[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 49 (Wednesday, April 23, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3520-S3525]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]



                         Privilege of the Floor

  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Jeff Severs 
be given the privilege of the floor for this day.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I yield 15 minutes to the Senator from 
Alaska.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I have been involved with the chemical 
weapons debate and negotiations for a convention like this since its 
beginning. During the Reagan administration, at the suggestion of 
Ambassador John Tower, former Senator John Tower, I spent a month in 
Geneva during an August recess auditing the beginnings of the 
negotiations that led up to this Chemical Weapons Convention. John 
Tower even loaned me his home in Geneva to live in during that period. 
He and I agreed that negotiating a satisfactory chemical weapons treaty 
was an objective that had to be achieved, because we shared the feeling 
that the world was becoming a very dangerous place to live in because 
of chemical and biological warfare developments. We felt the United 
States needed to show leadership in reducing some of the dangers 
whenever possible.
  This convention before the Senate could be improved. The START 
treaties could have been improved. However, under those treaties, the 
United States and Russia will significantly reduce their numbers of 
nuclear warheads and reduce the risk of nuclear war. The Conventional 
Armed Forces in Europe Treaty could have been improved. Yet, today we 
no longer have Russian and NATO forces bristling with tanks, cannons, 
and fighter aircraft facing each other across the border in numbers 
that reminded many of Armageddon.

  The Chemical Weapons Convention does move the world toward a goal of 
bringing order and accountability to the production and transportation 
of weapons of mass destruction. This is a convention that has required 
the negotiating concurrence of 74 countries. I will never forget 
sitting around those rooms in Geneva while we waited for the 
representatives of the various countries to state their positions.
  To require this convention to be perfect asks the impossible. To 
expect it to be an effective tool in controlling chemical weapons is 
reasonable. This convention does provide an inspection regime that will 
allow our inspectors to monitor potential chemical weapons production 
and transportation more effectively than without the convention. And 
protections are built into the convention so that U.S. companies 
producing chemicals are not going to have their manufacturing processes 
compromised, and, obviously, we do not amend the Constitution of the 
United States by approving this convention.
  For me, this convention enhances the security of our forces deployed 
abroad, as well as throughout our whole Nation. The Joint Chiefs of 
Staff support the Chemical Weapons Convention. Generals Colin Powell 
and Norman Schwarzkopf support the convention. Former Secretary of 
State Jim Baker and former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft 
support this convention. Former CIA Directors, Jim Woolsey, Stansfield 
Turner, and John Deutch, support this convention. I could go on and on 
with the list, Mr. President.
  But, to me, it is not the former or present officials that should 
have an impact on this Senate. It is the men and women in uniform. They 
are in harm's way. They know now that many of their predecessors who 
served us in the Persian Gulf war, men and women there in uniform, were 
exposed to some type of a chemical weapon in Iraq. It is for them that 
I speak, because I think, universally, they are now worried about what 
this Congress is going to do, or not do, in trying to find some process 
of protecting them against chemical and biological warfare.
  In its essence, I believe that the United States has a responsibility 
for world leadership. This leadership is more graphically demonstrated 
in this legislative body than anywhere I know, because passage of the 
resolution of ratification will show our leadership in the effort to 
contain chemical weapons, just as Senate support for START I showed the 
United States' commitment to nuclear weapons reduction.
  I encourage the Senate to vote in favor of this resolution of 
ratification and support the Chemical Weapons Convention as it was 
presented to us.
  I ask unanimous consent that two articles from today's papers be 
printed in the record. One article is by Samuel Berger, in the 
Washington Times, entitled ``The CWC Imperative''; the other is by Gen. 
Thomas McInerney and Stanley Weiss, in the Hill newspaper.
  There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

              [From the Washington Times, April 23, 1997]

                           The CWC Imperative

                         (By Samuel R. Berger)

       Tomorrow, the Senate will vote on the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention. After years of international negotiation and 
     domestic debate, the Senate faces a clear choice; we can 
     continue to lead the widening international commitment to 
     begin banishing poison gas from the earth and head the effort 
     to make it work. Or we can walk away from a treaty we helped 
     write, deny our soldiers and citizens its benefits, expose 
     our companies to its penalties, and put America on the same 
     side as pariah nations like Libya and Iraq.
       This treaty will take effect next week--with or without us. 
     That's why the real test of the Chemical Weapons Convention 
     is not whether it's perfect, but whether we will be better 
     off inside or outside it. By that basic measure, this treaty 
     is overwhelmingly in our national interest.
       First, this treaty will help protect our soldiers by 
     requiring other countries to do what we decided to do years 
     ago--get rid of chemical weapons. The treaty will also make 
     it harder for rogue states and terrorists to get or make 
     chemical weapons. By eliminating existing stockpiles, it will 
     remove the single largest source of weapons that they could 
     steal or buy on the black market. By imposing new controls on 
     the transfer of dangerous chemicals, it will help put the raw 
     ingredients for such weapons further out of reach.
       Finally, by giving us new tools for verification like 
     short-notice, on-site inspections, creating a global 
     intelligence network, and strengthening the authority of our 
     own law enforcement, this treaty will make it easier for us 
     to prevent and punish those who seek to break its rules.
       Two and half months ago, President Clinton and Senate 
     Majority Leader Trent Lott established a process to work 
     through the concerns of some senators about the treaty. As a 
     result of this effort, and negotiations led by Sen. Jessie 
     Helms and Sen. Joe Biden, we have reached agreement on 28 
     conditions that will be included in the treaty's resolution 
     of ratification. Among them are binding commitments to 
     maintain strong defenses against chemical attack; allow the 
     use of riot control agents like tear gas in a wide

[[Page S3521]]

     range of military and law enforcement situations; and require 
     search warrants for any involuntary inspections of an 
     American business. These conditions resolve almost all the 
     issues that have been raised about this treaty.
       Almost, but not all. Opponents insist on a handful of 
     additional conditions, each of which would make it impossible 
     for us to participate in this treaty. One would have us wait 
     to join until Russia does--giving cover to hard-liners in 
     Russia who want to hold on to their weapons. Another would 
     have us wait until rogue states like Iraq become members--
     delaying our chance to use the treaty's tools against these 
     international outlaws and giving them a veto over our 
     national security. Another would impose an unrealistically 
     high standard of verification--and risk our ability to 
     protect our troops by using the treaty's already tough 
     provisions to detect cheating that is militarily significant.
       Two other killer conditions would require us to re-open 
     negotiations on the treaty. First, some critics mistakenly 
     believe that the treaty requires the United States to provide 
     advanced chemical weapons defenses to rogue states. In fact, 
     only countries that have joined the CWC, renounced chemical 
     weapons and destroyed their stockpiles can request 
     assistance--and then, only if they are threatened with 
     chemical weapons by a non-party. President Clinton has 
     committed to the Senate that if a country of concern such as 
     Cuba or Iran should meet the strict conditions for aid, the 
     United States will restrict our assistance to emergency 
     medical supplies--and to use our influence as member of the 
     CWC to prevent other states from transferring equipment that 
     could harm our national security.
       Second, some opponents misread treaty language to conclude 
     that the CWC would somehow facilitate their spread. President 
     Clinton has made it clear we reject this far-fetched 
     interpretation. He has committed to maintain strict U.S. and 
     multilateral export controls on certain dangerous chemicals 
     and obtained the same assurance from our allies.
       If the Senate approves any of these ``killer conditions,'' 
     it will mean foregoing this treaty's clear costs. We will be 
     denied use of the treaty's tools against rogue states and 
     terrorists. We will lose the ability to enforce the rules we 
     helped make. We will subject our chemical companies to trade 
     restrictions that could cost them hundreds of millions of 
     dollars in sales. And we will send a clear signal of retreat 
     that will undermine our leadership to stop the spread of 
     weapons of mass destruction.
       That must not be allowed to happen. While the Convention is 
     not a panacea, it represents a real opportunity to strengthen 
     the global fight against the threat that no one nation can 
     meet on its own. That is why president and legislators from 
     both parties and our military leaders have made U.S. approval 
     of the Convention their common cause. Negotiated under 
     President Reagan and signed under President Bush, the treaty 
     has broad, bipartisan support that includes every chairman of 
     the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the past 20 years and the 
     overwhelming majority of our veterans, chemical manufacturers 
     and arms control experts. As Secretary of State Madeleine 
     Albright has said, this treaty was ``made in America.'' It is 
     right for America, and now, at last, it must be ratified in 
     America.
                                                                    ____


                    [From the Hill, April 23, 1997]

                Chemical Weapons Pact: Let's Make a Deal

             (By Thomas G. McInerney and Stanley A. Weiss)

       On one side is President Clinton. He wants the Senate to 
     ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). This model 
     agreement, which bands the production and use of chemical 
     weapons, is supported by an overwhelming majority of 
     Americans, including a ``Who's Who'' of former officials and 
     military leaders, and has been signed by most of the 
     civilized world.
       On the other side is Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.). The Foreign 
     Relations Committee chairman wants to reorganize the State 
     Department, and threatened to keep the CWC bottled up in his 
     committee until this was agreed upon.
       Mr. President, Sen. Helms. It's time to make a deal!
       Both of them and, more importantly, the American people 
     would come out winners if the Senate votes to ratify the CWC, 
     and the State Department streamlines its operations. Here are 
     three ways to improve the business of diplomacy:
       First, cut back on assistant secretaries. The State 
     Department currently houses 19 assistant secretaries focusing 
     on certain regions (East Asia) or functional areas (human 
     rights). Compare this to the Department of Defense where nine 
     assistant secretaries help oversee a budget 10 times larger 
     than the State Department's program budget. The system has 
     evolved into an unwieldy bureaucratic morass. The practical 
     effect of 19 assistant secretaries is overlap and poor 
     coordination.
       Second, improve coordination and eliminate layers in 
     foreign aid programs. Here again, a hodgepodge of well-
     intentioned programs operates with little oversight and 
     coordination. The details should be left to careful 
     negotiation between the State Department and Congress. But, 
     the goal should be to reduce bureaucracies, establish clear 
     priorities, and put these aid programs more closely in the 
     service of our overall foreign policy goals.
       Finally, start running the State Department in a more 
     business-like manner. State Department officials rightly tout 
     their important role in supporting American businesses 
     overseas. But as part of this effort, they ought to get their 
     own house in order.
       The required management reforms are no secret. The General 
     Accounting Office (GAO), The National Performance Review, and 
     other studies have all reached similar conclusions. Closing 
     unnecessary overseas posts, outsourcing administrative 
     support functions, and rethinking overseas staff structure 
     can save money and improve performance.
       Maintaining the status quo is impossible. The GAO estimates 
     that simply maintaining current functions and personnel will 
     require a 22 percent increase in State Department budgets by 
     the year 2000--an unlikely prospect in today's budget 
     environment.
       Despite the clear need for action, the State Department 
     management continues to postpone the inevitable. A well-
     conceived strategy for reconstructing the department does not 
     exist, and Helms is right to demand action.
       In return, the Senate should ratify the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention. Americans will be safer with the treaty than 
     without it. The CWC combines an arms-control agreement that 
     bans an entire class of weapons of mass destruction and a 
     non-proliferation regime that forbids trade to any nation in 
     non-compliance.
       It will help prevent terrorists and pariah states from 
     getting their hands on materials to make chemical weapons, 
     while ensuring that American manufacturers can continue to 
     successfully compete in the global trade of legitimate 
     chemical products.
       Ameria is unilaterally destroying its chemical stockpile. 
     The question now is whether it will become party to a 
     convention which will go into effect on April 29, with or 
     without U.S. approval. As retired Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf 
     stated in Senate testimony, ``We don't need chemical weapons 
     to fight our future wars. And frankly . . . by not ratifying 
     that treaty, we align ourselves with nations like Libya and 
     North Korea, and I'd just as soon not be associated with 
     those thugs.''
       If the price of getting two-thirds of the Senate to ratify 
     the CWC is improving the way the State Department works, that 
     sounds like a deal we can all live with.

  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, it is not an easy position for me to be 
opposed to friends with whom I normally stand shoulder to shoulder. But 
I believe we must be motivated by what we believe is in the best 
interest of the country as a whole. I believe if we took a poll of men 
and women in uniform today, they would say that the No. 1 threat they 
fear is chemical and biological warfare. I say that we must lead the 
world in addressing the consequences of production and use of these 
weapons of mass destruction, just as we led the world in dealing with 
the consequences of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Voting for 
the Chemical Weapons Convention resolution of ratification will make 
the world a safer place.
  Thank you, Mr. President.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from 
Massachusetts.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts is recognized.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, it is interesting. I have been here on the 
floor listening to this debate for a period of time, and it is almost 
as if the arguments kind of pass each other in a strange way. I have, 
also, on the Foreign Relations Committee, been at the hearings. We keep 
hearing the same mantra repeated with respect to a number of 
objections, notwithstanding the fact that either the language of the 
treaty is going to be changed by virtue of agreements made between 
Senator Helms and Senator Biden and the administration, or the treaty 
itself addresses those specific arguments. One of the most interesting 
repetitive arguments is that this is somehow going to be dangerous for 
the chemical companies. We keep hearing people say that this is going 
to be terrible for American industry. But American industry has signed 
off on it. The Senator from Delaware represents many chemical 
companies. Fifty-six percent of the economy in the State of Delaware is 
represented by chemical companies. He hasn't heard from them in 
opposition. Nevertheless, we hear people repeat that.
  Now, obviously, this convention, despite its attributes, is not a 
panacea for the threat of chemical weapons. None of us who are 
proposing this convention, I think, are suggesting that this is the 
panacea. But what it does do, Mr. President, is it contributes, on 
balance, more to the effort to have deterrence, to expose cheaters and 
to detect chemical weapons production and

[[Page S3522]]

proliferation of any kind of significant military nature than not 
having it.
  Mr. President, although crude chemical weapons have been around for 
centuries, poison gas unfortunately came of age as a tool of warfare in 
World War I. First chlorine, then phosgene, mustard gas, and lewisite 
were introduced onto the battlefields of Europe, burning, blistering, 
and choking unprotected soldiers and civilians alike. Both because with 
chemical weapons so closely associated with World War I there is a 
perception they are an anachronistic threat and are therefore of less 
concern, and because we became accustomed during 40 years of the cold 
war to living with the threat of a global nuclear Armageddon, some fail 
to recognize the magnitude of the threat now posed by chemical weapons. 
This is a terribly serious mistake.
  Modern chemical weapons--nerve agents like sarin, soman, tabun, and 
VX--are so lethal that a dose as small as 15 milligrams can kill a 
person. Equally as troubling, chemical weapons are the most financially 
and technically attractive option for a country--or a terrorist--that 
sets its sights on developing and producing a weapon of mass 
destruction. The ingredients for chemical weapons are chemicals that 
are inexpensive and readily available in the marketplace, and the 
formulae to make nerve and blister agents are well known. It is no 
coincidence that chemical weapons are known as the poor man's atom 
bomb. The U.S. intelligence community estimates that more than 20 
nations possess chemical weapons or the capability to make them 
readily. Still other countries are working to acquire a chemical 
arsenal. Chemical weapons have proliferated far more widely than the 
two other types of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear and biological 
weapons. We ignore this threat at our peril. It is this threat that the 
Chemical Weapons Convention confronts. And the Senate today and 
tomorrow has an historical opportunity to address and reduce that 
threat--to our civilian citizens, to our armed forces, and to the 
entire world--as we perform our constitutional responsibility of advice 
and consent with respect to the convention.
  Our Nation's highest military and intelligence officials repeatedly 
have stated that while the Chemical Weapons Convention is no panacea 
for these threats, America will be safer and we will have greater 
ability to reduce chemical weapons proliferation, and to identify and 
remove chemical weapons threats, if the United States and a majority of 
the world's nations ratify this treaty. The number of signatories is up 
to 161. Seventy-four nations, including the majority of our allies in 
NATO and the European Union, have already ratified the convention.

  The public outcry over the use of chemical weapons in World War I 
compelled diplomats to begin work to ban these weapons. These post-war 
efforts fell short of a complete prohibition. They resulted, however, 
in the 1925 Geneva Protocol that outlaws the use of chemical weapons. 
Negotiations on a more far-reaching prohibition resumed in 1968, 
focusing on a treaty that would prohibit the development, production, 
and stockpiling of chemical weapons as well. In 1969, the United States 
renounced the first use of chemical weapons and initiated a moratorium 
on their production that lasted 18 years. Five years later, the Senate 
gave its advice and consent to ratification of both the Geneva Protocol 
and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. International 
negotiation toward a Chemical Weapons Convention, however, made little 
progress until the United States again took the initiative.
  In the 1980's, Saddam Hussein's use of chemical weapons against Iran 
and against his own Kurdish people horrified the international 
community. Iraq clearly violated its obligations under the Geneva 
Protocol, but the international community did nothing to punish Saddam 
for his outlaw behavior. This failure to enforce the Geneva Protocol 
was a failure of international political will, not of the treaty 
itself. America's leaders at that time, including many of us in this 
Chamber, must bear part of the responsibility for not having insisted 
that Saddam pay a price for his outrageous behavior. Just like a 
domestic law, an international agreement, no matter how good, is of 
little use unless it is enforced.
  Iraq's flagrant violation of the Geneva Protocol did, however, serve 
as a catalyst for the negotiators' attempt to complete the Chemical 
Weapons Convention. Working from a draft treaty text first introduced 
by then-Vice President George Bush in 1984, the 39 nations hammering 
out the treaty in the Conference on Disarmament reached agreements on 
intrusive and far-reaching verification provisions that were included 
in the Bush draft text. For example, Vice President Bush proposed on 
behalf of President Reagan ``anytime, anywhere'' on-site challenge 
inspections to deter and catch treaty violators. At the time the 
concept of challenge inspections was first advanced, no nuclear arms 
treaty yet included even routine on-site inspections of declared 
nuclear facilities.

  Vice President Bush asked for these tough verification measures for 
good reason. It is much more difficult to monitor a chemical weapons 
treaty than a nuclear accord. The capabilities of our national 
technical means--including intelligence satellites--enable us to track 
the production and deployment of nuclear weapons in other countries 
with a considerable degree of confidence. Chemical weapons production, 
however, cannot be monitored from afar with anywhere near the same 
level of confidence. Aside from using large government facilities to 
churn out chemical weapons, a government could coopt a commercial 
chemical firm into making chemical weapons, or manufacture chemical 
weapons in a factory purported to be involved in the commercial 
production of legitimate products. The legitimate chemical industry 
around the world makes products that are important to modern life. Some 
of the same chemicals and technologies that this industry employs to 
manufacture fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, pesticides, herbicides, and 
countless other products could also be used to make chemical weapons. 
There are literally thousands of industrial facilities worldwide, and 
we know all too well from the inspections in Iraq in the aftermath of 
the 1991 gulf war that a determined rogue proliferator can and will use 
the industrial sector to mask efforts to develop and produce weapons of 
mass destruction. For these very reasons, the Reagan administration not 
only pushed for routine data declarations and inspections of government 
and industry facilities; it also insisted on these unprecedented 
challenge inspections.
  After George Bush was elected President, the Bush administration took 
a variety of steps to give impetus to the international negotiations. 
Perhaps most importantly, in May of 1991, President Bush, without 
waiting for or depending on completion and ratification of the Chemical 
Weapons Convention, unilaterally forswore any use of chemical weapons 
by the United States, even as in-kind retaliation on the battlefield. A 
year and a half later, as one of the last acts of his Administration, 
Bush sent Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger to Paris in January, 
1993 to join more than 130 states in signing the Chemical Weapons 
Convention. Pushing these negotiations through to a successful 
conclusion stands as one of the most important foreign policy 
achievements of the Bush administration. We owe the dedicated 
negotiators from the Reagan and Bush administrations, most notably 
Ambassador Stephen Ledogar and Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
Director Ronald Lehman, a debt of gratitude for their far-sighted 
proposals and their persistence at the negotiating table. We owe 
Presidents Reagan and Bush a debt as well--for their leadership and 
consistent support of this historic arms control initiative.

  The convention that President Bill Clinton presented to the Senate on 
November 23, 1993, which is before us today, is a feasible and 
pragmatic treaty. Given the inherent difficulty of curtailing the 
proliferation of chemical weapons, America's negotiators did not insist 
on obtaining a flawless pact--an effort that would have been certain to 
fail. Instead, the U.S. delegation worked closely with our allies in 
Europe, Japan, Australia, and Canada to create a realistic treaty with 
verification provisions that offer a significant likelihood of 
identifying militarily-significant violations and that will force 
cheaters to incur higher costs and endure greater inconvenience in 
order to accumulate a covert chemical weapons

[[Page S3523]]

stockpile. It is important to note that the convention's negotiators 
and advocates have never claimed that it provides an ironclad assurance 
that the world will become and remain free from all chemical weapons. 
That is an impossible standard to meet, so it should come as no 
surprise the convention does not meet it. Instead, the convention makes 
identification of cheaters more likely; it requires all non-cheaters to 
dispose of all chemical weapons--which, of course, the United States 
already was unilaterally committed to doing by law; and it will make it 
more difficult and expensive for cheaters to cheat.
  A very important ally in the negotiations leading to the Chemical 
Weapons Convention was the U.S. chemical industry. It is 
counterintuitive to think that the chemical industry would participate 
in a negotiation that would ultimately bring additional regulation, 
notably data declarations and inspections, upon itself. To its credit, 
that is exactly what the U.S. chemical industry, and many of its 
counterparts in other nations, did. For well over a decade, the U.S. 
chemical industry provided invaluable assistance to the U.S. delegation 
and all of the negotiators in Geneva, opening their facilities to test 
verification concepts and proposing workable solutions for how the data 
declarations and inspections should operate. With the help of the U.S. 
chemical industry, the CWC emerged with sufficient provisions and 
restrictions to make trade in chemical weapons materials more visible 
and more difficult. The convention's inspectors will watch closely over 
the global industry, guarding against the diversion of commercial 
chemicals for purposes of weapons proliferation. At the same time, the 
treaty contains numerous safeguards that enable the industry to protect 
its confidential business information to its satisfaction, despite 
claims to the contrary that are made by some treaty opponents.

  I want to be clear that despite all of its attributes, the treaty is 
not a panacea for the threat of chemical weapons. It can't be. But the 
convention's primary merit is that it will contribute to deterrence, 
exposure, and detection of chemical weapons proliferation of a 
militarily significant nature. By requiring the destruction of existing 
arsenals and making it much more difficult for future adversaries to 
acquire or increase chemical weapons stocks, the CWC greatly reduces 
the prospect that U.S. troops will encounter chemical weapons on the 
battlefield. Following in our footsteps as we move to unilaterally 
destroy our chemical weapons stockpile, the CWC will begin to level the 
international playing field by requiring other countries to eliminate 
their chemical weapons as well.
  That is the balance. That is the judgment we are called on to make in 
the Senate.
  Is this, as the Senator from Alaska was just saying, in the interest 
of our country to protect our troops and the long-term interests of our 
Nation? I believe this convention makes identification of cheaters more 
likely. It requires all noncheaters to dispose of all chemical weapons, 
something we can't do today. And, of course, we have already 
unilaterally decided that we are going to get rid of all of our 
chemical weapons.
  So here we are going down the road of getting rid of all of our 
chemical weapons, and here you have finally some form of legal 
structure that will hold other nations accountable.
  Clearly the United States must never be complacent about the threat 
of adversary nations or terrorists armed with chemical weapons.
  I respectfully suggest that nothing in this convention and none of 
those of us who advocate this convention begs complacency.
  The convention's critics claim that the treaty will lull us into a 
false sense of security, resulting in a weakening of our defenses. To 
the contrary, the convention stipulates that each of its member nations 
is allowed to maintain defensive programs to develop and test 
antidotes, gas masks, and other protective gear and to train its troops 
in how to use them.
  So it is really a question of us. I mean that there is nothing in the 
treaty that lulls us to sleep. The treaty specifically allows us to 
have defenses. And if we are, indeed, concerned about it, as we ought 
to be, we will have those defenses, precisely as this administration is 
offering us with an additional $225 million of expenditure this year.
  So how can you continually come to the floor and say, ``Oh, my God, 
this is going to lull us to sleep'' when the administration is 
providing an additional $225 million?
  It is our responsibility as elected officials to ensure that we 
maintain a robust U.S. chemical weapons defense program. To do less 
would be an injustice to our troops, a threat to our security, and a 
failure on our part to exercise fully our rights under this treaty. One 
of the 28 conditions to the treaty negotiated by Senators Helms and 
Biden, and agreed to by the administration, condition 11, explicitly 
states this determination, and requires the Secretary of Defense to 
ensure that U.S. forces are capable of carrying out required military 
missions regardless of any foreign threat or use of chemical weapons.
  The Pentagon's view of the convention is unambiguous. In his 
testimony, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. John 
Shalikashvili stated:

       From a military perspective, the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention is clearly in our national interest. The 
     convention's advantages outweigh its shortcomings. The United 
     States and all other CW-capable state parties incur the same 
     obligation to destroy their chemical weapons stockpiles . . . 
     if we do not join and walk away from the CWC an awful lot of 
     people will probably walk away from it as well, and our 
     influence on the rogue states will only decrease.''

  So here you have the general of our Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 
Chairman, coming before us and saying, indeed, the problem of the rogue 
states is not passing the convention. The problem is not having a 
convention because, if you do not have a convention, you don't have the 
kind of legal structure and inspection and tracking and accountability 
that help put pressure on those rogue states and limit the access of 
the rogue states to the materials with which they make chemical 
weapons.
  The truth is that until the convention enters into force, the actions 
of any nation, signatory or not, to manufacture or to stockpile 
chemical weapons will be objectionable but it won't be illegal. Mr. 
President, it won't be illegal. And it is very hard for this Senator to 
understand how, against the regimen that we have for inspection--
against the intrusiveness that we are acquiring that we don't have 
today, and measured by the level of destruction of existing stockpiles 
that is required, the people who today are under no obligation 
whatsoever to destroy those stockpiles--you could be better off without 
it against those who have it is really very, very difficult to 
understand.
  General Shalikashvili's last point alludes to an argument often made 
by the treaty's opponents, who are quick to point out that not all of 
the countries believed to have chemical weapons will join. Indeed, that 
is true. Libya, Syria, Iraq, and North Korea have not signed the 
convention, but three-quarters of the nations on the intelligence 
community's list of probable proliferators have signed.
  The truth is that until the convention enters into force, the actions 
of any nation--signatory or not--to manufacture or stockpile chemical 
weapons will be objectionable, but not illegal under any international 
law or agreement. Some colleagues in this Chamber suggest we defer 
United States ratification until after Libya, Syria, Iraq, and North 
Korea have joined. To them I would respond that failure to ratify gains 
us absolutely nothing with respect to those rogue states. We are in no 
way aided in meeting our intelligence and military obligations 
regarding those nations and their chemical weapons activities by 
failing to ratify the CWC; conversely, we are in no way impeded, and in 
fact are assisted, in meeting those obligations by ratification. 
Rather, I agree with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this 
matter: We increase our leverage against these hold-out states by 
ratifying the Convention. We also make it more difficult for those 
hold-outs to obtain materials they can use in their chemical weapons 
programs.
  Some opponents of the CWC, suggest that it is fatally flawed because 
adherence to or violation of its requirements cannot be verified.
  We keep hearing this. It is interesting. At the hearings I kept 
hearing two arguments coming out from the people

[[Page S3524]]

who said you can't verify it. They say it is too intrusive, that we 
will give away all of the trade secrets of the businesses, so we can't 
allow obtrusive verification. They object to it because they think it 
is going to prevent business from conducting its business. And they go 
to the other side of the coin, and say, ``If we get more intrusive, we 
are going to be verifying sufficiently but then you lose on the other 
side.'' You can't have it both ways. Either it is a balanced effort at 
verification and at the level of intrusiveness, which is why the 
chemical companies support this treaty.
  Mr. President, the fact is that the very people who have argued for 
that intrusiveness--the Reagan administration, and most of the 
principal critics who are making that argument today --are the very 
people who insisted that the challenge inspections would be essential 
to the integrity of this convention.
  Ironically, the handful of principal critics making this argument 
served in the Reagan administration and, fortunately, insisted that 
challenge inspections would be essential to the CWC's integrity. 
Virtually every inspection provision that the Reagan administration 
proposed was included in the treaty text when the negotiations 
concluded in 1992. Their proposals having been accepted, these critics 
now want to raise the bar even higher.

  The CWC's verification provisions will put inspectors on the ground 
with sensitive equipment and the right to review records, ask 
questions, go to any part of a facility, and take and analyze samples. 
These powerful inspection tools are needed to get the job done, and it 
would be sheer folly for the Senate to deprive the U.S. intelligence 
community of the information that these inspections will provide. 
According to former Director of Central Intelligence James Woolsey:

       What the Chemical Weapons Convention provides the 
     intelligence community is a new tool to add to our collection 
     tool kit. It is an instrument with broad applicability, which 
     can help resolve a wide variety of problems. Moreover, it is 
     a universal tool which can be used by diplomats and 
     politicians, as well as intelligence specialists, to further 
     a common goal: elimination of the threat of chemical weapons.

  Another argument used by critics of the treaty is that Russia does 
not comply with other arms control treaties and that more of the same 
can be expected with the CWC. Reports from whistleblowers who worked in 
the Soviet chemical weapons production complex indicate that in the 
late 1980's and on into the 1990's, the Soviet Union was developing and 
testing a new generation of nerve agents. More recent reports suggest 
chemical weapons research, if not limited production, continues. Russia 
has declared a stockpile of 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons--the 
world's largest--but reports indicate that even these numbers may be 
incorrectly low.
  Mr. President, to the extent these reports of continuing Russian 
chemical weapons activity are true, I join treaty critics --and, I 
confidently expect--all Senators in abhoring this Russian activity. I 
take second place to no Senator in wanting to use all capability at the 
disposal of the United States to obtain cessation of those activities, 
and destruction of all Russian chemical weapons. But treaty opponents 
seem to have stepped through the lookingglass in Alice in Wonderland. 
Simply insisting that Russia tell us the truth is no way to get the 
bottom of this situation. Refusing to ratify the CWC because we are 
piqued at their behavior is a classic example of what the old cliche 
refers to as ``cutting off one's nose to spite one's face.''
  The United States greatly increases its leverage by ratifying the 
CWC, which will put pressure on Russia to follow suit. When Senate 
debate of the CWC was scheduled in the fall of 1996, it became evident 
that Moscow was feeling the heat of a pending Senate vote on the CWC. 
Suddenly, Russian officials backpedaled from a 1990 bilateral 
destruction agreement, which had not yet entered into force, and stated 
the CWC's activation should be delayed until the bilateral agreement 
was underway. This strategy belies Moscow's eagerness to postpone U.S. 
ratification. I, for one, am not buying it. The longer we wait to 
ratify the CWC, the more breathing room Moscow has. The time has long 
since passed to put some real pressure on Russia. Senate ratification 
of the CWC will do just that.

  Another of the treaty opponents' claims is that the treaty requires 
the United States to share chemical and chemical weapons defense 
technologies and capabilities with even those party States that are 
rogue nations or adversaries of our Nation. Some claim that we would be 
forced to remove our current export controls applicable to chemicals 
with respect to all other parties to the CWC. Articles X and XI of the 
Convention are frequently referenced in this context. What is going on 
here, Mr. President, is very regrettable. The black and white language 
of the convention itself contradicts that view. And if the convention 
itself were not sufficiently clear in enabling the United States to 
refuse to provide any technology or other information or data that 
could be misused by rogue nations or adversaries, several of the 28 
conditions to which bipartisan agreement has been reached directly 
address these concerns and should lay them to rest in all minds.
  Condition 7 requires the President to certify before the ratification 
documents are deposited that the CWC will in no way weaken the 
Australia Group of nations, of which the United States is a 
participant, that has established a cooperative export control regime, 
and that every single nation that participates in the Australia Group 
must concur that there is no CWC requirement that would weaken the 
Group's export controls. Then, annually, certification is required to 
the Congress that the Group's controls have not been weakened. Further, 
the condition requires the President to block any attempt within the 
Australia Group to change the Group's view of its obligations under the 
CWC.
  Condition 16 requires the President to notify Congress if he ever 
determines the Convention's secretariat, the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, has willfully divulged confidential 
business information that results in a financial loss or damage to U.S. 
company, and to withhold half the United States' annual assessment 
toward the OPCW's expenses if such a breach occurs and the OPCW does 
not waive immunity for prosecution of any OPCW official involved in the 
breach, or if the OPCW refuses to establish an investigatory commission 
to investigate the breach.
  Condition 15 requires the United States not to contribute to the 
voluntary fund the CWC establishes for providing chemical weapons 
defense assistance to other parties to the treaty, and, with regard to 
the CWC requirement for all treaty parties to assist other party 
nations who have been attacked with chemicals or are threatened with 
such an attack, the same condition limits U.S. assistance to those 
nations determined to be adversaries to medical antidotes and 
treatments.

  Perhaps the least credible argument raised by the CWC's opponents is 
that this treaty would place unreasonable burdens on America's chemical 
industry. It would seem that those making this argument have not been 
listening to what the chemical industry itself has been saying for the 
last two decades. The chemical industry's reasons for supporting the 
convention are not altogether altruistic, but they are imminently 
logical. First and foremost, the chemical industry seeks to 
disassociate itself from the odious practice of making chemical 
weapons. Equally important, the U.S. industry long ago decided that the 
Chemical Weapons Convention would be good for business. The convention 
contains automatic economic sanctions that preclude treaty members from 
trading in controlled chemicals with states that do not join. The U.S. 
chemical industry, which is America's largest exporter, views the 
convention as a way to a more open marketplace. Industry 
representatives describe their obligations under the treaty as 
manageable and acceptable; to wit, the CWC will not impose inspections, 
regulations, intrusions, or costs greater than those already required 
by other Federal laws and standards.
  But it is very important to go beyond the fact that the chemical 
industry believes the CWC will not impose significantly difficult 
burdens on its companies--and look closely at the critical fact that 
U.S. failure to ratify will result in tremendous financial and market 
share losses--grave in the near term and likely even worse in the 
longer term--for the U.S. chemical industry. In a letter dated August 
29,

[[Page S3525]]

1996, the CEO's of 53 of America's most prominent chemical companies 
bluntly stated: ``Our industry's status as the world's preferred 
supplier of chemical products may be jeopardized if the United States 
does not ratify the convention.'' The American chemical industry would 
be marked as unreliable and unjustly associated with chemical weapons 
proliferation. If the resolution of ratification of the CWC were to be 
defeated, it would cost the U.S. chemical industry significant portion 
of its $60 billion export business--many in the industry have agreed on 
an estimate of $600 million a year--and result in the loss of thousands 
of good-paying American jobs.
  Under the terms of the CWC, some 2,000 U.S. industry facilities--not 
companies--will be affected by the treaty. Of that group, some 1,800 
will be asked to fill out brief data declaration forms and the 
remaining 200 are likely to undergo inspections. Assertions that the 
neighborhood ``Mom and Pop'' dry cleaners, cosmetics firms, and 
breweries will be involved in this are wildly inaccurate.
  In addition, although the industry's representatives explained 
patiently to Senators that the CWC's onsite verification and inspection 
procedures will not violate a U.S. company's constitutional protection 
against undue search or seizure, there is included in the 28 agreed 
conditions condition 28 that requires the United States to obtain a 
criminal search warrant in the case of any challenge inspection of a 
U.S. facility to which the facility does not give its consent, and to 
obtain an administrative search warrant from a U.S. magistrate judge in 
the case of any routine inspection of a U.S. facility to which the 
facility does not give its consent.
  The U.S. chemical industry led by the Chemical Manufacturers 
Association, the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association, 
and the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America have 
repeatedly and unequivocally requested that the Senate approve the 
resolution of ratification and pass its associated implementing 
legislation. Industry's support of this treaty should not be 
questioned, it should be applauded.

  It's suprising to see nonindustry people shouting industry concern 
when the industry itself was intimately involved in developing the 
convention and the proposed implementation legislation and is urging 
the Senate to approve the resolution of ratification. The CEO's or 
other senior executives of seven major chemical firms with significant 
operations in my home State of Massachusetts are among those who have 
repeatedly urged the Senate to approve the resolution of ratification. 
Frankly, in my judgment, the statements of these executives concerning 
the effects this convention will have on their businesses are more 
credible than the contradictory statements of the opponents of the CWC.
  Also among the arguments against the convention used by its critics 
is the assertion that the CWC will cost the American taxpayers too much 
money. On the contrary, the U.S. share of the CWC's monitoring and 
inspection regime, approximately $20 million annually, is far less than 
the $75 million annual cost to store America's chemical weapons. This 
$20 million of support for the international inspection agency is 
minuscule in comparison to the amounts we spend for U.S. defenses. This 
is a small price to pay to institute and maintain an international 
mechanism that will dramatically reduce the chemical weapons threat 
that faces U.S. service men and women and establish an international 
norm for national behavior which is so apparently in the interests of 
this Nation and, indeed, all the world's people. And, lest the 
estimates of the costs of U.S. participation prove to be low, included 
in the 28 agreed conditions is a condition that limits the U.S. annual 
contribution to no more than $25 million a year, to be adjusted every 
third year based on changes in the Consumer Price Index.
  The United States led the international community throughout the 
negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Three administrations--
two Republican and one Democratic--have labored to develop and place 
before the Senate a carefully crafted instrument that will increase the 
safety and security of U.S. citizens and armed forces and will do so at 
very reasonable costs to taxpayers, companies that make and use 
legitimate chemicals, and American consumers. Former Presidents Ford, 
Carter, and Bush have spoken out strongly in favor of ratification. 
Today 1996 Republican Presidential nominee and former Senate Majority 
Leader Robert Dole announced his support for the CWC coupled with the 
28 conditions to which bipartisan agreement has been secured.

  Rarely does one see a situation in which it is more important to 
apply the admonition that we would be wise not to let the perfect 
become the enemy of the good. Perfect security against chemical weapons 
is unattainable. I have great hopes that wise Senators will not permit 
a group of Senators who will not be satisfied by the greatest 
achievable increase in our security, and many of whom have a basic 
objection to any international arms control treaty to scuttle a 
carefully engineered agreement that our military leaders, our 
intelligence community senior executives, former Presidents of both 
parties, President Clinton, and 1996 Presidential nominee Dole agree 
will make all Americans and, indeed, the entire world safer and more 
secure from chemical weapons.
  In closing, I want to commend those who have labored diligently to 
bring the Senate to this point. Former Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee Chairman Richard Lugar, with the assistance of his able 
staff, has done yeoman service and again demonstrated his capacity as a 
leader and statesman. Senator Joe Biden, the ranking Democratic member 
of the Foreign Relations Committee, has labored, also with the help of 
his staff, to bring this treaty before the Senate. Senator Carl Levin, 
ranking Democrat on the Armed Services Committee, and Senate Democratic 
Leader Tom Daschle, each knowledgeable and dedicated, have made 
considerable contributions to this effort and to the debate. Majority 
Leader Trent Lott's leadership has permitted negotiation of 28 
conditions designed to reassure those who in good faith had questions 
and concerns about various aspects of the treaty. I compliment and 
thank all of them.
  Mr. President the compelling logic of this convention and the breadth 
and depth of support for it should produce an overwhelming vote to 
approve the resolution of ratification. I have great hope that the 
Senate will demonstrate its ability by taking this important step of 
ratifying this treaty. I urge my colleagues to vote for the resolution.