[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 49 (Wednesday, April 23, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3520-S3525]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
Privilege of the Floor
Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Jeff Severs
be given the privilege of the floor for this day.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I yield 15 minutes to the Senator from
Alaska.
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I have been involved with the chemical
weapons debate and negotiations for a convention like this since its
beginning. During the Reagan administration, at the suggestion of
Ambassador John Tower, former Senator John Tower, I spent a month in
Geneva during an August recess auditing the beginnings of the
negotiations that led up to this Chemical Weapons Convention. John
Tower even loaned me his home in Geneva to live in during that period.
He and I agreed that negotiating a satisfactory chemical weapons treaty
was an objective that had to be achieved, because we shared the feeling
that the world was becoming a very dangerous place to live in because
of chemical and biological warfare developments. We felt the United
States needed to show leadership in reducing some of the dangers
whenever possible.
This convention before the Senate could be improved. The START
treaties could have been improved. However, under those treaties, the
United States and Russia will significantly reduce their numbers of
nuclear warheads and reduce the risk of nuclear war. The Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe Treaty could have been improved. Yet, today we
no longer have Russian and NATO forces bristling with tanks, cannons,
and fighter aircraft facing each other across the border in numbers
that reminded many of Armageddon.
The Chemical Weapons Convention does move the world toward a goal of
bringing order and accountability to the production and transportation
of weapons of mass destruction. This is a convention that has required
the negotiating concurrence of 74 countries. I will never forget
sitting around those rooms in Geneva while we waited for the
representatives of the various countries to state their positions.
To require this convention to be perfect asks the impossible. To
expect it to be an effective tool in controlling chemical weapons is
reasonable. This convention does provide an inspection regime that will
allow our inspectors to monitor potential chemical weapons production
and transportation more effectively than without the convention. And
protections are built into the convention so that U.S. companies
producing chemicals are not going to have their manufacturing processes
compromised, and, obviously, we do not amend the Constitution of the
United States by approving this convention.
For me, this convention enhances the security of our forces deployed
abroad, as well as throughout our whole Nation. The Joint Chiefs of
Staff support the Chemical Weapons Convention. Generals Colin Powell
and Norman Schwarzkopf support the convention. Former Secretary of
State Jim Baker and former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft
support this convention. Former CIA Directors, Jim Woolsey, Stansfield
Turner, and John Deutch, support this convention. I could go on and on
with the list, Mr. President.
But, to me, it is not the former or present officials that should
have an impact on this Senate. It is the men and women in uniform. They
are in harm's way. They know now that many of their predecessors who
served us in the Persian Gulf war, men and women there in uniform, were
exposed to some type of a chemical weapon in Iraq. It is for them that
I speak, because I think, universally, they are now worried about what
this Congress is going to do, or not do, in trying to find some process
of protecting them against chemical and biological warfare.
In its essence, I believe that the United States has a responsibility
for world leadership. This leadership is more graphically demonstrated
in this legislative body than anywhere I know, because passage of the
resolution of ratification will show our leadership in the effort to
contain chemical weapons, just as Senate support for START I showed the
United States' commitment to nuclear weapons reduction.
I encourage the Senate to vote in favor of this resolution of
ratification and support the Chemical Weapons Convention as it was
presented to us.
I ask unanimous consent that two articles from today's papers be
printed in the record. One article is by Samuel Berger, in the
Washington Times, entitled ``The CWC Imperative''; the other is by Gen.
Thomas McInerney and Stanley Weiss, in the Hill newspaper.
There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the Washington Times, April 23, 1997]
The CWC Imperative
(By Samuel R. Berger)
Tomorrow, the Senate will vote on the Chemical Weapons
Convention. After years of international negotiation and
domestic debate, the Senate faces a clear choice; we can
continue to lead the widening international commitment to
begin banishing poison gas from the earth and head the effort
to make it work. Or we can walk away from a treaty we helped
write, deny our soldiers and citizens its benefits, expose
our companies to its penalties, and put America on the same
side as pariah nations like Libya and Iraq.
This treaty will take effect next week--with or without us.
That's why the real test of the Chemical Weapons Convention
is not whether it's perfect, but whether we will be better
off inside or outside it. By that basic measure, this treaty
is overwhelmingly in our national interest.
First, this treaty will help protect our soldiers by
requiring other countries to do what we decided to do years
ago--get rid of chemical weapons. The treaty will also make
it harder for rogue states and terrorists to get or make
chemical weapons. By eliminating existing stockpiles, it will
remove the single largest source of weapons that they could
steal or buy on the black market. By imposing new controls on
the transfer of dangerous chemicals, it will help put the raw
ingredients for such weapons further out of reach.
Finally, by giving us new tools for verification like
short-notice, on-site inspections, creating a global
intelligence network, and strengthening the authority of our
own law enforcement, this treaty will make it easier for us
to prevent and punish those who seek to break its rules.
Two and half months ago, President Clinton and Senate
Majority Leader Trent Lott established a process to work
through the concerns of some senators about the treaty. As a
result of this effort, and negotiations led by Sen. Jessie
Helms and Sen. Joe Biden, we have reached agreement on 28
conditions that will be included in the treaty's resolution
of ratification. Among them are binding commitments to
maintain strong defenses against chemical attack; allow the
use of riot control agents like tear gas in a wide
[[Page S3521]]
range of military and law enforcement situations; and require
search warrants for any involuntary inspections of an
American business. These conditions resolve almost all the
issues that have been raised about this treaty.
Almost, but not all. Opponents insist on a handful of
additional conditions, each of which would make it impossible
for us to participate in this treaty. One would have us wait
to join until Russia does--giving cover to hard-liners in
Russia who want to hold on to their weapons. Another would
have us wait until rogue states like Iraq become members--
delaying our chance to use the treaty's tools against these
international outlaws and giving them a veto over our
national security. Another would impose an unrealistically
high standard of verification--and risk our ability to
protect our troops by using the treaty's already tough
provisions to detect cheating that is militarily significant.
Two other killer conditions would require us to re-open
negotiations on the treaty. First, some critics mistakenly
believe that the treaty requires the United States to provide
advanced chemical weapons defenses to rogue states. In fact,
only countries that have joined the CWC, renounced chemical
weapons and destroyed their stockpiles can request
assistance--and then, only if they are threatened with
chemical weapons by a non-party. President Clinton has
committed to the Senate that if a country of concern such as
Cuba or Iran should meet the strict conditions for aid, the
United States will restrict our assistance to emergency
medical supplies--and to use our influence as member of the
CWC to prevent other states from transferring equipment that
could harm our national security.
Second, some opponents misread treaty language to conclude
that the CWC would somehow facilitate their spread. President
Clinton has made it clear we reject this far-fetched
interpretation. He has committed to maintain strict U.S. and
multilateral export controls on certain dangerous chemicals
and obtained the same assurance from our allies.
If the Senate approves any of these ``killer conditions,''
it will mean foregoing this treaty's clear costs. We will be
denied use of the treaty's tools against rogue states and
terrorists. We will lose the ability to enforce the rules we
helped make. We will subject our chemical companies to trade
restrictions that could cost them hundreds of millions of
dollars in sales. And we will send a clear signal of retreat
that will undermine our leadership to stop the spread of
weapons of mass destruction.
That must not be allowed to happen. While the Convention is
not a panacea, it represents a real opportunity to strengthen
the global fight against the threat that no one nation can
meet on its own. That is why president and legislators from
both parties and our military leaders have made U.S. approval
of the Convention their common cause. Negotiated under
President Reagan and signed under President Bush, the treaty
has broad, bipartisan support that includes every chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the past 20 years and the
overwhelming majority of our veterans, chemical manufacturers
and arms control experts. As Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright has said, this treaty was ``made in America.'' It is
right for America, and now, at last, it must be ratified in
America.
____
[From the Hill, April 23, 1997]
Chemical Weapons Pact: Let's Make a Deal
(By Thomas G. McInerney and Stanley A. Weiss)
On one side is President Clinton. He wants the Senate to
ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). This model
agreement, which bands the production and use of chemical
weapons, is supported by an overwhelming majority of
Americans, including a ``Who's Who'' of former officials and
military leaders, and has been signed by most of the
civilized world.
On the other side is Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.). The Foreign
Relations Committee chairman wants to reorganize the State
Department, and threatened to keep the CWC bottled up in his
committee until this was agreed upon.
Mr. President, Sen. Helms. It's time to make a deal!
Both of them and, more importantly, the American people
would come out winners if the Senate votes to ratify the CWC,
and the State Department streamlines its operations. Here are
three ways to improve the business of diplomacy:
First, cut back on assistant secretaries. The State
Department currently houses 19 assistant secretaries focusing
on certain regions (East Asia) or functional areas (human
rights). Compare this to the Department of Defense where nine
assistant secretaries help oversee a budget 10 times larger
than the State Department's program budget. The system has
evolved into an unwieldy bureaucratic morass. The practical
effect of 19 assistant secretaries is overlap and poor
coordination.
Second, improve coordination and eliminate layers in
foreign aid programs. Here again, a hodgepodge of well-
intentioned programs operates with little oversight and
coordination. The details should be left to careful
negotiation between the State Department and Congress. But,
the goal should be to reduce bureaucracies, establish clear
priorities, and put these aid programs more closely in the
service of our overall foreign policy goals.
Finally, start running the State Department in a more
business-like manner. State Department officials rightly tout
their important role in supporting American businesses
overseas. But as part of this effort, they ought to get their
own house in order.
The required management reforms are no secret. The General
Accounting Office (GAO), The National Performance Review, and
other studies have all reached similar conclusions. Closing
unnecessary overseas posts, outsourcing administrative
support functions, and rethinking overseas staff structure
can save money and improve performance.
Maintaining the status quo is impossible. The GAO estimates
that simply maintaining current functions and personnel will
require a 22 percent increase in State Department budgets by
the year 2000--an unlikely prospect in today's budget
environment.
Despite the clear need for action, the State Department
management continues to postpone the inevitable. A well-
conceived strategy for reconstructing the department does not
exist, and Helms is right to demand action.
In return, the Senate should ratify the Chemical Weapons
Convention. Americans will be safer with the treaty than
without it. The CWC combines an arms-control agreement that
bans an entire class of weapons of mass destruction and a
non-proliferation regime that forbids trade to any nation in
non-compliance.
It will help prevent terrorists and pariah states from
getting their hands on materials to make chemical weapons,
while ensuring that American manufacturers can continue to
successfully compete in the global trade of legitimate
chemical products.
Ameria is unilaterally destroying its chemical stockpile.
The question now is whether it will become party to a
convention which will go into effect on April 29, with or
without U.S. approval. As retired Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf
stated in Senate testimony, ``We don't need chemical weapons
to fight our future wars. And frankly . . . by not ratifying
that treaty, we align ourselves with nations like Libya and
North Korea, and I'd just as soon not be associated with
those thugs.''
If the price of getting two-thirds of the Senate to ratify
the CWC is improving the way the State Department works, that
sounds like a deal we can all live with.
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, it is not an easy position for me to be
opposed to friends with whom I normally stand shoulder to shoulder. But
I believe we must be motivated by what we believe is in the best
interest of the country as a whole. I believe if we took a poll of men
and women in uniform today, they would say that the No. 1 threat they
fear is chemical and biological warfare. I say that we must lead the
world in addressing the consequences of production and use of these
weapons of mass destruction, just as we led the world in dealing with
the consequences of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Voting for
the Chemical Weapons Convention resolution of ratification will make
the world a safer place.
Thank you, Mr. President.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from
Massachusetts.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts is recognized.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, it is interesting. I have been here on the
floor listening to this debate for a period of time, and it is almost
as if the arguments kind of pass each other in a strange way. I have,
also, on the Foreign Relations Committee, been at the hearings. We keep
hearing the same mantra repeated with respect to a number of
objections, notwithstanding the fact that either the language of the
treaty is going to be changed by virtue of agreements made between
Senator Helms and Senator Biden and the administration, or the treaty
itself addresses those specific arguments. One of the most interesting
repetitive arguments is that this is somehow going to be dangerous for
the chemical companies. We keep hearing people say that this is going
to be terrible for American industry. But American industry has signed
off on it. The Senator from Delaware represents many chemical
companies. Fifty-six percent of the economy in the State of Delaware is
represented by chemical companies. He hasn't heard from them in
opposition. Nevertheless, we hear people repeat that.
Now, obviously, this convention, despite its attributes, is not a
panacea for the threat of chemical weapons. None of us who are
proposing this convention, I think, are suggesting that this is the
panacea. But what it does do, Mr. President, is it contributes, on
balance, more to the effort to have deterrence, to expose cheaters and
to detect chemical weapons production and
[[Page S3522]]
proliferation of any kind of significant military nature than not
having it.
Mr. President, although crude chemical weapons have been around for
centuries, poison gas unfortunately came of age as a tool of warfare in
World War I. First chlorine, then phosgene, mustard gas, and lewisite
were introduced onto the battlefields of Europe, burning, blistering,
and choking unprotected soldiers and civilians alike. Both because with
chemical weapons so closely associated with World War I there is a
perception they are an anachronistic threat and are therefore of less
concern, and because we became accustomed during 40 years of the cold
war to living with the threat of a global nuclear Armageddon, some fail
to recognize the magnitude of the threat now posed by chemical weapons.
This is a terribly serious mistake.
Modern chemical weapons--nerve agents like sarin, soman, tabun, and
VX--are so lethal that a dose as small as 15 milligrams can kill a
person. Equally as troubling, chemical weapons are the most financially
and technically attractive option for a country--or a terrorist--that
sets its sights on developing and producing a weapon of mass
destruction. The ingredients for chemical weapons are chemicals that
are inexpensive and readily available in the marketplace, and the
formulae to make nerve and blister agents are well known. It is no
coincidence that chemical weapons are known as the poor man's atom
bomb. The U.S. intelligence community estimates that more than 20
nations possess chemical weapons or the capability to make them
readily. Still other countries are working to acquire a chemical
arsenal. Chemical weapons have proliferated far more widely than the
two other types of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear and biological
weapons. We ignore this threat at our peril. It is this threat that the
Chemical Weapons Convention confronts. And the Senate today and
tomorrow has an historical opportunity to address and reduce that
threat--to our civilian citizens, to our armed forces, and to the
entire world--as we perform our constitutional responsibility of advice
and consent with respect to the convention.
Our Nation's highest military and intelligence officials repeatedly
have stated that while the Chemical Weapons Convention is no panacea
for these threats, America will be safer and we will have greater
ability to reduce chemical weapons proliferation, and to identify and
remove chemical weapons threats, if the United States and a majority of
the world's nations ratify this treaty. The number of signatories is up
to 161. Seventy-four nations, including the majority of our allies in
NATO and the European Union, have already ratified the convention.
The public outcry over the use of chemical weapons in World War I
compelled diplomats to begin work to ban these weapons. These post-war
efforts fell short of a complete prohibition. They resulted, however,
in the 1925 Geneva Protocol that outlaws the use of chemical weapons.
Negotiations on a more far-reaching prohibition resumed in 1968,
focusing on a treaty that would prohibit the development, production,
and stockpiling of chemical weapons as well. In 1969, the United States
renounced the first use of chemical weapons and initiated a moratorium
on their production that lasted 18 years. Five years later, the Senate
gave its advice and consent to ratification of both the Geneva Protocol
and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. International
negotiation toward a Chemical Weapons Convention, however, made little
progress until the United States again took the initiative.
In the 1980's, Saddam Hussein's use of chemical weapons against Iran
and against his own Kurdish people horrified the international
community. Iraq clearly violated its obligations under the Geneva
Protocol, but the international community did nothing to punish Saddam
for his outlaw behavior. This failure to enforce the Geneva Protocol
was a failure of international political will, not of the treaty
itself. America's leaders at that time, including many of us in this
Chamber, must bear part of the responsibility for not having insisted
that Saddam pay a price for his outrageous behavior. Just like a
domestic law, an international agreement, no matter how good, is of
little use unless it is enforced.
Iraq's flagrant violation of the Geneva Protocol did, however, serve
as a catalyst for the negotiators' attempt to complete the Chemical
Weapons Convention. Working from a draft treaty text first introduced
by then-Vice President George Bush in 1984, the 39 nations hammering
out the treaty in the Conference on Disarmament reached agreements on
intrusive and far-reaching verification provisions that were included
in the Bush draft text. For example, Vice President Bush proposed on
behalf of President Reagan ``anytime, anywhere'' on-site challenge
inspections to deter and catch treaty violators. At the time the
concept of challenge inspections was first advanced, no nuclear arms
treaty yet included even routine on-site inspections of declared
nuclear facilities.
Vice President Bush asked for these tough verification measures for
good reason. It is much more difficult to monitor a chemical weapons
treaty than a nuclear accord. The capabilities of our national
technical means--including intelligence satellites--enable us to track
the production and deployment of nuclear weapons in other countries
with a considerable degree of confidence. Chemical weapons production,
however, cannot be monitored from afar with anywhere near the same
level of confidence. Aside from using large government facilities to
churn out chemical weapons, a government could coopt a commercial
chemical firm into making chemical weapons, or manufacture chemical
weapons in a factory purported to be involved in the commercial
production of legitimate products. The legitimate chemical industry
around the world makes products that are important to modern life. Some
of the same chemicals and technologies that this industry employs to
manufacture fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, pesticides, herbicides, and
countless other products could also be used to make chemical weapons.
There are literally thousands of industrial facilities worldwide, and
we know all too well from the inspections in Iraq in the aftermath of
the 1991 gulf war that a determined rogue proliferator can and will use
the industrial sector to mask efforts to develop and produce weapons of
mass destruction. For these very reasons, the Reagan administration not
only pushed for routine data declarations and inspections of government
and industry facilities; it also insisted on these unprecedented
challenge inspections.
After George Bush was elected President, the Bush administration took
a variety of steps to give impetus to the international negotiations.
Perhaps most importantly, in May of 1991, President Bush, without
waiting for or depending on completion and ratification of the Chemical
Weapons Convention, unilaterally forswore any use of chemical weapons
by the United States, even as in-kind retaliation on the battlefield. A
year and a half later, as one of the last acts of his Administration,
Bush sent Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger to Paris in January,
1993 to join more than 130 states in signing the Chemical Weapons
Convention. Pushing these negotiations through to a successful
conclusion stands as one of the most important foreign policy
achievements of the Bush administration. We owe the dedicated
negotiators from the Reagan and Bush administrations, most notably
Ambassador Stephen Ledogar and Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Director Ronald Lehman, a debt of gratitude for their far-sighted
proposals and their persistence at the negotiating table. We owe
Presidents Reagan and Bush a debt as well--for their leadership and
consistent support of this historic arms control initiative.
The convention that President Bill Clinton presented to the Senate on
November 23, 1993, which is before us today, is a feasible and
pragmatic treaty. Given the inherent difficulty of curtailing the
proliferation of chemical weapons, America's negotiators did not insist
on obtaining a flawless pact--an effort that would have been certain to
fail. Instead, the U.S. delegation worked closely with our allies in
Europe, Japan, Australia, and Canada to create a realistic treaty with
verification provisions that offer a significant likelihood of
identifying militarily-significant violations and that will force
cheaters to incur higher costs and endure greater inconvenience in
order to accumulate a covert chemical weapons
[[Page S3523]]
stockpile. It is important to note that the convention's negotiators
and advocates have never claimed that it provides an ironclad assurance
that the world will become and remain free from all chemical weapons.
That is an impossible standard to meet, so it should come as no
surprise the convention does not meet it. Instead, the convention makes
identification of cheaters more likely; it requires all non-cheaters to
dispose of all chemical weapons--which, of course, the United States
already was unilaterally committed to doing by law; and it will make it
more difficult and expensive for cheaters to cheat.
A very important ally in the negotiations leading to the Chemical
Weapons Convention was the U.S. chemical industry. It is
counterintuitive to think that the chemical industry would participate
in a negotiation that would ultimately bring additional regulation,
notably data declarations and inspections, upon itself. To its credit,
that is exactly what the U.S. chemical industry, and many of its
counterparts in other nations, did. For well over a decade, the U.S.
chemical industry provided invaluable assistance to the U.S. delegation
and all of the negotiators in Geneva, opening their facilities to test
verification concepts and proposing workable solutions for how the data
declarations and inspections should operate. With the help of the U.S.
chemical industry, the CWC emerged with sufficient provisions and
restrictions to make trade in chemical weapons materials more visible
and more difficult. The convention's inspectors will watch closely over
the global industry, guarding against the diversion of commercial
chemicals for purposes of weapons proliferation. At the same time, the
treaty contains numerous safeguards that enable the industry to protect
its confidential business information to its satisfaction, despite
claims to the contrary that are made by some treaty opponents.
I want to be clear that despite all of its attributes, the treaty is
not a panacea for the threat of chemical weapons. It can't be. But the
convention's primary merit is that it will contribute to deterrence,
exposure, and detection of chemical weapons proliferation of a
militarily significant nature. By requiring the destruction of existing
arsenals and making it much more difficult for future adversaries to
acquire or increase chemical weapons stocks, the CWC greatly reduces
the prospect that U.S. troops will encounter chemical weapons on the
battlefield. Following in our footsteps as we move to unilaterally
destroy our chemical weapons stockpile, the CWC will begin to level the
international playing field by requiring other countries to eliminate
their chemical weapons as well.
That is the balance. That is the judgment we are called on to make in
the Senate.
Is this, as the Senator from Alaska was just saying, in the interest
of our country to protect our troops and the long-term interests of our
Nation? I believe this convention makes identification of cheaters more
likely. It requires all noncheaters to dispose of all chemical weapons,
something we can't do today. And, of course, we have already
unilaterally decided that we are going to get rid of all of our
chemical weapons.
So here we are going down the road of getting rid of all of our
chemical weapons, and here you have finally some form of legal
structure that will hold other nations accountable.
Clearly the United States must never be complacent about the threat
of adversary nations or terrorists armed with chemical weapons.
I respectfully suggest that nothing in this convention and none of
those of us who advocate this convention begs complacency.
The convention's critics claim that the treaty will lull us into a
false sense of security, resulting in a weakening of our defenses. To
the contrary, the convention stipulates that each of its member nations
is allowed to maintain defensive programs to develop and test
antidotes, gas masks, and other protective gear and to train its troops
in how to use them.
So it is really a question of us. I mean that there is nothing in the
treaty that lulls us to sleep. The treaty specifically allows us to
have defenses. And if we are, indeed, concerned about it, as we ought
to be, we will have those defenses, precisely as this administration is
offering us with an additional $225 million of expenditure this year.
So how can you continually come to the floor and say, ``Oh, my God,
this is going to lull us to sleep'' when the administration is
providing an additional $225 million?
It is our responsibility as elected officials to ensure that we
maintain a robust U.S. chemical weapons defense program. To do less
would be an injustice to our troops, a threat to our security, and a
failure on our part to exercise fully our rights under this treaty. One
of the 28 conditions to the treaty negotiated by Senators Helms and
Biden, and agreed to by the administration, condition 11, explicitly
states this determination, and requires the Secretary of Defense to
ensure that U.S. forces are capable of carrying out required military
missions regardless of any foreign threat or use of chemical weapons.
The Pentagon's view of the convention is unambiguous. In his
testimony, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. John
Shalikashvili stated:
From a military perspective, the Chemical Weapons
Convention is clearly in our national interest. The
convention's advantages outweigh its shortcomings. The United
States and all other CW-capable state parties incur the same
obligation to destroy their chemical weapons stockpiles . . .
if we do not join and walk away from the CWC an awful lot of
people will probably walk away from it as well, and our
influence on the rogue states will only decrease.''
So here you have the general of our Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
Chairman, coming before us and saying, indeed, the problem of the rogue
states is not passing the convention. The problem is not having a
convention because, if you do not have a convention, you don't have the
kind of legal structure and inspection and tracking and accountability
that help put pressure on those rogue states and limit the access of
the rogue states to the materials with which they make chemical
weapons.
The truth is that until the convention enters into force, the actions
of any nation, signatory or not, to manufacture or to stockpile
chemical weapons will be objectionable but it won't be illegal. Mr.
President, it won't be illegal. And it is very hard for this Senator to
understand how, against the regimen that we have for inspection--
against the intrusiveness that we are acquiring that we don't have
today, and measured by the level of destruction of existing stockpiles
that is required, the people who today are under no obligation
whatsoever to destroy those stockpiles--you could be better off without
it against those who have it is really very, very difficult to
understand.
General Shalikashvili's last point alludes to an argument often made
by the treaty's opponents, who are quick to point out that not all of
the countries believed to have chemical weapons will join. Indeed, that
is true. Libya, Syria, Iraq, and North Korea have not signed the
convention, but three-quarters of the nations on the intelligence
community's list of probable proliferators have signed.
The truth is that until the convention enters into force, the actions
of any nation--signatory or not--to manufacture or stockpile chemical
weapons will be objectionable, but not illegal under any international
law or agreement. Some colleagues in this Chamber suggest we defer
United States ratification until after Libya, Syria, Iraq, and North
Korea have joined. To them I would respond that failure to ratify gains
us absolutely nothing with respect to those rogue states. We are in no
way aided in meeting our intelligence and military obligations
regarding those nations and their chemical weapons activities by
failing to ratify the CWC; conversely, we are in no way impeded, and in
fact are assisted, in meeting those obligations by ratification.
Rather, I agree with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this
matter: We increase our leverage against these hold-out states by
ratifying the Convention. We also make it more difficult for those
hold-outs to obtain materials they can use in their chemical weapons
programs.
Some opponents of the CWC, suggest that it is fatally flawed because
adherence to or violation of its requirements cannot be verified.
We keep hearing this. It is interesting. At the hearings I kept
hearing two arguments coming out from the people
[[Page S3524]]
who said you can't verify it. They say it is too intrusive, that we
will give away all of the trade secrets of the businesses, so we can't
allow obtrusive verification. They object to it because they think it
is going to prevent business from conducting its business. And they go
to the other side of the coin, and say, ``If we get more intrusive, we
are going to be verifying sufficiently but then you lose on the other
side.'' You can't have it both ways. Either it is a balanced effort at
verification and at the level of intrusiveness, which is why the
chemical companies support this treaty.
Mr. President, the fact is that the very people who have argued for
that intrusiveness--the Reagan administration, and most of the
principal critics who are making that argument today --are the very
people who insisted that the challenge inspections would be essential
to the integrity of this convention.
Ironically, the handful of principal critics making this argument
served in the Reagan administration and, fortunately, insisted that
challenge inspections would be essential to the CWC's integrity.
Virtually every inspection provision that the Reagan administration
proposed was included in the treaty text when the negotiations
concluded in 1992. Their proposals having been accepted, these critics
now want to raise the bar even higher.
The CWC's verification provisions will put inspectors on the ground
with sensitive equipment and the right to review records, ask
questions, go to any part of a facility, and take and analyze samples.
These powerful inspection tools are needed to get the job done, and it
would be sheer folly for the Senate to deprive the U.S. intelligence
community of the information that these inspections will provide.
According to former Director of Central Intelligence James Woolsey:
What the Chemical Weapons Convention provides the
intelligence community is a new tool to add to our collection
tool kit. It is an instrument with broad applicability, which
can help resolve a wide variety of problems. Moreover, it is
a universal tool which can be used by diplomats and
politicians, as well as intelligence specialists, to further
a common goal: elimination of the threat of chemical weapons.
Another argument used by critics of the treaty is that Russia does
not comply with other arms control treaties and that more of the same
can be expected with the CWC. Reports from whistleblowers who worked in
the Soviet chemical weapons production complex indicate that in the
late 1980's and on into the 1990's, the Soviet Union was developing and
testing a new generation of nerve agents. More recent reports suggest
chemical weapons research, if not limited production, continues. Russia
has declared a stockpile of 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons--the
world's largest--but reports indicate that even these numbers may be
incorrectly low.
Mr. President, to the extent these reports of continuing Russian
chemical weapons activity are true, I join treaty critics --and, I
confidently expect--all Senators in abhoring this Russian activity. I
take second place to no Senator in wanting to use all capability at the
disposal of the United States to obtain cessation of those activities,
and destruction of all Russian chemical weapons. But treaty opponents
seem to have stepped through the lookingglass in Alice in Wonderland.
Simply insisting that Russia tell us the truth is no way to get the
bottom of this situation. Refusing to ratify the CWC because we are
piqued at their behavior is a classic example of what the old cliche
refers to as ``cutting off one's nose to spite one's face.''
The United States greatly increases its leverage by ratifying the
CWC, which will put pressure on Russia to follow suit. When Senate
debate of the CWC was scheduled in the fall of 1996, it became evident
that Moscow was feeling the heat of a pending Senate vote on the CWC.
Suddenly, Russian officials backpedaled from a 1990 bilateral
destruction agreement, which had not yet entered into force, and stated
the CWC's activation should be delayed until the bilateral agreement
was underway. This strategy belies Moscow's eagerness to postpone U.S.
ratification. I, for one, am not buying it. The longer we wait to
ratify the CWC, the more breathing room Moscow has. The time has long
since passed to put some real pressure on Russia. Senate ratification
of the CWC will do just that.
Another of the treaty opponents' claims is that the treaty requires
the United States to share chemical and chemical weapons defense
technologies and capabilities with even those party States that are
rogue nations or adversaries of our Nation. Some claim that we would be
forced to remove our current export controls applicable to chemicals
with respect to all other parties to the CWC. Articles X and XI of the
Convention are frequently referenced in this context. What is going on
here, Mr. President, is very regrettable. The black and white language
of the convention itself contradicts that view. And if the convention
itself were not sufficiently clear in enabling the United States to
refuse to provide any technology or other information or data that
could be misused by rogue nations or adversaries, several of the 28
conditions to which bipartisan agreement has been reached directly
address these concerns and should lay them to rest in all minds.
Condition 7 requires the President to certify before the ratification
documents are deposited that the CWC will in no way weaken the
Australia Group of nations, of which the United States is a
participant, that has established a cooperative export control regime,
and that every single nation that participates in the Australia Group
must concur that there is no CWC requirement that would weaken the
Group's export controls. Then, annually, certification is required to
the Congress that the Group's controls have not been weakened. Further,
the condition requires the President to block any attempt within the
Australia Group to change the Group's view of its obligations under the
CWC.
Condition 16 requires the President to notify Congress if he ever
determines the Convention's secretariat, the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, has willfully divulged confidential
business information that results in a financial loss or damage to U.S.
company, and to withhold half the United States' annual assessment
toward the OPCW's expenses if such a breach occurs and the OPCW does
not waive immunity for prosecution of any OPCW official involved in the
breach, or if the OPCW refuses to establish an investigatory commission
to investigate the breach.
Condition 15 requires the United States not to contribute to the
voluntary fund the CWC establishes for providing chemical weapons
defense assistance to other parties to the treaty, and, with regard to
the CWC requirement for all treaty parties to assist other party
nations who have been attacked with chemicals or are threatened with
such an attack, the same condition limits U.S. assistance to those
nations determined to be adversaries to medical antidotes and
treatments.
Perhaps the least credible argument raised by the CWC's opponents is
that this treaty would place unreasonable burdens on America's chemical
industry. It would seem that those making this argument have not been
listening to what the chemical industry itself has been saying for the
last two decades. The chemical industry's reasons for supporting the
convention are not altogether altruistic, but they are imminently
logical. First and foremost, the chemical industry seeks to
disassociate itself from the odious practice of making chemical
weapons. Equally important, the U.S. industry long ago decided that the
Chemical Weapons Convention would be good for business. The convention
contains automatic economic sanctions that preclude treaty members from
trading in controlled chemicals with states that do not join. The U.S.
chemical industry, which is America's largest exporter, views the
convention as a way to a more open marketplace. Industry
representatives describe their obligations under the treaty as
manageable and acceptable; to wit, the CWC will not impose inspections,
regulations, intrusions, or costs greater than those already required
by other Federal laws and standards.
But it is very important to go beyond the fact that the chemical
industry believes the CWC will not impose significantly difficult
burdens on its companies--and look closely at the critical fact that
U.S. failure to ratify will result in tremendous financial and market
share losses--grave in the near term and likely even worse in the
longer term--for the U.S. chemical industry. In a letter dated August
29,
[[Page S3525]]
1996, the CEO's of 53 of America's most prominent chemical companies
bluntly stated: ``Our industry's status as the world's preferred
supplier of chemical products may be jeopardized if the United States
does not ratify the convention.'' The American chemical industry would
be marked as unreliable and unjustly associated with chemical weapons
proliferation. If the resolution of ratification of the CWC were to be
defeated, it would cost the U.S. chemical industry significant portion
of its $60 billion export business--many in the industry have agreed on
an estimate of $600 million a year--and result in the loss of thousands
of good-paying American jobs.
Under the terms of the CWC, some 2,000 U.S. industry facilities--not
companies--will be affected by the treaty. Of that group, some 1,800
will be asked to fill out brief data declaration forms and the
remaining 200 are likely to undergo inspections. Assertions that the
neighborhood ``Mom and Pop'' dry cleaners, cosmetics firms, and
breweries will be involved in this are wildly inaccurate.
In addition, although the industry's representatives explained
patiently to Senators that the CWC's onsite verification and inspection
procedures will not violate a U.S. company's constitutional protection
against undue search or seizure, there is included in the 28 agreed
conditions condition 28 that requires the United States to obtain a
criminal search warrant in the case of any challenge inspection of a
U.S. facility to which the facility does not give its consent, and to
obtain an administrative search warrant from a U.S. magistrate judge in
the case of any routine inspection of a U.S. facility to which the
facility does not give its consent.
The U.S. chemical industry led by the Chemical Manufacturers
Association, the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association,
and the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America have
repeatedly and unequivocally requested that the Senate approve the
resolution of ratification and pass its associated implementing
legislation. Industry's support of this treaty should not be
questioned, it should be applauded.
It's suprising to see nonindustry people shouting industry concern
when the industry itself was intimately involved in developing the
convention and the proposed implementation legislation and is urging
the Senate to approve the resolution of ratification. The CEO's or
other senior executives of seven major chemical firms with significant
operations in my home State of Massachusetts are among those who have
repeatedly urged the Senate to approve the resolution of ratification.
Frankly, in my judgment, the statements of these executives concerning
the effects this convention will have on their businesses are more
credible than the contradictory statements of the opponents of the CWC.
Also among the arguments against the convention used by its critics
is the assertion that the CWC will cost the American taxpayers too much
money. On the contrary, the U.S. share of the CWC's monitoring and
inspection regime, approximately $20 million annually, is far less than
the $75 million annual cost to store America's chemical weapons. This
$20 million of support for the international inspection agency is
minuscule in comparison to the amounts we spend for U.S. defenses. This
is a small price to pay to institute and maintain an international
mechanism that will dramatically reduce the chemical weapons threat
that faces U.S. service men and women and establish an international
norm for national behavior which is so apparently in the interests of
this Nation and, indeed, all the world's people. And, lest the
estimates of the costs of U.S. participation prove to be low, included
in the 28 agreed conditions is a condition that limits the U.S. annual
contribution to no more than $25 million a year, to be adjusted every
third year based on changes in the Consumer Price Index.
The United States led the international community throughout the
negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Three administrations--
two Republican and one Democratic--have labored to develop and place
before the Senate a carefully crafted instrument that will increase the
safety and security of U.S. citizens and armed forces and will do so at
very reasonable costs to taxpayers, companies that make and use
legitimate chemicals, and American consumers. Former Presidents Ford,
Carter, and Bush have spoken out strongly in favor of ratification.
Today 1996 Republican Presidential nominee and former Senate Majority
Leader Robert Dole announced his support for the CWC coupled with the
28 conditions to which bipartisan agreement has been secured.
Rarely does one see a situation in which it is more important to
apply the admonition that we would be wise not to let the perfect
become the enemy of the good. Perfect security against chemical weapons
is unattainable. I have great hopes that wise Senators will not permit
a group of Senators who will not be satisfied by the greatest
achievable increase in our security, and many of whom have a basic
objection to any international arms control treaty to scuttle a
carefully engineered agreement that our military leaders, our
intelligence community senior executives, former Presidents of both
parties, President Clinton, and 1996 Presidential nominee Dole agree
will make all Americans and, indeed, the entire world safer and more
secure from chemical weapons.
In closing, I want to commend those who have labored diligently to
bring the Senate to this point. Former Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Chairman Richard Lugar, with the assistance of his able
staff, has done yeoman service and again demonstrated his capacity as a
leader and statesman. Senator Joe Biden, the ranking Democratic member
of the Foreign Relations Committee, has labored, also with the help of
his staff, to bring this treaty before the Senate. Senator Carl Levin,
ranking Democrat on the Armed Services Committee, and Senate Democratic
Leader Tom Daschle, each knowledgeable and dedicated, have made
considerable contributions to this effort and to the debate. Majority
Leader Trent Lott's leadership has permitted negotiation of 28
conditions designed to reassure those who in good faith had questions
and concerns about various aspects of the treaty. I compliment and
thank all of them.
Mr. President the compelling logic of this convention and the breadth
and depth of support for it should produce an overwhelming vote to
approve the resolution of ratification. I have great hope that the
Senate will demonstrate its ability by taking this important step of
ratifying this treaty. I urge my colleagues to vote for the resolution.