[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 49 (Wednesday, April 23, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3492-S3520]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]



                         Privilege of the Floor

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield 10 seconds for a 
unanimous-consent request regarding a staff member?
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Greg Suchan, a fellow on 
the staff of Senator McCain, be granted the privilege of the floor 
during the discussion of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BIDEN. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. KYL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona is recognized.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, we are now going to commence additional 
debate on the Chemical Weapons Convention. I would like to begin with 
some general observations about treaties in general and about this 
treaty in particular.
  Mr. President, I want to begin by making what should be an obvious 
point. But in view of some of the rhetoric, I think it is important to 
reiterate it; that is, that the opponents of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention abhor chemical weapons just as much as proponents do. If 
this treaty performs as it is advertised to perform, I think everyone 
in this body would be supportive of it. Certainly those who oppose the 
convention support eliminating our chemical weapons, which will happen 
with or without the Chemical Weapons Convention.

  As has been noted by previous speakers, the United States is 
committed to eliminating all of our chemical weapons, and I suspect 
that everyone in this Chamber supports that position. So opposition is 
not based on the notion that we would retain our chemical weapons.
  Mr. President, I also ask that the Record reflect that the Senator 
from Iowa, Senator Grassley, was present and voted ``aye'' on the last 
two votes.
  Mr. President, let me move forward to this proposition. Last week the 
Senate approved Senate Resolution 495, which demonstrates our 
commitment to do more. Whether one supports the Chemical Weapons 
Convention or not, this was an important bill to demonstrate our 
commitment, both here at home and abroad, to do more to try to stop the 
spread of chemical weapons, and not doing it alone, as my friend from 
Delaware has said, because Senate Resolution 495 contains several 
provisions that call for additional multilateral action on the part of 
the United States. It requires the President, for example, to use his 
best efforts to keep the Australia Group intact and to work against any 
weakening of the Australia Group restrictions on trade in chemicals; to 
work with Russia to ensure that it conforms to its obligations under 
the bilateral destruction agreement; for the President to impose 
sanctions on countries that violate international law with respect to 
chemical weapons.
  So Senate Resolution 495 was not a go-it-alone resolution. Quite to 
the contrary. Though it did close some loopholes in American law, it 
also reached out in various specific ways to enable us to deal with the 
problem of the spread of chemical weapons in more practical and 
specific ways than the Chemical Weapons Convention itself does.
  We have just had a vote on the resolution of ratification as 
presented by Senator Helms, the resolution that is currently before us. 
Many of us voted for that resolution, to make the point that we favor 
the Chemical Weapons Convention so long as it has certain protections 
built into it. I think it should also be clear that the opposition to 
the Chemical Weapons convention is not based on politics.
  As one of my colleagues said, there will be criticism of President 
Clinton. I don't think you will hear criticism of President Clinton. 
The opposition to this treaty is not based on politics. Indeed, it is 
not an easy treaty to oppose. I think those who oppose it must be 
recognized as doing so because of a firm principle and commitment 
rather than anything political.

[[Page S3493]]

  Another general point I would like to make is this. The Senate has a 
constitutional obligation to independently scrutinize treaties. It has 
been said that treaties are forever. Most of the treaties that have 
been ratified by the U.S. Senate are still in force--treaties that are 
many, many, many years old, some undoubtedly far beyond this time. It 
is like amending the Constitution. It requires a two-thirds vote. It 
requires a great deal of thought, therefore, on the part of the Senate.
  Mr. President, we are not a rubber stamp. No one should feel that 
they have to support this treaty just because it has been proposed. 
Treaties are no substitute for sensible action. They are in many 
respects inherently limited in their value, especially when the nations 
with whom they are entered into are not committed to the principles of 
the treaty. There are examples in past history that demonstrate this.
  The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, which outlawed war, was obviously 
something that everyone felt good about supporting. But the actions 
didn't follow the words, and we know what happened.
  Also, this morning one of my colleagues quoted Will Rogers, who said, 
``We have never lost a war or won a treaty.'' While that has a certain 
ring of truth to it, I don't think anyone would suggest that, 
therefore, all treaties are bad. As a matter of fact, we have supported 
very specific treaties that we think have done some good--arms control 
treaties like the INF Treaty, the START I Treaty, and the START II 
Treaty. As a matter of fact, I was asked to support the START II Treaty 
on the grounds that Russia would not ratify the START II Treaty until 
the United States did. So we did. We support the START II Treaty. It 
was ratified here. And 2 years later, the Russians still have not 
ratified the START II Treaty. So I agree with my colleagues who say 
that some treaties can be useful. I also make the point that one should 
not rely strictly on treaties.
  I also am troubled by the proposition that we somehow feel that we 
could do internationally that which we could never do domestically. I 
don't think any of us would contend, for example, that we think we can 
solve the problem of crime by going to the criminals in our 
neighborhoods and making a treaty with them to stop committing crime. 
Instead, we have police forces, we have laws, we have specific 
punishments, we have a court system, and we put people in prison when 
they violate those laws. In other words, we take specific action to 
deal with the problem. We don't rely upon the written word of someone 
who may be unreliable. Yet, in the international forum that seems to be 
very much in vogue.

  I don't think there is any reason that we can believe that a treaty 
with Iran, for example, is going to change its behavior, or Iraq, or 
Libya, or North Korea, or many of the other rogue states throughout the 
world. I think it is countries like Iran that want the benefits of the 
CWC and the lifting of the trade restrictions that we currently have 
with Iran, secure in the knowledge that it can avoid detection and/or 
any punishment that might follow that. Treaties generally do not modify 
the behavior of states. The law-abiding will abide, and those that 
intend to cheat will either cheat or not join at all.
  That is why these multilateral treaties, unlike some of the bilateral 
treaties that we entered into earlier, are more difficult to make work. 
Frequently what they do is complicate diplomacy and encourage 
dishonesty. We know that there are numerous examples of violations of 
existing treaties and previous treaties. But it was uncomfortable for 
us to bring those violations to light because, frankly, we thought that 
we had bigger fish to fry. We had more important matters with those 
states than the violation of a particular treaty. As a result, 
paradoxically it was more difficult to enforce these conditions once 
the treaty went into effect than it was before, because once the treaty 
went into effect, in order to upset the applecart, we have to find 
violations. We take it to the body that is going to find a violation 
and sanction, and we decide that would be diplomatically difficult 
because we want to accomplish some greater purpose with the state that 
is in violation. So we just forget the whole thing. What that does is 
literally put into law the violations that are occurring currently. So 
they can complicate diplomacy and encourage dishonesty.
  The bottom line about this general discussion is this: Sometimes 
treaties can be very useful and sometimes not. We have an obligation to 
make that distinction--not just to take the word that, if a treaty has 
been proposed, we have an obligation to support it. That is not the job 
of the U.S. Senate. Treaties are not an excuse to do that which is 
difficult. It is like making a New Year's resolution rather than 
beginning to diet. Sometimes we have to have the courage to begin the 
diet rather than just relying on a New Year's resolution.
  Mr. President, a second set of general comments:
  Reasonable people can differ over the Chemical Weapons Convention. We 
have a series of former governmental officials on both sides of this 
issue. We have former Secretaries of Defense, ambassadors, generals, 
columnists--all of whom have come out very publicly against the treaty. 
There is undoubtedly an equal number who have come out for the chemical 
weapons treaty. I hope we can begin this debate with the proposition 
that reasonable people can differ on this very important matter. 
Frankly, when former Secretaries of State--like Dick Cheney, Casper 
Weinberger, Don Rumsfeld, James Schlesinger; former Defense officials, 
such as Jeane Kirkpatrick and Richard Perle, Gen. P.X. Kelley, and 
Freddie Clay--when people like this say that they are opposed to the 
treaty, it ought to be clear that there are reasonable arguments on 
both sides and that neither side should claim that all right and truth 
and justice are on their side.
  Important columnists have also weighed in to this and find themselves 
on both sides of the issue.
  That is why I am troubled by the slogan of some people in the 
administration--and, in particular, I will cite the Secretary of State, 
who has said on national television that one of the reasons to vote for 
this treaty is that it has ``Made in America'' written all over it. Mr. 
President, that is not a substitute for reasoned argument. It is a 
slogan. It misrepresents the Reagan administration's position on the 
chemical weapons treaty, which, by the way, was very much different 
than the treaty that is before the Senate today.
  I can point out the fact that there have been other treaties proposed 
to the U.S. Senate that also had ``Made in America'' written all over 
them--like the League of Nations, which this Senate in its judgment 
decided not to rubberstamp but to reject.
  There were cries at the time similar to the cries you hear today that 
it would isolate America; that it would hurt our business; that we 
would be the laughingstock of the world; that, after all, President 
Wilson was the one who created this treaty and how could we vote 
against it. Moreover, we would be the pariah in the world if we voted 
against the League of Nations. But in 1919, this body exercised its 
judgment, its constitutional prerogative and it declined to allow the 
United States to participate. And I do not think today there are very 
many people who believe this country made a mistake by waiting and 
creating instead the United Nations.
  We, I think, should be able to go forward. I think it takes more 
courage sometimes to go forward with a position that acknowledges a 
mistake than it does to simply blindly go forward and perhaps have in 
the back of your mind the idea that you have made a mistake but it 
would not look good if you backed out at this time.
  That is another one of the arguments being made by the opponents; we 
would be embarrassed internationally if we backed out of the treaty at 
this point or caused part of it to be renegotiated. I submit that 
knowing we have made a mistake at least with regard to articles X and 
XI in this treaty, we should have the courage to fix articles X and XI 
before our resolution of ratification is deposited at The Hague.
  Now another general comment, Mr. President. No one has a monopoly on 
morality. Ours is a disagreement about means, not about ends. I want to 
make this point very clear because some people, perhaps a little 
overzealous to push this treaty, have inferred that those who vote 
against it somehow

[[Page S3494]]

support the use of chemical weapons. I watched my grandfather die, Mr. 
President, from emphysema acquired as a result of his being gassed in 
World War I in Europe. Therefore, I take a back seat to no one in 
expressing my abhorrence for these despicable weapons and why I fully 
support the United States eliminating our chemical weapons and leading 
the world in that regard. We are the only country in the world with 
chemical weapons that has declared we will eliminate all of our stocks 
of those weapons.
  So I hope no one tries to lecture me about the evils of poison gas 
and how the only way to deal with that is through this Chemical Weapons 
Convention. We have been the moral leader of the world by imposing 
trade restrictions on countries like Iran, for example, restrictions 
that will probably have to be lifted as a result of this treaty because 
of articles X and XI. So I believe that insisting on renegotiation of 
articles X and XI would confirm our moral position. Our negotiators 
tried but failed to win key concessions on those provisions. In the 
future, they will be strengthened by the knowledge that the Senate will 
not go along with such halfway measures with a defective treaty.
  So, Mr. President, my point here is this. It matters how we make a 
moral statement, and simply ballyhooing a treaty that everyone knows is 
flawed does not enhance our moral stature.
  Now to some specific comments. Those of us who have reservations 
about the treaty have said that it fails in its key objectives, that if 
it met these objectives we would support it, that our opposition is 
based on two simple points. It fails to meet the objectives and it does 
more harm than good.
  In what way does it fail to meet its objectives. It was proposed as a 
global and verifiable and enforceable treaty. Unfortunately, it is none 
of those. First, it is not global. It does not cover the key countries 
and the key chemicals that are currently suspected of being the 
problems. Nine of the 14 countries suspected of possessing chemical 
weapons have not even signed this treaty. These countries include 
Libya, Iraq, Syria, North Korea, Egypt, Sudan, Serbia, South Korea, and 
Taiwan. So many of the countries in the world that possess the 
chemicals are not signatories. They are not going to bind themselves to 
it. And there is nothing we can do in terms of verification or 
inspection or anything else that is going to deal with it. The best way 
to deal with those countries is to do what we are currently doing, 
which is to maintain and enforce the restrictions of the Australia 
Group.
  Now, I spoke of that before. What is it? It is a group of 29 
countries, including the United States, that have agreed among 
themselves not to trade these chemicals to countries that they think 
might want to develop chemical weapons with them. And we have these 
restrictions in place now. That is the best way to prevent the spread 
of these chemicals. Unfortunately, as an incentive to get countries to 
join the chemical weapons treaty, articles X and XI call into question 
the existence of those conditions and in fact in our view require that 
the states remove those restrictions and trade with the countries that 
are parties to the treaty.
  Second, the treaty is not verifiable. Now, proponents have said, 
well, nothing is 100-percent verifiable. That is a false standard, Mr. 
President. Nobody is claiming that it should be 100-percent verifiable. 
The question is whether it is effectively verifiable. And on that there 
is virtually unanimous agreement that, no, it is not effectively 
verifiable. I read to you a recently unclassified national 
intelligence estimate conclusion published originally in August of 1993 
which stated:

       The capability of the intelligence community to monitor 
     compliance with the CWC is severely limited and likely to 
     remain so for the rest of the decade. The key provision of 
     the monitoring regime, challenge inspections at undeclared 
     sites, can be thwarted by a nation determined to preserve a 
     small secret program using the delays and managed access 
     rules allowed by the convention.

  And there are a variety of other statements I could read, including 
statements of the former Director of the CIA, all of which confirm the 
fact that this is not a verifiable treaty.
  Nor is the treaty enforceable. Even if you were to find a violation 
and you brought it to the bodies that are supposed to run this treaty, 
you would have to have a three-quarter vote, and there is no sanction 
in place. Once they found a violation, they would go to the country and 
say, would you please stop violating. If the country continued to 
ignore them, although the likelihood is the country would say, well, 
sure, we would be happy to, and eventually hide the material in such a 
way that you could not find a violation in the future, but assuming the 
violation continued and you continue to prove that, what is the 
sanction? There is none. Where do you go? The United Nations, the 
General Assembly.
  Mr. President, that is not a place where at least the United States 
has been treated very kindly in the past. And if you have to go all the 
way to the Security Council, Russia, China, other states have a veto. 
So it is unlikely that significant punishment would be meted out. As a 
matter of fact, the evidence of that probably most clearly is the case 
of Iraq which admittedly--I should not say admittedly. They denied it, 
but after inspection it was confirmed that chemical weapons were used 
against both Iran and against the Kurdish population of Iraq itself and 
yet the United Nations, the peace-loving nations of the world were 
incapable of mustering the courage to even name Iraq in a meaningless 
resolution about the use of these weapons. So it does not seem likely 
to me that the United Nations would muster the courage to impose any 
kind of particular sanction.
  Now, another one of the selling points of this treaty, according to 
its proponents, is, well, it is better than nothing. In other words, 
granted, it does not cover a lot of the countries we wished it covered 
and it is not very verifiable and there are not any particular 
sanctions in the treaty, but at least it is better than nothing.
  Our response to that is essentially twofold. First of all, it is very 
costly both in terms of money and potential constitutional restrictions 
and, second, there are some other very significant reasons why it is 
not better than nothing.
  In terms of cost, we know that the cost to the Government is going to 
be $150 million to $200 million annually. Businesses are going to have 
to pay between $200,000 and $500,000 for inspections. Just to fill out 
the forms, and there are thousands of businesses in this country that 
will have to fill out the forms, it is going to be a $50,000 to $70,000 
proposition, and, of course, untold amounts lost in confidential 
business information which can result as a result of the industrial 
espionage that most people believe will result from the inspections 
under this treaty.
  Second, we mentioned the constitutional issues. There has been an 
attempt to fix about half of the constitutional issues. One deals with 
the fourth amendment, and there has been an amendment to say a search 
warrant would be required. The problem with that is that it would 
probably be found to be in violation of the treaty if a constitutional 
requirement were imposed to prevent the treaty from operating as it was 
written.
  So if we actually go ahead with a protection from fourth amendment 
searches and seizures, we may very well be found in violation of the 
treaty. On the other hand, those responsible for making such a decision 
may decide that we can have such a constitutional protection in which 
case I think we can count on all of the other nations that want to 
avoid detection doing the same thing and, of course, as a nation that 
lives under the rule of law we will abide by it in a proper way. And I 
think we can count on countries like Iran or China or Cuba, for 
example, to use that as an excuse not to allow the kind of inspections 
that would result in detection.
  The other part of the Constitution, the fifth amendment, presents a 
special problem that nobody has figured out how to fix. The fifth 
amendment provides that if there is a taking by the Government of 
property one is entitled to be paid. The problem is that when the U.S. 
Government imposes this regime on American businesses and individuals, 
it has not yet made the commitment to pay them. My own guess is that I 
would have a right to sue and the U.S. Government would have to pay but 
there is no provision for that. You cannot sue under the Federal Tort 
Claim Act, and so we would have to somehow construct an ability to sue

[[Page S3495]]

the U.S. Government and provide for the unlimited liability that would 
result from such an undertaking. So that has not been dealt with 
either.

  The bottom line is the constitutional issues remain very much up in 
the air.
  Now, those are some of the costs. I think, however, the biggest costs 
are the following two. The mere fact that this treaty has been proposed 
has caused many to decide that we do not have to worry as much about 
defending our troops. I know the President has made a big matter out of 
saying that this treaty would help to protect our troops. Well, I think 
he is very wrong and his own administration officials verify this 
because for the last 2 years his representatives have come to the 
Congress and based on the fact that the United States signed this 
treaty and they presumed we would ratify it, this administration has 
called for reductions in spending on defensive measures for our troops.
  How can a President who tries to sell the treaty on the basis that it 
will be good for our troops, that it will protect them, come before the 
Congress not once but twice and call for a reduction in funding to 
provide defenses for our troops? Two years ago, $850 million. 
Fortunately, we restored it. What was the reason? The reason expressly 
was because this treaty is going to enter into force and we will be a 
part of it, as if the treaty were going to make the threat go away.
  And this year General Shalikashvili let us cut another $1.5 billion 
over 5 years out of this part of the defense budget, this despite the 
fact that the General Accounting Office in a very critical report 
following the Persian Gulf war, updated just last year, has found that 
our defenses are in a very serious state of disrepair; that we are not 
adequately prepared; that we have not provided our soldiers, our 
marines, our fighting people who are going to be confronting chemical 
or biological warfare the kind of training, the kind of equipment, the 
kind of antidotes, the kind of protection they deserve. So you have GAO 
in a very current finding that we are not doing enough for our troops, 
the administration trying to cut the funding to do more, and the 
President saying that the chemical weapons treaty will solve the 
problem.
  That is what I had reference to when I said that treaties can make 
you feel good, like you have solved a problem, but when it comes to the 
lives of American soldiers, we will not have done enough to protect 
them. And that is why we should not be lulled into a sense of false 
security by signing a piece of paper that I do not think people would 
loan money on if they wanted to get it back, frankly. So, this treaty 
does damage. It is worse than nothing.

  What is another example? You have heard me talk about articles X and 
XI. You are going to hear a lot about that, because articles X and XI 
turn out not to be such a good idea. I am going to discuss that in more 
detail later. They were put into the treaty at a time when it seemed 
like a good idea. Now it does not seem like such a good idea. The 
administration and everybody else acknowledges we have a problem here. 
The problem is, everybody is embarrassed to go back and change it. The 
administration says, ``Well, we negotiated the best deal we could.'' We 
say, ``Because it is flawed, let us go back and take those two sections 
out.'' But the administration does not want to do that. Not taking them 
out is going to result in a proliferation of chemical weapons and 
technology, not a restriction of it. Again, I will get into that in 
more detail later.
  The point I want to make here is that as long as this treaty has 
articles X and XI in it, it is going to be worse than nothing because 
it is going to result in the proliferation of chemicals rather than a 
restriction. I will just quote one sentence that a letter that former 
Defense Secretary, Dick Cheney wrote in this regard. He said, ``In my 
judgment, the treaty's article X and XI amount to a formula for greatly 
accelerating the proliferation of chemical warfare capabilities around 
the globe.'' So, in this second significant respect, the treaty makes 
the situation worse than it was before.
  Finally, as I made a point to mention before, it is going to 
significantly reduce our diplomatic options. Claiming violations will 
take back seat to more pressing diplomatic considerations. We have seen 
this in a variety of situations. When the Russians were in violation of 
the ABM Treaty and had a radar at a place called Krasnoyarsk, we were 
in delicate negotiations with them in a variety of other things and 
therefore it was ``see no evil,'' basically. ``We are really not all 
that sure they violated the treaty,'' when in fact our intelligence 
community knew full well they had. And after the Soviet Union broke up, 
its leaders said, ``Sure we were in violation.'' The question is, why 
didn't we do anything about it? Well, because we did not want to upset 
the diplomatic applecart.
  Think about China with MFN. Are we going to upset the diplomatic 
applecart? You see, today we do not have to because there is no treaty. 
Once a treaty is in place we have an obligation. If we know there are 
violations--perhaps, for example, with China--we would have an 
obligation to send inspectors over there and ask them to see what they 
could find. One of two things will happen. Either they are going to 
confirm there are violations--unlikely, in which case we are then going 
to have to do something about it. More likely, they will come back and 
say, ``Well, we couldn't prove it.''
  As a result, China or whoever is doing the violating will have the 
Good Housekeeping stamp of approval. We set up this regime. You try to 
find people guilty. But the burden is so difficult you are not going to 
find people guilty. They are going to, in effect, be acquitted. And 
when they are acquitted we have then diminished our opportunity to 
negotiate with them, to tell them to stop selling chemicals, for 
example, to Iran or other countries we do not want to have them. In 
that respect, again, the treaty reduces our diplomatic options. It puts 
us into a box. It makes it more difficult to deal with these kinds of 
violations and in that respect again it is not better than nothing, it 
is worse than doing nothing.
  What are some of the administration's claims? First of all, they have 
made the astonishing claim that failure to ratify the treaty would mean 
that we are aligned with the pariah states of Iraq and Libya because 
Iraq and Libya are not going to sign or ratify this treaty. I hope the 
Secretary of State and the President of the United States could 
discriminate a little better than that. I could make the same argument 
to them. If we sign the treaty, we are going to be in with a bunch of 
other pariah states. Do they think it is any better to be with Iran or 
Cuba? These are states that have signed the treaty and presumably will 
ratify it. Obviously, that is not an argument that gets you anywhere. 
But it is the kind of simplistic, superficial argument that this 
administration is using to sell the treaty. It is an affront to the 
intelligence of the Senate. As I said, I hope the President and 
Secretary of State can make better distinctions than that.
  I also note it is a bit meaningless at this point to join the treaty, 
though 67 other nations have joined it, because they do not have 
chemical weapons. The countries that have chemical weapons have not 
joined it, and many of them are not going to. About 99 percent of the 
world's chemical weapons, according to open source material, are held 
by three countries, none of whom have joined the treaty: The United 
States, Russia, and China. We have a bilateral destruction agreement 
with Russia, in which we are trying to get them to destroy their 
chemical weapons--and they decided they are not going to follow through 
with that, apparently. So, what makes us think that we are going to do 
any good by joining the treaty, when about 80 percent-plus of the 
chemicals in China and Russia would be outside the purview of the 
treaty?

  The next comment made is, ``No treaty is 100 percent verifiable.'' I 
think I dealt with that before. Nobody is claiming it needs to be 100-
percent verifiable, but when we say this treaty is not adequately 
verifiable or effectively verifiable, their comeback is, ``Well, no 
treaty is 100 percent.'' That is not the issue. The issue is whether it 
is effectively verifiable, and unfortunately no one claims that this 
treaty is effectively verifiable.
  No one, for example, has said that they have high confidence that 
this treaty will timely detect significant violations. As a matter of 
fact, one of

[[Page S3496]]

the strong supporters of the treaty, a friend and someone who has 
served this country well, and we have a difference of opinion about the 
treaty, Ron Adelman, said in an op-ed piece he wrote on February 20, 
``Granted, the treaty is virtually unverifiable and granted it doesn't 
seem right for the Senate to ratify an unverifiable treaty. . .'' he 
went on to say: ``however, I think we are still better off by going 
ahead.''
  My point is that even treaty proponents acknowledge it is not 
verifiable, so let us not get into a debate as to whether it has to be 
100-percent verifiable or not. It is not effectively verifiable. That 
is the point.
  I discussed a bit ago the argument that the CWC will protect American 
troops and prevent a terrorist attack. No one who has spoken to this 
from an intelligence point of view can credibly make the claim that 
this treaty will, in any way, shape or form, reduce the threat of 
terrorism. Let me repeat that. Our intelligence community is unwilling 
to say that this treaty would stop terrorist attacks. And even one of 
the much vaunted agreements that was entered into between our friends 
on the other side of the aisle and Senator Helms recognizes the fact 
that the CWC is not effective to deal with the problem of terrorism. 
Let me quote one of the recently unclassified assessments of our 
intelligence agency, the Central Intelligence Agency:

       In the case of Aum Shinrikyo [this is the cult in Japan 
     that gassed Japanese citizens] the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention would not have hindered the cult from procuring 
     the needed chemical compounds needed in the production of 
     sarin. Further, the Aum would have escaped the requirement 
     for an end-use certification because it purchased the 
     chemicals within Japan.

  The point is, here, that chemicals are so easily secreted, chemical 
weapons are so easily made in small, confined spaces, that it is 
essentially impossible to find all of them. And a terrorist group, in a 
room the size of a large closet, in Japan, was able to make the sarin 
gas that they used. This Chemical Weapons Convention has no capability 
to deal with that. I will say it this way: It is a fraud on the 
American people to suggest that we have to adopt this treaty in order 
to do away with terrorist use of chemical weapons. It will not be 
effective for that purpose. It may have some other beneficial effects, 
but no one should contend that it is going to help with regard to 
terrorism.
  The same thing, as I said, is true with regard to the defense of our 
troops. If this administration were actually pursuing a strong 
defensive capability for our troops, that would be one thing, but it is 
not. As a result, I think it is not an appropriate argument for this 
administration to base the ratification of the treaty on.
  Another argument of the administration is that this is important to 
protect the jobs in the chemical industry and that there would be some 
losses to our chemical companies if the treaty were not adopted by the 
United States. First, I would say that this is no reason for the United 
States to enter into a treaty, simply to enhance the financial balance 
sheets of American companies. We are all for doing that, we are all for 
helping American businesses do well, but one does not enter into a 
treaty for that purpose. I think there should be a question about 
whether our chemical companies ought to be selling these kinds of 
chemicals to countries like Iran and Cuba and China in any event, 
because that is the new market that will open up. These are countries 
that have signed the treaty, not yet ratified. Presumably they will 
ratify it at some point so there will be an added market for us to sell 
our chemicals.
  The other added market is that if the Australia Group restrictions 
come off, then our companies would not be restricted by the Australia 
Group limitations. In both cases they would be able to sell more 
chemicals. I would argue that that is not necessarily a good thing, 
even though it might enhance their balance sheets.
  And to the argument that somehow there will be a downside to them, 
that they will actually lose money, it is an argument that does not 
persuade me. Because folks should know that the only limitation that 
can be imposed on companies in countries that do not sign the treaty is 
with respect to so-called schedule 1 and schedule 2 chemicals. These 
are the chemicals of chemical warfare, of chemical weapons and their 
precursors, by definition, made in noncommercial quantities. So the 
only limitation that could ever be imposed upon American companies, if 
it ever were, would be on such a small amount of chemicals that, even 
by their own definition it would constitute only a fraction of 1 
percent of the chemicals that are traded. We should pass the treaty for 
that? I do not think so.

  Another argument is that at least we will get more intelligence if we 
are a party to the treaty. This is the argument that says granted it 
may not solve all the problems but it is better to be inside than 
outside. I think this particular argument deserves a little bit of 
attention.
  I serve on the Senate Intelligence Committee. I know how this works. 
I think I should explain a little bit about it. The claim is not true. 
Our intelligence agencies, of course, always are looking for new 
opportunities to get information, but it is not correct to say that the 
chemical weapons treaty provides us that mechanism. The chemical 
weapons treaty says that if you want to inspect another country for a 
suspected violation, you bring the matter to the council in charge of 
the treaty, and if it decides to go forward, it will appoint three 
inspectors--but it cannot be somebody from your country. So, it would 
be somebody from three other countries that go do the inspection. They 
come back and they deposit their findings with this body, this 
executive council. And by the treaty terms they cannot share that 
information with anybody else. It is secret. So the United States, not 
being a party to the inspection, does not have the information, and 
cannot have it, under the terms of the treaty. So there is only one way 
that we would gain more information under the terms of the treaty and 
that is by cheating, by violating the treaty, by somehow trying to 
steal the information, by somehow trying to turn one of those 
inspectors to be an agent for us in violation of the treaty terms. That 
is how we would get more information--not legally, under the treaty.
  What would we do if we found somebody cheating? Let us assume that we 
find that Russia or China has chemical weapons, is not destroying 
them--in other words, does possess in violation of this treaty. Would 
we insist on sanctions? How about today? Take the case of China. Would 
we insist on sanctions? We shake in our boots when the President of 
Taiwan comes over, attends his 25th class reunion at Cornell, and the 
Chinese Government threatens to lob missiles into Los Angeles and 
steams in the Straits of Taiwan and sends missiles over Taiwan. Are we 
going to impose sanctions on China because of a finding that they have 
maintained a chemical weapons stock? Are we going to have to prove to 
this international body, this executive council, that they are in 
violation? And at what cost to our relations?
  The problem is, with the treaty you can no longer ignore violations. 
You either object or it ends up in a whitewash. Either way it creates 
significant problems.
  There is a final argument that has been made recently and it 
mystifies me because it doesn't go anywhere but they have been making 
it, so I will try to respond. Proponents say we are getting rid of our 
weapons, and therefore the chemical weapon convention will force others 
to do so, too. It is absolutely true the United States is getting rid 
of our weapons. We are committed to doing that. We do not need the 
Chemical Weapons Convention to prove to the world that we are the moral 
leader of the world. We have said we are getting rid of ours. Nobody 
else has, but we have.
  So you don't need the Chemical Weapons Convention. I challenge my 
friends who propose the treaty, in what way will the chemical weapons 
treaty make the other countries get rid of theirs? That is the purpose, 
that is the goal, but there is no effective mechanism to make it 
happen, and there is no intelligence estimate or assessment to that 
effect, Mr. President.
  We are going to have an opportunity tomorrow to go into classified 
session and hear just what our intelligence community has to say about 
the chemical weapons programs of other nations and about what we think 
they are going to be doing in the future, and I urge my colleagues to 
attend that session.

[[Page S3497]]

  (Ms. COLLINS assumed the chair.)
  Mr. KYL. Finally, Madam President, there has been much made of the 
fact that in the negotiations over this treaty, numerous improvements 
were made and, therefore, we should remove our objections and go along 
with the treaty.
  First of all, I want to set the stage. Last fall when the treaty came 
before the Senate, the statement was that we couldn't touch it, that we 
couldn't negotiate anything, we had to use the resolution that came out 
of the committee and there were no changes that were possible; ``You 
can't change the treaty; we're not interested in negotiating any 
terms.''
  It turned out there was not sufficient support for the treaty and, 
therefore, the administration had it pulled. Interestingly enough, last 
night I saw a news program, the Jim Lehrer News Hour, in which it was 
misstated that Senator Dole, the previous majority leader, asked the 
treaty to be withdrawn. He did not ask the treaty to be withdrawn. He 
was not even in the Senate at the time. He wrote a letter in opposition 
to the treaty, but he did not ask it be withdrawn. He just said he 
wouldn't vote for it if it were still in the Senate. It was withdrawn 
by the administration, by the Clinton administration, not by anyone 
here in the Senate.
  Notwithstanding the fact that the administration took the position 
that nothing could change, once the treaty was found not to have 
adequate support, the administration began to change its tune, and 
little by little, they began to sit down and talk to those who had 
objections. Over many months, various concessions were made which 
marginally improved the situation. Now, they are not concessions with 
respect to the treaty itself because it can't be changed, but there are 
some things which at least help to clarify how the United States is 
going to proceed, and had it not been for the considerable efforts of 
the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, these changes would 
not have been made. So while they were critical of the chairman for his 
opposition to the treaty, it turns out that now they are bragging about 
the changes that he sought to have made, and I think that is a very 
important point, Madam President. Let me just repeat it. While 
initially deriding the concerns of the chairman of the committee, they 
are now bragging about the changes that he forced them to make, 
claiming that this makes it a better treaty, now we should all support 
it. It does make it a better treaty, but at the margins, not at the 
core.
  What has been negotiated? First of all, there are nine specific 
conditions that merely restate existing constitutional protections. 
Those could not have been taken away in any event, but it was helpful 
to get the administration to acknowledge that they existed. They were 
even reluctant to acknowledge some of these constitutional protections. 
We could do without them, because they are in the Constitution anyway, 
but at least it was handy to get the administration to acknowledge that 
they existed.
  Second, there are two conditions that merely allow the Congress to 
enact appropriations or approve reprogramming. As every Senator knows, 
we have that right. We are the body, along with the House, that enacts 
appropriations or approves reprogramming. So that was essentially 
meaningless, though handy to have the administration acknowledge.
  There are four conditions that call for reports. Whenever you see a 
call for a report, Madam President, you know that that means we tried 
to reach agreement on something, we couldn't, so we said, ``By golly, 
we'll have a study on it, we'll have a report.'' And that is what this 
calls for. There are seven conditions that call for Presidential 
certifications, all of which he can make today. These were not 
concessions by the administration. They were able to agree to these 
because these are certifications they can currently make. So one should 
not brag about those.
  Four additional conditions are a restatement of current U.S. policy. 
Again, we thought these were good to have on paper in connection with 
the treaty so there would be no mistake about what U.S. policy was. It 
isn't new, it isn't new policy, it isn't a compromise, it isn't a 
negotiated settlement; this is just a restatement in the resolution of 
ratification about existing U.S. policy. One of the conditions doesn't 
take effect until 1998.
  I conclude, then, with the two that have some meaning. One deals with 
search and seizures under the fourth amendment, and I discussed that 
briefly a moment ago. The other deals with the subject of riot control 
agents. We do not know what the courts will do with either of these 
two.

  I spoke to the issue of the fourth amendment. The resolution includes 
a statement that we will require search warrants, either administrative 
warrants or criminal warrants in the appropriate case. That may or may 
not be effective under the treaty. It may be declared in violation of 
the treaty. If not, other countries are going to be able to do the same 
thing. While the United States will assiduously adhere to the law and 
to the Constitution, my guess is if other States are able to do the 
same thing, we will suddenly find interesting provisions in the Iranian 
Constitution or Chinese Constitution that are going to constitute 
loopholes big enough to drive a truck through.
  The other matter is important, but in the overall scheme of things, I 
think perhaps more has been made of it than was generally warranted, 
and it is still not certain that it is resolved, but at least the 
allegation is that it is. This has to do with riot control agents, tear 
gas to most people. This was one of the areas in which the Bush and 
Reagan administrations had been very clear, and the Clinton 
administration changed policy, another example of a situation where 
this is not the same treaty that the Bush and Reagan administrations 
had in mind. They always thought you could use tear gas in certain 
situations; for example, to rescue a downed pilot, to deal with a 
situation where you had civilians surrounding an American hostage, for 
example. Rather than having to shoot those people, we say it makes 
sense to use tear gas to disperse the crowd and rescue the American. 
This administration said, no, we don't interpret the treaty as allowing 
that. Even people who support the treaty, like Gen. Brent Scowcroft, 
said, that's crazy, that has to be changed. It took a long time to get 
the administration to finally agree in concept to a change. I am still 
not persuaded the language does it, but let's assume in good faith they 
have really agreed to a change in this policy. What that will mean is 
that, at least in that limited kind of situation, we will be able to 
use tear gas. That is a positive development, but in light of the final 
points that I want to make here, it is not reason to change from 
supporting a treaty that is not global, not verifiable, not effective, 
does more harm than good. That change is helpful but not dispositive.
  What are the five unresolved issues? The way this treaty comes before 
the Senate, it is the Helms resolution of ratification. In other words, 
it is a resolution wrapped around the treaty. It has 28 agreed-upon 
items, and then, in addition, there are 5 that are not agreed upon. 
Those are the items that constitute the Helms resolution of 
ratification. To approve the treaty, we will vote on the resolution of 
ratification. The proponents of the treaty have the right under the 
rule here to seriatim move to strike each of these five remaining 
conditions. If they are all stricken, then we will end up voting for 
the Helms resolution of ratification sans these five protections. If 
four of them are stricken, we will have one, and so forth.
  What are these five unresolved issues? These are the core of the 
dispute. This is really what it is all about. And this is what I will 
spend the rest of my time on.
  The first issue says the country that has the most chemical weapons 
in the world, Russia, is not a party to the treaty. It has not complied 
with various agreements that we have concerning destruction of its 
chemical weapons stocks and its biological weapons, incidentally, and 
it has not agreed to abide by a memorandum of understanding with this 
country under which it would list its stocks of chemicals. These were 
key agreements that were part of the basis for the Reagan and Bush 
administrations' sponsorship of this treaty. Russia had agreed to these 
things. One is called the bilateral destruction agreement. The other is 
called the Wyoming memorandum of understanding.

[[Page S3498]]

 The Reagan and Bush administrations believed that if the Russians 
complied with these provisions, that the chemical weapons treaty might 
be a good thing. But they are not complying with them. Again, we will 
hear some details in the session tomorrow. But the fact of the matter 
is, we ought to require that Russia at least demonstrates some good 
faith to proceed down the path toward declaring what they have and 
getting rid of those things. If there is no indication by the Russians 
that they intend to do this, then it seems a little odd to be entering 
into a treaty where 60 percent of the world's chemical weapons are not 
even being dealt with and we are basically conceding to the Russians 
that they don't have to agree with these other agreements with us. What 
we are saying is, to try to apply a little leverage to our friends in 
Russia, look, we know it is expensive to dismantle this, but that 
cannot be the only problem you have when you will not even declare all 
of the chemical weapons you have, when you won't even begin the process 
of dismantling them, when you have signaled that you are no longer 
going to be complying with the bilateral destruction agreement, you 
consider it now inoperative, no longer useful. We want some signs from 
you that you are serious about dealing with chemical weapons before we 
enter into the Chemical Weapons Convention.
  And there is a final reason for this, Madam President. One of the 
leaders of Russia has written to one of the top leaders of the United 
States and made it clear that if Russia is to join the Chemical Weapons 
Convention, it wants to do so at the same time the United States does. 
As a result, it would be highly unfortunate if the United States went 
ahead and ratified this treaty before the Russian Duma did. The Russian 
Duma is clearly not ready to do so. This first condition, therefore, in 
the Helms resolution of ratification says, ``Hold on, we will ratify 
the Chemical Weapons Convention, but we will not deposit our instrument 
of ratification at The Hague until Russia has done the same, thus 
enabling us to come in at the same time.'' That is all that condition 
says.
  It would require certification by the President that Russia is making 
progress, that it intends to comply, it is making progress toward 
complying. They don't have to demonstrate that they have complied. We 
think that is a reasonable condition. I guess I will state it the other 
way around as to this first condition, should we be supporting a treaty 
that we know is being breached by the country that has the largest 
number of chemical weapons in the world and is going to continue to be 
breached by that country, or should we insist on a condition that they 
are making progress toward complying before we buy into it?
  The second condition has to do with other states, the so-called rogue 
states. I will spend only a moment on this because I know my colleague 
from Oklahoma, Senator Inhofe, wants to speak at greater length about 
this. We know that there are a variety of rogue states that have no 
intention of signing on to this treaty and others that may want to sign 
on but know they can violate it with impunity. These chemical weapons 
in these countries' hands constitute a real threat to American troops. 
We think that if one is going to make the claim that this Chemical 
Weapons Convention is going to reduce the chemical weapons stocks of 
these rogue nations that pose a threat to the United States, the least 
that ought to happen is that they submit themselves to the treaty. 
Can't do any good if they are not members. We need to certify that some 
of these nations are going to be states parties before we subject 
ourselves to it.
  The third condition is one that I can't imagine anybody is going to 
object to, and that is that certain inspectors would be barred from 
inspecting American sites. We have the right to do this under the 
treaty. The President has the right to say, I don't want any inspectors 
from China, I don't want any inspectors from Iran coming in here 
because we think they are going to--and I use these as hypotheticals--
the President says, we think they may be bent on industrial espionage 
and therefore we are going to ask that they not be inspectors. The 
argument against that is, well, tit for tat. They will say, fine, we 
don't want any Americans on the inspection team that comes into our 
country. We are willing to say, fine. We think for certain countries, 
like China and Iran, we should put right up front they are not going to 
be inspectors of United States facilities. And that would be a third 
condition to ratification.

  A fourth condition to--actually No. 5 on the list has to do with the 
standard for verification. This has to do with the question of whether 
or not we have an adequate sense that we can actually find cheating 
under the treaty. And we are not asking for an impossible standard. We 
are not asking for 100-percent verification.
  We are simply asking that the President certify to the Congress 
before we submit the articles of ratification that the CIA has 
certified to the President to a level of verification that will work. 
And what we have basically done is take the definition of previous 
administrations, the so-called Baker-Nitze definition, along with a 
specific aspect that General Shalikashvili identified as a way of 
identifying our standard here for verification under the treaty.
  It would be effectively verifiable. We could find violations with a 
high degree of confidence in a timely fashion, within a year of their 
occurrence. And they would be militarily significant.
  Now, militarily significant was defined in a hearing before the U.S. 
Congress by General Shalikashvili as 1 ton of chemical weapons. And, 
therefore, that is what we have built into this definition.
  So what we have said, Madam President, is that we would join the 
treaty at such time as we had the certification from the President that 
the CIA certified that we could achieve this level of verification. I 
do not think that is asking too much.
  Finally, the final condition has to do with articles X and XI. This 
is what I had spoken to before.
  I would ask my distinguished chairman if I could go on for just a few 
minutes here.
  Mr. HELMS. Go right ahead.
  Mr. KYL. I will conclude on articles X and XI because we are going to 
hear a lot more about them. I think it is important to read into the 
Record the provisions we are talking about and discuss in a little bit 
of detail specifically what our concerns are.
  Here is what article X says. I might preface this comment, Madam 
President, with the statement that these were inducements put into the 
treaty originally to induce countries to join the treaty. They were put 
there based upon inducements that were included in a previous treaty, 
the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, under the so-called atoms for 
peace plan.
  Many people know or will remember that the atoms for peace plan was 
the idea that if countries would eschew the development of nuclear 
weapons, we would provide them peaceful nuclear technology. And 
countries like Iraq, and other countries that could be mentioned, took 
advantage of that program, and said, ``Fine. We won't develop nuclear 
weapons. Now send us the peaceful nuclear technology.'' We eventually 
learned that what they did with that peaceful technology was to use it 
in their nuclear weapons program.
  So after it was put in the treaty, and we got these people signed up, 
we learned that several countries were using this provision of the 
treaty to actually enhance their nuclear weapons capability. It worked 
to the detriment of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
  Well, before that was ever learned this chemical weapons treaty was 
negotiated. So at the time it seemed like a good idea to put the same 
kind of provision in the chemical weapons treaty. At the time it seemed 
like it would be a smart thing to provide an inducement for countries 
to join the treaty, saying:

       If you'll join up, then we will not have any restrictions 
     on trade in chemicals with you. You can buy all the chemicals 
     you want. And, in addition to that, you can ask us for, and 
     we will provide to you, all of the defensive gear, chemicals, 
     antidotes, equipment, and so on, that will enable you to 
     defend against chemical weapons.

  That is a pretty good incentive for a country to join up. Look at it 
from the standpoint of a country that has in mind conducting chemical 
warfare capability. The first thing they want to do is be able to 
protect their own

[[Page S3499]]

troops from the use of the weapons. So they want our latest technology 
in defensive gear, in defensive equipment, in antidotes and the like. 
So it is a pretty good incentive to sign up for the treaty because they 
have a right to ask us, and the treaty says we will undertake to 
provide to them that material. Moreover they want to buy chemicals.
  Right now the Australia group I talked about before has limitations 
on what chemicals can be sold. As a matter of fact, there are 54 
specific chemicals under the Australia group that cannot be sold to the 
countries we believe want to develop the chemical weapons capability. 
These countries then have an incentive for joining the convention 
because under the convention you cannot limit the trade in chemicals.
  What does the treaty say? Article X:

       Each State Party undertakes to facilitate, and shall have 
     the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of 
     equipment, material and scientific and technological 
     information concerning means of protection against chemical 
     weapons.
  It could not be more clear, Madam President. Article X says that the 
parties to the treaty have the right to participate in and each party 
undertakes to facilitate. In other words, we have an obligation to 
facilitate their acquisition of this defensive equipment.
  Article XI carries this further and adds another element. And I read 
in part:

       The . . . States Parties . . . .shall . . . undertake to 
     facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest 
     . . . exchange of chemicals, equipment and scientific and 
     technical information relating to the development and 
     application of chemistry for purposes not prohibited under 
     this Convention . . . for peaceful purposes . . .

  In other words. The ``atoms for peace'' equivalent in the Chemical 
Weapons Convention.
  So here is a big incentive for countries who want to develop a 
defense against chemical weapons to join the Chemical Weapons 
Convention.
  The second part of article XI, section (c) says that:

       [The] States Parties. . . shall. . .[n]ot maintain among 
     themselves any restrictions, including those in any 
     international agreements . . .
       shall. . . [n]ot maintain among themselves any 
     restrictions, including those in any international 
     agreements, incompatible with the obligations undertaken 
     under this Convention, which would restrict or impede trade 
     and the development and promotion of [again] scientific and 
     technological knowledge in the field of chemistry for 
     industrial, agriculture, research, medical, pharmaceutical or 
     other peaceful purposes.
       shall . . . [n]ot maintain among themselves any 
     restrictions, [either unilateral or international 
     restrictions.]

  So what this says is that States Parties will have the right to say, 
once they become parties, ``You can't have an embargo on selling 
chemicals to us. You have to lift your restrictions.''
  For a country like Iran, for example, which has signed the treaty, 
this would be a pretty good deal because currently none of the 
Australia Group countries will sell it these chemicals.
  What is going to happen? Well, today, China may be selling chemicals 
to Iran or maybe another country is selling chemicals to Iran not 
covered by the treaty. Once the treaty goes into effect, those 
countries could continue to sell chemicals to Iran. But what is going 
to happen is that the other countries, countries that sign onto the 
convention are going to say, ``Wait a minute. China, for example, is 
selling chemicals to Iran. Our chemical companies want in on the 
action. It says right here in the treaty we're not supposed to maintain 
any restrictions. So we are out of here. We are going to allow our 
countries to sell chemicals to a country like Iran.'' We will have a 
very poor argument against that.
  What has been the administration's response to this? Belatedly the 
administration seems to find there is a little problem here. But 
originally it did not think so. As a matter of fact--and I think this 
is a critical point of this debate, Madam President,--right after the 
chemical weapons treaty was signed into force, the Australia Group 
members were all asked to begin the process of lifting their 
restrictions pursuant to the Chemical Weapons Convention, the plain 
wording of articles X and XI.
  Let me read to you, according to the administration--this is in 
testimony before the Congress:

       Australia Group members in August 1992 committed to review 
     their export control measures with a view of removing them 
     for CWC States Parties in full compliance with their own 
     obligations under the convention.

  In other words, after the CWC was signed, the Australia Group 
countries began to review their export control measures which currently 
prohibit them from selling chemicals to certain countries, so that they 
could bring themselves into compliance with their obligations under 
articles X and XI of the convention.
  And the Australia Group itself issued a formal statement--and I am 
quoting now--

       Undertaking to review, in light of the implementation of 
     the Convention, the measures that they take to prevent the 
     spread of chemical substances and equipment for purposes 
     contrary to the objectives of the convention with the aim of 
     removing such measures for the benefit of States Parties to 
     the Convention acting in full compliance with the obligations 
     under the Convention.

  In other words, again, if you have limitations on the sale of 
chemicals to countries, you are going to have to lift them or you will 
be in violation of articles X and XI of the convention.
  What has the administration's response to this been?
  At first it was denial. Then, one comment made to me was, ``Well, we 
tried our best to negotiate our way out of this, but the best we could 
do is get language like `undertake to facilitate' rather than 
`obligated to.' We just couldn't negotiate anything better.''

  So this was a bone to those countries, an incentive for them to come 
in. And to our argument, this makes the situation worse, not better, 
and will actually proliferate these weapons, the same as Secretary 
Cheney just said in the quotation I just read, that articles X and XI 
will result in the proliferation of chemical weapons because there 
cannot be any restrictions.
  The administration then began to take a different tack. First they 
said, well, we will decide not to lift our restrictions, so the United 
States will still not sell to countries that we think might develop 
chemical weapons. And we will get you a letter to that effect. I have 
not seen anything in writing, but that is the administration's latest 
statement.
  We said, that does not do any good because it only takes one country 
to break an embargo. Any one of the countries could do it. And the 
horse would be out of the barn. So they said, well, we will try to get 
the other Australia Group states to agree to the same thing.
  Bear in mind what they are saying. First, they were all going to lift 
these restrictions to be in compliance with the treaty. Now we are 
going to try to convince them they should keep them in place in clear 
violation to the treaty. This is the way to make a moral statement, 
Madam President, by violating the treaty right up front and announcing 
to the world we are violating the treaty, by keeping in place 
restrictions that are required to be lifted under articles X and XI?
  It is not a very propitious way to make a moral statement or to begin 
the operation of an international treaty to announce in effect not only 
are you going to violate it but you are going to try to get all your 
friends in the Australia Group to violate it because not to do so would 
be to lift the restrictions we currently believe are helpful in 
preventing the spread of chemical weapons.
  Even if all these countries do decide to ignore articles X and XI, 
countries that are not States Parties can continue to sell these 
chemicals. I said, it will not be long until everyone else will want in 
the action. The same argument that has been made by some of our 
chemical companies, in the event if somebody is selling we should have 
the right to sell too otherwise we are just losing good business.
  So I will conclude, Madam President, by trying to make this rather 
simple, but I think important point. To those who say, granted, it is 
not going to be a very effective treaty, but at least it does no harm, 
I say, you are wrong. It is going to do a lot of harm--to business, to 
the taxpayers, to our ability to conduct diplomacy and, importantly, to 
our ability to constrain the spread of chemical weapons.
  As Secretary Cheney said, unless articles X and XI are removed from 
this treaty, it is going to make matters worse, not better.
  So the fourth condition that is a part of the Helms resolution of 
ratification

[[Page S3500]]

says that we will ratify the treaty, but before we deposit the articles 
of ratification there has to be a certification by the President that 
those two sections have been removed from the treaty. Yes, of course, 
that will require a renegotiation. The States Parties will have to 
agree to take those provisions out. That should not be a problem if the 
administration's most current assurances are to be believed.
  I suspect, however, there are specific States Parties who do not 
agree with those assurances who fully intend to continue these sales. 
As a matter of fact, if you will read the language of the Chinese 
ratification, it explicitly preserves their understanding of articles X 
and XI which is the obvious understanding of anyone reading them, that 
it would be improper to have trade restrictions or to deny the 
defensive equipment in the case of other States Parties.
  So, Madam President, we are stuck with articles X and XI. And it is 
the belief of many of us that perhaps we could support this treaty if 
those articles were removed. But until they are removed, it makes 
matters worse and therefore we cannot in good conscience support the 
treaty in that form.
  I thank the distinguished chairman of the committee for yielding me 
this time.
  Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina is recognized.
  Mr. HELMS. Madam President, allow me to thank the able Senator from 
Arizona. He is a walking encyclopedia on the details of this 
treaty, and he has been enormously helpful to me and to many other 
Senators in understanding the implications of a great many provisions 
of the treaty. I thank him now publicly for all he has done to be 
helpful. I am deeply grateful.

  Mr. KYL. Madam President, I return that thanks. I see the 
distinguished ranking member of the committee. I compliment both of 
them for their work to achieve what I have described as ``limited 
success'' in the provisions agreed to, but nonetheless important. I 
appreciate the negotiations that they conducted and the spirit in which 
this debate has been conducted as well.
  Mr. HELMS. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the Record 
reflect that had there been a recorded vote on the previous two voice 
votes, that Senators Ashcroft and Grams would have voted ``aye'' on 
both votes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. HELMS. Madam President, I hope the distinguished ranking member 
will agree that the other Senator from Arizona should follow. I will 
leave it for him to limit his time or not. Let me do one or two other 
things and I will let the Senator take care of that. I noticed that two 
or three times in the past week--and I am used to the media criticism; 
as a matter of fact, I enjoy it. I have a lot of cartoons on my office 
wall to prove that I do enjoy it. But I noticed that two or three 
people said, ``Helms doesn't do anything in the Foreign Relations 
Committee except hold up treaties.''
  Well, let's look at the record. In the past 2 years--that is to say 
the 104th Congress--the Foreign Relations Committee has considered 39 
treaties, and the Senate approved 38 of them--the one exception being 
this chemical weapons treaty, which the administration pulled down just 
before it was to become the pending business in the Senate.
  I will read the list that I am going to put into the Record: 
Consideration of the CWC, in the context of the work of the committee 
in carrying out its responsibility to us and consent to ratification as 
set forth in article II, section 2, of the Constitution. Treaties 
considered during the 104th Congress included bilateral tax and 
investment treaties, important to protecting and furthering U.S. 
business interests abroad; 14 treaties strengthening U.S. law 
enforcement through extradition of criminals and access to criminal 
evidence in other countries. One notable example of the impact of these 
treaties was the ratification of the United States extradition treaty 
with Jordan, which enabled the United States to take into custody a 
suspect in the World Trade Center bombing. Extensive hearings were held 
by the committee to consider the START II Treaty and the Convention on 
Chemical Weapons. The Foreign Relations Committee also considered, and 
the Senate ratified, three multilateral treaties dealing with landmines 
and the rubber industry and international fisheries laws.
  I ask unanimous consent that this list be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the list was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

       Treaties Ratified by the Senate During the 104th Congress


                         Arms Control Treaties

       Convention on Conventional Weapons.
       Start II.
       [Convention on Chemical Weapons (approved by Committee/no 
     vote by Senate)].


                              Commodities

       1995 International Natural Rubber Agreement.


                               Fisheries

       U.N. Convention Relating to the Conservation and Management 
     of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks.


                     bilateral extradition treaties

       Belgium.
       Supplementary with Belgium.
       Bolivia.
       Hungary.
       Jordan.
       Malaysia.
       The Philippines.
       Switzerland.


                     Bilateral investment treaties

       Albania.
       Belarus.
       Estonia.
       Georgia.
       Jamaica.
       Latvia.
       Mongolia.
       Trinidad Tobago.
       Ukraine.


               Bilateral Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties

       Austria.
       Hungary.
       Korea.
       Panama.
       The Philippines.
       United Kingdom.


                         Bilateral Tax Treaties

       Canada.
       France.
       Indonesia.
       Kazakstan.
       Kazakstan Exchange of Notes.
       Mexico.
       Netherlands-Antilles.
       Portugal.
       Sweden.
       Ukraine.
       Ukraine Exchange of Notes.

  Mr. HELMS. In addition to my recommendation to the distinguished 
ranking member, I hope Senator McCain, although he does not share my 
view on the treaty, will be recognized, because he is a patriot of the 
first order, as far as I am concerned. If anybody ever paid his dues to 
this country, the Senator from Arizona did. Following him, I should 
like for Senator Hutchinson to represent our side in the pecking order. 
How much time will the Senator need?
  Mr. HUTCHINSON. Ten minutes.
  Mr. HELMS. The Senator can use a little longer if he wishes. Let me 
ask about the time consumed thus far, Madam President.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina has 3 hours 10 
minutes remaining. The Senator from Delaware has 3 hours 21 minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. HELMS. Three hours even for me?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. And 10 minutes. And 3 hours 21 minutes for the 
Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. HELMS. We are running pretty near. The distinguished Senator from 
Delaware made his usual eloquent speech this morning. How long did I 
speak, by the way?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator spoke for 4 minutes, plus 26 
minutes earlier today.
  Mr. HELMS. Four months? No, I understand. With the understanding that 
the Senator from Arkansas will follow the distinguished Senator from 
Arizona, I yield the floor to my distinguished friend from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. That ``four month'' comment reminds me of a joke about the 
two guys who were cheering at the bar, clapping their hands. A guy 
walks into the bar and says, ``What are they so happy about?'' Another 
guy says, ``Oh, they just put together a jigsaw puzzle, and they did it 
in 3 hours.'' The guy walks up to them and says, ``Congratulations, but 
why is that so special?'' They showed him the box, which said ``2 to 4 
years.'' At any rate, it will take a while for that to sink in. A 
little bit of levity in the chemical weapons treaty is worth the 
effort.

[[Page S3501]]

  The junior Senator from Arizona complimented me on the limited 
success that we have achieved here. I thank him for that. Now I am 
going to yield to a man of unlimited capacity to prove to everyone that 
there is no limit to the success we are about to achieve in this 
treaty.
  I yield 15 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Arizona, my good 
friend, John McCain.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona is recognized.
  Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I thank my distinguished colleague from 
Delaware and the Senator from North Carolina. The distinguished Senator 
from North Carolina deserves great credit, in my view, because he, as 
chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, allowed this treaty to 
come to the floor. The distinguished chairman could have bottled up 
this treaty under his authority as chairman of the committee. He 
deserves great praise.
  I also point out that, as various groups have gotten into this 
debate, there have been a lot of allegations, a lot of impugning of 
character and patriotism and views about whether people are tough 
enough or not tough enough or what is too soft. This is a debate 
amongst honorable people who have honorable differences of opinion, as 
I do with the junior Senator from Arizona, my dear friend and 
colleague, Senator Kyl. I would like to see, especially in the columns 
of various periodicals interested in this view, the debate elevated a 
bit as to the virtues or vices, as the observers of this treaty might 
view them, as opposed to speculations about the motives of those who 
either support or oppose this treaty. I think the American people would 
be far better off.
  Madam President, the importance of this issue has been pointed out. 
We will have political and economic consequences for the United States 
for many years to come. The most important question is whether this 
agreement is good for U.S. national security.
  In my view, one central fact dominates consideration of this issue. 
Regardless of whether the United States ratifies this treaty, the 
United States will, in the next decade or so, complete the destruction 
of its own aging chemical weapons stockpile. Our reasons for doing so 
have nothing to do with arms control. The decision was made before the 
CWC became a near-term possibility. I am not aware of any interest of 
Congress or the U.S. military in getting the United States back in the 
chemical weapons business. So when we consider the wisdom of ratifying 
this treaty, we should bear in mind that this is, first and foremost, a 
treaty about limiting other countries' chemical weapons, not our own, 
because we are doing away with ours. In practical terms, the 
alternative to ratification of the CWC is U.S. unilateral disarmament 
in the field of chemical weapons.
  The critics point out that a number of countries, such as Iraq, 
Libya, Syria, and North Korea, will not ratify the CWC and will 
therefore not be bound by its limits. True. But will our efforts to 
keep weapons of mass destruction out of their hands be enhanced if we 
don't ratify this treaty? No, they will not. In fact, I am confident 
that these rogue states are desperately hoping the Senate will reject 
ratification because, if we do, we will not only spare them the 
mandatory trade sanctions that the CWC imposes on nonparties, we will 
also undermine a near global consensus that all chemical weapons, 
including those of nonparties, should be banned.

  Madam President, for 10 years I have had the privilege of working 
with the former Senate majority leader, Bob Dole. Probably the closest 
working relationship I had with him was on issues of national security. 
In fact, I was privileged to serve as one of his advisers in the last 
campaign in his efforts for the Presidency of the United States. Madam 
President, I know of no one more credible on these issues, and I know 
of no one, going back to World War II, who understands service and 
sacrifice and our national security interests more than Senator Bob 
Dole, a man whose friendship I cherish and whose companionship I enjoy 
but, more important than that, a person whose views I hold in the 
highest esteem and regard. There are many other experts on national 
security issues in this town, but I know of no one who has had the 
experience and hands-on involvement with these issues, that is, the 
tough decisions, than Senator Dole. We all know that Senator Dole 
issued a letter today that I think is of great importance.
  Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Dole's 
statement and the letter from President Clinton to Senator Dole be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

        Statement of Bob Dole on the Chemical Weapons Convention

       Washington.--Bob Dole today issued the following statement 
     regarding the Chemical Weapons Convention:
       ``Last September, the Senate Majority Leader, Trent Lott, 
     asked me to express my opinion on the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention. In my response, I raised concerns about the 
     Chemical Weapons Convention and expressed hope that the 
     President and the Senate would work together to ensure that 
     the treaty is effectively verifiable and genuinely global. 
     They have, and as a result, 28 conditions to the Senate's 
     Resolution of Ratification have been agreed to. These 28 
     agreed conditions address major concerns.
       ``I commend Senator Lott, Senator Helms, Senator Lugar, and 
     many other former colleagues, as well as President Clinton 
     and administration officials for their constructive efforts. 
     Is it perfect--no--but I believe there are now adequate 
     safeguards to protect American interests. We should keep in 
     mind that the United States is already destroying its 
     chemical weapons in accordance with legislation passed more 
     than 10 years ago. The CWC would require all other parties to 
     destroy their stockpiles by April 2007.
       ``In addition, the Administration has agreed to a number of 
     provisions dealing with rogue states that remain outside the 
     treaty. (See attached letter from President Clinton to me 
     dated April 22, 1997). I also understand there is a 
     possibility of an additional agreement with respect to 
     sharing of information. If so, it would further strengthen 
     the treaty. I understand that even with all the added 
     safeguards, not every Senator, for their own good reasons, 
     will support ratification.
       ``As a member of the Senate, I supported the START I, START 
     II, INF, and CFE treaties because they met the crucial tests 
     of effective verification, real reductions, and stability. If 
     I were presently in the Senate, I would vote for ratification 
     of the CWC because of the many improvements agreed to.
       ``Those who may still have concerns can look to Article 
     XVI, which allows withdrawal from the treaty on 90 days 
     notice if it fails to serve America's vital interests. There 
     is little doubt in my mind that if this convention increases 
     proliferation of chemical weapons, it would lead to public 
     outrage which would compel any President to act. The bottom 
     line is that when it comes to America's security, we must 
     maintain a strong national defense that is second to none.''
                                                                    ____



                                              The White House,

                                       Washington, April 22, 1997.
     Hon. Bob Dole,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Bob: I welcomed the opportunity to discuss the 
     Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) with you Saturday and 
     appreciated your taking the time Monday to have Bob Bell 
     brief you on the 28 agreed conditions to the Resolution of 
     Ratification.
       When you wrote Senator Lott last September, you expressed 
     the hope that I would assist him in amending the Resolution 
     of Ratification in a manner that would address certain 
     concerns you raised and thereby ``achieve a treaty which 
     truly enhances American security.'' I believe the 28 agreed 
     conditions, which are the product of over 60 hours of 
     negotiation between the Administration and the Senate over 
     the last two and a half months, meet both these tests. We 
     have truly gone the extra mile in reaching out, as you 
     recommended, to broaden the base of bipartisan support for 
     this treaty. As I said in my public remarks Friday, ``I 
     consider that the things that we've agreed to in good faith 
     are really a tribute to the work that Senator Lott and 
     Senator Helms and Senator Biden and a number of others did to 
     really clarify what this Convention will mean; I think it's a 
     positive thing.''
       Let me mention briefly how my Administration has addressed 
     the specific concerns you raised last fall:
       Constitutionality. You said Constitutional protections 
     should be safeguarded against unwarranted searches. We have 
     agreed to a condition (#29) guaranteeing that there will be 
     no involuntary inspection of a U.S. company or facility 
     without a search warrant. Period. We have also agreed to a 
     condition (#12) underscoring that nothing in the treaty 
     ``authorizes legislation, or other action, by the United 
     States prohibited by the Constitution of the United States, 
     as interpreted by the United States.''
       Real Reductions. You asked whether the CWC will actually 
     eliminate chemical weapons. We have agreed to a condition 
     (#13) specifying severe measures that the United States will 
     insist upon if a country is in non-compliance of this 
     fundamental obligation under the treaty.
       Verification. You asked whether we will have high 
     confidence that our intelligence

[[Page S3502]]

     community (IC) will detect violations. We have agreed to a 
     condition (#10) which would require the Administration to 
     identify on a yearly basis priorities, specific steps and 
     resources being undertaken to strengthen U.S. monitoring 
     and detection capabilities. These annual reports would 
     also include a determination of the IC's level of 
     confidence with respect to each monitoring task. We also 
     made clear during the negotiations on the conditions our 
     willingness to certify that the CWC is ``effectively 
     verifiable'' and that the IC has high confidence it could 
     detect the kind of violation that matters most in terms of 
     protecting our troops deployed in the field: any effort by 
     an adversary to try to train and equip his army for 
     offensive chemical warfare operations. I regret that the 
     unanimous consent (U/C) agreement governing the floor 
     debate on the CWC will not allow this condition to be 
     offered.
       Universality. Finally, you asked whether the treaty will be 
     truly global. We have agreed to a condition (#11) which 
     requires the Secretary of Defense to ensure that U.S. forces 
     are effectively equipped, trained and organized to fight and 
     win against any rogue state that remains outside the treaty 
     and employs CW in battle. To restrict CW options for such 
     states, we agreed to a condition (#7) requiring the President 
     to certify that we will strengthen our national export 
     controls and that all 30 states participating in the 
     Australia Group are committed to maintaining this export 
     control regime on dangerous chemicals. This certification 
     will have to be made annually. Lastly, during the 
     negotiations on the conditions we underscored our willingness 
     to commit to a mechanism by which we would have to consult 
     each year with the Senate on whether to remain in the CWC if 
     rogue states do not over time succumb to pressure to join the 
     treaty regime. As with the proposed verification condition, I 
     regret the Senate will not have an opportunity to vote on 
     this condition either.
       In closing, let me again thank you for your interest in and 
     support for achieving a treaty that enhances the security of 
     our Armed Forces and all our citizens.
           Sincerely,
                                                     Bill Clinton.

  Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I will not read Senator Dole's whole 
statement, but I think it is important what he said. I will read parts 
of it:

       I commend Senator Lott, Senator Helms, Senator Lugar, and 
     many other former colleagues, as well as President Clinton 
     and the administration officials for their constructive 
     efforts. Is it perfect--no--but I believe there are now 
     adequate safeguards to protect American interests.

  I repeat.

       * * * I believe there are now adequate safeguards to 
     protect American interests. We should keep in mind that the 
     United States is already destroying its chemical weapons in 
     accordance with legislation passed more than 10 years ago. 
     The CWC would require all other parties to destroy their 
     stockpiles by April 2007.

  He goes on to say:

       As a Member of the Senate, I supported the START I, START 
     II, INF, and CFE treaties because they met the crucial tests 
     of effective verification, real reductions, and stability. If 
     I were presently in the Senate, I would vote for ratification 
     of the CWC because of the many improvements agreed to.

  Madam President, it is well known that, last fall, one of the reasons 
the treaty was withdrawn by the administration was because of the 
reservations expressed by Senator Dole at that time--then candidate 
Dole. It is well known that Senator Dole's reservations were legitimate 
and sincere. There is also now no doubt--at least in my mind, as well 
as in Senator Dole's--that those reservations and concerns have been 
satisfied by the 28 conditions that are included in this treaty, with 
only 5 remaining, which we will be voting on tomorrow.
  Obviously, every U.S. Senator thinks for himself or herself; there is 
no doubt about that. But, in my mind, this is an important event that 
Senator Dole should weigh in on this issue--not because there is any 
benefit to Senator Dole; clearly, there is a downside for his 
involvement, and he could have kept silent. But, once again, Senator 
Dole has chosen to speak out for what he believes is important to U.S. 
vital national security interests. I applaud him and, again, hope that 
he will continue his involvement in the challenges that we face in the 
years ahead to our Nation's security, as he has so successfully done in 
the past.
  The CWC critics also contend that the treaty will weaken our 
nonproliferation policy because article XI of the treaty says the 
parties will have the right to participate in ``the fullest possible 
exchange'' of chemical technology for purposes not prohibited under the 
convention. As a result, we will have to eliminate our national 
controls on chemical technologies and disband the Australia Group, the 
multilateral framework for restraining transfers of sensitive chemical 
technology.
  This interpretation of the treaty is contradicted not only by the 
text of the treaty--which subordinates article XI to the basic 
undertakings in article I for parties not to acquire chemical weapons 
or to assist another state in doing so--but also by our experience with 
other nonproliferation treaties and the agreed ``consensus'' conditions 
included in the resolution of ratification before us.
  First of all, article XI is essentially similar to the language of 
article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in that it blesses 
technology exchanges among treaty parties, but the NPT has not caused 
us to disband the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which was, in fact, founded 
after the NPT went into force.
  Nor has it obliged us to curtail our national controls on the 
transfer of nuclear technology, even to other NPT parties; the United 
States enacted the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 10 years after 
the NPT was signed. There will always be some countries that object to 
our technology controls, but these are decisions the United States 
makes for itself. And successive administrations, Republican and 
Democratic, have maintained and expanded our export controls on nuclear 
technology, while the NPT has contributed to our ability to obtain 
support from our allies in this effort by establishing an international 
consensus that nuclear proliferation is an evil that must be countered.
  Moreover, beyond the text of the CWC itself, we have before us 28 
agreed conditions in the resolution of ratification. As a member of the 
group that the majority leader put together to address issues regarding 
CWC ratification, I am proud of the work done at the member and staff 
level to achieve agreement with the administration on a number of 
difficult issues. I am also grateful for the work done by the chairman 
of the Foreign Relations Committee and the ranking minority member, who 
together resolved many additional problems. This work has greatly 
strengthened the resolution of ratification on which we will soon vote.
  Agreed condition 7 of the resolution requires the President to 
certify not only that the United States believes that the CWC does not 
require us to weaken our export controls, but also that all members of 
the Australia Group have communicated, at the highest diplomatic 
levels, their agreement that multilateral and national export controls 
on sensitive chemical technology are compatible with the treaty and 
will be maintained under the CWC.
  Conversely, if the United States rejects ratification, I doubt that 
we will be able to play our traditional leadership role in attempting 
to persuade other chemical suppliers to exercise restraint. The world 
will blame the United States for undermining a chemical weapons ban 
that the vast majority of other countries were willing to sign. If we 
reject ratification, where will we get the moral and political 
authority to persuade other Australia Group participants to block 
exports to countries of concern?
  The same case can be made regarding article X of the treaty, which 
critics claim will require us to share defensive technologies with 
potential enemy states. Not only does this provision apply only to CWC 
parties, so countries outside the treaty like Libya cannot benefit, but 
condition 15 in the resolution of ratification obliges the United 
States to share only medical antidotes and treatment to countries of 
concern if they are attacked with chemical weapons. And our respected 
former colleague, Secretary of Defense Cohen, has committed the United 
States to use every instrument of U.S. diplomacy and leverage to block 
transfers of chemical technology that would undermine our security, and 
he has made the obvious point that we will be better able to do this if 
we are inside the CWC regime rather than outside.
  It is true that the Chemical Weapons Convention will be more 
difficult to verify than nuclear arms control agreements such as START 
and INF. But regardless of whether the United States ratifies the CWC, 
we will have to monitor closely the chemical weapons programs of other 
states. The intelligence community has repeatedly told the Senate that 
the CWC's verification

[[Page S3503]]

measures will be a useful tool in doing this job. General Shalikashvili 
has told the Armed Services Committee that ``I believe that the system 
of declarations, of routine inspections, challenge inspections, all put 
together, give us a leg up to the ability to detect whether (potential 
violators) are, in fact, embarked upon a program that would be in 
violation of the CWC. So I think our chances are improved when they are 
members of the CWC. Our chances decrease dramatically if they are not 
members of the CWC.''
  While some want to reject the CWC because of verification concerns, 
it seems to me that this would have the practical effect of reducing 
the United States' ability to monitor the chemical weapons programs of 
other countries. This is an example of the best being the enemy of the 
good.
  Discussions among Senators and between the Senate and the 
administration have produced other agreed conditions to the resolution 
that have strengthened the case for ratification.
  Madam President, I also want to commend the work of the majority 
leader, Senator Lott, who has worked long and hard to address the 
legitimate concerns many Republicans Senators had expressed about the 
Convention and to accommodate the administration's correct assertion 
that the Senate has a duty to vote, yea or nay, on the treaty. Senator 
Lott and his indefatigable foreign policy advisor, Randy Scheunemann, 
labored tirelessly to facilitate negotiations between members and 
between the Senate and the administration. They ensured that these 
negotiations bore fruit and resulted in a resolution of ratification 
that resolved most, if not all, of the reservations expressed by some 
Senators. Both the Senate and the administration are in their debt.

  It is also appropriate, Madam President, to commend administration 
officials for working with the Senate in a genuinely nonpartisan way 
that was notable for the respect paid to the views of all Members, and 
the good faith shown in trying to come to terms with so many difficult 
issues. I have on many past occasions been critical of administration 
policies and the lack of bipartisanship in promoting those policies. In 
this instance, administration officials took great pains to secure the 
Senate's advice and consent in a manner that was, as I said, genuinely 
respectful of every Senator's views. Thus, I am happy to give praise 
where praise is due.
  Madam President, I respect the concerns of those Senators who cannot 
vote in favor of ratifying the CWC. But in my opinion, we do not need 
killer amendments to ensure that this treaty--negotiated under 
President Reagan and signed by President Bush--is on balance a good 
deal for the United States. This view is shared by former Presidents 
Ford and Bush, numerous Nobel Prize winners in chemistry, the chemical 
industry trade associations, gulf war victors Colin Powell and Norman 
Schwarzkopf, retired CNO Adm. Elmo Zumwalt, plus the Veterans of 
Foreign Wars, the Vietnam Veterans of America, and the Reserve Officers 
Association. I am comfortable in their company, and that of every U.S. 
ally in Europe and Asia. That is why I intend to vote to ratify this 
treaty, and I urge my colleagues to do the same.
  Madam President, I yield back my time to the distinguished Senator 
from Delaware.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas is recognized for 10 
minutes.
  Mr. HUTCHINSON. Madam President, I rise today to voice my serious 
reservations about the Chemical Weapons Convention treaty. The most 
important standards for an effective treaty are: Verifiability, 
protection to the signatories, constitutionality, and the applicability 
to nations of most concern. I sincerely believe that the CWC falls 
short in each of these basic requirements.
  On April 8, 1997 three former Secretaries of Defense appeared before 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee urging Senators to vote against 
the ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. This fact alone 
should give this body great pause in the consideration of this treaty.
  I know that there are good, there are loyal, and there are patriotic 
Americans on both sides of this issue of ratifying the Chemical Weapons 
Convention. I have many constituents who have called me, and said, 
``Senator, how do we know? We hear former Secretaries of Defense saying 
it is a bad treaty. We hear Colin Powell saying it is a good treaty. 
Today we hear former Senator Dole saying we need to ratify this. How do 
we know?''
  I believe that it is simply our responsibility as Senators, 
respecting the differences that exist, to study this, to evaluate it, 
and to make a reasoned judgment. I believe also when our national 
security is at risk that we must always opt on the side of caution in 
consideration of a treaty such as we have before us.
  Madam President, the opinions of Secretaries Schlesinger, Rumsfeld, 
Weinberger, and Cheney regarding this treaty should not be taken 
lightly. On April 7, in a letter to Senator Jesse Helms, chairman of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, former Secretary of Defense 
Cheney wrote, and I am quoting, Mr. President:

       The technology to manufacture chemical weapons is simply 
     too ubiquitous, covert chemical warfare programs too easily 
     concealed, and the international community's record of 
     responding effectively to violations of arms control treaties 
     too unsatisfactory to permit confidence that such a regime 
     would actually reduce the chemical threat. Indeed, some 
     aspects of the present convention, notably its obligation to 
     share with potential adversaries like Iran, chemical 
     manufacturing technology that can be used for military 
     purposes and chemical defensive equipment, threaten to make 
     this accord worse than having no treaty at all.

  Those words of Dick Cheney have echoed in my mind--``worse than 
having no treaty at all''.
  He said, if I might summarize, that the manufacture of chemical 
weapons is too widespread, concealing it is too easy, and enforcement 
is too uncertain for us to ratify this treaty.
  Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that this statement from 
Dick Cheney be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

       The technology to manufacture chemical weapons is simply 
     too ubiquitous, covert chemical warfare programs too easily 
     concealed, and the international community's record of 
     responding effectively to violations of arms control treaties 
     too unsatisfactory to permit confidence that such a regime 
     would actually reduce the chemical threat. Indeed, some 
     aspects of the present convention, notably its obligation to 
     share with potential adversaries like Iran, chemical 
     manufacturing technology that can be used for military 
     purposes and chemical defensive equipment, threaten to make 
     this accord worse than having no treaty at all.--Richard 
     Cheney, Letter to Chairman Helms, April 7, 1997.

  Mr. HUTCHINSON. Madam President, Secretary Cheney's statement sends a 
clear message to the American people that this treaty does not 
effectively deal with the threat of chemical and biological weapons. As 
we begin this debate on the CWC, the American people, with 
justification, will ask their leaders how and where they stand on the 
issue of chemical weapons.
  I stand here today wanting to tell the American people that this 
Congress will do everything in its power to rid our world of chemical 
and biological weapons, however, the CWC is not global, is not 
verifiable, is not constitutional, and quite frankly, it will not work.
  While the intent of the CWC is to create a global chemical weapons 
ban, accomplishing that goal does seem unlikely. Six countries with 
chemical weapons programs--including all of those with aggressive 
programs--have not yet signed the CWC.
  So how then can we call this a global treaty?
  Neither Iraq, Libya, Syria, nor North Korea have signed or ratified 
the CWC. China, Pakistan, and Iran have signed the CWC, but have not 
ratified it. Russia has signed the CWC, but has not ratified it.
  These rogue nations of Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Syria represent 
a clear threat to United States security and the security of key United 
States allies. All of these countries have active, aggressive programs 
to develop and produce chemical weapons.
  Let's be clear about one important thing. The administration has 
refused to ban inspectors from rogue nations such as Iran and China.
  That will be one of the reservations that we will have the 
opportunity to vote on. And it is one of those reservations that I find 
it incomprehensible

[[Page S3504]]

that the administration has found unacceptable--banning inspectors from 
rogue nations such as Iran and China.
  In addition, there are intelligence reports that have recently 
indicated that Russia has already begun to cheat, even before the CWC 
has gone into effect. These facts alone give substance to opposing the 
treaty.
  Madam President, inherent in the CWC is a requirement that we share 
our advanced chemical defensive gear with countries like Iran and 
China. It is important to recognize that rogue nations, through reverse 
engineering, can easily figure out how to infiltrate our technologies. 
This would not only increase the chances of a chemical attack, but more 
importantly this would endanger our troops around the world.
  Let us be crystal clear on the fact that once there is a free-for-all 
of U.S. chemical and defensive technologies between the proposed 
signatories of this treaty, it will quite frankly be impossible to stop 
the transfer of this information to the rogue nations, that do not sign 
the CWC.
  I believe that the CWC will not increase pressure on rogue regimes. 
The CWC will not result in an international norm against the use of 
chemical weapons. The Geneva Convention of 1925 already established 
that norm. How many times has this prohibition been violated by Iraq, 
on the Kurds and even in the case of our own troops?
  Madam President, it took 5 years before the Pentagon came forward 
with information pertaining to the exposure of our own troops to 
certain chemical and biological substances that could affect the health 
and well-being of our 700,000 U.S. service people in the gulf.
  The rogues have demonstrated that they will plan for the use of, 
threaten the use of, and indeed use chemical weapons despite 
international norms.
  We must, to the best of our ability, avoid the horrible events of the 
1980's, when the international community witnessed the horrors of 
Iraq's use of chemical weapons against its own people. Since that time, 
sanctions against Iraq have been strong and effective. The CWC will not 
address any shortcomings in these sanctions.
  Madam President, how can the CWC be global if these so-called rogue 
nations have not signed the CWC? The bottom line seems to be that the 
CWC is most applicable to the countries of least concern to the United 
States. It may help us with Great Britain, but provide no protection 
regarding North Korea or Iraq.
  It is my understanding, that under article XII of the treaty, members 
caught violating treaty provisions are simply threatened with a 
restriction or suspension of convention privileges. At worst, a report 
will be sent to the U.N. General Assembly and the U.N. Security 
Council. Mr. President, how does a report protect the American people?
  Madam President, with no predetermined sanctions in place to deter 
potential violators, the CWC seems ineffective and unenforceable.
  I am very sensitive to the needs and wishes of the small business-
man. And while large multinational chemical corporations can bear the 
estimated astronomical costs regarding reporting requirements of a CWC 
member nation, these costs constitute a significant burden, in some 
cases an overwhelming burden, to small businesses, not just in Arkansas 
but all around America. There are roughly 230 small businesses which 
custom-synthesize made-to-order products and compete with large 
chemical manufacturers. It is my understanding that they generally have 
fewer than 100 employees and have annual sales of less than $40 million 
each. Few, if any, of them can afford to employ legions of lawyers just 
to satisfy the new reporting requirements of the CWC. Let us be 
realistic. Can these burdensome reporting requirements prevent the 
proliferation of chemical weapons?

  In addition to the cost factor on our small businesses, the 
possibility of U.S. trade secrets being stolen during CWC inspections 
to me at least seems very high. I have been advised that the U.S. 
intelligence community has said that the CWC inspections constitute a 
new tool to add to our intelligence collection tool kit. Putting one 
and one together, inspections will also constitute a tool in the kit of 
foreign governments as well. I hope that the American people realize 
that U.S. expenditures as a member nation of the CWC include a 
mandatory 25-percent assessment for operating expenses of the 
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the OPCW.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 10 minutes have expired.
  Mr. HUTCHINSON. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent for an 
additional 3 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. HUTCHINSON. As a member nation, we will pick up a 25-percent 
assessment for the operating expenses of the organization. This is the 
new international organization created to administer the CWC. It is my 
understanding that operating costs are likely to be a minimum of $100 
million per year, $25 million of which will come from U.S. taxpayers.
  Finally, it is my understanding that the CWC requires the United 
States to begin destruction of our chemical stockpile no later than 2 
years after the treaty enters into force. I simply believe that is 
unreasonable and unattainable.
  The Department of Defense has publicly stated that the U.S. 
destruction of its chemical weapons stockpile will continue regardless 
of whether we are a signatory to such treaty. We have one such arsenal 
in Pine Bluff, AR. I believe it is unrealistic to expect that the $12.4 
billion cost in destroying those chemical weapons will be achievable 
particularly given the environmental concerns that exist. And I am 
being contacted daily by those with environmental concerns about the 
Pine Bluff arsenal. So I believe that the recent debate on Yucca 
Mountain further illustrates how problematic the fulfillment of our 
treaty obligations would be.
  Madam President, I certainly want this body to provide a 
comprehensive domestic and international plan to reduce the threat of 
chemical and biological weapons. As I have already stated today, 
however, the CWC has too many loopholes that will perpetuate chemical 
weapon activity rather than end it. It is a serious obligation that we 
have. I believe that this body will make the right decision. For me, 
the words of Dick Cheney keep echoing: ``Worse than no treaty at all.''
  For this Senator, I will be voting ``no'' on I believe a flawed, 
unfixable treaty. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware is recognized.
  Mr. BIDEN. I yield the distinguished Senator from New Jersey 7 
minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey is recognized.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. I thank the Chair. I thank the Senator from Delaware 
for yielding.
  Madam President, tomorrow the Senate will exercise its historic 
constitutional powers of treaty ratification. It is a solemn power that 
we have exercised for two centuries. That power has often defined the 
security of the Nation and sometimes been determinant of war and peace 
itself. The issue before the Senate now is the ban on chemical weapons, 
probably the most important foreign policy question remaining before 
the United States in this century.
  Perhaps because the consequences are so great the choice is also 
clear. This treaty demands ratification. The treaty itself is a 
culmination of a process that began over 12 years ago under the 
leadership of Ronald Reagan. The United States began a review and then 
determined that it would eliminate chemical weapons. We did so because 
of the need to reduce the numbers of those weapons in the world and to 
restrict the ability of those nations that did not possess them to 
obtain them.
  Since Ronald Reagan's judgment a decade ago, we have made 
extraordinary progress. In 1985, President Reagan signed into law a 
judgment that would eliminate American stockpiles by the year 2004, 
having an important impact on the ratification of this treaty because, 
whether it is ratified or not, no matter what judgments are made by 
this institution, the United States is going to eliminate chemical 
weapons. Second, the United States then followed our own judgment by 
leading the international effort with 160 other nations to enact a 
multilateral ban. It is the result of that process that is now before 
the Senate.

  The process, it is important to note, did not culminate with the 
Reagan administration. In 1992, President George

[[Page S3505]]

Bush announced a strong American support for the treaty and the United 
States became an original signatory. A year later, under President 
Clinton, the United States once again announced its support. Today, we 
have come full circle. From Ronald Reagan's first pronouncements, the 
treaty, now endorsed by a Democratic President, seeks ratification 
under a majority Republican Congress.
  The Secretary of State said only a week ago:

       This treaty has ``made in America'' written all over it. It 
     was Ronald Reagan's idea, George Bush negotiated it and 
     signed it, and Bill Clinton has embraced it.

  In truth, however, Madam President, the treaty is neither Democratic 
nor Republican. It reflects the bipartisan commitments of the United 
States toward our security, our values, and a century of learning the 
lessons of collective security because after 80 years of living under 
the threats of chemical weapons, it is the judgment of this 
administration and those that preceded it that it is time to eliminate 
these weapons.
  The treaty does several direct and important things. It bans the 
development, production, and stockpiling of chemical weapons.
  Second, it requires the destruction of all chemical weapons and their 
production facilities.
  Third, it provides the most extensive verification process in the 
history of arms control.
  Finally, it grants member nations the effective tools for dealing 
with those who refuse to comply, tools that will be denied the United 
States if we fail to ratify the treaty. And yet many of my colleagues 
have questioned the need for the United States to become a member 
state. They note two principal objections. First, that the burden of 
reporting requirements and verifications would be onerous on American 
industry; and second, the impact on American defense capabilities.
  Allow me to deal with each. First, the economic impact. In my State 
of New Jersey, the chemical industry represents fully one-third of the 
entire industrial capability of the State; 150,000 citizens of the 
State of New Jersey are employed in this vital manufacturing industry 
of chemicals. Let us be clear. The entire industry, from small 
companies to among the largest industries in the State of New Jersey, 
not only supports this treaty but has joined in demanding its 
ratification.
  Second, on the question of American defense capabilities, it should 
be self-evident that if the United States is unilaterally forgoing 
these weapons and rogue nations continue to embrace them, American 
military personnel will be more vulnerable and, indeed, endangered if 
the United States is not a signatory, allowing us to help enforce the 
provisions of the treaty and deny capability to rogue nations than if 
we are to remain on the outside.

  That is why this treaty has been endorsed by General Powell, 17 other 
four-star generals and every former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff--in the Carter, Clinton, and Ford administrations.
  I ask my colleagues who oppose this treaty, would all these members 
of the general staff, would each of these men who have held the 
principal responsibility for guiding and leading our Armed Forces have 
endorsed this treaty if there was any chance, if there was any 
judgment, that, indeed, our Armed Forces would be less safe?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 7 minutes have expired.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Thank you, Madam President. I ask the Senator from 
Delaware to yield 3 additional minutes.
  Mr. BIDEN. Without objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator may proceed.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Madam President, this is a moment of judgment that 
this Senate has faced before. History instructs us that we cannot 
afford to be wrong. Over 75 years ago, this body chose the wrong route 
and the toll was monumental. During consideration of the treaty for the 
League of Nations, the United States took the lead in forming the 
principles of collective security. It was our leadership which brought 
the world to understand that there was no separate peace, there was no 
individual security, and yet in that instance, as in this moment, the 
United States, after providing the intellectual and the political 
leadership, was a reluctant participant. The judgment then, we were 
told, was that there were reservations because of individual provisions 
of the treaty. But, indeed, history instructs us, and I believe would 
guide us now, that those reservations were not because of individual 
aspects of the treaty but because of a general ideologic opposition to 
arms control and the general notion of collective security.
  It is time for the United States, after all the painful lessons of 
previous generations, to simply understand there is no unilateral 
security in a multilateral world. From Pearl Harbor to the Persian 
Gulf, history demands us to recognize an essential truth: American 
security, because of a changing world and developing technology, 
requires and demands that we deal with other nations.
  The choice before this Senate is clear. From the doughboys who 
endured the horrors of mustard gas in the trenches of Europe, the 
Kurdish refugees who suffered in Iraq, to the refugees of Cambodia who 
suffered yellow rain, to our own veterans of the Persian Gulf, it is 
time to put an end to chemical weapons. That power is in the hands of 
the Senate. If we fail to do so, a host of rogue nations will take 
advantage of the opportunity.
  Before this Senate on July 10, 1919, Woodrow Wilson closed the debate 
saying, ``We are the only hope of mankind. Dare we reject it and break 
the hearts of the world.''
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired. Who yields 
time?
  Mr. HELMS. Madam President, I yield 10 minutes to the distinguished 
Senator from Idaho, [Mr. Craig].
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho is recognized.
  Mr. CRAIG. Madam President, thank you and let me thank my chairman, 
not only for yielding but for his leadership on this most important 
issue that now is being thoughtfully and responsibly debated here on 
the floor of the U.S. Senate.
  Madam President, the Chemical Weapons Convention has such far-
reaching domestic and national security implications that it deserves 
the most thorough and thoughtful examination the Senate can give it. I 
have given this matter a careful review and would like to reiterate 
some of the conclusions I have reached.
  If I thought supporting this treaty would make chemical weapons 
disappear, and give us all greater security from these heinous weapons, 
I would not hesitate in giving my support. Unfortunately, the facts do 
not demonstrate this; indeed, implementing this treaty may actually 
increase danger to U.S. citizens and troops.
  The convention has been signed by 160 nations and ratified by only 
74--less than 50 percent. Five countries who are thought to have 
chemical weapons are not even signatories of the convention: Egypt, 
Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Syria. Another six nations have signed, 
but not ratified the convention: China, India, Iran, Pakistan, Israel, 
and Russia. In short, this convention is not global in scale.
  Even if it were true that this treaty had been signed and ratified by 
160 nations, serious problems would remain. Compliance with the 
Chemical Weapons Convention cannot be assured because it is not 
effectively verifiable.
  I think it is timely and appropriate to remember, as others have 
mentioned, the principles of Ronald Reagan. Even though he started the 
process that we are debating today, he would have insisted in the end, 
while we might trust our allies and our friends around the world, that 
in every circumstance we must verify.
  Unlike nuclear weapons which require a large, specialized industrial 
base, chemical weapons can be manufactured almost anywhere. 
Furthermore, many lethal chemicals are common and have peaceful uses. 
Chemicals help us to manufacture products such as pesticides, 
pharmaceuticals, plastics, and paints. With such a broad spectrum of 
uses, it would be difficult to discern the legitimate from the illicit.
  It is also very disturbing to me that ratification of this treaty 
would abandon a fundamental arms control principle insisted upon over 
the last 17 years--that the United States must be able to effectively 
verify compliance with the terms of the treaty. Verification has meant 
that U.S. intelligence is

[[Page S3506]]

able to detect a breach in an arms control agreement in time to respond 
appropriately and assure preservation of our national security 
interests. I believe the Senate has an obligation to uphold this sound 
standard. Let me take this opportunity to express my support for 
Senator Helms' condition in this regard. I applaud his effort to make 
real verification a condition of CWC implementing legislation, if the 
treaty is ratified.
  Even if verification of compliance were not a concern, this 
convention would be difficult to enforce. In a sound arms control 
treaty, the United States must be able to punish other countries caught 
in violation of the agreement. The Chemical Weapons Convention provides 
only vague, unspecified sanctions to be imposed on a country found in 
breach of the Convention. Ultimately, the Chemical Weapons convention 
leaves the U.N. Security Council to impose penalties severe enough to 
change behavior of an outlaw nation. Since any one of the five members 
of the Security Council can veto any enforcement resolution lodged 
against them or their friends, China and Russia, for example, could 
simply veto resolutions imposing sanctions if they disagreed with other 
Security Council members. In sum, it does not appear that this 
agreement is verifiable or enforceable.
  Even if the enforcement mechanism to punish violators of the treaty 
were perfect, countries that represent the greatest threat to United 
States security such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and North Korea have 
not ratified the treaty and would be under no obligation to comply with 
its terms and conditions. Furthermore, our intelligence experts tell us 
that each one of these countries has active and aggressive programs to 
develop and produce chemical weapons.

  Iran has a stockpile of blister, choking, and blood agents possibly 
exceeding 2,000 tons. Their program is the largest in the Third World. 
Syria, which has been increasing production of chemical weapons since 
the 1980's, is home to several radical terrorist organizations, 
including Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine. Many worry that Syria could easily 
supply these organizations with chemical weapons. North Korea has a 
stockpile of nerve gas, blood agents, and mustard gas. Additionally, 
North Korea has the ability to unleash large scale chemical attacks 
through mortars, artillery, multiple rocket launchers, and Scud 
missiles. Currently, Libya has one chemical weapons production facility 
in operation, and a larger plant under construction. Iraq has not only 
a substantial capability, but has demonstrated a willingness to use 
these weapons against their own people.
  It has been observed that under the CWC, members to the convention 
would face no difficulty looking for prohibited chemicals in free and 
open countries which will accurately declare the location of chemical 
facilities. However, this situation will be much different for rogue 
states that are a party to the convention. As arms control verification 
experts correctly point out, ``We've never found anything that's been 
successfully hidden.'' Let me repeat that: ``We've never found anything 
that's been successfully hidden.'' Will the unintended consequence of 
the CWC be that villainous states will be more secure, and peaceful 
states less?
  Furthermore, have all questions raised in regards to the convention's 
compatibility with our constitution been sufficiently addressed? The 
Convention creates an international monitoring regime called the 
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, or OPCW. The OPCW 
will be granted the most extensive monitoring power of any arms control 
treaty ever because it extends coverage to governmental and civilian 
facilities.

  The authority of this international monitoring regime also raises 
concern about foreign nationals having such broad authority to obtain 
access to property held by private U.S. citizens. The U.S. chemical 
industry is known to be one of the top industries targeted for 
espionage by foreign companies and governments. There is legitimate 
worry that international inspections could jeopardize confidential 
business information, trade secrets, and other proprietary data. Since 
the United States will be expected to pay 25 percent, or approximately 
$50 million, of the OPCW's operating costs, American tax dollars could 
be subsidizing increased risk for U.S. business interests.
  There is also an implementation cost that will be borne by private 
industry. The cost for each inspection has been estimated as high as 
$500,000 for large chemical companies, and a range of $10,000 to 
$20,000 for small companies. Costs could become even higher if a 
shutdown is required for an inspection to safeguard proprietary 
information or company security.
  Another issue which has not been thoroughly discussed is how the 
costs incurred with the inspections are to be paid. Estimates of the 
number of companies to be inspected in America vary from 140 firms to 
over 10,000 firms.
  And even though we would pay the lion's share of the international 
monitoring regime's budget, the United States would have no special 
status over other signatory nations, no veto power, and no assurance of 
being a member of the executive council.
  In conclusion, making the production and possession of chemical 
weapons illegal according to international law will not make them 
disappear. Use of such weapons has been prohibited since 1925 yet we 
have seen the results of their use. We all know about the tens of 
thousands of deaths from poison gas in World War I, and no one could 
forget the tragic photographs of the Iranian children killed during the 
1980's by the Iraqi government. Illegal? Yes, but still in use, 
nonetheless.

  I stand today with all Americans expressing a grave concern over the 
increasing proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. The real 
question here seems to be whether ratification of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention will increase our own national security. Unfortunately, the 
answer is no. There is little value in implementing international laws 
which do little to decrease illegal research, development, and 
proliferation of chemical weapons worldwide.
  I support the goal of making the world safe from the threat of 
chemical weapons. I applaud the honorable statement the CWC makes 
against these heinous weapons. However, I believe the best way to 
protect ourselves from this threat is by rejecting this treaty. The 
convention does nothing to better our security, but may even open the 
door to increasing risks against our vital security interests and 
infringing on the rights of innocent citizens. For these reason, I am 
compelled to vote against the ratification of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Faircloth). Who yields time?
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield myself 3 minutes and then I will 
yield to the Senator from Ohio.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Ohio.
  Mr. BIDEN. No, I yield myself 3 minutes and then I will yield to the 
Senator from Ohio.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the distinguished Senator 
from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I found it fascinating, the statement of my 
friend from Idaho. He made a very compelling case, from his 
perspective, as why we cannot verify the treaty and therefore why we 
should be against the treaty--because we cannot verify it. We cannot 
verify it because, he says, we cannot inspect sufficiently well. And 
that is why he is against the treaty. Then he says one of the other 
reasons he is against the treaty is because the verification regime is 
so intrusive that it will allow the opposition--allow rogue states to 
get access to information in the chemical industry.
  So, if we correct one problem, which is to make it more verifiable, 
then he would argue he is against the treaty because it is verifiable. 
If you do not make it more verifiable, he said, he is against the 
treaty because it is not verifiable.
  Mr. CRAIG. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. BIDEN. Not on my time. I will be delighted to yield on the time 
of the Senator, since I have limited time, on Senator Helms' time.
  Mr. CRAIG. I yield myself 1 minute off the time of Senator Helms.
  Mr. BIDEN. I will be happy to yield when I finish.
  He also said the intelligence community says, ``They have never found 
anything that is successfully hidden.''

[[Page S3507]]

  I do not know how many of you are golfers. That is like saying you 
cannot sink a putt if it is short. Obviously, a putt will not go in if 
it does not get to the hole. Obviously, you cannot uncover something 
that is successfully hidden.
  The last point I would make is the chemical industry, the outfit that 
represents the bulk of the chemical industry has strongly endorsed this 
treaty. I am just responding to the last point that the chemical 
industry is the target. The chemical industry, coincidentally, is for 
this treaty.
  But I would be happy, now, on Senator Helms' time, to yield back to 
my friend from Idaho.
  Mr. HELMS. Yes, I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Idaho.
  Mr. CRAIG. I thank the Senator for yielding.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho.
  Mr. CRAIG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for yielding me time. I think it 
is very important that what I said be what I said. Let me reiterate 
that it would be impossible to verify with rogue nations. We know in 
this country we will verify. Our chemical companies will be an open 
door. We have always played by the rules of the treaties we have signed 
and we have never intentionally or purposely violated them. That is not 
the point I was trying to make, and I think the Senator knows that.
  But, what we do know is that for countries who choose not to play by 
international rules--and there are a good many out there--it would be 
difficult, if not impossible, for the international monitoring team to 
be able to verify compliance. I think that is the point. I have not 
even discussed, nor did I bring up the point of concern, that we would 
be releasing information. I am also concerned about espionage. And I 
did express that. So, it is important that that part of it be 
understood. Our chemical companies, by this treaty, would be an open 
door.
  Let me also say I do not believe there is a chemical company in this 
country that is an expert in international affairs. Nor do I want the 
executives of these chemical companies negotiating a treaty. Nor do I 
want them establishing the foreign policy of this country. I believe 
that is the job of the Senator, and it is mine, and the job of this 
body, and of the President of the United States.

  I'm sorry, no matter what the chemical industry says, frankly, I 
don't care. What I do care about is the security of this country. What 
I do care about is our national sovereignty. And what I do care about 
is the issue of verification. I think this treaty simply does not get 
us where we need to get for a safer world.
  I must say, I am tremendously proud and I have supported this 
country's disarming itself of chemical and biological weapons. I 
encourage us to do that. We have done it and we ought to continue to do 
it and we ought to make sure that our troops in the field have adequate 
equipment to be able to protect themselves.
  We must lead by example, but let's not walk into or create the 
illusionary track that I think the CWC simply offers to the world, and 
most assuredly to this country.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield myself as much time as I might 
take, and I am only going to take a few minutes.
  Mr. President, the reason I mention the Chemical Manufacturers 
Association is not that they should determine the foreign policy. My 
friend from Idaho is saying that the target of this kind of espionage, 
or stealing secrets, whatever, is going to be the chemical industry. 
All I am pointing out is, just as they should not determine the foreign 
policy, I respectfully suggest my friend from Idaho does not know 
anything about their secrets. The chemical industry knows about their 
secrets, and they believe that this treaty fully protects them in 
maintaining their secrets. That is the point I was making.
  You know that play and movie that is out, ``Don't Cry for Me 
Argentina,'' well, don't worry about the chemical companies, they think 
they can take care of themselves in terms of their secrets.
  One last point. The Senator raised, as others have raised, the 1 ton 
of weapons and 2 tons that could be amassed, et cetera. I want to point 
out what John Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
said, and he is not quoted by the Senator from Idaho, but others. 
Everyone quotes John Shalikashvili as saying that 1 ton of chemical 
weapons is militarily significant and that we cannot effectively 
guarantee we could uncover 1 ton. Let me read what General 
Shalikashvili said:

       A militarily significant quantity of chemical weapons is 
     situationally dependent. Thousands--

  Thousands--

     of tons of chemical agent would be required to significantly 
     impact on a large scale engagement while a mere ton of agent 
     could be effective as a weapon of terror.

  He went on to say:

       In certain limited circumstances--

  I emphasize ``in certain limited circumstances''--

     even 1 ton of chemical agent may have a military impact, for 
     example, if chemical weapons are used as a weapon of terror 
     against an unprotected population in a regional conflict.

  He went on to say further:

       The United States should be resolute that the 1-ton limit 
     set by the convention will be our guide.

  He did not mean, however, that 1 ton was an appropriate standard for 
what constitutes effective verifiability. Rather, General Shali meant 
that the 1-ton limit in the CWC on agent stocks for peaceful purposes--
that is the context in which he talked about it--was appropriate and 
that any country's stock in excess of 1 ton would likely be for 
offensive military purposes.
  So what he is saying--the 1 ton that keeps being used--he is saying 
if you detect that there is more than a ton of chemical weapons out 
there, they are probably doing it not for peaceful purposes, they are 
probably doing it to gain some military advantage. But it would take a 
lot more than 1 ton to have a major effect on a battle, a major effect 
on our security. He said it would take thousands of tons.
  Other people may think in this body that 1 ton is militarily 
significant and if you can't effectively verify 1 ton then there is no 
verification in terms of our strategic interests. They may think that, 
but that is not what the Joint Chiefs think. The 1-ton reference was 
for the purpose of determining whether or not a country was trying to 
do more than use those chemicals for peaceful purposes. He says, if you 
have more than 1 ton, it is a pretty good sign that these are bad guys 
and they are trying to do something worse, but they are nowhere near 
being militarily significant in terms of U.S. security.
  I see my friend.
  Mr. HELMS. I think it is fair to let Senator Craig have another whack 
at it, and I do wish the former Democratic Secretary of Defense can be 
quoted on this subject as well. As a matter of fact, the news media 
ignored him entirely.
  I yield the Senator 2 more minutes.
  Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I thank my chairman for yielding, and I 
recognize and appreciate the patience of the Senator from Ohio. I will 
be brief.
  It is very important that it not be suggested that all who are in 
favor makes it so lopsided that there is nobody in opposition. May I 
quote Donald Rumsfeld or James Schlesinger or, most important, Edward 
O'Malley, who was the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, chief of counterintelligence under Ronald Reagan. He 
speaks of many companies' great concerns about both economic and secret 
espionage and expresses his opposition to it.
  Here are the names of 25 major CEO's of chemical companies who stand 
clearly in opposition to this treaty. Mr. President, I ask unanimous 
consent that these ladies and gentlemen and their statements be printed 
in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

   America's Top Foreign Policy, Defense, and Economic Experts Raise 
            Concerns Over the CWC's Impact on U.S. Business

       Steve Forbes, President and CEO of Forbes Inc.: ``....As I 
     have strenuously argued on other occasions, maintaining 
     America's competitive edge requires a lessening of the tax 
     and regulatory burdens on the American people and on our 
     Nation's enterprises. Unfortunately, the CWC will have 
     precisely the opposite effect. It will burden up to 8,000 
     companies across the United States. Remember,

[[Page S3508]]

     these are in the hands of an international bureaucracy, not 
     what we would like them to be, with major new reporting 
     regulatory and inspection requirements entailing large and 
     uncompensated compliance costs. These added costs constitute 
     an unfunded Federal mandate. Like so many mandates, they are 
     bound to retard our economic growth and make our companies 
     less competitive.
       ...in addition to the costs arising from heavy duty 
     reporting, the CWC subjects our chemical companies to snap 
     inspections that will allow other nations access to our 
     latest chemical equipment and information. No longer will 
     violators of intellectual property rights in China, Iran, and 
     elsewhere, have to go to the trouble of pirating our 
     secrets... Some might even regard such burdens as a barrier 
     to entry that can enhance their market share at the expense 
     of their smaller competitors.''
       Donald Rumsfeld, former Secretary of Defense and President 
     and former Chairman and CEO of G.D. Searle and Company: 
     ``...Big companies seem to get along fine with big 
     government. They get along with American government, they get 
     along with foreign governments, they get along with 
     international organizations, and they have the ability, with 
     all their Washington representatives, to deal effectively 
     with bureaucracies... Indeed, that capability on the part of 
     the big companies actually serves as a sort of barrier to 
     entry to small and medium-sized companies that lack that 
     capability. So I do not suggest... for one minute that large 
     American companies are not going to be able to cope with the 
     regulations. They will do it a whale of a lot better than 
     small and medium sized companies...
       I don't believe that the thousands--whatever the number 
     is--of companies across this country know about this treaty 
     in any detail, believe that the treaty would apply to them, 
     understand that they could be subjected to inspections, 
     appreciate the unfunded mandates that would be imposed on 
     them in the event this were to pass.''
       James Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense and former 
     Director of Central Intelligence: ``The convention permits or 
     encourages challenge inspections against any facility deemed 
     capable of producing chemical weapons--indeed, against any 
     facility. This exposes American companies to a degree of 
     industrial espionage never before encountered in this 
     country. This implies the possibility of the capture of 
     proprietary information or national security information from 
     American corporations by present or by prospective commercial 
     rivals.
       ...we are dealing with the possible industrial espionage in 
     the United States, and that industrial espionage is going to 
     be a godsend--I repeat, a godsend--to foreign intelligence 
     agencies and to the corporations which will feed on those 
     foreign intelligence agencies.''
       Lieutenant General William Odom, former Director of the 
     National Security Agency: ``Looking at the verification 
     regime as a former official of the Intelligence Community, I 
     am disturbed by it, not just because it is impossible to 
     verify, but also because it can complicate U.S. security 
     problems. Take, for example, the U.N.-like organization to be 
     set up to make inspections. All of the appointed members may 
     have no foreign intelligence links initially. As they find 
     that they can tramp around in all kinds of U.S. production 
     facilities, however, foreign intelligence services are likely 
     to offer to supplement their wages for a little ``technology 
     collection'' activity on the side. And they will provide 
     truly sophisticated covert technical means to facilitate such 
     endeavors.''
       Lieutenant General James Williams, former Director of the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency: ``. . . the opportunity for 
     unfettered access to virtually every industrial facility in 
     this country, not merely the pharmaceutical and chemical 
     plants, would make most foreign intelligence organizations 
     very happy, even gleeful. It is likely to cause the 
     counterintelligence sections of the FBI and the Defense 
     Investigative Service major problems for the foreseeable 
     future. The inspection procedures which apply to ALL 
     industries constitute unprecedented access to our 
     manufacturing base, not just to those thought likely to be 
     engaged in proscribed activities! My experience in protecting 
     patents and intellectual property over the past ten years 
     leads me to conclude that there is the potential for the loss 
     of untold billions of dollars in trade secrets which can be 
     used to gain competitive advantage, to shorten R&D cycles, 
     and a steal US market share.''
       Edward J. O'Malley, former Assistant Director of Federal 
     Bureau of Investigation, Chief of Counterintelligence: ``The 
     activities of the former Soviet Union and others are as 
     aggressive as ever, and remain a major threat. What is new, 
     however, is the increased importance given by them to the 
     collection of American corporate proprietary information.
       . . . One of the greatest concerns of companies . . . is 
     that the CWC will open them up to economic espionage. I think 
     their concerns are well-justified. . . . The acquisition of 
     American trade secrets has become a high stakes business 
     involving billions and billions of dollars, and I would be 
     able to pay an agent handsomely to acquire such information''
       Deborah Wince-Smith, former Assistant Secretary of Commerce 
     for Technology Policy (in September 9, 1996, letter signed 
     jointly by Secretaries Weinberger, Rumsfeld, and others): 
     ``What the CWC will do, however, is quite troubling: It will 
     create a massive new, UN-style international inspection 
     bureaucracy (which will help the total cost of this treaty to 
     U.S. taxpayers amount to as much as $200 million per year). 
     It will jeopardize U.S. citizens constitutional rights by 
     requiring the government to permit searches without either 
     warrants or probable cause. It will impose a costly and 
     complex regulatory burden on U.S. industry. As many as 8,000 
     companies across the country may be subjected to new 
     reporting requirements entailing uncompensated annual costs 
     of between thousands to hundreds-of-thousands of dollars per 
     year to comply. Most of these American companies have no idea 
     they will be affected.''
       Bruce Merrifield, former Assistant Secretary of Commerce 
     for Technology: ``I am quite concerned about the Chemical 
     Weapons Convention which, in its current form, would 
     seriously diminish our U.S. competitive advantage in the 
     currently existing hyper-competitive global marketplace . . . 
     industrial espionage by countries that do not have an 
     equivalent capability to make basic discoveries, now accounts 
     for the theft each year of some $24 billion to perhaps over 
     $100 billion of U.S. proprietary technology. The Chemical 
     Weapons Convention would literally open the floodgates of 
     access to U.S. technology by foreign nations. Virtually 
     unannounced inspections by scientific experts, taking samples 
     and inspecting invoices can quickly uncover the proprietary 
     nature of any industrial operation, bypassing millions of 
     dollars of research and many years of development time that a 
     U.S. company has expended to create its competitive 
     advantage.''
       Kathleen Bailey, Senior Fellow, Lawrence Livermore 
     Laboratories, former Assistant Director for the Arms Control 
     and Disarmament Agency ``Experts in my laboratory recently 
     conducted experiments to determine whether or not there would 
     be a remainder inside of the equipment that is used for 
     sample analysis on-site.
       They found out that, indeed, there is residue remaining. 
     And if the equipment were taken off-site, off of the Lawrence 
     Livermore Laboratory site, or off of the site of a 
     biotechnology firm, for example, and further analysis were 
     done on those residues, you would be able to get classified 
     and/or proprietary information.''
       ``. . . . My bottom line is that the use of treaty 
     inspections for espionage is easy, effective, and all but 
     impossible to detect . . . Hypothetically, an inspector could 
     either be an intelligence official assigned to be an 
     inspector or could later sell information to a company or 
     country abroad that reveals either classified or CBI, 
     confidential business information, that they might have 
     gleaned through the process of gathering samples and 
     analyzing them.''
       Ralph S. Cunninghan, President and CEO of Citgo Petroleum 
     Corporation: ``CITGO believes that the requisite inspections 
     associated with the Treaty will, no doubt, jeopardize 
     confidential business information as well as disrupt normal 
     business operations.
       We realize that the petroleum industry is not the specific 
     target of this treaty. Nevertheless, it will be affected 
     because of the extensive list of chemicals covered by the 
     treaty.''
       William Arbitman, Associate General Counsel for the Dial 
     Corp: ``We are not prepared to receive a foreign inspection 
     team to our facilities, and we would be greatly concerned 
     that such a visit might compromise our confidential business 
     information.''
       Kevin Kearns, President of the U.S. Business and Industrial 
     Council: ``On behalf of the 1,000 member companies of the 
     United States Business Industrial Council (USBIC), I strongly 
     urge you to oppose ratification of the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention (CWC).
       . . . the CWC effectively authorizes industrial espionage. 
     The CWC offers no protections for company formulas and other 
     trade secrets; they must be handed over if inspected. Nothing 
     would prevent other unscrupulous countries such as France and 
     China from placing intelligence officers on the inspection 
     team.''
       Larry Postelwait, President of the Crosby Group, Inc.: ``I 
     have several concerns regarding the access of our facilities 
     to a foreign inspection team. The treaty, as written, gives 
     them too much authority considering they could interfere with 
     our operations and affect production. It also makes us 
     vulnerable to our global competitors since they could benefit 
     from interfering with our production and from gaining close 
     insight into our operations.''
       David M. Craig, Manager of Environmental and Safety 
     Compliance for the Detrex Corporation: ``Although reverse 
     engineering of a product (the process of determining the 
     products' composition or molecular structure) may be 
     possible, many companies enjoy a competitive advantage in a 
     market due to the manufacturing process used. Process ``trade 
     secrets'' may include items as simple as: the type of 
     equipment used, manufacturing parameters, or even who 
     supplies a particular raw material. Allowing inspectors full 
     access to a company's manufacturing site and records could 
     have a large impact on a company's ability to compete in 
     domestic and international trade.''
       Tracy Hesp, Assistant to the Director of Regulatory Affairs 
     for Farnam Industries: ``First, the short-notice challenge 
     inspections that can be initiated by foreign states would be 
     a burden physically and financially. We have confidential 
     information concerning formulations and manufacturing 
     procedures that we need to protect.''
       Lesa McDonald, Environmental/Safety Manager for the Gemini 
     Company: ``. . .

[[Page S3509]]

     hosting such an inspection would be a serious hindrance to 
     our business. It would be very difficult to safeguard 
     confidential business information during such an inspection.
       We have serious reservations about the ability of more 
     legislation and further regulation of U.S. industry to solve 
     the chemical weapons problem. Further, since the countries of 
     Libya, Iraq, Syria and North Korea refuse to sign this 
     treaty, how will further reporting requirements, and 
     inspection of businesses such as ours prohibit the 
     development of chemical weapons?''
       John Hobbs, Safety Coordinator for Crafco, Inc.: ``The 
     potential for abuse, specifically the theft of trade secrets 
     both formulations and process oriented is significant. 
     Unannounced inspections are also costly in terms of 
     production disruption. A second concern would be that the 
     apparent goals of this treaty are enforceable in the United 
     States under already existing statutes. Industry sponsored 
     terrorism in the form of chemical weapons manufacture is 
     controllable without external intervention. Finally, without 
     the assent of the states sponsoring terrorism this treaty 
     really amounts to the good guys policing the good guys and 
     picking up whatever they can in the process.''
       J. Doug Pruitt, President of the Sundt Corporation: ``Based 
     upon the depth of inspection, e.g. interviews with corporate 
     personnel, employees, vendors, subcontractors; review of 
     drawings, purchase orders, subcontracts; inspection and 
     review of internal and external correspondence; we feel that 
     it could be difficult to safeguard confidential business 
     information during this inspection. This has to do not only 
     with our internal corporate information but we would be 
     concerned about information that we have signed a 
     confidentiality agreement with our partners and/or 
     customers.''


   u.s. companies are extremely worried about the cwc--a massive new 
                            paperwork burden

       S. Reed Morian, CEO of Dixie Chemical Company, Inc. (a CMA-
     member company): ``We would incur a significant increase in 
     data reporting under the CWC. . . . I'm certain we could not 
     comply with the CWC under our current budget. The CWC would 
     probably require an increase in headcount at our plant. . . . 
     It would be of little benefit for the U.S. to rigorously 
     participate in the CWC, if ALL the nations of the world don't 
     also participate.
       Thank you again for allowing us this opportunity to comment 
     on a treaty ratification that could impact us so greatly.''
       Robert Roten, the President and CEO of Sterling Chemicals 
     (a CMA-member company): ``We are very concerned about control 
     and cooperation of other countries (Mexico, Colombia, North 
     Korea, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Croatia, etc.). Since they 
     probably will not cooperate, how does this treaty assure a 
     ``worldwide ban?'' . . . We are familiar with the Chemical 
     Weapons Convention and we understand our responsibilities 
     (and liabilities) should this treaty become U.S. law. . . . 
     We cannot comply within our current annual budget and 
     personnel constraints. Our best estimates is that this treaty 
     will cost Sterling a minimum of $100,000 per year and should 
     an inspection occur at least another $200,000-$300,000 will 
     possibly be required.''
       Raymond Keating, Chief Economist for the Small Business 
     Survival Committee: ``Of course, smaller businesses will be 
     hit hardest by these increased regulatory costs. 
     Interestingly, the Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA) 
     supports ratification of the CWC and told the Senate Foreign 
     Relations Committee that the new regulations would not be a 
     burden. But the CMA is a group of generally large chemical 
     manufacturers, and reportedly more than 60 percent of the 
     facilities likely affected by the CWC are not CMA members.
       Large companies possess far greater resources and have 
     accrued significant experience in dealing with regulators of 
     all kinds. In fact, new regulatory burdens can perversely 
     give large firms a competitive edge over smaller companies 
     due to these resource and experience factors. As economist 
     Thomas Hopkins has shown, the per-employee cost of federal 
     regulation runs almost 50 percent higher for firms with fewer 
     than 500 employees versus companies with more than 500 
     employees.''
       Marvin Gallisdorfer, President of Lomac, Inc.: ``It is not 
     possible to estimate the amount of time that it will take to 
     fill out the various CWC forms, but I can assure you that the 
     total time will far exceed the 2-10 hour estimate found in 
     Section 1.A. [of the Draft Department of Commerce 
     Regulations.]. The instructions alone will require a 
     substantial commitment of time. After the data is gathered, 
     it must be checked thoroughly to assure accuracy, because an 
     honest mistake can (and most assuredly will in some cases) 
     lead to a $50,000 fine. Even if, however, we estimate a 20-
     hour commitment per form, where can we find the 20 hours? Our 
     staff is already employed full-time filling out a host of 
     forms and applications for the Michigan Department of 
     Environmental Quality, the U.S. EPA, and other government 
     agencies. I have enclosed, for your information, copies of 
     the reports that we are required to file annually. As you can 
     see, this is quite a bit of paperwork--and we are a 
     relatively small (150-200 employees) company.
       * * * I truly believe that this CWC will cost American jobs 
     without any benefit. The United States can be trusted to 
     refrain from making chemical weapons, but I cannot believe 
     that certain other countries will abide by the treaty. 
     Because of the adverse impact on Michigan's chemical industry 
     (with little or no off-setting benefit) I urge you to vote 
     against ratification of the treaty.''
       Edward Noble, Senior Corporate Environmental Specialist for 
     ISK Biosciences Corporation: ``In general, we believe that 
     banning chemical weapons is a laudable goal. Since those 
     countries most likely to instigate the use of chemical 
     weapons are not among the signatories of the CWC, it would 
     seem that this convention creates a lot of paper and does 
     very little to gain the goal of eliminating chemical 
     weapons.''
       Paul Eisman, Vice President of Ultraform-Diamond Shamrock: 
     ``* * * our costs have increased by an estimated $1 million 
     per year over the last couple of years just to meet new 
     regulatory paperwork demands. We are incurring these costs, 
     but should assume that our customers are paying for these in 
     the long run * * *. We cannot comply with the requirements of 
     this treaty with our current staff and resources. We estimate 
     additional costs of $250,000 annually to comply.''
       Jim Moon, President of Moon Chemical Products, Inc.: ``The 
     reporting requirements in this treaty are a burden for any 
     company not involved in weapons * * * We are manufacturers of 
     industrial, institutional, and agricultural products. Several 
     years ago we had to hire an outside consultant to make sure 
     we meet government regulations for our business, our 
     employees, and our customers. Please do not add another 
     burden to our industry.''
       Nick Carter, President of South Hampton Refining Company: 
     ``No, we could not comply with this treaty within our current 
     annual budget and personnel. The reason we are in business as 
     a small refiner is that we change the operation quickly and 
     often to meet the market. The reporting alone would require 
     additional personnel, much less the cost of potential 
     inspection, interpreting the regulations, etc. We currently 
     have 10% of our work force assigned to nothing but regulatory 
     functions, mostly environmental. At some point these non-
     profit producing efforts will outweigh the value of keeping 
     the business operating.
       * * * There are months where the cost of compliance with 
     this treaty would completely eliminate the profit for the 
     month. You can explain to our employees how this is more 
     important to the nation than them getting a paycheck, or 
     having health coverage, or having a retirement plan, or 
     having a profit sharing check.''
       John Hohnholt, Vice-President of Valero Refining Company: 
     ``Valero is an independent refinery with limited staff 
     resources which are already overwhelmed with regulatory 
     compliance record keeping and reporting. This additional 
     burden on our staff appears excessive and probably unintended 
     for our industry.''
       Odus Hennessee, President and COO for Cosmetic Specialty 
     Labs: ``The ultimate result is to simply add unnecessary 
     costs to the production of our products making it difficult 
     if not impossible to sell our products in our own market, 
     much less to compete in the international marketplace.''


                       the theft of trade secrets

       Don Fuqua, President of the Aerospace Industries 
     Association: ``We are very concerned, however, that the 
     application of the Convention's reporting and inspection 
     regime to AIA member companies could unnecessarily jeopardize 
     our nation's ability to protect its national security 
     information and proprietary technological data.''
       Rear Admiral Jim Carey, Chairman of 21st Century Coatings: 
     ``This communication is to urge you in the strongest possible 
     terms to oppose the Chemical Weapons Convention on the 
     grounds that it will cost my company an outrageous amount of 
     money and subject us to intrusive international inspections 
     that we can ill afford. We make paint under trade-secret 
     technology that with one coat can stop all rust and corrosion 
     for 50 years. We have spent the last 6 months researching 
     construction of a new plant in Texas. The CWC will bring that 
     effort to a screeching halt and instead we will look 
     offshore. The CWC will not stop the world chemical weapons 
     threat; it will only put people like us out of business.''
       Eduardo Beruff, President of SICPA Industries of America, 
     Inc.: ``For the reasons outlined below, we at SICPA 
     Industries of America, Inc. (``SICPA'') respectfully urge you 
     to reject this treaty.
       . . . SICPA Industries of America, Inc. is the foremost 
     manufacturer of security inks used in printing U.S. currency, 
     and is a leader in developing new security ink technologies 
     to protect the nation's valuable documents and proprietary 
     products. . . . The proposed Chemical Weapons Convention 
     would impose new financial burdens on SICPA and similar 
     companies in order to attain and maintain compliance. More 
     importantly, it could jeopardize the security of SICPA's 
     invaluable trade secret information.''
       S. Reed Morian, CEO of Dixie Chemical Company, Inc. (a CMA-
     member company): ``While the intent of the CWC is of the 
     highest merit, the regulations appear to be very onerous 
     requiring increased reporting and record keeping, foreign 
     inspection of our facilities, and a significant challenge to 
     our ability to maintain Confidential Business Information 
     (CBI) . . . We are not prepared to have a foreign inspection 
     team in our plant. I doubt that CBI could be safeguarded 
     during such an inspection.''

[[Page S3510]]

       Ralph Johnson, Vice President of Environmental Affairs of 
     Dixie Chemical Company: ``. . . If we use EPA inspections as 
     an example, these foreign Chemical Weapon Convention 
     inspections could cost up to maybe $50,000 per site. . . . 
     These inspections would be very costly and burdensome. The 
     biggest problem with these inspections, however, is . . . our 
     highly probable loss of confidential business information. An 
     inspector observing one of our reactors would know, for the 
     product being observed, our operating pressures, 
     temperatures, catalysts, reaction time, ingredients, 
     purification methods, pollution abatement methods. We would 
     no longer have any confidential technology, methodology, or 
     know-how relative to this product. It would be gone 
     forever.''

  Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I also ask unanimous consent that an 
editorial from the Wall Street Journal that I think speaks very openly 
to the concerns that many in the chemical industry have as it relates 
to what they would be required to do, which is open their doors wide 
and embrace an international inspection team, be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                     [From the Wall Street Journal]

                          Here Come the Spies

       We've already made the case for why the Senate should 
     reject the Chemical Weapons Convention. The last thing the 
     world needs is another unverifiable arms control treaty. The 
     worst danger here is creating the illusion that we are 
     ridding the world of the threat of chemical weapons. But 
     there's another danger: The treaty would be a bonanza to 
     countries that are in the business of spying on American 
     business.
       Worst hit would be the defense and aerospace industry--and 
     hence national security--but plenty of other industries would 
     be subject to industrial espionage. There has never been an 
     arms control treaty whose reach would extend so far into 
     ordinary business, both through its reporting requirements 
     and its inspection regime.
       The CWC covers not just companies that manufacture certain 
     chemicals and discrete organic chemicals, but also those that 
     use them to make something else--such as automobiles, 
     pharmaceuticals, electronics or even liquor. The Arms Control 
     and Disarmament Agency has drawn up a list of more than 1,000 
     American companies that would be subject to the treaty's 
     terms. Others say at least 6,000 companies would be affected.
       The Chemical Manufacturers Association has been vocal in 
     pooh-poohing the treaty's reporting and inspection 
     requirements, which may in fact not be much for the CMA's 
     already highly regulated membership of fewer than 200 
     companies. But companies that make such things as soap or 
     tires or paint are going to find the paperwork alone an 
     expensive new irritant.
       Far more troublesome, however, is the treaty's proposed 
     inspection regime, to be carried out by a new international 
     bureaucracy in the Hague called the Organization for the 
     Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. A better name might be the 
     Organization for the Promotion of Industrial Espionage.
       OPCW will conduct both routine inspections and 
     ``challenge'' inspections at the request of member 
     governments. Under the terms of the treaty, it would be next 
     to impossible for the U.S. to halt a frivolous or abusive 
     inspection. A challenge inspection would take place with less 
     than a day's notice, and inspectors would have extraordinary 
     access to files, data, equipment, etc. A company might as 
     well post its trade secrets on the Internet.
       The challenging country would send along an observer, and 
     even though he wouldn't be permitted beyond a specified 
     perimeter, there's a lot he would be able to learn from that 
     distance. In a mock inspection that the U.S. carried out 
     using the CWC's proposed rules, the ``observer'' was able to 
     steal proprietary information simply by gathering soil and 
     water samples from his spot on the edge of the inspection 
     site.
       Worse, there are no guarantees that the inspectors 
     themselves won't moonlight as spies. Senator Helms raised 
     this issue during Madeleine Albright's confirmation hearing 
     in January. He pointed to evidence that Chinese applicants 
     for OPCW inspector jobs had been ``directed to volunteer'' 
     and that most had ties to the People's Liberation Army's 
     chemical ``defense'' program. It's not hard to imagine the 
     damage an inspector-spy could do. Reverse engineering is one 
     threat, but even something seemingly as simple as the type of 
     equipment used in a manufacturing process could constitute a 
     trade secret.
       All this poses a danger to national security. Kathleen 
     Bailey of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory testified to 
     that effect before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
     last year. She said ``classified information can be obtained 
     from sampling and analysis during, and perhaps after, 
     inspections under the Chemical Weapons Convention. 
     Furthermore, clandestine sampling would be virtually 
     impossible to detect or to prevent.'' In the defense area, 
     stealth technology is particularly at risk; a challenge 
     inspection of a U.S. defense contractor could yield much on 
     that score.
       So far, the debate on the Chemical Weapons Convention 
     hasn't moved beyond Washington to the boardroom. Only a few 
     companies--Dial Soap and Citgo Petroleum among them--have 
     spoken out against the treaty. It's perhaps understandable 
     that most CEOs would assume that a treaty on chemical weapons 
     wouldn't affect them. It does and they'd be wise to pay 
     attention.


                            cwc is watching

       From a May 14, 1996 list compiled by the Arms Control and 
     Disarmament Agency of companies that would be subject to the 
     Chemical Weapons Convention: Archer Daniels Midland Co., 
     Armco Steel Co., Castrol, Citgo Petroleum Corp., Colgate-
     Palmolive Co., Dial Corp., General Motors Corp., Gillette 
     Co., Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Jim Beam Brands Co., Kaiser 
     Aluminum, Lever Brothers Co., Maxwell House Coffee Co., 
     Nutrasweet Co., Pfizer, Quaker Oats Co., Raytheon Co, Safeway 
     Stores; Sherwin Williams Co., Simpson Timber Co., Winn-Dixie 
     Stores, and Xerox Corp.
       Source: Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
  Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, my point is simply this. There are 
reasonable people on both sides of this issue who differ and are very 
loud about the concerns they have. The chemical industry is not 
monolithic at all when it comes to support for this. There are a 
substantial number within it who are extremely concerned that they may 
expose their companies to tremendous economic risk and to the liability 
of the loss of their secrets that relate to the formulas for the 
production of peaceful goods and services to our country. I think it is 
important that that be said at this time and that the names and quotes 
of these ladies and gentlemen become a part of the Record.
  I yield back any time.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield 30 seconds to myself. I ask 
unanimous consent that a statement of the Chemical Manufacturers 
Association be printed in the Record, as well as the list of those 
companies supporting this treaty.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                            Chemical Manufacturers


                                                  Association,

                                    Arlington, VA, April 18, 1997.
     Hon. Joseph R. Biden,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Biden: On April 24, the Senate will vote on 
     whether to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). On 
     behalf of nine organizations representing a broad spectrum of 
     chemical producers, consumers, and professionals, I urge your 
     strong support of this important treaty.
       Opponents of the CWC contend that the treaty will have a 
     catastrophic impact on American business, including a 
     burdensome regulatory system, intrusive on-site inspections, 
     and losses of proprietary information. The facts, however, 
     bear out our belief that the CWC is the right thing to do:
       Less than 2,000 facilities nationwide will have any 
     responsibilities under the CWC. Of these, ninety percent will 
     have to do no more than fill out a two-page report once a 
     year.
       The chemical industry helped develop the procedures by 
     which fewer than 200 facilities will be inspected. We then 
     tested those provisions in a series of full-fledged trial 
     inspections at plant sites. We helped confirm that inspected 
     companies have a role in determining how inspections will be 
     conducted, and the extent to which inspection teams access 
     the facilities.
       Industry representatives helped write the treaty provisions 
     that safeguard confidential business information. Chemical 
     companies worked closely with the Administration in drafting 
     the CWC implementing legislation that complements those 
     safeguards.
       The chemical industry has continued its efforts to further 
     narrow the potential impact of the Convention on commercial 
     interests. We successfully advocated a complete exemption for 
     polymer and oligomer producers, which means that the plastics 
     and textile industries are not subject to the Convention. We 
     helped push an exemption for petroleum refineries and 
     explosives manufacturers. We have worked to develop 
     reasonable, low concentration limits that are commercially 
     practicable, yet provide the level of verification necessary 
     to assure that the CWC is not being violated.
       On April 17, the Senate passed Senator Kyl's legislation, 
     S. 495. Although Senator Kyl's legislation would generally 
     expand the legal basis for domestic action against chemical 
     weapons proliferation, it is important that you know that S. 
     495 is not a substitute for the Chemical Weapons Convention.
       For example, S. 495 provides no mechanism for multilateral 
     agreement to prevent or prohibit the production, storage, 
     development or use of chemical weapons. It provides no means 
     for investigating potential diversions to illegal weapons 
     uses. And it does not remedy the trade impacts that will 
     arise when the CWC's trade ban goes into effect three years 
     from now. CMA estimates that some $500 to $600 million in two 
     way trade will be at risk if this ban goes into effect. 
     Moreover, S. 495 does nothing to prevent trade barriers being 
     imposed by CWC Parties, aimed at U.S. trade in chemicals.
       The chemical industry is America's largest exporter 
     surpassing agriculture, aerospace,

[[Page S3511]]

     computers, etc. It is the world leader in technological 
     development, research and innovation. The industry works hard 
     to maintain that leadership. The industry has maintained a 
     trade surplus for 68 consecutive years. You can be assured 
     that the chemical industry would not be silent if the CWC 
     truly jeopardized commercial interests.
       For your further information, I have enclosed a copy of an 
     advertisement that appeared in the April 14, 1997 issue of 
     Roll Call. I have also enclosed a copy of a letter signed by 
     members of CMA's Board of Directors, reiterating their 
     support for this important agreement.
       In short, Senator, we need your vote in favor of the 
     Chemical Weapons Convention.
       If you have any questions concerning the chemical 
     industry's support for the CWC, please call me or Claude 
     Boudrias, Legislative Representative for Tax and Trade at 
     (703) 741-5915.
           Sincerely,
                                              Frederick L. Webber,
     President and Chief Executive Officer.
                                                                    ____

                                                   April 15, 1997.
     Hon. Trent Lott,
     Senate Majority Leader, U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Lott: We, the undersigned members of the 
     Chemical Manufacturers Association's Board of Directors, are 
     writing to ask you to support the Chemical Weapons Convention 
     (CWC).
       We believe the Convention is a fair and effective 
     international response to the international threat of 
     chemical weapons proliferation. Ratifying the CWC is in the 
     national interest.
       The CWC is a natural extension of existing U.S. policy. In 
     1985, Congress voted to end production of chemical weapons by 
     the military and to begin destroying existing stockpiles.
       For years, the United States has imposed the world's 
     strongest controls on exports of weapons-making ingredients. 
     Our nation is the standard bearer in preventing the spread of 
     chemical weapons.
       The CWC requires other nations to do what the United States 
     is already doing. That's why President Reagan proposed the 
     treaty to the United Nations in 1984. It's why President Bush 
     signed the treaty in Paris in 1993. And it's why President 
     Clinton is asking the Senate to ratify it.
       The chemical industry has thoroughly examined the CWC. We 
     have tested the treaty's record-keeping and inspection 
     provisions. And we have concluded that the benefits of the 
     CWC far outweigh the costs.
       Ratifying the CWC is the right thing to do. We urge you to 
     vote for the Convention.
           Sincerely,
         Frederick L. Webber, President & CEO, Chemical 
           Manufacturers Association; J. Lawrence Wilson, Chairman 
           & CEO, Rohm and Haas Company, Chairman, Board of 
           Directors, Chemical Manufacturers Association; John E. 
           Akitt, Executive Vice President, Exxon Chemical 
           Company; Phillip D. Ashkettle, President and CEO, 
           Reichhold Chemicals, Inc.; Bernard Azoulay, President 
           and CEO, Elf Atochem North America; William G. Bares, 
           Chairman and CEO, The Lubrizol Corporation; Jerald A. 
           Blumberg, Executive Vice President, DuPont, Chairman, 
           DuPont Europe; Michael R. Boyce, CEO & President, 
           Harris Chemical Group; Vincent A. Calarco, Chairman, 
           President & CEO, Crompton & Knowles Corporation; 
           William R. Cook, Chairman, President and CEO, 
           BetzDearborn Inc.; Albert J. Costello, Chairman, 
           President & CEO, W.R. Grace & Co.; David J. D'Antoni, 
           President, Ashland Chemical Company; John R. Danzeisen, 
           Chairman, ICI Americas Inc.; Earnest W. Deavenport, 
           Jr., Chairman of the Board and CEO, Eastman Chemical 
           Company.
         R. Keith Elliott, Chairman, President & CEO, Hercules 
           Incorporated; Darryl D. Fry, Chairman, President and 
           CEO, Cytec Industries Inc.; Michael C. Harnetty, 
           Division Vice President, 3M; Richard A. Hazleton, 
           Chairman & CEO, Dow Corning Corporation; Alan R. 
           Hirsig, President & CEO, ARCO Chemical Company; Gerald 
           L. Hoerig, President, Syntex Chemicals, Inc.; Jack L. 
           Howe, Jr., President, Phillips Chemical Company; Jon M. 
           Huntsman, Jr., Vice Chairman, Huntsman Corporation; 
           Donald M. James, President & CEO, Vulcan Materials 
           Company; Dale R. Laurance, President and Sr. Operating 
           Officer, Occidental Petroleum Corporation; Raymond W. 
           LeBoeuf, President & CEO, PPG Industries, Inc.; James 
           A. Mack, President & CEO, Cambrex Corporation; Hans C. 
           Noetzli, President & CEO, Lonza, Inc.; Robert G. 
           Potter, Executive Vice President, Monsanto Company; 
           Arthur R. Sigel, President & CEO, Velsicol Chemical 
           Corporation; Enrique J. Sosa, Executive Vice President-
           Chemicals Sector, Amoco Corporation; William 
           Stavropoulos, President & CEO, The Dow Chemical 
           Corporation; F. Quinn Stepan, Chairman & President, 
           Stepan Company; S. Jay Stewart, Chairman & CEO, Morton 
           International, Inc.; Robert O. Swanson, Executive Vice 
           President, Mobil Corporation; Rudy van der Meer, 
           Member, Board of Management, Akzo Nobel nv; Jeroen van 
           der Veer, President & CEO, Shell Chemical Company; 
           George A. Vincent, Chairman, President & CEO, The C.P. 
           Hall Company; J. Virgil Waggoner, President & CEO, 
           Sterling Chemicals, Inc.; H. A. Wagner, Chairman & CEO, 
           Air Products & Chemicals, Inc.; Helge H. Wehmeier, 
           President & CEO, Bayer Corporation; Ronald H. Yocum, 
           President & CEO, Millennium Petrochemical Company.

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, just as my friend from Idaho knows a lot 
about mining and knows a lot about potatoes and knows a lot about 
apples, because they are big issues in his State, I assure you, being a 
Senator from Delaware, if there was any genuine opposition from the 
chemical industry for this treaty, since most of those companies are 
incorporated in my State and it makes up 56 percent of my State's 
economy, I assure you, I would hear about it.
  Now, there may be some companies that do not like it, but I want to 
tell you, to use the expression, there may be reasons why for this in 
the minds of my colleagues, but none of the big boys, none of the 
outfits that do this as a big business, none of the outfits with 
multibillion-dollar operations, none of them, that I am aware of, are 
opposed to this treaty. They strongly support it.
  I yield 7 minutes to my friend from Ohio.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the distinguished Senator 
from Ohio.
  Mr. GLENN. I thank the Chair, and I ask the Chair to please notify me 
when I have used 6 minutes.
  Mr. President, I rise to urge my colleagues to vote in favor of 
ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention with its 28 agreed 
conditions.
  So far in this century, we have witnessed the use of chemical weapons 
in Europe, in China and in the Middle East, and we have seen the 
absolutely revolting photographs of victims of chemical weapons attacks 
at the Iraqi village of Halabja and the Tokyo subway. Some of us may 
have seen the famous photograph of the great violinist, Isaac Stern, 
performing in Israel while wearing a gas mask during the Iraqi 
occupation of Kuwait. Let there be no doubt about it, these weapons do 
present a clear and present danger to our security and the security of 
our allies around the world. They have not acquired the nickname, 
``poor man's nukes'' for nothing. They are cheap to make, easy to 
conceal, and can have devastating effects.
  Since 1995, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the 
Committee on Governmental Affairs has held six hearings titled ``Global 
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,'' which documented in 
vivid detail the gravity of the threat our country faces from both 
chemical and biological weapons. The three committee prints covering 
these hearings contain over 2,000 pages of relevant documentation. 
While I was chairman of that committee, I chaired personally four 
hearings on ``Global Spread of Chemical and Biological Weapons.'' In 
1989, that produced another 746 pages of documentation on these threats 
and the various choices facing our country by way of responses.
  Mr. President, today is not the day for additional hand wringing over 
these nightmares. Today is the day finally to do something truly 
constructive to alleviate these threats and stop the hand wringing. In 
this case, constructive means multilateral, since we are dealing here 
with a truly global threat, not one susceptible to solution by 
unilateral U.S. legislation. For example, bills like S. 495, which 
passed a badly divided Senate last week after virtually no serious 
debate and without a single hearing, would, if enacted, impose yet 
another death penalty, while opening up several new loopholes for 
continued U.S. possession of both chemical and biological weapons. 
Fortunately, we have an alternative approach to consider.
  Today, we can vote on a resolution providing our advice and consent 
to ratify a treaty that does not just address the problem of halting 
the proliferation of these weapons, but a treaty that will also set the 
world on a course finally to eliminate such weapons everywhere. Though 
we will not obviously achieve these goals overnight simply by ratifying 
the CWC, we will be taking a crucial step toward achieving that 
ultimate goal.

  My argument, simply put, is that we just cannot solve the global 
problems of the CWC destruction, proliferation,

[[Page S3512]]

terrorism and warfare by acting alone. The international framework, 
machinery, reporting procedures, and enforcement and verification 
mechanisms of this treaty will complement and reinforce--not compete 
with, substitute for or compromise--our own national military, 
intelligence, and diplomatic efforts against the global CW threat.
  The time has now come to put into place the international legal 
foundation necessary to eliminate chemical weapons once and for all. I 
am proud to be here on this historical occasion to speak on behalf of 
and to vote in favor of U.S. ratification of this treaty.
  Mr. President, let me get into some highlights of the CWC. The CWC 
bans the development, the production, stockpiling, use, and 
proliferation of chemical weapons. It requires the destruction of 
existing weapons, chemical agents, and CW production facilities. It 
breaks new ground with a system of verification that is the most 
extensive in the history of weapons of mass destruction.
  On November 23, 1993--over 3 years ago--President Clinton sent this 
treaty to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. Though 
the Senate has proceeded very, very slowly with the consideration of 
this treaty, the rest of the world seems prepared to go forward with or 
without us. Over 160 countries have now signed the treaty and 74 have 
already ratified it. So with or without U.S. ratification, the treaty 
will enter into force on April 29 of this year. At that point, world 
commerce in chemicals and chemical equipment will begin to take place 
within a multilaterally coordinated system that imposes real costs on 
nonparties to this convention. It is one reason why I support this 
treaty.
  There is a widespread consensus among the military, the intelligence 
and the defense experts inside our Government that this treaty will 
serve our national interest. This consensus is bipartisan. Indeed, the 
convention was negotiated during the Reagan administration, signed by 
President George Bush and sent to the Congress by President Clinton.
  Except with respect to nonparties, this treaty is completely 
nondiscriminatory: It obligates its parties not to develop or to 
possess chemical weapons, period. It does not divide the world up into 
one set of countries that may have these weapons and another set that 
may not. It works from a different premise, one more closely aligned 
with its cousin, the Biological Weapons Convention--by outlawing such 
weapons among the parties to the treaty, it will significantly 
strengthen international diplomatic efforts to make the prohibition 
truly global.
  To ensure compliance, the treaty provides a verification system that 
operates on two dimensions. First, it provides for routine monitoring 
of potentially sensitive activities at declared chemical weapons sites, 
storage areas, and relevant civilian chemical industries. Second, it 
provides for a system of on-site challenge inspections operating on the 
principle of managed access to ensure the protection of proprietary 
information, constitutional rights, and national security interests. 
These inspections will be conducted by the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons [OPCW]. This system of verification has 
been worked out not just in consultation with industry, but with the 
strong and continuing support of industry.


                            nothing perfect

  I believe that this system of verification--coupled with the 
increased transparency of chemical transfers and activities at chemical 
facilities around the world--will, when backed by robust national 
intelligence capabilities, build a level of confidence in the world 
community sufficient to ensure that the treaty is being observed by its 
parties.


      even if imperfect--better than present with no restrictions

  This view is shared today by our military and intelligence officials. 
On June 23, 1994, Gen. John Shalikashvili, the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, summarized this judgment quite clearly when he 
testified that--``From a military perspective, the Chemical Weapons 
Convention is clearly in our national interest.'' On August 11, 1994, 
he specifically testified that--``Because of the regime of 
declarations, which then can be verified through routine inspection and 
challenge inspection, I believe that the CWC can be effectively 
verified.'' The treaty has also been supported by former generals Colin 
Powell and Norman Schwarzkopf, among many other top military and 
intelligence officials. It has the full support of the Joint Chiefs.
  the verification system, in short, represents an appropriate balance 
between the need for intrusiveness and the need to protect commercial 
secrets and national security information. As a whole, the treaty will 
serve U.S. national interests in a number of ways. It will reduce the 
risk that chemical weapons will be used against our country. It will 
potentially reduce--but of course not eliminate entirely--the risk of 
terrorism involving chemical weapons. It will enhance the transparency 
of activities at chemical facilities around the world and thereby build 
confidence in CW disarmament. It will serve U.S. interests in combating 
the proliferation of chemical weapons. And it will, after the 10-year 
process of destroying existing CW stockpiles, remove many serious 
environmental hazards that faced citizens who live near plants that 
produced or stored chemical weapon agents.


                           common criticisms

  It is not surprising that any great achievement in the realm of 
disarmament would encounter criticism. I am not going to claim that 
each and every one of these criticisms is totally unfounded. I am also 
not going to question the motives of those who make such criticisms. I 
believe it is good to hear the views of such critics, to listen 
carefully to their interpretations of the flaws of this treaty, to 
debate points on which there is disagreement, and to come to a decision 
on what is in the long-term interest of our country. This is what the 
whole ratification process is all about. Though no treaty is perfect 
and the CWC is no exception to this rule, by my reckoning the flaws in 
this treaty are not sufficient grounds for the Senate not to proceed 
with ratification.
  I would now like to discuss briefly some of the main criticisms of 
the treaty that I have encountered over the many years this treaty has 
been awaiting a vote in the Senate.
  No. 1. Lack of universality. It is true, not ever country is a party 
to this treaty, nor is universal membership even a likelihood anytime 
soon. It may never be a universal agreement. There are several Arab 
countries, for example, that will no doubt refuse to enter into binding 
CW disarmament agreements until an agreement can also be reached 
concerning Israel's nuclear capability. Is this a sufficient cause to 
vote against the treaty? Absolutely not.
  I know of no multilateral disarmament agreement that is truly 
universal, if that term is defined to mean that all countries on Earth 
are parties. True, the more countries that join the better. But opting 
for isolation hardly seems to me to be a rational way for a country to 
pursue the goal of universality. I cannot imagine anything that would 
set back the goal of universality of this treaty more than a decision 
by the Senate of the United States not to vote for ratification of this 
treaty, or to approve it with killer amendments. I believe this treaty 
will stand the test of time and will approach universality of 
membership as confidence grows in its credibility as a force for 
international peace and security. It will be a challenge for diplomats 
and national leaders of the 21st century to induce the hold-out 
countries into the CWC regime.

  As for the treaty hold-outs specifically in the Middle East--
including Iraq, Libya, and some other Arab states that critics cite as 
a reason why the United States should not join this treaty--let us 
remember that no country has a bigger stake in putting a halt to 
chemical weapon proliferation in that turbulent region than does 
Israel. And I think it is instructive that Israel has considered and 
chosen to ignore this particular criticism--it has signed the treaty.
  No. 2. Verification problems. Now nobody questions that verifying a 
global ban on possessing or manufacturing chemical weapons will be a 
difficult undertaking, maybe even an impossible one, if the test of 
success is the ability to detect the secret manufacture of a small 
number of such weapons. Nobody doubts the widespread availability of 
the dual-use materials and know-how needed to make and to deliver 
chemical weapons. Nobody doubts that such

[[Page S3513]]

weapons can be manufactured in very small facilities, some even as 
small as some hearing rooms here in the Senate, as our intelligence 
officials have openly testified.
  In light of these basic facts of life about chemical weapons, the 
Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the ``U.S. 
Capability to Monitor Compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention'' 
(Rpt. 103-390) identified several potential difficulties in verifying 
this treaty. The committee's report, however, reads not as an 
indictment of the treaty, but as a convincing reminder of the need for 
America to maintain and upgrade its intelligence capabilities to 
grapple with such problems. I am concerned that some of my colleagues 
and outside commentators have looked at these challenges and simply 
concluded that it is impossible to verify this, or indeed any, CW 
disarmament treaty.
  Though the treaty offers no absolute guarantee against cheating at 
the level of relatively small-scale violations--it will leave us far 
more secure than we would be without such a treaty. First, the 
reporting and inspection provisions of the treaty will enhance the 
transparency of global flows of chemicals and chemical production 
equipment--it will also give us better information about how such 
chemicals are used after they leave international commerce. Second, the 
challenge inspection system will give the United States a new means to 
check up on suspicious activities inside countries, including 
activities that may not even involve chemicals or chemical equipment 
that entered international commerce.
  In short, we stand a much better chance of detecting, assessing, and 
mobilizing collective international action against potential CW-related 
activities by having a multilateral system of CW disarmament, than we 
would under the ``go-it-alone'' approach we would be left with as a 
non-party to this treaty.
  I think Maj. Gen. John Landry--testifying before the Armed Services 
Committee as the National Intelligence Officer for General Purpose 
Forces--accurately summarized the view of the U.S. intelligence 
community when he said on August 11, 1994, that ``we are better off 
with the treaty than without it.'' Former Defense Secretary Perry 
similarly observed on March 28, 1996, that despite the inherent 
difficulties of detecting illicit production of small quantities of 
chemical weapons, ``we also recognize that that [detection capability] 
would be even more difficult without a CWC.''
  Let us keep in mind that when it comes to verifying international 
compliance with arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation 
treaties, America does not rely exclusively upon the verification 
mechanisms in those treaties to judge compliance. Verification is 
achieved by these mechanisms operating alongside our own national 
intelligence capabilities. As I stated in my additional views to the 
SSCI's report on the CWC, the difficulties of monitoring this treaty 
underscore the importance of maintaining a highly capable U.S. 
intelligence community. If we work hard toward the goal of universal 
membership in the CWC and maintain or increase the capabilities of our 
intelligence community, then the lingering questions about compliance 
and verification would only fade accordingly. I would not be at all 
surprised if Russia were to ratify this treaty very soon.

  It is useful to recall that the Russian scientist who blew the 
whistle in 1991 and 1992 on illicit Russian chemical weapons activities 
is now a firm supporter of the CWC as a means to combat just such 
activities. On November 1, 1995, Dr. Vil Mirzayanov testified as 
follows before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations about the 
risk of theft of chemical agents in Russia:

       I am sure that the system of international inspections 
     provided for under the Chemical Weapons Convention will help 
     address this problem . . . These are very strong tools and I 
     hope that you will do your part to see that they are applied 
     in Russia by pressing for the Senate's ratification of the 
     Convention.

  The fact that this statement came from someone who is one of Russia's 
toughest critics on chemical weapons issues will, I hope, inspire other 
treaty critics to reexamine their own views.
  No, this is not the time to badger the CWC's verification system 
because it is unable to guarantee perfect international compliance. I 
wish we had some domestic criminal laws that would guarantee perfect 
compliance. Today is a day to rejoice that the CWC's verification 
system will soon be generating information that will be useful to our 
national leaders in detecting, characterizing, and defending against 
chemical weapons threats. When I hear all these criticisms about the 
treaty's verification system, I can only wonder--if these arguments are 
true, then why would Israel, which is located in one of the most 
dangerous neighborhoods on Earth, and which has so much at stake, sign 
such a treaty?
  The answer is that the CWC serves Israel's national security 
interests for precisely the same reason it serves our own national 
security interests. It deserves the support of all nations, and the 
more support it has, the better the verification system will become. 
Remaining outside the CWC is no way to improve its verification system.
  No. 3. Cost. Now with respect to cost, nobody can possibly predict 
exactly what it will cost to implement this treaty. The International 
Atomic Energy Agency's annual budget of about $200 million does not 
serve as a useful indicator of the cost of implementing the CWC given 
the many different functions of the respective treaty organizations, 
the IAEA and the OPCW. For fiscal year 1998, the administration has 
requested $25 million for meeting our CWC assessment and an additional 
$21 million for multilateral verification at U.S. facilities should 
that be necessary. This annual financial contribution approximates the 
cost of a couple of F-16 aircraft.
  The Chemical Manufacturers Association [CMA] has estimated that the 
cost to industry of complying with this treaty is about ``. . . one-
onehundredth of one percent of the cost of environmental reporting in 
the United States.'' CMA estimates that industry's total CWC reporting 
costs for 1997 would come to less than $250,000 and will decline in 
subsequent years. CMA has also estimated, however, that the cost to 
industry of America not ratifying this treaty would be ``hundreds of 
millions of dollars'' and thousands of jobs.
  As for the claim by some critics that the treaty will place a heavy 
regulatory burden on industry, CMA reports that in a recent field test 
it took less than 2 hours for producers of the broadcast category of 
materials--discrete organic chemicals--to fill out the appropriate 
reporting form. Some plant managers have estimated that they could 
complete this form in as little as 15 minutes. In recent field tests 
involving materials that are more tightly controlled, it took companies 
between 2-8 hours to complete the relevant paperwork. This does not 
seem to me to be an unduly burdensome procedure.
  We all know that the costs of destroying CW agent material will of 
course be considerable, particularly in countries like the United 
States and Russia which have tens of thousands of tons of this 
material. But U.S. law already requires us to destroy these materials, 
whether or not we join the CWC.
  The costs of having to defend against the use of such weapons--costs 
we have to pay regardless of whether America is a party to the CWC--
will remain considerable, though this expense will decline as the 
world's stockpiles of CW materials gradually diminish in accordance 
with the treaty. The treaty, it should be noted, does not outlaw 
national defenses against chemical weapons nor does it ban military 
retaliation for CW users.

  When it comes to measuring the true costs of this treaty, there is an 
absolute way and a relative way to measure these costs. The absolute 
approach merely adds up the costs of implementing the treaty and 
considers such costs in a vacuum. The relative approach compares these 
costs against various alternatives, such as costs we would have to pay 
in a world in which chemical war remains a clear and present danger, or 
a world with a CWC without the United States as a party.
  I think that any fair assessment would need to compare the costs of 
implementing the CWC against the costs of chemical war--preparing for 
one, fighting one, defending against one, deterring one, and 
recuperating from one. Now there is no way that the absolute costs of 
implementing this treaty would ever outweigh the devastating

[[Page S3514]]

costs of coping in a world armed to the teeth with chemical weapons. I 
just do not accept the argument that the costs of implementing this 
treaty are greater than the benefits to our national security from 
membership.
  No. 4. Sovereignty and secrecy. Under the Constitution, the CWC will 
be a supreme law of the land. Ironically, some of the same critics of 
the CWC who argue that the treaty is not verifiable because it is not 
intrusive enough, also argue that the treaty is too intrusive insofar 
as it allegedly jeopardizes the U.S. constitutional rights. These 
questions have already been examined closely by the Congress, as well 
they should, and most Members would agree that these arguments have 
been overdrawn.
  The main problem with this criticism is that it ignores the many 
safeguards that exist in the treaty to protect sovereign rights. First 
and most fundamentally, there is the right of withdrawal from the 
treaty on 90-days' notice. Second, the treaty's inspection system is 
far from a ``no-notice'' system--it prescribes a series of timetables 
which allow a state party time to prepare a site for inspection. The 
inspection itself is limited in time.
  As the Department of State put it in its letter transmitting the 
treaty to the President, ``The inspected State Party has the final say 
in determining the extent and nature of access within the challenged 
site.'' That is from the letter of November 20, 1993. This gets at the 
whole notion of ``managed access,'' which lies at the heart of the CWC 
inspections system. Under this approach, the State Department letter 
continued, ``the inspected State Party may give only individual 
inspectors access to certain parts of the inspection site, may shroud 
sensitive pieces of equipment, such as computer or electronic systems, 
and it may restrict sampling and sample analysis.'' Indeed, it is 
highly improbable that the U.S. chemical industry would have been such 
strong and chronic supporters of the CWC if this industry had concluded 
that the treaty would harm the competitiveness of U.S. industry or 
jeopardize company secrets.
  Aside from industry, I can imagine that the scientific community 
should be quite well informed about the merits of this treaty, 
especially its alleged intrusiveness. Mr. President, I ask unanimous 
consent to have printed at the end of my remarks a list of 151 members 
of the National Academy of Scientists who are chemists or biochemists 
and who support this treaty, and another list, compiled by the 
Federation of American Scientists, of 45 Nobel laureates who also 
endorse this treaty. No doubt about it, American support for this 
treaty is both broad and deep.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection it is so ordered.
  (See exhibits 1 and 2.)
  Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, No. 5. Other Criticisms. These are not the 
only lines of attack that critics have taken against the treaty in 
recent years.
  First, would the CWC require a new strategic nuclear doctrine that 
actually encourages the use of tactical nuclear weapons, given the 
unavailability of a CW alternative? Not very likely, given that our 
military has unparalleled conventional military options that are 
available to respond to and to deter any CW attack. In this respect, 
critics who urge the retention of a CW arsenal underestimate the power 
of our conventional military capabilities and overestimate both the 
value and likelihood of the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Typically, 
such critics also tend to ignore the impact of making such nuclear 
threats upon our global nuclear nonproliferation policy.
  Second, it is true that the parties to the CWC are nation states, 
not nonstate entities such as terrorist groups that may seek to acquire 
such weapons. Though the treaty offers no guarantee against CW 
terrorism, the treaty's transparency provisions will at least operate 
to make it more difficult for terrorists to acquire equipment or 
materials for use in making such weapons and that in itself is a 
positive feature of the treaty. In particular, it will make it much 
more difficult for terrorists to engage in large-scale production of 
chemical weapons without detection. Since the CWC has never been 
intended to serve as a substitute for national efforts against sub-
national terrorism, I find this whole argument that the treaty is weak 
on terrorism to be a red herring.

  I find it quite interesting that Japan--which was the victim of a 
recent chemical weapons attack by terrorists--has already ratified the 
CWC. In fact, Japan's Diet ratified the CWC within a month of the Sarin 
gas attack in the Tokyo subway. Though the treaty may not have been 
able to guarantee that this specific attack would not occur, Japan's 
leaders have obviously concluded that their country would still be 
better off with this treaty than without it. So would our country.
  Third, critics have argued that the treaty lacks teeth. In fact, the 
CWC does not repeal the fundamental principle of national sovereignty 
that has dominated world affairs for over 300 years. The treaty does 
not intend for the OPCW to perform as a police force in a world state. 
Though the treaty provides procedures for mobilizing international 
action against treaty violators, sanctions must still be implemented by 
individual state parties to the treaty.
  Nonparties to the treaty, however, will feel the teeth of this 
treaty. They will have a harder time participating in the world market 
for chemicals and chemical equipment. The few remaining CW states will 
in time feel the inevitable political pressures that come with the 
possession of internationally outlawed weaponry. And as the taboo on 
possession settles in the world community, so will the likelihood of 
strong international action against countries that would actually use 
such weapons. Sanctions against all forms of proliferation could always 
be strengthened, and I would certainly hope that this would be a high 
priority national security goal of this and future administrations. But 
the lack of mandatory sanctions in this treaty should not be confused 
with any lack of teeth--it will fall to the national diplomats, the 
leaders, and ultimately the people of the states that are CWC parties 
to sharpen this treaty's teeth. Though teething pains can be expected 
in the years ahead, sharper teeth will come.
  Fourth, and most recently, critics have pointed to trade and 
cooperation provisions in the treaty as evidence of an alleged 
obligation to provide chemicals and chemical equipment that will help 
treaty cheaters to make chemical weapons. Frankly, this argument is 
hogwash. The very first article of this treaty obligates its parties 
``* * * never under any circumstances * * * to assist, encourage or 
induce, in any way, anyone'' to acquire chemical weapons. Given this 
obligation--and given the treaty's inspection system and national 
intelligence capabilities to back it up--the only appropriate response 
to the accusation that the treaty will encourage peaceful trade and 
scientific exchanges is, so what?
  The administration has been more than reasonable in accommodating the 
concerns of the critics. The fact that agreement was reached on 28 
conditions hardly suggests a posture of stonewalling by anybody. But I 
cannot support any of the five additional conditions that have been 
offered concerning Russian chemical weapons activities, requiring 
terrorist states to join the CWC before we do, asserting a unilateral 
U.S. right to bar certain inspectors from certain countries, 
requiring the United States to seek the renegotiation of key provisions 
of the treaty on certain trade and CW defense issues, and adopting a 
verification standard based on a concept of military significance that 
is both inappropriate and unworkable. To the limited extent that these 
final conditions touch upon legitimate concerns, let us address these 
concerns inside the tent of the CWC, not by howling in the wilderness 
outside that tent.


                               conclusion

  Mr. President, I would like to conclude my remarks on a personal 
note. I have come a long way when it comes to the issue of CW 
disarmament. On May 21, 1985, I joined with three of my Senate 
colleague to argue in an Op-Ed in the Washington Post in favor of 
modernizing America's chemical weapons arsenal. At the time, there was 
scant prospect of a Chemical Weapons Convention. The Soviet Union was 
sitting on a huge CW arsenal and was threatening United States 
interests around the world. And our old so-called unitary chemical 
weapons were at best a national embarrassment, at worst an

[[Page S3515]]

actual danger to American citizens and our own troops. I favored the 
safer binary weapons--safer for our own troops if they ever had to use 
them.
  But times have changed. The Soviet Union has ceased to exist and 
there is significant support inside the Russian Government to follow 
through with Russia's obligations under the CWC, support which America 
has every reason to encourage in any way it can. Yes, there still are 
countries in the world today that have chemical weapons. There still is 
a terrorist threat involving such weapons. There is still a CW 
proliferation threat. Russia, though it will hardly be alone in this 
respect, will no doubt still seek to compete with us in many arenas of 
world affairs. And many of those old unitaries are still sitting around 
like rusting relics of a by-gone age.
  Yet the world today is closer than ever to outlawing one of the most 
dangerous weapons that mankind has every devised. As a U.S. Senator for 
over 20 years now, I have at times encountered some of my colleagues 
who were simply unprepared to reconsider policy positions that they 
took in considerably different times and circumstances. I am determined 
not to follow that practice.
  Mr. GLENN. In partial answer to Senator Kyl's comments on export 
controls, I ask unanimous consent that this release by the Australia 
Group, which deals with export controls, be printed at the end of my 
remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 3.)
  Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, the only other thing I would add is that I 
have examined this treaty and listened to arguments both pro and con. I 
am convinced the time has finally arrived to move the campaign to 
eliminate chemical weapons into high gear. The CWC certainly offers no 
panacea to all risks concerning their proliferation or use of chemical 
weapons. It does, however, represent a substantial step along the way 
to alleviating these risks and, therefore, deserves the full support of 
the Senate and the people of the United States. I urge all my 
colleagues to vote for ratification.
  I thank the Chair.

                               Exhibit 1

                                                February 24, 1997.
     Hon. Trent Lott,
     487 Russell Senate Office Building,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Lott: We, the undersigned scientists, urge you 
     to work as a matter of national urgency to bring the Chemical 
     Weapons Convention to a vote in the Senate before April 29 of 
     this year. That is the date when the Convention will 
     automatically enter into force, with or without the United 
     States.
       Negotiated by the administrations of Presidents Reagan and 
     Bush, and signed by the United States under President Bush in 
     January 1993, the Convention was formally submitted to the 
     Senate for its advice and consent to ratification by 
     President Clinton in November 1993. Since then it has been 
     the subject of thirteen hearings before the Committee on 
     Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services and the 
     Select Committee on Intelligence. The Secretaries of State 
     and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Director 
     of Central Intelligence and the representatives of the 
     Chemical Manufacturers Association have all testified 
     strongly in favor of ratification. More than 65 countries, 
     including all of our major allies, have ratified.
       If the Senate fails even to vote on the CWC, after three 
     administrations have been its leading architects and 
     proponents, the United States will have surrendered by 
     default its essential leadership in combating the 
     proliferation of chemical weapons.
           Respectfully,
       Julius Adler.
       Robert A. Alberty.
       Sidney Altman.\1\
       Fred C. Anson.
       W. O. Baker.
       John D. Baldeschwieler.
       Robert L. Baldwin.
       Allen J. Bard.
       Neil Bartlett.
       Helmut Beinert.
       Howard C. Berg.
       R. Stephen Berry.
       Richard Bersohn.
       Jerome A. Berson.
       Klaus Biemann.
       Jacob Bigeleisen.
       Virgil Boekelheide.
       Jan L. Breslow.
       Leo Brewer.
       Herbert C. Brown.\1\
       Giulio L. Cantoni.
       John A. Carbon.
       Herbert E. Carter.
       Charles P. Casey.
       Thomas R. Cech.\1\
       David Chandler.
       Carolyn Cohen.
       Mildred Cohn.
       Robert E. Connick.
       John D. Corbett.
       Stanley J. Cristol.
       James E. Dahlberg.
       Samuel Danishefsky.
       Earl W. Davie.
       David R. Davies.
       Peter B. Dervan.
       William Doering.
       Paul Doty.
       Harry G. Drickhamer.
       James L. Dye.
       Isidore S. Edelman.
       Mary P. Edmonds.
       David Eisenberg.
       Mostafa A. El-Sayed.
       Ernest L. Eliel.
       David A. Evans.
       John D. Ferry
       Edmond H. Fischer.\1\
       Marshall Fixman.
       Marye Anne Fox.
       Josef Fried.
       Carl Frieden.
       Gerhart Friedlander.
       Joseph S. Fruton.
       Marshall Gates.
       E. Peter Geiduschek.
       Martin Gellert.
       Walter Gilbert.\1\
       Roy G. Gordon.
       Robert H. Grubbs.
       Lowell P. Hager.
       George S. Hammond.
       Dudley Herschbach.\1\
       George P. Hess.
       Robert L. Hill.
       Mahlon Hoagland.
       Bernard L. Horecker.
       Donald F. Hornig.
       William P. Jencks.
       Harold Johnston.
       Isabella L. Karle.
       Martin Karplus.
       Joseph J. Katz.
       Walter Kauzmann.
       Sung-Hou Kim.
       James L. Kinsey.
       William Klemperer.
       Judith P. Klinman.
       Irving M. Klotz.
       Edward D. Korn.
       Roger Kornberg.
       Daniel E. Koshland, Jr.
       Henry Lardy.
       Robert Lehman.
       Nelson J. Leonard.
       Robert L. Letsinger.
       Stephen J. Lippard.
       William N. Lipscomb.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \1\ Nobel Laureate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       F.W. McLafferty.
       Jerrold Meinwald.
       Matthew Meselson.
       Thomas J. Meyer.
       Josef Michl.
       William H. Miller.
       Kurt Mislow.
       Mario J. Molina.\1\
       C. Bradley Moore.
       Manuel F. Morales.
       Howard A. Nash.
       Daniel Nathans.\1\
       Elizabeth F. Neufeld.
       Marshall Nirenberg.\1\
       Harry F. Noller.
       Leslie E. Orgel.
       Mary J. Osborn.
       Norman R. Pace.
       Charles S. Parmenter.
       Robert G. Parr.
       George W. Parshall.
       Ralph G. Pearson.
       Gregory A. Petsko.
       Kenneth S. Pitzer.
       Charles M. Radding.
       Julius Rebek.
       Lester J. Reed.
       Howard Reiss.
       Stuart A. Rice.
       Frederic M. Richards.
       Irwin A. Rose.
       F. Sherwood Rowland.\1\
       William J. Rutter.
       Lewis H. Sarett.
       Robert T. Sauer.
       Howard K. Schachman.
       Peter G. Schultz.
       Glenn T. Seaborg.\1\
       K. Barry Sharpless.
       Robert G. Shulman.
       Maxine F. Singer.
       Robert L. Sinsheimer.
       Emil L. Smith.
       David B. Sprinson.
       George R. Stark.
       Donald F. Steiner.
       Joan A. Steitz.
       Thomas A. Steitz.
       Walter H. Stockmayer.
       Gilbert Stork.
       Jack L. Strominger.
       Julian M. Sturtevant.
       Dean Stanley Tarbell.
       Henry Taube.\1\
       H.E. Umbarger.
       Peter H. von Hippel.
       Salih J. Wakil.
       Frederick T. Wall.
       Cheves Walling.
       James C. Wang.
       Gregorio Weber.
       Samuel I. Weissman.
       Frank Westheimer.
       Ralph S. Wolfe.
       (All signatories are members of the United States National 
     Academy of Sciences in the field of Chemistry or 
     biochemistry)

                               Exhibit 2

     Nobel Laureates Urges Senators To Ratify the Chemical Weapons 
                               Convention

                                                   March 11, 1997.
       The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) has sent a 
     letter to US Senators urging the Senate to ratify the 
     Chemical Weapons Convention without delay. Support for

[[Page S3516]]

     the letter's goal of prompt ratification came from 45 Nobel 
     prize winners who specifically confirmed their desire for CWC 
     ratification.
       The letter, signed by FAS Chairman, and former Deputy 
     National Security Adviser to the President, Carl Kaysen, 
     reminds Senators of the importance of U.S. ratification. The 
     treaty requires ``total elimination of chemical weapons 
     stocks, prohibits chemical weapons-related activities, bans 
     assistance for such activities, and bars trade with non-
     parties in certain relevant chemicals.''
       In ratifying the treaty, the U.S. would join 70 countries--
     including all major NATO allies and all other G-7 members--
     who have already ratified it.
       The Federation of American Scientists is a national 
     organization of scientists and engineers concerned with 
     issues of science and global security.
                                                                    ____



                            Federation of American Scientists,

                                    Washington, DC, March 7, 1997.
     Hon. Trent Lott,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Lott: The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 
     will enter into force on April 29, 1997, following its 
     ratification by the 65th signatory nation in November, 1996. 
     It has not yet been ratified by the United States.
       This treaty bans an entire class of weapons of mass 
     destruction. It is a nonproliferation treaty that requires 
     total elimination of chemical weapons stocks, prohibits 
     chemical weapons-related activities, bans assistance for such 
     activities, and bars trade with non-parties in certain 
     relevant chemicals. This treaty denies us no option we would 
     otherwise wish to exercise, for the United States has already 
     renounced chemical weapons and is in the process of 
     destroying them. The CWC is a critical instrument for 
     universalizing this policy and preventing the further spread 
     of chemical weapons.
       With no military interest in chemical weapons, the United 
     States can only gain by ratifying the treaty, regardless of 
     its level of verification. US accession is necessary to give 
     the CWC the force of an international norm against the 
     possession of chemical weapons. That norm alone would be 
     powerful, providing a basis for joint action to enforce 
     compliance.
       But, in addition, the CWC provides new tools for deterring 
     and detecting chemical weapons proliferation. The value of 
     its provisions will grow with time, as the treaty's 
     incentives work to increase the number of adherents. The 
     declaration and inspection requirements will improve our 
     knowledge of possible proliferation activities, whether 
     conducted by nations or terrorists. Access to declared and 
     undeclared sites will make clandestine operations more 
     difficult, risky and expensive; participating states will 
     have the right to demand short-notice inspections of sites in 
     other States Parties. The CWC's provisions constitute the 
     most rigorous verification regime ever negotiated. At the 
     same time, the treaty and the proposed US implementing 
     legislation explicitly protect Constitutional rights and 
     confidential and proprietary information.
       During negotiation of the treaty, senior officials of the 
     U.S. Chemical Manufacturers Association participated at the 
     side of U.S. Government negotiators, and the chemical 
     industry has consistently and publicly advocated ratification 
     of the CWC. Now, if the treaty comes into force without U.S. 
     ratification, its constraints on the chemical exports of non-
     parties will penalize the U.S. chemical industry. Should the 
     Senate not ratify the Convention, the U.S. Government would 
     also be excluded from a seat on the CWC's governing body, and 
     from participating in the establishment of operating 
     procedures. At the same time, as signatories we will be 
     obligated to abide by the treaty's prohibitions.
       Since the treaty was opened for signature in 1993, the 
     United States and 166 other countries have signed it. 
     Further, 67 countries, including all the major NATO allies, 
     have deposited their instruments of ratifications, as have 
     all other G-7 members.
       In order to draw the attention of the Senate to the 
     importance of this issue, the Federation of American 
     Scientists has secured the specific endorsement of 45 Nobel 
     Prize winners to the ratification of the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention, and records their names below.
           Yours sincerely,
                                                      Carl Kaysen,
                                                    Chairman, FAS.
       I urge the U.S. Senate to ratify the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention without delay.
       Signed by: Sidney Altman, Philip W. Anderson, Kenneth J. 
     Arrow, Julius Axelrod, David Baltimore, Helmut Beinert, 
     Konrad Bloch, Baruch S. Blumberg, Herbert C. Brown, Stanley 
     Cohen, Leon N. Cooper, Johann Deisenhofer, Renato Dulbecco, 
     Gertrude B. Elion, and Val L. Fitch.
       Walter Gilbert, Dudley R. Herschbach, David Hubel, Jerome 
     Karle, Arthur Kornberg, Edwin G. Krebs, Joshua Lederberg, 
     Leon Lederman, Wassily W. Leontief, Edward B. Lewis, William 
     N. Lipscomb, Mario J. Molina, Joseph E. Murray, Daniel 
     Nathans, Arno A. Penzias, and Norman F. Ramsey.
       Burton Richter, Richard J. Roberts, Martin Rodbell, F. 
     Sherwood Rowland, Glenn T. Seaborg, Herbert A. Simon, Phillip 
     A. Sharp, R.E. Smalley, Robert M. Solow, Jack Steinberger, 
     Henry Taube, James Tobin, Charles H. Townes, and Eric 
     Weischaus.

                               Exhibit 3

                        Australia Group Meeting

       Australia Group participants held informal consultations in 
     Paris between Oct. 14-17, to discuss the continuing problem 
     of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) proliferation. 
     Participants at these talks were Argentina, Australia, 
     Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the 
     European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
     Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, 
     Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
     Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom 
     and the United States, with the Republic of Korea taking part 
     for the first time.
       Participants maintain a strong belief that full adherence 
     to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and to the 
     Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) will be the 
     best way to eliminate these types of particularly inhumane 
     weapons from the world's arsenals. In this context, the 
     maintenance of effective export controls will remain an 
     essential practical means of fulfilling obligations under the 
     CWC and the BTWC.
       All participants at the meeting welcomed the expected entry 
     into force of the CWC, noting that this long-awaited step 
     will be an important, historic moment in international 
     efforts to prohibit chemical weapons. Participants agreed to 
     issue a separate statement on this matter, which is attached.
       Participants also welcomed the progress of efforts to 
     strengthen the BTWC in the negotiations taking place in the 
     Ad Hoc Group of BTWC States Parties in Geneva. All Australia 
     Group participating countries are also States Parties to this 
     Treaty, and strongly support efforts to develop 
     internationally-agreed procedures for strengthening 
     international confidence in the treaty regime by verifying 
     compliance with BTWC obligations.
       Experts from participating countries discussed national 
     export licensing systems aimed at preventing inadvertent 
     assistance to the production of CBW. They confirmed that 
     participants administered export controls in a streamlined 
     and effective manner which allows trade and the exchange of 
     technology for peaceful purposes to flourish. They agreed to 
     continue working to focus these national measures efficiently 
     and solely on preventing any contribution to chemical and 
     biological weapons programs. Participants noted that the 
     value of these measures in inhibiting CBW proliferation 
     benefited not only the countries participating in the 
     Australia Group, but the whole international community.
       Participants also agreed to continue a wide range of 
     contacts, including a further program of briefings for 
     countries not participating in the Paris consultations to 
     further awareness and understanding of national policies in 
     this area. Participants endorsed in this context the 
     importance of regional seminars as valuable means of widening 
     contacts with other countries on these issues. In particular, 
     Romania's plans to host a seminar on CBW export controls for 
     Central and Eastern European countries and the Commonwealth 
     of Independent States in Bucharest on Oct. 21-22 and Japan's 
     plans to host a fourth Asian Export Control Seminar in Tokyo 
     in early 1997 were warmly welcomed by participants. Argentina 
     will also host a regional seminar on non-proliferation 
     matters, in Buenos Aires, in the first week of December 1996. 
     France will organize a seminar for French-speaking countries 
     on the implementation of the CWC. This will take place 
     shortly before entry into force of the Convention.
       The meeting also discussed relevant aspects of terrorist 
     interest in CBW and agreed that this serious issue requires 
     continuing attention.
       Participants agreed to hold further consultations in 
     October 1997.
                                                                    ____


 Australia Group Countries Welcome Prospective Entry Into Force of the 
                      Chemical Weapons Convention

       The countries participating in the Australia Group warmly 
     welcomed the expected entry into force of the Chemical 
     Weapons Convention (CWC) during a meeting of the Group in 
     Paris in October 1996. They noted that the long awaited 
     commencement of the CWC regime, including the establishment 
     of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 
     will be an historic watershed in global efforts to abolish 
     chemical weapons for all time. They also noted that all 
     states adhering to the CWC are obliged to ensure their 
     national activities support the goal of a world free of 
     chemical weapons.
       All of the participating countries reiterated their 
     previous statements underlining their intention to be among 
     the original States Parties to the CWC. They noted that 24 of 
     the 30 countries participating in the Australia Group have 
     already ratified the Convention. Representatives also 
     recalled their previous expressions of support for the CWC, 
     and reaffirmed these commitments. They restated their view 
     that the effective operation and implementation of the CWC 
     offers the best means available to the international 
     community to rid the world of these weapons for all time. 
     They called on all signatories to ratify the CWC as soon as 
     possible, and on the small number of countries which have not 
     signed the Treaty to join the regime and thereby contribute 
     to international efforts to ban these weapons.
       Representatives at the Australia Group meeting recalled 
     that all of the participating

[[Page S3517]]

     countries are taking steps at the national level to ensure 
     that relevant national regulations promote the object and 
     purpose of the CWC and are fully consistent with the 
     Convention's provisions when the CWC enters into force for 
     each of these countries. They noted that the practical 
     experience each country had obtained in operating export 
     licensing systems intended to prevent assistance to chemical 
     weapons programs have been especially valuable in each 
     country's preparations for implementation of key obligations 
     under the CWC. They noted in this context, that these 
     national systems are aimed solely at avoiding assistance for 
     activities which are prohibited under the Convention, while 
     ensuring they do not restrict or impede trade and other 
     exchanges facilitated by the CWC.

  Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from North 
Carolina.
  Mr. HELMS. I yield myself 1 minute.
  Mr. President, I have received a very fine statement by a 
distinguished former Member of this body, Malcolm Wallop of Wyoming, a 
gentleman and Senator whom I admire very much. He is now chairman, by 
the way, of the Frontiers of Freedom. I ask unanimous consent that his 
statement be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

              Bad Treaties do Make Security Problems Worse

                          (By Malcolm Wallop)

       On Thursday, April 24th, the U.S. Senate will debate and 
     vote on ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. As 
     is the case with many pieces of legislation like the 
     Endangered Species Act and The Comprehensive Antiterrorism 
     Act of 1995, the Chemical Weapons Convention sounds great. 
     Who can be against the Convention except those who like 
     chemical weapons? Dig deep, however, and you will find how 
     bankrupt and harmful the Chemical Weapons Convention can be, 
     if ratified. Ken Adelman, noted arms control expert an 
     proponent of this Convention, admits forthrightly, in a 
     Washington Post op-ed that ``no accord banning all chemical 
     weapons can be verifiable in any real sense. The convention's 
     verification provisions may help somewhat, but not all that 
     much.''
       This reality virtually assures that the treaty will be 
     violated by many who sign up, as well as having no effect 
     whatsoever on several dangerous chemical weapon states--such 
     as Iraq, Syria, North Korea and Libya--that have said they 
     will not become parties.
       With this devastating admission, virtually the only 
     argument left for the Chemical Weapons Convention is the 
     proposition, as Adelman puts it, that ``standards and values 
     violated are better than no standards or values at all.'' 
     According to this logic, we will be better off being party to 
     a treaty that cannot and will not reduce the chemical weapons 
     threat because of the civilizing effect such ``international 
     norms'' create.
       The implication is that the ``international norm'' will 
     somehow enhance our security. In fact, quite the contrary is 
     true--as former Secretaries of Defense James Schlesinger, 
     Donald Rumsfeld and Caspar Weinberger observed in a 
     Washington Post op-ed dated March 5th.
       That this can happen with even relatively practical 
     ``international norms'' can be seen in one cited by Adelman, 
     himself in a follow-up to the March 5th op-ed--the Nuclear 
     Non-Proliferation Treaty. Even its strongest admires 
     recognize that this treaty has a terrible flaw: Its ``Atoms 
     for Peace'' provision which permits the sharing of nuclear 
     weapons-relevant technology with countries that promise not 
     to apply it to that end. One rogue nation after another has 
     violated this promise, giving rise to a large and growing 
     number of undeclared or incipient nuclear weapon states. 
     Unfortunately, a similar flaw has been built into the 
     Chemical Weapons Convention, virtually assuring that this new 
     ``norm'' will produce more proliferation of chemical 
     weaponry, not less.
       If anything, Mr. Adelman, as a spokesperson for proponents 
     for the treaty; exaggerates the value of unverifiable, 
     unenforced ``international norms'' which validates a central 
     concern expressed by the three Secretaries: Such ``norms'' 
     frequently induce a false sense of security in law-abiding 
     societies.
       This dangerous placebo effect of defective arms control 
     agreements is especially evident with respect to another 
     ``international norm'' lauded by Mr. Adelman, namely, the 
     Biological Weapons Convention. Adelman contends that this 
     treaty--which he acknowledges lacks ``even a pretense of 
     verifiability''--has, nonetheless, ``served us fairly well.''
       Regrettably, this Convention has not prevented the spread 
     of biological weapons and related technology to virtually 
     every dangerous country on the planet. The ``international 
     norm'' created by the Biological Weapons Convention has, 
     however, encouraged the United States government to remain 
     woefully unprepared to deal with the threat such weapons 
     pose.
       This point is dramatically made in the cover story of the 
     March 14-20, 1997 edition of Washington City Paper. This 
     article is entitled ``Margin of Terror--The Government has 
     One Clear Strategy for Responding to a Terrorist Attack on 
     Washington: Pray.''
       It describes in detail how the United States' systematic 
     failure to ready the resources and emergency personnel--to 
     say nothing of the American people--to contend with the 
     nightmare of weapons of mass destruction in the subways or 
     other public spaces of cities like Washington could easily 
     translate into hundreds, if not many thousands, of 
     casualties.
       The U.S. military has proven no more immune to the 
     seductive effects of ineffectual ``international norms'' 
     created by unverifiable arms control treaties. Operation 
     Desert Storm illuminated serious shortfalls in the armed 
     services' capability to operate and prevail in combat should 
     chemical and/or biological weapons be used. These shortfalls 
     persist today to varying degrees thanks, in part, to illusion 
     that ``international norms'' will make that sort of combat 
     unlikely.
       Overstating the value of international accords has one 
     other deleterious effect: It tends to make the United States 
     and other law-abiding states reluctant to respond to 
     violators of such accords. As with President Clinton's 
     successive decisions to grant MFN to China--despite its 
     repeated violations of undertakings concerning human rights 
     and the curbing the spread of nuclear weapons and missile 
     technology, the argument is always made that larger national 
     interests must be taken into account. When the Untied States 
     winds up ignoring violations in the interest of preserving an 
     arms control regime, however, the effect is not only to 
     invite further violations but to undermine the value of the 
     ``international norm'' thus created.
       Those who believe that arms control can make a measurable 
     contribution to U.S. security and civilized intercourse 
     between states have a special responsibility to avoid 
     debasing the currency of international law. Unverifiable, 
     unenforceable accords do not promote valuable ``international 
     norms'' any more than unverifiable, unenforceable domestic 
     statues like Prohibition lead to a sober and law-abiding 
     society. The difference is that the former threaten to make 
     arms control a sham--an outcome that can translate into 
     incalculable harm to our Nation and its people.
       (Malcolm Wallop represented Wyoming in the United States 
     Senate from 1976-1995 and is currently chairman of the 
     Frontiers of Freedom Institute, a non-partisan, public policy 
     organization located in Arlington, VA.)

  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I yield 20 minutes to the able Senator from 
New Hampshire, a great patriot, Bob Smith.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Thank you very much, I say to Senator 
Helms.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the distinguished Senator 
from New Hampshire.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Thank you, Mr. President.
  I thank the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee 
for his tremendous leadership on this matter. He has been steadfast. I 
have been in a number--several hours and days--of meetings with him as 
he has tried very hard to get this treaty into a position where it 
could be acceptable to some of us--to all of us. But in this case, Mr. 
President, I have to maintain my opposition to this convention.
  Contrary to the assertions of its proponents, this treaty will not 
advance our national interests, and as a Member of the U.S. Senate, I 
must put the national and sovereignty interests above all others when 
it comes to votes here on the Senate floor. This is a flawed accord 
that will undermine our security and create a massive, unfunded 
regulatory burden on U.S. companies. And the Senate should reject it.
  Let me make clear, I do not object to the goal of eliminating 
chemical weapons, although those of us who have taken a position in 
opposition to this treaty will be accused of that, and have been. In 
fact, as a member of the Armed Services Committee, I have consistently 
supported funding for our Nation's chemical demilitarization program. 
Certainly, we all support the goal of eliminating chemical weapons.
  But this treaty will not accomplish that goal. Sometimes we forget 
that fact as we debate these issues that have a great-sounding name. It 
does not even come close. For the benefit of my colleagues, I want to 
highlight some of the most egregious problems with this treaty.
  First of all, it is not a global treaty. Its advocates would have you 
believe that it is. It is not global. In fact, many nations believed to 
have active chemical weapons programs, such as Iraq, Libya, North 
Korea, and Syria, have not even signed on to the treaty and they are 
not bound by any provisions.
  Additionally, other confirmed or suspected chemical weapons nations, 
such as India, Iran, Pakistan, and Russia,

[[Page S3518]]

have signed the treaty but do not seem very likely to ratify it or even 
comply with it.
  For the life of me, I cannot understand how anyone could possibly 
stand here on the floor of the U.S. Senate and say this is a global 
treaty if the most heinous anti-American regimes on the face of the 
Earth are not even a party to it. They are going to be making chemical 
weapons, and nobody can do anything about it. That is like saying we 
have a global treaty outlawing terrorism, but Iran, North Korea, Syria, 
and Lebanon are not a part of it. Why not have another treaty and 
outlaw terrorism? Well intended; great goal. Why not just pass a treaty 
and we will outlaw it? That will be the end of it.
  It is absurd, not to mention patently false, to allege that this 
Chemical Weapons Convention is a global treaty. Iraq used chemical 
weapons on its own citizens in the last decade--on its own people. How 
can we have a global treaty banning chemical weapons without Iraq? 
Could somebody please answer that question for me? It is not global. 
And we are not banning chemical weapons in Iraq. We are inspecting the 
devil out of Iraq and we still do not know what they are doing and what 
they can and cannot do.
  Mr. President, not only is this treaty not global, it is not 
verifiable according to the U.S. intelligence community, not according 
to Senator Smith, but the U.S. intelligence community.
  In testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee, former Director 
of Central Intelligence, James Woolsey stated:

       The chemical weapons problem is so difficult from an 
     intelligence perspective that I cannot state that we have 
     high confidence in our ability to detect noncompliance, 
     especially on a small scale.

  This is not exactly a ringing endorsement for this treaty, 
particularly when it is coming from a person who is representing an 
administration that supports it and that is bringing it here to the 
Senate. Let us be honest, there is no way we are going to be able to 
verify compliance, and everybody on this floor knows it. The 
proponents, as well as the opponents, know that.
  The United Nations Special Commission on Iraq was established 
following the gulf war to oversee the dismantling of Iraq's chemical, 
biological, and nuclear weapons programs. There have been over 1,000 
inspectors searching every nook and cranny in Iraq for the past 5 
years, yet we continue to uncover new evidence and new revelations 
regarding Iraq's programs to develop weapons of mass destruction.
  I say to my colleagues on the floor, now that you have seen all these 
inspections, you all feel very comfortable, I am sure. Now you have the 
full knowledge that Iraq does not have any chemical weapons or any 
biological weapons or any nuclear weapons. Everybody feels real 
comfortable with that. We have inspected them, so everybody is certain. 
Right.
  Iraq is the most heavily monitored and inspected country on Earth. We 
have more access to Iraq than the chemical weapons treaty will ever 
provide for any country. If we cannot determine after 5 years just how 
large and sophisticated Iraq's chemical weapons program is, how on 
Earth are we going to be able to verify compliance for the dozens and 
dozens of countries supposedly bound by this treaty? The answer is 
simple. We cannot. We are not going to be able to do it.

  We will move into classified session later on, tomorrow, to more 
fully examine the intelligence community's assessment. I urge my 
colleagues to come to that session and listen to the facts from our 
intelligence community.
  Noncompliance is not something to take lightly. Without adherence by 
all parties, no treaty is worth the paper it is written on--never has 
been, never will be. But we cannot verify this treaty. We know for a 
fact that some of its signatories have routinely and repeatedly 
violated other treaties in the past. So they have a track record.
  Russia has the world's largest chemical weapons arsenal. The former 
Soviet Union routinely violated its arms control obligations whenever 
it was convenient, whenever it was in their best interest. Russia 
remains in violation of the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention and 
the CFE treaty. Thus, it is clear that the cold war pattern of 
noncompliance did not end when the Soviet Union ended.
  Russia has also made clear that it has no intention of ratifying the 
chemical weapons treaty or complying with its provisions unless the 
United States provides a massive aid package to pay for destruction of 
its arsenal. Mr. President, where I come from in New Hampshire, this is 
called blackmail. That is what it is. And I object to it. We are 
already committed to spending $12 billion to eliminate our own chemical 
weapons arsenal. Are we supposed to foot the bill for Russia's as well 
now?
  Let us not forget we are already giving Russia billions of dollars in 
ransom for the START I and START II treaties, even though they have yet 
to ratify START II. With the hard-line Communists and nationalists 
gaining 33 percent of Parliament seats in the recent Russian elections, 
can anyone actually believe that this situation is likely to improve? I 
do not think so.
  Russia is not implementing the 1990 bilateral destruction agreement 
in which it pledged to substantially reduce its chemical weapons 
arsenal. The DIA stated Russia is moving so slowly that no meaningful 
reduction of its arsenal is likely to occur in the next decade. These 
are facts that the proponents do not want you to hear, Mr. President. 
The DIA has expressed skepticism regarding the veracity of Russia's 
data declarations. It appears highly likely that Russia has grossly 
underreported its chemical weapons arsenal.
  Finally, it has been widely reported in the international 
publications that Russia is developing new binary weapons that are 
highly lethal, yet contained none of the chemicals--none of the 
chemicals--listed on the treaty's schedules. If this is true, Russia 
will be capable of circumventing this treaty in a very significant and, 
frankly, destabilizing way. We will be considering this issue in more 
detail during the closed session, but I want to say here and now that 
this is a very, very big problem and it ought to be looked at very 
closely.
  It gives me no pleasure to take the floor of the Senate and raise 
these troubling issues. I would like to be for this treaty. I wish it 
banned all chemical weapons. But the fact of the matter is, it does 
not, and I have a constitutional responsibility to look carefully at 
these issues and act in a manner that I believe advances our national 
security.
  This treaty is deeply flawed--deeply flawed. No amount of public 
relations spin, no amount of pressure from the White House or from 
anybody else can change that issue. Certainly it is not going to change 
this Senator's mind.
  I know that many of my colleagues think that since the cold war is 
over arms control issues do not matter anymore. I know many Members who 
would just as soon focus on issues that seem to be drawing more 
attention in the polls. But as the stewards of national security, we do 
not have that luxury. We cannot afford to sweep these issues under the 
rug for the convenience of political expediency.
  Mr. President, in addition to these important national security 
considerations, I want to highlight for my colleagues the enormous 
burden that this treaty will place on U.S. businesses. Under the 
treaty, there would be two basic types of inspections: routine and 
challenge. Routine inspections are to be directed at sites producing 
chemicals that present the greatest risk of diversion to weapons uses. 
A nation could be subject to up to 20 routine inspections per year, and 
a specific site up to two routine inspections. Challenge inspections 
would occur by request by a party to the treaty and can take place with 
very little advance notice. There is no limit to the number of 
challenge inspections that can take place.
  The United States also, Mr. President, will be obligated to pay 25 
percent of the operating expenses of this organization. Does that sound 
familiar? Think of the United Nations and other international 
organizations where we wind up footing most of the bill. Membership on 
the Executive Council is determined by a rotating regional formula, 
with the majority of seats allocated to third world countries. The 
United States would not necessarily be represented on the council at 
all times and there is no U.S. veto, as there is in the U.N. Security 
Council.

  This represents a new open-ended entitlement for another United 
Nations-

[[Page S3519]]

style bureaucracy. I cannot believe that we are going to agree to pay 
25 percent of the cost when we are having so much difficulty injecting 
fiscal discipline into the existing foreign aid bureaucracy which 
Senator Helms has been trying to change for years. Why should we pay 
such a grossly disproportionate percentage when Russia, who has the 
world's largest stockpile, pays 5.6 percent--while we pay the 25 
percent?
  It is estimated that somewhere between 3,000 and 8,000 companies, 
perhaps more, will be affected by this treaty--3,000 to 8,000 U.S. 
companies. The treaty creates a massive program of reporting 
requirements for companies, companies that produce or use regulated 
chemicals.
  I would ask my colleagues, do you really think the rogue nations, the 
North Koreas, the Libyas, the Irans, or the Iraqs, and others, are 
going to be subject to this? Do you really think they care that we are 
harassing our own companies? They are probably getting a good laugh out 
of it, Mr. President.
  The individual companies are required to assume all costs associated 
with this compliance, including filings, escort and administration of 
routine inspections, challenge inspections, and in some circumstances, 
American businesses may even be required to shut down production during 
the inspection period. Failure to comply with the regulations could 
result in a company being fined up to $50,000 per incident--per 
incident.
  The Defense Department has estimated the cost imposed on a company 
with a large facility could be as high as $500,000 per inspection, 
while small businesses should expect inspections to cost between 
$10,000 and $20,000, all on U.S. businesses on something that does not 
ban chemical weapons in other countries.
  Each international inspection team will be accompanied by 
representatives of the U.S. Government. According to the 
administration, it is possible the representatives of the Environmental 
Protection Agency and OSHA could also serve as escorts to come into 
your business and have a good look at what we you are doing--maybe 
something very personal, very private, something you would not want 
your competitors to have. But under the treaty, the EPA can walk right 
in, have access to the whole facility, perhaps even take a few samples, 
a few products. Who knows--take some records.
  It is clear, Mr. President, that this treaty and the accompanying 
implementing legislation that the administration has requested 
represents a massive, unfunded mandate on U.S. businesses. It is 
staggering. I cannot believe that this Senate is prepared to do this 
injustice to businesses here in America and, frankly, injustice to 
ourselves as a nation. At a time when your constituents are crying out 
for relief from onerous and burdensome regulations, here we go again. 
The problem is, other nations who get to inspect our facilities have a 
lot more to gain than we do by inspecting theirs. The limited military-
related intelligence that we may gain is far outweighed by the 
industrial and commercial intelligence that other nations will derive 
from our companies. That is why nations like Iran are signing on to 
this treaty, because they want that information. They will have access 
to that information, if not directly, certainly indirectly even if they 
are not one of the inspectors.
  Most chemical manufacturers have not considered the effect of this 
treaty. Frankly, I am disappointed in some of those manufacturers 
because they have not thought it through. But they will be back, Mr. 
President. If we pass this, they will be back and they will be back 
with tears in their eyes because they are going to be very, very sorry 
that they supported this treaty.
  In fact, I know of one example where an individual called my office 
purporting to represent the CMA in support of the treaty. When 
questioned on the details of the treaty and the implications for U.S. 
businesses, the individual became frustrated, claimed ignorance, and 
stated that the CMA told him to make the calls. He admitted not knowing 
much about the treaty and quickly ended the call. That is pretty sad, 
Mr. President.

  If that is the kind of expertise being brought to bear in this 
lobbying campaign we are faced with, I think it raises more serious 
questions as to the merit and true nature of this endorsement by CMA.
  Additionally, while CMA's support is an important factor to consider, 
it is important to recognize that CMA does not even represent a 
majority of the businesses affected by the treaty. According to the 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 60 percent of the companies 
affected by the treaty are not CMA members.
  In fact, most of these non-CMA companies are smaller businesses who 
are most likely to be harmed by the increased regulatory burden. They 
have the most to lose. Yet, they are the ones that are overlooked by 
the treaty's proponents.
  Mr. President, since last fall, when the Clinton administration 
abruptly requested that the Senate defer consideration of the treaty, I 
have worked very closely with my colleagues in the Senate, including 
Senator Kyl and Senator Helms and others. I have attended numerous 
meetings with the President's National Security Adviser to explore 
possible conditions to protect U.S. national security, and, to their 
credit, the administration and others did work hard to address many of 
those concerns, and many have been addressed. But there are still some 
that I just cannot, in good faith, allow to go unchallenged.
  In the end, we are not able to agree on all of these issues. That is 
the nature of democracy. We discuss issues, debate policy, find common 
ground, and compromise where we can. We compromised 28 times.
  It is important to understand, though, that reasonable people can and 
do disagree on the merits of this treaty. I want to make it very clear 
that I have no problem with any of my colleagues in terms of how they 
arrived at their votes. That is their vote, and I respect that, I 
recognize that. In fact, it is healthy. While I strongly oppose this 
treaty, I don't impugn anyone's motives or character for taking an 
opposing viewpoint. Having said that, it is regrettable that those of 
us deeply troubled by the lack of participation in this treaty by Iran, 
Syria, Libya, and North Korea, and by the inherent unverifiability of 
the treaty, by the fact that nations such as Iran will gain access to 
sensitive data on our chemical defenses. Now, people have said that is 
not going to happen. Well, we will see. If this treaty passes, we will 
see, because they can be part of the inspection team and can have 
access to that information.
  Anyway, we are accused of being somehow in favor of chemical weapons 
because we take this position. It seems that when those of us who are 
conservatives want to stand by our principles, we are ``crazy people'' 
or something. But when you are liberal and you stand by your 
principles, you are thoughtful and considerate and compassionate. Well, 
maybe I am missing something somewhere.
  It is very easy for the media and the advocates of the treaty to 
demagog this issue. Some in the media have demagoged it. Some in the 
media in my own State are demagoging me and the treaty. That is their 
prerogative. But they are not here on the Senate floor--I am. Some in 
the media in my State may not like that fact, but I am here as an 
elected representative for the State of New Hampshire. I am sworn to 
uphold the Constitution and to defend the national security interests 
of the United States. Yes, if there is a treaty violating those, I am 
going to be opposed to it.
  While I wholeheartedly support the objective of banning chemical 
weapons, this doesn't ban chemical weapons. If somebody can stand up 
here and tell me how we are going to get access to all of Iraq and be 
certain that we are not going to have chemical weapons there, and all 
of Libya and North Korea, and can prove that to me, I will support the 
treaty. That is why we have this amendment, this provision on rogue 
nations. I don't believe this requires that the Senate rubber stamp any 
treaty dealing with chemical weapons. We have some very respected 
people, including four former Secretaries of Defense--that was 
testified to here before--who oppose this treaty.

  In the medical world, the wrong medicine can kill a patient even if 
it is prescribed with the best of intentions. The same holds true with 
national security.

[[Page S3520]]

 I have no doubt that the advocates of CWC believe that it will cure 
the plague of chemical weapons. But that is the wrong medicine and it 
won't work.
  I want to conclude my remarks by summarizing some of the more 
important arguments against this treaty.
  First, it is not global.
  Second, it is not effectively verifiable.
  Third, there are no technical means to detect undeclared stockpiles 
of chemical agents or weapons.
  Many of those who have signed the treaty are either unlikely to 
ratify it or to comply. Does anybody really believe that Iran will be a 
responsible party to this treaty? When is the last time we had access 
to all of the countryside in Iran and all of the industry and buildings 
in Iran? Why should we believe that this treaty is going to make us do 
that?
  Article X of the treaty will require us to share detailed information 
on our own chemical weapons defenses with all other signatories to the 
treaty, good and bad signatories to the treaty, friends and enemies.
  Thousands of U.S. businesses, many of them vulnerable small 
businesses, will be exposed to costly annual reporting requirements 
that they can't afford. Direct costs to U.S. industry are estimated to 
be over $200 million a year.
  It goes on and on and on, Mr. President. It is just incredible.
  Challenge inspections, which basically you could not do under our 
Constitution, are unlimited in number and may violate the fourth 
amendment, which guarantees the rights of individuals and their 
property against unreasonable search and seizure.
  Mr. President, it is clear that this treaty falls short of achieving 
its objectives and its goals. In fact, it doesn't even come close. As 
we will see later in the classified session, the stakes are high. We 
have little to gain and a great deal to lose.
  I urge my colleagues to reject this treaty. I yield the floor.