[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 49 (Wednesday, April 23, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3543-S3544]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]



                 TRANSFER OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS DEFENSES

  Some opponents of CWC have asserted that article X of the convention 
would require the United States to provide financial assistance and 
equipment to countries such as Iran and Cuba in order to improve their 
chemical weapons defense capabilities. This is an understandable 
misconception of paragraph 7 of article X, which states that ``each 
state party undertakes to provide [such] assistance through the 
organization.'' Paragraph 1 of article X defines ``assistance'' to 
include ``detection equipment and alarm systems, protective equipment; 
decontamination equipment and decontaminants; medical antidotes and 
treatments; and advice on any of these protective measures.''

  The rest of paragraph 7 of article X makes clear, however, that each 
state party is not required to provide all such assistance. A state 
party may contribute to a voluntary fund for assistance, or agree to 
provide assistance through the OPCW on demand, or simply declare what 
assistance it might provide in response to an appeal by the OPCW. So 
CWC does not compel the

[[Page S3544]]

United States to give any country, let alone an enemy like Cuba, 
anything more than medical assistance or advice.
  The Senator from North Carolina has proposed in condition 15 that the 
Senate bind the executive branch not to provide anything more than 
medical antidotes and treatment to a rogue state pursuant to article X 
of the convention. While there is no real need to so bind the executive 
branch, this proposal is certainly consistent with current 
administration policy. As such, it may usefully allay the suspicions 
that article X has aroused in some quarters, and is therefore worth 
supporting.


                 maintaining stringent export controls

  Some opponents of the CWC see article XI of the convention as 
requiring the Australia group--an informal alliance of potential 
supplier states--to relax its export controls, which are a bulwark of 
nonproliferation. I have never shared that concern, because the 
Australia Group has steadfastedly told the world that it viewed its 
export control regime to be fully consistent with the CWC. 
Nevertheless, condition 7 has been added to reassure those who worry 
that the Australia Group would be hobbled by the CWC.
  Pursuant to condition 7, the President must certify that he has 
obtained authoritative assurances from all other Australia Group 
members that they agree with the United States view that the CWC will 
not weaken any Australia Group controls--and these assurances have, in 
fact, been received. In addition, the President is required to do what 
it takes to prevent any backsliding in the years to come. If the 
Australia Group is weakened, the President will be required to consult 
with the Senate for the purposes of obtaining a resolution of continued 
adherence to the CWC.


                  protecting the senate's prerogatives

  Senators on both sides of the aisle wish to preserve the Senate's 
constitutional role in treaty-making. Several conditions address this 
issue.
  Condition 1 asserts that the Senate reserves the right to add 
reservations to the resolution of ratification, despite the ban--in 
article XXII of the convention--on reservations to the convention. This 
condition asserts the Senate's right under the U.S. Constitution, but 
does not exercise it. It requires the administration to inform all 
other states parties that the Senate reserves the right to give its 
advice and consent to ratification of the convention subject to 
reservations. Although the Senate has not exercised this right at this 
time, it could do so in ratifying future amendments to the convention; 
this condition puts all parties on notice.
  If the United States decided not to cast its vote--one way or 
another--on a proposed CWC amendment at an amendment conference under 
the convention, it would be possible for such an amendment to be passed 
without a vote in the Senate. So condition 6 will bind the executive 
branch to vote on every proposed CWC amendment and to submit any 
amendment to the Senate for its advice and consent.
  As explained in the discussion of condition 1, the CWC includes a 
provision barring states parties from attaching reservations to their 
ratification of the convention. A sense-of-the-Senate condition warns 
U.S. negotiators that they should not include such provisions in any 
future treaty.
  The Biden condition on treaty interpretation, which has been attached 
to all arms control treaties since the INF treaty was approved in 1988, 
is reaffirmed in condition 24. It states the constitutionally-
based principle that the shared understanding that exists between the 
executive branch and the Senate about the terms of the treaty at the 
time the Senate gives advice and consent to ratification can be altered 
only subject to the Senate's advice and consent to a subsequent treaty 
or protocol, or the enactment of a statute.

  Another condition is included which has been attached to major arms 
control treaties in recent years, setting forth the Senate position 
that any international agreement that would obligate the united States 
to limit its forces in a militarily significant way will be considered 
by the Senate only pursuant to article II, section 2, clause 2 of the 
Constitution. This is condition 25.
  Condition 20 also purports to preserve the rights of the Senate, by 
asserting the sense of the Senate that the United States should not be 
denied its vote in OPCW organs if Congress fails to appropriate the 
full amount of funds assessed to the United States.
  It should be noted that although paragraph 8 of article VIII of the 
convention allows the Conference of States Parties to permit a state 
party to retain its vote if the conference is satisfied that the 
state's arrears are due to conditions beyond the control of the state 
party, this is clearly a decision left to the states parties acting in 
that conference.
  I sincerely doubt that any international body will see the actions of 
Congress as conditions beyond the control of the United States, 
although sometimes the American people may sympathize with that 
concept. Condition 20 merely states the nonbinding sense of the Senate, 
however, so it does no harm.