[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 49 (Wednesday, April 23, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3528-S3543]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]



                         Privilege Of The Floor

  Mr. DOMENICI. I ask unanimous consent that Peter Lyons, a legislative 
fellow working in my office, be granted the privilege of the floor for 
today and the remainder of the debate on this issue.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I yield myself 10 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I believe it is crucial to American 
leadership and to the security of our men and women in the Armed Forces 
and, indeed, to all of us in America, that the Senate provide its 
advice and consent to the ratification of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention so that the United States can join it as an original party.
  The security of our men and women in the Armed Forces who someday may 
face the threat of chemicals, the security of our people who constantly 
face the threat of terrorists and terrorist states that try to get 
their hands on chemical weapons, all demand that the Senate join as an 
original party to this convention and ratify this treaty. To ratify it 
and to make it real, we have to do so without accepting any of the 
killer amendments that would render this ratification vote useless.
  I say this, and I reached this conclusion as a member of the Armed 
Services Committee who has listened to our military leaders testify 
before us, who has read the testimony of these leaders who have said 
that the ratification of this convention is unequivocally in our 
national security interest because it will reduce the risk of our 
military forces encountering chemical weapons on a future battlefield.
  In 1985, President Reagan signed a law which has resulted in our 
unilaterally destroying our stockpile of chemical weapons. This process 
will be completed in 2004. The destruction of our chemical weapons will 
take place, whether or not the United States ratifies the convention. 
We are destroying our chemical weapons. We are doing so because we 
decided they are no longer militarily useful and they are too expensive 
to maintain and we have all the capability we need to deter attack and 
to respond to attack. So that President Reagan, in 1985, proposed and 
the Congress accepted his proposal that we destroy our chemical 
weapons. What this convention will do will be to require other nations 
to do what we are already doing, and that is going to reduce the risk 
of chemical attacks against our troops and our Nation.
  General Shalikashvili, the Chairman of our Joint Chiefs, has had a 
great deal to say about this treaty. This is what he wrote on April 8. 
He said that:

       The ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention by as 
     many nations as possible is in the best interests of the 
     Armed Forces of the United States. The combination [he wrote] 
     of the nonproliferation and disarmament aspects of the 
     convention greatly reduces the likelihood that U.S. forces 
     may encounter chemical weapons in a regional conflict. The 
     protection of the young men and women in our forces, should 
     they have to go in harm's way in the future, is strengthened, 
     not diminished, by the Chemical Weapons Convention.

  Then he went on to say:

       We do not need chemical weapons to provide an effective 
     deterrent or to deliver an effective response.

  When the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, every member--every 
single member of the Joint Chiefs, and every combatant commander have 
reached the same conclusion, that the ratification of this treaty is in 
our national security interests and will reduce the likelihood of our 
men and women ever facing chemicals in combat, it seems to me we should 
listen. When they tell us that we are already unilaterally destroying 
our stockpile of chemical weapons and that what we are doing by joining 
this convention is being in a position where we will be able to help 
reduce the risk that others will obtain chemical weapons, we should 
listen. And when they tell us that they know that this is not perfectly 
verifiable but that this will reduce the chances that chemical weapons 
will fall in hands of terrorist states or terrorist organizations or 
individuals--when our top military leaders tell us that, we should 
listen.

  They have acknowledged what everyone has acknowledged. There is no 
way to perfectly verify a chemical weapons convention. But what they 
have also told us is that following their analysis of this treaty, that 
because of the intense inspection regime which is provided for here, 
that we will be able to reduce the risk that any militarily significant 
amount of chemicals will fall into the hands of an opponent or a future 
opponent. It is not a matter of perfection, they tell us. It is a 
matter of improving our current position. That sounds like a security 
bargain to them and it ought to sound like a security bargain to us. 
Our senior military leaders have a unique perspective on what makes our 
military stronger or more secure. And they have agreed. They have 
agreed that this treaty is good for our security. All the Chiefs of 
Staff, as I have said, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the 
combatant commanders have urged that we ratify this treaty.
  This is the way General Shalikashvili made that point. He said, ``I 
fully support early ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention and 
I reflect the views of the Joint Chiefs and the combatant commanders.''
  The previous Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Powell, spoke very 
forcefully on this issue just last week. He was addressing the Senate 
Veterans' Affairs Committee on April 17 during a hearing on gulf war 
illness, but he said this relative to the convention on chemical 
weapons:

       I think one of the greatest things we can do over the next 
     2 weeks is to pass the Chemical Weapons Convention treaty. 
     This is a good treaty. It serves our national interest. That 
     is why it was negotiated beginning in Ronald Reagan's term, 
     and I helped participate [The ``I,'' here, being Colin 
     Powell]--I helped participate in those negotiations as 
     National Security Adviser, and that is why we signed it in 
     the administration of President Bush. And I participated in 
     the development of the treaty during those days as Chairman 
     of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I supported the treaty then 
     and I support it now.

  Then General Powell went on to say the following:

       There are some uncertainties associated with the treaty and 
     there are some criticisms of the treaty. I think those 
     criticisms can be answered and dealt with. But we should not 
     overlook the simple fact that, with the treaty, the United 
     States joins over 160 nations in saying to the world that 
     chemical weapons will not be used, will not be made, will not 
     be developed, will not be produced, and we will not share the 
     technology associated with chemical weapons with other 
     nations who are inclined to use them inside or outside the 
     confines of this treaty.

  Then he went on to say the following:

       Not to participate in this treaty, for us to reject the 
     treaty that we designed, we signed, for us to reject that 
     treaty now because there are rogue states outside that treaty 
     is the equivalent of saying we should not have joined NATO 
     because Russia was not a part of NATO. It's exactly because 
     there are these rogue states that we should join with an 
     alliance of over 160 nations to make a clear international 
     statement that these are rogue nations.

  And he concludes:

       Not signing the treaty does not make them no longer rogue 
     nations. So I think this is a fine treaty and it is one of 
     the things the Senate can do to start to get a better handle 
     on the use of these weapons of mass destruction and 
     especially chemical weapons.

  Mr. President, Secretary Cohen addressed the Chemical Weapons 
Convention at great length before the Armed Services Committee.
  I ask the Chair whether or not I have used up the 10 minutes that I 
allotted myself?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan has 15 seconds 
remaining.
  Mr. LEVIN. I thank my Chair. I will just yield myself 3 additional 
minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has that right.
  Mr. LEVIN. Now, Secretary Cohen, our former colleague Bill Cohen, has 
testified before the Armed Services Committee on this subject. He has 
filed

[[Page S3529]]

some lengthy testimony supporting the Chemical Weapons Convention. To 
summarize what he said, and here again I am quoting:

       The Chemical Weapons Convention is both a disarmament and 
     nonproliferation treaty. It is very much in our national 
     security interest because it establishes an international 
     mandate for the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles, 
     because it prohibits the development, retention, storage, 
     preparations for use, and use of chemical weapons, because it 
     increases the probability of detecting militarily significant 
     violations of the CWC.

  And, here he said that:

       While no treaty is 100 percent verifiable, the Chemical 
     Weapons Convention contains complementary and overlapping 
     declaration and inspection requirements which increase the 
     probability of detecting militarily significant violations of 
     the convention. While detecting illicit production of small 
     quantities of chemical weapons will be extremely difficult, 
     it is easier to detect large-scale production, filling and 
     stockpiling of chemical weapons over time through 
     declaration, routine inspections, factfinding, consultation 
     and challenge inspection mechanisms. The verification regime 
     should prove effective in providing information on 
     significant chemical weapons programs that would not 
     otherwise be available.

  In conclusion, there has been reference to a classified session 
tomorrow, which will be held relative to advice from the intelligence 
community.
  Relative to this point, I will only say that the Acting Director of 
Central Intelligence, George Tenet, has said, ``The more tools we have 
at our disposal, the better off we feel we are in our business.'' And 
he said that as part of an acknowledgment that we can never guarantee 
that a power that signs up to this agreement will not cheat. ``No 
regime is foolproof, particularly with regard to these dual-use 
capabilities. Nothing is going to guarantee success but,'' George Tenet 
concluded, ``the more tools we have at our disposal, the better off we 
are in our business.''
  I also hope that our colleagues will come to that classified session 
tomorrow. I am very confident that they will conclude, as I have 
concluded after listening to the intelligence community, that it is 
very much in our interest, from an intelligence perspective, that we 
have these tools in our tool kit, and that these additional 
verification and inspection capabilities are very, very much in our 
Nation's interest.
  This treaty will enter into force on April 29 whether or not we 
ratify, but our ratification will make a big difference in the effect 
the treaty has on us and on our leadership in the world. Is it perfect? 
No, nothing in life is. Is it an improvement to our present position in 
terms of inspection of other countries? Surely it is, and we should 
listen to that top uniformed military official, General Shalikashvili, 
when he tells us our troops are safer, because if we ratify this 
convention, it is less likely--not certain--but less likely that they 
will ever face chemical weapons in combat.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor, and if my good friend from Rhode 
Island is ready, I will be happy to yield him 7 minutes. If there is 
nobody on the other side, I yield 7 minutes to the Senator from Rhode 
Island.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Hagel). The Senator from Rhode Island.
  Mr. REED. Mr. President, I rise to add my voice to the chorus of 
support for the ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. As a 
former company commander in the 82d Airborne Division, I have a keen 
interest in an international diplomatic agreement that will protect 
soldiers from one of the most terrible perils of war. As a Senator, I 
believe that the United States has a duty to assume a leadership role 
in this ambitious, global effort to not only reduce, but eliminate, an 
entire class of weapons of mass destruction.
  U.S. ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention is a paramount 
first step in removing the threat of chemical warfare on the 
battlefield. Soldiers in World War I were the first to know the terror 
of the release of poison gas. Over 1.3 million soldiers were injured or 
killed by chlorine and mustard gas during the Great War. This enormous 
number of casualties led to the negotiation of the Geneva Protocol in 
1925 which banned the use of chemical weapons in wartime. Eighty years 
later, however, young soldiers are still plagued by the dangers of 
chemical warfare. Many veterans of the Persian Gulf war fight illness 
and lie awake at night, worrying and wondering, ``Was there something 
in the air?''
  But this is not a treaty which will just protect soldiers in a time 
of armed conflict, it is a treaty which will protect innocent civilians 
from terrorist attacks. The 1995 Sarin gas attack in a crowded Tokyo 
subway that killed and injured dozens made this scenario a reality for 
everyone. It is imperative that we do what is necessary to ensure that 
such an incident becomes a distant memory rather than a daily fear.
  The Chemical Weapons Convention bans the development, production, 
acquisition, stockpiling, transfer or use of chemical weapons by 
signatories. It requires the destruction of all chemical weapon 
stockpiles and production facilities. Parties to the convention must 
begin to destroy weapons within 1 year and complete the process within 
10 years. If we ratify this treaty, we will take an important step 
toward eliminating the production, storage and use of blister agents, 
like mustard gas, which destroy exposed skin tissue; of choking agents 
that inflame the bronchial tubes and lungs and cause asphyxiation; of 
blood agents that block the circulation of oxygen when inhaled; and of 
nerve agents that cause the nervous system to overload, resulting in 
respiratory failure and death. The goal of this treaty is to ensure 
that these deadly chemicals will never again be dispersed over troops 
or civilian populations by bombs, rockets, missiles, artillery, mines, 
grenades or spray.
  Chemical weapons are terrifying because they kill quickly, silently, 
and indiscriminately. Even more disturbing is the fact that their 
production is easy, cheap and simple to conceal. With a little know-
how, a solvent used in pen ink can be converted into mustard gas and a 
chemical common in pesticides becomes an ingredient in a deadly nerve 
agent. It must be acknowledged that eliminating chemical weapons is a 
herculean task. But the Chemical Weapons Convention, which we are 
finally considering today, addresses this challenge. This treaty is the 
most comprehensive arms control agreement ever negotiated. It 
institutes an extensive and intrusive verification regime which will 
include both government and civilian facilities. International teams of 
inspectors will conduct instrument-monitoring as well as routine and 
random onsite inspections of facilities known to work with chemical 
agents. Furthermore, it allows challenge inspections, without right of 
refusal, of sites suspected of producing or storing chemical weapons. 
The convention also requires export controls and reporting requirements 
on chemicals that can be used as chemical warfare agents and their 
precursors. In addition, the treaty establishes the Organization for 
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons [OPCW], a permanent body which will 
oversee the convention's implementation and ensure compliance. The 
enemy is elusive but 162 signatory countries decided this treaty was 
the best means of waging war against chemical weapons.

  In January 1993, President Bush joined dozens of other nations in 
Paris and agreed to meet the challenge of eliminating chemical weapons 
by signing the Chemical Weapons Convention. Now some members of this 
chamber, members of President Bush's own party, are second-guessing 
that decision. The problem is that if we drag our feet any longer, the 
United States will be left behind. April 29, 1997 is not an artificial 
deadline imposed by a political party. One of the provisions of the 
treaty is that it enters into force 180 days after the ratification by 
the 65th country, and in 6 days, on April 29, the 74 nations who have 
ratified the treaty will begin its implementation. If we do not vote to 
ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention, we will not stop it. In fact, 
we will not even become a passive bystander. Instead, we will become 
the target of the trade restrictions that make this treaty so powerful.
  Now, no one can say the Senate has not had ample opportunity to 
consider this agreement. Thirteen years and two administrations ago, 
President Reagan proposed this treaty to the United Nations. It was 
approved by the United Nations in 1992 and President Bush signed the 
convention weeks before he left office. Several months later, President 
Clinton presented the CWC to the

[[Page S3530]]

Senate for consideration. The Committees on Foreign Relations, Armed 
Services, Intelligence, and Judiciary held 17 hearings over three 
Congresses. The administration has provided the Senate with over 1,500 
pages of information. In the past 2 months, the administration and a 
task force formed by the majority leader have held almost 60 hours of 
discussion. Twenty-eight additional conditions, statements, 
understandings, and declarations to the resolution of ratification have 
been reached. The overwhelming evidence persuasively argues that now is 
the time to ratify this treaty.
  Ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention complements the existing 
military strategy of the United States. We are already committed to 
unilateral destruction of our chemical weapons. In the early 1980's, 
the Department of Defense declared about 90 percent of our Nation's 
chemical weapons obsolete. In 1985, Congress directed destruction of 
these weapons. President Reagan signed the law that would eliminate 
approximately 30,000 metric tons of blister and nerve agents by the 
year 2004. Even President Reagan, one of the greatest advocates of a 
strong military, decided that chemical weapons were not needed to 
remain the most powerful fighting force in the world.
  We have much to gain by ratification. This treaty will force other 
nations to adopt the same standard as the United States. The monitoring 
regime and trade restrictions imposed by the convention will make the 
production and storage of chemical weapons by rogue states infinitely 
more difficult and costly. The CWC improves our ability to keep our 
troops safe and makes the enemy more vulnerable by reducing its options 
of weaponry.
  If we do not ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention, we will abdicate 
our leadership role in the world. As I have said before, the United 
States initiated this treaty. It was American leadership that led the 
negotiations through to completion. It would be irresponsible, both to 
Americans and the world, to abandon the convention on the eve of 
implementation. If we do not ratify this treaty tomorrow, the United 
States will not be able to participate in the executive council which 
will oversee the implementation of the treaty. Furthermore, U.S. 
citizens will not be eligible to become international inspectors and 
serve in other key positions. The ratifying countries will be forced to 
carry on our idea without us, and the United States will have no choice 
but to stand aside and watch.
  Without our expertise and support, the entire convention may be 
jeopardized. One of the key elements of the treaty is intelligence 
gathering. The United States has the most sophisticated intelligence 
network in the world. If our country refuses to participate, we deny 
our intelligence community the opportunity to tap into new sources of 
information and we may cripple the verification regime by denying the 
international community the benefits of our knowledge.

  In addition, the United States is the only nation with extensive 
experience in destroying chemical weapons. We are also the only country 
investing heavily in research and development to find methods other 
than incineration to destroy these weapons. Without our advice, 
participants in the convention risk inadvertent but dangerous accidents 
and may squander scarce financial resources attempting to reinvent the 
wheel in learning how to destroy weapons. Furthermore, if the entire 
international community pools its resources, both intellectual and 
financial, to discover safe, environmentally sound methods of 
destruction, the development time would certainly be reduced. If we 
show reluctance to ratify the treaty, we will undermine the confidence 
and commitment of the entire international community. It is counting on 
us to continue to lead the way.
  There are critics of this treaty, but their criticism, I think, 
misses the mark. This will not inhibit our business, it will help our 
chemical business. This treaty is not perfect, but it is a better tool 
for controlling weapons than having no treaty whatsoever. We are, I 
hope, committed to the path of destruction of our own weapons and to 
ensure that the rest of the world follows this very prudent, indeed, 
noble course.
  Vocal critics of the Chemical Weapons Convention claim that it is 
fatally flawed. They state that we should not ratify this treaty 
because we will not be able to verify that chemical weapons are 
completely eliminated. Of course this treaty is not perfect. But we 
will have increased our capability to find and eliminate large scale 
production of chemical weapons which can cause the most damage. The 
verification regime will also enable us to discover production and 
storage of small quantities of chemical weapons that we have little or 
no chance of discovering now. The CWC is not a panacea, but no law or 
treaty is. It is a tool that can help us solve a problem. Isn't it 
better to use the tool to try and fix the problem rather than simply 
admit defeat?
  Critics also contend that the treaty cannot be effective until all 
nations, particularly those who are known to possess chemical weapons, 
ratify the convention. It will be impossible to convince every rogue 
state to sign the treaty. It is also safe to say that some who sign the 
treaty will cheat. But the CWC is designed to isolate and cajole those 
who do not join. The treaty uses a most effective weapon against rogue 
states--economics. Trade restrictions will be implemented against these 
nations and they will soon be unable to acquire ``dual use'' chemicals 
which they need for the production of common items. As these nations 
begin to feel the pressures from shortages, they may find it 
advantageous to sign the treaty. Trade restrictions are one of the most 
effective weapons that the international community has.
  In an era when balancing the budget is of primary importance, it is 
not sunrising that opponents cite the cost of joining the treaty as a 
reason for not ratifying it. I cannot dispute that there is a financial 
price for joining the convention. Most of the costs will be incurred 
for maintaining the activities of the Organization for the Prohibition 
of Chemical Weapons [OPCW]. These costs will be apportioned according 
to a system similar to the one used by other international 
organizations. In addition, each signatory which destroys its stockpile 
must repay the OPCW for costs associated with verification. In his 
budget, the President requested about 20 cents per American to pay for 
CWC costs, a small price for the elimination of chemical weapons. 
Furthermore, members of this body can ensure that this cost does not 
escalate in the future, because the conditions agreed to in the Senate 
Executive Resolution allow Congress to control future payments by 
granting it the authority to authorize and appropriate any funds above 
this level. The cost of the CWC is reasonable, and certainly less than 
the cost of ``going it alone'' or entering a battlefield where chemical 
weapons are being used.

  Critics of the CWC claim that American private businesses will bear 
the brunt of the treaty provisions. However, the U.S. chemical 
industry, the private business which will be most affected by this 
treaty, heartily endorses its ratification. Contrary to what some have 
claimed, the burden on industry has not been discounted or ignored. The 
major trade associations which represent the chemical industry, like 
the US Chemical Manufacturers Association, have actively worked with 
those writing the treaty for the past 15 years. The chemical industry 
helped develop the confidentiality provisions, the data declarations 
and the inspection regime. Certain companies even participated in the 
National Trial Inspections to test the verification procedures outlined 
in the Chemical Weapons Convention. In addition, the conditions agreed 
to in the Senate Executive Resolution further protect businesses from 
unreasonable searches and seizures and the dissemination of 
confidential information. Less than 2,000 facilities will be affected 
by the treaty, and the vast majority of these must do no more than 
complete an annual two page form.
  Opponents of the Convention claim they are protecting American 
business interests. But American businesses seem to disagree. They 
fear, in fact, that the Senate will not ratify the treaty. Ironically, 
if we do not make the right decision tomorrow, our chemical companies 
will become subject to the same trade restrictions that will be imposed 
on non-signatories such as Libya, Egypt, Iraq, North Korea, and Syria. 
More than $600 million a year in sales could be lost. Treaty critics 
are

[[Page S3531]]

protesting so loudly, they seem unable to hear the voices of the 
constituencies they claim to protect.
  We have overcome many hurdles to reach this point: Years of 
negotiations among the nations of the world, months of negotiations 
among the leaders of this Nation. We are finally debating this treaty 
on the floor of the Senate today because we have agreed to an 
unprecedented 28 conditions--28 duties, declarations and understandings 
added to a treaty which was proposed, negotiated and agreed to by 
Republican administrations. But, unfortunately, five hurdles remain. 
Five conditions demanded by opponents of this treaty may prevent the 
United States from assuming its proper role of leadership in an 
ambitious arms control treaty. These conditions unacceptably compromise 
the treaty and the ability of the United States to participate in its 
implementation. These conditions are simply not fair play. Every member 
of this body has a right to oppose this treaty. They can voice their 
opposition by voting against it and their opinion will be respected. 
But hobbling the ability of the United States to ratify the Chemical 
Weapons Convention strikes an unwarranted blow to international arms 
control and our political process. I urge my colleagues to vote against 
these five killer conditions.
  Mr. President, 34 years ago, President John F. Kennedy undertook the 
challenge to convince the Senate and the people of the United States of 
America should ratify the Limited Test Ban Treaty. The same questions 
were raised about verification, about the reliability of those who 
might sign the treaty or who might not sign the treaty. In a nationwide 
television address, President Kennedy reminded us:

       We have a great obligation . . . to use whatever time 
     remains to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, to persuade 
     other countries not to test, transfer, acquire, possess or 
     produce such weapons.
       According to the ancient Chinese proverb, ``A journey of a 
     thousand miles must begin with a single step.'' My fellow 
     Americans, let us take that first step. Let us, if we can, 
     step back from the shadows of war and seek out the way of 
     peace. And if that journey is a thousand miles, or even more, 
     let history record that we, in this land, at this time, took 
     the first step.

  Complementing the President's words, though, were the words of a very 
wise, distinguished statesman of the Chamber, Senator Everett Dirksen 
of Illinois. In September of that year, 1963, he came to this Chamber 
and began a speech, but threw the pages away and spoke spontaneously 
from his heart and said:

       A young President calls this treaty the first step. I want 
     to take a first step, Mr. President. One my age thinks about 
     his destiny a little. I should not like to have written on my 
     tombstone, ``He knew what happened at Hiroshima, but he did 
     not take a first step . . .''

  We know what happened in World War I with poison gas. We know what 
happened in the Tokyo subway with sarin gas. Let us not have it said on 
our tombstone that we knew but were unwilling to take a first step. Let 
us, like the statesmen before us, take a first step to control weapons, 
to reduce weapons, to provide a more peaceful, a more dignified world.
  Mr. President, I hope we will take that first step and discharge our 
obligation to the world and to the citizens of this great country.

       On the eve of the vote to ratify another historic 
     agreement, one that seeks not just to limit weapons of mass 
     destruction, but eliminate them, the words of President 
     Kennedy and Senator Dirksen still ring true. We have an 
     obligation to take the first step. Let us do so.
  I yield back my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? The Senator from North 
Carolina.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I listened in amazement to some of the 
statements being made today about a nonexistent treaty. The treaty 
before us I understand, but I do not understand the descriptions that 
some are indicating that they believe are accurate.
  Furthermore, I was astonished at the number of companies that will be 
required to provide annual business information and undergo routine 
annual inspections under this arms control treaty, and that is what it 
is, an arms control treaty.
  The Chemical Weapons Convention, so-called, will affect companies 
engaged in coke, coal, steel production, mining, crop protection, 
fertilizers, paper production, wood preservation, chlorine 
manufacturing, color pigments, paint, ink, die stuff production, 
speciality coatings, powder and roof coatings, plating and packaging, 
compressed gas, cosmetics, toiletries and fragrances, drug chemicals 
manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, plastics, textiles, custom chemicals, 
food, wine, beer, processing and electronics, among others.
  The list I just read, as long as it is, is not all of them. So 
anybody sitting in television land listening to this conversation in 
the Senate today, I suggest, as the saying goes, wake up and smell the 
coffee and give some thought about what is going to happen to the 
business community if, as and when this treaty is ratified.
  It is not an ethereal thing that is floating through the air, 
dropping little rose petals, it is something that can bollix this 
country up. And yet what you hear from so much of the media and so much 
of the White House and other proponents of this treaty is simply not 
so.
  I note, however, that even this long list does not cover companies 
likely to be affected by the CWC, and I simply do not believe it 
advisable for the Senate to learn belatedly the far-reaching 
implications of this treaty for businesses of all kinds across the 
United States of America. As the April 15, 1997, hearing, recently, 
before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations demonstrated, 
compliance costs--compliance costs, the cost of complying with this 
treaty--will place a massive new regulatory burden upon so many 
companies who don't even know it is going to hit them, along with an 
unprecedented onsite inspections and data declarations that may very 
well compromise trade secrets vital to the competitive edge of many, 
many businesses.
  So you see, we are dealing with a lot of untrue, inaccurate 
statements. I am not saying everybody is deliberately distorting the 
facts. In the media, they do not know what it is all about. I did see 
Helen Dewar the other day sitting down and having lunch reading the 
treaty. Bless her heart, she was trying. She looked up and said, ``I'm 
trying to understand this.'' Well, Helen Dewar is a great reporter with 
a not so great newspaper, but she was sitting there eating her lunch 
with the treaty before her.
  I would like to take a poll of all the people who have commented on 
this treaty and see how many of them have even looked at it. That is 
the problem. That is the problem. But at our hearing the other day, a 
number of companies, including two members of the Chemical 
Manufacturers Association, provided testimony relating to rising 
concerns about the chemical weapons treaty.

  Now, then, here is a fact, indisputable: Companies will have to bear 
an entirely new reporting burden beyond anything required by, say, the 
Environmental Protection Agency or the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration or the International Trade Commission or the Census 
Bureau--and just name the various State and local agencies that require 
reports.
  Nobody says that on Pennsylvania Avenue about those reports, about 
the paperwork. Oh, no, we are not going to mention that because they 
might ask us too many questions. That is precisely the problem. 
Everybody has been dancing around the truth on this treaty. As a 
consequence, too few Americans understand the scope of it.
  For those businesses that are covered, current reporting thresholds 
are much higher than those required under the CWC. Some regulations 
require only prospective rather than retroactive reporting. Moreover, 
several environmental regulations--how do you like them apples?--will 
apply to the chemical producers but not to processors or consumers. And 
reporting deadlines for the chemical weapons treaty are shorter and 
will require more frequent updates than estimates currently required by 
the EPA.
  So, if you would like to file reports with the EPA, you will file 
more reports with this chemical weapons treaty. The regulations imposed 
by EPA and OSHA and all the others, in 1992 alone, 1 year, cost the 
chemical industry approximately $4 billion--$4 billion with a ``B''--
$4.9 billion.
  Now, isn't it a bit incredible that one major chemical manufacturer 
employs 1,700 of its 50,000 personnel for the sole

[[Page S3532]]

purpose of satisfying Federal and State requirements for environmental 
and regulatory data? That is why, Mr. President, I am concerned that 
while large, international chemical industries such as those 
represented by the Chemical Manufacturers Association may be able to 
afford the cost of the new regulations as a result of the ratification 
of this chemical weapons treaty, these same requirements will be 
proportionately far more burdensome for small businesses. That was the 
point that Don Rumsfeld, former Secretary of Defense, made when he 
appeared before the Foreign Relations Committee. But that was kept a 
secret by the news media. They hardly touched on anything that the four 
former Secretaries of Defense came and testified to. Well, let me 
correct that. One of them, it was delayed at the last moment, sent a 
letter.
  Now then, there are roughly 230 small businesses which custom 
synthesize made-to-order products and compete with the large chemical 
manufacturers. They generally have fewer than 100 employees. They are 
small businesses, and they have annual sales of less than $40 million 
each.
  Few, if any, of them can afford to employ the legions of lawyers just 
to satisfy the new reporting requirements of this chemical weapons 
treaty. Nobody talks about that. Sandy Berger down at the White House 
has not even mentioned it. He is telling Trent Lott and all the rest 
what to do. Yet, Bob Dole writes letters, but they did not talk about 
the details of the impact and the burden to be piled on the small 
businesses of America.
  It will not be reported in tomorrow's paper. You will not hear a 
thing about it unless you are looking at C-SPAN. That is one thing 
wrong with this country today--no warning is given the American people 
about some of the actions and some of the proposals that come up in the 
Congress of the United States.
  Mr. President, equally as important, Senators should be careful to 
note that the onsite inspection provisions of the CWC increase the 
potential for compromising proprietary information which is offered as 
the very basis for a company's competitive edge. Many companies will 
not survive if they had to do without their competitive edge.
  While it may be difficult to assess the potential dollar losses 
associated with the inspections under the chemical weapons treaty, it 
is clear, Mr. President, it is absolutely clear, that information 
gleaned from inspections and data declarations could be worth literally 
millions and millions of dollars to foreign competitors. You better 
believe that they will be digging for it every time they get a chance. 
So that is what some of us have been talking about and some of us have 
been pleading, let us get this thing straightened out before we make 
the mistake of ratifying this treaty.
  Let me tell you something. I do not enjoy having my shirttail on fire 
in the newspapers and on television about opposing a treaty that the 
newspapers and the television programs say is a wonderful treaty. But I 
stood there, as I said earlier this afternoon, five times, and I have 
taken the oath of office as a Senator. A part of that oath, I say to 
you, Mr. President, is to support the Constitution of the United 
States, defend it, and defend the American people. I have done my best 
to do that for every year that I have been here.
  So as Don Rumsfeld, the former Secretary of Defense, emphasized in 
his testimony during his appearance, which was unnoticed by the news 
media, his appearance before the Foreign Relations Committee, Don 
Rumsfeld emphasized that the greatest threat is not--is not--to the 
large, diversified chemical manufacturers who have the lobbyists 
lobbying for this treaty--you fall all over the lobbyists--but it is 
going to be the threat to other companies that are trying to 
concentrate on a single market or a particular technological nature.
  A company whose profitability and economic survival derives from the 
cost or quality advantage in one type of process will be particularly 
vulnerable to industrial espionage.
  One other thing. For some companies even visual inspection might 
reveal a unique process configuration of great value to a would-be 
competitor.
  While big chemical businesses routinely undergo Federal inspections, 
the chemical weapons treaty will allow a whole cadre of international 
inspectors from countries routinely engaging in economic espionage to 
inspect hundreds of facilities around the United States on a recurring 
basis.
  Among the companies potentially hardest hit by treaty inspections 
will be those companies that engage in technologically intensive 
applications, such as the biotechnology and pharmaceutical sectors as 
well as the manufacturers of commercial and military aircraft, 
missiles, space-launch vehicles, and other equipment of a highly 
sensitive nature. The economic integrity of these companies is 
essential not only to the economic stability of the United States, 
don't you see, but in many cases to our future national security.
  I, for one, was not surprised to have discovered that the Aerospace 
Industries Association stated in a March 13, 1997, letter to the 
majority leader of the U.S. Senate:

       We are very concerned, however, that the application of the 
     Convention's reporting and inspection regime to AIA member 
     company facilities could unnecessary jeopardize our nation's 
     ability to protect its national security information and 
     proprietary technological data.

  At this point I am going to pause so that Senator Brownback can be 
recognized.
  We had several of those favoring the treaty in a row, and I think it 
is fair for Senator Brownback to be recognized--for how long?
  Mr. BROWNBACK. Seven minutes, if I could.
  Mr. HELMS. Seven, eight minutes. I yield to the Senator for that 
purpose.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized.
  Mr. BROWNBACK. I thank the Senator from North Carolina for yielding 
to me for a few minutes to discuss this critical issue in front of the 
U.S. Senate, the Chemical Weapons Convention.
  I would like to state at the very outset of my statement that I would 
like to be on record that as to the earlier vote we had today of 
supporting the CWC treaty that came to the floor earlier, that we had 
an oral vote on, that I support that treaty. I support it. And I will 
go into the reasons why I supported that and why I will have problems 
ultimately voting for it if we do not hold tightly to what hit the 
floor earlier.
  Mr. President, I just want to talk about this as a couple people 
would perhaps talk about it if they were sitting somewhere across this 
country, somewhere in my State of Kansas, and how they look at the 
Chemical Weapons Convention.
  I think they would sit down and ask themselves: If we enter into this 
Chemical Weapons Convention Treaty, will it be less likely for chemical 
weapons to be used in the world or will it be more likely for chemical 
weapons to be used in the world? It seems to me that that is the real 
crucible that we have to decide this under: Is it more likely or less 
likely if we enter into this treaty?
  I take this treaty obligation very seriously. I chair the Middle East 
Subcommittee for Foreign Affairs, the region of the world where perhaps 
you have the most concentration and the most potentially recent use of 
chemical weapons happening in a battle situation. This is a very 
important issue in that region of the world. It is a very important 
issue in the United States as far as, are we going to be able to rid 
the world of these terrible, horrible weapons of mass destruction? I 
take that very seriously. So I have sat and I have visited with a 
number of people, experts on both sides.
  On Monday I did maybe an unusual thing for a Senator. I read the 
treaty. The parts of it I had not read, I have now read the treaty. I 
need to get on through the attachments, but I have gone through this. I 
have looked at the arguments. I have looked particularly at the 
problems. I have looked at the overall good aspects of it, and I want 
to say that I do strongly support the objectives of the Chemical 
Weapons Convention. We must oppose the use and existence of chemical 
weapons. There is just no doubt about it. They are an abomination that 
needs to be removed from the face of the Earth. We all agree on that.
  But it is actually for that reason, however, that I have some great 
difficulties with one particular provision--a number of them within the

[[Page S3533]]

treaty actually, but one in particular. That is article X of this 
treaty. It is for that reason, if that is left in this treaty, I do not 
think that I can support the overall vote, if article X is left in.

  Let me say why. The Chemical Weapons Convention, if that is left in, 
I believe will have the exact opposite of the intended effect. And that 
is, as I said at the outset, are we going to have more chemical weapons 
used or less? If article X is left in, I fear greatly we are going to 
have more use of chemical weapons taking place even though the purpose 
is exactly the opposite.
  Let me say why. Article X requires nations to share defensive 
technology regarding chemical weapons. It is something that has been 
discussed at some length. The particular paragraph reads this way:

       Each State Party undertakes to facilitate, and shall have 
     the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of 
     equipment, material and scientific and technological 
     information concerning means of protection against chemical 
     weapons.

  In other words, we are going to be sharing technology, particularly 
defensive technology, which is very high technology in many of these 
areas. I fear that that technology is going to more easily get into the 
hands of rogue nations, like Iran. I am very concerned about their 
getting weapons of mass destruction.
  We had a hearing last week in the Middle East Subcommittee regarding 
the threat and the expansion of Iran's capacity for mass destruction. 
The Chinese--and this is unclassified information--have sold precursor 
chemical weapons to the Iranians. This has in fact occurred. They do 
not use that without defensive technology to support their own troops, 
yet this treaty will make the possibility of their getting that 
defensive technology more likely, if not even ordered within the 
treaty.
  You can say, wait a minute. That is just your interpretation. Well, 
let us look at what Secretary Cheney has said on this, former Defense 
Secretary Dick Cheney, an admirable man, who served in the House of 
Representatives, also in the administration under President Bush. He 
says this about this treaty:

       [the] obligation to share with potential adversaries like 
     Iran, chemical manufacturing technology that can be used for 
     military purposes and chemical defensive equipment, threaten 
     to make this accord worse than having no treaty at all.

  Then he is joined, of course, as you know, by former Defense 
Secretaries Schlesinger, Weinberger, Rumsfeld, and others.
  Now you say, well, this is not going to happen. That is just not 
going to occur. We are not going to have people selling them this sort 
of technology, either us or other nations. And maybe we will not do it. 
But will other nations then step forward and sell this defensive 
technology? You say no, that will not happen. There have been people 
already pointing out the fact that actually that has already occurred 
under some previous treaties--the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
being one where the Russians now cite to us that treaty as a reason for 
them to sell nuclear production capacity to the Iranians, citing the 
very treaty we entered into to stop this from taking place and that is 
used back against this to try to expand. And now the Iranians having 
this capacity, we are trying to stop this nuclear generator from 
getting fully online for the Iranians. And the Russians cite a 
nonproliferation treaty that they have to share this technology with 
the Iranians.

  That certainly is not the intent. I am very fearful we will repeat 
the same mistakes of history here. We have to stop the abomination of 
chemical weapons. We have to stop it in the United States. We have to 
stop it in the world. We have to stop the abomination of these weapons 
of mass destruction, these terrible weapons of mass destruction being 
used. The way to do that is to have a CWC treaty that actually does it 
and doesn't spread their use. And striking article X is the way to do 
that. With that, even though the treaty has a number of other problems, 
it is supportable. Without that, I actually fear the opposite will 
occur.
  And with that I would like to yield back the time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. In 30 seconds, I will yield 12 minutes to my friend from 
Pennsylvania.
  Mr. President, I am holding up in my hand here a declaration form for 
those firms that face reporting requirements for production of discrete 
organic chemicals, which applies to about 1,800 firms. It is three 
pages long. I will at a later time read into the Record what it asks 
for to show you how non-onerous it is.
  On one of the pages of instructions, on the bottom of the page, it 
says,

       You do not have to declare unscheduled discrete organic 
     chemical plant sites that produce explosives exclusively, 
     produce hydrocarbons exclusively, refine sulfur-containing 
     crude oil, produce oligomers and polymers, whether or not 
     containing PSF, and produce unscheduled discrete organic 
     chemicals via a biological or bio-mediated process.

  This eliminates thousands of firms, hundreds of firms at least. And 
so this is not nearly as onerous as it was made out to be in my humble 
opinion.
  I now yield with the permission of my colleagues 12 minutes to the 
distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania, Mr Specter.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from Delaware for 
yielding me this time. I have sought recognition to voice my support 
for the pending treaty and to give my reasons.
  Long before the current debate on chemical weapons, in my college 
thesis, which I wrote back at the University of Pennsylvania in 1951, 
on United States-Soviet relations, I was convinced by Prof. Hans 
Morganthau's dictum that ``the objectives of foreign policy must be 
defined in terms of the national interest and must be supported with 
adequate power.''
  As a U.S. Senator, I have long advocated a strong national defense 
and have worked to shape a comprehensive arms control agenda for the 
United States as one arrow in our overall defense quiver.
  Ten years ago, in 1987, in Geneva, Switzerland, I was an observer to 
the U.S.-USSR nuclear disarmament talks. That year I debated 
extensively with many of my colleagues in the Chamber the need for a 
broad interpretation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, ABM. Many of 
those whom I opposed at that time I now side with on the current issue. 
I still believe that the approach for a broad interpretation to give 
the United States additional power, an approach advocated by President 
Reagan, was necessary and still remains necessary to provide security 
for our Nation.

  From my experience on the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, 
I have observed that strength is the best guarantor of peace and that 
prudent arms control can provide an important basis for such strength. 
From my work as chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, I have 
seen the wisdom of President Reagan's view that verification not trust 
is the realistic basis for arms control.
  Verification is an important issue in this treaty. It is true that 
this treaty does not guarantee verification and no treaty has or can 
guarantee absolute certainty on verification. However, ratifying this 
treaty gives us far greater opportunity to verify through inspections, 
data collection, and establishing a norm for chemical arms reduction.
  Mr. President, I adhere to my position on the need to secure a strong 
defense for America. It is my belief that the Chemical Weapons 
Convention will complement the existing components of our foreign 
policy which includes our arms control treaties. As we continue to work 
to protect our troops abroad and our citizens at home from the threat 
of weapons of mass destruction, arms control is an important ingredient 
of a sound foreign policy.
  Critics of the Chemical Weapons Convention say the treaty provides a 
false sense of security. On the contrary, no Senator has ever suggested 
that a single treaty standing alone would adequately deter aggressor 
nations. The Chemical Weapons Convention is not perfect but we can 
build on it as a parameter for dialog. Ratification certainly does not 
mean that we are going to rest on our laurels. The United States did 
not stop moving forward with strengthening our national defense while 
we negotiated arms control

[[Page S3534]]

agreements with the Russians such as the ABM Treaty, SALT I, and SALT 
II. In this combined approach we were successful. The nuclear threat 
today is dramatically lower than it was a decade or two decades ago, 
and arms control agreements are a critical part of that strategy.
  Similarly, we must not stop at mere ratification of the Chemical 
Weapons Convention in our quest to destroy existing and prevent the 
production of new chemical and biological weapons. One area of the 
treaty critics often point to as being particularly detrimental to the 
United States is the search and seizure provisions of the Chemical 
Weapons Convention which they claim is unconstitutional.
  This is a subject that I have worked on extensively since Mapp versus 
Ohio came down in 1961 imposing the burden on States not to admit 
evidence seized as a result of an unconstitutional search and seizure. 
At a time when I was an assistant district attorney in Philadelphia and 
later as district attorney of Philadelphia, I worked on these issues 
very, very extensively. Under this treaty, an international inspection 
team would be allowed to search a U.S. facility to determine whether or 
not a chemical agent is being diverted to use in noncompliance with the 
treaty. Similarly, that obligation, that inspection would be available 
for other nations.
  After careful review of the provisions of the treaty, I am personally 
confident that the language does not conflict with the fourth amendment 
of the U.S. Constitution but, rather, is in accord with that amendment. 
The language on search and seizure as negotiated by the administration 
and Members of the Senate states that in cases where the search is 
challenged, the U.S. Government will first obtain a criminal search 
warrant based upon probable cause. So that in any situation of 
challenge, the search will have to measure up to the tough criminal 
standard. In cases of routine inspection, the U.S. Government will 
obtain an administrative search warrant from a U.S. magistrate judge.
  Through the months preceding this debate, opponents have raised a 
number of issues. These include suggestions that the treaty plays into 
the hands of rogue nations like Libya and North Korea, that it 
facilitates the transfer of military chemical technology to aggressive 
countries and prohibits our troops from the use of riot control agents.

  There is now agreement on these issues among all the parties involved 
in negotiating the set of conditions now contained in the proposed 
resolution of ratification. The Chemical Weapons Convention will 
actually make it more difficult for rogue states to make chemical 
weapons. The treaty has prohibitions in place to prevent industrial 
espionage. Concerning riot control agents, the treaty sets sound 
guidelines on what agents may be used and when such agents may be used.
  As we debate the merits of the treaty and consider the outstanding 
amendments, I remind my colleagues of the importance of bipartisanship 
in foreign affairs. We have traditionally said that politics stop at 
the water's edge and bipartisanship in foreign affairs is of critical 
continuing importance. It is the role of Senators to shape a climate of 
bipartisan support for treaties of this magnitude. To work with the 
administration and our colleagues to craft an agreement that will serve 
the needs of the United States in both the long and short terms. Two of 
our noteworthy predecessors, giants in the Senate, one Republican and 
one Democrat, Senator Arthur Vandenberg and Senator Scoop Jackson 
exemplify how bipartisanship can work to the betterment of our country. 
Their willingness to look beyond the confines of partisan politics 
provides the model for us today as Republicans to support the 
ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
  And I note, Mr. President, the statement today made by our former 
majority leader, Senator Robert Dole, in support of the treaty.
  There is another much more recent example of why ratification of the 
treaty falls outside traditional partisan politics and that is the 
potential use of chemical agents against U.S. troops. This is an issue 
about which I am all too familiar. As former chairman of the Senate 
Intelligence Committee and as the current chairman of the Veterans' 
Affairs Committee, I have chaired several hearings on gulf war 
syndrome. I have traveled extensively throughout Pennsylvania and have 
heard from gulf war veterans who have been unable to explain the cause 
of their illnesses. And many gulf war veterans across the Nation echo 
similar complaints. Believe me when I say that their suffering is very 
real.
  Last year, this issue was addressed in great detail at a joint 
hearing of the Senate Intelligence Committee and the Veterans' Affairs 
Committee. This year a number of hearings have been held both in 
Washington and across Pennsylvania. And more recently, a few days ago, 
on April 17, Gen. Colin Powell testified before the Veterans' Affairs 
Committee on this important matter. While we can still not verify the 
cause of these illnesses, there are indicators that American troops may 
have been exposed to chemical agents. During the course of the hearing 
with General Powell, I asked him what effect if any the Chemical 
Weapons Convention would have had on Iraq if the United States had 
ratified the treaty before the gulf war and the treaty would have been 
in effect.
  We will never know with certainty the answer to that question. Iraq 
is a rogue nation, and it is difficult to imagine them as signatories. 
But General Powell was quick to point out that the Chemical Weapons 
Convention works to strengthen America's hand.
  He noted, ``In the future, when we deal with rogue states or with 
signatory states, we will be speaking from the position not of 
unilateral American action, but with the support of most of the nations 
of the world.''
  I suggest to my colleagues that it is a matter of considerable 
importance in protecting American troops from the ravages of chemical 
warfare, which the gulf war troops may have been exposed to.
  Now, we must ask ourselves, if we had this treaty in place 
beforehand, would we have at least averted or minimized the effects of 
chemical agents on our troops? We will never know the answer to this 
question with certainty, but we owe it to our Nation to reach out for 
every possible means of reducing the threat of chemical and biological 
weapons. United States ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, 
however, may certainly constrain the further development of chemical 
weapons by countries like Iraq.
  Mr. President, it is obviously impossible to craft a comprehensive 
treaty that meets the satisfaction of all people. I respect those who 
have spoken against the treaty. I disagree with them, but I respect the 
sincerity of their views. Yet, with the appropriate assurances given 
about some of the finer points of the treaty on objections which have 
been raised by opponents, most of which have been satisfied, on issues 
such as constitutional rights, we as a Nation, I submit, should take 
the moral high ground. We should ratify the treaty, or we will be 
categorized with the likes of Iraq and Libya. I am not advocating that 
we ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention instead of pursuing other 
forms of protection. But it is one important point of protection. The 
Chemical Weapons Convention is just one more tool for the United States 
as we work toward a more vigilant defense for our Nation. We have come 
a long way in making this treaty work for the best interests of the 
United States of America.
  I urge my colleagues in the Senate to vote to ratify this convention.
  (The remarks of Mr. Specter pertaining to the introduction of the 
legislation are located in today's Record under ``Statements on 
Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.'')
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, in the spirit that these negotiations began 
with me and the chairman of the committee and Senator Kyl, we have 
continued that spirit. The next speaker we have is undeclared. So we 
have agreed for a total of 7 minutes he will get. We ask unanimous 
consent that 3\1/2\ minutes be taken out of the time of the Senator 
from Delaware and 3\1/2\ minutes out of the time of the Senator from 
North Carolina.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BIDEN. Further, Mr. President, before I yield the floor to my 
friend from Washington State, we are trying to work out a unanimous-
consent agreement on the total 10 hours. I am not propounding such an 
agreement.

[[Page S3535]]

 But we are hoping we can work out an agreement, whereby in the closed 
session tomorrow, the so-called secret session that will take place 
tomorrow, which will be a 2-hour session, that that time not be counted 
against the 10 hours in the UC for debate on chemical weapons.
  Again, I will leave it in the able hands of my friend from Arizona to 
determine whether the Republican leader is amenable to that, but 
colleagues who may be listening hopefully were able to do that. The 
reason I stand up to say that, if they are not, each of us only have 
about 55 minutes left tomorrow in this process. So for the colleagues 
who wish to speak, I want them to understand that I am not going to 
have the time to give them if in fact this doesn't happen. This is by 
way of disclaimer this evening, so tomorrow morning my colleagues won't 
come in and say: Joe, you promised me time.
  I think we can work it out.
  Mr. President, we now yield a total of 7 minutes, 3\1/2\ from each 
side, to the distinguished Senator from the State of Washington.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Washington is recognized.
  Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, I thank my colleagues. I want to introduce 
my remarks by expressing my view that this has been a remarkably 
thoughtful and important debate in the finest traditions of the Senate, 
not only here on the Senate floor but during the months leading up to 
it. Perhaps one of the reasons for that is that all Members are united 
in detesting the use of chemical weapons, divided only by their views 
on how best to succeed in reaching that goal, and working toward 
reaching that goal with a high degree of good will and accommodation to 
one another. So, essentially, from the beginning, the only real 
question has been: Does this convention advance or inhibit the cause of 
limiting or eliminating the use of chemical weapons all around the 
world?
  Mr. President, at the very beginning of the debate when the 
convention was first submitted to the Foreign Relations Committee, I 
was inclined to fall on the side of that debate that said that the 
convention probably was worse than nothing because of the overwhelming 
false sense of security it created, a sense of security that it could 
not match in its provisions on a wide range of activities attempted to 
be covered by it.
  But as we vote tomorrow, Mr. President, I don't believe we are going 
to be voting on the original bare bones understanding of the 
convention. The administration and the proponents on this floor have 
agreed to some 28 conditions, or explanations, or interpretations of 
the convention, each of which has contributed to a greater degree of 
comfort with the balance of the convention and its ratification. Three 
are particularly important to me. One measure ensures that the Chemical 
Weapons Convention does not lead to a false sense of security--a false 
sense that is going to be there no matter what we do, but is at least 
limited by some specific promises on the part of the administration.
  Second, the clarification of the affect of the convention on the use 
of riot control agents.
  Third, and vitally important to us and to our constitutional rights, 
are the fourth amendment protections against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.
  That is not to say that the other 25 conditions aren't important, Mr. 
President, but these 3, at least, have been particularly significant, 
in my view, as I have listened to both sides during the course of this 
debate.
  Nevertheless, I am not yet willing at this point to commit to voting 
in favor of ratification because of my deep concerns with articles X 
and XI of the convention, and the proposition that they might well 
force the United States to share technologies and allow the world, by 
its sale of chemicals, to a far greater extent, and those technologies 
and chemicals may be sold at least by responsible and free nations in 
the world today under the aegis of the Australia Group.
  It would be ironic indeed if, in the guise of passing a treaty or a 
convention to lessen the opportunity for the use of chemical weapons in 
the future we actually enhanced it by assisting those nations that are 
willing to sign the convention but which, like Iran, have shown, 
without the slightest ability to contradict the proposition, that they 
do not regard any treaty, any convention, as binding on them, and who 
are more likely than not to use the convention to advance their own 
ability to violate it.
  And so, Mr. President, as I make up my own mind during the course of 
the next 24 hours, it is the impact of articles X and XI that cause me 
the greatest degree of concern. I don't believe that we can simply 
strike them from the treaty. That vote tomorrow seems to me to be the 
equivalent of saying, no, of killing the convention in its entirety. I 
do believe, however, that we should continue to work toward 
clarification and understandings on the part of the administration, as 
I know the majority leader is doing in this, as he has in many of the 
other questionable elements of this convention, so that we can be 
assured that the United States at least will not be required to do 
something that will undercut its own security and that of its friends 
and neighbors by the convention, that it is not required to do in the 
absence of that convention.
  So if my concerns with respect to the actual impact in the real world 
of articles X and XI are met, I will vote to ratify the convention. If 
they are not, it will remain, in my mind, a situation in which the 
convention increases our danger rather than obviates them.
  With that, Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. LAUTENBERG addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I yield myself 7 minutes in accordance 
with the understanding on the floor now.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized for 7 minutes.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, while the Senate debates one of the 
most important arms control treaties in our history, various issues 
come into play. It is obvious that the Chemical Weapons Convention will 
ban an entire class of weapons of mass destruction. It prohibits the 
full spectrum of activities associated with the offensive use of 
chemical weapons, including development, production, acquisition, 
stockpiling, and assistance to anyone engaging in these activities. It 
requires that the destruction of chemical weapons begin within 1 year 
and it be completed within 10 years.
  Mr. President, there is no doubt in my mind that the United States 
should join a treaty we helped to shape and which enhances our 
security. I am going to vote for it. Now, with the Chemical Weapons 
Convention and our leadership, other nations will follow the lead that 
we set years ago by giving up chemical weapons.
  Rogue nations and terrorist countries will have a harder time 
acquiring or making chemical weapons, and new tools will be available 
to prevent and punish them if they try. That is a noble goal.
  One of the arguments that we have heard against ratifying the 
Chemical Weapons Convention is that it will force some industries --one 
in particular--to bear an unusual burden. I want to address this for a 
few minutes because I don't believe it is true. To the contrary, the 
chemical industry will bear an undue burden if the United States fails 
to ratify the CWC. I want to explain why.

  If the Chemical Weapons Convention goes into effect without the 
United States a party, strict trade restrictions designed to pressure 
rogue states to join the convention would spell disaster for the U.S. 
chemical industry. Reasonably enough, neither Presidents Reagan nor 
Bush ever foresaw that the U.S. Senate might decide to place the United 
States outside of the treaty, along with countries like Iraq, Libya, 
and other rogue nations.
  But the fact is that treaty provisions prohibiting members from 
trading with nonmembers in certain chemicals that have both commercial 
as well as military uses would put at risk as much as $600 million a 
year in two-way trade by American chemical companies, and many jobs.
  I will repeat that. Should the U.S. Senate fail to ratify the treaty, 
as much as $600 million a year in American export and import sales 
would be

[[Page S3536]]

placed at risk as a result of sanctions against American companies.
  On April 15, Fred Webber, who is the president and CEO of the 
Chemical Manufacturers Association, testified in support of this 
treaty. He said:

       The industry I represent is America's largest export 
     industry, with over 1 million American jobs * * * we know how 
     this treaty affects our commercial interests. * * * We began 
     with many of the same concerns about the treaty that have 
     been voiced here. We worked hard to protect U.S. industrial 
     interests, especially proprietary information.
       We helped develop the protocols guiding the treaty's 
     inspection and recordkeeping requirements, and we put those 
     protocols to live-fire tests over and over again. * * * In 
     summary, we believe the treaty is not a threat to U.S. 
     business.

  Not only does the CWC have the support of the Chemical Manufacturers 
Association, which represents 193 chemical manufacturing companies, 
accounting for more than 90 percent of the Nation's productive capacity 
for basic chemicals, it has the support of the Chemical Industry 
Council of New Jersey and the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers 
Association, with over 260 member companies.
  It also has the support of the Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America and its 100 plus member companies, and the 
Biotechnology Industry Organization and its 650-plus member companies 
and affiliated organizations. It has the support of the Council for 
Chemical Research, the American Crop Protection Association, the 
American Institute of Chemical Engineers, and the American Chemical 
Society.
  Mr. President, the point I am trying to make is simple--the Senate 
cannot refuse to ratify the CWC in the name of industry. American 
industry supports this treaty. It does not believe it places an unfair 
burden on companies in this country.
  In fact, U.S. companies view the convention as an asset because it 
offers a way to dissociate themselves from chemical weapons production 
and to be good corporate citizens by helping to eliminate these 
abhorrent weapons.
  American industry even participated in the treaty negotiations and 
helped write the rules covering inspections and confidential business 
information. Its top priority during the negotiations conducted by the 
Reagan and Bush administrations was ensuring that any burdens on 
business would be reasonable and that trade secrets would be protected. 
To ensure that the protections against unreasonable searches and 
seizures and industrial espionage would be strong, the chemical 
industry tested the treaty during seven full-fledged trial inspections 
at chemical facilities. It ensured that warrants would be required when 
a company would not consent to a search and that the treaty would 
protect sensitive equipment, information, or areas not related to 
chemical weapons during a challenge inspection. For most companies in 
this country--more than 90 percent of the 2,000 American companies that 
will be covered by the treaty--the treaty will require them to do 
little more than fill out a two-page form once a year. Only about 140 
companies are likely to be subject to routine inspections.

  In addition to the protections negotiated by industry and already in 
the treaty, the Senate will be adding five additional protections.
  Under additional conditions that will be added by the Senate, if an 
employee of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
willfully discloses U.S. confidential business information that causes 
financial harm to a U.S. business, the President is required to 
withhold half of the U.S. contribution to the organization until that 
employee's immunity from prosecution is waived. This will serve as a 
deterrent to breaches of confidential information.
  To reduce the risk of industrial espionage, samples collected during 
inspections in the United States cannot be analyzed in a foreign 
laboratory. The President would be required to certify annually that 
the CWC is not significantly harming the legitimate commercial 
activities and interests of chemical, biotechnology, and pharmaceutical 
firms.
  The Senate would support the provision of assistance to U.S. business 
by the On-Site Inspection Agency. And, the Senate would be informed 
promptly of the proposed addition of a chemical to any of the CWC's 
schedules and the anticipated effect of such a proposal on U.S. 
industry.
  Mr. President, this treaty enhances America's security. It is the 
right thing to do, and I urge my colleagues to ratify it without delay.
  I hope that my colleagues will stand up and say this is good for 
America, that it is good for humanity, and that they will ratify this 
treaty without delay.
  I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.
  Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the Chemical 
Weapons Convention. While some of my colleagues may have other means of 
measuring this convention, I believe when we consider any arms control 
treaty, the main concern must be how it will affect our national 
security. I support this treaty because, on balance, our Nation's 
security will be vastly improved in a world where chemical weapons are 
outlawed than in a world where the possession of these horrible weapons 
remains an acceptable practice.
  I believe it is important for all in this Chamber and for the public 
at large to realize that today the United States is committed to 
destroying all of our chemical weapons. Under a law passed by Congress 
and signed by President Reagan in 1985, we will destroy all of our 
chemical weapons stockpile by the year 2004. Further, in 1991 President 
Bush committed the United States to banning chemical weapons and 
foreswore their use even in retaliation upon the Chemical Weapons 
Treaty entering into force.
  Many of those who have spoken out against this treaty imply that 
possession of chemical weapons is the only deterrent against a chemical 
weapons attack by an adversary. However, in the judgment of our 
political and military leaders, our Nation does not require chemical 
weapons to defend our Nation. In fact, the United States has already 
begun the process of destroying all our chemical weapons. Our Nation 
reserves the right to retaliate against a chemical weapons attack with 
overwhelming conventional force or any other means at our disposal. The 
United States can and will defend itself against any foe armed with a 
weapon of mass destruction. We do not need these ghastly weapons to 
ensure the safety of our military personnel and our Nation.
  Mr. President, I also believe it is important to note this treaty was 
negotiated and signed under two Republican Presidents and transmitted 
for ratification under a Democratic President. The Chemical Weapons 
Convention is an example of how U.S. foreign policy can be bipartisan 
and how both parties can act outside the shadow of political 
maneuvering when it is in the best interests of our Nation. Presidents 
Reagan, Bush, and Clinton realized the benefits we receive under a 
treaty banning the possession of chemical weapons could far outweigh 
any costs incurred by our industries and Nation.
  No treaty is perfect. As with other treaties, the Senate has included 
conditions to the resolution of ratification which I believe strengthen 
this accord. But opponents of the convention have added five conditions 
meant not to improve but to kill the treaty. These five provisions must 
be struck from the treaty if we are to receive the national security 
benefits the CWC offers our Nation.
  The opposition to this treaty centers on three questionable and 
contradictory points. First, opponents state that since this treaty is 
not absolutely verifiable, the U.S. Senate should not ratify it. 
Second, contradicting the first point, opponents state this treaty's 
verification regime, while not strict enough, nevertheless places too 
much of a burden on our chemical industry. And, third, opponents state 
that since rogue nations may either not join the Chemical Weapons 
Convention or will not comply with the treaty once they become 
signatories, this treaty does not further our national security 
interests. I believe they are wrong on all points.

  No treaty--be it an arms control treaty, a trade treaty, or a 
humanitarian treaty--is completely verifiable. If absolute 
verifiability is the marker, no treaty could attain that ideal and our 
Nation would never experience the varied benefits we now gain from 
treaties such as the SALT Treaties, the START Treaties, GATT, NAFTA, 
the

[[Page S3537]]

Convention on Fishing, or the Convention on Literary and Artistic 
Copyrights. Absolute verification should not be the measure of the CWC 
or any other treaty. Instead of insisting on absolute verification, our 
Nation has realized the strength of a treaty lies in the enforcement of 
the treaty and the measure to be taken if a party violates a treaty. 
America's treaties work because our treaty partners know the full power 
of the United States lies behind the conventions and we do not hesitate 
to protect our national interests by enforcing their provisions.
  When considering ratification of an arms control treaty, the question 
must be whether on balance the verification system is strong enough to 
significantly increase our national security. It is a simple fact that 
the verification measures included in this treaty are the most 
stringent and most intrusive of any multilateral arms control agreement 
currently in place. While still not powerful enough to allow searches 
of every warehouse, laboratory, or garage in the world, the means to be 
employed under the CWC are the most thorough and most rational ever to 
be included in a multilateral international agreement.
  The Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations all realized the nature 
of chemical weapons and their production created the need for a 
stringent system to verify compliance with the CWC provisions. And yet, 
some safeguards and limitations on the verification system would have 
to be put in place in order to protect companies engaged in legitimate 
chemicals from unwarranted hardships. Under President Bush's direction, 
the proper balance was struck between the strength and rigors of a 
verification regime on one hand and the intrusiveness of that same 
system on our industry and Nation on the other. Under the Chemical 
Weapons Convention, measures are in place which will severely increase 
the likelihood an illicit producer of chemical weapons will be caught 
while ensuring that any company that produces or uses potentially 
dangerous chemicals will not be unnecessarily burdened.
  Mr. President, some opponents argue that the treaty has it wrong both 
ways--they claim it is not intrusive enough to be completely verifiable 
and also claim the costs incurred by industry are too great under the 
verification regime. While the nature of all treaties makes them 
correct on the former point, since no treaty can reasonably be 
considered absolutely verifiable, the Chemical Manufacturers 
Association, which represents hundreds of chemical companies, and 
hundreds of individual chemical companies on their own have expressed 
their support for this treaty.
  If the vast majority of companies that produce or use chemicals 
pronounce their support for this agreement, I do not believe we should 
claim the treaty is unduly burdensome on these companies. They know 
what is in their own interest and they have stated their support for 
the Chemical Weapons Convention.
  Opponents also argue that since rogue nations can be expected not to 
join in the CWC or will not comply with its provisions the United 
States should not endorse this treaty. This argument overlooks the fact 
that even if the Chemical Weapons Convention does not enter into force 
these same rogue nations can develop and produce chemical weapons. 
Without the CWC we will still face this same threat.
  Yet, if we ratify the CWC and are vigorous in its enforcement, the 
United States will have a much improved ability to identify clandestine 
chemical weapons programs. The nature of chemical weapons make it 
possible to produce them in facilities as small as a high school 
laboratory or even a garage. Because these weapons of mass destruction 
can be produced in small areas, the intelligence community today faces 
extreme difficulties in locating programs already underway in rogue 
nations. However, as the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence noted 
in its September 1994 report on this issue, under the Chemical Weapons 
Convention, the United States Government will gain important new access 
to useful information, relevant to potential CWC threats to the United 
States, that would not otherwise be obtainable. As Acting Director of 
Central Intelligence George Tenet told the Intelligence Committee on 
February 5 of this year, the CWC will give our intelligence community 
more information and more tools to use in our efforts to combat those 
who would use these horrible weapons.
  The Chemical Weapons Convention's regular inspection process and its 
ability to perform challenge inspections on short notice are very 
powerful means of catching parties breaking the treaty. The convention 
also includes varied reporting requirements on the production and use 
of toxic agents and precursor chemicals which may help the intelligence 
agencies to locate clandestine production of chemical weapons. If the 
Chemical Weapons Convention is ratified and we use it to our advantage, 
the intelligence community will have another important tool with which 
to fight the battle against these weapons. If we do not ratify the 
convention, we will forgo a better chance to win a battle we must fight 
whether or not this treaty is in effect.
  The CWC will help protect our citizens by increasing the likelihood 
that a potential cheater would be caught under its inspection 
processes. But the CWC helps our national security in other ways as 
well. Three years after entry into force, the Chemical Weapons 
Convention prohibits parties from exporting high risk precursor and 
toxic chemicals to countries not belonging to the CWC. This will 
further limit the ability of nonsignatory countries to acquire 
chemicals which could be turned into a lethal gas. Finally, the power 
of international law created by the CWC against the possession of 
chemical weapons will assist our own Nation's continuing efforts 
against this abominable class of weapons.
  Taken together, the benefits we gain from ratifying the Chemical 
Weapons Convention far outweigh the minimal costs of implementing this 
treaty. The strict verification regime, increased opportunities for our 
intelligence agencies, the prohibition of exports to nonmember nations, 
and the force of international law complementing the United States' 
individual efforts will help protect our citizens and our national 
interests.
  We have already made the decision that possession and use of chemical 
weapons is not in the security interests of our Nation. We have 
determined the United States has the means and the will to protect our 
forces and our Nation without this type of weapon. It is time now to 
compel the other nations of the world to abide by these same rules.
  Mr. President, I have weighed the effects of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention on our national security and I believe our Nation is safer 
with this treaty than without it. It is my hope my colleagues will also 
realize that our national security interests lie in ratification, not 
in maintaining the status quo of a world where possession of chemical 
weapons remains acceptable under international law. I yield the floor.
  Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, this is a day many of us have been 
waiting for for a long time. After having been thoroughly reviewed by 
the relevant Senate committees, both in the last Congress and this one, 
the Chemical Weapons Convention has finally come to the Senate floor 
for debate and a vote.
  This is a complex and controversial treaty and I thank Senator Helms, 
Senator Biden, and others for their hard work on the resolution of 
ratification. The 28 conditions and provisions on which they have 
agreed go a long way toward protecting American interests and making 
this an even better treaty. While I have reservations about the 
remaining five provisions, I am pleased that the Senate will have the 
opportunity to openly discuss and debate these before moving to a final 
vote. I believe that when the facts come to light, those who are 
undecided will vote to ratify the treaty.
  I think I can safely say that no one in this body supports the 
production or use of chemical weapons, even as a deterrent. That is not 
what this debate is about. What it is about is what we get for what we 
give up. In other words, is the extra protection from chemical weapons 
that this treaty affords us worth the financial cost and the regulatory 
burden required to implement the treaty?
  Well, let's take a look. First, what do we get?
  Above all, we get enhanced national security. The treaty requires all 
signatories to do away with chemical

[[Page S3538]]

weapons and to refrain from any future production. We have already 
committed to destroy our own chemical weapons stocks, so why shouldn't 
we grasp an opportunity to require others to do so as well? I think 
this is a compelling argument. So do a few other people who know 
something about national security matters: General Powell, General 
Schwarzkopf, and every living former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. Believe me, if this treaty weakened the United States in some 
way these distinguished Americans would not support it.
  With a reduction in the number of chemical weapons we also get 
increased protection for U.S. troops. We have a responsibility to our 
brave men and women in uniform to do all we can to protect them as they 
put their lives on the line for our freedoms. We spare no expense to 
provide them with the best chemical weapons defenses possible. By the 
same token, we should do all we can to reduce the actual threat of a 
chemical weapons attack on them. Recognizing this, a number of the 
country's most prominent veterans' groups and military associations 
have spoken out in favor of the CWC, including the VFW and the Reserve 
Officer Association. They recognize the extra protection this treaty 
provides our troops in the field.

  The CWC also improves our ability to detect chemical weapons 
production by others. This treaty boasts the most intrusive 
verification regime of any arms control agreement ever. Will it enable 
us to sniff out every violation, every criminal effort to produce these 
horrible weapons? Of course not. But it will give us a powerful new 
tool to check up on those who seek to employ chemical weapons, 
something that is important to the intelligence community. Opponents 
point out that U.S. intelligence agencies cannot absolutely guarantee 
they will be able to detect treaty cheaters. This is true. But it is 
also true that the treaty will significantly improve our ability to 
uncover violations. Let's not make the perfect an enemy of the good.
  Finally, the CWC also stiffens international resolve to deal with the 
chemical weapons threat. Every signatory will be required to enact 
legislation cracking down on terrorists and criminals who use or 
threaten to use poison gas, as well as the unsavory businessmen who 
traffic in these dangerous chemicals. Last week the Senate passed a 
bill which would tighten U.S. laws in this area. Isn't it in our 
interest, in this ever-shrinking world, to make sure that others also 
toughen their laws against chemical weapons production? Moreover, a 
broadly accepted international regime outlawing this class of weapons 
altogether will put us on a much stronger footing to respond to serious 
violations, including by force if necessary.
  So with the CWC we get enhanced national security, better protection 
for U.S. troops, improved ability to detect violations, and stiffened 
international resolve in addressing this global problem.
  That's a pretty valuable package. What do we give up to get it? Well, 
we must pay our share of the costs for administering the treaty and 
carrying out required inspections. We must also underwrite costs 
associated with preparing U.S. military facilities for inspection. I 
understand that the Congressional Budget Office has estimated that 
implementation of the CWC would cost the U.S. taxpayer about $33 
million a year. That's about one-twentieth of the amount that we spend 
every year on chemical and biological weapons defenses. I think that's 
a reasonable investment to reduce the core threat against which these 
defenses are needed.
  The treaty does impose additional reporting and inspection 
requirements on American businesses in the chemical field. This is 
regrettable but necessary if we wish to have a serious verification 
regime. It's worth noting, though, that the U.S. chemical industry was 
closely involved in the negotiation of the treaty and strongly supports 
it. I am sympathetic to the concerns expressed by smaller businesses 
affected by the treaty but believe that some treaty opponents have 
vastly exaggerated the additional regulatory burden involved. As I 
understand it, the vast majority of these businesses will need do no 
more than submit a short, basic informational form annually. And only a 
handful are likely to be inspected in any given year. This is a small 
price to pay for the many benefits of the treaty.
  Finally, I would like to address the argument that the United States 
should withhold ratification until Russia and all the so-called rogue 
states sign and ratify the treaty. The issue is not whether we should 
press these countries to join the treaty--of course, we should--but how 
to most effectively achieve this goal. Does anyone really think that 
withholding U.S. ratification will convince these countries to sign up? 
Standing on the sidelines with arms folded will only give encouragement 
to those who want to ignore this treaty and continue making chemical 
weapons. The United States is a world leader and should act like one. 
We should not allow thugs like Qaddafi and Saddam Hussein to dictate 
our approach to national security matters.
  Mr. President, this treaty is good for America and good for the 
world. It's not perfect. What international treaty is? But it serves 
our interests and improves our security. For these reasons, I will vote 
to ratify and encourage my colleagues to do the same.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, the 29-year-old pursuit for a chemical 
weapons treaty has finally reached its moment of truth in the United 
States Senate. Few votes cast in this Congress or any Congress are 
likely to be more important.
  The effort to achieve this treaty was launched in 1968, and its 
history is genuinely bipartisan. In that year, the final year of the 
Johnson administration, international negotiations began in Geneva to 
build on the 1925 Geneva Protocol and try to reduce the production of 
chemical weapons. In the 1970's, President Gerald Ford had the vision 
to take that initiative a major step forward during intense 
international negotiations.
  President Ronald Reagan advanced it to the next stage with his 
efforts on arms control in the 1980's. And President Bush deserves high 
praise for embracing the ideal of eliminating chemical weapons, for 
making it a serious worldwide effort, and at long last bringing it to 
the stage where it was ready to be signed. In one of his last acts in 
office, George Bush signed the treaty, on January 13, 1993.
  President Clinton formally submitted the Chemical Weapons Convention 
to the Senate for its advice and consent later that year. Now, it's our 
turn. Today and tomorrow, in a series of votes, the Senate can and 
should join in this historic endeavor to rid the world of chemical 
weapons. We can bestow a precious gift on generations to come by 
freeing the world of an entire class of weapons of mass destruction.
  The chemical weapons treaty bans the development, production, 
stockpiling, and use of toxic chemicals as weapons. Previous agreements 
have merely limited weapons of mass destruction. But the Chemical 
Weapons Convention sets out to eliminate them from the face of the 
earth.
  The United States has already taken many steps unilaterally to 
implement a ban of our own. As long ago as 1968, this country ordered a 
moratorium on chemical weapons production.
  When President Bush signed the treaty on behalf of the United States, 
he also ordered the unilateral destruction of the U.S. stockpile of 
these weapons. Regardless of the treaty, the United States is 
destroying its chemical weapon stockpile.
  Today and tomorrow culminate many years of work and compromise. The 
Senate has held 17 hearings on the convention. Every issue has been 
exhaustively analyzed. The result is the shootout that the leadership 
has arranged for the next 24 hours.
  Bipartisan negotiations have achieved agreement on 28 amendments to 
the treaty, none of which go to the heart of the treaty and many of 
which help to clarify it.
  But five major issues have not yet been settled. The five amendments, 
on which we will vote tomorrow, seek to settle differences of opinion 
the wrong way. They are killer amendments. I hope the Senate will vote 
``no'' on each of them. If any one of them passes, it will doom our 
participation in the treaty, and relegate us to the company of outlaw 
regimes like North Korea and Libya, who also reject the treaty.
  Two of the killer amendments condition our participation on whether 
other nations--Russia, Iran, Iraq,

[[Page S3539]]

Syria, and China--have already become participants. Essentially, they 
would hand over U.S. security decisions to those nations.
  A third killer amendment arbitrarily excludes all representatives 
from certain other countries from participating in verification 
inspections. This amendment ignores the ability that the treaty already 
gives us to reject any inspectors we believe are not trustworthy.
  A fourth killer amendment omits and alters other key parts of the 
treaty that deal with the export of certain materials. Its proponents 
fear that rogue nations may gain valuable technology from us. Nothing 
in the convention requires the United States to weaken its export 
controls. Experts in the chemical industry, trade organizations, and 
Government officials have worked to ensure that nothing in the treaty 
threatens our technology and industrial power.
  The fifth killer amendment places an unrealistically high standard of 
verification on the treaty. It requires the treaty verification 
procedures to accomplish the impossible, by being able to detect small, 
not militarily significant, amounts of dangerous chemical materials.
  No international agreement can effectively police small amounts of 
raw materials that might possibly be used in chemical weapon 
production. Every effort is being made and will be made to make the 
detection procedures as effective as possible. It is hypocritical for 
opponents to attempt to scuttle this treaty because they feel it does 
not go far enough.
  The overwhelming majority of past and present foreign policy 
officials, military leaders, large and small businesses, Fortune 500 
companies, Nobel laureates, veterans organizations, religious groups, 
environmentalists, and public interest groups are united in their 
strong support of the convention. It is a practical international 
agreement with practical benefits for the United States, and the United 
States should be a part of it.
  Nevertheless, the treaty is being opposed by an entrenched band of 
foreign policy ideologues and isolationists who think the United 
Nations is the enemy and who say the arms race should be escalated, not 
restricted. History proved their ilk wrong once before, when they sank 
the League of Nations in the 1920's. And it will prove them wrong, 
again, with far more drastic consequences than World War II, if they 
prevail today.
  We cannot let that happen. The Senate should reject the five killer 
amendments, and give this treaty the two-thirds vote it needs and 
deserves.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I rise today to express my strong support 
for U.S. ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
  First, I wish to thank Senators Biden and Lugar for their untiring 
efforts in seeking ratification of this historic treaty. I also want to 
commend the majority leader for working diligently with both sides to 
bring this treaty to the Senate floor for consideration. No matter 
where one stands on this issue, we all agree that it is proper for this 
debate to take place while our Nation can still become a full 
participant in the convention.
  I think that it is only appropriate that we are having this debate 1 
week after we commemorated the second anniversary of the bombing of the 
Murrah Federal building in Oklahoma City. That singular event made us 
all aware that we are vulnerable to terrorism on our own soil. We also 
remember when terrorists launched a chemical attack in Tokyo's subways, 
taking 12 lives and injuring thousands more. We must take action to 
protect Americans from a similar terrorist outrage, and therefore it is 
incumbent upon this body to approve the Chemical Weapons Convention.
  The Chemical Weapons Convention is also relevant today in light of 
recent findings that thousands of our troops may have been exposed to 
chemical weapons during the Persian Gulf war. Veterans groups across 
the country have called on the Senate to approve the CWC, and I believe 
that it is inexcusable for us to forgo this opportunity to take a stand 
against chemical warfare. If we fail to do so, we will be unnecessarily 
placing those who volunteer their services in our military at risk.
  It is impossible to overstate the importance of the votes that will 
be cast in this Chamber tomorrow. We have an opportunity to consider a 
proposal that would eliminate an entire class of weapons of mass 
destruction, and we may never have this opportunity again. Our 
decisions will have a tremendous impact on the safety of the American 
people and our Nation's role as an international leader.
  We are all familiar with the horrifying effects associated with 
chemical weapons. We remember the use of mustard gas in World War I and 
the use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq war. It was the 
inhumane nature of chemical warfare that prompted President Reagan to 
initiate the negotiations for an international treaty to eliminate the 
use of chemical weapons. President Bush was also committed to phasing 
out chemical weapons, and the United States joined 160 other nations in 
signing the Chemical Weapons Convention during the final days of his 
administration.
  President Clinton has been a strong supporter of the convention, and 
he has made ratification of this treaty his top foreign policy 
priority.
  For nearly a decade, the United States led efforts to develop the 
Chemical Weapons Convention, and the result was an effective agreement 
to eliminate chemical weapons that was unprecedented in its scope. 
Considering its history of bipartisan support, one would have expected 
this treaty to be easily approved by the Senate. Unfortunately, 
opponents of the convention have distorted the facts surrounding this 
treaty, and it is possible that the United States will fail to ratify 
the treaty that it initiated.
  I strongly believe that the Chemical Weapons Convention is an 
effective tool for combating chemical warfare, and I hope that my 
fellow Senators will look beyond the rhetoric of the treaty's 
detractors and look at the positive things that this measure would 
accomplish.
  The Chemical Weapons Convention bans the development or transfer of 
chemical weapons by member nations. It also requires participating 
states to destroy their chemical weapon stockpiles and chemical weapons 
production facilities under the observation of international 
inspectors.
  The convention would also establish the most extensive verification 
regime of any arms control treaty, that would require inspections of 
not only governmental facilities but also civilian facilities. This 
system of monitoring will provide us with a mechanism for knowing who 
produces what chemicals throughout the world, and where these chemicals 
are being sent.
  The convention also prohibits signatory nations from exporting 
chemicals most frequently used in chemical weapons to non-member 
countries. The import of some chemicals from non-member nations would 
also be prohibited. These measures should isolate nonmember nations and 
provide them with incentive to ratify the convention.
  In order to oversee the convention's implementation, the CWC 
establishes the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 
or the OPCW. This organization will monitor the chemical production 
throughout the world and will enforce compliance with the convention.
  On April 29, the Chemical Weapons Convention will go into effect with 
or without the United States' ratification. The Senate must provide its 
advice and consent on the treaty and send a resolution of ratification 
to the President before next Tuesday, so that he may formally ratify 
the treaty.
  Many hours of intense negotiations have yielded the resolution of 
ratification to the Chemical Weapons Convention that we are now 
considering on the Senate floor. This resolution contains 33 conditions 
which cover nearly every objection raised by opponents of ratification. 
I am pleased that negotiators have reached an agreement on 28 of those 
33 conditions. However, the Senate will have a separate vote on each of 
the five remaining conditions tomorrow. I would like to stress that 
approval of any of these conditions would be tantamount to prohibiting 
U.S. participation in the Chemical Weapons Convention and could fatally 
damage the effectiveness of this treaty.

[[Page S3540]]

  I would like to quickly address these five conditions that threaten 
ratification of this treaty. Two of these conditions tie our 
ratification to the actions of other nations. One demands that Russia 
ratify the treaty first, and the other precludes ratification until the 
world's rogue nations like Libya and Iraq ratify the treaty.
  The logic behind these two amendments is that the convention is 
meaningless if it does not include all nations with the capability to 
develop and use chemical weapons. This logic is seriously flawed.
  The CWC would impose trade restrictions on nonmember nations that 
will curb their ability to obtain the materials used in making chemical 
agents. In addition, by establishing an international legal standard 
opposing the manufacture and use of chemical weapons, the United States 
will be able to isolate these pariah states making it more difficult 
for these nations to acquire chemical weapons.
  Also, since when does the United States allow other nations to 
dictate American policy? It is ridiculous to suggest that we should 
compromise our position as a world leader by following the lead of 
fringe countries.
  President Reagan did not wait for other nations when he declared that 
this Nation would unilaterally destroy its chemical weapons stockpile. 
He did not wait for other nations when he initiated negotiations to ban 
chemical weapons from the Earth. We did not follow others in making 
those critical decisions. We led and others fell in behind us. This 
Nation set the example. And now it is time for us once again to lead 
and set the example.
  In fact, perhaps the greatest way to ensure that Russia and other 
countries with offensive chemical weapons programs will not endorse 
this treaty, would be for the United States to reject this treaty. 
Seventy-three other nations, including all of our major allies, and 
two-thirds of all countries with chemical weapon capabilities, have 
already endorsed this treaty. I hope that we will align ourselves with 
those who have ratified the convention and not with those outlaw 
nations.
  Another condition that will be considered as an amendment would bar 
individual inspectors because they come from a country that supported 
terrorism or violated U.S. nonproliferation law. If a particular 
inspector has a past history of spying or assisting terrorists, we must 
prevent him or her from inspecting our facilities. But if we bar 
certain inspectors based solely on their nationality, other countries 
will certainly bar U.S. inspectors. In addition, these will likely be 
the countries that we would most like to monitor.
  Another condition that would surely kill the ratification agreement 
demands a level of verification that simply cannot be guaranteed. Like 
every other arms control agreement, this one is not 100 percent 
verifiable. Certainly, that is not a reason to avoid ratifying this 
treaty. The question ought to be: Are verification measures under this 
treaty better or worse than those we have now?
  The answer to that question must be ``yes.'' This treaty includes 
tougher verification measures than any existing arms control agreement 
to the extent that it allows for frequent inspections of both 
governmental and commercial chemical manufacturing plants throughout 
the world. And while chemical weapons are generally more difficult to 
detect than conventional weapons, the U.S. intelligence community has 
confidence that it will be able to detect a large scale effort to 
develop chemical weapons.
  The remaining condition of the ratification resolution is perhaps the 
most contentious, and it would certainly kill all hopes of ratifying 
the Chemical Weapons Convention if it were to pass as an amendment 
tomorrow.
  In today's Washington Post, my colleague from North Carolina, Senator 
Helms writes: ``* * * the one issue that has raised the greatest 
concern among Senators--the issue on which the ratification vote will 
almost certainly hinge--is the Clinton Administration's refusal to 
modify the treaty's Articles 10 and 11.'' His next sentence is 
particularly important, ``These controversial provisions require the 
transfer of dangerous chemical agents, defensive gear and know-how to 
any nation that joins the CWC.'' With all due respect to my colleague 
from North Carolina, the simple fact of the matter is that this 
statement is not true. Article 10 does not require the United States or 
any other signatory to share advanced chemical weapons defense 
technologies and equipment with other countries or to assist them in 
the development of such capabilities.
  I hope that all of my colleagues, who are considering opposing the 
CWC for this reason, will simply refer to the actual text of the 
convention to understand the true implications of the treaty.
  Paragraph 7 of article 10 states: ``Each State Party undertakes to 
provide assistance through the Organization and to this end to elect to 
take one or more of the following measures.'' One of the choices is, 
``to declare, not later than 180 days after the Convention enters into 
force for it, the kind of assistance it might provide in response to an 
appeal by the Organization.'' In no way does this language require any 
country to share advanced chemical defense technology and equipment. In 
fact, 1 of the 28 conditions agreed to in the resolution of 
ratification will ensure that no assistance other than medical 
antidotes and treatments is provided by the United States under article 
10.
  Opponents of the convention have also raised concerns regarding 
paragraph 3 of article 10. It reads as follows: ``Each State Party 
undertakes to facilitate, and shall have the right to participate in, 
the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material, and scientific 
and technological information concerning means of protection against 
chemical weapons.'' The inclusion of the word ``right'' underscores 
that each signatory state has a right, not an obligation, to exchange 
materials and information.
  In fact, President Clinton confirmed this interpretation when he 
recently stated: ``We have made it clear that, as regards to other 
countries, we will not do anything to give them our technology * * * 
and that our response will be * * * limited to helping them deal with 
the health effects of an attack. We will help people in medical ways 
and with other things having to do with the health consequences.''
  The national security concerns raised by Senator Helms were shared by 
the representatives of the Reagan and Bush administrations who 
negotiated this treaty. That is why treaty negotiators took great 
lengths to ensure that the treaty's language would be carefully crafted 
to protect America's interests. In responding to the criticisms of 
article 10 of the convention, I'll simply use the words of former 
Secretary of State James Baker: ``The suggestion that Presidents Bush 
and Reagan would negotiate a treaty detrimental to the nation's 
national security is outrageous.''
  I hope that my colleagues will not take the criticisms of this 
critically important treaty at face value and will closely examine the 
actual text.
  The final condition which opponents of the treaty seek to raise 
relates to cooperation in the field of chemical activities for 
businesses. Critics argue that the CWC might force industry to share 
manufacturing and trade secrets with other nations. These criticisms 
are completely unfounded. Fred Webber, president and CEO of the 
Chemical Manufacturers Association, criticized these allegations 
stating that, ``the Chemical Weapons Convention does not obligate us to 
turn over trade secrets, and it most certainly does not require the 
U.S. to abolish its system of export controls on dual-use chemistry. 
The CWC raises the export control bar for other nations to the high 
standard already set by the United States. That's why this treaty is in 
the national interest.'' In fact, it is ironic that critics of the 
treaty argue that they support the interests of America's chemical and 
pharmaceutical companies. Yet, if we fail to ratify this treaty, these 
very same companies will be subject to trade restrictions that were 
devised by the United States.
  Members of this body must examine the elements that set this 
agreement apart from others. The Chemical Weapons Convention was signed 
by nearly every nation in the world; it penalizes nations that refuse 
to sign on; it provides for routine and challenge inspections; and it 
creates an international norm that would prohibit the very existence of 
chemical weapons. We must recognize that there has never been an

[[Page S3541]]

arms control treaty that better accounted for the skeptic's concerns 
than this one.
  Today we live in a world of nations that increasingly act together. 
In this time of economic unions, coalition forces, and multinational 
businesses, we can ill-afford to disengage from the international 
community. If we do not ratify this treaty or if we accept conditions 
that prevent our ratification, we will careen off the course that we 
set for ourselves and the other peace-loving nations of the world.
  Worse, we will force the nations who have ratified the treaty to 
decide between ridding the world of chemical weapons on the one hand 
and maintaining good trade relations with the richest nation in the 
world on the other. If we force our allies to make decisions like that, 
they'll be justified in looking elsewhere for leadership.
  I strongly believe that ratification of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention is in the best interests of the United States, and I urge my 
colleagues to support this historic treaty.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, as we close the first day of debate on the 
Chemical Weapons Convention, I wanted to insert into the Record an 
explanation of the 28 conditions to the resolution of ratification that 
we adopted this afternoon, so we can create a legislative history.
  Mr. President, the Chemical Weapons Convention is a fine arms control 
agreement. It can stand on its own.
  But the U.S. Senate has a constitutional duty to consider carefully 
all the implications of treaties submitted for its advice and consent 
to ratification. Such careful consideration often enables us to spot 
aspects of an agreement that merit clarification, or implementation 
matters on which we would be well advised to require particular 
executive branch policies.
  The Chemical Weapons Convention is no exception to this rule. Over 
the years since its signing over 4 years ago, near the end of the Bush 
administration, we have identified several areas in which clarifying 
the convention's intent or establishing requirements regarding 
executive branch implementation would be useful.
  In addition, there were several areas in which some of my colleagues 
wanted assurances that went beyond those that the executive branch or I 
could give them, even though we thought that such reassurances ought to 
suffice. In many such cases, the easiest way of providing the needed 
assurances was to codify them in a condition to the resolution of 
ratification.
  The convention enters into force on April 29, with or without the 
United States. To be an original state party, therefore, the President 
must deposit the instrument of ratification by midnight on April 28. As 
a technical matter, the Senate's vote is not the final word, because 
the Senate does not ``ratify'' a treaty; it provides advice and consent 
to it. Once that occurs, the President then must formally ratify--an 
indication to our treaty partners that the United States is consenting 
to be legally bound to its terms--by signing an ``instrument of 
ratification.'' The President then directs the Secretary of State to 
deposit that instrument at a central location designated by the 
convention; then, once the convention enters into force, the United 
States is bound under international law to abide by its terms.
  The Senate's role in providing consent to a treaty is not that of a 
rubber stamp. The Senate may attach amendments or reservations to the 
treaty--essentially changing the terms of the original bargain between 
the United States and its treaty partners, or it may adopt conditions, 
which are, in effect, a binding contract between the Senate and the 
President which will govern how the treaty will be implemented or 
interpreted under U.S. law and practice.
  In the case of the Chemical Weapons Convention, no amendments to the 
convention's text have been, or will be, offered; the Senate has 
already moved beyond the stage in its consideration of treaties in 
which such amendments would be in order. Neither have any reservations 
been put forth--although article XXII of the convention purports to 
prevent a party from doing so. The Senate has gone on record several 
times, and does so again in condition 17, that the President's 
agreement to such a prohibition cannot constrain the Senate's 
constitutional right and obligation to give its advice and consent to a 
treaty subject to any reservation it might determine is required by the 
national interest.
  Instead, we have a set of 28 conditions which were agreed to by those 
involved in the negotiations to date, and which the Senate approved by 
voice vote earlier this afternoon. These conditions, as stated before, 
are binding upon the President.
  Several conditions will be debated tomorrow which are tantamount to 
killing the treaty. For example, any condition which requires a 
renegotiation of the treaty--as condition 32 does--is a killer, plain 
and simple, because there is no way that this treaty can be 
renegotiated. Additionally, any condition which requires the President 
to make impossible certifications before depositing the instrument of 
ratification will prevent the United States from formally entering the 
convention.
  As I described earlier, there have been several stages of negotiation 
to work out agreed conditions to the resolution and to narrow our areas 
of disagreement. The Senator from North Carolina and I engaged in many 
hours of negotiation as part of this process.
  The end result of our negotiations, of the negotiations between the 
White House and the task force established by the majority leader, and 
of discussions directly between the White House and the majority leader 
is a set of 28 agreed conditions to the resolution of ratification. I 
would like to summarize and comment upon those agreed conditions, so 
that my colleagues may understand what we have achieved.
  For I think that we have achieved quite a lot. I also think that 
Members should study the many agreed conditions that the Senator from 
North Carolina was able to propound. Frankly, virtually all of the 
concerns that have been raised regarding the CWC have been addressed in 
these agreed conditions, in a manner that should substantially ease 
those concerns.
  So I would like to summarize, Mr. President, what the Senator from 
North Carolina and I, along with other Members and the executive 
branch, have been able to achieve.


                   providing protection for industry

  The CWC contains a number of built-in protections for U.S. 
businesses, largely because industry helped write many of the 
convention's provisions. A number of conditions have been added, 
however, to provide even greater protection for business.
  Condition 16 provides that if an employee of the organization for the 
prohibition of chemical weapons, or OPCW, willfully discloses U.S. 
confidential business information that causes financial harm to a U.S. 
business, the President must inform Congress. If the director-general 
does not waive the employee's diplomatic immunity from prosecution, 
which may be done pursuant to paragraph 20 of the CWC's confidentiality 
annex, within 9 months of the President's reporting the matter to 
Congress, the President is required to withhold half of the U.S. 
contribution to the OPCW until that employee's immunity from 
prosecution is waived. This will serve as a strong deterrent to 
breaches of confidential information. You might call it a ``don't mess 
with our trade secrets'' condition.
  Condition 18 is a further protection for proprietary information. 
This condition prohibits any samples collected during inspections in 
the United States from being analyzed in a foreign laboratory. This 
will greatly reduce the risk of industrial espionage. I frankly have 
concerns about this condition. I hope it does not lead to every country 
keeping all its samples in-country, so that all of Iran's samples are 
analyzed in Iran and all of Russia's samples are analyzed in Russia. 
But there is no question that this is a major concession to some of my 
colleagues' concerns regarding the need to protect confidential 
business information.
  Condition 9 requires the President to certify, both now and annually, 
that the CWC's limits on the production and use of the most toxic 
chemical weapons and their precursors are not significantly harming the 
legitimate commercial activities and interests of chemical, 
biotechnology, and pharmaceutical firms. The administration is fully 
prepared to make that certification.
  The Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations have all taken 
extraordinary measures to limit the impact of

[[Page S3542]]

the CWC upon U.S. businesses. For example, the Bush administration made 
sure that challenge inspections would be subject to ``managed access,'' 
in which a firm will be able to limit the access of inspectors to the 
minimum necessary to disprove any allegations of CWC violations by that 
firm. And the Clinton administration worked with other countries in the 
CWC Preparatory Commission to make sure that most of the businesses 
covered by the convention will only have to fill out a short form to 
comply with the requirement for data declarations.
  Condition 21 puts the Senate on record supporting the provision of 
assistance to U.S. businesses by the On-Site Inspection Agency--or 
OSIA--an arm of the Department of Defense. OSIA has years of experience 
in helping protect sensitive information during inspections of 
Government-run facilities and defense contractors. This Agency lacks 
authority to aid other U.S. businesses, however. Following through on 
this provision with authorizing legislation--which I would hope we 
could do in the CWC implementing legislation--would ensure that 
American businesses have the full benefit of OSIA's expertise available 
to them.

  Under condition 23, the Senate will be informed promptly of the 
proposed addition of a chemical to any of the CWC's schedules of 
chemicals. A report from the President will indicate the anticipated 
effect of such proposal on U.S. industry. If a proposed addition should 
appear to promise too great a burden on U.S. industry for too little 
gain in protection against chemical weapons, Congress will then have 
time to convince the executive branch to force that proposed addition 
into a CWC process that requires two-thirds vote of the states parties 
to adopt the change.


                        holding down u.s. costs

  Allegations have been made that the CWC will create a massive U.S.-
style bureaucracy that will cost U.S. taxpayers hundreds of millions of 
dollars. Several conditions have been agreed upon to keep U.S. costs to 
a minimum and ensure a well-managed organization.
  Under condition 22, regular U.S. contributions to the Organization 
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, or OPCW, have been capped at 
$25 million annually. Any increase to this cap must cross two high 
hurdles. First, the President must make a ``national security 
interest'' waiver. Second, the Congress must enact a joint resolution 
approving the President's waiver.
  Fortunately, condition 22 allows a periodic inflation adjustment to 
the regular U.S. contribution. In addition, the United States will be 
permitted to contribute funds to help the OPCW handle the costs of 
monitoring U.S. destruction of chemical weapons. Those are costs that 
we originally intended to fund for implementation of the 1990 bilateral 
destruction agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, 
and they have not been included in the regular OPCW budget.
  Condition 2 provides that any U.S. contributions to the OPCW will be 
subject to congressional authorization and appropriation. This means 
that not one dollar can be transferred to the organization by the U.S. 
Government without congressional approval.
  Pursuant to condition 3, the OPCW must create an independent 
inspector general within its first 9 months of operation. Otherwise, 
half of the regular U.S. contribution to the OPCW budget will be 
withheld. An inspector general will ensure rigorous oversight of OPCW 
activities and expenditures.
  While it is in the U.S. interest for the CWC to have a strong 
verification regime, we should not have to foot the bill for all of the 
research and development that goes to improving verification. That is 
why condition 4 was included, to require that any research and 
development by the United States that is designed primarily to improve 
the verification provisions of the CWC--including the training of OPCW 
inspectors--must be pursuant to an agreed cost-sharing arrangement that 
spreads the costs of such R&D equitably between the United States and 
the organization.
  A cost-sharing arrangement will also be required in order to share 
items or services that were developed through U.S. research and 
development. It will still be possible, however, for U.S. agencies to 
pursue R&D programs so as to improve U.S. monitoring of chemical 
weapons, and cost-sharing arrangements need not be in place unless and 
until the United States wants to share the results with the OPCW.
  We would also not want to be stuck with the bill for Russian 
destruction of their vast chemical weapons stockpile. So there is 
agreement on condition 14, under which the United States shall not 
accept any Russian effort to condition its ratification of CWC upon 
United States guarantees to pay for Russian implementation of chemical 
weapons destruction under the CWC or the 1990 bilateral destruction 
agreement.


       ensuring improved monitoring, verification and enforcement

  Some opponents of CWC have alleged that the convention will lead to a 
``dumbing down'' of U.S. intelligence and that the United States will 
shy away from taking tough actions when faced with instances of 
noncompliance. Three conditions address these concerns head-on.
  We all know that monitoring and verification of some aspects of CWC 
compliance will be difficult. This fact of life has prompted 
understandable concern on the part of some Members, and the 
administration has accepted a condition-- No. 10--that requires both 
periodic reports and prompt notice regarding world chemical weapons 
programs and the status of CWC compliance. The executive branch would 
also offer briefings on current compliance issues, including issues to 
be raised in OPCW meetings and the results of those meetings.
  The careful reader of condition 10 may note some hyperbole in it. 
Thus, the first subparagraph states that ``the convention is in the 
interests of the United States only if all parties * * * are in strict 
compliance * * *, such compliance being measured by performance and not 
by efforts * * *''
  In truth, of course, there may be major violations or minor 
shortfalls. If a party is delayed in its sincere efforts to clean up 
the vestiges of a long-inactive chemical weapons program, that will 
hardly constitute a threat to U.S. national interests. But the drafters 
of this condition are on to something; even minor violations by a few 
parties could erode the commitment of other parties to strict 
compliance with the convention.
  The important thing is that the administration is not afraid to keep 
Congress in the loop on CWC compliance issues. Condition 10 requires 
briefings at least four times a year for the Congress on U.S. actions 
taken to address compliance issues. This regular flow of information 
will allow the Congress to keep abreast of chemical weapons programs 
and to judge for itself whether the United States is doing enough to 
detect and respond to noncompliance.
  It may be in our interest at times to share intelligence with the 
OPCW, especially so as to maximize the effectiveness of the CWC's on-
site inspection regime. All agree that we should take steps to protect 
U.S. sources and methods when sharing intelligence information.
  Thanks to the work of the senior Senator from Alabama, which I am 
happy to commend, condition 5 has been added to do just that. It 
requires the intelligence community, at the interagency level, to fully 
sanitize and to approve all intelligence information before it is 
released to the OPCW.
  The Director of Central Intelligence can waive this requirement for 
particular documents on a case-by-case basis, but that must be promptly 
reported to the Foreign Relations and Intelligence Committees of the 
Congress. The Director must also report on the procedures set up to 
protect classified information and on any unauthorized disclosures of 
information provided to the OPCW.

  The Senator from Alabama's condition makes a real contribution to the 
verification of compliance with the CWC. The ability of the United 
States to share information with the OPCW is vital to catching would-be 
violators of the convention. I hope that this condition will not only 
ease the Senator's concerns over the protection of intelligence sources 
and methods, but also reassure him that the overall convention is in 
the national interest.
  All of us want the executive branch to act effectively in the event 
that a State party should violate the CWC in any manner that threatened 
U.S. national security interests. Condition 13

[[Page S3543]]

will require the executive branch to report to and consult with the 
Senate regarding such violations and to make effective use of CWC 
provisions for challenge inspections, high-level diplomacy and U.N. 
sanctions. The executive branch also agrees that any sanctions required 
by U.S. law should be implemented in such a case.
  Pursuant to subparagraph (A)(vi), if the noncompliance should persist 
for a year, the executive branch will be bound to consult with the 
Senate for the purposes of obtaining a resolution of support of 
continued adherence to the convention. This seems unduly rigid; a 
country may well need more than a year to come into compliance if it 
must destroy chemical weapons stocks or facilities. Frankly, I do not 
know what is to be gained by requiring the executive branch to consult 
each time on a possible resolution of support for continued adherence 
to the CWC. But condition 13 does not require that such a nonbinding 
resolution be introduced or voted upon in every case, so there is 
little potential for harm in this.
  Some other aspects of condition 13 merit additional explanation. For 
example, several of the mandated executive branch responses to CWC 
violations must be undertaken on an urgent basis. This does not mean 
that they must all proceed concurrently. Thus, in some cases high-level 
diplomacy will suffice and there will be no need to seek a challenge 
inspection or U.N. sanctions.
  In some cases, it might be necessary to prepare the groundwork 
carefully for a challenge inspection or a diplomatic approach. The 
Senator from North Carolina and I are agreed that the executive branch 
could proceed with such preparations on an urgent basis, even though 
they may take many months to come to fruition.
  Finally, the requirement in subparagraph (A)(ii) that the executive 
branch seek a challenge inspection should not be read as requiring that 
the United States must always be the party that initiates such a 
request. There might well be other States parties with an equal or 
greater interest in a given country's apparent violation of the CWC, 
and it might be more fruitful in some cases for the executive branch to 
work with those other States parties to secure the common objective of 
a challenge inspection.


                  maintaining robust chemical defenses

  Some have asserted that if the United States joins the CWC, we will 
be lulled into a false sense of security and drop our guard against the 
continuing threat of chemical weapons. This concern is frankly a bit 
mystifying. Aside from the risk that any arms control treaty might be 
violated by a State party to it, U.S. military leaders are quite aware 
that such potential military adversaries as Iraq, Libya, and North 
Korea are not planning to sign the convention. The Joint Chiefs of 
Staff support CWC not because it will automatically remove the need to 
defend against chemical weapons, but rather because CWC is a vital step 
toward reducing and combating that threat.
  While the opponents' argument ignores the fact that the Pentagon has 
requested $225 million in additional funds for chemical weapons 
defenses over the next 5 years, a condition has nonetheless been added 
to address their concerns. Pursuant to condition 11, the Secretary of 
Defense shall ensure that U.S. forces are capable of carrying out 
required military missions in U.S. regional contingency plans, 
regardless of any threat or use of chemical weapons. In particular, 
U.S. forces must be properly trained, equipped, and organized to 
operate in chemically and biologically contaminated environments. This 
means not only improving the defensive capabilities of U.S. forces, but 
also initiating discussions on chemical weapons defense with likely 
coalition partners and countries whose civilian personnel would support 
U.S. forces in a conflict.

  The administration has also agreed to assure that the U.S. Army 
Chemical School remains under the supervision of an Army general. 
Finally, the President is required to submit exhaustive annual reports 
to Congress on the State of Chemical and Biological defense efforts.