify the CWC and signal to the world
our continuing leadership, by example, to eliminate these weapons of
mass destruction from the face of the earth.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Amendment No. 51
(Purpose: To strike condition no. 32, relating to stemming the
proliferation of chemical weapons)
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for
its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Enzi). The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Delaware [Mr. Biden] proposes an amendment
number 51.
On page 65, strike lines 5 through 24.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, we now turn to the last condition that I am
seeking to strike which will require the President, before he deposits
the instrument of ratification, to certify that the Chemical Weapons
Convention has been amended by striking article X and article XI in
several respects.
Mr. President, I apologize for the shorthand, because it does not do
justice to the arguments of my friends who oppose this, but this is
what we call in the trade a killer amendment. Were this to pass, there
is no treaty. I will speak to that later.
With permission of the chairman of the committee, I yield to the
Senator from Arizona, Senator McCain, who, as the old saying goes, has
forgotten more about this treaty than most people know. I yield such
time as he consumes.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, failure to approve the amendment proposed
by the Senator from Delaware would require the United States to delay
ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention until we obtain the
agreement of other CWC parties to delete one of the treaty's articles
and significantly alter another.
I believe the issue of technology transfer is a serious one because
it is the one argument that seeks to demonstrate that ratifying the CWC
will actually harm the United States national security.
The critics argue because of article XI of the CWC we will have to
eliminate our national controls on chemical technologies and disband
the Australia Group, a multilateral framework for restraining transfers
of sensitive chemical technology. This interpretation of the treaty is
contradicted not only by the text of the treaty which subordinates
Article XI on the basic undertakings in Article I for parties not to
acquire chemical weapons or to assist another state in doing so, but
also by our experience with other nonproliferation treaties and the
agreed consensus conditions included in the resolution of ratification
before us.
First of all, Mr. President, our experience with essentially similar
language in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty shows that we need not
weaken our national or multilateral export controls. The Nuclear
Suppliers Group, the counterpart of the Australia Group, was actually
founded after the NPT went into force. Nor has the NPT obliged us to
curtail our national controls on the transfer of nuclear technology,
even to other NPT parties. The United States enacted the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Act of 1978, 10 years after the NPT was signed.
Moreover, beyond the text of the CWC itself we have condition 7 of
the resolution of ratification before us. This requires the President
to certify not only that the United States believes that the CWC does
not require us to weaken our export controls but also that all members
of the Australia Group have communicated at the highest diplomatic
levels their agreement that multilateral and multinational controls on
sensitive chemical technology are compatible with the treaty and will
be maintained under the CWC.
We also have condition 15 obliging the United States to share only
medical antidotes and treatment to countries of concern if they are
attacked with chemical weapons.
Finally, we have received today from the majority leader a letter
which President Clinton has sent to him committing the administration
to withdraw from the CWC if other parties misuse articles X and XI of
the treaty. In the words of the majority leader, this commitment is
unprecedented and ironclad.
Let me just remind my colleagues, Mr. President, that the President
of the United States in this letter states:
In the event that a State Party or States Parties to the
Convention act contrary to the obligations under Article I
by:
(A) using Article X to justify providing defensive CW
equipment, material or information to another State Party
that could result in U.S. chemical protective equipment being
compromised so that U.S. warfighting capabilities in a CW
environment are significantly degraded;
(B) using Article XI to justify chemical transfers that
would make it impossible for me to make the annual
certification that the Australia Group remains a viable and
effective mechanism for controlling CW proliferation; or
(C) carrying out transfers or exchanges under either
Article X or XI which jeopardizes U.S. national security by
promoting CW proliferation:
I would, [the President of the United States] consistent
with Article XVI of the CWC, regard such actions as
extraordinary events that have jeopardized the supreme
interests of the United States and therefore, in consultation
with the Congress, be prepared to withdraw from the treaty.
Mr. President, I do not know how we could be any clearer than that
letter from the President of the United States.
Conversely, if the United States rejects ratification, I doubt that
we will be able to play our traditional leadership role in attempting
to persuade other chemical suppliers to exercise restraint.
The world will blame the United States for undermining a chemical
weapons ban that the vast majority of other countries were willing to
sign. If we reject ratification, where will we get the moral and
political authority to persuade other Australian Group participants to
block exports to countries of concern?
Mr. President, the supporters of this condition portray renegotiating
the CWC to change these two articles as a feasible undertaking. We are
talking about a new treaty with more than 160 other signatories, more
than 70 of which already ratified. In this context, retired Gen. Brent
Scowcroft, former National Security Adviser, recently testified:
Starting over, as was suggested this afternoon, I think it
is pure fantasy. If we reject this treaty, we will incur the
bitterness of all our friends and allies who followed us for
ten years in putting this together. The idea that we can lead
out again down a different path I think is just not in the
cards. We have got to deal with the situation we face now,
not an ideal one out in the future.
I think that the CWC, as we have it now and as strengthened by the 28
agreed conditions, is good enough. I urge my colleagues to adopt the
amendment of the Senator from Delaware.
[[Page S3625]]
Mr. President, I don't--to the relief of most--intend to speak again.
I want to congratulate Senator Helms for his leadership on this issue,
for his willingness to bring this treaty, which he opposed, to the
floor. I congratulate Senator Biden for his consistent leadership. He
just said that I knew more about the treaty. I know of nobody who knows
more details of the treaty than the Senator from Delaware, unless it is
the Senator from Indiana, Senator Lugar, who has consistently led on
this and is also responsible in the Senate for ratification of this
issue along with Senator Biden.
I congratulate my colleague from Arizona, Senator Kyl, who fought
long and hard in this cause. He has done a masterful and admirable job
in articulating his position on this issue. Our majority leader,
Senator Lott, has been through hundreds of hours of meetings and has
had tough negotiations with the administration. Senator Lott got from
the President of the United States a letter which he calls
unprecedented. I agree. I believe that it is something that can assure
all of our citizens that if there are violations of this treaty, the
United States of America will leave, and leave immediately. Senator
Lott has done a job unequaled by any in his leadership on this issue. I
am grateful for it.
Finally, I also want to express my appreciation to the former
majority leader, Senator Dole, who, of course, decided that this issue
was important enough for him to inform our colleagues.
Finally, Mr. President, sometimes the Senate doesn't have great days,
and sometimes the Senate has moments of which we can all be proud. I
believe, watching carefully this debate for the last 2 days and what
has transpired here on the floor of the Senate, I think the opponents
and proponents of the treaty can be proud of the level of debate, both
in its comity and also in its content. I congratulate my colleagues on
a hard-fought debate, one of which I think every Member, whether we are
on the winning or losing side, can be proud.
I yield the floor.
Mr. ENZI. Mr. President, one of the charges made consistently during
the weeks of debate over this treaty is the charge that supporters of
this treaty desired to see chemical weapons abolished from the earth,
while opponents have no such interest. Nothing could be further from
the truth. Opponents of the treaty also desire to see these heinous
weapons abolished. We have simply contended that a poorly drafted
treaty will not only fail to achieve that worthy end, but could even
lead to their increased proliferation.
I am pleased to report that, as of this morning, opponents of the
original treaty draft have prevailed in our efforts to add teeth and
additional safeguards to what was heretofore an unacceptable document.
To begin with, the Senate yesterday voted to add twenty-eight
additional provisions to the CWC. These provisions tighten our
intelligence sharing procedures to keep classified information out of
the wrong hands, would maintain the stricter exporting restrictions as
outlined in the ``Australia Group'' protocol, would enhance monitoring
and verification of compliance, and would greatly beef up our
military's chemical warfare defense capabilities. In addition, the
Senate leadership this morning received a letter from the President
committing him to withdrawing from the convention if it leads to the
degradation of our chemical weapons defenses, or leads to chemical
weapons proliferation.
I believe this treaty is now worthy of ratification and will vote
accordingly. Rest assured, however, that a treaty is only as reliable
as the offices administering it. Consequently I have every intention of
continuously evaluating the performance of the administration and the
United Nations relative to their implementation of these treaty
provisions. Should any party come up short in their verification and
enforcement duties, we will be right there to set them straight.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I suppose, at this point, it would be an
exercise in futility to go into great detail about why the Senate
should reject this chemical weapons treaty. But let me touch on it. I
ask the Chair to notify me when I have talked for 8 minutes.
Mr. President, this treaty won't touch--won't touch--terrorist states
like Libya, Iraq, Syria and North Korea. The administration admits this
itself. The administration also admits that this treaty is
unverifiable. The fact that Russia is already cheating, even before
this treaty goes into effect, and the rather incredible refusal by the
administration to bar inspectors from hostile nations, such as Iran and
China, to come and ``inspect'' the businesses of the United States of
America. It seems to me that each of these defects, in and of
themselves, are reason enough to oppose the treaty.
But one in the Senate often has to face reality. Let me say this.
There is one issue that has raised the greatest concern among Senators,
I believe--the issue on which the ratification vote should hinge--and
that is the administration's refusal to modify Articles X and XI of
this treaty.
Now, these controversial provisions require the transfer of dangerous
chemical agents, defensive gear and know-how to any nation that joins
the CWC, including--get this--terrorist states like Iran and Cuba, and
known proliferators, such as Russia and China. Now, think of the
implications of that. If anybody is out there in televisionland, I hope
you will contemplate what is going on here on the Senate floor and
watch who votes how when the roll is called up yonder in just a little
while.
Former Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, during the previous public
administration, the Bush administration, by the way, told the Foreign
Relations Committee earlier this month that Articles X and XI amount to
what he said are ``a formula for greatly accelerating the proliferation
of chemical warfare capabilities around the world.''
Now, this condition is an essential protection in the Senate's
resolution of ratification. It would make approval of this treaty
absolutely contingent upon the administration's agreement to seek
modifications of Articles X and XI. You have heard me say that over and
over again for the past several weeks and months. Now, I have urged
Senators to oppose efforts to strip out that key protection. But here
we go again. If this motion to strike prevails, it will be an
invitation to the Senate to reject the treaty entirely. But I don't
think the Senate is going to accept that invitation.
In any case, why should we modify Articles X and XI? The
administration argues that, in spite of all its flaws, the CWC is
better than nothing. Well, to the contrary. With Articles X and XI
unmodified, this treaty is far worse than nothing. Instead of halting
the spread of poison gas, this treaty will be aiding in its
proliferation by helping countries like Iran modernize their chemical
arsenals, giving them access to our secrets for defending against
poison gas attack, and giving a United States imprimatur to third
country transfers of dangerous chemicals and defensive technology to
rogue states.
Anybody who needs a road map or wants one for how this will work
doesn't have to go to a lot of trouble. Just examine how Russia has
taken advantage of similar provisions in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty. Russia is, at this very moment, using that treaty to justify
its sale of nuclear reactors to Iran, under a provision known as
``Atoms for Peace,'' if you can believe that. Under this CWC treaty's
Articles X and XI--again, I have to chuckle when I say it--dubbed
``Poisons for Peace''--if Russia or China decide, for example, to build
a chemical manufacturing facility in Iran, giving that terrorist regime
the chemical agents and high technology it needs to modernize its
chemical weapons program, Russia and China not only could argue that
they are allowed to give Iran this technology, but that they are
obliged to do so under a treaty, mind you, ratified by the Senate of
the United States.
In short, ratifying the chemical weapons treaty sends a signal to the
world that something has been done about the proliferation of chemical
weapons when, in fact, we would not have done anything at all except
make bad matters worse, because Articles X and XI of this treaty--this
dangerous, dangerous treaty--assure that the Chemical Weapons
Convention will increase the spread of chemical weapons rather than
stop it.
So in this next to the last vote of the evening, Senators have a
choice. In
[[Page S3626]]
making that choice, I for one cannot imagine that the U.S. Senate would
reject the advice of four former distinguished Secretaries of Defense,
who testified that unless Articles X and XI are modified, the Senate
should refuse to ratify this treaty.
Mr. President, I reserve the balance of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I note that the ranking member is not present on the
floor at the moment, Mr. President. I will yield myself 10 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I want to express my strong support
for the motion to strike condition 32 from the resolution of
ratification.
I strongly support the Chemical Weapons Convention. I believe it is
very much in our national interests to ratify this treaty.
The pending motion is to strike condition 32 from resolution of
ratification of the CWC. It is essential that this motion pass, because
if it does not, our decision to ratify the treaty will be meaningless.
During the debate over this treaty, a number of serious concerns have
been raised over Articles X and XI. I myself have shared some of these
concerns. But I want to address these criticisms of the CWC now,
because I believe that very solid answers have been provided to
virtually all of them.
I met at the White House last Friday with National Security Adviser
Sandy Berger and Special Assistant to the President for Defense Policy
and Arms Control Robert Bell, who explained these answers to me in
detail, and I found their explanations persuasive.
Sharing Defense Technologies: During the April 9, 1997 hearing in the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the concern was raised by several
witnesses that Article X of the CWC would require the United States to
share advanced chemical defense technologies with rogue nations like
Iran, who may sign and ratify the treaty.
If indeed the treaty required that, there would be significant
grounds for concern. But I believe the concern is unwarranted and
unfounded.
In an April 22 letter to me, National Security Adviser Sandy Berger
makes it very clear that Article X of the CWC would impose no
obligation on the United States to assist Iran with its chemical
weapons defense capabilities.
I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Berger's letter be included in the
Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
Mr. Berger makes clear that paragraph 7 of Article X, which spells
out the obligations of States Parties to assist others threatened by
chemical weapons, would require the United States to provide nothing
more than medical antidotes and treatments to any state we deemed
unreliable. We have the option to provide more advanced assistance to
those nations we trust, but no obligation.
The Administration is so comfortable with this reading of the treaty,
that, in their negotiations with Senator Helms and with the Majority
Leader's task force on the CWC, they have agreed to a binding condition
(number 15) that would ensure that the United States will not provide
any assistance other than medical assistance to any rogue nation that
becomes a party to the treaty.
Another concern about Article X is that paragraph 3, which calls for
parties to ``facilitate * * * the fullest possible exchange'' of
information and technology on protection against chemical weapons,
which some here have said would require the United States to share such
equipment with rogue nations who sign and ratify the treaty.
The Administration has made clear that the use of the words
``facilitate'' and ``possible'' in this paragraph mean that the United
States will determine whether any specific exchange is appropriate, and
we will not pursue those we deem inappropriate. In making these
decisions, we will do nothing to undermine our national export
controls.
With these assertions in hand, I am satisfied that the United States
will in no way be obligated to provide chemical weapons technology to
any nation we deem to be untrustworthy.
Some have also raised the concern that Article X might induce other,
less conscientious nations, to supply rogue states with defense
technologies. But there is nothing that prevents those sales from
taking place today, with no CWC in effect.
Within the CWC, the countries who make exchanges allowed in Article X
are legally bound by the treaty's overriding principle, stated in
Article I, that they can do nothing to ``assist, encourage, or induce,
in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State
Party under this Convention.'' Any country's failure to uphold this
obligation would enable the full force of over 160 nations to coalesce
in support of sanctions, and possibly military action.
In addition, the CWC would provide us with far more ability to
scrutinize any exchanges of chemical defense equipment than we have
today. The result is a net increase, not decrease, in our knowledge of
defense exchanges with rogue nations, and our ability to address any
compliance concerns that may arise from these exchanges.
Cooperation on Chemical Technology: Another concern that has been
raised involves Article XI. Some have suggested that Article XI, which
deals with cooperation in chemical activities not prohibited by the
treaty, would require the United States to provide other nations with
access to our dual-use technologies and manufacturing secrets. Here
again, the concern is unwarranted.
Article XI does aim to ensure that parties to the treaty can conduct
legitimate chemical commerce, which is reasonable. But in his April 22
letter, Mr. Berger explains that this Article does not require the
United States, or any U.S. company, to provide confidential business
information to any foreign party.
As to the concern that Article XI will undercut export controls,
indeed, the reverse is true. Mr. Berger makes clear that all U.S.
export controls now in effect are fully consistent with the CWC. In
addition, our allies in the Australia Group, all 28 of them, have
pledged to maintain all existing multilateral export controls, which
they agree are fully consistent with the CWC.
Here again, the problem identified by critics of the CWC would
actually be worse without the treaty. The CWC will allow us to better
monitor chemical commerce that occurs today without our knowledge. It
will also provide the basis for further multilateral efforts to control
exports, above and beyond our own existing export controls and those of
the Australia Group.
Furthermore, with the CWC, the countries undertaking exchanges are
legally bound by the fundamental obligations in Article I--the
overriding Article of the treaty--never ``to assist, encourage or
induce in any way anyone to engage in any activity prohibited'' under
the convention. It must be remembered that Article I supersedes all
subsequent articles of the Convention. It is disingenuous to suggest
that the treaty would undercut its central prohibition so blatantly.
To address the concerns raised about Article XI, the Administration
has agreed to a binding condition (number 7) that the President must
certify now and on an annual basis that the Australia Group of 30
nations is continuing to control chemical exports effectively and
remains a viable mechanism for doing so.
According to this condition, the President must also certify that
nothing in the CWC obligates the United States to weaken our own export
controls, and that each member of the Australia Group remains committed
to maintaining current export controls.
With this condition added to the resolution of ratification, I
believe concerns about Article XI can be laid aside.
In fact, the negotiations between the Administration and Sen. Biden
on the one hand, and Sen. Helms and Sen. Lott's task force on the
other, have been remarkably successful in addressing the concerns that
have been raised about the treaty.
If the Administration is willing to meet the concerns of the critics
of Articles X and XI, as it has, and those critics still insist on the
removal of those articles as their price for ratifying the treaty, it
is clear that the intent is to kill the treaty altogether.
It is completely unrealistic to suggest that we try to drop Article X
and amend Article XI of the CWC at this point. These two articles were
included
[[Page S3627]]
to reassure countries who signed the treaty that they would not be
prevented from developing chemical weapons defenses or engaging in
legitimate chemical commerce.
None of the 160 nations who have signed or 74 nations that have
ratified the treaty will agree to renegotiate these provisions at the
eleventh hour. It will simply result in our exclusion from the CWC--
which is clearly the intent.
As Gen. Brent Scowcroft, National Security Adviser to President Bush,
testified before the Foreign Relations Committee on April 9, 1997:
Starting over * * * is pure fantasy. If we reject this
treaty, we will incur the bitterness of all our friends and
allies who followed us for 10 years in putting this thing
together * * *. The idea that we can lead out again down a
different path I think is just not in the cards. We have got
to deal with the situation we face now, not an ideal one out
in the future.
The concerns raised about Articles X and XI--which I shared--have
been more than adequately addressed by the agreed conditions.
Failing to strike this condition would be tantamount to killing the
treaty. I urge my colleagues to vote for this motion to strike. Those
who do not are essentially voting against ratification of the entire
CWC.
The CWC is not a panacea, and none of its proponents believes it is.
It will not by itself banish chemical weapons from the earth, but it
would result in the destruction of much of the world's chemical weapons
stocks, and provide us with a valuable set of tools that would
significantly strengthen our ability to monitor and defend against the
threat of chemical weapons.
So, reiterating, Mr. President, during the April 9 hearing in the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the concern was raised by several
witnesses that Article X would require the United States to share
advanced chemical defense technologies with rogue nations like Iran,
who may sign and ratify the treaty. If indeed the treaty required that,
there would be significant grounds for concern. But I believe the
concern is unwarranted.
In an April 22 letter to me, National Security Adviser Sandy Berger
makes it very clear that Article X of the CWC would impose no
obligation on the United States to assist Iran with its chemical
weapons defense capabilities.
Mr. Berger makes clear that paragraph 7 of Article X, which spells
out the obligations of States Parties to assist others threatened by
chemical weapons would require the United States to provide nothing
more than medical antidotes and treatments to any state we deem
unreliable. We have the option to provide more advanced assistance to
those states we trust, but no obligation.
Another concern about Article X is that paragraph 3, which calls for
parties to * * * ``facilitate * * * the fullest possible exchange'' of
information and technology on protection against chemical weapons.
Now, I understand the concern there. But the administration has made
it clear that the use of the words ``facilitate'' and ``possible'' in
this paragraph mean that the United States will determine whether any
specific exchange is appropriate, and we will not pursue those we deem
inappropriate. In making these decisions we will do nothing to
undermine our national export controls.
With these assertions in hand, I am satisfied that the United States
will in no way be obligated to provide chemical weapons defense
technology to any nation we deem untrustworthy. And the President's
point A in his letter to the majority leader points this out as one of
the three conditions under which the United States would withdraw from
the treaty if it turns out any other way.
Some have also raised the concern that Article X might induce other,
less conscientious, nations to supply rogue states with defense
technologies. But there is nothing that prevents these sales from
taking place today, with no CWC in effect.
With the CWC, the countries who make exchanges allowed in Article X
are legally bound, as Senator McCain pointed out, to the treaty's
overriding and superseding principle, stated in Article I, that they
can do nothing to ``assist, encourage, or induce, in any way, anyone to
engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this
Convention.'' Any country's failure to uphold this obligation would
enable the full force of 160 nations to coalesce in support of
sanctions, and possibly military action.
In addition, the CWC would provide us with far more ability to
scrutinize any exchanges of chemical defense equipment than we have
today. So the result is a net increase, not a decrease, in our
knowledge of defense exchanges with rogue nations and our ability to
address any compliance concerns that may arise from these exchanges.
For me, it was very helpful to be present in the closed session of this
Senate. I very much appreciate the information shared. But I think the
bottom line is really this point.
Let me turn to article XI, which deals with cooperation in chemical
technology.
Another concern that has been raised involves the article XI
provisions on cooperation in chemical activity not prohibited by the
treaty. Some fear that these provisions would require the United States
to provide other nations with access to our dual-use technologies and
manufacturing secrets. Here again, I truly believe the concern is
unwarranted. Article XI aims to ensure that parties to the treaty can
conduct legitimate chemical commerce. It is reasonable.
In his April 22 letter to me, Mr. Berger explains that this article
does not require the United States nor any U.S. company to provide
confidential business information to any foreign party. As to the
concern that article XI will undercut export controls, indeed, the
reverse is true. Mr. Berger makes clear that all U.S. export controls
now in effect are fully consistent with the CWC.
In addition, our allies in the Australia Group--all 29 of them--have
pledged to maintain all existing multilateral export controls, which
they agree are fully consistent with the CWC. Here again the problem
identified by critics, I think, would be worse without the treaty. The
CWC allows us to better monitor chemical commerce that occurs today
without our knowledge. It will also provide the basis for further
multilateral efforts to control exports, above and beyond our own
existing export controls and those of the Australia Group. And, once
again, Article I supersedes this article with the overriding obligation
never ``to assist, encourage or induce in any way anyone to engage in
any activity prohibited'' under the convention.
To address the concerns raised about article XI, the administration
has agreed to a binding condition No. 7 that the President must certify
now and on an annual basis that the Australia Group of nations is
continuing to control chemical exports effectively and remains a viable
mechanism for doing so. The President must also certify that nothing in
the CWC obligates the United States to weaken its own export controls.
The President, in his point B on page 2 in his letter to the majority
leader, clearly points out that, if that happens, we would withdraw
from the treaty.
The negotiations between the administration and Senator Biden on the
one hand, and Senator Helms and Senator Lott's task force on the other,
I think have been remarkably successful in addressing concerns raised
by the treaty.
So we see here that the administration has been willing to meet the
concerns of critics of articles X and XI, and it has. It seems to me
completely unrealistic to suggest that we try to drop articles X and XI
at this late stage. These two articles were included to reassure
countries who sign the treaty that they would not be prevented from
developing chemical weapons defenses or engaging in legitimate chemical
commerce.
None of the 160 nations who have signed, nor the 74 nations who have
ratified this treaty will agree to renegotiate these provisions at the
eleventh hour. It will simply result in our exclusion from the CWC. And
that would truly be too high a price to pay. I urge all my colleagues
to support this motion to strike condition 32 from the resolution of
ratification.
I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I yield as much time as I may have to
Senator Kyl.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, first of all, let me say that I do not like
to disagree with my friend and colleague
[[Page S3628]]
from California, Senator Feinstein. And I find that I rarely disagree
with my colleague from Arizona, Senator McCain. This is a treaty which
has caused division among reasonable people. I respect their views
immensely. We find that even former members of the same administration,
the Bush and Reagan administrations, now find themselves on opposite
sides of this issue. So it is a matter upon which reasonable people can
differ. As I said, I respect the views of those who have disagreed with
me, and they have certainly shown a respect for my views, which I
appreciate.
These two articles are among the most important in the treaty, and I
think a little bit of background is important for us to understand the
reason we believe that it is important that they not be included in the
treaty when we enter into force.
We have said initially that this treaty is not global. It doesn't
cover countries that it should. It is not verifiable. It is fairly well
acknowledged there are no sanctions. But supporters have said it is
better than nothing. There are some advantages to it. Our response is
that in some respects it is not better than nothing.
In particular, these two sections, articles X and XI, make it worse
than nothing, and we ought to get rid of them. It is true that to get
rid of them, the states parties to the convention have to agree. That
will take some time. But we believe it is better, before the United
States enters, when we have the leverage to cause that renegotiation to
occur, to have it occur at that time. Therefore, the resolution of
ratification is passed, but prior to the President actually depositing
those articles, the President certify to us that articles X and XI have
been removed, or fixed.
Why is this so important? Secretary of Defense Cheney was quoted by
the distinguished chairman of the committee, and I think he succinctly
said it. Therefore, I will summarize these thoughts by quoting
Secretary Cheney in his letter of April of this year.
He said:
Indeed, some aspects of the present Convention--notably,
its obligation to share with potential adversaries like Iran
chemical manufacturing technology that can be used for
military purposes and chemical defensive equipment--threaten
to make this accord worse than having no treaty at all. In my
judgment, the treaty's Articles X and XI amount to a formula
for greatly accelerating the proliferation of chemical
warfare capabilities around the globe.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Secretary Cheney's letter
be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Dallas, TX, April 7, 1997.
Hon. Jesse Helms,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter inviting me to
join several other former Secretaries of Defense in
testifying in early April when the Foreign Relations
Committee holds hearings on the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Regrettably, other commitments will preclude me from
participation. I hope that this correspondence will be
sufficient to convey my views on this Convention.
During the years I served as Secretary of Defense, I was
deeply concerned about the inherent unverifiability, lack of
global coverage, and unenforceability of a convention that
sought to ban production and stockpiling of chemical weapons.
My misgivings on these scores have only intensified during
the four years since I left the Pentagon.
The technology to manufacture chemical weapons is simply
too ubiquitous, covert chemical warfare programs too easily
concealed, and the international community's record of
responding effectively to violations of arms control treaties
too unsatisfactory to permit confidence that such a regime
would actually reduce the chemical threat.
Indeed, some aspects of the present Convention--notably,
its obligation to share with potential adversaries like Iran
chemical manufacturing technology that can be used for
military purposes and chemical defensive equipment--threaten
to make this accord worse than having no treaty at all. In my
judgment, the treaty's Articles X and XI amount to a formula
for greatly accelerating the proliferation of chemical
warfare capabilities around the globe.
Those nations most likely to comply with the Chemical
Weapons Convention are not likely to ever constitute a
military threat to the United States. The governments we
should be concerned about are likely to cheat on the CWC,
even if they do participate.
In effect, the Senate is being asked to ratify the CWC even
though it is likely to be ineffective, unverifiable and
unenforceable. Having ratified the Convention, we will then
be told we have ``dealt with the problem of chemical
weapons'' when in fact we have not. But, ratification of the
CWC will lead to a sense of complacency, totally unjustified
given the flaws in the convention.
I would urge the Senate to reject the Chemical Weapons
Convention.
Sincerely,
Dick Cheney.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, what is it about articles X and XI that cause
Secretary Cheney and so many others to conclude that they should be
removed? I will quote to you the language of both. They are on the
chart behind me.
Article X provides that `` * * * each state party undertake to
facilitate, and shall have the right to participate in, the fullest
possible exchange of equipment, material, and scientific and
technological information concerning means of protection against
chemical weapons.''
In other words, in plain English, those parties which have defensive
capability will undertake to facilitate the fullest possible exchange
of that technology, equipment, and so on, to the countries that don't
have them. They shall have the right to participate in the fullest
possible exchange of that equipment.
Article XI is the article that says that the states parties shall:
``(b) undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in,
the fullest possible exchange of chemical equipment, and scientific and
technical information relating to the development and application of
chemistry for purposes not prohibited under the convention.''
That is to say, peaceful purposes. And, second, that the state
parties ``shall not maintain among themselves any restrictions,
including those in any international agreements, incompatible with the
obligations undertaken under this convention, which would restrict or
impede trade and the development and promotion of scientific and
technological knowledge in the field of chemistry for industrial and
agricultural research, medical, pharmaceutical, and other peaceful
purposes.''
These two provisions were inserted in the treaty essentially as
inducements to get the parties to join the treaty, in effect, saying,
``If you will join the CWC, those of us who have this technology and
these chemicals will provide them to you. We will sell you the
chemicals for peaceful purposes--not for chemical weapons. And we will
provide you the defense technology so that you can defend against any
possible use against you.'' Of course, the price for having that right
is not developing chemical weapons.
In this respect, the treaty was compared to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, and the so-called ``Atoms for Peace,'' which said
that if the countries would forswear the development of nuclear weapons
building that the developed countries of the world would provide them
peaceful nuclear technology. For some countries this worked. But sadly
we know that a couple of other countries used the peaceful technology
to build their nuclear weapon capability.
So, Secretary Cheney, and many others, fear that these sections,
these articles, would permit countries--since they have been induced to
come into the treaty with these commitments--to then call upon those
commitments from the countries that have this equipment.
Is this an unreasonable assumption? Today, we are basically hearing
statements that suggest that that is not the way it was intended at
all.
That is a very recent phenomenon. As a matter of fact, right after
the CWC was signed, it was very clear to all states parties that they
begin to dismantle the trade restrictions they had in place on
chemicals in order to come into compliance with the CWC.
According to the administration in testimony before the Senate, and I
am quoting now, ``Australia Group members''--these are the countries
that have agreed not to sell chemicals to terrorist states--``in August
1992 committed to review their export control measures with a view of
removing them for CWC states parties in full compliance with their
obligations under the convention.''
They knew that those trade restrictions were incompatible with the
new commitments they had undertaken in articles X and XI of the
convention, and the Australia Group itself issued a
[[Page S3629]]
formal statement which concluded again that states parties were
reviewing this, and I am quoting, ``with the aim of removing such
measures for the benefit of states parties to the convention acting in
full compliance with the obligations under the convention.''
The point being that when the treaty went into effect the parties
knew full well that trade restrictions they had were no longer
compatible with the convention, with articles X and XI, and that they
were going to have to review limiting those trade restrictions, and the
Australia Group is a very successful group of countries that has trade
restrictions against trade in chemicals to these terrorist states.
Well, we then began raising the questions about articles X and XI.
The administration position changed 180 degrees, Mr. President. The
administration began to say, well, actually, we could continue our
restrictions under these two articles. And we said, well, it will not
do any good unless everybody else does it. They said, we could even
persuade the Australia Group countries to do that. In other words, to
do exactly the opposite of what they had originally decided they had to
do to be in compliance.
So the administration has made much of and my colleagues have spoken
of the fact that the United States will now interpret the Chemical
Weapons Convention as not requiring us to provide this equipment and as
enabling us to maintain trade restrictions even despite articles X and
XI. Moreover, that we have even tried to get our fellow Australia Group
countries to maintain their restrictions in place.
That is laudable. We have at least pushed the rock that far up the
mountain. We have got them to agree these two sections should not
operate the way they plainly say they will. I think it is a little
unseemly to be signaling before we have entered the convention that we
are going to violate it up front and convince many of our friends to
violate it, because, frankly, it is the right thing to do because
articles X and XI ought to be violated by us. They have no place in
this treaty.
The problem is the administration has also glossed over the fact that
while we may interpret the treaty this way, there are others who do
not. For example, China does not. Iran does not. And there are other
countries that we heard about in our classified session this morning
that do not. They explicitly understand that the treaty means what it
says. And therefore two parties that have signed, not yet ratified but
signed the agreement have indicated that they intend to continue their
trade. And this is China selling chemicals to Iran, for Iran's chemical
weapons program. That is the problem. And it is true that nothing
prevents that trade from occurring today, Mr. President, but the
problem is that the Chemical Weapons Convention gives them the color of
law, the legal authority to be able to say: Look, we are parties to the
treaty. The treaty says we can do it, so stop complaining and, by the
way, don't impose any restrictions on us because of what we are doing.
I do not know how long it will be before chemical companies in other
countries are going to say wait a minute, why should the Chinese have
all the action here; we would like to have a piece of that action, too,
and therefore when one country breaks an embargo it begins to fall
apart. That is why I submit that just focusing on United States action
under the treaty is not going to solve the problem.
There is also the idea--and this is really not a proper legal
argument, but some have said that article I supersedes the specific
articles of the convention. Now, for those who are lawyers, they
recognize this is not true. The specific always governs over the
general. Article I is a general prohibition. The very specific articles
such as articles X and XI will control. They are the specific
implementation of the treaty.
But to conclude now, Mr. President, the President of the United
States has said given the fact that there are concerns, continuing
concerns about articles X and XI, I am going to write a letter which
maybe will put your mind at ease, and that letter has been referred to
here by some of my colleagues. I do not doubt the sincerity of the
President in sending the letter and certainly do not doubt the
sincerity of my colleagues in believing that letter provides some
solace, but I would like to make five points with respect to that
letter.
If the things under articles X and XI happen that we think will, it
does not solve anything for the United States to pull out of the treaty
as the President says he might do. The time to exercise leverage is now
before we are a party to the treaty. And what we are saying is prior to
the United States getting into the treaty, we should make sure that
articles X and XI are removed so that these bad things do not happen.
Once they happen, there is no point of the United States pulling out of
the treaty. That does not solve anything. So what the President says he
is willing to do, frankly, is not an inducement.
Moreover, there is the argument that it is better to be inside the
treaty than outside the treaty. And believe me, once we are inside it
is going to be much harder to leave than it is to get in in the first
place.
Third, certifications of the kind that the President indicated he
would be willing to make are very, very hard to do. There are a whole
series of certifications that have to be made under U.S. law. They are
too hard. We end up not doing them. The certification of Mexico is a
good example, to certify that they are cooperating with us in the war
on drugs. Most people believe that that was not an honest
certification. But the desire to cooperate with Mexico was so strong
that it overrode the point of being honest in the certification. The
same thing is true with the Arms Control Disarmament Act, the annual
Pell report, section 51. We know that Russia is not in compliance with
the Biological Weapons Convention or with the Wyoming Memorandum of
Understanding or with the Bilateral Destruction Agreement, but the most
this administration has ever done is to conduct high-level discussions
with the Russians. It is too hard to certify that they are in
noncompliance and therefore take the action that is required.
The same thing is true under the Export-Import Ban Act with respect
to violations by China and several other laws that China has violated
with respect to its chemical weapons transfers to Iran. These
certifications are simply too hard. And while I agree, I am sure the
intentions of the President are appropriate in this regard, those
certifications I submit are not going to be done.
The time line here is important, too. This is a commitment by
President Clinton. It is between 2 and 3 years before any action can be
taken under this convention. That means that this President's term will
almost be expired before he would have the opportunity to even consider
the issues that are set forth in his letter. So it is not an effective
commitment.
And finally, Mr. President, the letter only deals with United States
actions, the point that I made in the beginning. The question here is
not United States actions. The question has always been what are we
going to do with those countries of the world that seek an offensive
chemical weapons capability, a capability that we would like to deny
them, countries like Iran, the one I have been talking about here. This
commitment, the President's commitment in his letter does absolutely
nothing with respect to the sales of chemicals and chemical technology
from a country like China to a country like Iran. It doesn't affect it
at all.
So while it is a nice commitment to have made with respect to the
United States participation and attempting to keep the Australia Group
together, the fact is it does not deal with part of the problem that
has concerned us from the very beginning.
I conclude with this letter to simply make this point. As I said,
reasonable people can differ, and I respect the views of those who
disagree with me. They have sincere belief that this treaty is better
than nothing. And if they believe that way, they should vote yes on
this treaty. There are also those of us who disagree with that
proposition. But I urge my colleagues, if you believe that this letter
provides the basis for support for the treaty, I honestly believe that
is incorrect. If you are going to vote yes on this treaty, do it for
grounds other than this letter because it does not provide a
satisfactory response to the very real problem that
[[Page S3630]]
has been discussed by Secretary Cheney, by Secretary Weinberger, by
Secretary Rumsfeld, by Secretary Schlesinger, and a host of other
people who have all said that the fundamental problem is articles X and
XI. Unless they are removed, we are looking for more proliferation, not
less, under this treaty. And it is for that reason the motion to strike
should be defeated, Mr. President.
Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.
Mr. HELMS. From my general debate time I yield 10 minutes to the
assistant majority leader.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized for 10 minutes.
Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, first I would like to compliment my
colleague from Arizona, Senator Kyl, for an excellent statement. I
happen to think that this amendment we are debating is the key
amendment of the entire debate. I certainly compliment all Senators for
their involvement in this debate. I think it has been one of the best
debates we have had in the Senate for a long time. It is also one of
the most important issues we have had where we have seen so many
colleagues, particularly on this side of the aisle, who have been
undecided and probably because of this language dealing with article X
and article XI.
This is the language we have heard former Defense Secretary Cheney,
former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, and Cap Weinberger, really
speak out against in their statements before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee.
Also, I note that President Clinton has a letter addressing this
issue. But I looked at it a little bit more. I certainly concur with
the goals and objectives; we want to reduce chemical weapons. And we
have taken a laudatory step of saying we are going to ban them in this
country and we want to encourage other countries to ban them, and I
think that is great. And that is in article I. I see article I is over
here, and if one reads article I it looks great. But I think it is
incumbent upon us as Senators to read the balance of the treaty.
When you read article X, and it is in the treaty, it says:
Each State Party undertakes to facilitate, and shall have
the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of
equipment, material and scientific and technological
information concerning means of protection against chemical
weapons.
Share defensive technology. I know the administration said, well, we
are not going to do that. But it is in the treaty that we are going to.
I find that a little contradictory, we are going to limit what we are
going to share. This says to the fullest extent possible. The language
is very contradictory in what the administration says they are going to
do in subsequent letters and what the language of the treaty is. I
think maybe the language of the treaty will supersede.
If we are signing a treaty, don't we mean to comply with all of it.
And then again we are not just talking about the United States, because
I hope that we don't just give our technology away to some countries,
some countries that will sign this convention and will not comply. We
know that. We have had some experience. We have seen it not only with
the Geneva Protocol on chemical weapons, but we also have seen it with
the biological weapons convention which a lot of countries signed but
they have not complied with and we know that. Our intelligence
community has done a pretty good job, and in many cases we know a lot
of countries are not complying.
But I think it is legitimate to ask, are we better off with it or
without. And I have heard good debate on both sides. But this language
says to me we have to share this technology. Not only do we have to but
also other countries, including countries like China, would be sharing
this technology with Iran. Under the treaty, they would be obliged to,
or certainly that is what they will be saying. Does that increase the
likelihood and the dangers of chemical weapons? I am afraid it does.
And then looking at article XI, and again just looking at the treaty
and looking at the language of the treaty--every once in a while I
think it is important we do it--under article XI, section 2(c) it says:
Not maintain among themselves any restrictions, including
those in any international agreements, incompatible with the
obligations undertaken under this convention, which would
restrict or impede trade and the development and promotion of
scientific and technological knowledge in the field of
chemistry for industrial, agricultural, research, medical,
pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes.
In other words, we want a lot more trade in other chemicals that
aren't banned by this treaty.
There is an editorial in the Wall Street Journal that I ask unanimous
consent to have printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the Wall Street Journal, Apr. 24, 1997]
Chemical Reactions
Before today's vote on the Chemical Weapons Convention, we
hope that some Senator will twist his tongue around the 20
chemicals listed here and read their names into the record.
This list makes two important points about what's wrong with
the treaty.
First is that many ordinary chemicals can be put to deadly
use. The chemicals on this list can be used in such mundane
products as laundry soaps, ink and fumigation agents--or they
can be used in lethal weapons. Bear this in mind when you
hear the President assert that the CWC will ``banish poison
gas from the Earth.''
The second point is that the CWC not only will permit trade
in these 20 potentially deadly chemicals, it will require it.
American companies currently are restricted from exporting
these dual-use chemicals under the terms of an organization
called the Australia Group, which is made up of 29 Western
countries committed to ensuring that their exports don't
contribute to the spread of chemical weapons.
But Articles X and XI of the CWC require member countries
to transfer chemicals and technology to any other member
country that asks. This goes a long way toward explaining why
the Chemical Manufacturers Association is so loud in its
support of the treaty.
Senators who are still considering how to vote might
consider whether selling such chemicals to China or Iran or
Cuba will help make the world safe from chemical weapons--or
make the world a more dangerous place.
Mustard Gas for Sale
Trade in these 20 precursors for chemical weapons agents,
now regulated, would be permitted under the Chemical Weapons
Convention:
3-Hydroxy-1-methylpiperidine
Potassium fluoride
2-Chloroethanol
Dimethylamine (DMA)
Dimethylamine hydrochloride
Hydrogen fluoride
Methyl benzilate
3-Quinuclidone
Pinacolone
Potassium cyanide
Potassium bifluoride
Ammonium bifluoride
Sodium fluoride
Sodium bifluoride
Sodium cyanide
Phosphorus pentasulfide
Diisopropylamine (DIPA)
Diethylaminoethanol (DEAE)
Sodium sulfide
Triethanolamine hydrochloride
Source: Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Mr. NICKLES. This article lists about 20 chemicals that are not
prohibited by this treaty, that basically this section of article XI
says you will be able to sell those chemicals. As a matter of fact, no
restriction. This language says that countries cannot maintain amongst
themselves any restrictions including those in any international
agreements. It does not say some. It says any international agreements.
That sounds pretty open. A lot of those chemicals can be used to
develop chemical weapons. They can also have a dual purpose. It can be
kind of confusing.
I understand the President in his letter today said, well, he would
try to end the confusion. And so I looked at his letter, and in his
letter on page 2 he says--dealing with article X, he said:
Using article X to justify providing defensive chemical
weapon equipment, material or information to another State
Party that could result in U.S. chemical protective equipment
being compromised so that U.S. war fighting capabilities in a
chemical weapons environment are significantly degraded.
If that is the case, he wants out. What is ``significantly
degraded''? How do you reach that level. I do not know that you would
ever reach--since he has ``significantly degraded,'' I do not know,
because the word ``significantly'' is there that it would ever be
treated. And then in (b) he talks about where it would be impossible
for him to make a certification on the Australia Group. But in the
final language he says we would get out if the implementing of this
convention carries out transfers or
[[Page S3631]]
exchanges under either article X or XI which jeopardize U.S. national
security by promoting chemical weapons proliferation. When is that
going to be triggered?
His final conclusion is kind of interesting. I read the AP story that
said, well, because of the President's letter, he said if these things
happen, we are out of there, we are going to walk away from the treaty.
I do not read that in his language. It says I would be prepared to
withdraw. It did not say he would withdraw. So if it really jeopardizes
our national security, he might be prepared, but it did not say he
would withdraw, after consulting with Congress.
In other words, I do not find a lot in this letter that gives me any
real comfort or assurance that article X or XI has really been
addressed. And I appreciate the fact that a lot of our colleagues have
addressed this issue, but to me treaties are important. And we have had
a lot of significant discussion over various sections of the treaty,
maybe none more than article X and XI, but it happens to still be in
the treaty. And the President's letter notwithstanding, at the
conclusion of his letter he said if all these things happen or any of
these things happen, I would be prepared to withdraw.
Frankly, Senator Kyl is right. That is not going to happen in 2 or 3
years. It is not going to happen under President Clinton's term. I do
not know that this letter would be binding on succeeding or successors
of the President.
So, Mr. President, this language is vitally important. I would tell
my colleague from North Carolina my vote on final passage depends on
this amendment. If we are able to make this change by the Senator from
North Carolina, I will vote maybe for final passage. I think this is a
killer amendment, having it in the treaty. I think it is that
important. We are ratifying the entire treaty including article X,
including article XI. And again I compliment my colleagues. I have the
greatest respect for Senator Lugar. I know he has worked hard on this.
I have the greatest respect for Senator McCain and a lot of other
people on both sides of the aisle. They have conducted an excellent
debate. I have made a long list of pluses and minuses on this treaty. I
could debate either side of the treaty, I have spent just that amount
of time on it. But I happen to think that this article X and article XI
do a lot of damage. Since we are ratifying not just article I, but the
entire treaty, I urge my colleagues to vote to delete the section. I
urge my colleagues to vote no on this. I think this is the most
important amendment and discussion that we will have to date.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, have the yeas and nays been ordered on this
amendment?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. They have not.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, how much time remains under the control of
the Senator from Delaware?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Eleven minutes.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I suggest my colleague and I divide that
time. I yield 5 minutes to my friend from Indiana.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, the condition we are discussing, all
Senators by this time, I am certain, understand, requires the President
to certify that the parties to the convention have agreed to strike
article X of the convention and amend article XI of the convention.
That means, in simple language, that the United States would simply say
a treaty negotiated by 160 countries, now ratified by, apparently, 74--
unilaterally, we simply knock out article X and severely amend article
XI.
As all Senators who have addressed this will admit, this means
effectively the end of the treaty, at least in terms of our
participation, because, clearly, the other nations of the world are
under no obligation to renegotiate the entire treaty at that point.
This is the reason it is strictly a killer amendment. It simply knocks
out material parts of the convention.
If those who are advocating this had a point, there might be reason
to pause at this point and not ratify the treaty. But by and large it
appears to me that most of us want to ratify the treaty and we do so
with assurance, first of all, that as a country we have our wits about
us. There is no possibility this President, the next President, Members
of the Senate, any responsible American is going to furnish material to
countries that are rogue states that are going to jeopardize our
security. The treaty does not call for that, as again and again we
pointed out. This was a generous interpretation that the Iranians gave
because, at least from that standpoint, they would like to have the
material. But why we should ever be that gullible escapes me. There is
no mandate to give anything away.
Those of us who advocate the treaty have been saying we will not. The
President of the United States has been asked for assurance, and he
said that he will not. He has sent letters to the majority leader and
to individual Senators affirming this in any number of ways.
Furthermore, the question arises, ``Fair enough, Mr. President, or
Mr. Senator, if you will not give things away to the Iranians, how
about the French or the Germans or some other nation? Perhaps they will
do so.'' As Secretary Cohen replied on Meet The Press on Sunday--and
Secretary Albright, likewise, who was sitting beside him responded to
this question--they pointed out that is a very good reason for us to be
around the table with the other countries from the beginning, setting
the rules.
If Senators are seriously concerned that other countries are going to
give away the store, we had better be there to help restrain them, to
offer our leadership. It comes back to that, our leadership. We were
the ones that started the whole process--President Reagan, President
Bush, President Clinton. We are the ones who had a good idea: If we
were getting rid of our chemical weapons, others ought to get rid of
theirs.
This is our treaty, as Secretary Albright said, ``Made in the USA.''
And we ought to be there to set the rules, to be the governing board,
to assert our leadership at the moment that it is crucial after April
29.
So I say simply to those who have qualms about articles X and XI, we
are not going to give away the store, any of us, as patriotic
Americans. We would like to be at the table to make sure no one else
entertains that thought. But I say again, whether we are there or not,
the treaty is going to happen after April 29. We better be there and,
hopefully, with affirmative votes to strike this fifth situation we
have discussed this evening, this fifth condition, and for final
passage, to vote for the treaty. These are very important for the
foreign policy and security of our country.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Six minutes 11 seconds.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield myself 5 minutes and I ask to be
informed at the end of those 5 minutes. I am not going to take the time
to speak to why this is a killer amendment and why this is so
important, because I could not improve upon what the Senator from
Indiana said. I mean that sincerely.
It is real basic. This gets down to real basic considerations.
Anybody who has the capacity to transfer technology can do that right
now. They can do it right now. If they are in the treaty, the treaty
does not require them to transfer that technology, but they,
theoretically, could transfer technology. If we are not in the treaty
we are not there to modulate their attitudes, their activities. We are
out of the game.
This seems to me to be so simplistic and basic. But let me put on the
hat I have been wearing for the past 5 years. I have been teaching
constitutional law at Widner University on Saturday mornings, a three-
credit course. You know the old joke is, if you want to learn a
subject, teach it. If I had spent nearly as much time studying it when
I was in law school, as much time as I have spent teaching it, I would
have
[[Page S3632]]
ended up in the top of the class, not the bottom. I don't think I would
have the record the Senator from Indiana had, but it would be better.
But all kidding aside, there is something, to quote Elliot
Richardson, our former Attorney General, and Abe Chayes, Harvard Law
School professor, and a number of other professors, which I will submit
for the Record, there is, as the letter to me says, regarding article X
and article XI, it says:
As it is axiomatic that all treaty provisions must be
interpreted in view of the purposes and objectives of the
treaty and that a subsidiary obligation should never be read
out of context to authorize behavior that would contravene a
primary obligation, nothing in article X or XI may undermine
article I . . ..
But the first part of that sentence--maybe I spent too much time in
law schools. There is no legal scholar in America who will tell you
that you can read a subsidiary provision in a treaty, a document, a
contract or anything else, that contravenes the stated purpose of the
treaty--the stated purpose of the contract. You cannot do that.
Think about it. Forget being a lawyer, just think about it. How could
you write a contract, make a deal that said, ``This is our purpose,''
and five paragraphs later say, ``but if you don't want to meet the
purpose, you don't have to.'' It is bizarre. This is an absolute
bizarre interpretation.
Let me also point out--I wish my friend had not taken down their
chart. The Senator's chart, those in opposition to my amendment, a
chart on article XI, is somewhat incomplete. The paragraph that sat up
there for a half-hour or so, paragraph 2 in the chart, read, ``The
state party shall--'' and then it goes on, and then the subparagraphs
(b) and (c) were shown. But they left out the remaining part of that.
The words that were missing are very key. They read as follows:.
Subject to the provisions of the convention and without
prejudice to the principles and applicable rules of
international law, the state party shall. . ..
That is the part they left out of article X and XI. What does article
X and XI refer to? They are referring to article I.
I do not want to be overly technical here. This is not rocket
science. What does article I of the treaty say? It says:
Each State party to this convention undertakes never under
any circumstances:
(a) to develop or produce or otherwise acquire, stockpile
or retain chemical weapons or transfer, directly or
indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone;
(b) to use chemical weapons;
(c) to engage in any military preparation to use chemical
weapons;
(d) to assist, encourage or induce in any way anyone to
engage in any activity prohibited to a state party under this
convention.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.
Mr. BIDEN. I yield myself 2 additional minutes under the bill.
Mr. President, what are we talking about here? Do you know what this
debate on article X and article XI reminds me of, speaking of law
school? The only thing I ever did do well in law school was moot court.
I won that. Does that surprise you all? But I did.
It reminds me of what we used to do--maybe when my friend from
Indiana was at Oxford. You would walk in and you would be presented a
question. The question before the court or the question before the
House is--and you got assigned a side and you came up with the best
arguments.
This reminds me of that, as if we all got together earlier today and
said, OK, one side has to argue that article X and article XI do all
these terrible things. I am glad I did not get that side to argue. The
reason is, it is much harder to make the case. My friend from Arizona,
who is an able trial lawyer, is doing a very good job. But, look, you
cannot avoid the central purpose of the treaty and that is: Never,
under any circumstances, can any party assist, encourage, induce in any
way anyone to engage in any prohibited activity.
I yield myself 2 more minutes on the bill.
So we are in a position here where I really understand the worry.
But, even if there was any merit to the reading that is given by my
friends, we have, in the conditions that we did support, we have two
conditions which cover this--double cover it. We promise we are not
going to transfer anything that is not medical in nature.
Mr. President, a party cannot do something in the treaty by
transferring material which would have the effect these Senators are
worried about, because if it had the effect they were worrying about,
then it would be assisting, encouraging, inducing or in some way
engaging in activity prohibited by the treaty. Chemical weapons are
prohibited by the treaty.
To reiterate, Mr. President, this is a killer, pure and simple. This
will prevent the United States from joining the Chemical Weapons
Convention.
The condition requires the President to certify that he has achieved
the impossible: that he has been able to substantially rewrite the
treaty.
There is no chance--none--that he can achieve this by April 29, and
it is highly unlikely that he can ever do so--because amendments may be
blocked by any State party to the convention. If a party wants to keep
us out--and thus render the treaty ineffective--it can easily do so.
Aside from the practical difficulties of rewriting a treaty that took
nearly a decade to negotiate, there is no need to do so.
Let me start with article 10. The Senator from North Carolina wants
to get rid of it completely.
Article 10 contains two paragraphs at issue. Paragraph three provides
that:
[E]ach State Party undertakes to facilitate, and shall have
the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of
equipment, material and scientific and technological
information concerning means of protection against chemical
weapons.
Note that this paragraph contains ambiguous terms like ``facilitate''
and ``possible.'' There's a reason for that--the negotiators did not
want us to make a concrete commitment.
And the Administration has made clear that it interprets this
paragraph to mean that it will have the flexibility to decide what
exchanges, if any, will occur under this paragraph.
On April 15, Sandy Berger wrote to me to say that:
. . . any exchange which does occur is limited to that
which we determine would be appropriate and permitted under
the Convention and consistent with our national export
controls on these heavily regulated items.
I ask unanimous consent that this letter be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
The White House,
Washington, April 15, 1997.
Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
Washington, DC.
Dear Joe: During the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's
hearings last week, concerns were again raised about the
impact of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on the
ability of rogue states to acquire advanced chemical defense
or chemical manufacturing technology. I would like to take
the opportunity to elaborate further on these issues and set
the record straight.
First and foremost, I would like to take issue with the
charge that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and
the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), which have language
similar to the CWC on promoting trade for peaceful purposes,
have hastened the spread of these dangerous weapons and
technologies. In fact, export controls in these areas have
been made tougher and these controls, as well as the treaties
themselves, have gained the support of more and more
countries over the years. In the early 1960s, President
Kennedy predicted that there would be 15-20 nuclear weapon
states by the 1970s. Due largely to the NPT, that number if
far lower today. Controls on biological weapons continue to
be strengthened, including in 1992, when the Australia Group
decided to add biological pathogens and related equipment to
their list of controlled items.
The CWC, like the NPT and the BWC, will result in a
strengthened export control regime on dangerous chemicals.
The CWC allows for maintenance and strengthening of the
controls already in place, while also formally expanding
controls over a broad range of chemicals and precursors. The
CWC also prohibits novel agents which are not currently
covered. The informal Australia Group consists of 30
countries, while the CWC has been ratified by 72 countries
and the list is growing. Furthermore, the CWC provides for
trade restrictions against states who are not party to the
treaty.
Regarding the specific CWC Articles in question, one area
of concern has been whether Article X of the CWC might force
us to share advanced chemical defense technologies and
equipment with rogue nations like Iran and to assist in the
development of CW defensive capabilities. Let me assure you
that Article X does not require the U.S. or any other Party
to the treaty to share its advanced chemical weapons defense
technologies and equipment with countries such
[[Page S3633]]
as Iran or to assist them in the development of such
capabilities.
Although Paragraph 7 of Article 10 obligates States Parties
to provide assistance through the treaty organization in
response to a request by a State Party that has either been
threatened by the use of chemical weapons or has had chemical
weapons used against it, assistance is broadly defined in the
article as including medical antidotes and treatments.
Article X provides complete flexibility to States Parties to
determine what type of assistance they provide and how they
provide it. A State Party's obligation under paragraph 7 of
Article X may be met in one of three ways--by contributing
monies to a voluntary fund (managed by the treaty
organization); by concluding an agreement with the
organization concerning the procurement, if requested, of
specific types of assistance; or by declaring (within 180
days after the CWC's entry-into-force) the kind of assistance
it might provide in response to an appeal by the
organization.
To meet its obligations under Article X, therefore, the
U.S. can choose from a variety of options and forms of
assistance. In no case would we be required to share advanced
chemical defense technology and equipment, or even to provide
older model gas masks. During our extensive negotiations with
Majority Leader Lott and the Task Force he established on the
CWC, the Administration has agreed to a binding condition,
regarding Article X, on the resolution of ratification that
will ensure that no assistance other than medical antidotes
and treatments is provided by the United States to any
country of concern.
A particular concern has also been raised about Paragraph 3
of Article X. This paragraph states that ``Each Party
undertakes to facilitate, and shall have the right to
participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment,
material and scientific and technological information
concerning means of protection against chemical weapons.''
The inclusion of the words ``facilitate'' and ``possible''
underscores that no specific exchange is required and that
any exchange which does occur is limited to that which we
determine would be appropriate and permitted under the
Convention and consistent with our national export controls
on these heavily regulated items. Paragraph 3 of Article X
does not override any other rights and obligations under
international law, such as the right to have export controls.
The concerns about Article X also include whether other
less scrupulous countries might seek to use this article as
an excuse to profiteer by giving away defense secrets. This
concern misses the main point, which is that any such
unscrupulous exchanges can take place now without the CWC.
With the CWC, the countries undertaking any exchanges in
Article X are legally bound by the fundamental obligation of
the treaty in Article I, which obligates Parties never to ``.
. . assist, encourage, or induce, in any way, anyone to
engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this
Convention.'' The Chemical Weapons Convention will mean not
only that all relevant trade is subject to closer
scrutiny, especially with countries whose compliance may
be in doubt, but it will also provide the legal basis as
well as the verification and compliance measures to
redress those compliance concerns.
In this regard, concern has been raised specifically that
Paragraph 6 of Article X could provide the basis for other
Parties to argue that they must share defensive technologies.
Paragraph 6 states that ``Nothing in this Convention shall be
interpreted as impeding the right of States Parties to
request and provide assistance bilaterally . . . concerning
the emergency procurement of assistance.'' This paragraph
does not require or obligate a Party to provide emergency
bilateral assistance, but simply states that a party may
choose to provide such emergency assistance. Again, I would
underscore that with the CWC in force, any exchange of CW
defense assistance takes place within the framework of the
fundamental obligations of the treaty not to assist anyone in
acquiring a chemical weapons capability.
A specific concern also has been raised that Paragraph 5 of
Article X could be read to require the release of advanced
and classified information about defensive capabilities and
technologies. This is simply not the case. Paragraph 5
requires the international Technical Secretariat which will
administer the Convention to establish and maintain ``for the
use of any requesting State Party, a data bank containing
freely available information concerning various means of
protection against chemical weapons as well as such
information as may be provided by States Parties.'' As stated
in the Article-by-Article Analysis submitted to the Senate on
November 23, 1993, ``freely available'' means ``from open
public sources.'' Further, the CWC imposes no obligation on
States Parties to contribute to this database. Hence, the
provision does not require the release of classified or
otherwise sensitive information about U.S. chemical defense
capabilities.
A second area of concern has been whether Article XI of the
CWC, which relates to cooperation in the field of chemical
activities for purposes not prohibited by the CWC, might
force our industry to share dual-use technologies and
manufacturing secrets with other nations. This is not what
the treaty says. Let me assure you that Article XI does not
require private businesses to release such proprietary or
otherwise confidential business information, nor does it
require the U.S. Government to force private businesses to
undertake such actions.
Article XI is explicitly subject to the fundamental ban in
Article I on assisting anyone in acquiring a chemical weapons
capability. Here again, far from undercutting export
controls, the CWC will be a basis for stronger controls,
enforced by more countries. I want to make clear that the
export controls that we and other Australia Group members
have undertaken, as well as our own national export
controls, are fully consistent with the CWC and will
further its implementation. This is not just a U.S.
Government position. In recent weeks, we have instructed
our embassies to confirm with our Australia Group partners
that they agree that the Group's export control and
nonproliferation measures are fully compatible with the
CWC. Our partners have confirmed this and have also
confirmed that they are committed to maintaining such
export control and nonproliferation measures in the
future.
In order to address the concerns raised about Article XI,
the Administration has agreed to a binding condition in our
negotiations with the Majority Leader's Task Force that would
have the President certify prior to the deposit of our
instrument of ratification that nothing in the Convention
obligates us to accept any weakening of our export controls,
that we maintain the right to impose export controls
unilaterally or collectively on chemicals and chemical
production technology, and that each member of the Australia
Group agrees that its export controls and nonproliferation
measures are consistent with the CWC and is committed to
maintaining such controls in the future.
Furthermore, as prescribed in the condition, the President
must certify on an annual basis that the Australia Group
continues to maintain equivalent or more effective controls
over exports and that it remains a viable mechanism for
limiting the spread of chemical and biological weapons-
related materials. If this certification cannot be made, the
President must consult with the Senate for the purpose of
obtaining a resolution of continued adherence to the
Convention.
I hope this information facilitates the Senate's
consideration of the CWC. I look forward to continuing to
work with you and other CWC supporters to ensure a successful
vote on this vital treaty in the days ahead.
Sincerely,
Samuel R. Berger,
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs.
Mr. BIDEN. Moreover, as with any treaty, this paragraph must be read
in light of the object and purpose of the convention. The purpose of
the treaty, quite obviously, is to ban chemical weapons.
And any nation which provides technology to a country of concern
would find itself in violation of the overriding obligation of Article
One of the treaty, which requires states ``never under any circumstance
* * * to assist, encourage, or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in
any activity prohibited to a state party under this Convention.''
This is an overriding obligation. It governs everything you do under
the treaty.
Ronald Lehman, the head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
during the Reagan Administration, stated during a recent Foreign
Relations Committee hearing that:
We made it very clear throughout the negotiations that all
of this was subject to [A]rticle I, which is the fundamental
obligation [under the Convention] not to assist. So we
reiterated that again and again and again. But the most
important, I think, telling factoid in support of the U.S.
interpretation is the fact that after the Convention was done
so many of the usual list of suspects were so unhappy that
they did not get what they wanted in these provisions.
On this point, I would also like to refer to a letter submitted to me
by a group of eminent legal scholars, including Abe Chayes of Harvard
Law School, former State Department legal adviser, and Elliot
Richardson, former Secretary of Defense and former Attorney General.
They write that the language in paragraph three which discusses that
each State Party has the right to ``participate in exchanges of
equipment'' is axiomatic--that is, it ``merely reaffirms current trade
policies that allow nations to exchange goods and services. Each State
Party retains the right to participate in this trade at the level of
its own choosing, including not to trade at all. There is no
affirmative duty to trade * * *.''
I ask unanimous consent to have the letter printed in the Record at
this point.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
April 23, 1997.
Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Biden: You have asked us to state whether
Articles X and XI of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
require
[[Page S3634]]
States Parties to ``undertake to share everything that is
hard to achieve in a chemical weapons capability'' thereby
enabling States Parties to develop a ``militarily effective
chemical weapons capability.''
Before analyzing Articles X and XI, we note that the CWC
primarily obligates all States Parties, as set forth in
Article I, ``never under any circumstances'' to ``assist,
encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any
activity'' prohibited under the CWC. This includes the
obligations not to develop, produce, stockpile, acquire or
retain chemical weapons, and not to engage in any military
preparations to use chemical weapons. As it is axiomatic that
all treaty provisions must be interpreted in view of the
purposes and objects of that treaty and that a subsidiary
obligation should never be read out of context to authorize
behavior that would contravene a primary obligation, nothing
in Article X or XI may undermine Article I by assisting a
country in developing a chemical weapons capability.
Article X is titled ``Assistance and Protection Against
Chemical Weapons.'' Paragraph (7) is the only provision in
Article X which contains a specific obligation: each State
Party must elect to take one or more of three specified
measures of assistance. Under Agreed Condition 15 to the
Resolution of Ratification of Advice and Consent, the United
States, to meet its commitments, will only provide medical
antidotes and treatment to states not eligible for assistance
under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Nothing in
paragraph (7) can remotely be construed as requiring the
United States to provide equipment or assistance that would
enhance a rogue state's offensive or defensive chemical
weapons capability; again, a proper reading of the treaty as
a whole would prohibit the provision of assistance that would
encourage such a result.
Paragraph 2 clarifies that the CWC does not restrict a
State Party from researching chemical weapon protection
capabilities for purposes not prohibited. Paragraph 6
clarifies that the CWC does not impede parties from providing
assistance or entering into bilateral agreements concerning
the emergency procurement of assistance. Neither of these
paragraphs compels any conduct whatsoever but merely enables
States Parties to pursue these activities without fear of
being in breach.
Article X, paragraph 3, asserts that: ``Each State Party
undertakes to facilitate, and shall have the right to
participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment,
material and scientific and technological information
concerning means of protection against chemical weapons. In
our view, nothing in paragraph (3) requires the United States
to provide any particular matter or information. Accordingly,
this paragraph would require the United States to withhold,
either unilaterally or as part of a multilateral group,
materials or information that could enhance the chemical
weapons capability of any particular state.
That each State Party has the right to participate in
exchanges of equipment, etc. regarding chemical weapons
protection merely reaffirms current trade policies that allow
nations to exchange goods and services. Each State Party
retains the right to participate in this trade to the level
of its own choosing, including not to trade at all. There is
no affirmative duty to trade, but only a reaffirmation that
States Parties wishing to trade may do so without fear of
contravening the CWC. Under recognized principles of treaty
interpretation, the use of the intentionally vague and weak
verb ``undertakes to facilitate'' conveys no specific
affirmative obligation nor would the refusal to trade in
sensitive items support even the most tenuous claim that the
United States has breached its obligations.
Article XI is titled ``Economic and Technological
Development'' and seeks to balance free trade in chemicals,
equipment and technology with the prevention of proliferation
of chemical weapons. It is modeled on Article X of the
Biological Weapons Convention and is analogous to Article IV
of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) dealing with
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Subparagraphs (b), (c), (d),
and (e) of paragraph 2 address the right of each State Party
to participate ``in the fullest possible exchange'' of
information; generally prohibits restrictions on trade; and
prohibits using the Convention as grounds for measures not
provided under the CWC. Only paragraph (2)(e) contains an
affirmative obligation: each State Party must review its
existing national regulations to make them consistent with
the CWC. The remainder of its provisions clarify that the CWC
should not restrict commercial and research activity that
would be otherwise permissible. Moreover, these provisions
are explicitly balanced against general provisions,
including: (1) ``without prejudice to the principles and
applicable rules of international law,'' (2) ``for purposes
not prohibited under this Convention'', (3) ``other peaceful
purposes'', and (4) to ``render them consistent with the
objects and purpose of the Convention''.
Article XI, when read in its entirety and together with
Article I, undoubtedly permits the United States to continue
national security controls over exports of chemical weapons
material, equipment and dual use items. We believe that
Agreed Condition 7 to the Resolution of Ratification of
Advice and Consent the continuing vitality of the Australia
Group and national export controls is consistent with Article
X and XI, and the CWC as a whole. Accordingly, we believe
that Agreed Condition 7 should alleviate concerns raised by
critics of the CWC concerning United States obligations under
Articles X or XI. Furthermore, we would note that the United
States has never been prevented (or seriously challenged)
from legally pursuing unilateral and multilateral export
controls on nuclear technology that it deems necessary on
national security grounds, despite objections from certain
states citing Article IV of the NPT. We do not believe that
the CWC requires any different course.
Throughout the Chemical Weapons Convention is a manifest
effort to balance the elimination of chemical weapons with
the legitimate security requirements of States as well as
their legitimate need to use, develop and trade chemicals for
commercial purposes. The critical characterization of the CWC
quoted in the first paragraph of this letter focuses on
selected provisions of the CWC reflecting only one side of
this balancing effort, misreads those provisions to render
them obligatory instead of voluntary or conditional, and
ignores the language of the treaty as well as principles of
international law. We disagree. We do not believe Articles X
and XI require the United States to take any steps contrary
to its security interests. Accordingly, we do believe that
Disagreed Condition 32, which would require an amendment to
strike Article X and amend Article XI, is legally unnecessary
to preserve U.S. security interests if the United States
ratifies the CWC.
Respectfully,
Abe Chayes,
Harvard Law School.
Elliot L. Richardson,
Former Secretary of Defense and Attorney General, Nixon
Administration.
Michael Moodie,
Former Bush Administration arms control negotiator.
John B. Rhinelander,
Former deputy legal advisor and arms control negotiator,
Nixon Administration.
George Bunn,
Center for International Security and Arms Control,
Stanford University.
Barry Kellman,
DePaul University Law School.
David Koplow,
Georgetown University Law School.
Mr. BIDEN. More to the point, even if we were obligated--which we're
not, we maintain export controls on chemical defense equipment. In
other words, we do not allow it to be sold to the rogue states.
The only specific obligation contained in Article Ten is in paragraph
seven, which is where you provide assistance to nations facing attack
by chemical weapons.
This provision also has much flexibility--it allows a nation to
choose one of three methods for providing assistance.
But to ensure that this paragraph does not become a loophole, we have
added a binding condition, condition number fifteen, which limits the
type of assistance we will provide--at least when it comes to countries
ineligible for economic or military assistance, which includes the
rogue states--to medical antidotes and treatment.
Let me now turn to Article Eleven. The proponents of this condition
contend that this article requires us to weaken our export controls
under the CWC.
There is nothing in the CWC that requires us to weaken our export
controls. But just to ensure that there isn't any doubt, we have agreed
to a binding condition that addresses the problem.
Condition seven requires the President to certify that nothing in the
Convention requires us to weaken our export controls, and that the
Australia Group--an informal group of potential supplier states to
which the United States belongs--will continue to maintain controls
over chemical weapons precursors that are equal to, or exceed, those in
effect today.
the Australia Group has already indicated, as a group, that it would
maintain its export controls. On October 17, 1996--a little more
recently than the statement read by the Senator from Arizona--the
Australia Group stated that the ``maintenance of effective export
controls will remain an essential practical means of fulfilling
obligations under the CWC.''
But just to be sure, I asked the administration to ask each country--
individually--whether it intended to maintain existing levels of
controls. The answers have come back--all in
[[Page S3635]]
the affirmative--as the president stated today in his letter to the
majority leader.
Finally, the President committed today, in the event that either
Article Ten or Article Eleven to legitimate trade in a manner that
endangers our security, the President will consult promptly with
Congress on whether we should withdraw from the Convention.
This is an extraordinary commitment. So I hope it resolves everyone's
concern.
Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of the time on the bill. I
think I have used up all the time on the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is 1 minute remaining on the amendment.
Mr. BIDEN. Oh, there is 1 minute remaining on the amendment? Mr.
President, in that case I have another 10 minutes.
No, if the majority is ready to yield back their time, I will yield
back my minute.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.
Mr. HELMS. A bum deal, just like this treaty.
Mr. BIDEN. I reserve the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I always enjoy holding court with my friend
from Delaware. We have had some of these debates in the past, and this
is the thing that lawyers like to argue about, but I believe that most
lawyers will agree with me that what they learned in law school was
that the specific provisions of the contract always prevail over a
general statement at the beginning of the contract. There are a lot of
rules of instruction. Later provisions generally govern over previous
provisions on the theory that you later describe your intent, fully
cognizant of what existed before. The same thing is true with specific
provisions of the contract, and that is why article I is called, not
``CWC article I,'' but rather ``general article.'' ``Article I, General
Obligations.''
Then article II is definitions, and after that are the specifics.
This is the reason why the Australia Group itself issued a statement
right after this convention was entered into undertaking to review, in
light of the implementation of the convention, the measures that they
take to ``prevent the spread of chemical substances and equipment for
purposes contrary to the objectives of the convention with the aim of
removing such measures for the benefit of states parties to the
convention acting in full compliance with the obligations under the
convention.''
Australia Group members would not have had to do this under the
interpretation of the convention by my friend from Delaware. Rather,
they began to do this because they read articles X and XI the same as
the many experts do that I cited earlier as limiting our ability to
impose trade restrictions on states parties to the convention. That is
why it says we will undertake to facilitate, and the other states
parties have the right to the fullest possible trade in these chemical
weapons. This is not just my view. I read to you what Secretary Cheney
said before, James Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense and head of
the CIA. It is plain that article X legitimizes such transfers.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware has 33 seconds.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in
the Record a letter dated October 17, 1996--speaking of superseding--
which supersedes the statement referred to by my colleague about the
Australia Group. It says:
In this context, the maintenance of effective export
controls will remain an essential practical means of
fulfilling obligations under the CWC and the BTWC.
Translated into ordinary English, it means that we adhere to the
commitment we made in the Australia Group with export controls. We
believe it is consistent with the CWC and required by the CWC.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
Australia Group Meeting
Australia Group participants held informal consultations in
Paris between Oct. 14-17, to discuss the continuing problem
of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) proliferation.
Participants at these talks were Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the
European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom
and the United States, with the Republic of Korea taking part
for the first time.
Paticipants maintain a strong belief that full adherence to
the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and to the Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) will be the best way to
eliminate these types of particularly inhumane weapons from
the world's arsenals. In this context, the maintenance of
effective export controls will remain an essential practical
means of fulfilling obligations under the CWC and the BTWC.
All participants at the meeting welcomed the expected entry
into force of the CWC*, noting that this long-awaited step
will be an important, historic moment in international
efforts to prohibit chemical weapons. Participants agreed to
issue a separate statement on this matter, which is attached.
Participants also welcomed the progress of efforts to
strengthen the BTWC in the negotiations taking place in the
Ad Hoc Group of BTWC States Parties in Geneva. All Australia
Group participating countries are also States Parties to this
Treaty, and strongly support efforts to develop
internationally-agreed procedures for strengthening
international confidence in the treaty regime by verifying
compliance with BTWC obligations.
Experts from participating countries discussed national
export licensing systems aimed at preventing inadvertent
assistance to the production of CBW. They confirmed that
participants administered export controls in a streamlined
and effective manner which allows trade and the exchange of
technology for peaceful purposes to flourish. They agreed to
continue working to focus these national measures efficiently
and solely on preventing any contribution to chemical and
biological weapons programs. Participants noted that the
value of these measures in inhibiting CBW proliferation
benefited not only the countries participating in the
Australia Group, but the whole international community.
Participants also agreed to continue a wide range of
contacts, including a further program of briefings for
countries not participating in the Paris consultations to
further awareness and understanding of national policies in
this area. Participants endorsed in this context the
importance of regional seminars as valuable means of widening
contacts with other countries on these issues. In particular,
Romania's plans to host a seminar on CBW export controls for
Central and Eastern European countries and the Commonwealth
of Independent States in Bucharest on Oct. 21-22 and Japan's
plans to host a fourth Asian Export Control Seminar in Tokyo
in early 1997 were warmly welcomed by participants. Argentina
will also host a regional seminar on non-proliferation
matters, in Buenous Aires, in the first week of December
1996. France will organize a seminar for French-speaking
countries on the implementation of the CWC. This will take
place shortly before entry into force of the Convention.
The meeting also discussed relevant aspects of terrorist
interest in CBW and agreed that this serious issue requires
continuing attention.
Participants agreed to hold further consultations in
October 1997.
AUSTRALIA GROUP COUNTRIES WELCOME PROSPECTIVE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE
CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
The countries participating in the Australia Group warmly
welcomed the expected entry into force of the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC) during a meeting of the Group in
Paris in October 1996. They noted that the long awaited
commencement of the CWC regime, including the establishment
of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,
will be an historic watershed in global efforts to abolish
chemical weapons for all time. They also noted that all
states adhering to the CWC are obliged to ensure their
national activities support the goal of a world free of
chemical weapons.
All of the participating countries reiterated their
previous statement underlining their intention to be among
the original States Parties to the CWC. They noted that 24 of
the 30 countries participating in the Australia Group have
already ratified the Convention. Representatives also
recalled their previous expressions of support for the CWC,
and reaffirmed these commitments. They restated their view
that the effective operation and implementation of the CWC
offers the best means available to the international
community to rid the world of these weapons for all time.
They called on all signatories to ratify the CWC as soon as
possible, and on the small number of countries which have not
signed the Treaty to join the regime and thereby contribute
to international efforts to ban these weapons.
Representatives at the Australia Group meeting recalled
that all of the participating countries are taking steps at
the national level to ensure that relevant national
regulations promote the object and purpose of the CWC and are
fully consistent with the Convention's provisions when the
CWC enters into force for each of these countries. They noted
that the practical experience each
[[Page S3636]]
country had obtained in operating export licensing systems
intended to prevent assistance to chemical weapons programs
have been especially valuable in each country's preparations
for implementation of key obligations under the CWC. They
noted in this context, that these national systems are aimed
solely at avoiding assistance for activities which are
prohibited under the Convention, while ensuring they do not
restrict or impede trade and other exchanges facilitated by
the CWC.
Mr. BIDEN. We are ready to vote, Mr. President.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired. The question is on
agreeing to amendment No. 51. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The
clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
The result was announced--yeas 66, nays 34, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 50 Ex.]
YEAS--66
Akaka
Baucus
Biden
Bingaman
Boxer
Breaux
Bryan
Bumpers
Byrd
Chafee
Cleland
Coats
Cochran
Collins
Conrad
D'Amato
Daschle
DeWine
Dodd
Domenici
Dorgan
Durbin
Feingold
Feinstein
Ford
Frist
Glenn
Gorton
Graham
Hagel
Harkin
Hatch
Hollings
Inouye
Jeffords
Johnson
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Kohl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lugar
McCain
Mikulski
Moseley-Braun
Moynihan
Murray
Reed
Reid
Robb
Roberts
Rockefeller
Roth
Sarbanes
Smith (OR)
Snowe
Specter
Stevens
Torricelli
Warner
Wellstone
Wyden
NAYS--34
Abraham
Allard
Ashcroft
Bennett
Bond
Brownback
Burns
Campbell
Coverdell
Craig
Enzi
Faircloth
Gramm
Grams
Grassley
Gregg
Helms
Hutchinson
Hutchison
Inhofe
Kempthorne
Kyl
Lott
Mack
McConnell
Murkowski
Nickles
Santorum
Sessions
Shelby
Smith (NH)
Thomas
Thompson
Thurmond
The amendment (No. 51) was agreed to.
Mr. HELMS. I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. BIDEN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. DASCHLE addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The minority leader.
Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be allowed
to use the 5 minutes allocated to each leader for purposes of closing
debate in addition to my 15 minutes for the leader in an effort to make
my statement at this point in the debate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, let me begin by commending the
distinguished majority leader for his leadership on this issue and for
his eloquent statement earlier today. I think he spoke for a large
number of the American people, both Republicans and Democrats in coming
to the conclusion he did about this treaty. I rise to commend him and
to support him in the decision that he made.
I also wish to commend the distinguished ranking member of the
Foreign Relations Committee, the Senator from Delaware, for his
leadership on our side of the aisle. No one could have managed this
bill better. And we could not have come to this point were it not for
the remarkable commitment he has made in the effort to pass this
treaty. I thank him for his leadership in bringing us to this point
tonight.
Under the terms of article II, section 2 of the Constitution, the
Senate alone was granted the power to advise and consent to treaties
made by the President. Our Founding Fathers also decided that approval
by a simple majority was simply not sufficient for legislation of this
magnitude. Instead, they established the requirement that two-thirds of
the Senate must support a treaty for it to take effect.
This is as it should be. There is no more important or unique power
assigned to the Senate by the Constitution than the authority to
provide advice and consent on treaties. With this authority, however,
comes obligations. Senators must examine a treaty not through a prism
of narrow political pursuits, but rather from the perspective of broad
national interests.
Put simply, the most important question we should ask ourselves when
considering the Chemical Weapons Convention, or any other treaty, is,
does this make sense for the Nation and are its citizens more secure?
Mr. President, after a thorough review of this treaty, its
negotiating history, and the 28 conditions added by the Senate, I
believe the answer to this question is a resounding and unqualified
yes.
The Chemical Weapons Convention bans the development, production,
stockpiling, and use of toxic chemicals as weapons. A look at the
negotiating history of the CWC reveals that this treaty is truly a
bipartisan product. Negotiations, as has been mentioned now on several
occasions throughout the day, began with President Reagan in the early
1980s.
While the bulk of the negotiations and most of the difficult
decisions occurred during the Bush administration, President Clinton
finished the work started by his two predecessors and submitted the
treaty to the Senate for consideration in November of 1993.
The Senate's counsel on crucial issues was sought and provided
repeatedly throughout the course of the decade-long negotiations.
Playing an especially important role in this regard was the Senate's
Arms Control Observer Group, a bipartisan gathering of Senators with
special interests and expertise in arms control matters. Currently,
Senators Stevens and Byrd lead the group.
In addition, since the treaty has been before the Senate for nearly 3
years, Members have had ample opportunity to request the information
needed to reach their judgment, and more than sufficient time to carry
out a thorough examination of the treaty's impact on our national
security.
During that 3-year period, nearly 20 hearings have been conducted in
several different Senate committees, including Armed Services, Foreign
Relations, Intelligence, and Judiciary. In addition, the administration
has made available over 1,500 pages of documentation on the Chemical
Weapons Convention and answered over 300 questions from Senators and
their staffs.
Moreover, as a result of intensive, around-the-clock negotiating
sessions between the administration, Senator Helms and Senator Biden,
the resolution of ratification now contains 28 separate conditions on
the U.S. Senate's resolution of ratification. That is 28 individual
clarifications by the Senate about the terms and conditions under which
the U.S. would enter into the Chemical Weapons Convention. These
conditions were the product of over 100 hours of discussion. And I am
told that the vast majority of the conditions address problems first
raised by Republicans. I think it is safe to say that these list of
conditions address virtually every legitimate concern that has been
raised about the potential impact of the CWC on our national security
and economy.
Mr. President, we must now evaluate what has been revealed during
this process that has spanned three Presidential Administrations and
includes numerous hearings, briefings and mounds of documents. What
have we determined about the merits of the CWC in the nearly 3\1/2\
years since President Clinton submitted it to us?
First, officials from previous Administrations who were involved in
the CWC negotiations support the treaty. General Brent Scowcroft, the
National Security Advisor to Presidents Reagan and Bush, has said the
following:
``The time has come for the Senate to uphold U.S.
leadership in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction by providing its consent to the [Chemical
Weapons] Convention.
And President Bush himself, in a February meeting with Secretary of
State Madeleine Albright and former Secretary of State James Baker,
noted:
``I . . . strongly support efforts to get this chemical
weapons treaty approved. This should be beyond partisanship.
I think it is vitally important for the United States to be
out front. . . . We don't need chemical weapons, and we ought
to get out front and make clear that we are opposed to others
having them.''
Second, what are the views of America's chemical manufacturers--the
industry that will be most directly affected by the provisions of the
CWC? The chemical industry is America's largest export industry,
posting $60 billion in export sales last year alone. Opponents of this
treaty claim its ratification will lead to onerous and costly
[[Page S3637]]
restrictions and regulations on this industry as well as the exposure
of confidential, proprietary information.
The chemical industry has repeatedly refuted these claims; yet, it
appears that CWC's critics are so blinded by their ideological zeal to
kill all arms control treaties that they cannot take no for an answer.
One of the industry's best responses was contained in a letter sent
late last year to the distinguished Majority leader, Senator Lott. This
letter is an important one, so I will quote it at length:
``The chemical industry has long supported the Chemical
Weapons Convention. Our industry participated in negotiating
the agreement and in U.S. and international implementation
efforts. The treaty contains substantial protections for
confidential business information. We know because industry
helped to draft these provisions . . . In short, our industry
has thoroughly examined and tested this Convention. We have
concluded that the benefits of the CWC far outweigh the
costs. . . . Indeed, the real price would come from not
ratifying the CWC. . . . If the Senate does not vote in favor
of the CWC, we stand to lose hundreds of millions of dollars
in overseas sales, putting at risk thousands of good-paying
American jobs.''
So says the chemical industry in a letter signed by the CEOs of 53 of
America's preeminent chemical manufacturers. Signees include the ARCO
Chemical Company, the Ashland Chemical Company, the Bayer Corporation,
the B.F. Goodrich Company, the Dow Chemical Company, the Eastman
Chemical Company, the E.I. Dupont Company, the Exon Chemical Company
and the Monsanto Company. I should also note that these companies
issued this statement before we agreed upon the 28 conditions I
discussed earlier, several of which would further reduce the
possibility that proprietary information from American businesses would
fall into the hands of our adversaries.
Well, Mr. President, what about the military? After all, it is our
men and women in uniform who must face, as they did in Desert Storm,
the threat of an attack from lethal chemical weapons. Make no mistake.
We are talking about invisible and instantaneous killers. What about
our people in the Pentagon who have to make the decisions that may
ultimately lead to the exposure of our troops to that insidious threat?
General Shalikashvili, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:
``The potential benefits of the Chemical Weapons Convention
will have a positive impact on the lives of our service
people and how the U.S. military fulfills its responsibility
to national security.''
In another appearance before the Foreign Relations Committee, General
Shalikashvili noted:
``From a military perspective, the Chemical Weapons
Convention is clearly in our national interest. The non-
proliferation aspects of the convention will retard the
spread of chemical weapons and, in so doing, reduce the
probability that U.S. forces may encounter chemical weapons
in a regional conflict.''
Some may argue that General Shalikashvili is but one general who was
appointed by President Clinton. To those skeptics, let me say three
things. First, General Shalikashvili's record of service to this
country is unparalleled. Second, a comprehensive review of this record
will not reveal a single instance where he failed to offer anything but
than his objective, untarnished opinion. Third, he is not alone.
An April 3 letter to the President states the following:
The CWC destroys stockpiles that could threaten our troops;
it significantly improves our intelligence capabilities; and
it creates new international sanctions to punish those states
who remain outside of the treaty. For these reasons, we
strongly support the CWC.
Mr. President, that letter was sent on behalf of 16 three- and four-
star generals and admirals, including Colin Powell, John Vessey, and
Norman Schwartzkopf. This letter, in addition to an endorsement by
David Jones, means that every occupant in the last 20 years of the
position of chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this Nation's
highest military office, has come out in support of the CWC.
The final group the Senate has heard from in its efforts to weigh the
pros and cons of the Chemical Weapons Convention is the intelligence
community. The task of verifying this treaty, like other arms control
treaties, ultimately falls on the shoulders of the Central Intelligence
and the other organizations within the intelligence community. Despite
the most comprehensive, intrusive verification regime in the history of
arms control, critics of CWC argue that it is unverifiable; if they had
their way, the Senate would reject the CWC because the intelligence
community will be unable to detect any violations of the treaty itself.
But in this case, the perfect is the enemy of the good.
While the intelligence community has rightly acknowledged that it
cannot detect any production of chemical agents--anywhere or at
anytime--it has also said that it can effectively verify the provisions
of this treaty. Moreover, the critics' argument ignores the fact that,
with or without the Chemical Weapons Convention, our intelligence
community will still seek to collect information on efforts by foreign
nations to develop and produce chemical weapons. The more important
question is whether our intelligence and nonproliferation efforts are
helped or hindered by the adoption of the treaty.
According to James Woolsey, then director of the Central Intelligence
Agency, and since confirmed by George Tenet, acting director of the
CIA:
The Intelligence community has the broader mission--with or
without the treaty--of detecting the existence and assessing
the threat from chemical weapons programs of any country.
This mission must be carried out regardless of whether we
have the additional requirement to assess such activities
against the provisions of the treaty. And it is to this
broader mission that the CWC can make a significant
contribution.
The Senate has heard from President Reagan's National Security
Advisor, from President Bush, from the leading figures in the chemical
industry, from the current chairman of the JCS, three of his
predecessors and 14 other three- and four-star generals and admirals,
and from the intelligence community. Each of these groups and
individuals have looked at the CWC from their unique perspectives and
interests and each has reached the same conclusion: the Senate should
support this treaty and should do so promptly.
Mr. President, I would submit since the Senate received the CWC
treaty for its advice and consent, one other group has spoken all too
loudly to us: those who commit terrorist acts. In the 3\1/2\ years this
treaty has been before the Senate, terrorist incidents have occurred
with a sickening and disturbing regularity: the sarin gas attack in the
Tokyo subway; the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma
City; the attack on Khobar Towers in Dharan, Saudi Arabia; the
suspected bombing of TWA flight 800; the bombing in Olympic Park in
Atlanta. Each incident has painfully dramatized the fact that we live
in an age where, unfortunately, no one is inoculated against the threat
of terrorism. No community stands outside the reach of determined
terrorists. As President Clinton noted in a recent address, ``Terrorism
has become an equal opportunity destroyer, with no respect for
borders.''
This treaty is an opportunity to send a small message to those who
threaten our families, our communities and our way of life with their
unprovoked acts of violence.
The United States Senate has heard what terrorists have to say.
Today, with our votes on this treaty, we determine how the United
States Senate will respond to these acts. I hope we will send the
message that we are going to do all we can to ensure that these deadly
chemicals will never be the means terrorists employ to advance their
cause. It is time we said to the terrorists, on the issue of chemical
weapons, enough is enough.
Now the argument will be made that this treaty will not halt
terrorism, will not shut down the private laboratories of insane
extremists and will not halt the efforts of various rogue nations.
To a certain degree, that is probably true. But what this treaty will
do is begin the orchestration of a concert of nations--an orchestration
of civilized voices that speaks out forcefully against an unambiguous
evil.
Tonight America has the opportunity to make the moral stand. We are
destroying our own chemical stockpiles. We began that cleansing process
under President Reagan and it continues today. Why should we oppose a
treaty that demands the world to live up to a moral standard that we
have already willingly accepted ourselves? Why deprive ourselves of the
right to call upon our neighbors to live up to the example
[[Page S3638]]
that we in the United States are willing to act?
In summary, Mr. President, this is a necessary treaty. It has been
endorsed by a bipartisan group of Senators who are experts on this
issue, by advisors to Presidents Reagan and Bush, and President
Clinton, by the U.S. military, by our chemical industry and by our
intelligence community.
To all of this I would add two final points. First, over 80 percent
of the American people have indicated their support for ridding the
world of toxic agents by ratifying the CWC. Second, over 70 countries
have already ratified this treaty and thereby forsworn the use of
chemical weapons. Mr. President, this treaty is going to happen with or
without us. I urge the Members of this body to set aside partisan
differences, demonstrate leadership to our friends and enemies alike,
join with those who have already ratified this treaty and take the
first step toward eliminating these evil weapons. Mr. President, I ask
that the Senate ratify this treaty.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. BIDEN. How much time remains?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina has 21
minutes, the Senator from Delaware has 7 minutes, the Senator from
Vermont has 8\1/2\ minutes, and the majority leader has 5 minutes.
Mr. BIDEN. I yield myself such time as I may consume under the 7
minutes. I do not plan on using it all.
Mr. President, it has been a long road to this spot, this point. We
have had not only extensive debate in the last 2 days, we have had an
extensive debate on this floor, in committees, in the press, among
foreign policy experts, think-tank types, for the past 3 years. We
reached the point where we are constitutionally required to fulfill a
duty of either giving our consent to ratification or withholding it. As
both leaders have pointed out, it is maybe the most significant
responsibility delegated to the U.S. Senate
I realize that we sometimes stand on this floor, particularly when
any one of us and all of us have invested a significant amount of time
in one issue or another where we feel that we have spent most of our
waking hours for the past month, two, or three--everyone has
experienced that on this floor--and we tend to think that since we put
so much time into the passage of a piece of legislation, or in this
case, a treaty, that maybe it is the most important thing that the
Senate has done or could do because I guess we say to ourselves we
would not invest that much of our time, our energy, our mind, our soul,
into the effort if it was not so important.
Acknowledging that we all err on that side of thinking what we do is
sometimes more important than what it is, I respectfully suggest that
the vote each of us is about to cast on this treaty is likely to be the
most significant vote any of us cast in this Congress.
Twice today I have been referred to as the senior Senator from
Delaware. I want the record to show, I know I am the junior Senator. I
am the second most senior junior Senator in the United States. I have
been here 25 years, but that young man in the back there is the most
senior junior Senator, the distinguished Senator from South Carolina,
Senator Hollings, because the most senior Senator of senior Senators is
his colleague, Senator Thurmond.
Mr. President, I am not sure that there is any vote that I have cast
in the last 4 or 5 years that I think is as significant for the future
of the United States as this treaty. And as I said, and I will conclude
with this, not merely because of what the treaty attempts to do--and
that is, for the first time in the history of modern man, ban even the
possession of an entire category of weaponry--but that is not the
reason why this is the most important vote. We are at a juncture in our
history, Mr. President, in my opinion, where the United States has an
opportunity, which rarely comes to any nation in its history--it has
come to us, in my opinion, on two occasions--where our actions and our
leadership can literally, not figuratively--and it is not hyperbole--
can literally shape, at least on the margins, the future of the world.
After World War II, we stepped up to the plate. My father's
generation and my grandfather's generation and grandmother's and my
mother's generation stepped up to the plate. They did things, when we
look back on them, that must have taken incredible courage. Can you
imagine having over 10 million men still under arms and standing up as
a Senator, or as a President, or as a Secretary of State, and saying,
by the way, I want us now to send billions of dollars to those people
who killed our sons and daughters? That was the Marshall Plan. Can you
imagine the foresight it took and how difficult it must have been to
cast a vote to set up an outfit called NATO, of which Germany, our
sworn enemy that killed our sons and daughters, were members? Those
people had courage. But they did what the Senator from Indiana, Senator
Lugar, said: They led.
This is about leadership. This is about the role of the United States
in leading the world. If we refrain from exercising that opportunity--
and we will if we do not vote for this treaty--we will have passed up
an opportunity that, as I said, rarely comes to any nation in the
history of the world. We can affect, if we are wise, the behavior,
activity and actions for a generation to come, not for what is
contained in this treaty, but because of the leadership that was
demonstrated in drafting this treaty, in ratifying this treaty and
enforcing this treaty.
So, Mr. President, I realize that all of us--myself included--tend to
engage in hyperbole and rhetoric that doesn't mean the substance of
what we are talking about. But I honestly believe this is one of the
most important votes, in terms of the future of this country and its
ability to lead at a moment in history that seldom comes to any nation,
that may be the most important vote that any of us will cast. If we
embark on this path of continuing to engage the world and lead the
world, we maintain the reasonable prospect that we can make the world--
the world--a better place in which to live.
I yield the remainder of my time, and I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from North
Carolina.
Mr. HELMS. I am profoundly disappointed in the five votes of the
Senate on the important, vital amendments. After all the debate, all
the gallons of newspaper ink spilled, all of the negotiations--
ultimately, I had hoped for better. But so be it.
There isn't a person in this room, rhetoric aside, who can believe
that the amendments that we have just considered are ``killer
amendments.'' The nature of international relations, and of treaties is
that what is negotiated can be renegotiated, and if necessary,
negotiated anew. If our aim is a better future, what are a hundred more
meetings in Geneva, or Vienna or the Hague? These amendments would have
ensured that this treaty did no harm, even if it did no good.
Now, we must vote on a treaty that, stripped of these key
protections, four former Defense Secretaries have told us is contrary
to the national security interests of the United States.
The truth is that I cannot abide the pretense of action on a matter
as weighty as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. If we
ratify this treaty today, the Senate, with the President, will announce
to the world that we have done something about the scourge of chemical
weapons. We will pat ourselves on the back and go home.
But, Mr. President, we will have done nothing. And, worse than
nothing, we will have done harm. In the name of curbing the
proliferation of these chemicals, we will allow rogue states to gain
access to our most precious defense secrets. We will guarantee that
rogue nations of the World--both those who have signed this treaty and
those who have not--have the ability to manufacture chemical weapons
and penetrate our Nation's most advanced chemical defenses.
Article X and XI--``Poisons for Peace''--will foster the
proliferation of those very poisons. Anyone who doubts that need only
look to how Russia has abused similar provisions in the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty. The N.P.T.'s ``Atoms for Peace'' provisions
allows Russia to transfer to Iran, a terrorist state, a nuclear
reactor. Russia has argued that the sale is perfectly legal, and Russia
is right. Iran, despite its nuclear weapons program and its chemical
weapons program, is a nation
[[Page S3639]]
in full compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. And so it will
get one nuclear reactor from Russia, maybe more. And perhaps China will
throw in a reactor or two as well. And we can do nothing to stop it.
The administration says that we will not sell Iran chemical
technology or defensive gear under the similar provisions of the CWC.
We are not selling them nuclear reactors either. Russia is.
And it will not be the United States which provides Iran the chemical
technology. They will get it from Russia and China under ``Poisons for
Peace.'' And Iran will give it to its terrorist allies Syria and Libya,
who have not signed up to the treaty. And we will be powerless to
protest--because if we ratify this treaty, here, today, in this body,
we will have endorsed those transfers.
Now this morning the President has offered us some sweeteners for the
hemlock he is asking us to swallow. He promises to keep an eye on any
problems Articles X and XI may cause. I appreciate his willingness to
recognize the legitimacy of the concerns my colleagues and I have
expressed. However, I can't help but feel that this last ditch attempt
to buy off opponents to this dangerous treaty is nothing more than
empty promises.
I am a veteran of the counter-proliferation wars. Every week, I see
more and more classified information about proliferation activities
that should require the President, under existing law, to levy
sanctions against Russia, China, or both. We never do, and we won't
under the terms of the CWC with or without the assurances under Article
X and XI. The President doesn't want to fight with those 800-pound
gorillas. In much the same way as we will turn a blind eye while Russia
helps Iran get a nuclear weapon, we will allow others to develop
chemical weapons. And there won't be a darn thing we'll be able to do.
Should Articles 10 and 11 of the CWC be renegotiated? Yes. Did the
Senate err by stripping out the protections we inserted that would have
required the administration to do so? Yes. And I am deeply disappointed
that I was unable to convince my colleagues of the danger to the people
of the United States and our allies. We have made a terrible,
potentially cataclysmic, mistake today in ignoring the desperate need
to revise the terms of this treaty.
Without revision of Articles 10 and 11, this treaty is bad for
America, and bad for the world. It must be voted down. For it we ratify
this treaty, our children and our grandchildren will hold us
accountable. They will hold us accountable when Iran or Syria or Libya
or North Korea finally uses a chemical weapon--and they will do so--
built with technology they acquired thanks to Articles 10 and 11 of the
CWC. They will look back on this debate, look back on where each us of
stood, and--mark my words--they will hold us accountable.
Mr. President, let us listen to the wisdom of the four former
Secretaries of Defense, who have urged us to oppose this treaty. Let us
listen to the mountain of evidence--classified and unclassified--that
has been presented over the past two days as to the dangers posed by
this treaty. And most important, let us listen to our consciences. Let
us vote to reject the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Amendment No. 52
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for
its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from North Carolina [Mr. Helms], for Mr. Biden,
proposes an amendment numbered 52.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the
amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
On page 2, line 18, strike ``payments'' and insert ``any
payment''.
On page 6, line 3, strike ``the head of''.
On page 8, line 2, insert ``or such other organization, as
the case may be,'' after ``nization''.
On page 8, line 10, insert ``or the affiliated
organization'' after ``tion''.
On page 9, line 11, insert ``or the affiliated
organization'' after ``Organization''.
On page 9, line 17, insert ``or the affiliated
organization'' after ``Organization''.
On page 13, line 21, insert ``, and any official or
employee thereof'' after ``it''.
On page 14, line 5, insert ``, and any official or employee
thereof'' after ``functions''.
On page 15, lines 6 and 7, strike ``to United States
ratification'' and insert ``affecting the object and
purpose''.
On page 18, line 2, insert ``support for'' after
``resolution of''.
On page 20, line 12, strike ``citizens,'' and insert
``citizens and''.
On page 23, line 18, strike ``obligation'' and insert
``obligations''.
On page 25, line 19, strike the comma.
On page 32, line 13, insert ``of Representatives'' after
``House''.
On page 32, lines 19 and 20, strike ``Foreign Military
Sales, Foreign Military Financing,'' and insert ``Foreign
Military Sales and Foreign Military Financing under the Arms
Export Control Act''.
On page 34, line 1, strike ``Committee'' and insert
``Committees''.
On page 34, line 3, insert ``the'' after ``and''.
On page 37, line 11, insert a comma immediately after
``games''.
On page 40, line 9, strike ``of'' and insert ``for''.
On page 41, line 16, insert ``of the Convention'' after
``ratification''.
On page 47, line 19, insert ``the ratification of'' after
``to''.
On page 49, line 5, move the margin of ``(i)'' 2 ems to the
right.
On page 49, line 11, move the margin of ``(ii)'' 2 ems to
the right.
On page 49, line 16, move the margin of ``(iii)'' 2 ems to
the right.
On page 52, line 9, insert a comma after ``(D)''.
On page 53, line 21, strike the comma.
On page 55, line 4, insert ``a schedule of'' after ``to''.
On page 57, line 1, strike ``the'' the first place it
appears and insert ``to''.
On page 59, line 15, strike the comma.
On page 61, line 11, strike ``on an involuntary basis''.
On page 61, line 12, insert ``where consent has been
withheld,'' after ``States,''.
On page 8, line 8, insert ``, if accepted,'' after
``provision''.
On page 25, line 19, insert ``on Intelligence'' after
``tee''.
On page 27, line 7, strike ``is'' and insert ``are''.
On page 27, line 22, insert ``on Intelligence'' after
``Committee''.
On page 57, line 15, strike ``Ruanda'' and insert
``Rwanda''.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is agreed to.
The amendment (No. 52) was agreed to.
Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Mr. President, it was President Ronald Reagan who
said, ``Trust but verify.'' Sound advice I believe we should heed
today.
Reluctantly, I rise in opposition to the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Do I want to see the elimination of chemical weapons and deadly
poisons? Absolutely. Will the proposed treaty actually prevent the use
of chemical weapons? Not in my opinion. As I've listened carefully to
all of the arguments, I have concluded the proposed treaty will not do
what it is intended to do, and, in fact, may actually do more harm than
good.
Again, trust but verify.
Like many Americans, I took notice when four recent Secretaries of
Defense came out in opposition to the Chemical Weapons Convention. The
opposition of Secretaries Schlesinger, Cheney, Rumsfeld and Weinberger
is based, in part, on the fact that the treaty is not verifiable. In
other words, we have no way of knowing if our ``partners'' in this
agreement are living up to their end of the deal. Like the four former
Secretaries of Defense, I am troubled by statements by CIA and
Department of Defense officials that admit they do not have ``high
confidence'' the treaty can be verified, key provisions ``can be
thwarted'' and detection of small amounts of chemical weapons ``will
admittedly be extremely difficult.'' In my mind, the admission of
Clinton Administration officials that the treaty is not verifiable
raises serious questions about the value of the agreement.
The Chemical Weapons Treaty also contains provisions, Articles X and
XI, which mandate the sharing of all chemical equipment and technology,
including chemical weapons defensive technology, with other countries.
These provisions might allow countries like Iran and Iraq to acquire
advanced defensive technologies so they can improve their chemical
weapons combat capability. This exchange of technical information,
mandated by the treaty, may also be used to develop ways to defeat our
chemical weapons defensive technology. Because of these flaws in the
treaty, Secretary Cheney wrote ``In my judgement, the treaty's Articles
X and XI amount to a formula for greatly accelerating the proliferation
of chemical warfare capabilities around the
[[Page S3640]]
globe.'' This mandated sharing of technology represents one example of
how the treaty may actually do more harm than good.
I want to point out that one of the conditions removed from the
Resolution of Ratification directed the U.S. to renegotiate Articles X
and XI to ensure the treaty does not inadvertently increase the threat
of chemical weapons. The Clinton Administration viewed the requirement
to renegotiate the treaty as a ``killer amendment'' and encouraged the
Senate to strike this condition. Under pressure from the President, the
Senate voted to remove this condition so renegotiation of these
important articles will not happen.
In addition, the President's letter to Majority Leader Lott on the
day of the vote acknowledges that there are legitimate security
concerns regarding the flaws in Articles X and XI. I'm troubled because
the letter is non-binding and it will be three years before we will
discover if Articles X and XI lead to the proliferation of chemical
weapons technology. The President says the U.S. could then withdraw
from the Convention, but by then the damage will have been done.
If I believed this treaty by itself would stop chemical weapons, I
would support it. During my own deliberations regarding the CWC, I had
a thoughtful discussion with James Schlesinger, a former Secretary of
Defense, Secretary of Energy and Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency. Secretary Schlesinger made the point that although scores of
nations ratified the Geneva Protocol which claimed to ``prohibit'' the
use of poison gas, Iraq used mustard gas against Iran and its own
citizens with impunity. In my mind, this episode demonstrates one of
the weaknesses of international treaties which sound good on the
surface but lack enforcement procedures in practice.
I am also concerned about the provisions of the Chemical Weapons
Convention which will allow international inspectors access to chemical
businesses and other important national security facilities. The idea
that North Korea or Iraq can come into the United States and examine
our facilities and then take that information home to help their own
chemical and defense industries is wrong. The treaty makes no
arrangement to compensate businesses for the loss of this sensitive
data. This is another reason I believe the Chemical Weapons Convention
will, in fact, do more harm than good.
As a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I understand the
military threat posed by chemical weapons. I continue to support
efforts to destroy the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile in a safe and
environmentally sensitive manner. I oppose any use of these horrible
weapons and I believe the United States should threaten massive
retaliation against any nation that might consider using these weapons
against our citizens or soldiers. I am also very proud of the
leadership role of the United States in the fight to stop the spread of
chemical weapons. Without a doubt, this leadership role will continue
whether or not we ratify the CWC.
But we must also be honest with ourselves. The Chemical Weapons
Convention cannot be verified. The treaty will not prevent countries or
terrorists from acquiring or using chemical weapons. The treaty may in
fact increase proliferation of advanced defensive technologies and the
treaty may jeopardize proprietary information of U.S. companies.
As I weigh these facts, I conclude the Chemical Weapons Convention
will do more harm than good and I will cast my vote against the
ratification of this treaty.
Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, I will vote today to ratify the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC). I do so without any illusions. I have
concluded that it will be of marginal benefit, but that its benefits do
outweigh the risks. Clearly, no chemical weapons treaty can be 100%
verifiable. Inside the CWC, there is at least a better chance of
catching violators than if we remain outside the treaty.
I commend the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator
Helms, as well as Senator Kyl, and others who have worked so hard to
improve this treaty. As a result of their efforts, for example, we
retain the right for our troops to use tear gas in hostage rescue
operations; we require search warrants in cases where consent is not
granted to protect 4th amendment rights; and we restrict U.S.
assistance to rogue nations under Article X to medical antidotes and
humanitarian assistance.
This is a historic agreement bringing together 74 countries that have
ratified the treaty in a comprehensive, worldwide fight, to ban
chemical weapons. The treaty requires all nations to follow America's
lead to destroy all chemical stockpiles by 2007. The CWC also provides
for sanctions against those who trade in chemical agents with non-
parties to the treaty. These provisions will help to ensure that on a
future battlefield our troops will be less likely to face chemical
agents.
Passage of this treaty should not bring a false sense of security. A
treaty alone will not protect our troops and citizens from chemical
weapons. We should continue to devote attention and resources to
improving our chemical weapons defenses. We should provide our troops
with the equipment and training they need in combat situations. The
parties to this treaty must also take action against violators who
resort to using chemical weapons. As a member of the Intelligence
Committee, I will work to ensure that the goals of this treaty are not
lost in its implementation.
Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the
resolution of ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
I am pleased that--more than 3 years after the administration sent
this treaty to the Senate--the CWC is finally before us on the floor of
this Chamber.
In these three years, Mr. President, three Senate committees have
held numerous hearings--nearly 20 of them--on the efficacy of this
treaty. As a Member of both the Foreign Relations and Judiciary
Committees, I have been privileged to participate in several of these
hearings and to hear numerous perspectives during this debate.
More recently, several Senators and Administration officials have
spent a considerable amount of time negotiating the terms under which
this treaty would come to the floor. And so I think we should all thank
the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee [Mr. Helms] and the
Senator from Delaware [Mr. Biden], the ranking member of that
committee, for the time they both have spent on this issue.
I would also like to recognize the efforts of the White House Working
Group and the Lott Task Force to come to a consensus on the aspects of
this treaty on which we can agree. I know that the Members and
Administration officials involved in these negotiations have spent
hours reviewing countless technical details. It is because of these
efforts that the resolution of ratification before us today contains 28
agreed-upon conditions. These conditions were carefully crafted by our
colleagues to respond to Members' specific concerns. I am myself
comfortable with these conditions, which, for the most part, duly
exercise the Senate's prerogatives with respect to treaty ratification,
and instruct the administration to undertake certain commitments. They
also require greater reporting requirements which will help the Senate
to monitor U.S. participation in the Convention in the future.
I am pleased that our colleagues have come to agreement on these
points, because throughout the deliberations over this convention, I
have made two observations: No. 1 the CWC is not a perfect document,
and No. 2 notwithstanding that, the CWC is the best avenue available
today for beginning to control the spread of chemical weapons, and
leading, eventually, to the total elimination of such weapons.
Like any document arrived at through consensus, the Chemical Weapons
Convention can not claim to address every party's concerns. But, it is
my view that the 28 agreed-upon conditions in the resolution before us
today serve to strengthen what we do have.
Let me speak first on my initial point--that the CWC is not a perfect
document. There are real flaws that we all recognize, and that experts
both pro and con acknowledge, related to the verifiability of the CWC.
There may well be cheating, evasions, and attempts to disobey the
spirit, as well as the letter, of the treaty. Some of this cheating may
escape detection--although not enough, I believe, to pose a
[[Page S3641]]
legitimate threat to the security of the United States.
Nevertheless, I think we gain more by establishing an international
regime that prohibits such behavior than we do by refusing to exercise
U.S. leadership in that regime.
My second, and more important, point is this: The CWC is the best
avenue available today for beginning to control the spread of chemical
weapons, and leading, eventually, to the total elimination of such
weapons.
Those countries that do ratify the treaty--and this group represents
most of the responsible players on the international stage--recognize
that through the CWC, the world firmly rejects the existence and use of
chemical weapons. The treaty puts in place mechanisms to enforce its
precepts and monitor its progress, and signatories are committed to
complying with these mechanisms.
What of the handful of nations who flout international will, and will
not sign on to this treaty?
First, defense experts at the very top of our military command
structure are satisfied that the use of chemical weapons by these so-
called rogue states does not pose a significant threat to our national
security. In March 1996, then-Secretary of Defense William Perry told
the Foreign Relations Committee that he was ``damm sure'' that the
United States could respond massively and effectively to any chemical
weapons challenge.
Moreover, the CWC will make it easier for the international community
to track the chemical ingredients necessary for weapons production and
to inhibit the flow of these materials to rogue or non-signatory
states. The Convention will impose trade sanctions on non-signatory
countries whether or not they are known to posses chemical weapons.
This provision was devised by the Bush administration specifically to
make it expensive for countries not to join this Convention.
As Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said in testimony before the
Foreign Relations Committee earlier this month, ``These penalties would
not exist without the treaty. They will make it more costly for any
nation to have chemical weapons, and more difficult for rogue states or
terrorists to acquire materials needed to produce them.''
Those states that we are most concerned about currently are unwilling
to accept the norms that the treaty would establish. That is why they
have thus far chosen not to ratify. But it is just as clear these
states will never accept the treaty if the United States refuses to
ratify.
This is why I plan to vote in favor of striking the so-called killer
amendments that would tie the deposit of our instrument of ratification
to the actions of these nations.
If the linkage were to remain in the resolution, the Senate would
become responsible for painting the United States into a very
uncomfortable corner, a corner from which we would be unable to exit.
Such conditions would force the United States, which led the
negotiations of this treaty, to engage in a game of chicken with other
countries. It should instead join our allies in ratifying this treaty.
Mr. President, this treaty provides a solid start to limiting the
flow of chemical weapons.
It urges the destruction of all chemical weapons. It will provide
more information about the prevalence of chemical weapons than we have
ever had before. And it will make the dissemination of such weapons--
and the materials used to make them--more actionable than they have
ever been before.
Mr. President, do I think the treaty could be improved? Of course. So
I am pleased that the CWC has the provision for amendment after it
comes into force.
But now is not the time to debate amendments to the treaty. One
hundred sixty-one nations have signed the Chemical Weapons Convention
and 74 of them have ratified it.
I think we can all assume that--just as we played a leading role in
negotiating the existing treaty--the United States will again be at the
forefront of efforts to make the treaty more effective after a period
to test its utility. We have the technological means and the economic
weight to do so. But only if we ratify this treaty prior to its entry
into force on April 29. Only by that deadline--now less than a week
away--will the United States be a full participant in the Organization
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons [OPCW], the governing body that
will have the responsibility for deciding the terms for the
implementation of the CWC.
Would I like to see the enforcement provisions of the CWC written in
a less ambiguous manner? Certainly.
Could sanctions against violators be spelled out more clearly?
Absolutely.
But the CWC was laboriously crafted throughout three decades to meet
the security and economic interests of States' Parties. The United
States led this effort, and the treaty which we are voting on reflects
our needs. As Secretary Albright has said, this treaty has ``Made in
the USA'' written all over it. That is why the CWC has the blessing and
enthusiastic support of our defense and business communities.
Mr. President, I would like to address an issue that is of particular
importance to me, and that is the potential constitutional implications
of this treaty.
In particular, the argument has been made, incorrectly in my opinion,
that adoption of the CWC would subvert, in some way, the constitutional
protections of the fourth amendment which--as Americans--we all enjoy.
Let me say at the outset that preserving the fourth amendment is a
responsibility that I take very seriously and very personally. My
concern about preserving the protections of the fourth amendment does
not end at the corners of this treaty. I have opposed in this Congress
proposals to weaken the fourth amendment's protections, for example, in
the area of wire taps.
In fact, I am pleased to see that throughout the debate over this
treaty, many of my colleagues have taken an active interest in
promoting the rights bestowed upon us by the fourth amendment. Indeed,
I welcome the opportunity to work with these members on future
initiatives related to this vital provision of our Constitution.
With respect to the claim that ratification of this treaty risks
constitutional protections for Americans, I think three points need to
be stressed.
First, this treaty, and in particular the inspection language
therein, is the product of bipartisan efforts spanning many years. In
fact, it was the Bush administration which rejected efforts to adopt
overly broad, and undoubtedly unconstitutional inspection proceedings
in favor of those in the treaty today.
Second, although the treaty itself acknowledges the supremacy of the
constitutions of its signatories, this would be the case even without
specific language. The Senate cannot, be it through signing a treaty or
passing a law, subvert any of the protections guaranteed by our
Constitution. That is the very essence of our Constitution: it is the
bedrock of our freedoms and cannot be abrogated short of amendment to
the Constitution itself.
Mr. President, during a Judiciary Committee hearing last September, I
questioned Professor Barry Kellman of the DePaul Law School on various
aspects of the constitutionality of this treaty and on each of the
points I have raised here today. On each point, Professor Kellman was
in agreement with me. In fact, Professor Kellman, who has dedicated
many years, and much time and energy to reviewing the constitutional
implications of the Chemical Weapons Treaty, testified that, ``every
serious scholar'' who has looked into the issue has found this treaty
to be constitutional.
Finally, to the extent there are concerns to be addressed, and there
may be, the proper context for airing those concerns is during what I
expect to be a lively discussion over the implementing legislation,
which we will have a chance to debate in the next several weeks. It is
in the implementing legislation--not the treaty itself--where these
issues should be addressed and resolved.
I look forward to working with concerned colleagues as we consider
implementation of the treaty, so I am pleased that the unanimous
consent agreement arrived at regarding the resolution of ratification
before us today included the intent to debate and vote on the
implementing legislation prior to the Memorial Day recess.
As the debate over the implementing language continues, I will work
with
[[Page S3642]]
my colleagues to ensure that the language we ultimately adopt fully and
properly reflects the protections embodied in the United States
Constitution.
In the interim, however, we should not become side-tracked by
arguments that this treaty is unconstitutional or subverts the fourth
amendment. The inspections conducted pursuant to this treaty will be
conducted pursuant to the Constitution of this nation. Nothing in this
treaty can, nor does it even attempt to, alter that simple, but
fundamental fact.
Mr. President, I support the ratification of the Chemical Weapons
Convention which I believe is in the best interests of the United
States.
And if the Senate is to lend its support to this treaty, we must vote
to strike each one of the five conditions before us. Four of these
would pronounce the treaty dead on arrival by linking the deposit of
the U.S. instrument of ratification to conditions that are simply
impossible to achieve--by April 29, or at any time in the near future.
The other condition would establish a precedent for the selection of
inspectors that would greatly undermine the entire inspection process.
Mr. President, it is imperative that those of us who support this
treaty help strike the language that would undermine U.S. participation
in the Convention in this manner.
And, after doing so, Mr. President, I hope my colleagues will join me
in voting for final passage of the resolution of ratification.
Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I rise to urge my colleagues to ratify
the Chemical Weapons Convention.
The Chemical Weapons Convention is a historic arms control treaty
which will significantly enhance America's security. The treaty
prohibits the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, and
transfer of chemical weapons by those countries that are signatories.
It requires signatories to begin to destroy their chemical weapons
within a year and to complete destruction of chemical weapons within
ten years. Importantly, it prohibits the use of chemical weapons in
combat, and it prohibits signatories from helping other countries to
engage in any activity banned by the treaty. As such, the Chemical
Weapons Convention is an important non-proliferation tool that will
help slow the spread of dangerous chemical weapons and force the
destruction of most of the world's chemical weapons stockpiles.
President Reagan recognized the wisdom of working to ban chemical
weapons worldwide. Under his administration, negotiations on the terms
of a chemical weapons treaty began. Those negotiations continued under
President Bush, who signed the treaty. Now, five years after
completion, with the full support of President Clinton, the Chemical
Weapons Treaty is before the Senate for ratification.
There are many good reasons to support the Chemical Weapons Treaty.
First, and foremost, this treaty will protect America's military from
the threat of chemical weapons attack without requiring America to give
up anything militarily. The United States has already decided to
destroy its stockpile of chemical weapons and has vowed not to use
chemical weapons in warfare. Because the Chemical Weapons Convention
requires other nations to abandon chemical weapons as the United States
has done, America gains from this treaty. We give up nothing, and our
troops will be less likely to face poison gas in future conflicts.
Civilians in America and worldwide will benefit from Senate
ratification of this treaty as well. Last year's terrorist attack in
Japan, in which chemical weapons were used against innocent civilians,
reminds us that none of us is safe from the threat of chemical weapons.
As long as chemical weapons are produced and stockpiled, the
possibility remains real that they will end up in the hands of
terrorists. Because the Chemical Weapons Convention requires all
countries to enact laws making it a crime to develop or produce
chemical weapons, the treaty will make it harder for terrorists to
obtain chemical weapons, making America's cities, streets, and schools
safer.
Additionally, the Chemical Weapons Convention will help America and
the intelligence community to better track and control the spread of
chemical weapons and to punish violators. Through the verification
regime established by the treaty, our country will have an easier time
monitoring chemical weapons threats and establishing rigorous
verification procedures to prevent cheating.
Already seventy countries have ratified the treaty, and it will go
into effect with or without the United States. But if the Senate does
not ratify the treaty, America will be siding with rogue nations like
Iraq and Libya. If the Senate does not ratify the treaty, American
industry will be sanctioned and will lose roughly $600 million in
trade, a point I addressed more fully in an earlier speech to the
Senate. If the Senate does not ratify the treaty, America will not be
able to participate in the body that will determine the rules for
implementing the treaty. And if the Senate does not ratify the treaty,
America's credibility as a proponent of nonproliferation and arms
control will be jeopardized.
Mr. President, there is no doubt in my mind that the United States
should join a treaty we helped to shape and which enhances our
security. With the Chemical Weapons Convention and our leadership,
other nations will follow the lead America set years ago by giving up
chemical weapons. Rogue nations and terrorist countries will have a
harder time acquiring or making chemical weapons, and new tools will be
available to prevent and punish them if they try. America is much
better off with the Chemical Weapons Convention than without it, and I
urge my colleagues to ratify it without delay.
Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, I have thought long and hard on whether I
should vote to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention. I must admit
that as the Convention was originally presented, I was inclined to
oppose it. But after three weeks of hard work with the Majority Leader
and with the many thoughtful opponents of ratification, I believe we
have resolved a significant number of issues in contention and now
believe that ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention will do
more to reach our common goal of eradicating these deadly and detested
weapons from the earth than will non-ratification.
First, I would like to commend my many constituents, and the
thousands of Americans like them, who were relentless in raising their
voices against many dangerous aspects of the treaty and its
interpretation. Without their vigilance, we would never have reached
the point we have today.
I also commend Senator Helms, Senator Kyl, and the Majority Leader
for their work and negotiations with the Administration that has led to
vast improvements in the Chemical Weapons Convention ratifying
documents.
Since the beginning of the debate on the Chemical Weapons Convention,
I have stated that the real question is not whether to support the
cause of restricting the production, stockpile, and use of chemical
weapons throughout the world, but whether the Chemical Weapons
Convention itself advanced or inhibited this honorable cause.
As it was originally presented to the Senate for ratification, Mr.
President, I believe the treaty did not advance our cause, but instead
inhibited it by making sensitive information on chemicals and chemical
weapons technology so readily available as to encourage the
proliferation of these hideous weapons. But through the good work of
Senator Helms and Senator Kyl, we were able to reach 28 agreements with
the Administration. These 28 agreements went a long way toward
advancing our cause. I think three of these agreements are particularly
important.
First, I shared the concern of many of my constituents and several
former Secretaries of Defense who testified before the Armed Services
Committee that the convention would create a false sense of security,
not only in the United States, but in nations around the world. It
would be easy, Mr. President, for governments to believe that, because
the Chemical Weapons Convention is in force, we no longer need to worry
about the use of chemical weapons or to prepare ourselves to defend
against them. I found this aspect of the treaty to be quite troubling.
No arms control treaty has yet proven to be perfect. And chemical
weapons are far more difficult to detect than missiles or nuclear
warheads. Thus, I originally feared that ratification of the treaty
would lull us into a false sense of security in which our armed forces
would not be properly prepared to deal with a chemical attack.
[[Page S3643]]
I now believe, however, that the agreement reached between Senator
Helms and the Administration that ensures our armed forces will
continue to receive the equipment and training necessary to complete
their missions in the face of chemical weapons is a major
improvement which will guard against a debilitating false sense of
security.
Second, I and many of my constituents had grave concerns about the
treaty's impact on Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable
searches and seizures. The treaty, in its original form, did not go far
enough to protect U.S. citizens and businesses from involuntary
inspections. The treaty's provisions on challenge inspections of
chemical producing facilities in the United States did not, in my
opinion, comply with the Constitution.
I am pleased that the administration has agreed to a condition to
protect the Fourth Amendment rights of all Americans and to conform the
Chemical Weapons Convention to the United States Constitution.
According to this condition, before the U.S. deposits its instrument of
ratification, the President must certify to Congress that for any
challenge inspection in the United States for which consent has been
withheld, the inspection team must first obtain a criminal search
warrant based upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized. For any routine inspection of a declared facility in the United
States that is conducted on an involuntary basis, the inspection team
must obtain an administrative search warrant from a United States
magistrate judge.
I am now confident that this agreement will ensure that the
constitutional rights of U.S. citizens and businesses will be protected
under the treaty. I commend Senators Helms and Kyl and the
administration for their work on this vitally important condition.
Third, I was troubled by the treaty's impact on the use of non-lethal
riot control agents. Since the Chemical Weapons Convention was
originally drafted, there has been a great deal of debate in the United
States on whether the treaty language would preclude American armed
forces from using non-toxic riot control agents. Tear gas and other
such chemicals provide the United States military with an invaluable
tool when conducting sensitive operations. Tear gas, for example, is an
excellent means of rescuing downed pilots, or avoiding unnecessary loss
of life when enemy troops and civilians are in the same area.
I am pleased with the agreement that has been reached on this issue.
According to a condition the administration has now accepted, the
President will certify to Congress that the United States is not
restricted by the convention in the use of riot control agents in the
following situations: (1) in the conduct of peacetime military
operations within an area of ongoing armed conflict when the United
States is not a party to the conflict; (2) in consensual peacekeeping
operations when the use of force is authorized by the receiving state;
and (3) in peacekeeping operations when force is authorized by the
Security Council under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. The
agreement also leaves in place Executive Order 11850 signed by
President Ford which cites four cases where the use of riot control
agents should be permissible under the Chemical Weapons Convention:
avoiding unnecessary loss of life, subduing rioting enemy POWs,
protecting supply convoys, and rescuing a downed pilot from enemy
troops or a POW from behind enemy lines. I commend the administration
for agreeing to this reasonable and necessary condition. It will ensure
that the men and women of the United States armed forces have the tools
necessary to do their jobs in precarious situations.
While the 28 agreements made did go a long way to improve the
Chemical Weapons Convention, I still had one remaining concern, in my
view the most important concern, until this morning. That concern
relates to Articles X and XI of the convention and the proposition that
they might well force the United States to share sensitive information
on our chemical weapons defense capabilities and to eliminate our
export controls on dangerous chemicals.
Article X of the treaty obliges all parties to provide assistance and
protection to any State Party threatened by the potential use of
chemical weapons, including information on chemical weapons defense and
detection. Article XI of the treaty obliges all parties to freely
exchange chemicals, equipment and scientific and technical information
relating to the development and application of chemistry for purposes
not prohibited by the Convention. It forbids parties to the treaty to
maintain export controls that would restrict the trade and development
of chemicals and chemical technology with other treaty parties.
Ironically, these provisions of the treaty, a treaty designed to
eliminate the proliferation of chemical weapons, could in fact promote
that very proliferation. If the United States is forced under the
treaty to provide this sensitive technology to countries such as Iran,
China, or Cuba, those countries could use that information to develop
weapons against which we have no ability to defend.
It is my contention that Articles X and XI do more to inhibit the
cause of eradicating chemical weapons than they do to promote it. Thus,
they comprise a fatal flaw in the Chemical Weapons Convention. And,
until today, I was inclined to vote against ratification because of my
concerns on Articles X and XI.
I am pleased to say, however, that the distinguished Majority Leader
was remarkably successful in his negotiations with the President on
this most important aspect of the debate on the treaty. I commend him
for his diligence and commend the President for his wisdom in
responding to our concerns.
This morning, the President sent Senator Lott a letter in which he
extended a promise that the United States will withdraw from the
Convention if Articles X and XI are used by other treaty parties to
undermine the intent of the Convention. The specific circumstances
under which the President agreed to withdraw from the treaty are as
follows: (1) if Article X is used to justify actions that could degrade
U.S. defensive capabilities; (2) if Article XI erodes the Australia
Group export controls; and (3) if Article XI promotes increased
proliferation of chemical weapons.
With this assurance from the President, I am now prepared to support
the Chemical Weapons Convention and will vote for its ratification.
With the 28 agreements Senator Helms and Senator Kyl were able to
negotiate, and with this final commitment from the President, I am
comfortable with the treaty. The Convention has been transformed from
one doing more harm than good, to one promoting rather than inhibiting
the cause of eradicating chemical weapons from the earth.
In closing, Mr. President, let me say that these changes could not
have been made without the diligent and good-faith negotiating done by
the majority leader, and without the voices raised by thousands upon
thousands of Americans who went out of their way to draw attention to
the treaty's many flaws. They should be given the lion's share of
credit for the conditions and modifications we have made that make the
Chemical Weapons Convention a more workable, more responsible treaty.
Mr. BAUCUS. Mr. President, I rise today to express my firm support of
the Chemical Weapons Convention Treaty. I have thought long and hard on
this issue. And I believe that my colleagues--both for and against this
treaty--have shown patience, diligence and understanding during this
important debate.
I also believe the time has come for us to lead the civilized world
in signing this treaty. And to remember why, we need to look back to
our history.
On October 30, 1918, 12 days before the end of the First World War,
the 362nd Infantry Division received orders to attack German positions
outside the city of Audenarde in France. Many Montanans served in this
division.
During this battle, German troops lobbed several gas shells toward
the Montana troops. The wind that morning just happened to be blowing
to the east, and the gas carried over the American area.
The men of the 362nd fought valiantly that day. And in the end, they
overtook the German positions with a minimal loss of life. But they,
and hundreds of thousands of other World War
[[Page S3644]]
I veterans, carried scars in their lungs for the rest of their lives.
It made breathing difficult and left many of them invalids.
Chemical weaponry has come a long way in the 79 years since that
battle took place. Modern technology has made this type of warfare more
devastating and more deadly. It can now kill instantly as well as scar
and maim the lungs.
Chemical warfare is an indiscriminate killer. It cannot tell the
difference between a soldier and a civilian, a bunker from a subway, or
a barracks from a school.
And worst of all, some chemical weapons are relatively easy to
create. As we have seen in recent news reports, if the substances used
to create chemical weapons are freely available, terrorist groups and
cults can make them and use them against civilians.
This, of course, often makes them hard to detect. So the critics of
this Convention have a point when they say it will be hard to verify.
But this agreement will make it much easier than it is now for us to
find out when rogue states try to create or stockpile chemical weapons.
We will have the right to inspect the factories and defense
installations of those we suspect are creating these weapons. And we
will be able to block those who do not sign from buying the substances
they need to create chemical weapons.
That is why this treaty has wide support. If we choose not to ratify
it, we cast ourselves with such countries as Iraq and Libya--one which
used chemical weapons against Iran and its own Kurdish citizens,
another suspected of clandestine efforts to create a chemical weapons
program.
And we make it more likely that some day, another generation of
American servicemen and servicewomen will suffer the same kind of
outrageous attack that the Montanans in the 362nd went through in 1918.
That must not happen. And the Senate must pass this Convention.
If we ratify this treaty now, we allow the United States to
participate in its administration from the outset. To fail to ratify
the treaty is to lose our seat at the table. I want to make sure that
we put American inspectors on the ground to ensure the eventual end of
these horrible weapons.
Again, I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this treaty. And
I look forward to the day we remove chemical weapons from the face of
the earth.
Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I rise today to join my colleagues in
addressing the issue of ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC).
While some who are less familiar with the advice and consent process
may regret the pace the Senate has undertaken, I strongly believe it is
a point of pride. The Senate, led by Majority Leader Lott, Senator Kyl,
Senator Helms, Senator Lugar and many others, has painstakingly
reviewed the CWC for many months. The 33 conditions which have been the
subject of protracted negotiations have created a document which better
protects our nation's security interests. I congratulate Senator Lott
and the rest of the participants for their efforts.
Despite the best efforts of all involved I continue to harbor a
number of strong reservations about the convention. I am concerned
about its verifiability, the impact on U.S. business, the effect on
U.S. efforts to eliminate existing chemical weapons stockpiles, and the
number of rogue nations which are not party to the CWC.
Former CIA director James Woolsey testified that detection of
violations of the CWC is so difficult that we cannot ``have high
confidence in our ability to detect noncompliance, especially on a
small scale.'' Nowhere is this more evident than Iraq. In a recent
column, Charles Krauthammer pointed out that Iraq has been subjected to
the most intrusive, comprehensive inspections for weapons of mass
destruction ever devised or implemented by an international
organization. Yet, we continue to uncover secret sites and weapons and
have no confidence we know the extent of Saddam Hussein's lethal
stockpile. If we are uncertain under the best of conditions, we should
not underestimate the significant risks under adverse circumstances.
Mr. President, my second concern is the unforseen impact inspection
requirements might have on U.S. businesses. One estimate puts the
number of Kentucky businesses which are likely to be impacted by the
CWC at 44. Not all of these companies are large enough to be able to
afford the increased costs of additional burdensome regulations. The
chemical industry is already one of the most over-regulated industries
in America. Currently, the combined costs of EPA, OSHA and other
federal regulations on the industry is near $4.9 billion annually.
Adding to this incredible financial burden is overkill.
In addition to the costly regulatory burdens CWC asks these companies
to withstand, the treaty will require companies to open their books and
facilities to foreign inspection teams--creating a Pandora's box of
commercial hazards. Former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld points
out, despite best efforts its possible, even likely, that inspection
teams could come away with classified and proprietary information.
Specifically, the inspection requirements may compel companies to
provide proprietary technical data which could be used to considerable
financial advantage by competitors. Worse yet, the results might enable
adversaries to enhance their chemical weapons capabilities, putting
American soldiers and citizens at potential risk. These risks
underscore the need to include the imperative protections in Condition
31 enabling the President to ban inspection teams with terrorist track
records.
The third issue of concern relates to Condition 27's direct affect on
my state and on our ability to dismantle our existing stockpiles.
Kentucky is home to the Lexington Bluegrass Army Depot where thousands
of chemical munitions are currently stored. The community surrounding
this facility is justifiably concerned over the method by which the
weapons will be destroyed. The Treaty mandates signatories register
specific technical plans for destruction shortly after the instruments
of ratification are filed. This may undermine alternatives currently
being explored.
Let me explain. Last year, I offered an amendment to the Defense
Appropriations Bill which directed the Secretary of Defense to pursue
the acquisition of at least two alternative technologies to the current
plan of incineration. Condition 27, provides some assurance that the
development and use of alternatives to incineration would not be
affected by the CWC regime. However, if this agreement between Congress
and the Administration is overruled, reversed or challenged by the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, my constituents
will be placed at increased risk. I accept the President's written
guarantee at this point, but will keep a close watch to assure his
commitment is not reversed or revised. I ask unanimous consent that a
letter from President Clinton to me on this issue be included in the
Record following my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. McCONNELL. Condition 27 also presents another problem. Current
law requires the President to destroy the U.S. stockpile by 2004.
Condition 27 extends the deadline to 2007. Mr. President I am
emphatically opposed to this provision. I do not believe it wise to
give the Army, or any party the opportunity to slow down efforts to
identify alternative technologies or to delay the destruction process.
The weapons stored in the U.S. need to be dismantled now. They are
aging and therefore becoming more unstable every day. As this occurs,
safe destruction becomes increasingly difficult and the chance of an
accident increases dramatically. I hope the Administration will not
seek a delay in the destruction deadline unless it is absolutely
necessary in order to undergo the safe and effective elimination of our
weapons.
Finally, Mr. President, the fact that many of the nations with either
the intent or the means to attack U.S. soldiers and citizens with
chemical weapons are not covered by the CWC is deeply troubling. Libya,
Syria, Iraq and North Korea are all suspected of possessing chemical
weapons and not one is a participant in the CWC. This fact is strong
justification for maintaining Condition 30 which compels their
participation.
If the U.S. ratifies the CWC the horrors of chemical attack will not
magically disappear. Those of us in the
[[Page S3645]]
United States Senate must remain vigilant in ensuring that America
continues to prepare adequate defensive capabilities against potential
chemical or biological attack. Incidents such as the sarin gas attack
in the Tokyo subway cannot be prevented by this or any other treaty.
The world remains a dangerous place and this treaty will not
substantially change that fact. The Secretary of State insists that
this Treaty is not about our chemical weapons--it is a means to limit
other nations'. The plain fact is it will not constrain one nation from
acquiring or using these weapons. Even if we are able to determine that
a participating nation is violating the CWC, the means of redress or
sanction available under the treaty are toothless and largely
ineffective. The United Nations Security Council must craft penalties
which could avoid potential Chinese or Russian vetoes. I am certain
this would be a near impossible task.
With these objections stated, it is clear that I do not believe the
CWC is a perfect document. In fact, it remains unclear whether the
treaty will have any of the positive effects its proponents allege.
Why then do I feel compelled to support U.S. ratification? Quite
simply it comes down to one issue--the necessity to sustain the
strength and credibility of U.S. leadership. As the principal architect
of the CWC, the United States risks our authority and stature should we
refuse to ratify the convention. If this treaty is to enjoy any success
it will be due to U.S. participation and leadership. As President Bush
has stated repeatedly, ``it is vitally important for the United States
to be out front.'' I also agree with former Secretary of State James
Baker's assertion that failure to ratify the convention ``would send a
message of American retreat from engagement in the world.''
The United States must be in a position to lead, and it must use this
leadership to push other nations to follow our example and eliminate
their chemical stockpiles. Just this week we heard from a former high
ranking North Korean official of that country's significant chemical
and nuclear capabilities and willingness to use both. The U.S. must
actively work to ensure that the North Korea's of the world recognize
the futility in relying on these weapons. The CWC is a modest step on
that road, a road which I hope yields success.
Exhibit 1
The White House,
Washington, March 19, 1997.
Dear Senator McConnell: Thank you for your letter
concerning your support for the Chemical Weapons Convention
and for the alternative technologies program.
I want to assure you that nothing in the Convention would
preclude the consideration of alternative technologies funded
by your amendment to the FY 1997 Defense Appropriations bill.
Indeed, the Administration has agreed to a condition to the
CWC resolution of ratification which makes clear my
commitment to exploring alternatives to incineration for the
destruction of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile and
clarifies the relationship between the CWC and our chemical
weapons demilitarization program. A copy of the condition is
attached.
I am gratified that you agree on the importance to U.S.
national security of banning the production, possession and
use of chemical weapons worldwide. I look forward to your
support for Senate ratification of the CWC in the weeks
ahead.
Sincerely,
Bill Clinton.
Ms. MOSELEY-BRAUN. Mr. President, in recent weeks we have heard a
great deal about the Chemical Weapons Convention.
We have talked about the risks of information sharing, the
reliability of the verification systems, and whether Russia should go
first. We have debated the dangers of exchanging inspectors, we have
questioned whether outcasts like Iran, Iraq and North Korea should sign
this international agreement, and whether anything would change if they
did. Fundmentally, we have been considering whether the proposed treaty
is a step forward, or whether it is worse than no treaty at all.
Opponents have argued that the treaty is fatally flawed, and that the
United States is better off without it. It's true that the Chemical
Weapons Convention is not perfect. Chemical weapons are cheap and easy
to make, and despite our best efforts, we will never be able to monitor
every laboratory, or stop every nation in this world that is driven to
make tools of biological warfare.
But this debate is not about whether the treaty is perfect, or
whether its provisions must be changed. This debate is about what
happens if the United States fails to act.
Every weapon of war is horrible. While the bloodshed, violence and
destruction caused by things that kill people cannot be ranked, death
by poison gases or viruses is particularly grisly. I am reminded of the
words of Erich Maria Remarque in his novel about men lost to poison gas
attacks during the Great War in the early part of this century:
We found one dug-out full of them, with blue heads and
black lips. Some . . . took their masks off too soon . . .
they swallowed enough to scorch their lungs. Their condition
is hopeless; they choke to death with hemorrhages and
suffocation--``All Quiet on The Western Front'' Erich Maria
Remarque.
It was experiences like this that helped to generate worldwide hatred
and fear of chemical weapons, and is what led to the Geneva Protocol of
1925.
In the 70 years since that time, negotiations have been conducted,
conferences have been held, and agreements have been signed to
permanently ban chemical weapons from the earth. It is universally
recognized that outlawing chemical and biological weapons and their
manufacture--while it might not completely prevent any use in future
conflicts--is the right thing to do.
That's why it is incredible to me, less than a week before the
ratification deadline, that this treaty has become a point of political
division here in the U.S. Senate.
This treaty is the first global arms control agreement to ban an
entire class of weapons. Participating states must destroy their
chemical weapons within 10 years of the treaty's enactment and pledge
to never make them again. The agreement also creates an international
organization to monitor compliance, and signatories must exchange data
and permit routine inspections of their facilities.
Nations refusing to participate will be barred from purchasing the
ingredients necessary to make chemical weapons and many commercial
chemical products, and will face heightened scrutiny over their
chemical weapons activities. Their chemical and biotechnology
industries will face great international trade obstacles.
Opponents of the Chemical Weapons Convention argue that this treaty
should not be ratified because countries such as Iraq, Iran and Syria
are not signatories. They argue that the treaty is unverifiable, that
it is intrusive and damaging to confidential trade information held by
the U.S. chemical industry, and that, due to the Clinton
administration's refusal to modify article 10 and 11, the United States
will be forced to share critical technology with other nations.
I do not subscribe to this interpretation. The sanctions provided by
this treaty for nonmembers were designed with the distinct
understanding that pariah states were unlikely to join the agreement,
and therefore would be isolated and targeted for sanctions.
Furthermore, article 10 does not obligate the United States to share
chemical defense technologies and equipment with member or nonmember
states. Article 10, in fact, provides the United States with the
flexibility to determine how and what types of assistance should be
provided to signatories. Article 11 will not force private businesses
to release proprietary information. The convention legally binds
signatories, via article 1, never to engage in any activities
prohibited under the convention, greatly decreasing the likelihood that
nations would seek to profit by giving secrets to non-signatories.
For the American people, the benefits of the Chemical Weapons
Convention are clear. Its provisions will diminish the threat of
chemical warfare against our young troops overseas. It will help
protect Americans at home from terrorist attacks like the kind that
occurred in the Tokyo subway. And it gives us new tools to help us
track down and punish nations that violate this treaty.
The amount of good that this treaty can accomplish has been
recognized by the rest of the civilized world. One hundred and sixty-
four nations have signed, and seventy-four nations have ratified this
agreement. The treaty,
[[Page S3646]]
which was negotiated by the Republican administrations of Reagan and
Bush, has been endorsed by military leaders like General Powell and
General Schwartzkopf. It's supported by the chemical manufacturers, and
most significantly, it is supported by the American people.
The Senate has less than 1 week, however, to ratify this treaty. If
we miss the April 29 deadline, the world will move ahead without us,
and the United States will lose a critical opportunity to take a stand
against the worldwide proliferation of chemical weapons. America will
lose its seat at the table in the international enforcement process,
and American inspectors will be barred from examining foreign
facilities. Our chemical industry will lose hundreds of millions of
dollars per year as a result of the treaty's trade restrictions. And we
will sit on the sidelines with outlaw nations like Libya, North Korea,
Iraq, and Iran.
The United States is not an outlaw nation, and should not be
considered one because of our failure to act. We cannot stop these
deadly weapons alone, and the world cannot stop these weapons without
us. As President Clinton said in his State of the Union Address, ``We
must be shapers of events, not observers.'' If we want to continue our
leadership role into the next century, then it is time for the United
States to be leagued with the rest of the world and put an end to these
weapons of death.
We have a clear choice. We can take the path of political
partisanship, and stand in isolation. Or we can set aside discord, take
responsibility for our children's future, and ratify this agreement.
This is the decision that the Senate must make. In the 100 years
since the Hague Conventions, a historic opportunity is within reach to
ban chemical weapons forever. It is time for the Senate to complete the
job and ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, I support the ratification of the
Chemical Weapons Convention. This international treaty is our best hope
to end the use of lethal chemical weapons. It will protect Americans by
making it harder for terrorists to produce chemical weapons and it will
protect our soldiers on the battlefield. This treaty will make America
and the world more secure.
The Chemical Weapons Convention bans the development, production,
stockpiling, and use of chemicals as weapons. Each and every nation
that signs this treaty becomes an ally in the fight against chemical
weapons used by terrorists or by outlaw states. If we don't ratify this
treaty, America will join countries like Libya and Iraq who refuse to
join the worldwide effort to end the use of chemical weapons. I can't
speak for my colleagues, but I know that this Senator does not want the
United States to be aligned with those terrorist states.
The Chemical Weapons Convention is not a liberal or a conservative
document. It is not a Democratic or a Republican document. It was
negotiated by the Reagan and Bush administrations and it is supported
by the Clinton administration. It is in the tradition of a nonpartisan
foreign policy.
The Chemical Weapons Convention was made in America. It is
inconceivable that we--the world's only superpower--would refuse to
ratify a Convention that we were instrumental in drafting.
Of course no treaty can ever eliminate every threat. That is why the
United States must continue to maintain our strong chemical weapons
defense program. At the Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland, scientists
and technicians are developing better ways to protect our troops from
the effects of chemical weapons. This important work must continue.
In addition, our intelligence agencies, like the National Security
Agency, must continue to provide the kind of information that prevents
the use of chemical weapons. The National Security Agency is listening
in on the international criminals and terrorists as they seek to buy
chemicals and produce weapons. The Chemical Weapons Convention will aid
these efforts by making it harder for terrorists to get chemicals that
could be turned against Americans.
America has always led the effort to end the use of chemical
weapons--and the convention will ensure that other countries follow our
lead. We have already decided not to use chemical weapons and we have
started to dismantle our chemical stockpile.
Maryland is one of seven States that stores chemical weapons left
over from the First and Second World Wars. For many years, we have
lived with the threat of an accident. We are only now preparing to
neutralize the chemical stockpile that is stored in Maryland. We
in Maryland know first-hand the dangers these chemical weapons pose to
military personnel and civilians. America's priority must be to safely
dispose of these lethal chemicals--not to produce them.
Mr. President, The Chemical Weapons Convention will make it harder
for thugs and rogue nations to make and use chemical weapons. I urge my
colleagues to join me in voting for its ratification.
Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, in my view there is no greater threat to
our nation's security than the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. Among these is the scourge of chemical weapons which have
been unleashed in this century with such horrifying effect in the
trenches of the First World War, in the villages of Iraq a decade ago,
and more recently in the Tokyo subway.
In 1985 the United States took a bold unilateral decision to destroy
our chemical weapons stockpiles because they serve no military purpose.
And in 1990 the United States negotiated a bilateral chemical weapons
destruction agreement with the Soviet Union in an effort to begin the
process of reducing that country's stockpiles, the largest in the
world. The leadership of the United States through the years has been
crucial in forging the broad international consensus which produced the
Chemical Weapons Convention. The whole world is watching us closely
today to see whether or not the United States is going to continue its
leadership role on this critical issue.
The United States must not retreat from more than a decade of
leadership on controlling chemical weapons. We must ratify the Chemical
Weapons Convention before it comes into force on April 29--not just to
maintain our leadership on this issue, but because it is in our best
interests to do so.
The issue is not whether the Convention will completely eliminate the
threat of chemical weapons. There is no magic wand to do that. However,
what the Chemical Weapons Convention will do is nevertheless
substantial. It will establish--for the first time--an international
standard against the production and use of chemical weapons. It will
provide us with significant additional monitoring and inspection tools
to detect chemical weapons activities. And it will impose trade
restrictions that will make it more difficult for ``rogue'' states and
terrorist organizations to start or continue chemical weapons programs.
Opponents of the Convention argue that it is not adequately
verifiable, although many of those same critics argue at the same time
that the treaty is too intrusive. The fact is that the Convention
includes the most extensive monitoring and inspection regime of any
arms control treaty to date. The U.S. chemical industry--which will be
the target of most of the monitoring and inspection under the
Convention-- helped write these provisions and is comfortable with
them.
The U.S. intelligence community believes that the Convention will
significantly enhance its current ability to detect suspicious patterns
of chemical activity in other countries. I am particularly pleased with
the Condition #5, which has been agreed to, that protects U.S.
intelligence information that may be shared with the Organization for
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. It reflects the legislation I have
introduced to protect U.S. intelligence which is shared with
international organizations.
The trade restrictions imposed by the Convention represent another
key element in controlling the proliferation of chemical weapons.
Building on the existing trade restrictions in chemicals under the
informal Australia Group, the Convention limits trade in the most
likely chemicals to be used in weapons production--Schedule I
chemicals--to trade among countries that have already ratified it. The
same restrictions will apply after three years to Schedule II ``dual-
use'' chemicals
[[Page S3647]]
which have both commercial and military applications.
Therefore, if we do not ratify, we hurt our own chemical industry
which will be excluded from commerce in Schedule I chemicals with some
of our principal trading partners, including the United Kingdom,
France, Germany, Japan, and Canada. The economic loss to the United
States is estimated to be $600 million annually.
Opponents of the Convention also argue that it is contrary to our
national security interests because countries like Iraq and North Korea
will continue their chemical weapons programs while we destroy our own
stockpiles. But the Convention will make it harder for these countries
to obtain critical chemical ingredients for their weapons programs.
And, by outlawing the production of chemical weapons for the first
time, the Convention will allow the international community to take
collective action to isolate ``rogue'' states intent on developing
these weapons.
The Pentagon's top military leaders have all testified that chemical
weapons are not needed to deter other countries from using these
weapons against the U.S. or our armed forces. In fact, chemical weapons
serve no useful military purpose as a method of warfare. America's
ability to inflict overwhelming destruction, without resorting to
chemical warfare, serves as a sufficient deterrent to the use of
chemical weapons against our armed forces. I agree strongly with
Condition #11, which has already been agreed to, that requires the
United States to maintain a robust program of chemical and biological
defenses to ensure that our forces are provided with maximum protection
in the event such weapons are ever used against U.S. forces. Such a
policy is only matter of prudence and common sense.
The resolution of ratification before the Senate today sets out
further conditions that address widely-shared concerns about the
Chemical Weapons Convention. For instance, conditions will ensure the
primacy of the U.S. Constitution, limit U.S. financial obligations
under the Convention, ensure appropriate cost-sharing arrangements, and
require consultation with this body in cases of noncompliance with the
treaty. By clarifying and reinforcing the Senate's views on these and
other important issues, the conditions constitute a useful complement
to the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Mr. President, it is important to note that this Convention has a
history of bipartisan support. Negotiations began under the Reagan
Administration and were concluded by the Bush Administration. Former
President George Bush has said, and I quote, ``This Convention clearly
serves the best interests of the United States in a world in which the
proliferation and use of chemical weapons is a real and growing threat
. . . United States leadership is required once again to bring this
historic agreement into force.''
A total of 162 countries have now signed the Chemical Weapons
Convention and 74 countries have ratified it. Russia, China and Iran--
all with known chemical weapons programs--have signed the Convention,
but it is unlikely that these countries will ratify it if the U.S. does
not do so first.
Mr. President, American leadership is needed once again. The U.S.
must be among the original ratifying states in order to play a central
role in setting up the new Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons and to participate fully in the Convention's monitoring,
inspection, and trade control activities. I urge my colleagues to
support the resolution of ratification for the Chemical Weapons
Convention.
Mrs. MURRAY. Mr President, I am pleased that the United States Senate
has finally turned its attention to the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Before this body today sits the work of President Reagan, President
Bush and now President Clinton. The CWC will place a global ban on the
manufacture, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons by its
signatories. Along with protocols for inspections and sanctions against
countries that do not abide by the CWC, it contains a specific
timetable for the destruction of existing chemical weapons and
production facilities.
The United States provided valuable leadership for many years in the
effort to outlaw chemical weapons and their use. Our government was the
driving force behind the negotiations that produced the Chemical
Weapons Convention. The CWC will go into effect next week with or
without U.S. participation. Failure to ratify the CWC would be a
monumental error for the United States; a symbolic retreat from our
traditional role in the world that will likely impede our efforts to
further eliminate and combat proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.
I do strongly support the immediate ratification of the Chemical
Weapons Convention. I want to add my personal thanks to my many
colleagues who have worked so hard to bring the articles of
ratification to the Senate floor. Senator Biden and Senator Lugar have
both been champions in this effort. I have great admiration and respect
for both of these Senators and I know many thousands of my constituents
also appreciate their leadership on the CWC.
As a Member of the Senate Committee on Veterans Affairs, I have been
particularly impressed by the support given to the CWC by numerous
veterans service organizations. My own state has more than 700,000
veterans and thousands of additional active duty personnel stationed in
every corner of my state. The following veterans organization have all
called upon the Senate to ratify the CWC; the Veterans of Foreign Wars,
the Vietnam Veterans of America, the Reserve Officers Association of
the United States, the American Ex-Prisoners of War and the Jewish War
Veterans of the USA. The National Gulf War Resource Center, a coalition
of two dozen Gulf War veterans organizations has also publicly endorsed
the CWC.
Such distinguished senior US military commanders as General Norman
Schwarzkopf, former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Generals John
M. Shalikashvili and Colin Powell, former Chief of Naval Operations
Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, and former National Security Adviser General
Brent Scowcroft have all publicly called for the ratification of the
CWC. Colin Powell appeared before the Veterans Affairs Committee last
week; he gave the committee his unequivocal support for the CWC.
General Powell stated that the treaty will lessen the likelihood that
U.S. troops will be safer from chemical attack in the future. Given the
problems many of our Gulf War veterans are suffering that many
attribute to exposure to chemical weapons, I believe the Senate should
give General Powell's comments in support of the CWC special
consideration.
Also of great importance to me in considering the merits of the CWC
is the strong support of the chemical industry, including both small
and large businesses. It is noteworthy that our business community
provided advice to the Reagan and Bush administrations on the treaty
provisions affecting this industry.
If the United States does not ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention
it will not have access to the Treaty's tools to help detect rogue
states and terrorists who seek to acquire chemical weapons. The United
States will not be allowed to participate in the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the governing body deciding the
terms for the implementation of the Treaty. Therefore, Americans will
not be able to serve on inspection teams or influence amendments, and
Americans now serving as head of administration, head of industrial
inspections, and head of security will be replaced by nationals from
countries that have ratified the CWC. Chemical proliferation and
terrorism are undoubtedly problems the United States can fight more
effectively within the framework of global cooperation.
The Chemical Manufacturing Association has stated that the CWC ``does
not trump US export control laws.'' Instead, the Treaty will expand and
improve the effectiveness of non-proliferation by instituting a strong
system of multilateral export controls. No information will be
disclosed regarding imports, exports or domestic shipments. The CWC
will affect approximately 2,000 companies, not 8,000 as the Treaty's
opponents hold. About 1,800 of those 2,000 companies will do nothing
more than check a box regarding the range of Discrete Organic Chemicals
they produce, without specifying the nature of these chemicals. Of the
some 140 companies most likely to be subjected to routine inspections,
a large
[[Page S3648]]
proportion are CMA members, who assisted in writing the provisions of
the Treaty. Regardless, it is anticipated that any challenge
inspections will more than likely involve military, rather than
commercial facilities. Thus, we should not concern ourselves with a
potential negative impact of the CWC on the industry, because clearly
this is not the case. On the contrary, if the US Senate chooses not to
ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention, American chemical companies
risk losing as much as $600 million a year in sales and many well-
paying jobs when the mandatory trade sanctions against non-parties are
enforced.
Critics insist that the CWC will be ineffective because rogue states
suspected of possessing or attempting to acquire chemical weapons, such
as Syria, Iraq, North Korea and Libya, have not joined the convention.
Accordingly, they argue that the United States should hold up
ratification until these states join. The reality is that only about 20
states are believed to have or to be seeking a chemical weapons
program, more than two-thirds of which have already signed the CWC. For
the past 40 years, the United States has led nonproliferation regimes
that have established accepted norms of international behavior. Failing
to ratify the convention will not persuade the rogue states to join the
CWC. Rather, it will legitimize their action and hurt US credibility in
the international community. The Treaty ensures that non-party states
are isolated and makes it extremely difficult for them to pursue their
nefarious objectives.
I urge my Senate colleagues to reflect on the measure of American
leadership and the indispensability of our nation on nonproliferation
issues and to vote for the Chemical Weapons Convention. This Treaty
makes sense on political, legal and moral grounds. As officials of both
Republican and Democratic administrations assert, the Chemical Weapons
Convention will ensure that Americans live in a safer America and a
safer world.
Mr. BOND. Mr. President I will vote against ratification of the
Chemical Warfare Convention. I came to this decision, not because I am
against doing away with chemical weapons, we all are. I will vote
against ratification because amendments which I believe were critical
to ensuring our safety and security were stricken rendering the
convention more dangerous to our well being than one which would
include those conditions, even if it means having to renegotiate the
convention. Of the outstanding amendments which were debated through
out the day today, I believe those covering Russian ratification and
their compliance with previous treaties, the rejection of inspectors or
inspections by states with a history of violating non-proliferation
treaties or which have been designated by our State Department as
sporting terrorism, striking article 10 of the treaty and amending
article 11, and having our intelligence agencies certify that the
treaty would be credibly verifiable were critical to making the treaty
worthwhile.
The fact that the President suggested we could withdraw from the
convention if there were a compelling reason to do so, was a placebo
which carried little viable meaning. I believe that it would not only
be more difficult to withdraw from the convention once we ratify it, it
would be much more dangerous to world stability if we were to withdraw
after obligating ourselves to a flawed treaty. And so, I must, in good
conscience, vote not to ratify.
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, the first thing I wish to express is my
gratitude to the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and the
Majority Leader for the work they have done in the final weeks to
improve this resolution of ratification.
The Chemical Weapons Convention before us is significantly better
than what we faced last year. In addition, I wish to compliment both
the Chairman and the Ranking Member of the Foreign Relations Committee
for holding numerous hearings during the past month and for the way
they have led the debate over the past two days. The duty of this body
to advise and consent has never been more honorably met.
This treaty, with the resolution of ratification, while now an
acceptable treaty, is not the panacea for chemical weapons that some of
the more adamant proponents have implied or suggested. It will not, in
and of itself, spare our grandchildren from the horrors of chemical
warfare. It will not, in and of itself, protect our citizens from
terrorists intent on using chemical weapons.
This Convention will not significantly reduce the threat of
terrorism, Mr. President. Now that this debate is almost concluded, it
would be of great benefit to the future of this agreement that everyone
be realistic about this. The Administration and other proponents of
this agreement recognized this when they stated in the resolution of
ratification, condition 19 that: ``The Senate finds that without regard
to whether the Convention enters into force, terrorists will likely
view chemical weapons as a means to gain greater publicity and instill
widespread fear; and the March 1995 Tokyo subway attack by the Aum
Shinrikyo would not have been prevented by the Convention.''
Mr. President, I am greatly concerned about future terrorist threats
to the citizens of this country, and I urge those who have suggested
that this Convention will curb that threat to decease from such
counterproductive rhetoric that could disastrously mislead us about
future threats.
In addition, I must note to the ardent proponents of the CWC that a
number of nations will remain outside of this regime, and some of them
have policies inimical to this nation's welfare and security. I have
read the Convention, and I wish to state that I read Article XI,
section (d) to mean that the U.S. is free to pursue any action--
unilaterally or multilaterally--against nations having chemical
weapons. Furthermore, I will insist on clarification indicating that
current trade sanctions promoting U.S. national security, and supported
by this body as well the executive, will not be infringed by this
Treaty.
The benefits of this Treaty will not nearly approach the rhetoric of
some of its proponents. In my opinion, overblown rhetoric enhanced the
possibility that this Treaty could have failed, as some of us studied
the document and realized the great gap between the rhetoric and
reality.
The current resolution of ratification helps to close that gap. The
conditions included in the resolution preserve the Senate's
constitutional role in treaty-making, including approval of amendments
to the CWC. Agreed conditions established standards for U.S.
intelligence sharing, including requiring reports on such sharing. They
limit the sharing of defensive capabilities under Article X. They
clarify our position on the use of riot control agents in wartime
circumstances, preserving for us that option along the lines originally
intended by our negotiators under President Reagan. They require the
President to report regularly on the threat of chemical weapons.
Finally--and this is extremely important, Mr. President--the
resolution of ratification requires criminal search warrants for
challenge inspections against non-complying parties.
I stress again, Mr. President, my gratitude to those, on both sides
of the aisle as well as in the Clinton Administration, who negotiated
this resolution.
The letter the Majority Leader has obtained from President Clinton
also helps close the gap between rhetoric and reality. The President
recognizes, with this letter, that the Treaty may not guarantee the
cessation of proliferation of these monstrous weapons and their
precursors. He recognizes that, despite the goals of this document, our
defenses against their possible use on our troops should not wane. He
recognizes that we have a regime--the Australia Group--in place that
has addressed the problem of illicit trade in chemicals and that that
regime should not go by the wayside.
With this letter, the President recognizes that if this Treaty is
seen to be failing, we can and will exercise Article XVI, which defines
how a State Party may withdraw from the CWC.
Despite these improvements and assurances, Mr. President, I know that
a number of thoughtful colleagues continue to have reservations about
the effectiveness of this Treaty. And I wish to say that I respect
their decisions, and I object to certain exceptional notions heard
during the debate that opponents of this Treaty object because they are
against all arms control treaties. I don't believe this to be the case
[[Page S3649]]
at all. This Treaty has many practical limitations, and I believe that
we should not impugn the motives of individuals who, at the end of the
day, have great reservations over its benefits.
I have supported many arms control agreements myself, Mr. President,
but always after careful consideration of the strategic value as well
as practical consequences of making so grave a commitment. And I must
say that it has never been more difficult for me to determine the net
worth of an arms control agreement as it has been for me regarding the
Chemical Weapons Convention before us today.
I have concluded that this treaty can advance our security, but only
if Administration matches the rhetoric of arms control with the muscle
of political will. Because, Mr. President, international norms without
political will do not become norms.
The benefits of treaties are measured on achievements, not
intentions. If intentions were all that mattered, all treaties would be
beneficial prima facie. By this standard, the Kellogg-Briand Treaty,
which outlawed war, or the 1925 Geneva Convention Against the Use of
Chemical Weapons, would have been rousing successes. History has proven
that they were not. But, the success of treaties is measured in
reality, not rhetoric. And the benefits of this Treaty are measured on
a narrow margin.
It is after a careful parsing of this margin, and much reflection,
that I have determined that I will vote for the Chemical Weapons
Convention. But I do so with the expectation that this Chief Executive,
and subsequent ones, must be wholly dedicated to implementing this
agreement in a way that advances U.S. security interests and protects
U.S. domestic interests.
Mr. President, this Treaty will give us some tools--inspections and
other data collections--that will enhance our knowledge of the threat
of chemical weapons. The information will not be comprehensive; it will
not apply universally. But, if in collecting this information we reduce
the possibility that our troops will face a chemical threat, then this
is a tangible, defensible goal, for which anyone could support this
Treaty.
The United States has been a principal negotiator of this agreement,
through Republican and Democratic administrations. To abandon it now
would be to abdicate U.S. leadership. We are now burdened to support it
and implement it. The goals are admirable. The bridge to achieving
those goals, to bridging the gap between the idealistic rhetoric and
the vexing reality, will be difficult. On that bridge, Mr. President,
will ride the credibility of the United States, and, I believe, the
credibility of future arms control. Past administrations have led in
the establishment of this international norm. Future administrations
will need to verify its legitimacy. President Clinton must carry
through on his pledge for strict international compliance and for
vigilence regarding threats by terrorists or renegade groups.
Over 70 nations have ratified this Convention. Of course, we decided
to unilaterally destroy our stockpile more than a decade ago, and we
are proceeding as expeditiously as possible, restrained only by
prudence regarding safety and the environment. We've known all along
that our unilateral destruction plan was not contingent on the outcome
of this debate. We determined these weapons were not militarily useful
to us; our defense establishment can preserve and promote our national
security without them. But as of the moment that our instrument of
ratification is deposited, we will be the first of the countries with a
large stockpile to ratify. The United States is leading. Will other
nations follow?
Mr. President, I wish to say a few words about Russia. With the
consent of the Senate today, the Administration will be able to deposit
the instrument of ratification before the April 29 deadline, allowing
U.S. participation in the formation of the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The U.S. and Russia are the only
powers that voluntarily declare they have chemical weapons. On two
occasions the Russians have joined us--in the 1990 Bilateral
Destruction Agreement and under the 1989 Wyoming Memorandum--in
bilateral commitments to expose and destroy our stockpiles. As those
who have studied this question know, the record of Russian compliance
is not good. As those who read the papers and get the briefings know,
the Russian chemical arms capability is not stagnant.
President Yeltsin has indicated that he wishes the Russian Duma to
approve ratification before the April 29 deadline. I hope they do. The
Russians need to join and participate in the initial construction of
this regime. And we need to begin to inspect and expose all of our
stockpiles. If the Russians are not part of this Treaty, Mr. President,
this regime may be stillborn, because the largest stockpile of chemical
weapons in the world exists in the Russian Federation. I hope we can
work with the Russians as partners beginning next week.
If the Senate gives its consent today, Mr. President, next week the
hard work will begin. The success or failure of this regime will not be
a function of depositing the instrument of ratification. It will be a
function of implementing the agreement. I am supporting this Convention
today because I think it can only succeed with U.S. participation--and
leadership. It can fail for many reasons, including noncompliance or
nonparticipation by nations around the world. But it won't succeed
without U.S. leadership.
Leadership will require more than idealistic promises. We must
abandon the rhetoric of unattainable promises and commit to the reality
of national interest. I fear the Administration will have a lot of work
building the bridge between the rhetoric and reality. On that bridge
lies the future of this Convention and the future of arms control.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, let me state the order of distinguished
speakers on this side of the aisle. I am going to start with the most
distinguished of all. The President pro tempore of the Senate, Senator
Thurmond, will have 5 minutes; followed by Senator Hutchison of Texas,
for 5 minutes; Senator Hutchinson of Arkansas to follow with 2 minutes;
Senator Brownback, for 1 minute; Senator Kyl, for 1 minute; Senator
Ashcroft, for 2 minutes. They will be recognized in that order.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina is recognized.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I want to recognize the work done on
this treaty by the floor managers--both in opposition and in support of
this very important international treaty. Both sides have made laudable
arguments in supporting their different positions. This subject is one
of great importance. I want to especially commend our able majority
leader for the long hours he spent working with both floor managers and
the administration.
Mr. President, during the Senate Armed Services Committee's review of
the national security implications of the Chemical Weapons Convention,
I raised concerns about the ability of the U.S. to comply with the
treaty obligation to destroy our chemical stockpile within the
timeframe stipulated, the universality of the treaty, the verifiability
of the treaty, and the administration's interpretation of the provision
on the defensive use of riot control agents by U.S. forces.
During the committee's hearings on the treaty in August 1994, I took
no position on this treaty. I made it clear that the administration
would have to convince me that it was in the national security
interests of the United States.
I have concerns about statements made over the past few weeks, by the
President and several administration representatives, that if the
United States does not ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention, that we
would be aligning ourselves on the side of rogue nations, like Iraq and
Libya, and against our allies.
Mr. President, in 1985 the Congress legislated the requirement for
the United States to destroy its chemical stockpile, and has reaffirmed
that decision every year since that time. The Senate agreed to take
actions against Iraq for attacking its neighbor, and against Libya for
terrorist actions which resulted in the death of American citizens. How
can the President, the Secretary of State and other administration
representatives liken a decision by the Senate, in its performance of
its constitutional duties to provide advice and consent to
international treaties, to be aligning the United States with rogue
nations? Regardless of the outcome of the CWC,
[[Page S3650]]
the United States will continue to destroy its chemical stockpiles.
Last Sunday, the Secretary of Defense talked about his recent visit
to South Korea and the discussions he had about the threat posed to
U.S. Forces by the chemical weapons in North Korea. He also mentioned
General Tilelli's support for ratification of the CWC because it would
reduce the chemical weapons threat faced by his troops in South Korea.
Mr. President, North Korea has not signed the CWC. As I read the
treaty, none of the provisions will apply to nations that have not
signed and ratified it. Only trade sanctions will apply to countries
that have not signed it. United States ratification of the CWC will not
minimize the North Korean chemical weapons threat which face our United
States forces.
Mr. President, I cannot support the Chemical Weapons Convention. I
appreciate the efforts made by the White House to work out conditions
to the resolution of ratification that respond to concerns raised about
the treaty made by Members of the Senate. However, I do not believe
they go far enough. I remain concerned about the ability of the
intelligence community to verify compliance with the treaty. Rogue
nations which pose a military and terrorist threat to the United States
have not signed the treaty, and most likely will not sign it. I am also
concerned about the potential compromise of U.S. defensive capability
through potential transfers of chemical defensive protective equipment,
material or information under article X and article XI.
It is for these reasons that I cannot vote for this treaty.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Texas
for 5 minutes.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I respect everyone who is going to
vote today for the position that they are taking because I know that it
is sincere. I respect the people who have come out for this convention
treaty--the former Presidents--and I respect the people who have come
out against the treaty, the former Secretaries of Defense.
It comes down, for me, to a basic question, and that is: Do we
believe that international conventions and conferences keep us safe at
night? Or do we believe a strong national defense is what keeps us safe
at night and what has served us so well for this century? Mr.
President, I think it is a commitment to a strong national defense, and
I have decided, reluctantly, to vote against this convention treaty
because I believe this does more to harm our strength and our national
defense than it does to help it.
Mr. President, we have seen our allies transfer nuclear technology
that can be made into weapons to rogue nations. So now we have a treaty
that will allow people to come into our chemical plants--not chemical
plants that make weapons, because we are not going to make weapons, but
into our chemical plants that might be doing research on how to defend
against chemical weapons. That technology can then be transferred to
the nations who would use the chemical weapons.
It seems to me that we are unilaterally disarming ourselves, Mr.
President, with a treaty that would say we must allow international
groups to come into plants that use chemicals, whether it is to make
fertilizer or disinfectant, or defenses to chemical weapons, any of
those things. An international group will be able to come in and, I
think, violate our constitutional right against search and seizure. I
am concerned that we are hurting our ability to defend our country.
So, Mr. President, I think we have a choice here between America
being the leader and undercutting our defenses, or standing on
principle and protecting our security. Mr. President, I just don't
think there is a choice. We must stand on principle. So that if our
young men and women in the field are attacked by chemical weapons by
those who will not sign this treaty, we will surely have the defenses
to protect them; and so that we will keep the ability in our country to
have the strength to fight the chemical weapons that will be produced,
that we know are being produced right now, by nations who will not
abide by this treaty.
So I do not buy the argument that we are better off with this treaty
than without it. In fact, I think we are hurting our ability to combat
the rogue nations, the terrorist nations with whom we are dealing all
over the world, and I could not vote in good conscience to do that.
Thank you.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas is recognized.
Mr. HUTCHINSON. Mr. President, I want to especially applaud this
evening the Senator from North Carolina and the Senator from Arizona
for their courageous opposition to this treaty. I also want to
recognize the good and patriotic Americans and Senators who have
differed on this treaty and have come down to different places on how
they are going to vote.
But this treaty is not about who is committed to and who believes in
the elimination of chemical warfare in this world. I believe all of us
are equally committed to that goal.
I rise in opposition to the CWC because I simply believe that it is a
flawed treaty in which we claim to verify the unverifiable, we are
ratifying the unenforceable, and we are trusting the untrustworthy. We
are binding ourselves and our friends, while those that we should be
most concerned about go unrestrained and undeterred. When addressing
the ratification of a treaty, we in this body are executing one of our
most solemn duties. When addressing our Nation's security and when
addressing our Nation's sovereignty, our watch words should be
``prudence'' and ``caution.''
I believe that prudence and caution call out for a ``no'' vote. By
ratifying this treaty, we spurn the sage advice of former Secretaries
of Defense. And I close with the words of one of those Secretaries,
Secretary Cheney, who wrote that ``This accord is worse than no treaty
at all.''
So, while I recognize and applaud the sincerity and the passion with
which the advocates of this treaty have spoken and how they articulated
their position, I believe firmly that it is not in the interest of the
sovereignty and the security of the United States. And I urge a ``no''
vote on the treaty ratification.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Kansas
for 1 minute.
Mr. BROWNBACK. Thank you very much, Mr. President. I appreciate that.
Mr. President, I join with other Senators noting how extremely
difficult and important this decision is to vote for treaty
ratification. I have taken it very seriously, as well as everybody
else. I have read the entire treaty. I sat down and thought it through.
I have talked with people. I have talked with President Bush, Bob Dole,
Colin Powell, Casper Weinberger, James Schlesinger, Richard Perle, and
my 9-year-old son, too, who I think has a stake in this as well.
I find it a terribly tough call to make on this treaty; a tough one
to be able to decide what is in the best interest and ultimately what
will get the fewest chemical weapons used in this world. That to me is
the real litmus test issue. What is going to make the world safer is
when we are going to have fewer chemical weapons used in the world.
I would like to bare to the body that I chair the Middle East
Subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee. We held a hearing just
last week on U.S. policy toward Iran. Our policy has failed to stop
them from receiving weapons of mass destruction, particularly chemical
weapons. The Iranians are receiving precursor chemical weapons from the
Chinese.
May I have an additional minute and a half?
Mr. HELMS. Please. Yes.
Mr. BROWNBACK. I thank the chairman very much.
As I mentioned in our hearing last week, it was noted and pointed out
that the Iranians have received chemical weapons, precursor chemical
weapons, from the Chinese and from other sources.
I have reluctantly but clearly concluded that Iran would be more
likely to obtain and use chemical weapons if we enter into this
Chemical Weapons Convention with article X in place, which is currently
how it sits; that they will be more likely to get and use chemical
weapons, weapons of mass destruction. Iran is our erstwhile terrorist
enemy.
I spoke to Colin Powell. He noted that chemical weapons today are the
[[Page S3651]]
weapons of choice, primarily, for terrorists. These are primarily
weapons used by terrorists. That certainly fits the Iranians.
So that is why I have, unfortunately, reluctantly yet clearly,
decided that with article X in it and with the likelihood of that being
used by the Iranians, that this treaty would actually cause more
chemical weapons to be used by people that we don't want; by terrorist
regimes such as the Iranians. Therefore, I will have to vote against
this treaty.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from
Missouri.
Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, I thank you for this opportunity to make
some comments in regard to this serious matter.
None of us has any affection for chemical weapons. Each of us hates
chemical weapons. We would all like to see chemical weapons abolished.
None of us would like to see chemical weapons used. We would all like
to believe the statements of prominent experts that have been made
about this treaty. We would all like to embrace the assurances of the
President that, if something goes wrong, the treaty could be something
easily walked away from.
But, in spite of all our aspirations, in spite of all of our desires,
and in spite of all our hopes, there is one reality which will persist;
and that reality is the language of the treaty itself. Long after the
assurances have stopped echoing through this Chamber, long after the
President has left office, who is trying to assuage the fears of those
who have misgivings about this treaty, the black and white letters of
the treaty itself will be the controlling components of what happens.
And the thing that gives me great pause is that the treaty will remain.
There are the requirements, particularly in articles X and XI of the
treaty, which require us to share technology, to share information, and
to share, in particular, the defensive technology of chemical weaponry.
There is an anomaly in chemical weaponry which is challenging. It is
that when you provide the defensive technology for chemical weapons,
you are providing one of the essential components of delivering
chemical weapons. No one can deliver chemical weapons, unless it
is launched by a missile, without having to have all the technologies
of how to defend against the chemistry of the weapons.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
Mr. ASHCROFT. I ask for 30 additional seconds.
If a rogue state wants to deliver chemical weapons, one of the things
they need to do is to acquire the defensive technology to defend
against them and to protect their own soldiers in delivery. That seems
to me one of the substantial problems contained in articles X and XI.
The risks far exceed the benefits.
As a result, I think it is ill-advised for us to accept assurances
which would mislead us. We need to read the treaty, and the treaty is
not one which merits our approval.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Arizona
for 1 minute.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, let me begin by thanking Senator Helms and
Senator Biden, the floor managers of this treaty, for the work they did
in bringing it before us.
Mr. President, I share the hope of the supporters of this treaty that
it will help end the proliferation of chemical weapons. I believe,
however, that history will record this treaty as one of the most well-
intentioned yet least effective in our history. My hope is that we will
not relax our efforts in other ways to reduce this threat, that we will
not be lulled into a sense of security when it is ratified.
With the protections in the original resolution of ratification, I
voted for the treaty. But the protections having been stricken, I must
vote ``no.''
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from North
Carolina.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, Senators will be glad to hear this.
I ask for the yeas and nays on the final vote in the Senate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. LEAHY addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, how much time remains to the Senator from
Vermont?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont has 8\1/2\ minutes.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I will not use all of that time, only to
say this. We will advise and consent so the President can ratify this
treaty. I truly believe we will. It will show the moral leadership that
the Senate should show and that the United States should show. We will
act as the conscience of this Nation, and we will advise and consent to
this treaty. We will show the moral leadership because we began this by
saying we would act unilaterally, if need be, renouncing our own use of
chemical weapons with or without a treaty. That was true leadership.
Not all countries are going to join with us. But most did join with
us on this, and we should be proud of that leadership that brought them
together. We will never have all of the countries with us, but we know
that it is in the best interests of the United States to do this.
I suggest, after we do this, Mr. President, that we should again look
at the question of antipersonnel landmines and show the same moral
leadership to get countries to join with us--not all countries will--to
ban antipersonnel landmines which kill and injure far more people than
chemical weapons.
Mr. President, I will vote for advice and consent of this treaty so
the President can ratify it.
I yield the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I, on behalf of the leader's time and any
other time that may be assigned to me, yield the remainder of time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the resolution
of ratification. On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered,
and the clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 74, nays 26, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 51 Ex.]
YEAS--74
Abraham
Akaka
Baucus
Biden
Bingaman
Boxer
Breaux
Bryan
Bumpers
Byrd
Chafee
Cleland
Coats
Cochran
Collins
Conrad
D'Amato
Daschle
DeWine
Dodd
Domenici
Dorgan
Durbin
Enzi
Feingold
Feinstein
Ford
Frist
Glenn
Gorton
Graham
Gregg
Hagel
Harkin
Hatch
Hollings
Inouye
Jeffords
Johnson
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Kohl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lott
Lugar
McCain
McConnell
Mikulski
Moseley-Braun
Moynihan
Murkowski
Murray
Reed
Reid
Robb
Roberts
Rockefeller
Roth
Santorum
Sarbanes
Smith (OR)
Snowe
Specter
Stevens
Thomas
Torricelli
Warner
Wellstone
Wyden
NAYS--26
Allard
Ashcroft
Bennett
Bond
Brownback
Burns
Campbell
Coverdell
Craig
Faircloth
Gramm
Grams
Grassley
Helms
Hutchinson
Hutchison
Inhofe
Kempthorne
Kyl
Mack
Nickles
Sessions
Shelby
Smith (NH)
Thompson
Thurmond
The VICE PRESIDENT. On this vote, the yeas are 74, the nays are 26.
Two-thirds of the Senators present having voted in the affirmative, the
resolution of ratification is agreed to.
The resolution of ratification, as amended, was agreed to, as
follows:
Resolved, (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring
therein),
SECTION 1. SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS.
The Senate advises and consents to the ratification of the
Chemical Weapons Convention (as defined in section 3 of this
resolution), subject to the conditions in section 2.
SECTION 2. CONDITIONS.
The Senate's advice and consent to the ratification of the
Chemical Weapons Convention is subject to the following
conditions, which shall be binding upon the President:
(1) Effect of article xxii.--Upon the deposit of the United
States instrument of ratification, the President shall
certify to the Congress that the United States has informed
all other States Parties to the Convention that the Senate
reserves the right, pursuant to the Constitution of the
United States, to give its advice and consent to ratification
of the Convention subject to reservations, notwithstanding
Article XXII of the Convention.
[[Page S3652]]
(2) Financial contributions.--Notwithstanding any provision
of the Convention, no funds may be drawn from the Treasury of
the United States for any payment or assistance (including
the transfer of in-kind items) under paragraph 16 of Article
IV, paragraph 19 of Article V, paragraph 7 of Article VIII,
paragraph 23 of Article IX, Article X, or any other provision
of the Convention, without statutory authorization and
appropriation.
(3) Establishment of an internal oversight office.--
(A) Certification.--Not later than 240 days after the
deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the
President shall certify to the Congress that the current
internal audit office of the Preparatory Commission has been
expanded into an independent internal oversight office whose
functions will be transferred to the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons upon the establishment of the
Organization. The independent internal oversight office shall
be obligated to protect confidential information pursuant to
the obligations of the Confidentiality Annex. The independent
internal oversight office shall--
(i) make investigations and reports relating to all
programs of the Organization;
(ii) undertake both management and financial audits,
including--
(I) an annual assessment verifying that classified and
confidential information is stored and handled securely
pursuant to the general obligations set forth in Article VIII
and in accordance with all provisions of the Annex on the
Protection of Confidential Information; and
(II) an annual assessment of laboratories established
pursuant to paragraph 55 of Part II of the Verification Annex
to ensure that the Director General of the Technical
Secretariat is carrying out his functions pursuant to
paragraph 56 of Part II of the Verification Annex;
(iii) undertake performance evaluations annually to ensure
the Organization has complied to the extent practicable with
the recommendations of the independent internal oversight
office;
(iv) have access to all records relating to the programs
and operations of the Organization;
(v) have direct and prompt access to any official of the
Organization; and
(vi) be required to protect the identity of, and prevent
reprisals against, all complainants.
(B) Compliance with recommendations.--The Organization
shall ensure, to the extent practicable, compliance with
recommendations of the independent internal oversight office,
and shall ensure that annual and other relevant reports by
the independent internal oversight office are made available
to all member states pursuant to the requirements established
in the Confidentiality Annex.
(C) Withholding a portion of contributions.--Until a
certification is made under subparagraph (A), 50 percent of
the amount of United States contributions to the regular
budget of the Organization assessed pursuant to paragraph 7
of Article VIII shall be withheld from disbursement, in
addition to any other amounts required to be withheld from
disbursement by any other provision of law.
(D) Assessment of first year contributions.--
Notwithstanding the requirements of this paragraph, for the
first year of the Organization's operation, ending on April
29, 1998, the United States shall make its full contribution
to the regular budget of the Organization assessed pursuant
to paragraph 7 of Article VIII.
(E) Definition.--For purposes of this paragraph, the term
``internal oversight office'' means an independent office (or
other independent entity) established by the Organization to
conduct and supervise objective audits, inspections, and
investigations relating to the programs and operations of the
Organization.
(4) Cost sharing arrangements.--
(A) Annual reports.--Prior to the deposit of the United
States instrument of ratification, and annually thereafter,
the President shall submit a report to Congress identifying
all cost-sharing arrangements with the Organization.
(B) Cost-sharing arrangement required.--The United States
shall not undertake any new research or development
expenditures for the primary purpose of refining or improving
the Organization's regime for verification of compliance
under the Convention, including the training of inspectors
and the provision of detection equipment and on-site analysis
sampling and analysis techniques, or share the articles,
items, or services resulting from any research and
development undertaken previously, without first having
concluded and submitted to the Congress a cost-sharing
arrangement with the Organization.
(C) Construction.--Nothing in this paragraph may be
construed as limiting or constricting in any way the ability
of the United States to pursue unilaterally any project
undertaken solely to increase the capability of the United
States means for monitoring compliance with the Convention.
(5) Intelligence sharing and safeguards.--
(A) Provision of intelligence information to the
organization.--
(i) In general.--No United States intelligence information
may be provided to the Organization or any organization
affiliated with the Organization, or to any official or
employee thereof, unless the President certifies to the
appropriate committees of Congress that the Director of
Central Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of
State and the Secretary of Defense, has established and
implemented procedures, and has worked with the Organization
or other such organization, as the case may be to ensure
implementation of procedures, for protecting from
unauthorized disclosure United States intelligence sources
and methods connected to such information. These procedures
shall include the requirement of--
(I) the offer and provision if accepted of advice and
assistance to the Organization or the affiliated organization
in establishing and maintaining the necessary measures to
ensure that inspectors and other staff members of the
Technical Secretariat meet the highest standards of
efficiency, competence, and integrity, pursuant to
paragraph 1(b) of the Confidentiality Annex, and in
establishing and maintaining a stringent regime governing
the handling of confidential information by the Technical
Secretariat, pursuant to paragraph 2 of the
Confidentiality Annex;
(II) a determination that any unauthorized disclosure of
United States intelligence information to be provided to the
Organization or any organization affiliated with the
Organization, or any official or employee thereof, would
result in no more than minimal damage to United States
national security, in light of the risks of the unauthorized
disclosure of such information;
(III) sanitization of intelligence information that is to
be provided to the Organization or the affiliated
organization to remove all information that could betray
intelligence sources and methods; and
(IV) interagency United States intelligence community
approval for any release of intelligence information to the
Organization or the affiliated organization, no matter how
thoroughly it has been sanitized.
(ii) Waiver authority.--
(I) In general.--The Director of Central Intelligence may
waive the application of clause (i) if the Director of
Central Intelligence certifies in writing to the appropriate
committees of Congress that providing such information to the
Organization or an organization affiliated with the
Organization, or to any official or employee thereof, is in
the vital national security interests of the United States
and that all possible measures to protect such information
have been taken, except that such waiver must be made for
each instance such information is provided, or for each such
document provided. In the event that multiple waivers are
issued within a single week, a single certification to the
appropriate committees of Congress may be submitted,
specifying each waiver issued during that week.
(II) Delegation of duties.--The Director of Central
Intelligence may not delegate any duty of the Director under
this paragraph.
(B) Periodic and special reports.--
(i) In general.--The President shall report periodically,
but not less frequently than semiannually, to the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives on the types and volume of intelligence
information provided to the Organization or affiliated
organizations and the purposes for which it was provided
during the period covered by the report.
(ii) Exemption.--For purposes of this subparagraph,
intelligence information provided to the Organization or
affiliated organizations does not cover information that is
provided only to, and only for the use of, appropriately
cleared United States Government personnel serving with the
Organization or an affiliated organization.
(C) Special reports.--
(i) Report on procedures.--Accompanying the certification
provided pursuant to subparagraph (A)(i), the President shall
provide a detailed report to the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence of the House of Representatives identifying
the procedures established for protecting intelligence
sources and methods when intelligence information is provided
pursuant to this section.
(ii) Reports on unauthorized disclosures.--The President
shall submit a report to the Select Committee on Intelligence
of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives within 15 days
after it has become known to the United States Government
regarding any unauthorized disclosure of intelligence
provided by the United States to the Organization.
(D) Delegation of duties.--The President may not delegate
or assign the duties of the President under this section.
(E) Relationship to existing law.--Nothing in this
paragraph may be construed to--
(i) impair of otherwise affect the authority of the
Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure pursuant to
section 103(c)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 403-3(c)(5)); or
(ii) supersede or otherwise affect the provisions of title
V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et
seq.).
(F) Definitions.--In this section:
(i) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term
``appropriate committees of Congress'' means the Committee on
Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of
the Senate and the Committee on International Relations and
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House
of Representatives.
(ii) Organization.--The term ``Organization'' means the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
established
[[Page S3653]]
under the Convention and includes any organ of that
Organization and any board or working group, such as the
Scientific Advisory Board, that may be established by it and
any official or employee thereof.
(iii) Organization affiliated with the organization.--The
terms ``organization affiliated with the Organization'' and
``affiliated organizations'' include the Provisional
Technical Secretariat under the Convention and any laboratory
certified by the Director-General of the Technical
Secretariat as designated to perform analytical or other
functions and any official or employee thereof.
(6) Amendments to the convention.--
(A) Voting representation of the united states.--A United
States representative will be present at all Amendment
Conferences and will cast a vote, either affirmative or
negative, on all proposed amendments made at such
conferences.
(B) Submission of amendments as treaties.--The President
shall submit to the Senate for its advice and consent to
ratification under Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the
Constitution of the United States any amendment to the
Convention adopted by an Amendment Conference.
(7) Continuing vitality of the australia group and national
export controls.--
(A) Declaration.--The Senate declares that the collapse of
the informal forum of states known as the ``Australia
Group,'' either through changes in membership or lack of
compliance with common export controls, or the substantial
weakening of common Australia Group export controls and non-
proliferation measures in force on the date of United States
ratification of the Convention, would constitute a
fundamental change in circumstances affecting the object and
purpose of the Convention.
(B) Certification requirement.--Prior to the deposit of the
United States instrument of ratification, the President shall
certify to Congress that--
(i) nothing in the Convention obligates the United States
to accept any modification, change in scope, or weakening of
its national export controls;
(ii) the United States understands that the maintenance of
national restrictions on trade in chemicals and chemical
production technology is fully compatible with the provisions
of the Convention, including Article XI(2), and solely within
the sovereign jurisdiction of the United States;
(iii) the Convention preserves the right of State Parties,
unilaterally or collectively, to maintain or impose export
controls on chemicals and related chemical production
technology for foreign policy or national security
reasons, notwithstanding Article XI(2); and
(iv) each Australia Group member, at the highest diplomatic
levels, has officially communicated to the United States
Government its understanding and agreement that export
control and nonproliferation measures which the Australia
Group has undertaken are fully compatible with the provisions
of the Convention, including Article XI(2), and its
commitment to maintain in the future such export controls and
nonproliferation measures against non-Australia Group
members.
(C) Annual certification.--
(i) Effectiveness of australia group.--The President shall
certify to Congress on an annual basis that--
(I) Australia Group members continue to maintain an equally
effective or more comprehensive control over the export of
toxic chemicals and their precursors, dual-use processing
equipment, human, animal and plant pathogens and toxins with
potential biological weapons application, and dual-use
biological equipment, as that afforded by the Australia Group
as of the date of ratification of the Convention by the
United States; and
(II) the Australia Group remains a viable mechanism for
limiting the spread of chemical and biological weapons-
related materials and technology, and that the effectiveness
of the Australia Group has not been undermined by changes in
membership, lack of compliance with common export controls
and nonproliferation measures, or the weakening of common
controls and nonproliferation measures, in force as of the
date of ratification of the Convention by the United States.
(ii) Consultation with senate required.--In the event that
the President is, at any time, unable to make the
certifications described in clause (i), the President shall
consult with the Senate for the purposes of obtaining a
resolution of support for continued adherence to the
Convention, notwithstanding the fundamental change in
circumstance.
(D) Periodic consultation with congressional committees.--
The President shall consult periodically, but not less
frequently than twice a year, with the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate and the Committee on International
Relations of the House of Representatives, on Australia Group
export control and nonproliferation measures. If any
Australia Group member adopts a position at variance with the
certifications and understandings provided under subparagraph
(B), or should seek to gain Australia Group acquiescence or
approval for an interpretation that various provisions of the
Convention require it to remove chemical-weapons related
export controls against any State Party to the Convention,
the President shall block any effort by the Australia Group
member to secure Australia Group approval of such a position
or interpretation.
(E) Definitions.--In this paragraph.
(i) Australia group.--The term ``Australia Group'' means
the informal forum of states, chaired by Australia, whose
goal is to discourage and impede chemical and biological
weapons proliferation by harmonizing national export
controls, chemical weapons precursor chemicals, biological
weapons pathogens, and dual-use production equipment, and
through other measures.
(ii) Highest diplomatic levels.--The term ``highest
diplomatic levels'' means at the levels of senior officials
with the power to authoritatively represent their
governments, and does not include diplomatic representatives
of these governments to the United States.
(8) Negative security assurances.--
(A) Reevalation.--In forswearing under the Convention the
possession of a chemical weapons retaliatory capability, the
Senate understands that deterrence of attack by chemical
weapons requires a reevaluation of the negative security
assurances extended to non-nuclear-weapon states.
(B) Classified report.--Accordingly, 180 days after the
deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the
President shall submit to the Congress a classified report
setting forth the findings of a detailed review of United
States policy on negative security assurances, including a
determination of the appropriate responses to the use of
chemical or biological weapons against the Armed Forces of
the United States, United States citizens and allies, and
third parties.
(9) Protection of advanced biotechnology.--Prior to the
deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, and
on January 1 of every year thereafter, the President shall
certify to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives that the legitimate
commercial activities and interests of chemical,
biotechnology, and pharmaceutical firms in the United States
are not being significantly harmed by the limitations of the
Convention on access to, and production of, those chemicals
and toxins listed in Schedule 1 of the Annex on Chemicals.
(10) Monitoring and verification of compliance.--
(A) Declaration.--The Senate declares that--
(i) the Convention is in the interests of the United States
only if all State Parties are in strict compliance with the
terms of the Convention as submitted to the Senate for its
advice and consent to ratification, such compliance being
measured by performance and not by efforts, intentions, or
commitments to comply; and
(ii) the Senate expects all State Parties to be in strict
compliance with their obligations under the terms of the
Convention, as submitted to the Senate for its advice and
consent to ratification;
(B) Briefings on compliance.--Given its concern about the
intelligence community's low level of confidence in its
ability to monitor compliance with the Convention, the Senate
expects the executive branch of the Government to offer
regular briefings, not less than four times a year, to the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the
Committee on International Relations of the House of
Representatives on compliance issues related to the
Convention. Such briefings shall include a description of all
United States efforts in bilateral and multilateral
diplomatic channels and forums to resolve compliance issues
and shall include a complete description of--
(i) any compliance issues the United States plans to raise
at meetings of the Organization, in advance of such meetings;
(ii) any compliance issues raised at meetings of the
Organization, within 30 days of such meeting;
(iii) any determination by the President that a State Party
is in noncompliance with or is otherwise acting in a manner
inconsistent with the object or purpose of the Convention,
within 30 days of such a determination.
(C) Annual reports on compliance.--The President shall
submit on January 1 of each year to the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate and the Committee on International
Relations of the House of Representatives a full and complete
classified and unclassified report setting forth--
(i) a certification of those countries included in the
Intelligence Community's Monitoring Strategy, as set forth by
the Director of Central Intelligence's Arms Control Staff and
the National Intelligence Council (or any successor document
setting forth intelligence priorities in the field of the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction) that are
determined to be in compliance with the Convention, on a
country-by-country basis;
(ii) for those countries not certified pursuant to clause
(i), an identification and assessment of all compliance
issues arising with regard to the adherence of the country to
its obligations under the Convention;
(iii) the steps the United States has taken, either
unilaterally or in conjunction with another State Party--
(I) to initiate challenge inspections of the noncompliant
party with the objective of demonstrating to the
international community the act of noncompliance;
(II) to call attention publicly to the activity in
question; and
(III) to seek on an urgent basis a meeting at the highest
diplomatic level with the noncompliant party with the
objective of bringing the noncompliant party into compliance;
(iv) a determination of the military significance and
broader security risks arising from any compliance issue
identified pursuant to clause (ii); and
[[Page S3654]]
(v) a detailed assessment of the responses of the
noncompliant party in question to action undertaken by the
United States described in clause (iii).
(D) Countries previously included in compliance reports.--
For any country that was previously included in a report
submitted under subparagraph (C), but which subsequently is
not included in the Intelligence Community's Monitoring
Strategy (or successor document), such country shall continue
to be included in the report submitted under subparagraph (C)
unless the country has been certified under subparagraph
(C)(i) for each of the previous two years.
(E) Form of certifications.--For those countries that have
been publicly and officially identified by a representative
of the intelligence community as possessing or seeking to
develop chemical weapons, the certification described in
subparagraph (C)(i) shall be in unclassified form.
(F) Annual reports on intelligence.--On January 1, 1998,
and annually thereafter, the Director of Central Intelligence
shall submit to the Committees on Foreign Relations, Armed
Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate and to the Committees on International Relations,
National Security, and Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives a full and
complete classified and unclassified report regarding--
(i) the status of chemical weapons development, production,
stockpiling, and use, within the meanings of those terms
under the Convention, on a country-by-country basis;
(ii) any information made available to the United States
Government concerning the development, production,
acquisition, stockpiling, retention, use, or direct or
indirect transfer of novel agents, including any unitary or
binary chemical weapon comprised of chemical components not
identified on the schedules of the Annex on Chemicals, on a
country-by-country basis;
(iii) the extent of trade in chemicals potentially relevant
to chemical weapons programs, including all Australia Group
chemicals and chemicals identified on the schedules of the
Annex on Chemicals, on a country-by-country basis;
(iv) the monitoring responsibilities, practices, and
strategies of the intelligence community (as defined in
section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947) and a
determination of the level of confidence of the intelligence
community with respect to each specific monitoring task
undertaken, including an assessment by the intelligence
community of the national aggregate data provided by State
Parties to the Organization, on a country-by-country basis;
(v) an identification of how United States national
intelligence means, including national technical means and
human intelligence, are being marshaled together with the
Convention's verification provisions to monitor compliance
with the Convention; and
(vi) the identification of chemical weapons development,
production, stockpiling, or use, within the meanings of those
terms under the Convention, by subnational groups, including
terrorist and paramilitary organizations.
(G) Reports on resources for monitoring.--Each
report required under subparagraph (F) shall include a
full and complete classified annex submitted solely to the
Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and to the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives regarding--
(i) a detailed and specific identification of all United
States resources devoted to monitoring the Convention,
including information on all expenditures associated with the
monitoring of the Convention; and
(ii) an identification of the priorities of the executive
branch of Government for the development of new resources
relating to detection and monitoring capabilities with
respect to chemical and biological weapons, including a
description of the steps being taken and resources being
devoted to strengthening United States monitoring
capabilities.
(11) Enhancements to robust chemical and biological
defenses.--
(A) Sense of the senate.--It is the sense of the Senate
that--
(i) chemical and biological threats to deployed United
States Armed Forces will continue to grow in regions of
concern around the world, and pose serious threats to United
States power projection and forward deployment strategies;
(ii) chemical weapons or biological weapons use is a
potential element of future conflicts in regions of concern;
(iii) it is essential for the United States and key
regional allies to preserve and further develop robust
chemical and biological defenses;
(iv) the United States Armed Forces are inadequately
equipped, organized, trained and exercised for chemical and
biological defense against current and expected threats, and
that too much reliance is placed on non-active duty forces,
which receive less training and less modern equipment, for
critical chemical and biological defense capabilities;
(v) the lack of readiness stems from a de-emphasis of
chemical and biological defenses within the executive branch
of Government and the United States Armed Forces;
(vi) the armed forces of key regional allies and likely
coalition partners, as well as civilians necessary to support
United States military operations, are inadequately prepared
and equipped to carry out essential missions in chemically
and biologically contaminated environments;
(vii) congressional direction contained in the Defense
Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (title XIV of
Public Law 104-201) should lead to enhanced domestic
preparedness to protect against chemical and biological
weapons threats; and
(viii) the United States Armed Forces should place
increased emphasis on potential threats to forces deployed
abroad and, in particular, make countering chemical and
biological weapons use an organizing principle for United
States defense strategy and development of force structure,
doctrine, planning, training, and exercising policies of the
United States Armed Forces.
(B) Actions to strengthen defense capabilities.--The
Secretary of Defense shall take those actions necessary to
ensure that the United States Armed Forces are capable of
carrying out required military missions in United States
regional contingency plans, despite the threat or use of
chemical or biological weapons. In particular, the Secretary
of Defense shall ensure that the United States Armed Forces
are effectively equipped, organized, trained, and exercised
(including at the large unit and theater level) to conduct
operations in a chemically or biologically contaminated
environment that are critical to the success of the United
States military plans in regional conflicts, including--
(i) deployment, logistics, and reinforcement operations at
key ports and airfields;
(ii) sustained combat aircraft sortie generation at
critical regional airbases; and
(iii) ground force maneuvers of large units and divisions.
(C) Discussions with regional allies and likely coalition
partners.--
(i) In general.--The Secretaries of Defense and State
shall, as a priority matter, initiate discussions with key
regional allies and likely regional coalition partners,
including those countries where the United States currently
deploys forces, where United States forces would likely
operate during regional conflicts, or which would provide
civilians necessary to support United States military
operations, to determine what steps are necessary to ensure
that allied and coalition forces and other critical civilians
are adequately equipped and prepared to operate in chemically
and biologically contaminated environments.
(ii) Reporting requirement.--Not later than one year after
deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the
Secretaries of Defense and State shall submit a report to the
Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services of the
Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives on
the result of these discussions, plans for future
discussions, measures agreed to improve the preparedness of
foreign forces and civilians, and proposals for increased
military assistance, including through the Foreign Military
Sales and Foreign Military Financing under the Arms Export
Control Act, and the International Military Education and
Training programs pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961.
(D) United states army chemical school.--The Secretary of
Defense shall take those actions necessary to ensure that the
United States Army Chemical School remains under the
oversight of a general officer of the United States Army.
(E) Sense of the senate.--Given its concerns about the
present state of chemical and biological defense readiness
and training, it is the sense of the Senate that--
(i) in the transfer, consolidation, and reorganization of
the United States Army Chemical School, the Army should not
disrupt or diminish the training and readiness of the United
States Armed Forces to fight in a chemical-biological warfare
environment;
(ii) the Army should continue to operate the Chemical
Defense Training Facility at Fort McClellan until such time
as the replacement training facility at Fort Leonard Wood is
functional.
(F) Annual reports on chemical and biological weapons
defense activities.--On January 1, 1998, and annually
thereafter, the President shall submit a report to the
Committees on Foreign Relations, Appropriations, and Armed
Services of the Senate and the Committees on International
Relations, National Security, and Appropriations of the House
of Representatives, and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives on previous, current, and planned chemical
and biological weapons defense activities. The report shall
contain for the previous fiscal year and for the next three
fiscal years--
(i) proposed solutions to each of the deficiencies in
chemical and biological warfare defenses identified in the
March 1996 report of the General Accounting Office entitled
``Chemical and Biological Defense: Emphasis Remains
Insufficient to Resolve Continuing Problems'', and steps
being taken pursuant to subparagraph (B) to ensure that the
United States Armed Forces are capable of conducting required
military operations to ensure the success of United States
regional contingency plans despite the threat or use of
chemical or biological weapons;
(ii) identification of the priorities of the executive
branch of Government in the development of both active and
passive chemical and biological defenses;
(iii) a detailed summary of all budget activities
associated with the research, development, testing, and
evaluation of chemical and biological defense programs;
(iv) a detailed summary of expenditures on research,
development, testing, and evaluation, and procurement of
chemical and biological defenses by fiscal years defense
programs, department, and agency;
[[Page S3655]]
(v) a detailed assessment of current and projected vaccine
production capabilities and vaccine stocks, including
progress in researching and developing a multivalent vaccine;
(vi) a detailed assessment of procedures and capabilities
necessary to protect and decontaminate infrastructure to
reinforce United States power-projection forces, including
progress in developing a nonaqueous chemical decontamination
capability;
(vii) a description of progress made in procuring light-
weight personal protective gear and steps being taken to
ensure that programmed procurement quantities are sufficient
to replace expiring battle-dress overgarments and chemical
protective overgarments to maintain required wartime
inventory levels;
(viii) a description of progress made in developing long-
range standoff detection and identification capabilities and
other battlefield surveillance capabilities for biological
and chemical weapons, including progress on developing a
multichemical agent detector, unmanned aerial vehicles, and
unmanned ground sensors;
(ix) a description of progress made in developing and
deploying layered theater missile defenses for deployed
United States Armed Forces which will provide greater
geographic coverage against current and expected ballistic
missile threats and will assist in mitigating chemical and
biological contamination through higher altitude intercepts
and boost-phase intercepts;
(x) an assessment of--
(I) the training and readiness of the United States Armed
Forces to operate in a chemically or biologically
contaminated environment; and
(II) actions taken to sustain training and readiness,
including training and readiness carried out at national
combat training centers;
(xi) a description of progress made in incorporating
chemical and biological considerations into service and joint
exercises as well as simulations, models, and war games, and
the conclusions drawn from these efforts about the United
States capability to carry out required missions, including
missions with coalition partners, in military contingencies;
(xii) a description of progress made in developing and
implementing service and joint doctrine for combat and non-
combat operations involving adversaries armed with chemical
or biological weapons, including efforts to update the range
of service and joint doctrine to better address the wide
range of military activities, including deployment,
reinforcement, and logistics operations in support of combat
operations, and for the conduct of such operations in concert
with coalition forces; and
(xiii) a description of progress made in resolving issues
relating to the protection of United States population
centers from chemical and biological attack, including plans
for inoculation of populations, consequence management, and a
description of progress made in developing and deploying
effective cruise missile defenses and a national ballistic
missile defense.
(12) Primacy of the united states constitution.--Nothing in
the Convention requires or authorizes legislation, or other
action, by the United States prohibited by the Constitution
of the United States, as interpreted by the United States.
(13) Noncompliance.--
(A) In general.--If the President determines that
persuasive information exists that a State Party to the
Convention is maintaining a chemical weapons production or
production mobilization capability, is developing new
chemical agents, or is in violation of the Convention in any
other manner so as to threaten the national security
interests of the United States, then the President shall--
(i) consult with the Senate, and promptly submit to it, a
report detailing the effect of such actions;
(ii) seek on an urgent basis a challenge inspection of the
facilities of the relevant party in accordance with the
provisions of the Convention with the objective of
demonstrating to the international community the act of
noncompliance;
(iii) seek, or encourage, on an urgent basis a meeting at
the highest diplomatic level with the relevant party with the
objective of bringing the noncompliant party into compliance;
(iv) implement prohibitions and sanctions against the
relevant party as required by law;
(v) if noncompliance has been determined, seek on an urgent
basis within the Security Council of the United Nations a
multilateral imposition of sanctions against the noncompliant
party for the purposes of bringing the noncompliant party
into compliance; and
(vi) in the event that the noncompliance continues for a
period of longer than one year after the date of the
determination made pursuant to subparagraph (A), promptly
consult with the Senate for the purposes of obtaining a
resolution of support for continued adherence to the
Convention, notwithstanding the changed circumstances
affecting the object and purpose of the Convention.
(B) Construction.--Nothing in this section may be construed
to impair or otherwise affect the authority of the Director
of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and
methods from unauthorized disclosure pursuant to section
103(c)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
403-3(c)(5)).
(C) Presidential determinations.--If the President
determines that an action otherwise required under
subparagraph (A) would impair or otherwise affect the
authority of the Director of Central Intelligence to protect
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure, the President shall report that determination,
together with a detailed written explanation of the basis for
that determination, to the chairmen of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence not later than 15 days after making
such determination.
(14) Financing russian implementation.--The United States
understands that, in order to be assured of the Russian
commitment to a reduction in chemical weapons stockpiles,
Russia must maintain a substantial stake in financing the
implementation of both the 1990 Bilateral Destruction
Agreement and the Convention. The United States shall not
accept any effort by Russia to make deposit of Russia's
instrument of ratification of the Convention contingent upon
the United States providing financial guarantees to pay for
implementation of commitments by Russia under the 1990
Bilateral Destruction Agreement or the Convention.
(15) Assistance under article x.--
(A) In general.--Prior to the deposit of the United States
instrument of ratification, the President shall certify to
the Congress that the United States shall not provide
assistance under paragraph 7(a) of Article X.
(B) Countries ineligible for certain assistance under the
foreign assistance act.--Prior to the deposit of the United
States instrument of ratification, the President shall
certify to the Congress that for any State Party the
government of which is not eligible for assistance under
chapter 2 of part II (relating to military assistance) or
chapter 4 of part II (relating to economic support
assistance) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961--
(i) no assistance under paragraph 7(b) of Article X will be
provided to the State Party; and
(ii) no assistance under paragraph 7(c) of Article X other
than medical antidotes and treatment will be provided to the
State Party.
(16) Protection of confidential information.--
(A) Unauthorized disclosure of united states business
information.--Whenever the President determines that
persuasive information is available indicating that--
(i) an officer or employee of the Organization has
willfully published, divulged, disclosed, or made known in
any manner or to any extent not authorized by the Convention
any United States confidential business information coming to
him in the course of his employment or official duties or by
reason of any examination or investigation of any return,
report, or record made to or filed with the Organization, or
any officer or employee thereof, and
(ii) such practice or disclosure has resulted in financial
losses or damages to a United States person,
the President shall, within 30 days after the receipt of such
information by the executive branch of Government, notify the
Congress in writing of such determination.
(B) Waiver of immunity from jurisdiction.--
(i) Certification.--Not later than 270 days after
notification of Congress under subparagraph (A), the
President shall certify to Congress that the immunity from
jurisdiction of such foreign person has been waived by the
Director-General of the Technical Secretariat.
(ii) Withholding of portion of contributions.--If the
President is unable to make the certification described under
clause (i), then 50 percent of the amount of each annual
United States contribution to the regular budget of the
Organization that is assessed pursuant to paragraph 7 of
Article VIII shall be withheld from disbursement, in addition
to any other amounts required to be withheld from
disbursement by any other provision of law, until--
(I) the President makes such certification, or
(II) the President certifies to Congress that the situation
has been resolved in a manner satisfactory to the United
States person who has suffered the damages due to the
disclosure of United States confidential business
information.
(C) Breaches of confidentiality.--
(i) Certification.--In the case of any breach of
confidentiality involving both a State Party and the
Organization, including any officer or employee thereof, the
President shall, within 270 days after providing written
notification to Congress pursuant to subparagraph (A),
certify to Congress that the Commission described under
paragraph 23 of the Confidentiality Annex has been
established to consider the breach.
(ii) Withholding of portion of contributions.--If the
President is unable to make the certification described under
clause (i), then 50 percent of the amount of each annual
United States contribution to the regular budget of the
Organization that is assessed pursuant to paragraph 7 of
Article VIII shall be withheld from disbursement, in addition
to any other amounts required to be withheld from
disbursement by any other provision of law, until--
(I) the President makes such certification, or
(II) the President certifies to Congress that the situation
has been resolved in a manner
[[Page S3656]]
satisfactory to the United States person who has suffered the
damages due to the disclosure of United States confidential
business information.
(D) Definitions.--In this paragraph:
(i) United states confidential business information.--The
term ``United States confidential business information means
any trade secrets or commercial or financial information that
is privileged and confidential, as described in section
662(b)(4) of title 5, United States Code, and that is
obtained--
(I) from a United States person; and
(II) through the United States National Authority or the
conduct of an inspection on United States territory under the
Convention.
(ii) United States person.--The term ``United States
person'' means any natural person or any corporation,
partnership, or other juridical entity organized under the
laws of the United States.
(iii) United states.--The term ``United States'' means the
several States, the District of Columbia, and the
commonwealths, territories, and possessions of the United
States.
(17) Constitutional prerogatives.--
(A) Findings.--The Senate makes the following findings:
(i) Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the United States
Constitution states that the President ``shall have Power, by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make
Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present
concur''.
(ii) At the turn of the century, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge
took the position that the giving of advice and consent to
the ratification of treaties constitutes a stage in
negotiation on the treaties and that Senate amendments or
reservations to a treaty are propositions ``offered at a
later stage of the negotiation by the other part of the
American treaty making power in the only manner in which they
could then be offered''.
(iii) The executive branch of Government has begun a
practice of negotiating and submitting to the Senate treaties
which include provisions that have the purported effect of--
(I) inhibiting the Senate from attaching reservations that
the Senate considers necessary in the national interest; or
(II) preventing the Senate from exercising its
constitutional duty to give its advice and consent to treaty
commitments before ratification of the treaties.
(iv) During the 85th Congress, and again during the 102d
Congress, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate
made its position on this issue clear when stating that ``the
President's agreement to such a prohibition cannot constrain
the Senate's constitutional right and obligation to give its
advice and consent to a treaty subject to any reservation it
might determine is required by the national interest''.
(B) Sense of the senate.--It is the sense of the Senate
that--
(i) the advice and consent given by the Senate in the past
to ratification of treaties containing provisions which
prohibit amendments or reservations should not be construed
as a precedent for such provisions in future treaties;
(ii) United States negotiators to a treaty should not agree
to any provision that has the effect of inhibiting the Senate
from attaching reservations or offering amendments to the
treaty; and
(iii) the Senate should not consent in the future to any
article or other provision of any treaty that would prohibit
the Senate from giving its advice and consent to ratification
of the treaty subject to amendment or reservation.
(18) Laboratory sample analysis.--Prior to the deposit of
the United States instrument of ratification, the President
shall certify to the Senate that no sample collected in the
United States pursuant to the Convention will be transferred
for analysis to any laboratory outside the territory of the
United States.
(19) Effect on terrorism.--The Senate finds that--
(A) without regard to whether the Convention enters into
force, terrorists will likely view chemical weapons as a
means to gain greater publicity and instill widespread fear;
and
(B) the March 1995 Tokyo subway attack by the Aum Shinrikyo
would not have been prevented by the Convention.
(20) Constitutional separation of powers.--
(A) Findings.--The Senate makes the following findings:
(i) Article VIII(8) of the Convention allows a State Party
to vote in the Organization if the State Party is in arrears
in the payment of financial contributions and the
Organization is satisfied that such nonpayment is due to
conditions beyond the control of the State Party.
(ii) Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution
vests in Congress the exclusive authority to ``pay the
Debts'' of the United States.
(iii) Financial contributions to the Organization may be
appropriated only by Congress.
(B) Sense of senate.--It is therefore the sense of the
Senate that--
(i) such contributions thus should be considered, for
purposes of Article VIII(8) of the Convention, beyond the
control of the executive branch of the United States
Government; and
(ii) the United States vote in the Organization should not
be denied in the event that Congress does not appropriate the
full amount of funds assessed for the United States financial
contribution to the Organization.
(21) On-site inspection agency.--It is the sense of the
Senate that the On-Site Inspection Agency of the Department
of Defense should have the authority to provide assistance in
advance of any inspection to any facility in the United
States that is subject to a routine inspection under the
Convention, or to any facility in the United States that is
the object of a challenge inspection conducted pursuant to
Article IX, if the consent of the owner or operator of the
facility has first been obtained.
(22) Limitation on the scale of assessment.--
(A) Limitation on annual assessment.--Notwithstanding any
provision of the Convention, and subject to the requirements
of subparagraphs (B), (C), and (D), the United States shall
pay as a total annual assessment of the costs of the
Organization pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article VIII not more
than $25,000,000.
(B) Recalculation of limitations.--On January 1, 2000, and
at each 3-year interval thereafter, the amount specified in
subparagraph (A) is to be recalculated by the Administrator
of General Services, in consultation with the Secretary of
State, to reflect changes in the consumer price index for the
immediately preceding 3-year period.
(C) Additional contributions requiring congressional
approval.--
(i) Authority.--Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), the
President may furnish additional contributions which would
otherwise be prohibited under subparagraph (A) if--
(I) the President determines and certifies in writing to
the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate that the failure to
provide such contributions would result in the inability of
the Organization to conduct challenge inspections pursuant to
Article IX or would otherwise jeopardize the national
security interests of the United States; and
(II) Congress enacts a joint resolution approving the
certification of the President.
(ii) Statement of reasons.--The President shall transmit
with such certification a detailed statement setting forth
the specific reasons therefor and the specific uses to which
the additional contributions provided to the Organization
would be applied.
(D) Additional contributions for verification.--
Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), for a period of not more
than ten years, the President may furnish additional
contributions to the Organization for the purposes of meeting
the costs of verification under Articles IV and V.
(23) Additions to the annex on chemicals.--
(A) Presidential notification.--Not later than 10 days
after the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat
communicates information to all States Parties pursuant to
Article XI(5)(a) of a proposal for the addition of a chemical
or biological substance to a schedule of the Annex on
Chemicals, the President shall notify the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate of the proposed addition.
(B) Presidential report.--Not later than 60 days after the
Director-General of the Technical Secretariat communicates
information of such a proposal pursuant to Article XV(5)(a)
or not later than 30 days after a positive recommendation by
the Executive Council pursuant to Article XV(5)(c), whichever
is sooner, the President shall submit to the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate a report, in classified and
unclassified form, detailing the likely impact of the
proposed addition to a schedule of the Annex on Chemicals.
Such report shall include--
(i) an assessment of the likely impact on United States
industry of the proposed addition of the chemical or
biological substance to a schedule of the Annex on Chemicals;
(ii) a description of the likely costs and benefits, if
any, to United States national security of the proposed
addition of such chemical or biological substance to a
schedule of the Annex on Chemicals; and
(iii) a detailed assessment of the effect of the proposed
addition on United States obligations under the Verification
Annex.
(C) Presidential consultation.--The President shall, after
the submission of the notification required under
subparagraph (A) and prior to any action on the proposal by
the Executive Council under Article XV(5)(c), consult
promptly with the Senate as to whether the United States
should object to the proposed addition of a chemical or
biological substance pursuant to Article XV(5)(c).
(24) Treaty interpretation.--The Senate affirms the
applicability to all treaties of the Constitutionally based
principles of treaty interpretation set forth in Condition
(1) of the resolution of ratification with respect to the INF
Treaty. For purposes of this declaration, the term ``INF
Treaty'' refers to the Treaty Between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter Range
Missiles, together with the related memorandum of
understanding and protocols, approved by the Senate on May
27, 1988.
(25) Further arms reductions obligations.--The Senate
declares its intention to consider for approval international
agreements that would obligate the United States to reduce or
limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States in a
militarily significant manner only pursuant to the treaty
power as set forth in Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the
Constitution.
[[Page S3657]]
(26) Riot control agents.--
(A) Permitted uses.--Prior to the deposit of the United
States instrument of ratification, the President shall
certify to Congress that the United States is not restricted
by the Convention in its use of riot control agents,
including the use against combatants who are parties to a
conflict, in any of the following cases:
(i) United states not a party.--The conduct of peacetime
military operations within an area of ongoing armed conflict
when the United States is not a party to the conflict (such
as recent use of the United States Armed Forces in Somalia,
Bosnia, and Rwanda).
(ii) Consensual peacekeeping.--Consensual peacekeeping
operations when the use of force is authorized by the
receiving state, including operations pursuant to Chapter VI
of the United Nations Charter.
(iii) Chapter vii peacekeeping.--Peacekeeping operations
when force is authorized by the Security Council under
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.
(B) Implementation.--The President shall take no measure,
and prescribe no rule or regulation, which would alter or
eliminate Executive Order 11850 of April 8, 1975.
(C) Definition.--In this paragraph, the term ``riot control
agent'' has the meaning given the term in Article II(7) of
the Convention.
(27) Chemical weapons destruction.--Prior to the deposit of
the United States instrument of ratification of the
Convention, the President shall certify to the Congress that
all of the following conditions are satisfied:
(A) Exploration of alternative technologies.--The President
has agreed to explore alternative technologies for the
destruction of the United States stockpile of chemical
weapons in order to ensure that the United States has the
safest, most effective and environmentally sound plans and
programs for meeting its obligations under the Convention
for the destruction of chemical weapons.
(B) Convention extends destruction deadline.--The
requirement in section 1412 of Public Law 99-145 (50 U.S.C.
1521) for completion of the destruction of the United States
stockpile of chemical weapons by December 31, 2004, will be
superseded upon the date the Convention enters into force
with respect to the United States by the deadline required by
the Convention of April 29, 2007.
(C) Authority to employ a different destruction
technology.--The requirement in Article III(1)(a)(v) of the
Convention for a declaration by each State Party not later
than 30 days after the date the Convention enters into force
with respect to that Party on general plans of the State
Party for destruction of its chemical weapons does not
preclude in any way the United States from deciding in the
future to employ a technology for the destruction of chemical
weapons different than that declared under that Article.
(D) Procedures for extension of deadline.--The President
will consult with Congress on whether to submit a request to
the Executive Council of the Organization for an extension of
the deadline for the destruction of chemical weapons under
the Convention, as provided under part IV(A) of the Annex on
Implementation and Verification to the Convention, if, as a
result of the program of alternative technologies for the
destruction of chemical munitions carried out under section
8065 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1997
(as contained in Public Law 104-208), the President
determines that alternatives to the incineration of chemical
weapons are available that are safer and more environmentally
sound but whose use would preclude the United States from
meeting the deadlines of the Convention.
(28) Constitutional protection against unreasonable search
and seizure.--
(A) In general.--In order to protect United States citizens
against unreasonable searches and seizures, prior to the
deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the
President shall certify to Congress that--
(i) for any challenge inspection conducted on the territory
of the United States pursuant to Article IX, where consent
has been withheld, the United States National Authority will
first obtain a criminal search warrant based upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and describing with
particularity the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized; and
(ii) for any routine inspection of a declared facility
under the Convention that is conducted on the territory of
the United States, where consent has been withheld the United
States National Authority first will obtain an administrative
search warrant from a United States magistrate judge.
(B) Definition.--For purposes of this resolution, the term
``National Authority'' means the agency or office of the
United States Government designated by the United States
pursuant to Article VII(4) of the Convention.
SECTION 3. DEFINITIONS.
As used in this resolution:
(1) Chemical weapons convention or convention.--The terms
``Chemical Weapons Convention'' and ``Convention'' mean the
Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their
Destruction, Opened for Signature and Signed by the United
States at Paris on January 13, 1993, including the following
protocols and memorandum of understanding, all such documents
being integral parts of and collectively referred to as the
``Chemical Weapons Convention'' or the ``Convention''
(contained in Treaty Document 103-21):
(A) The Annex on Chemicals.
(B) The Annex on Implementation and Verification.
(C) The Annex on the Protection of Confidential
Information.
(D) The Resolution Establishing the Preparatory Commission
for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
(E) The Text on the Establishment of a Preparatory
Commission.
(2) Organization.--The term ``Organization'' means the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
established under the Convention.
(3) State party.--The term ``State Party'' means any nation
that is a party to the Convention.
(4) United States instrument or ratification.--The term
``United States instrument of ratification'' means the
instrument of ratification of the United States of the
Convention.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, of course I am disappointed by today's vote
on the CWC. But I find some solace in the fact that, thanks to our
efforts, this treaty is much less harmful than it would have been. I am
enormously proud of Senators Kyl, Inhofe, and other Senators who stood
with us despite enormous pressure against this treaty. I believe
history will vindicate their efforts.
Make no mistake, this is a dangerous treaty. But it is a little less
dangerous thanks to the efforts we made to amend it, and to deliver the
truth to the American people. Last September, treaty proponents were
pressing the Senate to vote on a treaty that had none of the key
protections that some of us succeeded in inserting in this treaty. Had
we not been a phalanx of common sense standing in their way, the exact
same treaty would have been before the Senate for ratification today,
and that would have been a disaster.
The treaty approved by the Senate tonight was toned down with 28
conditions, most of which the administration was until recently calling
``killer amendments.'' Those include, among many others, conditions
that limit the cost of the treaty to the American taxpayer, place
safeguards on intelligence sharing, enhance our chemical defenses, and
protect confidential business information.
Further, concessions on what I consider some of the most important
issues--such as protecting the right of American commanders in the
field to use tear gas, and requiring criminal search warrants for
foreign inspectors--came only the final days before I agreed to allow
the treaty to go to the Senate floor for a vote. If we had not held out
so long--in spite of all the criticism and derision lobbed in our
direction--none of those protections would be in the treaty today.
I hope I may be forgiven for taking some satisfaction in the
knowledge that, thanks to what our critics called our stubbornness, our
soldiers in the field will be a little safer, and the constitutional
rights of American citizens will be a little better protected. Final
judgment of our efforts will be left to future generations.
I do know this: those great Senators with whom I was honored to stand
fought the good fight, we won some battles, and lost others. But we
fought with honor, and integrity, and for the cause of right.
Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. I would like to thank the Vice President for being at the
ready the whole day, and I would like to thank my colleagues for not
making it necessary. I am glad they deprived the Vice President of the
United States the opportunity to vote on the five conditions and on
final passage. But I want to point out to my colleagues who are being
very nice and solicitous about my efforts in this regard, the Vice
President of the United States, who is in the Chair, played a critical
role in pushing this, making sure that we kept it before the Nation,
generating the interesting debate so this could not be left untouched,
and I want to publicly thank him.
There is that old expression in politics that politics makes strange
bedfellows. I have had the distinction and the honor of having been the
ranking member and/or chairman with the distinguished Senator from
South Carolina, Senator Thurmond, and when I
[[Page S3658]]
got that assignment I think most of my colleagues looked at me and
said, this is going to be an interesting time, Biden and Thurmond. We
turned out to be very good friends. This is the first occasion after 25
years that I have had to work as closely as I have with my new chairman
of the Foreign Relations Committee, on which I rank, and that is
Senator Helms. I want to publicly thank him. He kept his word at every
stage of this long, arduous, and for me ultimately rewarding
negotiation. I want to acknowledge how much I appreciate it.
I conclude by saying, because I do not want to turn this into some
litany of people to thank, what a pleasure it has been to work with and
receive the guidance and encouragement from the Senator from Indiana
[Mr. Lugar]. He has served this Nation well on this occasion, as well
as Senator McCain. I hope I am not hurting their credentials in the
Republican party by acknowledging how closely I worked with both of
them. However, I think it should be noted that without the two of them
weighing in on this treaty I not only doubt, I know we would not have
passed this.
I conclude by saying I truly think this is a very important moment in
the Senate, and I do think the vote we just cast will be within the
next hour heard around the world. Had we voted the other way, it would
have been a louder, more resounding sound than the one now. It will be
heard around the world, and it will reaffirm American leadership.
I thank the Vice President for being here again and I am also
thankful we did not have to have his vote, but I knew where it was if
we had needed it.
I yield the floor.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Under the previous order, the President will be
immediately notified.
____________________