[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 49 (Wednesday, April 23, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3492-S3520]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
Privilege of the Floor
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield 10 seconds for a
unanimous-consent request regarding a staff member?
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Greg Suchan, a fellow on
the staff of Senator McCain, be granted the privilege of the floor
during the discussion of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. BIDEN. I thank the Chair.
Mr. KYL addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona is recognized.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, we are now going to commence additional
debate on the Chemical Weapons Convention. I would like to begin with
some general observations about treaties in general and about this
treaty in particular.
Mr. President, I want to begin by making what should be an obvious
point. But in view of some of the rhetoric, I think it is important to
reiterate it; that is, that the opponents of the Chemical Weapons
Convention abhor chemical weapons just as much as proponents do. If
this treaty performs as it is advertised to perform, I think everyone
in this body would be supportive of it. Certainly those who oppose the
convention support eliminating our chemical weapons, which will happen
with or without the Chemical Weapons Convention.
As has been noted by previous speakers, the United States is
committed to eliminating all of our chemical weapons, and I suspect
that everyone in this Chamber supports that position. So opposition is
not based on the notion that we would retain our chemical weapons.
Mr. President, I also ask that the Record reflect that the Senator
from Iowa, Senator Grassley, was present and voted ``aye'' on the last
two votes.
Mr. President, let me move forward to this proposition. Last week the
Senate approved Senate Resolution 495, which demonstrates our
commitment to do more. Whether one supports the Chemical Weapons
Convention or not, this was an important bill to demonstrate our
commitment, both here at home and abroad, to do more to try to stop the
spread of chemical weapons, and not doing it alone, as my friend from
Delaware has said, because Senate Resolution 495 contains several
provisions that call for additional multilateral action on the part of
the United States. It requires the President, for example, to use his
best efforts to keep the Australia Group intact and to work against any
weakening of the Australia Group restrictions on trade in chemicals; to
work with Russia to ensure that it conforms to its obligations under
the bilateral destruction agreement; for the President to impose
sanctions on countries that violate international law with respect to
chemical weapons.
So Senate Resolution 495 was not a go-it-alone resolution. Quite to
the contrary. Though it did close some loopholes in American law, it
also reached out in various specific ways to enable us to deal with the
problem of the spread of chemical weapons in more practical and
specific ways than the Chemical Weapons Convention itself does.
We have just had a vote on the resolution of ratification as
presented by Senator Helms, the resolution that is currently before us.
Many of us voted for that resolution, to make the point that we favor
the Chemical Weapons Convention so long as it has certain protections
built into it. I think it should also be clear that the opposition to
the Chemical Weapons convention is not based on politics.
As one of my colleagues said, there will be criticism of President
Clinton. I don't think you will hear criticism of President Clinton.
The opposition to this treaty is not based on politics. Indeed, it is
not an easy treaty to oppose. I think those who oppose it must be
recognized as doing so because of a firm principle and commitment
rather than anything political.
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Another general point I would like to make is this. The Senate has a
constitutional obligation to independently scrutinize treaties. It has
been said that treaties are forever. Most of the treaties that have
been ratified by the U.S. Senate are still in force--treaties that are
many, many, many years old, some undoubtedly far beyond this time. It
is like amending the Constitution. It requires a two-thirds vote. It
requires a great deal of thought, therefore, on the part of the Senate.
Mr. President, we are not a rubber stamp. No one should feel that
they have to support this treaty just because it has been proposed.
Treaties are no substitute for sensible action. They are in many
respects inherently limited in their value, especially when the nations
with whom they are entered into are not committed to the principles of
the treaty. There are examples in past history that demonstrate this.
The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, which outlawed war, was obviously
something that everyone felt good about supporting. But the actions
didn't follow the words, and we know what happened.
Also, this morning one of my colleagues quoted Will Rogers, who said,
``We have never lost a war or won a treaty.'' While that has a certain
ring of truth to it, I don't think anyone would suggest that,
therefore, all treaties are bad. As a matter of fact, we have supported
very specific treaties that we think have done some good--arms control
treaties like the INF Treaty, the START I Treaty, and the START II
Treaty. As a matter of fact, I was asked to support the START II Treaty
on the grounds that Russia would not ratify the START II Treaty until
the United States did. So we did. We support the START II Treaty. It
was ratified here. And 2 years later, the Russians still have not
ratified the START II Treaty. So I agree with my colleagues who say
that some treaties can be useful. I also make the point that one should
not rely strictly on treaties.
I also am troubled by the proposition that we somehow feel that we
could do internationally that which we could never do domestically. I
don't think any of us would contend, for example, that we think we can
solve the problem of crime by going to the criminals in our
neighborhoods and making a treaty with them to stop committing crime.
Instead, we have police forces, we have laws, we have specific
punishments, we have a court system, and we put people in prison when
they violate those laws. In other words, we take specific action to
deal with the problem. We don't rely upon the written word of someone
who may be unreliable. Yet, in the international forum that seems to be
very much in vogue.
I don't think there is any reason that we can believe that a treaty
with Iran, for example, is going to change its behavior, or Iraq, or
Libya, or North Korea, or many of the other rogue states throughout the
world. I think it is countries like Iran that want the benefits of the
CWC and the lifting of the trade restrictions that we currently have
with Iran, secure in the knowledge that it can avoid detection and/or
any punishment that might follow that. Treaties generally do not modify
the behavior of states. The law-abiding will abide, and those that
intend to cheat will either cheat or not join at all.
That is why these multilateral treaties, unlike some of the bilateral
treaties that we entered into earlier, are more difficult to make work.
Frequently what they do is complicate diplomacy and encourage
dishonesty. We know that there are numerous examples of violations of
existing treaties and previous treaties. But it was uncomfortable for
us to bring those violations to light because, frankly, we thought that
we had bigger fish to fry. We had more important matters with those
states than the violation of a particular treaty. As a result,
paradoxically it was more difficult to enforce these conditions once
the treaty went into effect than it was before, because once the treaty
went into effect, in order to upset the applecart, we have to find
violations. We take it to the body that is going to find a violation
and sanction, and we decide that would be diplomatically difficult
because we want to accomplish some greater purpose with the state that
is in violation. So we just forget the whole thing. What that does is
literally put into law the violations that are occurring currently. So
they can complicate diplomacy and encourage dishonesty.
The bottom line about this general discussion is this: Sometimes
treaties can be very useful and sometimes not. We have an obligation to
make that distinction--not just to take the word that, if a treaty has
been proposed, we have an obligation to support it. That is not the job
of the U.S. Senate. Treaties are not an excuse to do that which is
difficult. It is like making a New Year's resolution rather than
beginning to diet. Sometimes we have to have the courage to begin the
diet rather than just relying on a New Year's resolution.
Mr. President, a second set of general comments:
Reasonable people can differ over the Chemical Weapons Convention. We
have a series of former governmental officials on both sides of this
issue. We have former Secretaries of Defense, ambassadors, generals,
columnists--all of whom have come out very publicly against the treaty.
There is undoubtedly an equal number who have come out for the chemical
weapons treaty. I hope we can begin this debate with the proposition
that reasonable people can differ on this very important matter.
Frankly, when former Secretaries of State--like Dick Cheney, Casper
Weinberger, Don Rumsfeld, James Schlesinger; former Defense officials,
such as Jeane Kirkpatrick and Richard Perle, Gen. P.X. Kelley, and
Freddie Clay--when people like this say that they are opposed to the
treaty, it ought to be clear that there are reasonable arguments on
both sides and that neither side should claim that all right and truth
and justice are on their side.
Important columnists have also weighed in to this and find themselves
on both sides of the issue.
That is why I am troubled by the slogan of some people in the
administration--and, in particular, I will cite the Secretary of State,
who has said on national television that one of the reasons to vote for
this treaty is that it has ``Made in America'' written all over it. Mr.
President, that is not a substitute for reasoned argument. It is a
slogan. It misrepresents the Reagan administration's position on the
chemical weapons treaty, which, by the way, was very much different
than the treaty that is before the Senate today.
I can point out the fact that there have been other treaties proposed
to the U.S. Senate that also had ``Made in America'' written all over
them--like the League of Nations, which this Senate in its judgment
decided not to rubberstamp but to reject.
There were cries at the time similar to the cries you hear today that
it would isolate America; that it would hurt our business; that we
would be the laughingstock of the world; that, after all, President
Wilson was the one who created this treaty and how could we vote
against it. Moreover, we would be the pariah in the world if we voted
against the League of Nations. But in 1919, this body exercised its
judgment, its constitutional prerogative and it declined to allow the
United States to participate. And I do not think today there are very
many people who believe this country made a mistake by waiting and
creating instead the United Nations.
We, I think, should be able to go forward. I think it takes more
courage sometimes to go forward with a position that acknowledges a
mistake than it does to simply blindly go forward and perhaps have in
the back of your mind the idea that you have made a mistake but it
would not look good if you backed out at this time.
That is another one of the arguments being made by the opponents; we
would be embarrassed internationally if we backed out of the treaty at
this point or caused part of it to be renegotiated. I submit that
knowing we have made a mistake at least with regard to articles X and
XI in this treaty, we should have the courage to fix articles X and XI
before our resolution of ratification is deposited at The Hague.
Now another general comment, Mr. President. No one has a monopoly on
morality. Ours is a disagreement about means, not about ends. I want to
make this point very clear because some people, perhaps a little
overzealous to push this treaty, have inferred that those who vote
against it somehow
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support the use of chemical weapons. I watched my grandfather die, Mr.
President, from emphysema acquired as a result of his being gassed in
World War I in Europe. Therefore, I take a back seat to no one in
expressing my abhorrence for these despicable weapons and why I fully
support the United States eliminating our chemical weapons and leading
the world in that regard. We are the only country in the world with
chemical weapons that has declared we will eliminate all of our stocks
of those weapons.
So I hope no one tries to lecture me about the evils of poison gas
and how the only way to deal with that is through this Chemical Weapons
Convention. We have been the moral leader of the world by imposing
trade restrictions on countries like Iran, for example, restrictions
that will probably have to be lifted as a result of this treaty because
of articles X and XI. So I believe that insisting on renegotiation of
articles X and XI would confirm our moral position. Our negotiators
tried but failed to win key concessions on those provisions. In the
future, they will be strengthened by the knowledge that the Senate will
not go along with such halfway measures with a defective treaty.
So, Mr. President, my point here is this. It matters how we make a
moral statement, and simply ballyhooing a treaty that everyone knows is
flawed does not enhance our moral stature.
Now to some specific comments. Those of us who have reservations
about the treaty have said that it fails in its key objectives, that if
it met these objectives we would support it, that our opposition is
based on two simple points. It fails to meet the objectives and it does
more harm than good.
In what way does it fail to meet its objectives. It was proposed as a
global and verifiable and enforceable treaty. Unfortunately, it is none
of those. First, it is not global. It does not cover the key countries
and the key chemicals that are currently suspected of being the
problems. Nine of the 14 countries suspected of possessing chemical
weapons have not even signed this treaty. These countries include
Libya, Iraq, Syria, North Korea, Egypt, Sudan, Serbia, South Korea, and
Taiwan. So many of the countries in the world that possess the
chemicals are not signatories. They are not going to bind themselves to
it. And there is nothing we can do in terms of verification or
inspection or anything else that is going to deal with it. The best way
to deal with those countries is to do what we are currently doing,
which is to maintain and enforce the restrictions of the Australia
Group.
Now, I spoke of that before. What is it? It is a group of 29
countries, including the United States, that have agreed among
themselves not to trade these chemicals to countries that they think
might want to develop chemical weapons with them. And we have these
restrictions in place now. That is the best way to prevent the spread
of these chemicals. Unfortunately, as an incentive to get countries to
join the chemical weapons treaty, articles X and XI call into question
the existence of those conditions and in fact in our view require that
the states remove those restrictions and trade with the countries that
are parties to the treaty.
Second, the treaty is not verifiable. Now, proponents have said,
well, nothing is 100-percent verifiable. That is a false standard, Mr.
President. Nobody is claiming that it should be 100-percent verifiable.
The question is whether it is effectively verifiable. And on that there
is virtually unanimous agreement that, no, it is not effectively
verifiable. I read to you a recently unclassified national
intelligence estimate conclusion published originally in August of 1993
which stated:
The capability of the intelligence community to monitor
compliance with the CWC is severely limited and likely to
remain so for the rest of the decade. The key provision of
the monitoring regime, challenge inspections at undeclared
sites, can be thwarted by a nation determined to preserve a
small secret program using the delays and managed access
rules allowed by the convention.
And there are a variety of other statements I could read, including
statements of the former Director of the CIA, all of which confirm the
fact that this is not a verifiable treaty.
Nor is the treaty enforceable. Even if you were to find a violation
and you brought it to the bodies that are supposed to run this treaty,
you would have to have a three-quarter vote, and there is no sanction
in place. Once they found a violation, they would go to the country and
say, would you please stop violating. If the country continued to
ignore them, although the likelihood is the country would say, well,
sure, we would be happy to, and eventually hide the material in such a
way that you could not find a violation in the future, but assuming the
violation continued and you continue to prove that, what is the
sanction? There is none. Where do you go? The United Nations, the
General Assembly.
Mr. President, that is not a place where at least the United States
has been treated very kindly in the past. And if you have to go all the
way to the Security Council, Russia, China, other states have a veto.
So it is unlikely that significant punishment would be meted out. As a
matter of fact, the evidence of that probably most clearly is the case
of Iraq which admittedly--I should not say admittedly. They denied it,
but after inspection it was confirmed that chemical weapons were used
against both Iran and against the Kurdish population of Iraq itself and
yet the United Nations, the peace-loving nations of the world were
incapable of mustering the courage to even name Iraq in a meaningless
resolution about the use of these weapons. So it does not seem likely
to me that the United Nations would muster the courage to impose any
kind of particular sanction.
Now, another one of the selling points of this treaty, according to
its proponents, is, well, it is better than nothing. In other words,
granted, it does not cover a lot of the countries we wished it covered
and it is not very verifiable and there are not any particular
sanctions in the treaty, but at least it is better than nothing.
Our response to that is essentially twofold. First of all, it is very
costly both in terms of money and potential constitutional restrictions
and, second, there are some other very significant reasons why it is
not better than nothing.
In terms of cost, we know that the cost to the Government is going to
be $150 million to $200 million annually. Businesses are going to have
to pay between $200,000 and $500,000 for inspections. Just to fill out
the forms, and there are thousands of businesses in this country that
will have to fill out the forms, it is going to be a $50,000 to $70,000
proposition, and, of course, untold amounts lost in confidential
business information which can result as a result of the industrial
espionage that most people believe will result from the inspections
under this treaty.
Second, we mentioned the constitutional issues. There has been an
attempt to fix about half of the constitutional issues. One deals with
the fourth amendment, and there has been an amendment to say a search
warrant would be required. The problem with that is that it would
probably be found to be in violation of the treaty if a constitutional
requirement were imposed to prevent the treaty from operating as it was
written.
So if we actually go ahead with a protection from fourth amendment
searches and seizures, we may very well be found in violation of the
treaty. On the other hand, those responsible for making such a decision
may decide that we can have such a constitutional protection in which
case I think we can count on all of the other nations that want to
avoid detection doing the same thing and, of course, as a nation that
lives under the rule of law we will abide by it in a proper way. And I
think we can count on countries like Iran or China or Cuba, for
example, to use that as an excuse not to allow the kind of inspections
that would result in detection.
The other part of the Constitution, the fifth amendment, presents a
special problem that nobody has figured out how to fix. The fifth
amendment provides that if there is a taking by the Government of
property one is entitled to be paid. The problem is that when the U.S.
Government imposes this regime on American businesses and individuals,
it has not yet made the commitment to pay them. My own guess is that I
would have a right to sue and the U.S. Government would have to pay but
there is no provision for that. You cannot sue under the Federal Tort
Claim Act, and so we would have to somehow construct an ability to sue
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the U.S. Government and provide for the unlimited liability that would
result from such an undertaking. So that has not been dealt with
either.
The bottom line is the constitutional issues remain very much up in
the air.
Now, those are some of the costs. I think, however, the biggest costs
are the following two. The mere fact that this treaty has been proposed
has caused many to decide that we do not have to worry as much about
defending our troops. I know the President has made a big matter out of
saying that this treaty would help to protect our troops. Well, I think
he is very wrong and his own administration officials verify this
because for the last 2 years his representatives have come to the
Congress and based on the fact that the United States signed this
treaty and they presumed we would ratify it, this administration has
called for reductions in spending on defensive measures for our troops.
How can a President who tries to sell the treaty on the basis that it
will be good for our troops, that it will protect them, come before the
Congress not once but twice and call for a reduction in funding to
provide defenses for our troops? Two years ago, $850 million.
Fortunately, we restored it. What was the reason? The reason expressly
was because this treaty is going to enter into force and we will be a
part of it, as if the treaty were going to make the threat go away.
And this year General Shalikashvili let us cut another $1.5 billion
over 5 years out of this part of the defense budget, this despite the
fact that the General Accounting Office in a very critical report
following the Persian Gulf war, updated just last year, has found that
our defenses are in a very serious state of disrepair; that we are not
adequately prepared; that we have not provided our soldiers, our
marines, our fighting people who are going to be confronting chemical
or biological warfare the kind of training, the kind of equipment, the
kind of antidotes, the kind of protection they deserve. So you have GAO
in a very current finding that we are not doing enough for our troops,
the administration trying to cut the funding to do more, and the
President saying that the chemical weapons treaty will solve the
problem.
That is what I had reference to when I said that treaties can make
you feel good, like you have solved a problem, but when it comes to the
lives of American soldiers, we will not have done enough to protect
them. And that is why we should not be lulled into a sense of false
security by signing a piece of paper that I do not think people would
loan money on if they wanted to get it back, frankly. So, this treaty
does damage. It is worse than nothing.
What is another example? You have heard me talk about articles X and
XI. You are going to hear a lot about that, because articles X and XI
turn out not to be such a good idea. I am going to discuss that in more
detail later. They were put into the treaty at a time when it seemed
like a good idea. Now it does not seem like such a good idea. The
administration and everybody else acknowledges we have a problem here.
The problem is, everybody is embarrassed to go back and change it. The
administration says, ``Well, we negotiated the best deal we could.'' We
say, ``Because it is flawed, let us go back and take those two sections
out.'' But the administration does not want to do that. Not taking them
out is going to result in a proliferation of chemical weapons and
technology, not a restriction of it. Again, I will get into that in
more detail later.
The point I want to make here is that as long as this treaty has
articles X and XI in it, it is going to be worse than nothing because
it is going to result in the proliferation of chemicals rather than a
restriction. I will just quote one sentence that a letter that former
Defense Secretary, Dick Cheney wrote in this regard. He said, ``In my
judgment, the treaty's article X and XI amount to a formula for greatly
accelerating the proliferation of chemical warfare capabilities around
the globe.'' So, in this second significant respect, the treaty makes
the situation worse than it was before.
Finally, as I made a point to mention before, it is going to
significantly reduce our diplomatic options. Claiming violations will
take back seat to more pressing diplomatic considerations. We have seen
this in a variety of situations. When the Russians were in violation of
the ABM Treaty and had a radar at a place called Krasnoyarsk, we were
in delicate negotiations with them in a variety of other things and
therefore it was ``see no evil,'' basically. ``We are really not all
that sure they violated the treaty,'' when in fact our intelligence
community knew full well they had. And after the Soviet Union broke up,
its leaders said, ``Sure we were in violation.'' The question is, why
didn't we do anything about it? Well, because we did not want to upset
the diplomatic applecart.
Think about China with MFN. Are we going to upset the diplomatic
applecart? You see, today we do not have to because there is no treaty.
Once a treaty is in place we have an obligation. If we know there are
violations--perhaps, for example, with China--we would have an
obligation to send inspectors over there and ask them to see what they
could find. One of two things will happen. Either they are going to
confirm there are violations--unlikely, in which case we are then going
to have to do something about it. More likely, they will come back and
say, ``Well, we couldn't prove it.''
As a result, China or whoever is doing the violating will have the
Good Housekeeping stamp of approval. We set up this regime. You try to
find people guilty. But the burden is so difficult you are not going to
find people guilty. They are going to, in effect, be acquitted. And
when they are acquitted we have then diminished our opportunity to
negotiate with them, to tell them to stop selling chemicals, for
example, to Iran or other countries we do not want to have them. In
that respect, again, the treaty reduces our diplomatic options. It puts
us into a box. It makes it more difficult to deal with these kinds of
violations and in that respect again it is not better than nothing, it
is worse than doing nothing.
What are some of the administration's claims? First of all, they have
made the astonishing claim that failure to ratify the treaty would mean
that we are aligned with the pariah states of Iraq and Libya because
Iraq and Libya are not going to sign or ratify this treaty. I hope the
Secretary of State and the President of the United States could
discriminate a little better than that. I could make the same argument
to them. If we sign the treaty, we are going to be in with a bunch of
other pariah states. Do they think it is any better to be with Iran or
Cuba? These are states that have signed the treaty and presumably will
ratify it. Obviously, that is not an argument that gets you anywhere.
But it is the kind of simplistic, superficial argument that this
administration is using to sell the treaty. It is an affront to the
intelligence of the Senate. As I said, I hope the President and
Secretary of State can make better distinctions than that.
I also note it is a bit meaningless at this point to join the treaty,
though 67 other nations have joined it, because they do not have
chemical weapons. The countries that have chemical weapons have not
joined it, and many of them are not going to. About 99 percent of the
world's chemical weapons, according to open source material, are held
by three countries, none of whom have joined the treaty: The United
States, Russia, and China. We have a bilateral destruction agreement
with Russia, in which we are trying to get them to destroy their
chemical weapons--and they decided they are not going to follow through
with that, apparently. So, what makes us think that we are going to do
any good by joining the treaty, when about 80 percent-plus of the
chemicals in China and Russia would be outside the purview of the
treaty?
The next comment made is, ``No treaty is 100 percent verifiable.'' I
think I dealt with that before. Nobody is claiming it needs to be 100-
percent verifiable, but when we say this treaty is not adequately
verifiable or effectively verifiable, their comeback is, ``Well, no
treaty is 100 percent.'' That is not the issue. The issue is whether it
is effectively verifiable, and unfortunately no one claims that this
treaty is effectively verifiable.
No one, for example, has said that they have high confidence that
this treaty will timely detect significant violations. As a matter of
fact, one of
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the strong supporters of the treaty, a friend and someone who has
served this country well, and we have a difference of opinion about the
treaty, Ron Adelman, said in an op-ed piece he wrote on February 20,
``Granted, the treaty is virtually unverifiable and granted it doesn't
seem right for the Senate to ratify an unverifiable treaty. . .'' he
went on to say: ``however, I think we are still better off by going
ahead.''
My point is that even treaty proponents acknowledge it is not
verifiable, so let us not get into a debate as to whether it has to be
100-percent verifiable or not. It is not effectively verifiable. That
is the point.
I discussed a bit ago the argument that the CWC will protect American
troops and prevent a terrorist attack. No one who has spoken to this
from an intelligence point of view can credibly make the claim that
this treaty will, in any way, shape or form, reduce the threat of
terrorism. Let me repeat that. Our intelligence community is unwilling
to say that this treaty would stop terrorist attacks. And even one of
the much vaunted agreements that was entered into between our friends
on the other side of the aisle and Senator Helms recognizes the fact
that the CWC is not effective to deal with the problem of terrorism.
Let me quote one of the recently unclassified assessments of our
intelligence agency, the Central Intelligence Agency:
In the case of Aum Shinrikyo [this is the cult in Japan
that gassed Japanese citizens] the Chemical Weapons
Convention would not have hindered the cult from procuring
the needed chemical compounds needed in the production of
sarin. Further, the Aum would have escaped the requirement
for an end-use certification because it purchased the
chemicals within Japan.
The point is, here, that chemicals are so easily secreted, chemical
weapons are so easily made in small, confined spaces, that it is
essentially impossible to find all of them. And a terrorist group, in a
room the size of a large closet, in Japan, was able to make the sarin
gas that they used. This Chemical Weapons Convention has no capability
to deal with that. I will say it this way: It is a fraud on the
American people to suggest that we have to adopt this treaty in order
to do away with terrorist use of chemical weapons. It will not be
effective for that purpose. It may have some other beneficial effects,
but no one should contend that it is going to help with regard to
terrorism.
The same thing, as I said, is true with regard to the defense of our
troops. If this administration were actually pursuing a strong
defensive capability for our troops, that would be one thing, but it is
not. As a result, I think it is not an appropriate argument for this
administration to base the ratification of the treaty on.
Another argument of the administration is that this is important to
protect the jobs in the chemical industry and that there would be some
losses to our chemical companies if the treaty were not adopted by the
United States. First, I would say that this is no reason for the United
States to enter into a treaty, simply to enhance the financial balance
sheets of American companies. We are all for doing that, we are all for
helping American businesses do well, but one does not enter into a
treaty for that purpose. I think there should be a question about
whether our chemical companies ought to be selling these kinds of
chemicals to countries like Iran and Cuba and China in any event,
because that is the new market that will open up. These are countries
that have signed the treaty, not yet ratified. Presumably they will
ratify it at some point so there will be an added market for us to sell
our chemicals.
The other added market is that if the Australia Group restrictions
come off, then our companies would not be restricted by the Australia
Group limitations. In both cases they would be able to sell more
chemicals. I would argue that that is not necessarily a good thing,
even though it might enhance their balance sheets.
And to the argument that somehow there will be a downside to them,
that they will actually lose money, it is an argument that does not
persuade me. Because folks should know that the only limitation that
can be imposed on companies in countries that do not sign the treaty is
with respect to so-called schedule 1 and schedule 2 chemicals. These
are the chemicals of chemical warfare, of chemical weapons and their
precursors, by definition, made in noncommercial quantities. So the
only limitation that could ever be imposed upon American companies, if
it ever were, would be on such a small amount of chemicals that, even
by their own definition it would constitute only a fraction of 1
percent of the chemicals that are traded. We should pass the treaty for
that? I do not think so.
Another argument is that at least we will get more intelligence if we
are a party to the treaty. This is the argument that says granted it
may not solve all the problems but it is better to be inside than
outside. I think this particular argument deserves a little bit of
attention.
I serve on the Senate Intelligence Committee. I know how this works.
I think I should explain a little bit about it. The claim is not true.
Our intelligence agencies, of course, always are looking for new
opportunities to get information, but it is not correct to say that the
chemical weapons treaty provides us that mechanism. The chemical
weapons treaty says that if you want to inspect another country for a
suspected violation, you bring the matter to the council in charge of
the treaty, and if it decides to go forward, it will appoint three
inspectors--but it cannot be somebody from your country. So, it would
be somebody from three other countries that go do the inspection. They
come back and they deposit their findings with this body, this
executive council. And by the treaty terms they cannot share that
information with anybody else. It is secret. So the United States, not
being a party to the inspection, does not have the information, and
cannot have it, under the terms of the treaty. So there is only one way
that we would gain more information under the terms of the treaty and
that is by cheating, by violating the treaty, by somehow trying to
steal the information, by somehow trying to turn one of those
inspectors to be an agent for us in violation of the treaty terms. That
is how we would get more information--not legally, under the treaty.
What would we do if we found somebody cheating? Let us assume that we
find that Russia or China has chemical weapons, is not destroying
them--in other words, does possess in violation of this treaty. Would
we insist on sanctions? How about today? Take the case of China. Would
we insist on sanctions? We shake in our boots when the President of
Taiwan comes over, attends his 25th class reunion at Cornell, and the
Chinese Government threatens to lob missiles into Los Angeles and
steams in the Straits of Taiwan and sends missiles over Taiwan. Are we
going to impose sanctions on China because of a finding that they have
maintained a chemical weapons stock? Are we going to have to prove to
this international body, this executive council, that they are in
violation? And at what cost to our relations?
The problem is, with the treaty you can no longer ignore violations.
You either object or it ends up in a whitewash. Either way it creates
significant problems.
There is a final argument that has been made recently and it
mystifies me because it doesn't go anywhere but they have been making
it, so I will try to respond. Proponents say we are getting rid of our
weapons, and therefore the chemical weapon convention will force others
to do so, too. It is absolutely true the United States is getting rid
of our weapons. We are committed to doing that. We do not need the
Chemical Weapons Convention to prove to the world that we are the moral
leader of the world. We have said we are getting rid of ours. Nobody
else has, but we have.
So you don't need the Chemical Weapons Convention. I challenge my
friends who propose the treaty, in what way will the chemical weapons
treaty make the other countries get rid of theirs? That is the purpose,
that is the goal, but there is no effective mechanism to make it
happen, and there is no intelligence estimate or assessment to that
effect, Mr. President.
We are going to have an opportunity tomorrow to go into classified
session and hear just what our intelligence community has to say about
the chemical weapons programs of other nations and about what we think
they are going to be doing in the future, and I urge my colleagues to
attend that session.
[[Page S3497]]
(Ms. COLLINS assumed the chair.)
Mr. KYL. Finally, Madam President, there has been much made of the
fact that in the negotiations over this treaty, numerous improvements
were made and, therefore, we should remove our objections and go along
with the treaty.
First of all, I want to set the stage. Last fall when the treaty came
before the Senate, the statement was that we couldn't touch it, that we
couldn't negotiate anything, we had to use the resolution that came out
of the committee and there were no changes that were possible; ``You
can't change the treaty; we're not interested in negotiating any
terms.''
It turned out there was not sufficient support for the treaty and,
therefore, the administration had it pulled. Interestingly enough, last
night I saw a news program, the Jim Lehrer News Hour, in which it was
misstated that Senator Dole, the previous majority leader, asked the
treaty to be withdrawn. He did not ask the treaty to be withdrawn. He
was not even in the Senate at the time. He wrote a letter in opposition
to the treaty, but he did not ask it be withdrawn. He just said he
wouldn't vote for it if it were still in the Senate. It was withdrawn
by the administration, by the Clinton administration, not by anyone
here in the Senate.
Notwithstanding the fact that the administration took the position
that nothing could change, once the treaty was found not to have
adequate support, the administration began to change its tune, and
little by little, they began to sit down and talk to those who had
objections. Over many months, various concessions were made which
marginally improved the situation. Now, they are not concessions with
respect to the treaty itself because it can't be changed, but there are
some things which at least help to clarify how the United States is
going to proceed, and had it not been for the considerable efforts of
the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, these changes would
not have been made. So while they were critical of the chairman for his
opposition to the treaty, it turns out that now they are bragging about
the changes that he sought to have made, and I think that is a very
important point, Madam President. Let me just repeat it. While
initially deriding the concerns of the chairman of the committee, they
are now bragging about the changes that he forced them to make,
claiming that this makes it a better treaty, now we should all support
it. It does make it a better treaty, but at the margins, not at the
core.
What has been negotiated? First of all, there are nine specific
conditions that merely restate existing constitutional protections.
Those could not have been taken away in any event, but it was helpful
to get the administration to acknowledge that they existed. They were
even reluctant to acknowledge some of these constitutional protections.
We could do without them, because they are in the Constitution anyway,
but at least it was handy to get the administration to acknowledge that
they existed.
Second, there are two conditions that merely allow the Congress to
enact appropriations or approve reprogramming. As every Senator knows,
we have that right. We are the body, along with the House, that enacts
appropriations or approves reprogramming. So that was essentially
meaningless, though handy to have the administration acknowledge.
There are four conditions that call for reports. Whenever you see a
call for a report, Madam President, you know that that means we tried
to reach agreement on something, we couldn't, so we said, ``By golly,
we'll have a study on it, we'll have a report.'' And that is what this
calls for. There are seven conditions that call for Presidential
certifications, all of which he can make today. These were not
concessions by the administration. They were able to agree to these
because these are certifications they can currently make. So one should
not brag about those.
Four additional conditions are a restatement of current U.S. policy.
Again, we thought these were good to have on paper in connection with
the treaty so there would be no mistake about what U.S. policy was. It
isn't new, it isn't new policy, it isn't a compromise, it isn't a
negotiated settlement; this is just a restatement in the resolution of
ratification about existing U.S. policy. One of the conditions doesn't
take effect until 1998.
I conclude, then, with the two that have some meaning. One deals with
search and seizures under the fourth amendment, and I discussed that
briefly a moment ago. The other deals with the subject of riot control
agents. We do not know what the courts will do with either of these
two.
I spoke to the issue of the fourth amendment. The resolution includes
a statement that we will require search warrants, either administrative
warrants or criminal warrants in the appropriate case. That may or may
not be effective under the treaty. It may be declared in violation of
the treaty. If not, other countries are going to be able to do the same
thing. While the United States will assiduously adhere to the law and
to the Constitution, my guess is if other States are able to do the
same thing, we will suddenly find interesting provisions in the Iranian
Constitution or Chinese Constitution that are going to constitute
loopholes big enough to drive a truck through.
The other matter is important, but in the overall scheme of things, I
think perhaps more has been made of it than was generally warranted,
and it is still not certain that it is resolved, but at least the
allegation is that it is. This has to do with riot control agents, tear
gas to most people. This was one of the areas in which the Bush and
Reagan administrations had been very clear, and the Clinton
administration changed policy, another example of a situation where
this is not the same treaty that the Bush and Reagan administrations
had in mind. They always thought you could use tear gas in certain
situations; for example, to rescue a downed pilot, to deal with a
situation where you had civilians surrounding an American hostage, for
example. Rather than having to shoot those people, we say it makes
sense to use tear gas to disperse the crowd and rescue the American.
This administration said, no, we don't interpret the treaty as allowing
that. Even people who support the treaty, like Gen. Brent Scowcroft,
said, that's crazy, that has to be changed. It took a long time to get
the administration to finally agree in concept to a change. I am still
not persuaded the language does it, but let's assume in good faith they
have really agreed to a change in this policy. What that will mean is
that, at least in that limited kind of situation, we will be able to
use tear gas. That is a positive development, but in light of the final
points that I want to make here, it is not reason to change from
supporting a treaty that is not global, not verifiable, not effective,
does more harm than good. That change is helpful but not dispositive.
What are the five unresolved issues? The way this treaty comes before
the Senate, it is the Helms resolution of ratification. In other words,
it is a resolution wrapped around the treaty. It has 28 agreed-upon
items, and then, in addition, there are 5 that are not agreed upon.
Those are the items that constitute the Helms resolution of
ratification. To approve the treaty, we will vote on the resolution of
ratification. The proponents of the treaty have the right under the
rule here to seriatim move to strike each of these five remaining
conditions. If they are all stricken, then we will end up voting for
the Helms resolution of ratification sans these five protections. If
four of them are stricken, we will have one, and so forth.
What are these five unresolved issues? These are the core of the
dispute. This is really what it is all about. And this is what I will
spend the rest of my time on.
The first issue says the country that has the most chemical weapons
in the world, Russia, is not a party to the treaty. It has not complied
with various agreements that we have concerning destruction of its
chemical weapons stocks and its biological weapons, incidentally, and
it has not agreed to abide by a memorandum of understanding with this
country under which it would list its stocks of chemicals. These were
key agreements that were part of the basis for the Reagan and Bush
administrations' sponsorship of this treaty. Russia had agreed to these
things. One is called the bilateral destruction agreement. The other is
called the Wyoming memorandum of understanding.
[[Page S3498]]
The Reagan and Bush administrations believed that if the Russians
complied with these provisions, that the chemical weapons treaty might
be a good thing. But they are not complying with them. Again, we will
hear some details in the session tomorrow. But the fact of the matter
is, we ought to require that Russia at least demonstrates some good
faith to proceed down the path toward declaring what they have and
getting rid of those things. If there is no indication by the Russians
that they intend to do this, then it seems a little odd to be entering
into a treaty where 60 percent of the world's chemical weapons are not
even being dealt with and we are basically conceding to the Russians
that they don't have to agree with these other agreements with us. What
we are saying is, to try to apply a little leverage to our friends in
Russia, look, we know it is expensive to dismantle this, but that
cannot be the only problem you have when you will not even declare all
of the chemical weapons you have, when you won't even begin the process
of dismantling them, when you have signaled that you are no longer
going to be complying with the bilateral destruction agreement, you
consider it now inoperative, no longer useful. We want some signs from
you that you are serious about dealing with chemical weapons before we
enter into the Chemical Weapons Convention.
And there is a final reason for this, Madam President. One of the
leaders of Russia has written to one of the top leaders of the United
States and made it clear that if Russia is to join the Chemical Weapons
Convention, it wants to do so at the same time the United States does.
As a result, it would be highly unfortunate if the United States went
ahead and ratified this treaty before the Russian Duma did. The Russian
Duma is clearly not ready to do so. This first condition, therefore, in
the Helms resolution of ratification says, ``Hold on, we will ratify
the Chemical Weapons Convention, but we will not deposit our instrument
of ratification at The Hague until Russia has done the same, thus
enabling us to come in at the same time.'' That is all that condition
says.
It would require certification by the President that Russia is making
progress, that it intends to comply, it is making progress toward
complying. They don't have to demonstrate that they have complied. We
think that is a reasonable condition. I guess I will state it the other
way around as to this first condition, should we be supporting a treaty
that we know is being breached by the country that has the largest
number of chemical weapons in the world and is going to continue to be
breached by that country, or should we insist on a condition that they
are making progress toward complying before we buy into it?
The second condition has to do with other states, the so-called rogue
states. I will spend only a moment on this because I know my colleague
from Oklahoma, Senator Inhofe, wants to speak at greater length about
this. We know that there are a variety of rogue states that have no
intention of signing on to this treaty and others that may want to sign
on but know they can violate it with impunity. These chemical weapons
in these countries' hands constitute a real threat to American troops.
We think that if one is going to make the claim that this Chemical
Weapons Convention is going to reduce the chemical weapons stocks of
these rogue nations that pose a threat to the United States, the least
that ought to happen is that they submit themselves to the treaty.
Can't do any good if they are not members. We need to certify that some
of these nations are going to be states parties before we subject
ourselves to it.
The third condition is one that I can't imagine anybody is going to
object to, and that is that certain inspectors would be barred from
inspecting American sites. We have the right to do this under the
treaty. The President has the right to say, I don't want any inspectors
from China, I don't want any inspectors from Iran coming in here
because we think they are going to--and I use these as hypotheticals--
the President says, we think they may be bent on industrial espionage
and therefore we are going to ask that they not be inspectors. The
argument against that is, well, tit for tat. They will say, fine, we
don't want any Americans on the inspection team that comes into our
country. We are willing to say, fine. We think for certain countries,
like China and Iran, we should put right up front they are not going to
be inspectors of United States facilities. And that would be a third
condition to ratification.
A fourth condition to--actually No. 5 on the list has to do with the
standard for verification. This has to do with the question of whether
or not we have an adequate sense that we can actually find cheating
under the treaty. And we are not asking for an impossible standard. We
are not asking for 100-percent verification.
We are simply asking that the President certify to the Congress
before we submit the articles of ratification that the CIA has
certified to the President to a level of verification that will work.
And what we have basically done is take the definition of previous
administrations, the so-called Baker-Nitze definition, along with a
specific aspect that General Shalikashvili identified as a way of
identifying our standard here for verification under the treaty.
It would be effectively verifiable. We could find violations with a
high degree of confidence in a timely fashion, within a year of their
occurrence. And they would be militarily significant.
Now, militarily significant was defined in a hearing before the U.S.
Congress by General Shalikashvili as 1 ton of chemical weapons. And,
therefore, that is what we have built into this definition.
So what we have said, Madam President, is that we would join the
treaty at such time as we had the certification from the President that
the CIA certified that we could achieve this level of verification. I
do not think that is asking too much.
Finally, the final condition has to do with articles X and XI. This
is what I had spoken to before.
I would ask my distinguished chairman if I could go on for just a few
minutes here.
Mr. HELMS. Go right ahead.
Mr. KYL. I will conclude on articles X and XI because we are going to
hear a lot more about them. I think it is important to read into the
Record the provisions we are talking about and discuss in a little bit
of detail specifically what our concerns are.
Here is what article X says. I might preface this comment, Madam
President, with the statement that these were inducements put into the
treaty originally to induce countries to join the treaty. They were put
there based upon inducements that were included in a previous treaty,
the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, under the so-called atoms for
peace plan.
Many people know or will remember that the atoms for peace plan was
the idea that if countries would eschew the development of nuclear
weapons, we would provide them peaceful nuclear technology. And
countries like Iraq, and other countries that could be mentioned, took
advantage of that program, and said, ``Fine. We won't develop nuclear
weapons. Now send us the peaceful nuclear technology.'' We eventually
learned that what they did with that peaceful technology was to use it
in their nuclear weapons program.
So after it was put in the treaty, and we got these people signed up,
we learned that several countries were using this provision of the
treaty to actually enhance their nuclear weapons capability. It worked
to the detriment of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Well, before that was ever learned this chemical weapons treaty was
negotiated. So at the time it seemed like a good idea to put the same
kind of provision in the chemical weapons treaty. At the time it seemed
like it would be a smart thing to provide an inducement for countries
to join the treaty, saying:
If you'll join up, then we will not have any restrictions
on trade in chemicals with you. You can buy all the chemicals
you want. And, in addition to that, you can ask us for, and
we will provide to you, all of the defensive gear, chemicals,
antidotes, equipment, and so on, that will enable you to
defend against chemical weapons.
That is a pretty good incentive for a country to join up. Look at it
from the standpoint of a country that has in mind conducting chemical
warfare capability. The first thing they want to do is be able to
protect their own
[[Page S3499]]
troops from the use of the weapons. So they want our latest technology
in defensive gear, in defensive equipment, in antidotes and the like.
So it is a pretty good incentive to sign up for the treaty because they
have a right to ask us, and the treaty says we will undertake to
provide to them that material. Moreover they want to buy chemicals.
Right now the Australia group I talked about before has limitations
on what chemicals can be sold. As a matter of fact, there are 54
specific chemicals under the Australia group that cannot be sold to the
countries we believe want to develop the chemical weapons capability.
These countries then have an incentive for joining the convention
because under the convention you cannot limit the trade in chemicals.
What does the treaty say? Article X:
Each State Party undertakes to facilitate, and shall have
the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of
equipment, material and scientific and technological
information concerning means of protection against chemical
weapons.
It could not be more clear, Madam President. Article X says that the
parties to the treaty have the right to participate in and each party
undertakes to facilitate. In other words, we have an obligation to
facilitate their acquisition of this defensive equipment.
Article XI carries this further and adds another element. And I read
in part:
The . . . States Parties . . . .shall . . . undertake to
facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest
. . . exchange of chemicals, equipment and scientific and
technical information relating to the development and
application of chemistry for purposes not prohibited under
this Convention . . . for peaceful purposes . . .
In other words. The ``atoms for peace'' equivalent in the Chemical
Weapons Convention.
So here is a big incentive for countries who want to develop a
defense against chemical weapons to join the Chemical Weapons
Convention.
The second part of article XI, section (c) says that:
[The] States Parties. . . shall. . .[n]ot maintain among
themselves any restrictions, including those in any
international agreements . . .
shall. . . [n]ot maintain among themselves any
restrictions, including those in any international
agreements, incompatible with the obligations undertaken
under this Convention, which would restrict or impede trade
and the development and promotion of [again] scientific and
technological knowledge in the field of chemistry for
industrial, agriculture, research, medical, pharmaceutical or
other peaceful purposes.
shall . . . [n]ot maintain among themselves any
restrictions, [either unilateral or international
restrictions.]
So what this says is that States Parties will have the right to say,
once they become parties, ``You can't have an embargo on selling
chemicals to us. You have to lift your restrictions.''
For a country like Iran, for example, which has signed the treaty,
this would be a pretty good deal because currently none of the
Australia Group countries will sell it these chemicals.
What is going to happen? Well, today, China may be selling chemicals
to Iran or maybe another country is selling chemicals to Iran not
covered by the treaty. Once the treaty goes into effect, those
countries could continue to sell chemicals to Iran. But what is going
to happen is that the other countries, countries that sign onto the
convention are going to say, ``Wait a minute. China, for example, is
selling chemicals to Iran. Our chemical companies want in on the
action. It says right here in the treaty we're not supposed to maintain
any restrictions. So we are out of here. We are going to allow our
countries to sell chemicals to a country like Iran.'' We will have a
very poor argument against that.
What has been the administration's response to this? Belatedly the
administration seems to find there is a little problem here. But
originally it did not think so. As a matter of fact--and I think this
is a critical point of this debate, Madam President,--right after the
chemical weapons treaty was signed into force, the Australia Group
members were all asked to begin the process of lifting their
restrictions pursuant to the Chemical Weapons Convention, the plain
wording of articles X and XI.
Let me read to you, according to the administration--this is in
testimony before the Congress:
Australia Group members in August 1992 committed to review
their export control measures with a view of removing them
for CWC States Parties in full compliance with their own
obligations under the convention.
In other words, after the CWC was signed, the Australia Group
countries began to review their export control measures which currently
prohibit them from selling chemicals to certain countries, so that they
could bring themselves into compliance with their obligations under
articles X and XI of the convention.
And the Australia Group itself issued a formal statement--and I am
quoting now--
Undertaking to review, in light of the implementation of
the Convention, the measures that they take to prevent the
spread of chemical substances and equipment for purposes
contrary to the objectives of the convention with the aim of
removing such measures for the benefit of States Parties to
the Convention acting in full compliance with the obligations
under the Convention.
In other words, again, if you have limitations on the sale of
chemicals to countries, you are going to have to lift them or you will
be in violation of articles X and XI of the convention.
What has the administration's response to this been?
At first it was denial. Then, one comment made to me was, ``Well, we
tried our best to negotiate our way out of this, but the best we could
do is get language like `undertake to facilitate' rather than
`obligated to.' We just couldn't negotiate anything better.''
So this was a bone to those countries, an incentive for them to come
in. And to our argument, this makes the situation worse, not better,
and will actually proliferate these weapons, the same as Secretary
Cheney just said in the quotation I just read, that articles X and XI
will result in the proliferation of chemical weapons because there
cannot be any restrictions.
The administration then began to take a different tack. First they
said, well, we will decide not to lift our restrictions, so the United
States will still not sell to countries that we think might develop
chemical weapons. And we will get you a letter to that effect. I have
not seen anything in writing, but that is the administration's latest
statement.
We said, that does not do any good because it only takes one country
to break an embargo. Any one of the countries could do it. And the
horse would be out of the barn. So they said, well, we will try to get
the other Australia Group states to agree to the same thing.
Bear in mind what they are saying. First, they were all going to lift
these restrictions to be in compliance with the treaty. Now we are
going to try to convince them they should keep them in place in clear
violation to the treaty. This is the way to make a moral statement,
Madam President, by violating the treaty right up front and announcing
to the world we are violating the treaty, by keeping in place
restrictions that are required to be lifted under articles X and XI?
It is not a very propitious way to make a moral statement or to begin
the operation of an international treaty to announce in effect not only
are you going to violate it but you are going to try to get all your
friends in the Australia Group to violate it because not to do so would
be to lift the restrictions we currently believe are helpful in
preventing the spread of chemical weapons.
Even if all these countries do decide to ignore articles X and XI,
countries that are not States Parties can continue to sell these
chemicals. I said, it will not be long until everyone else will want in
the action. The same argument that has been made by some of our
chemical companies, in the event if somebody is selling we should have
the right to sell too otherwise we are just losing good business.
So I will conclude, Madam President, by trying to make this rather
simple, but I think important point. To those who say, granted, it is
not going to be a very effective treaty, but at least it does no harm,
I say, you are wrong. It is going to do a lot of harm--to business, to
the taxpayers, to our ability to conduct diplomacy and, importantly, to
our ability to constrain the spread of chemical weapons.
As Secretary Cheney said, unless articles X and XI are removed from
this treaty, it is going to make matters worse, not better.
So the fourth condition that is a part of the Helms resolution of
ratification
[[Page S3500]]
says that we will ratify the treaty, but before we deposit the articles
of ratification there has to be a certification by the President that
those two sections have been removed from the treaty. Yes, of course,
that will require a renegotiation. The States Parties will have to
agree to take those provisions out. That should not be a problem if the
administration's most current assurances are to be believed.
I suspect, however, there are specific States Parties who do not
agree with those assurances who fully intend to continue these sales.
As a matter of fact, if you will read the language of the Chinese
ratification, it explicitly preserves their understanding of articles X
and XI which is the obvious understanding of anyone reading them, that
it would be improper to have trade restrictions or to deny the
defensive equipment in the case of other States Parties.
So, Madam President, we are stuck with articles X and XI. And it is
the belief of many of us that perhaps we could support this treaty if
those articles were removed. But until they are removed, it makes
matters worse and therefore we cannot in good conscience support the
treaty in that form.
I thank the distinguished chairman of the committee for yielding me
this time.
Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina is recognized.
Mr. HELMS. Madam President, allow me to thank the able Senator from
Arizona. He is a walking encyclopedia on the details of this
treaty, and he has been enormously helpful to me and to many other
Senators in understanding the implications of a great many provisions
of the treaty. I thank him now publicly for all he has done to be
helpful. I am deeply grateful.
Mr. KYL. Madam President, I return that thanks. I see the
distinguished ranking member of the committee. I compliment both of
them for their work to achieve what I have described as ``limited
success'' in the provisions agreed to, but nonetheless important. I
appreciate the negotiations that they conducted and the spirit in which
this debate has been conducted as well.
Mr. HELMS. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the Record
reflect that had there been a recorded vote on the previous two voice
votes, that Senators Ashcroft and Grams would have voted ``aye'' on
both votes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. HELMS. Madam President, I hope the distinguished ranking member
will agree that the other Senator from Arizona should follow. I will
leave it for him to limit his time or not. Let me do one or two other
things and I will let the Senator take care of that. I noticed that two
or three times in the past week--and I am used to the media criticism;
as a matter of fact, I enjoy it. I have a lot of cartoons on my office
wall to prove that I do enjoy it. But I noticed that two or three
people said, ``Helms doesn't do anything in the Foreign Relations
Committee except hold up treaties.''
Well, let's look at the record. In the past 2 years--that is to say
the 104th Congress--the Foreign Relations Committee has considered 39
treaties, and the Senate approved 38 of them--the one exception being
this chemical weapons treaty, which the administration pulled down just
before it was to become the pending business in the Senate.
I will read the list that I am going to put into the Record:
Consideration of the CWC, in the context of the work of the committee
in carrying out its responsibility to us and consent to ratification as
set forth in article II, section 2, of the Constitution. Treaties
considered during the 104th Congress included bilateral tax and
investment treaties, important to protecting and furthering U.S.
business interests abroad; 14 treaties strengthening U.S. law
enforcement through extradition of criminals and access to criminal
evidence in other countries. One notable example of the impact of these
treaties was the ratification of the United States extradition treaty
with Jordan, which enabled the United States to take into custody a
suspect in the World Trade Center bombing. Extensive hearings were held
by the committee to consider the START II Treaty and the Convention on
Chemical Weapons. The Foreign Relations Committee also considered, and
the Senate ratified, three multilateral treaties dealing with landmines
and the rubber industry and international fisheries laws.
I ask unanimous consent that this list be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the list was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
Treaties Ratified by the Senate During the 104th Congress
Arms Control Treaties
Convention on Conventional Weapons.
Start II.
[Convention on Chemical Weapons (approved by Committee/no
vote by Senate)].
Commodities
1995 International Natural Rubber Agreement.
Fisheries
U.N. Convention Relating to the Conservation and Management
of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks.
bilateral extradition treaties
Belgium.
Supplementary with Belgium.
Bolivia.
Hungary.
Jordan.
Malaysia.
The Philippines.
Switzerland.
Bilateral investment treaties
Albania.
Belarus.
Estonia.
Georgia.
Jamaica.
Latvia.
Mongolia.
Trinidad Tobago.
Ukraine.
Bilateral Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties
Austria.
Hungary.
Korea.
Panama.
The Philippines.
United Kingdom.
Bilateral Tax Treaties
Canada.
France.
Indonesia.
Kazakstan.
Kazakstan Exchange of Notes.
Mexico.
Netherlands-Antilles.
Portugal.
Sweden.
Ukraine.
Ukraine Exchange of Notes.
Mr. HELMS. In addition to my recommendation to the distinguished
ranking member, I hope Senator McCain, although he does not share my
view on the treaty, will be recognized, because he is a patriot of the
first order, as far as I am concerned. If anybody ever paid his dues to
this country, the Senator from Arizona did. Following him, I should
like for Senator Hutchinson to represent our side in the pecking order.
How much time will the Senator need?
Mr. HUTCHINSON. Ten minutes.
Mr. HELMS. The Senator can use a little longer if he wishes. Let me
ask about the time consumed thus far, Madam President.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina has 3 hours 10
minutes remaining. The Senator from Delaware has 3 hours 21 minutes
remaining.
Mr. HELMS. Three hours even for me?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. And 10 minutes. And 3 hours 21 minutes for the
Senator from Delaware.
Mr. HELMS. We are running pretty near. The distinguished Senator from
Delaware made his usual eloquent speech this morning. How long did I
speak, by the way?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator spoke for 4 minutes, plus 26
minutes earlier today.
Mr. HELMS. Four months? No, I understand. With the understanding that
the Senator from Arkansas will follow the distinguished Senator from
Arizona, I yield the floor to my distinguished friend from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. That ``four month'' comment reminds me of a joke about the
two guys who were cheering at the bar, clapping their hands. A guy
walks into the bar and says, ``What are they so happy about?'' Another
guy says, ``Oh, they just put together a jigsaw puzzle, and they did it
in 3 hours.'' The guy walks up to them and says, ``Congratulations, but
why is that so special?'' They showed him the box, which said ``2 to 4
years.'' At any rate, it will take a while for that to sink in. A
little bit of levity in the chemical weapons treaty is worth the
effort.
[[Page S3501]]
The junior Senator from Arizona complimented me on the limited
success that we have achieved here. I thank him for that. Now I am
going to yield to a man of unlimited capacity to prove to everyone that
there is no limit to the success we are about to achieve in this
treaty.
I yield 15 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Arizona, my good
friend, John McCain.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona is recognized.
Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I thank my distinguished colleague from
Delaware and the Senator from North Carolina. The distinguished Senator
from North Carolina deserves great credit, in my view, because he, as
chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, allowed this treaty to
come to the floor. The distinguished chairman could have bottled up
this treaty under his authority as chairman of the committee. He
deserves great praise.
I also point out that, as various groups have gotten into this
debate, there have been a lot of allegations, a lot of impugning of
character and patriotism and views about whether people are tough
enough or not tough enough or what is too soft. This is a debate
amongst honorable people who have honorable differences of opinion, as
I do with the junior Senator from Arizona, my dear friend and
colleague, Senator Kyl. I would like to see, especially in the columns
of various periodicals interested in this view, the debate elevated a
bit as to the virtues or vices, as the observers of this treaty might
view them, as opposed to speculations about the motives of those who
either support or oppose this treaty. I think the American people would
be far better off.
Madam President, the importance of this issue has been pointed out.
We will have political and economic consequences for the United States
for many years to come. The most important question is whether this
agreement is good for U.S. national security.
In my view, one central fact dominates consideration of this issue.
Regardless of whether the United States ratifies this treaty, the
United States will, in the next decade or so, complete the destruction
of its own aging chemical weapons stockpile. Our reasons for doing so
have nothing to do with arms control. The decision was made before the
CWC became a near-term possibility. I am not aware of any interest of
Congress or the U.S. military in getting the United States back in the
chemical weapons business. So when we consider the wisdom of ratifying
this treaty, we should bear in mind that this is, first and foremost, a
treaty about limiting other countries' chemical weapons, not our own,
because we are doing away with ours. In practical terms, the
alternative to ratification of the CWC is U.S. unilateral disarmament
in the field of chemical weapons.
The critics point out that a number of countries, such as Iraq,
Libya, Syria, and North Korea, will not ratify the CWC and will
therefore not be bound by its limits. True. But will our efforts to
keep weapons of mass destruction out of their hands be enhanced if we
don't ratify this treaty? No, they will not. In fact, I am confident
that these rogue states are desperately hoping the Senate will reject
ratification because, if we do, we will not only spare them the
mandatory trade sanctions that the CWC imposes on nonparties, we will
also undermine a near global consensus that all chemical weapons,
including those of nonparties, should be banned.
Madam President, for 10 years I have had the privilege of working
with the former Senate majority leader, Bob Dole. Probably the closest
working relationship I had with him was on issues of national security.
In fact, I was privileged to serve as one of his advisers in the last
campaign in his efforts for the Presidency of the United States. Madam
President, I know of no one more credible on these issues, and I know
of no one, going back to World War II, who understands service and
sacrifice and our national security interests more than Senator Bob
Dole, a man whose friendship I cherish and whose companionship I enjoy
but, more important than that, a person whose views I hold in the
highest esteem and regard. There are many other experts on national
security issues in this town, but I know of no one who has had the
experience and hands-on involvement with these issues, that is, the
tough decisions, than Senator Dole. We all know that Senator Dole
issued a letter today that I think is of great importance.
Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Dole's
statement and the letter from President Clinton to Senator Dole be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Statement of Bob Dole on the Chemical Weapons Convention
Washington.--Bob Dole today issued the following statement
regarding the Chemical Weapons Convention:
``Last September, the Senate Majority Leader, Trent Lott,
asked me to express my opinion on the Chemical Weapons
Convention. In my response, I raised concerns about the
Chemical Weapons Convention and expressed hope that the
President and the Senate would work together to ensure that
the treaty is effectively verifiable and genuinely global.
They have, and as a result, 28 conditions to the Senate's
Resolution of Ratification have been agreed to. These 28
agreed conditions address major concerns.
``I commend Senator Lott, Senator Helms, Senator Lugar, and
many other former colleagues, as well as President Clinton
and administration officials for their constructive efforts.
Is it perfect--no--but I believe there are now adequate
safeguards to protect American interests. We should keep in
mind that the United States is already destroying its
chemical weapons in accordance with legislation passed more
than 10 years ago. The CWC would require all other parties to
destroy their stockpiles by April 2007.
``In addition, the Administration has agreed to a number of
provisions dealing with rogue states that remain outside the
treaty. (See attached letter from President Clinton to me
dated April 22, 1997). I also understand there is a
possibility of an additional agreement with respect to
sharing of information. If so, it would further strengthen
the treaty. I understand that even with all the added
safeguards, not every Senator, for their own good reasons,
will support ratification.
``As a member of the Senate, I supported the START I, START
II, INF, and CFE treaties because they met the crucial tests
of effective verification, real reductions, and stability. If
I were presently in the Senate, I would vote for ratification
of the CWC because of the many improvements agreed to.
``Those who may still have concerns can look to Article
XVI, which allows withdrawal from the treaty on 90 days
notice if it fails to serve America's vital interests. There
is little doubt in my mind that if this convention increases
proliferation of chemical weapons, it would lead to public
outrage which would compel any President to act. The bottom
line is that when it comes to America's security, we must
maintain a strong national defense that is second to none.''
____
The White House,
Washington, April 22, 1997.
Hon. Bob Dole,
Washington, DC.
Dear Bob: I welcomed the opportunity to discuss the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) with you Saturday and
appreciated your taking the time Monday to have Bob Bell
brief you on the 28 agreed conditions to the Resolution of
Ratification.
When you wrote Senator Lott last September, you expressed
the hope that I would assist him in amending the Resolution
of Ratification in a manner that would address certain
concerns you raised and thereby ``achieve a treaty which
truly enhances American security.'' I believe the 28 agreed
conditions, which are the product of over 60 hours of
negotiation between the Administration and the Senate over
the last two and a half months, meet both these tests. We
have truly gone the extra mile in reaching out, as you
recommended, to broaden the base of bipartisan support for
this treaty. As I said in my public remarks Friday, ``I
consider that the things that we've agreed to in good faith
are really a tribute to the work that Senator Lott and
Senator Helms and Senator Biden and a number of others did to
really clarify what this Convention will mean; I think it's a
positive thing.''
Let me mention briefly how my Administration has addressed
the specific concerns you raised last fall:
Constitutionality. You said Constitutional protections
should be safeguarded against unwarranted searches. We have
agreed to a condition (#29) guaranteeing that there will be
no involuntary inspection of a U.S. company or facility
without a search warrant. Period. We have also agreed to a
condition (#12) underscoring that nothing in the treaty
``authorizes legislation, or other action, by the United
States prohibited by the Constitution of the United States,
as interpreted by the United States.''
Real Reductions. You asked whether the CWC will actually
eliminate chemical weapons. We have agreed to a condition
(#13) specifying severe measures that the United States will
insist upon if a country is in non-compliance of this
fundamental obligation under the treaty.
Verification. You asked whether we will have high
confidence that our intelligence
[[Page S3502]]
community (IC) will detect violations. We have agreed to a
condition (#10) which would require the Administration to
identify on a yearly basis priorities, specific steps and
resources being undertaken to strengthen U.S. monitoring
and detection capabilities. These annual reports would
also include a determination of the IC's level of
confidence with respect to each monitoring task. We also
made clear during the negotiations on the conditions our
willingness to certify that the CWC is ``effectively
verifiable'' and that the IC has high confidence it could
detect the kind of violation that matters most in terms of
protecting our troops deployed in the field: any effort by
an adversary to try to train and equip his army for
offensive chemical warfare operations. I regret that the
unanimous consent (U/C) agreement governing the floor
debate on the CWC will not allow this condition to be
offered.
Universality. Finally, you asked whether the treaty will be
truly global. We have agreed to a condition (#11) which
requires the Secretary of Defense to ensure that U.S. forces
are effectively equipped, trained and organized to fight and
win against any rogue state that remains outside the treaty
and employs CW in battle. To restrict CW options for such
states, we agreed to a condition (#7) requiring the President
to certify that we will strengthen our national export
controls and that all 30 states participating in the
Australia Group are committed to maintaining this export
control regime on dangerous chemicals. This certification
will have to be made annually. Lastly, during the
negotiations on the conditions we underscored our willingness
to commit to a mechanism by which we would have to consult
each year with the Senate on whether to remain in the CWC if
rogue states do not over time succumb to pressure to join the
treaty regime. As with the proposed verification condition, I
regret the Senate will not have an opportunity to vote on
this condition either.
In closing, let me again thank you for your interest in and
support for achieving a treaty that enhances the security of
our Armed Forces and all our citizens.
Sincerely,
Bill Clinton.
Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I will not read Senator Dole's whole
statement, but I think it is important what he said. I will read parts
of it:
I commend Senator Lott, Senator Helms, Senator Lugar, and
many other former colleagues, as well as President Clinton
and the administration officials for their constructive
efforts. Is it perfect--no--but I believe there are now
adequate safeguards to protect American interests.
I repeat.
* * * I believe there are now adequate safeguards to
protect American interests. We should keep in mind that the
United States is already destroying its chemical weapons in
accordance with legislation passed more than 10 years ago.
The CWC would require all other parties to destroy their
stockpiles by April 2007.
He goes on to say:
As a Member of the Senate, I supported the START I, START
II, INF, and CFE treaties because they met the crucial tests
of effective verification, real reductions, and stability. If
I were presently in the Senate, I would vote for ratification
of the CWC because of the many improvements agreed to.
Madam President, it is well known that, last fall, one of the reasons
the treaty was withdrawn by the administration was because of the
reservations expressed by Senator Dole at that time--then candidate
Dole. It is well known that Senator Dole's reservations were legitimate
and sincere. There is also now no doubt--at least in my mind, as well
as in Senator Dole's--that those reservations and concerns have been
satisfied by the 28 conditions that are included in this treaty, with
only 5 remaining, which we will be voting on tomorrow.
Obviously, every U.S. Senator thinks for himself or herself; there is
no doubt about that. But, in my mind, this is an important event that
Senator Dole should weigh in on this issue--not because there is any
benefit to Senator Dole; clearly, there is a downside for his
involvement, and he could have kept silent. But, once again, Senator
Dole has chosen to speak out for what he believes is important to U.S.
vital national security interests. I applaud him and, again, hope that
he will continue his involvement in the challenges that we face in the
years ahead to our Nation's security, as he has so successfully done in
the past.
The CWC critics also contend that the treaty will weaken our
nonproliferation policy because article XI of the treaty says the
parties will have the right to participate in ``the fullest possible
exchange'' of chemical technology for purposes not prohibited under the
convention. As a result, we will have to eliminate our national
controls on chemical technologies and disband the Australia Group, the
multilateral framework for restraining transfers of sensitive chemical
technology.
This interpretation of the treaty is contradicted not only by the
text of the treaty--which subordinates article XI to the basic
undertakings in article I for parties not to acquire chemical weapons
or to assist another state in doing so--but also by our experience with
other nonproliferation treaties and the agreed ``consensus'' conditions
included in the resolution of ratification before us.
First of all, article XI is essentially similar to the language of
article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in that it blesses
technology exchanges among treaty parties, but the NPT has not caused
us to disband the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which was, in fact, founded
after the NPT went into force.
Nor has it obliged us to curtail our national controls on the
transfer of nuclear technology, even to other NPT parties; the United
States enacted the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 10 years after
the NPT was signed. There will always be some countries that object to
our technology controls, but these are decisions the United States
makes for itself. And successive administrations, Republican and
Democratic, have maintained and expanded our export controls on nuclear
technology, while the NPT has contributed to our ability to obtain
support from our allies in this effort by establishing an international
consensus that nuclear proliferation is an evil that must be countered.
Moreover, beyond the text of the CWC itself, we have before us 28
agreed conditions in the resolution of ratification. As a member of the
group that the majority leader put together to address issues regarding
CWC ratification, I am proud of the work done at the member and staff
level to achieve agreement with the administration on a number of
difficult issues. I am also grateful for the work done by the chairman
of the Foreign Relations Committee and the ranking minority member, who
together resolved many additional problems. This work has greatly
strengthened the resolution of ratification on which we will soon vote.
Agreed condition 7 of the resolution requires the President to
certify not only that the United States believes that the CWC does not
require us to weaken our export controls, but also that all members of
the Australia Group have communicated, at the highest diplomatic
levels, their agreement that multilateral and national export controls
on sensitive chemical technology are compatible with the treaty and
will be maintained under the CWC.
Conversely, if the United States rejects ratification, I doubt that
we will be able to play our traditional leadership role in attempting
to persuade other chemical suppliers to exercise restraint. The world
will blame the United States for undermining a chemical weapons ban
that the vast majority of other countries were willing to sign. If we
reject ratification, where will we get the moral and political
authority to persuade other Australia Group participants to block
exports to countries of concern?
The same case can be made regarding article X of the treaty, which
critics claim will require us to share defensive technologies with
potential enemy states. Not only does this provision apply only to CWC
parties, so countries outside the treaty like Libya cannot benefit, but
condition 15 in the resolution of ratification obliges the United
States to share only medical antidotes and treatment to countries of
concern if they are attacked with chemical weapons. And our respected
former colleague, Secretary of Defense Cohen, has committed the United
States to use every instrument of U.S. diplomacy and leverage to block
transfers of chemical technology that would undermine our security, and
he has made the obvious point that we will be better able to do this if
we are inside the CWC regime rather than outside.
It is true that the Chemical Weapons Convention will be more
difficult to verify than nuclear arms control agreements such as START
and INF. But regardless of whether the United States ratifies the CWC,
we will have to monitor closely the chemical weapons programs of other
states. The intelligence community has repeatedly told the Senate that
the CWC's verification
[[Page S3503]]
measures will be a useful tool in doing this job. General Shalikashvili
has told the Armed Services Committee that ``I believe that the system
of declarations, of routine inspections, challenge inspections, all put
together, give us a leg up to the ability to detect whether (potential
violators) are, in fact, embarked upon a program that would be in
violation of the CWC. So I think our chances are improved when they are
members of the CWC. Our chances decrease dramatically if they are not
members of the CWC.''
While some want to reject the CWC because of verification concerns,
it seems to me that this would have the practical effect of reducing
the United States' ability to monitor the chemical weapons programs of
other countries. This is an example of the best being the enemy of the
good.
Discussions among Senators and between the Senate and the
administration have produced other agreed conditions to the resolution
that have strengthened the case for ratification.
Madam President, I also want to commend the work of the majority
leader, Senator Lott, who has worked long and hard to address the
legitimate concerns many Republicans Senators had expressed about the
Convention and to accommodate the administration's correct assertion
that the Senate has a duty to vote, yea or nay, on the treaty. Senator
Lott and his indefatigable foreign policy advisor, Randy Scheunemann,
labored tirelessly to facilitate negotiations between members and
between the Senate and the administration. They ensured that these
negotiations bore fruit and resulted in a resolution of ratification
that resolved most, if not all, of the reservations expressed by some
Senators. Both the Senate and the administration are in their debt.
It is also appropriate, Madam President, to commend administration
officials for working with the Senate in a genuinely nonpartisan way
that was notable for the respect paid to the views of all Members, and
the good faith shown in trying to come to terms with so many difficult
issues. I have on many past occasions been critical of administration
policies and the lack of bipartisanship in promoting those policies. In
this instance, administration officials took great pains to secure the
Senate's advice and consent in a manner that was, as I said, genuinely
respectful of every Senator's views. Thus, I am happy to give praise
where praise is due.
Madam President, I respect the concerns of those Senators who cannot
vote in favor of ratifying the CWC. But in my opinion, we do not need
killer amendments to ensure that this treaty--negotiated under
President Reagan and signed by President Bush--is on balance a good
deal for the United States. This view is shared by former Presidents
Ford and Bush, numerous Nobel Prize winners in chemistry, the chemical
industry trade associations, gulf war victors Colin Powell and Norman
Schwarzkopf, retired CNO Adm. Elmo Zumwalt, plus the Veterans of
Foreign Wars, the Vietnam Veterans of America, and the Reserve Officers
Association. I am comfortable in their company, and that of every U.S.
ally in Europe and Asia. That is why I intend to vote to ratify this
treaty, and I urge my colleagues to do the same.
Madam President, I yield back my time to the distinguished Senator
from Delaware.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas is recognized for 10
minutes.
Mr. HUTCHINSON. Madam President, I rise today to voice my serious
reservations about the Chemical Weapons Convention treaty. The most
important standards for an effective treaty are: Verifiability,
protection to the signatories, constitutionality, and the applicability
to nations of most concern. I sincerely believe that the CWC falls
short in each of these basic requirements.
On April 8, 1997 three former Secretaries of Defense appeared before
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee urging Senators to vote against
the ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. This fact alone
should give this body great pause in the consideration of this treaty.
I know that there are good, there are loyal, and there are patriotic
Americans on both sides of this issue of ratifying the Chemical Weapons
Convention. I have many constituents who have called me, and said,
``Senator, how do we know? We hear former Secretaries of Defense saying
it is a bad treaty. We hear Colin Powell saying it is a good treaty.
Today we hear former Senator Dole saying we need to ratify this. How do
we know?''
I believe that it is simply our responsibility as Senators,
respecting the differences that exist, to study this, to evaluate it,
and to make a reasoned judgment. I believe also when our national
security is at risk that we must always opt on the side of caution in
consideration of a treaty such as we have before us.
Madam President, the opinions of Secretaries Schlesinger, Rumsfeld,
Weinberger, and Cheney regarding this treaty should not be taken
lightly. On April 7, in a letter to Senator Jesse Helms, chairman of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, former Secretary of Defense
Cheney wrote, and I am quoting, Mr. President:
The technology to manufacture chemical weapons is simply
too ubiquitous, covert chemical warfare programs too easily
concealed, and the international community's record of
responding effectively to violations of arms control treaties
too unsatisfactory to permit confidence that such a regime
would actually reduce the chemical threat. Indeed, some
aspects of the present convention, notably its obligation to
share with potential adversaries like Iran, chemical
manufacturing technology that can be used for military
purposes and chemical defensive equipment, threaten to make
this accord worse than having no treaty at all.
Those words of Dick Cheney have echoed in my mind--``worse than
having no treaty at all''.
He said, if I might summarize, that the manufacture of chemical
weapons is too widespread, concealing it is too easy, and enforcement
is too uncertain for us to ratify this treaty.
Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that this statement from
Dick Cheney be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
The technology to manufacture chemical weapons is simply
too ubiquitous, covert chemical warfare programs too easily
concealed, and the international community's record of
responding effectively to violations of arms control treaties
too unsatisfactory to permit confidence that such a regime
would actually reduce the chemical threat. Indeed, some
aspects of the present convention, notably its obligation to
share with potential adversaries like Iran, chemical
manufacturing technology that can be used for military
purposes and chemical defensive equipment, threaten to make
this accord worse than having no treaty at all.--Richard
Cheney, Letter to Chairman Helms, April 7, 1997.
Mr. HUTCHINSON. Madam President, Secretary Cheney's statement sends a
clear message to the American people that this treaty does not
effectively deal with the threat of chemical and biological weapons. As
we begin this debate on the CWC, the American people, with
justification, will ask their leaders how and where they stand on the
issue of chemical weapons.
I stand here today wanting to tell the American people that this
Congress will do everything in its power to rid our world of chemical
and biological weapons, however, the CWC is not global, is not
verifiable, is not constitutional, and quite frankly, it will not work.
While the intent of the CWC is to create a global chemical weapons
ban, accomplishing that goal does seem unlikely. Six countries with
chemical weapons programs--including all of those with aggressive
programs--have not yet signed the CWC.
So how then can we call this a global treaty?
Neither Iraq, Libya, Syria, nor North Korea have signed or ratified
the CWC. China, Pakistan, and Iran have signed the CWC, but have not
ratified it. Russia has signed the CWC, but has not ratified it.
These rogue nations of Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Syria represent
a clear threat to United States security and the security of key United
States allies. All of these countries have active, aggressive programs
to develop and produce chemical weapons.
Let's be clear about one important thing. The administration has
refused to ban inspectors from rogue nations such as Iran and China.
That will be one of the reservations that we will have the
opportunity to vote on. And it is one of those reservations that I find
it incomprehensible
[[Page S3504]]
that the administration has found unacceptable--banning inspectors from
rogue nations such as Iran and China.
In addition, there are intelligence reports that have recently
indicated that Russia has already begun to cheat, even before the CWC
has gone into effect. These facts alone give substance to opposing the
treaty.
Madam President, inherent in the CWC is a requirement that we share
our advanced chemical defensive gear with countries like Iran and
China. It is important to recognize that rogue nations, through reverse
engineering, can easily figure out how to infiltrate our technologies.
This would not only increase the chances of a chemical attack, but more
importantly this would endanger our troops around the world.
Let us be crystal clear on the fact that once there is a free-for-all
of U.S. chemical and defensive technologies between the proposed
signatories of this treaty, it will quite frankly be impossible to stop
the transfer of this information to the rogue nations, that do not sign
the CWC.
I believe that the CWC will not increase pressure on rogue regimes.
The CWC will not result in an international norm against the use of
chemical weapons. The Geneva Convention of 1925 already established
that norm. How many times has this prohibition been violated by Iraq,
on the Kurds and even in the case of our own troops?
Madam President, it took 5 years before the Pentagon came forward
with information pertaining to the exposure of our own troops to
certain chemical and biological substances that could affect the health
and well-being of our 700,000 U.S. service people in the gulf.
The rogues have demonstrated that they will plan for the use of,
threaten the use of, and indeed use chemical weapons despite
international norms.
We must, to the best of our ability, avoid the horrible events of the
1980's, when the international community witnessed the horrors of
Iraq's use of chemical weapons against its own people. Since that time,
sanctions against Iraq have been strong and effective. The CWC will not
address any shortcomings in these sanctions.
Madam President, how can the CWC be global if these so-called rogue
nations have not signed the CWC? The bottom line seems to be that the
CWC is most applicable to the countries of least concern to the United
States. It may help us with Great Britain, but provide no protection
regarding North Korea or Iraq.
It is my understanding, that under article XII of the treaty, members
caught violating treaty provisions are simply threatened with a
restriction or suspension of convention privileges. At worst, a report
will be sent to the U.N. General Assembly and the U.N. Security
Council. Mr. President, how does a report protect the American people?
Madam President, with no predetermined sanctions in place to deter
potential violators, the CWC seems ineffective and unenforceable.
I am very sensitive to the needs and wishes of the small business-
man. And while large multinational chemical corporations can bear the
estimated astronomical costs regarding reporting requirements of a CWC
member nation, these costs constitute a significant burden, in some
cases an overwhelming burden, to small businesses, not just in Arkansas
but all around America. There are roughly 230 small businesses which
custom-synthesize made-to-order products and compete with large
chemical manufacturers. It is my understanding that they generally have
fewer than 100 employees and have annual sales of less than $40 million
each. Few, if any, of them can afford to employ legions of lawyers just
to satisfy the new reporting requirements of the CWC. Let us be
realistic. Can these burdensome reporting requirements prevent the
proliferation of chemical weapons?
In addition to the cost factor on our small businesses, the
possibility of U.S. trade secrets being stolen during CWC inspections
to me at least seems very high. I have been advised that the U.S.
intelligence community has said that the CWC inspections constitute a
new tool to add to our intelligence collection tool kit. Putting one
and one together, inspections will also constitute a tool in the kit of
foreign governments as well. I hope that the American people realize
that U.S. expenditures as a member nation of the CWC include a
mandatory 25-percent assessment for operating expenses of the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the OPCW.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 10 minutes have expired.
Mr. HUTCHINSON. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent for an
additional 3 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. HUTCHINSON. As a member nation, we will pick up a 25-percent
assessment for the operating expenses of the organization. This is the
new international organization created to administer the CWC. It is my
understanding that operating costs are likely to be a minimum of $100
million per year, $25 million of which will come from U.S. taxpayers.
Finally, it is my understanding that the CWC requires the United
States to begin destruction of our chemical stockpile no later than 2
years after the treaty enters into force. I simply believe that is
unreasonable and unattainable.
The Department of Defense has publicly stated that the U.S.
destruction of its chemical weapons stockpile will continue regardless
of whether we are a signatory to such treaty. We have one such arsenal
in Pine Bluff, AR. I believe it is unrealistic to expect that the $12.4
billion cost in destroying those chemical weapons will be achievable
particularly given the environmental concerns that exist. And I am
being contacted daily by those with environmental concerns about the
Pine Bluff arsenal. So I believe that the recent debate on Yucca
Mountain further illustrates how problematic the fulfillment of our
treaty obligations would be.
Madam President, I certainly want this body to provide a
comprehensive domestic and international plan to reduce the threat of
chemical and biological weapons. As I have already stated today,
however, the CWC has too many loopholes that will perpetuate chemical
weapon activity rather than end it. It is a serious obligation that we
have. I believe that this body will make the right decision. For me,
the words of Dick Cheney keep echoing: ``Worse than no treaty at all.''
For this Senator, I will be voting ``no'' on I believe a flawed,
unfixable treaty. I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware is recognized.
Mr. BIDEN. I yield the distinguished Senator from New Jersey 7
minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey is recognized.
Mr. TORRICELLI. I thank the Chair. I thank the Senator from Delaware
for yielding.
Madam President, tomorrow the Senate will exercise its historic
constitutional powers of treaty ratification. It is a solemn power that
we have exercised for two centuries. That power has often defined the
security of the Nation and sometimes been determinant of war and peace
itself. The issue before the Senate now is the ban on chemical weapons,
probably the most important foreign policy question remaining before
the United States in this century.
Perhaps because the consequences are so great the choice is also
clear. This treaty demands ratification. The treaty itself is a
culmination of a process that began over 12 years ago under the
leadership of Ronald Reagan. The United States began a review and then
determined that it would eliminate chemical weapons. We did so because
of the need to reduce the numbers of those weapons in the world and to
restrict the ability of those nations that did not possess them to
obtain them.
Since Ronald Reagan's judgment a decade ago, we have made
extraordinary progress. In 1985, President Reagan signed into law a
judgment that would eliminate American stockpiles by the year 2004,
having an important impact on the ratification of this treaty because,
whether it is ratified or not, no matter what judgments are made by
this institution, the United States is going to eliminate chemical
weapons. Second, the United States then followed our own judgment by
leading the international effort with 160 other nations to enact a
multilateral ban. It is the result of that process that is now before
the Senate.
The process, it is important to note, did not culminate with the
Reagan administration. In 1992, President George
[[Page S3505]]
Bush announced a strong American support for the treaty and the United
States became an original signatory. A year later, under President
Clinton, the United States once again announced its support. Today, we
have come full circle. From Ronald Reagan's first pronouncements, the
treaty, now endorsed by a Democratic President, seeks ratification
under a majority Republican Congress.
The Secretary of State said only a week ago:
This treaty has ``made in America'' written all over it. It
was Ronald Reagan's idea, George Bush negotiated it and
signed it, and Bill Clinton has embraced it.
In truth, however, Madam President, the treaty is neither Democratic
nor Republican. It reflects the bipartisan commitments of the United
States toward our security, our values, and a century of learning the
lessons of collective security because after 80 years of living under
the threats of chemical weapons, it is the judgment of this
administration and those that preceded it that it is time to eliminate
these weapons.
The treaty does several direct and important things. It bans the
development, production, and stockpiling of chemical weapons.
Second, it requires the destruction of all chemical weapons and their
production facilities.
Third, it provides the most extensive verification process in the
history of arms control.
Finally, it grants member nations the effective tools for dealing
with those who refuse to comply, tools that will be denied the United
States if we fail to ratify the treaty. And yet many of my colleagues
have questioned the need for the United States to become a member
state. They note two principal objections. First, that the burden of
reporting requirements and verifications would be onerous on American
industry; and second, the impact on American defense capabilities.
Allow me to deal with each. First, the economic impact. In my State
of New Jersey, the chemical industry represents fully one-third of the
entire industrial capability of the State; 150,000 citizens of the
State of New Jersey are employed in this vital manufacturing industry
of chemicals. Let us be clear. The entire industry, from small
companies to among the largest industries in the State of New Jersey,
not only supports this treaty but has joined in demanding its
ratification.
Second, on the question of American defense capabilities, it should
be self-evident that if the United States is unilaterally forgoing
these weapons and rogue nations continue to embrace them, American
military personnel will be more vulnerable and, indeed, endangered if
the United States is not a signatory, allowing us to help enforce the
provisions of the treaty and deny capability to rogue nations than if
we are to remain on the outside.
That is why this treaty has been endorsed by General Powell, 17 other
four-star generals and every former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff--in the Carter, Clinton, and Ford administrations.
I ask my colleagues who oppose this treaty, would all these members
of the general staff, would each of these men who have held the
principal responsibility for guiding and leading our Armed Forces have
endorsed this treaty if there was any chance, if there was any
judgment, that, indeed, our Armed Forces would be less safe?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 7 minutes have expired.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Thank you, Madam President. I ask the Senator from
Delaware to yield 3 additional minutes.
Mr. BIDEN. Without objection.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator may proceed.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Madam President, this is a moment of judgment that
this Senate has faced before. History instructs us that we cannot
afford to be wrong. Over 75 years ago, this body chose the wrong route
and the toll was monumental. During consideration of the treaty for the
League of Nations, the United States took the lead in forming the
principles of collective security. It was our leadership which brought
the world to understand that there was no separate peace, there was no
individual security, and yet in that instance, as in this moment, the
United States, after providing the intellectual and the political
leadership, was a reluctant participant. The judgment then, we were
told, was that there were reservations because of individual provisions
of the treaty. But, indeed, history instructs us, and I believe would
guide us now, that those reservations were not because of individual
aspects of the treaty but because of a general ideologic opposition to
arms control and the general notion of collective security.
It is time for the United States, after all the painful lessons of
previous generations, to simply understand there is no unilateral
security in a multilateral world. From Pearl Harbor to the Persian
Gulf, history demands us to recognize an essential truth: American
security, because of a changing world and developing technology,
requires and demands that we deal with other nations.
The choice before this Senate is clear. From the doughboys who
endured the horrors of mustard gas in the trenches of Europe, the
Kurdish refugees who suffered in Iraq, to the refugees of Cambodia who
suffered yellow rain, to our own veterans of the Persian Gulf, it is
time to put an end to chemical weapons. That power is in the hands of
the Senate. If we fail to do so, a host of rogue nations will take
advantage of the opportunity.
Before this Senate on July 10, 1919, Woodrow Wilson closed the debate
saying, ``We are the only hope of mankind. Dare we reject it and break
the hearts of the world.''
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired. Who yields
time?
Mr. HELMS. Madam President, I yield 10 minutes to the distinguished
Senator from Idaho, [Mr. Craig].
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho is recognized.
Mr. CRAIG. Madam President, thank you and let me thank my chairman,
not only for yielding but for his leadership on this most important
issue that now is being thoughtfully and responsibly debated here on
the floor of the U.S. Senate.
Madam President, the Chemical Weapons Convention has such far-
reaching domestic and national security implications that it deserves
the most thorough and thoughtful examination the Senate can give it. I
have given this matter a careful review and would like to reiterate
some of the conclusions I have reached.
If I thought supporting this treaty would make chemical weapons
disappear, and give us all greater security from these heinous weapons,
I would not hesitate in giving my support. Unfortunately, the facts do
not demonstrate this; indeed, implementing this treaty may actually
increase danger to U.S. citizens and troops.
The convention has been signed by 160 nations and ratified by only
74--less than 50 percent. Five countries who are thought to have
chemical weapons are not even signatories of the convention: Egypt,
Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Syria. Another six nations have signed,
but not ratified the convention: China, India, Iran, Pakistan, Israel,
and Russia. In short, this convention is not global in scale.
Even if it were true that this treaty had been signed and ratified by
160 nations, serious problems would remain. Compliance with the
Chemical Weapons Convention cannot be assured because it is not
effectively verifiable.
I think it is timely and appropriate to remember, as others have
mentioned, the principles of Ronald Reagan. Even though he started the
process that we are debating today, he would have insisted in the end,
while we might trust our allies and our friends around the world, that
in every circumstance we must verify.
Unlike nuclear weapons which require a large, specialized industrial
base, chemical weapons can be manufactured almost anywhere.
Furthermore, many lethal chemicals are common and have peaceful uses.
Chemicals help us to manufacture products such as pesticides,
pharmaceuticals, plastics, and paints. With such a broad spectrum of
uses, it would be difficult to discern the legitimate from the illicit.
It is also very disturbing to me that ratification of this treaty
would abandon a fundamental arms control principle insisted upon over
the last 17 years--that the United States must be able to effectively
verify compliance with the terms of the treaty. Verification has meant
that U.S. intelligence is
[[Page S3506]]
able to detect a breach in an arms control agreement in time to respond
appropriately and assure preservation of our national security
interests. I believe the Senate has an obligation to uphold this sound
standard. Let me take this opportunity to express my support for
Senator Helms' condition in this regard. I applaud his effort to make
real verification a condition of CWC implementing legislation, if the
treaty is ratified.
Even if verification of compliance were not a concern, this
convention would be difficult to enforce. In a sound arms control
treaty, the United States must be able to punish other countries caught
in violation of the agreement. The Chemical Weapons Convention provides
only vague, unspecified sanctions to be imposed on a country found in
breach of the Convention. Ultimately, the Chemical Weapons convention
leaves the U.N. Security Council to impose penalties severe enough to
change behavior of an outlaw nation. Since any one of the five members
of the Security Council can veto any enforcement resolution lodged
against them or their friends, China and Russia, for example, could
simply veto resolutions imposing sanctions if they disagreed with other
Security Council members. In sum, it does not appear that this
agreement is verifiable or enforceable.
Even if the enforcement mechanism to punish violators of the treaty
were perfect, countries that represent the greatest threat to United
States security such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and North Korea have
not ratified the treaty and would be under no obligation to comply with
its terms and conditions. Furthermore, our intelligence experts tell us
that each one of these countries has active and aggressive programs to
develop and produce chemical weapons.
Iran has a stockpile of blister, choking, and blood agents possibly
exceeding 2,000 tons. Their program is the largest in the Third World.
Syria, which has been increasing production of chemical weapons since
the 1980's, is home to several radical terrorist organizations,
including Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine. Many worry that Syria could easily
supply these organizations with chemical weapons. North Korea has a
stockpile of nerve gas, blood agents, and mustard gas. Additionally,
North Korea has the ability to unleash large scale chemical attacks
through mortars, artillery, multiple rocket launchers, and Scud
missiles. Currently, Libya has one chemical weapons production facility
in operation, and a larger plant under construction. Iraq has not only
a substantial capability, but has demonstrated a willingness to use
these weapons against their own people.
It has been observed that under the CWC, members to the convention
would face no difficulty looking for prohibited chemicals in free and
open countries which will accurately declare the location of chemical
facilities. However, this situation will be much different for rogue
states that are a party to the convention. As arms control verification
experts correctly point out, ``We've never found anything that's been
successfully hidden.'' Let me repeat that: ``We've never found anything
that's been successfully hidden.'' Will the unintended consequence of
the CWC be that villainous states will be more secure, and peaceful
states less?
Furthermore, have all questions raised in regards to the convention's
compatibility with our constitution been sufficiently addressed? The
Convention creates an international monitoring regime called the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, or OPCW. The OPCW
will be granted the most extensive monitoring power of any arms control
treaty ever because it extends coverage to governmental and civilian
facilities.
The authority of this international monitoring regime also raises
concern about foreign nationals having such broad authority to obtain
access to property held by private U.S. citizens. The U.S. chemical
industry is known to be one of the top industries targeted for
espionage by foreign companies and governments. There is legitimate
worry that international inspections could jeopardize confidential
business information, trade secrets, and other proprietary data. Since
the United States will be expected to pay 25 percent, or approximately
$50 million, of the OPCW's operating costs, American tax dollars could
be subsidizing increased risk for U.S. business interests.
There is also an implementation cost that will be borne by private
industry. The cost for each inspection has been estimated as high as
$500,000 for large chemical companies, and a range of $10,000 to
$20,000 for small companies. Costs could become even higher if a
shutdown is required for an inspection to safeguard proprietary
information or company security.
Another issue which has not been thoroughly discussed is how the
costs incurred with the inspections are to be paid. Estimates of the
number of companies to be inspected in America vary from 140 firms to
over 10,000 firms.
And even though we would pay the lion's share of the international
monitoring regime's budget, the United States would have no special
status over other signatory nations, no veto power, and no assurance of
being a member of the executive council.
In conclusion, making the production and possession of chemical
weapons illegal according to international law will not make them
disappear. Use of such weapons has been prohibited since 1925 yet we
have seen the results of their use. We all know about the tens of
thousands of deaths from poison gas in World War I, and no one could
forget the tragic photographs of the Iranian children killed during the
1980's by the Iraqi government. Illegal? Yes, but still in use,
nonetheless.
I stand today with all Americans expressing a grave concern over the
increasing proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. The real
question here seems to be whether ratification of the Chemical Weapons
Convention will increase our own national security. Unfortunately, the
answer is no. There is little value in implementing international laws
which do little to decrease illegal research, development, and
proliferation of chemical weapons worldwide.
I support the goal of making the world safe from the threat of
chemical weapons. I applaud the honorable statement the CWC makes
against these heinous weapons. However, I believe the best way to
protect ourselves from this threat is by rejecting this treaty. The
convention does nothing to better our security, but may even open the
door to increasing risks against our vital security interests and
infringing on the rights of innocent citizens. For these reason, I am
compelled to vote against the ratification of the Chemical Weapons
Convention.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Faircloth). Who yields time?
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield myself 3 minutes and then I will
yield to the Senator from Ohio.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Ohio.
Mr. BIDEN. No, I yield myself 3 minutes and then I will yield to the
Senator from Ohio.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the distinguished Senator
from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I found it fascinating, the statement of my
friend from Idaho. He made a very compelling case, from his
perspective, as why we cannot verify the treaty and therefore why we
should be against the treaty--because we cannot verify it. We cannot
verify it because, he says, we cannot inspect sufficiently well. And
that is why he is against the treaty. Then he says one of the other
reasons he is against the treaty is because the verification regime is
so intrusive that it will allow the opposition--allow rogue states to
get access to information in the chemical industry.
So, if we correct one problem, which is to make it more verifiable,
then he would argue he is against the treaty because it is verifiable.
If you do not make it more verifiable, he said, he is against the
treaty because it is not verifiable.
Mr. CRAIG. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. BIDEN. Not on my time. I will be delighted to yield on the time
of the Senator, since I have limited time, on Senator Helms' time.
Mr. CRAIG. I yield myself 1 minute off the time of Senator Helms.
Mr. BIDEN. I will be happy to yield when I finish.
He also said the intelligence community says, ``They have never found
anything that is successfully hidden.''
[[Page S3507]]
I do not know how many of you are golfers. That is like saying you
cannot sink a putt if it is short. Obviously, a putt will not go in if
it does not get to the hole. Obviously, you cannot uncover something
that is successfully hidden.
The last point I would make is the chemical industry, the outfit that
represents the bulk of the chemical industry has strongly endorsed this
treaty. I am just responding to the last point that the chemical
industry is the target. The chemical industry, coincidentally, is for
this treaty.
But I would be happy, now, on Senator Helms' time, to yield back to
my friend from Idaho.
Mr. HELMS. Yes, I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Idaho.
Mr. CRAIG. I thank the Senator for yielding.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho.
Mr. CRAIG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for yielding me time. I think it
is very important that what I said be what I said. Let me reiterate
that it would be impossible to verify with rogue nations. We know in
this country we will verify. Our chemical companies will be an open
door. We have always played by the rules of the treaties we have signed
and we have never intentionally or purposely violated them. That is not
the point I was trying to make, and I think the Senator knows that.
But, what we do know is that for countries who choose not to play by
international rules--and there are a good many out there--it would be
difficult, if not impossible, for the international monitoring team to
be able to verify compliance. I think that is the point. I have not
even discussed, nor did I bring up the point of concern, that we would
be releasing information. I am also concerned about espionage. And I
did express that. So, it is important that that part of it be
understood. Our chemical companies, by this treaty, would be an open
door.
Let me also say I do not believe there is a chemical company in this
country that is an expert in international affairs. Nor do I want the
executives of these chemical companies negotiating a treaty. Nor do I
want them establishing the foreign policy of this country. I believe
that is the job of the Senator, and it is mine, and the job of this
body, and of the President of the United States.
I'm sorry, no matter what the chemical industry says, frankly, I
don't care. What I do care about is the security of this country. What
I do care about is our national sovereignty. And what I do care about
is the issue of verification. I think this treaty simply does not get
us where we need to get for a safer world.
I must say, I am tremendously proud and I have supported this
country's disarming itself of chemical and biological weapons. I
encourage us to do that. We have done it and we ought to continue to do
it and we ought to make sure that our troops in the field have adequate
equipment to be able to protect themselves.
We must lead by example, but let's not walk into or create the
illusionary track that I think the CWC simply offers to the world, and
most assuredly to this country.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield myself as much time as I might
take, and I am only going to take a few minutes.
Mr. President, the reason I mention the Chemical Manufacturers
Association is not that they should determine the foreign policy. My
friend from Idaho is saying that the target of this kind of espionage,
or stealing secrets, whatever, is going to be the chemical industry.
All I am pointing out is, just as they should not determine the foreign
policy, I respectfully suggest my friend from Idaho does not know
anything about their secrets. The chemical industry knows about their
secrets, and they believe that this treaty fully protects them in
maintaining their secrets. That is the point I was making.
You know that play and movie that is out, ``Don't Cry for Me
Argentina,'' well, don't worry about the chemical companies, they think
they can take care of themselves in terms of their secrets.
One last point. The Senator raised, as others have raised, the 1 ton
of weapons and 2 tons that could be amassed, et cetera. I want to point
out what John Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
said, and he is not quoted by the Senator from Idaho, but others.
Everyone quotes John Shalikashvili as saying that 1 ton of chemical
weapons is militarily significant and that we cannot effectively
guarantee we could uncover 1 ton. Let me read what General
Shalikashvili said:
A militarily significant quantity of chemical weapons is
situationally dependent. Thousands--
Thousands--
of tons of chemical agent would be required to significantly
impact on a large scale engagement while a mere ton of agent
could be effective as a weapon of terror.
He went on to say:
In certain limited circumstances--
I emphasize ``in certain limited circumstances''--
even 1 ton of chemical agent may have a military impact, for
example, if chemical weapons are used as a weapon of terror
against an unprotected population in a regional conflict.
He went on to say further:
The United States should be resolute that the 1-ton limit
set by the convention will be our guide.
He did not mean, however, that 1 ton was an appropriate standard for
what constitutes effective verifiability. Rather, General Shali meant
that the 1-ton limit in the CWC on agent stocks for peaceful purposes--
that is the context in which he talked about it--was appropriate and
that any country's stock in excess of 1 ton would likely be for
offensive military purposes.
So what he is saying--the 1 ton that keeps being used--he is saying
if you detect that there is more than a ton of chemical weapons out
there, they are probably doing it not for peaceful purposes, they are
probably doing it to gain some military advantage. But it would take a
lot more than 1 ton to have a major effect on a battle, a major effect
on our security. He said it would take thousands of tons.
Other people may think in this body that 1 ton is militarily
significant and if you can't effectively verify 1 ton then there is no
verification in terms of our strategic interests. They may think that,
but that is not what the Joint Chiefs think. The 1-ton reference was
for the purpose of determining whether or not a country was trying to
do more than use those chemicals for peaceful purposes. He says, if you
have more than 1 ton, it is a pretty good sign that these are bad guys
and they are trying to do something worse, but they are nowhere near
being militarily significant in terms of U.S. security.
I see my friend.
Mr. HELMS. I think it is fair to let Senator Craig have another whack
at it, and I do wish the former Democratic Secretary of Defense can be
quoted on this subject as well. As a matter of fact, the news media
ignored him entirely.
I yield the Senator 2 more minutes.
Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I thank my chairman for yielding, and I
recognize and appreciate the patience of the Senator from Ohio. I will
be brief.
It is very important that it not be suggested that all who are in
favor makes it so lopsided that there is nobody in opposition. May I
quote Donald Rumsfeld or James Schlesinger or, most important, Edward
O'Malley, who was the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, chief of counterintelligence under Ronald Reagan. He
speaks of many companies' great concerns about both economic and secret
espionage and expresses his opposition to it.
Here are the names of 25 major CEO's of chemical companies who stand
clearly in opposition to this treaty. Mr. President, I ask unanimous
consent that these ladies and gentlemen and their statements be printed
in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
America's Top Foreign Policy, Defense, and Economic Experts Raise
Concerns Over the CWC's Impact on U.S. Business
Steve Forbes, President and CEO of Forbes Inc.: ``....As I
have strenuously argued on other occasions, maintaining
America's competitive edge requires a lessening of the tax
and regulatory burdens on the American people and on our
Nation's enterprises. Unfortunately, the CWC will have
precisely the opposite effect. It will burden up to 8,000
companies across the United States. Remember,
[[Page S3508]]
these are in the hands of an international bureaucracy, not
what we would like them to be, with major new reporting
regulatory and inspection requirements entailing large and
uncompensated compliance costs. These added costs constitute
an unfunded Federal mandate. Like so many mandates, they are
bound to retard our economic growth and make our companies
less competitive.
...in addition to the costs arising from heavy duty
reporting, the CWC subjects our chemical companies to snap
inspections that will allow other nations access to our
latest chemical equipment and information. No longer will
violators of intellectual property rights in China, Iran, and
elsewhere, have to go to the trouble of pirating our
secrets... Some might even regard such burdens as a barrier
to entry that can enhance their market share at the expense
of their smaller competitors.''
Donald Rumsfeld, former Secretary of Defense and President
and former Chairman and CEO of G.D. Searle and Company:
``...Big companies seem to get along fine with big
government. They get along with American government, they get
along with foreign governments, they get along with
international organizations, and they have the ability, with
all their Washington representatives, to deal effectively
with bureaucracies... Indeed, that capability on the part of
the big companies actually serves as a sort of barrier to
entry to small and medium-sized companies that lack that
capability. So I do not suggest... for one minute that large
American companies are not going to be able to cope with the
regulations. They will do it a whale of a lot better than
small and medium sized companies...
I don't believe that the thousands--whatever the number
is--of companies across this country know about this treaty
in any detail, believe that the treaty would apply to them,
understand that they could be subjected to inspections,
appreciate the unfunded mandates that would be imposed on
them in the event this were to pass.''
James Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense and former
Director of Central Intelligence: ``The convention permits or
encourages challenge inspections against any facility deemed
capable of producing chemical weapons--indeed, against any
facility. This exposes American companies to a degree of
industrial espionage never before encountered in this
country. This implies the possibility of the capture of
proprietary information or national security information from
American corporations by present or by prospective commercial
rivals.
...we are dealing with the possible industrial espionage in
the United States, and that industrial espionage is going to
be a godsend--I repeat, a godsend--to foreign intelligence
agencies and to the corporations which will feed on those
foreign intelligence agencies.''
Lieutenant General William Odom, former Director of the
National Security Agency: ``Looking at the verification
regime as a former official of the Intelligence Community, I
am disturbed by it, not just because it is impossible to
verify, but also because it can complicate U.S. security
problems. Take, for example, the U.N.-like organization to be
set up to make inspections. All of the appointed members may
have no foreign intelligence links initially. As they find
that they can tramp around in all kinds of U.S. production
facilities, however, foreign intelligence services are likely
to offer to supplement their wages for a little ``technology
collection'' activity on the side. And they will provide
truly sophisticated covert technical means to facilitate such
endeavors.''
Lieutenant General James Williams, former Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency: ``. . . the opportunity for
unfettered access to virtually every industrial facility in
this country, not merely the pharmaceutical and chemical
plants, would make most foreign intelligence organizations
very happy, even gleeful. It is likely to cause the
counterintelligence sections of the FBI and the Defense
Investigative Service major problems for the foreseeable
future. The inspection procedures which apply to ALL
industries constitute unprecedented access to our
manufacturing base, not just to those thought likely to be
engaged in proscribed activities! My experience in protecting
patents and intellectual property over the past ten years
leads me to conclude that there is the potential for the loss
of untold billions of dollars in trade secrets which can be
used to gain competitive advantage, to shorten R&D cycles,
and a steal US market share.''
Edward J. O'Malley, former Assistant Director of Federal
Bureau of Investigation, Chief of Counterintelligence: ``The
activities of the former Soviet Union and others are as
aggressive as ever, and remain a major threat. What is new,
however, is the increased importance given by them to the
collection of American corporate proprietary information.
. . . One of the greatest concerns of companies . . . is
that the CWC will open them up to economic espionage. I think
their concerns are well-justified. . . . The acquisition of
American trade secrets has become a high stakes business
involving billions and billions of dollars, and I would be
able to pay an agent handsomely to acquire such information''
Deborah Wince-Smith, former Assistant Secretary of Commerce
for Technology Policy (in September 9, 1996, letter signed
jointly by Secretaries Weinberger, Rumsfeld, and others):
``What the CWC will do, however, is quite troubling: It will
create a massive new, UN-style international inspection
bureaucracy (which will help the total cost of this treaty to
U.S. taxpayers amount to as much as $200 million per year).
It will jeopardize U.S. citizens constitutional rights by
requiring the government to permit searches without either
warrants or probable cause. It will impose a costly and
complex regulatory burden on U.S. industry. As many as 8,000
companies across the country may be subjected to new
reporting requirements entailing uncompensated annual costs
of between thousands to hundreds-of-thousands of dollars per
year to comply. Most of these American companies have no idea
they will be affected.''
Bruce Merrifield, former Assistant Secretary of Commerce
for Technology: ``I am quite concerned about the Chemical
Weapons Convention which, in its current form, would
seriously diminish our U.S. competitive advantage in the
currently existing hyper-competitive global marketplace . . .
industrial espionage by countries that do not have an
equivalent capability to make basic discoveries, now accounts
for the theft each year of some $24 billion to perhaps over
$100 billion of U.S. proprietary technology. The Chemical
Weapons Convention would literally open the floodgates of
access to U.S. technology by foreign nations. Virtually
unannounced inspections by scientific experts, taking samples
and inspecting invoices can quickly uncover the proprietary
nature of any industrial operation, bypassing millions of
dollars of research and many years of development time that a
U.S. company has expended to create its competitive
advantage.''
Kathleen Bailey, Senior Fellow, Lawrence Livermore
Laboratories, former Assistant Director for the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency ``Experts in my laboratory recently
conducted experiments to determine whether or not there would
be a remainder inside of the equipment that is used for
sample analysis on-site.
They found out that, indeed, there is residue remaining.
And if the equipment were taken off-site, off of the Lawrence
Livermore Laboratory site, or off of the site of a
biotechnology firm, for example, and further analysis were
done on those residues, you would be able to get classified
and/or proprietary information.''
``. . . . My bottom line is that the use of treaty
inspections for espionage is easy, effective, and all but
impossible to detect . . . Hypothetically, an inspector could
either be an intelligence official assigned to be an
inspector or could later sell information to a company or
country abroad that reveals either classified or CBI,
confidential business information, that they might have
gleaned through the process of gathering samples and
analyzing them.''
Ralph S. Cunninghan, President and CEO of Citgo Petroleum
Corporation: ``CITGO believes that the requisite inspections
associated with the Treaty will, no doubt, jeopardize
confidential business information as well as disrupt normal
business operations.
We realize that the petroleum industry is not the specific
target of this treaty. Nevertheless, it will be affected
because of the extensive list of chemicals covered by the
treaty.''
William Arbitman, Associate General Counsel for the Dial
Corp: ``We are not prepared to receive a foreign inspection
team to our facilities, and we would be greatly concerned
that such a visit might compromise our confidential business
information.''
Kevin Kearns, President of the U.S. Business and Industrial
Council: ``On behalf of the 1,000 member companies of the
United States Business Industrial Council (USBIC), I strongly
urge you to oppose ratification of the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC).
. . . the CWC effectively authorizes industrial espionage.
The CWC offers no protections for company formulas and other
trade secrets; they must be handed over if inspected. Nothing
would prevent other unscrupulous countries such as France and
China from placing intelligence officers on the inspection
team.''
Larry Postelwait, President of the Crosby Group, Inc.: ``I
have several concerns regarding the access of our facilities
to a foreign inspection team. The treaty, as written, gives
them too much authority considering they could interfere with
our operations and affect production. It also makes us
vulnerable to our global competitors since they could benefit
from interfering with our production and from gaining close
insight into our operations.''
David M. Craig, Manager of Environmental and Safety
Compliance for the Detrex Corporation: ``Although reverse
engineering of a product (the process of determining the
products' composition or molecular structure) may be
possible, many companies enjoy a competitive advantage in a
market due to the manufacturing process used. Process ``trade
secrets'' may include items as simple as: the type of
equipment used, manufacturing parameters, or even who
supplies a particular raw material. Allowing inspectors full
access to a company's manufacturing site and records could
have a large impact on a company's ability to compete in
domestic and international trade.''
Tracy Hesp, Assistant to the Director of Regulatory Affairs
for Farnam Industries: ``First, the short-notice challenge
inspections that can be initiated by foreign states would be
a burden physically and financially. We have confidential
information concerning formulations and manufacturing
procedures that we need to protect.''
Lesa McDonald, Environmental/Safety Manager for the Gemini
Company: ``. . .
[[Page S3509]]
hosting such an inspection would be a serious hindrance to
our business. It would be very difficult to safeguard
confidential business information during such an inspection.
We have serious reservations about the ability of more
legislation and further regulation of U.S. industry to solve
the chemical weapons problem. Further, since the countries of
Libya, Iraq, Syria and North Korea refuse to sign this
treaty, how will further reporting requirements, and
inspection of businesses such as ours prohibit the
development of chemical weapons?''
John Hobbs, Safety Coordinator for Crafco, Inc.: ``The
potential for abuse, specifically the theft of trade secrets
both formulations and process oriented is significant.
Unannounced inspections are also costly in terms of
production disruption. A second concern would be that the
apparent goals of this treaty are enforceable in the United
States under already existing statutes. Industry sponsored
terrorism in the form of chemical weapons manufacture is
controllable without external intervention. Finally, without
the assent of the states sponsoring terrorism this treaty
really amounts to the good guys policing the good guys and
picking up whatever they can in the process.''
J. Doug Pruitt, President of the Sundt Corporation: ``Based
upon the depth of inspection, e.g. interviews with corporate
personnel, employees, vendors, subcontractors; review of
drawings, purchase orders, subcontracts; inspection and
review of internal and external correspondence; we feel that
it could be difficult to safeguard confidential business
information during this inspection. This has to do not only
with our internal corporate information but we would be
concerned about information that we have signed a
confidentiality agreement with our partners and/or
customers.''
u.s. companies are extremely worried about the cwc--a massive new
paperwork burden
S. Reed Morian, CEO of Dixie Chemical Company, Inc. (a CMA-
member company): ``We would incur a significant increase in
data reporting under the CWC. . . . I'm certain we could not
comply with the CWC under our current budget. The CWC would
probably require an increase in headcount at our plant. . . .
It would be of little benefit for the U.S. to rigorously
participate in the CWC, if ALL the nations of the world don't
also participate.
Thank you again for allowing us this opportunity to comment
on a treaty ratification that could impact us so greatly.''
Robert Roten, the President and CEO of Sterling Chemicals
(a CMA-member company): ``We are very concerned about control
and cooperation of other countries (Mexico, Colombia, North
Korea, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Croatia, etc.). Since they
probably will not cooperate, how does this treaty assure a
``worldwide ban?'' . . . We are familiar with the Chemical
Weapons Convention and we understand our responsibilities
(and liabilities) should this treaty become U.S. law. . . .
We cannot comply within our current annual budget and
personnel constraints. Our best estimates is that this treaty
will cost Sterling a minimum of $100,000 per year and should
an inspection occur at least another $200,000-$300,000 will
possibly be required.''
Raymond Keating, Chief Economist for the Small Business
Survival Committee: ``Of course, smaller businesses will be
hit hardest by these increased regulatory costs.
Interestingly, the Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA)
supports ratification of the CWC and told the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee that the new regulations would not be a
burden. But the CMA is a group of generally large chemical
manufacturers, and reportedly more than 60 percent of the
facilities likely affected by the CWC are not CMA members.
Large companies possess far greater resources and have
accrued significant experience in dealing with regulators of
all kinds. In fact, new regulatory burdens can perversely
give large firms a competitive edge over smaller companies
due to these resource and experience factors. As economist
Thomas Hopkins has shown, the per-employee cost of federal
regulation runs almost 50 percent higher for firms with fewer
than 500 employees versus companies with more than 500
employees.''
Marvin Gallisdorfer, President of Lomac, Inc.: ``It is not
possible to estimate the amount of time that it will take to
fill out the various CWC forms, but I can assure you that the
total time will far exceed the 2-10 hour estimate found in
Section 1.A. [of the Draft Department of Commerce
Regulations.]. The instructions alone will require a
substantial commitment of time. After the data is gathered,
it must be checked thoroughly to assure accuracy, because an
honest mistake can (and most assuredly will in some cases)
lead to a $50,000 fine. Even if, however, we estimate a 20-
hour commitment per form, where can we find the 20 hours? Our
staff is already employed full-time filling out a host of
forms and applications for the Michigan Department of
Environmental Quality, the U.S. EPA, and other government
agencies. I have enclosed, for your information, copies of
the reports that we are required to file annually. As you can
see, this is quite a bit of paperwork--and we are a
relatively small (150-200 employees) company.
* * * I truly believe that this CWC will cost American jobs
without any benefit. The United States can be trusted to
refrain from making chemical weapons, but I cannot believe
that certain other countries will abide by the treaty.
Because of the adverse impact on Michigan's chemical industry
(with little or no off-setting benefit) I urge you to vote
against ratification of the treaty.''
Edward Noble, Senior Corporate Environmental Specialist for
ISK Biosciences Corporation: ``In general, we believe that
banning chemical weapons is a laudable goal. Since those
countries most likely to instigate the use of chemical
weapons are not among the signatories of the CWC, it would
seem that this convention creates a lot of paper and does
very little to gain the goal of eliminating chemical
weapons.''
Paul Eisman, Vice President of Ultraform-Diamond Shamrock:
``* * * our costs have increased by an estimated $1 million
per year over the last couple of years just to meet new
regulatory paperwork demands. We are incurring these costs,
but should assume that our customers are paying for these in
the long run * * *. We cannot comply with the requirements of
this treaty with our current staff and resources. We estimate
additional costs of $250,000 annually to comply.''
Jim Moon, President of Moon Chemical Products, Inc.: ``The
reporting requirements in this treaty are a burden for any
company not involved in weapons * * * We are manufacturers of
industrial, institutional, and agricultural products. Several
years ago we had to hire an outside consultant to make sure
we meet government regulations for our business, our
employees, and our customers. Please do not add another
burden to our industry.''
Nick Carter, President of South Hampton Refining Company:
``No, we could not comply with this treaty within our current
annual budget and personnel. The reason we are in business as
a small refiner is that we change the operation quickly and
often to meet the market. The reporting alone would require
additional personnel, much less the cost of potential
inspection, interpreting the regulations, etc. We currently
have 10% of our work force assigned to nothing but regulatory
functions, mostly environmental. At some point these non-
profit producing efforts will outweigh the value of keeping
the business operating.
* * * There are months where the cost of compliance with
this treaty would completely eliminate the profit for the
month. You can explain to our employees how this is more
important to the nation than them getting a paycheck, or
having health coverage, or having a retirement plan, or
having a profit sharing check.''
John Hohnholt, Vice-President of Valero Refining Company:
``Valero is an independent refinery with limited staff
resources which are already overwhelmed with regulatory
compliance record keeping and reporting. This additional
burden on our staff appears excessive and probably unintended
for our industry.''
Odus Hennessee, President and COO for Cosmetic Specialty
Labs: ``The ultimate result is to simply add unnecessary
costs to the production of our products making it difficult
if not impossible to sell our products in our own market,
much less to compete in the international marketplace.''
the theft of trade secrets
Don Fuqua, President of the Aerospace Industries
Association: ``We are very concerned, however, that the
application of the Convention's reporting and inspection
regime to AIA member companies could unnecessarily jeopardize
our nation's ability to protect its national security
information and proprietary technological data.''
Rear Admiral Jim Carey, Chairman of 21st Century Coatings:
``This communication is to urge you in the strongest possible
terms to oppose the Chemical Weapons Convention on the
grounds that it will cost my company an outrageous amount of
money and subject us to intrusive international inspections
that we can ill afford. We make paint under trade-secret
technology that with one coat can stop all rust and corrosion
for 50 years. We have spent the last 6 months researching
construction of a new plant in Texas. The CWC will bring that
effort to a screeching halt and instead we will look
offshore. The CWC will not stop the world chemical weapons
threat; it will only put people like us out of business.''
Eduardo Beruff, President of SICPA Industries of America,
Inc.: ``For the reasons outlined below, we at SICPA
Industries of America, Inc. (``SICPA'') respectfully urge you
to reject this treaty.
. . . SICPA Industries of America, Inc. is the foremost
manufacturer of security inks used in printing U.S. currency,
and is a leader in developing new security ink technologies
to protect the nation's valuable documents and proprietary
products. . . . The proposed Chemical Weapons Convention
would impose new financial burdens on SICPA and similar
companies in order to attain and maintain compliance. More
importantly, it could jeopardize the security of SICPA's
invaluable trade secret information.''
S. Reed Morian, CEO of Dixie Chemical Company, Inc. (a CMA-
member company): ``While the intent of the CWC is of the
highest merit, the regulations appear to be very onerous
requiring increased reporting and record keeping, foreign
inspection of our facilities, and a significant challenge to
our ability to maintain Confidential Business Information
(CBI) . . . We are not prepared to have a foreign inspection
team in our plant. I doubt that CBI could be safeguarded
during such an inspection.''
[[Page S3510]]
Ralph Johnson, Vice President of Environmental Affairs of
Dixie Chemical Company: ``. . . If we use EPA inspections as
an example, these foreign Chemical Weapon Convention
inspections could cost up to maybe $50,000 per site. . . .
These inspections would be very costly and burdensome. The
biggest problem with these inspections, however, is . . . our
highly probable loss of confidential business information. An
inspector observing one of our reactors would know, for the
product being observed, our operating pressures,
temperatures, catalysts, reaction time, ingredients,
purification methods, pollution abatement methods. We would
no longer have any confidential technology, methodology, or
know-how relative to this product. It would be gone
forever.''
Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I also ask unanimous consent that an
editorial from the Wall Street Journal that I think speaks very openly
to the concerns that many in the chemical industry have as it relates
to what they would be required to do, which is open their doors wide
and embrace an international inspection team, be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the Wall Street Journal]
Here Come the Spies
We've already made the case for why the Senate should
reject the Chemical Weapons Convention. The last thing the
world needs is another unverifiable arms control treaty. The
worst danger here is creating the illusion that we are
ridding the world of the threat of chemical weapons. But
there's another danger: The treaty would be a bonanza to
countries that are in the business of spying on American
business.
Worst hit would be the defense and aerospace industry--and
hence national security--but plenty of other industries would
be subject to industrial espionage. There has never been an
arms control treaty whose reach would extend so far into
ordinary business, both through its reporting requirements
and its inspection regime.
The CWC covers not just companies that manufacture certain
chemicals and discrete organic chemicals, but also those that
use them to make something else--such as automobiles,
pharmaceuticals, electronics or even liquor. The Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency has drawn up a list of more than 1,000
American companies that would be subject to the treaty's
terms. Others say at least 6,000 companies would be affected.
The Chemical Manufacturers Association has been vocal in
pooh-poohing the treaty's reporting and inspection
requirements, which may in fact not be much for the CMA's
already highly regulated membership of fewer than 200
companies. But companies that make such things as soap or
tires or paint are going to find the paperwork alone an
expensive new irritant.
Far more troublesome, however, is the treaty's proposed
inspection regime, to be carried out by a new international
bureaucracy in the Hague called the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. A better name might be the
Organization for the Promotion of Industrial Espionage.
OPCW will conduct both routine inspections and
``challenge'' inspections at the request of member
governments. Under the terms of the treaty, it would be next
to impossible for the U.S. to halt a frivolous or abusive
inspection. A challenge inspection would take place with less
than a day's notice, and inspectors would have extraordinary
access to files, data, equipment, etc. A company might as
well post its trade secrets on the Internet.
The challenging country would send along an observer, and
even though he wouldn't be permitted beyond a specified
perimeter, there's a lot he would be able to learn from that
distance. In a mock inspection that the U.S. carried out
using the CWC's proposed rules, the ``observer'' was able to
steal proprietary information simply by gathering soil and
water samples from his spot on the edge of the inspection
site.
Worse, there are no guarantees that the inspectors
themselves won't moonlight as spies. Senator Helms raised
this issue during Madeleine Albright's confirmation hearing
in January. He pointed to evidence that Chinese applicants
for OPCW inspector jobs had been ``directed to volunteer''
and that most had ties to the People's Liberation Army's
chemical ``defense'' program. It's not hard to imagine the
damage an inspector-spy could do. Reverse engineering is one
threat, but even something seemingly as simple as the type of
equipment used in a manufacturing process could constitute a
trade secret.
All this poses a danger to national security. Kathleen
Bailey of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory testified to
that effect before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
last year. She said ``classified information can be obtained
from sampling and analysis during, and perhaps after,
inspections under the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Furthermore, clandestine sampling would be virtually
impossible to detect or to prevent.'' In the defense area,
stealth technology is particularly at risk; a challenge
inspection of a U.S. defense contractor could yield much on
that score.
So far, the debate on the Chemical Weapons Convention
hasn't moved beyond Washington to the boardroom. Only a few
companies--Dial Soap and Citgo Petroleum among them--have
spoken out against the treaty. It's perhaps understandable
that most CEOs would assume that a treaty on chemical weapons
wouldn't affect them. It does and they'd be wise to pay
attention.
cwc is watching
From a May 14, 1996 list compiled by the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency of companies that would be subject to the
Chemical Weapons Convention: Archer Daniels Midland Co.,
Armco Steel Co., Castrol, Citgo Petroleum Corp., Colgate-
Palmolive Co., Dial Corp., General Motors Corp., Gillette
Co., Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Jim Beam Brands Co., Kaiser
Aluminum, Lever Brothers Co., Maxwell House Coffee Co.,
Nutrasweet Co., Pfizer, Quaker Oats Co., Raytheon Co, Safeway
Stores; Sherwin Williams Co., Simpson Timber Co., Winn-Dixie
Stores, and Xerox Corp.
Source: Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, my point is simply this. There are
reasonable people on both sides of this issue who differ and are very
loud about the concerns they have. The chemical industry is not
monolithic at all when it comes to support for this. There are a
substantial number within it who are extremely concerned that they may
expose their companies to tremendous economic risk and to the liability
of the loss of their secrets that relate to the formulas for the
production of peaceful goods and services to our country. I think it is
important that that be said at this time and that the names and quotes
of these ladies and gentlemen become a part of the Record.
I yield back any time.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I yield 30 seconds to myself. I ask
unanimous consent that a statement of the Chemical Manufacturers
Association be printed in the Record, as well as the list of those
companies supporting this treaty.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Chemical Manufacturers
Association,
Arlington, VA, April 18, 1997.
Hon. Joseph R. Biden,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Biden: On April 24, the Senate will vote on
whether to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). On
behalf of nine organizations representing a broad spectrum of
chemical producers, consumers, and professionals, I urge your
strong support of this important treaty.
Opponents of the CWC contend that the treaty will have a
catastrophic impact on American business, including a
burdensome regulatory system, intrusive on-site inspections,
and losses of proprietary information. The facts, however,
bear out our belief that the CWC is the right thing to do:
Less than 2,000 facilities nationwide will have any
responsibilities under the CWC. Of these, ninety percent will
have to do no more than fill out a two-page report once a
year.
The chemical industry helped develop the procedures by
which fewer than 200 facilities will be inspected. We then
tested those provisions in a series of full-fledged trial
inspections at plant sites. We helped confirm that inspected
companies have a role in determining how inspections will be
conducted, and the extent to which inspection teams access
the facilities.
Industry representatives helped write the treaty provisions
that safeguard confidential business information. Chemical
companies worked closely with the Administration in drafting
the CWC implementing legislation that complements those
safeguards.
The chemical industry has continued its efforts to further
narrow the potential impact of the Convention on commercial
interests. We successfully advocated a complete exemption for
polymer and oligomer producers, which means that the plastics
and textile industries are not subject to the Convention. We
helped push an exemption for petroleum refineries and
explosives manufacturers. We have worked to develop
reasonable, low concentration limits that are commercially
practicable, yet provide the level of verification necessary
to assure that the CWC is not being violated.
On April 17, the Senate passed Senator Kyl's legislation,
S. 495. Although Senator Kyl's legislation would generally
expand the legal basis for domestic action against chemical
weapons proliferation, it is important that you know that S.
495 is not a substitute for the Chemical Weapons Convention.
For example, S. 495 provides no mechanism for multilateral
agreement to prevent or prohibit the production, storage,
development or use of chemical weapons. It provides no means
for investigating potential diversions to illegal weapons
uses. And it does not remedy the trade impacts that will
arise when the CWC's trade ban goes into effect three years
from now. CMA estimates that some $500 to $600 million in two
way trade will be at risk if this ban goes into effect.
Moreover, S. 495 does nothing to prevent trade barriers being
imposed by CWC Parties, aimed at U.S. trade in chemicals.
The chemical industry is America's largest exporter
surpassing agriculture, aerospace,
[[Page S3511]]
computers, etc. It is the world leader in technological
development, research and innovation. The industry works hard
to maintain that leadership. The industry has maintained a
trade surplus for 68 consecutive years. You can be assured
that the chemical industry would not be silent if the CWC
truly jeopardized commercial interests.
For your further information, I have enclosed a copy of an
advertisement that appeared in the April 14, 1997 issue of
Roll Call. I have also enclosed a copy of a letter signed by
members of CMA's Board of Directors, reiterating their
support for this important agreement.
In short, Senator, we need your vote in favor of the
Chemical Weapons Convention.
If you have any questions concerning the chemical
industry's support for the CWC, please call me or Claude
Boudrias, Legislative Representative for Tax and Trade at
(703) 741-5915.
Sincerely,
Frederick L. Webber,
President and Chief Executive Officer.
____
April 15, 1997.
Hon. Trent Lott,
Senate Majority Leader, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Lott: We, the undersigned members of the
Chemical Manufacturers Association's Board of Directors, are
writing to ask you to support the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC).
We believe the Convention is a fair and effective
international response to the international threat of
chemical weapons proliferation. Ratifying the CWC is in the
national interest.
The CWC is a natural extension of existing U.S. policy. In
1985, Congress voted to end production of chemical weapons by
the military and to begin destroying existing stockpiles.
For years, the United States has imposed the world's
strongest controls on exports of weapons-making ingredients.
Our nation is the standard bearer in preventing the spread of
chemical weapons.
The CWC requires other nations to do what the United States
is already doing. That's why President Reagan proposed the
treaty to the United Nations in 1984. It's why President Bush
signed the treaty in Paris in 1993. And it's why President
Clinton is asking the Senate to ratify it.
The chemical industry has thoroughly examined the CWC. We
have tested the treaty's record-keeping and inspection
provisions. And we have concluded that the benefits of the
CWC far outweigh the costs.
Ratifying the CWC is the right thing to do. We urge you to
vote for the Convention.
Sincerely,
Frederick L. Webber, President & CEO, Chemical
Manufacturers Association; J. Lawrence Wilson, Chairman
& CEO, Rohm and Haas Company, Chairman, Board of
Directors, Chemical Manufacturers Association; John E.
Akitt, Executive Vice President, Exxon Chemical
Company; Phillip D. Ashkettle, President and CEO,
Reichhold Chemicals, Inc.; Bernard Azoulay, President
and CEO, Elf Atochem North America; William G. Bares,
Chairman and CEO, The Lubrizol Corporation; Jerald A.
Blumberg, Executive Vice President, DuPont, Chairman,
DuPont Europe; Michael R. Boyce, CEO & President,
Harris Chemical Group; Vincent A. Calarco, Chairman,
President & CEO, Crompton & Knowles Corporation;
William R. Cook, Chairman, President and CEO,
BetzDearborn Inc.; Albert J. Costello, Chairman,
President & CEO, W.R. Grace & Co.; David J. D'Antoni,
President, Ashland Chemical Company; John R. Danzeisen,
Chairman, ICI Americas Inc.; Earnest W. Deavenport,
Jr., Chairman of the Board and CEO, Eastman Chemical
Company.
R. Keith Elliott, Chairman, President & CEO, Hercules
Incorporated; Darryl D. Fry, Chairman, President and
CEO, Cytec Industries Inc.; Michael C. Harnetty,
Division Vice President, 3M; Richard A. Hazleton,
Chairman & CEO, Dow Corning Corporation; Alan R.
Hirsig, President & CEO, ARCO Chemical Company; Gerald
L. Hoerig, President, Syntex Chemicals, Inc.; Jack L.
Howe, Jr., President, Phillips Chemical Company; Jon M.
Huntsman, Jr., Vice Chairman, Huntsman Corporation;
Donald M. James, President & CEO, Vulcan Materials
Company; Dale R. Laurance, President and Sr. Operating
Officer, Occidental Petroleum Corporation; Raymond W.
LeBoeuf, President & CEO, PPG Industries, Inc.; James
A. Mack, President & CEO, Cambrex Corporation; Hans C.
Noetzli, President & CEO, Lonza, Inc.; Robert G.
Potter, Executive Vice President, Monsanto Company;
Arthur R. Sigel, President & CEO, Velsicol Chemical
Corporation; Enrique J. Sosa, Executive Vice President-
Chemicals Sector, Amoco Corporation; William
Stavropoulos, President & CEO, The Dow Chemical
Corporation; F. Quinn Stepan, Chairman & President,
Stepan Company; S. Jay Stewart, Chairman & CEO, Morton
International, Inc.; Robert O. Swanson, Executive Vice
President, Mobil Corporation; Rudy van der Meer,
Member, Board of Management, Akzo Nobel nv; Jeroen van
der Veer, President & CEO, Shell Chemical Company;
George A. Vincent, Chairman, President & CEO, The C.P.
Hall Company; J. Virgil Waggoner, President & CEO,
Sterling Chemicals, Inc.; H. A. Wagner, Chairman & CEO,
Air Products & Chemicals, Inc.; Helge H. Wehmeier,
President & CEO, Bayer Corporation; Ronald H. Yocum,
President & CEO, Millennium Petrochemical Company.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, just as my friend from Idaho knows a lot
about mining and knows a lot about potatoes and knows a lot about
apples, because they are big issues in his State, I assure you, being a
Senator from Delaware, if there was any genuine opposition from the
chemical industry for this treaty, since most of those companies are
incorporated in my State and it makes up 56 percent of my State's
economy, I assure you, I would hear about it.
Now, there may be some companies that do not like it, but I want to
tell you, to use the expression, there may be reasons why for this in
the minds of my colleagues, but none of the big boys, none of the
outfits that do this as a big business, none of the outfits with
multibillion-dollar operations, none of them, that I am aware of, are
opposed to this treaty. They strongly support it.
I yield 7 minutes to my friend from Ohio.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the distinguished Senator
from Ohio.
Mr. GLENN. I thank the Chair, and I ask the Chair to please notify me
when I have used 6 minutes.
Mr. President, I rise to urge my colleagues to vote in favor of
ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention with its 28 agreed
conditions.
So far in this century, we have witnessed the use of chemical weapons
in Europe, in China and in the Middle East, and we have seen the
absolutely revolting photographs of victims of chemical weapons attacks
at the Iraqi village of Halabja and the Tokyo subway. Some of us may
have seen the famous photograph of the great violinist, Isaac Stern,
performing in Israel while wearing a gas mask during the Iraqi
occupation of Kuwait. Let there be no doubt about it, these weapons do
present a clear and present danger to our security and the security of
our allies around the world. They have not acquired the nickname,
``poor man's nukes'' for nothing. They are cheap to make, easy to
conceal, and can have devastating effects.
Since 1995, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the
Committee on Governmental Affairs has held six hearings titled ``Global
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,'' which documented in
vivid detail the gravity of the threat our country faces from both
chemical and biological weapons. The three committee prints covering
these hearings contain over 2,000 pages of relevant documentation.
While I was chairman of that committee, I chaired personally four
hearings on ``Global Spread of Chemical and Biological Weapons.'' In
1989, that produced another 746 pages of documentation on these threats
and the various choices facing our country by way of responses.
Mr. President, today is not the day for additional hand wringing over
these nightmares. Today is the day finally to do something truly
constructive to alleviate these threats and stop the hand wringing. In
this case, constructive means multilateral, since we are dealing here
with a truly global threat, not one susceptible to solution by
unilateral U.S. legislation. For example, bills like S. 495, which
passed a badly divided Senate last week after virtually no serious
debate and without a single hearing, would, if enacted, impose yet
another death penalty, while opening up several new loopholes for
continued U.S. possession of both chemical and biological weapons.
Fortunately, we have an alternative approach to consider.
Today, we can vote on a resolution providing our advice and consent
to ratify a treaty that does not just address the problem of halting
the proliferation of these weapons, but a treaty that will also set the
world on a course finally to eliminate such weapons everywhere. Though
we will not obviously achieve these goals overnight simply by ratifying
the CWC, we will be taking a crucial step toward achieving that
ultimate goal.
My argument, simply put, is that we just cannot solve the global
problems of the CWC destruction, proliferation,
[[Page S3512]]
terrorism and warfare by acting alone. The international framework,
machinery, reporting procedures, and enforcement and verification
mechanisms of this treaty will complement and reinforce--not compete
with, substitute for or compromise--our own national military,
intelligence, and diplomatic efforts against the global CW threat.
The time has now come to put into place the international legal
foundation necessary to eliminate chemical weapons once and for all. I
am proud to be here on this historical occasion to speak on behalf of
and to vote in favor of U.S. ratification of this treaty.
Mr. President, let me get into some highlights of the CWC. The CWC
bans the development, the production, stockpiling, use, and
proliferation of chemical weapons. It requires the destruction of
existing weapons, chemical agents, and CW production facilities. It
breaks new ground with a system of verification that is the most
extensive in the history of weapons of mass destruction.
On November 23, 1993--over 3 years ago--President Clinton sent this
treaty to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. Though
the Senate has proceeded very, very slowly with the consideration of
this treaty, the rest of the world seems prepared to go forward with or
without us. Over 160 countries have now signed the treaty and 74 have
already ratified it. So with or without U.S. ratification, the treaty
will enter into force on April 29 of this year. At that point, world
commerce in chemicals and chemical equipment will begin to take place
within a multilaterally coordinated system that imposes real costs on
nonparties to this convention. It is one reason why I support this
treaty.
There is a widespread consensus among the military, the intelligence
and the defense experts inside our Government that this treaty will
serve our national interest. This consensus is bipartisan. Indeed, the
convention was negotiated during the Reagan administration, signed by
President George Bush and sent to the Congress by President Clinton.
Except with respect to nonparties, this treaty is completely
nondiscriminatory: It obligates its parties not to develop or to
possess chemical weapons, period. It does not divide the world up into
one set of countries that may have these weapons and another set that
may not. It works from a different premise, one more closely aligned
with its cousin, the Biological Weapons Convention--by outlawing such
weapons among the parties to the treaty, it will significantly
strengthen international diplomatic efforts to make the prohibition
truly global.
To ensure compliance, the treaty provides a verification system that
operates on two dimensions. First, it provides for routine monitoring
of potentially sensitive activities at declared chemical weapons sites,
storage areas, and relevant civilian chemical industries. Second, it
provides for a system of on-site challenge inspections operating on the
principle of managed access to ensure the protection of proprietary
information, constitutional rights, and national security interests.
These inspections will be conducted by the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons [OPCW]. This system of verification has
been worked out not just in consultation with industry, but with the
strong and continuing support of industry.
nothing perfect
I believe that this system of verification--coupled with the
increased transparency of chemical transfers and activities at chemical
facilities around the world--will, when backed by robust national
intelligence capabilities, build a level of confidence in the world
community sufficient to ensure that the treaty is being observed by its
parties.
even if imperfect--better than present with no restrictions
This view is shared today by our military and intelligence officials.
On June 23, 1994, Gen. John Shalikashvili, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, summarized this judgment quite clearly when he
testified that--``From a military perspective, the Chemical Weapons
Convention is clearly in our national interest.'' On August 11, 1994,
he specifically testified that--``Because of the regime of
declarations, which then can be verified through routine inspection and
challenge inspection, I believe that the CWC can be effectively
verified.'' The treaty has also been supported by former generals Colin
Powell and Norman Schwarzkopf, among many other top military and
intelligence officials. It has the full support of the Joint Chiefs.
the verification system, in short, represents an appropriate balance
between the need for intrusiveness and the need to protect commercial
secrets and national security information. As a whole, the treaty will
serve U.S. national interests in a number of ways. It will reduce the
risk that chemical weapons will be used against our country. It will
potentially reduce--but of course not eliminate entirely--the risk of
terrorism involving chemical weapons. It will enhance the transparency
of activities at chemical facilities around the world and thereby build
confidence in CW disarmament. It will serve U.S. interests in combating
the proliferation of chemical weapons. And it will, after the 10-year
process of destroying existing CW stockpiles, remove many serious
environmental hazards that faced citizens who live near plants that
produced or stored chemical weapon agents.
common criticisms
It is not surprising that any great achievement in the realm of
disarmament would encounter criticism. I am not going to claim that
each and every one of these criticisms is totally unfounded. I am also
not going to question the motives of those who make such criticisms. I
believe it is good to hear the views of such critics, to listen
carefully to their interpretations of the flaws of this treaty, to
debate points on which there is disagreement, and to come to a decision
on what is in the long-term interest of our country. This is what the
whole ratification process is all about. Though no treaty is perfect
and the CWC is no exception to this rule, by my reckoning the flaws in
this treaty are not sufficient grounds for the Senate not to proceed
with ratification.
I would now like to discuss briefly some of the main criticisms of
the treaty that I have encountered over the many years this treaty has
been awaiting a vote in the Senate.
No. 1. Lack of universality. It is true, not ever country is a party
to this treaty, nor is universal membership even a likelihood anytime
soon. It may never be a universal agreement. There are several Arab
countries, for example, that will no doubt refuse to enter into binding
CW disarmament agreements until an agreement can also be reached
concerning Israel's nuclear capability. Is this a sufficient cause to
vote against the treaty? Absolutely not.
I know of no multilateral disarmament agreement that is truly
universal, if that term is defined to mean that all countries on Earth
are parties. True, the more countries that join the better. But opting
for isolation hardly seems to me to be a rational way for a country to
pursue the goal of universality. I cannot imagine anything that would
set back the goal of universality of this treaty more than a decision
by the Senate of the United States not to vote for ratification of this
treaty, or to approve it with killer amendments. I believe this treaty
will stand the test of time and will approach universality of
membership as confidence grows in its credibility as a force for
international peace and security. It will be a challenge for diplomats
and national leaders of the 21st century to induce the hold-out
countries into the CWC regime.
As for the treaty hold-outs specifically in the Middle East--
including Iraq, Libya, and some other Arab states that critics cite as
a reason why the United States should not join this treaty--let us
remember that no country has a bigger stake in putting a halt to
chemical weapon proliferation in that turbulent region than does
Israel. And I think it is instructive that Israel has considered and
chosen to ignore this particular criticism--it has signed the treaty.
No. 2. Verification problems. Now nobody questions that verifying a
global ban on possessing or manufacturing chemical weapons will be a
difficult undertaking, maybe even an impossible one, if the test of
success is the ability to detect the secret manufacture of a small
number of such weapons. Nobody doubts the widespread availability of
the dual-use materials and know-how needed to make and to deliver
chemical weapons. Nobody doubts that such
[[Page S3513]]
weapons can be manufactured in very small facilities, some even as
small as some hearing rooms here in the Senate, as our intelligence
officials have openly testified.
In light of these basic facts of life about chemical weapons, the
Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the ``U.S.
Capability to Monitor Compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention''
(Rpt. 103-390) identified several potential difficulties in verifying
this treaty. The committee's report, however, reads not as an
indictment of the treaty, but as a convincing reminder of the need for
America to maintain and upgrade its intelligence capabilities to
grapple with such problems. I am concerned that some of my colleagues
and outside commentators have looked at these challenges and simply
concluded that it is impossible to verify this, or indeed any, CW
disarmament treaty.
Though the treaty offers no absolute guarantee against cheating at
the level of relatively small-scale violations--it will leave us far
more secure than we would be without such a treaty. First, the
reporting and inspection provisions of the treaty will enhance the
transparency of global flows of chemicals and chemical production
equipment--it will also give us better information about how such
chemicals are used after they leave international commerce. Second, the
challenge inspection system will give the United States a new means to
check up on suspicious activities inside countries, including
activities that may not even involve chemicals or chemical equipment
that entered international commerce.
In short, we stand a much better chance of detecting, assessing, and
mobilizing collective international action against potential CW-related
activities by having a multilateral system of CW disarmament, than we
would under the ``go-it-alone'' approach we would be left with as a
non-party to this treaty.
I think Maj. Gen. John Landry--testifying before the Armed Services
Committee as the National Intelligence Officer for General Purpose
Forces--accurately summarized the view of the U.S. intelligence
community when he said on August 11, 1994, that ``we are better off
with the treaty than without it.'' Former Defense Secretary Perry
similarly observed on March 28, 1996, that despite the inherent
difficulties of detecting illicit production of small quantities of
chemical weapons, ``we also recognize that that [detection capability]
would be even more difficult without a CWC.''
Let us keep in mind that when it comes to verifying international
compliance with arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation
treaties, America does not rely exclusively upon the verification
mechanisms in those treaties to judge compliance. Verification is
achieved by these mechanisms operating alongside our own national
intelligence capabilities. As I stated in my additional views to the
SSCI's report on the CWC, the difficulties of monitoring this treaty
underscore the importance of maintaining a highly capable U.S.
intelligence community. If we work hard toward the goal of universal
membership in the CWC and maintain or increase the capabilities of our
intelligence community, then the lingering questions about compliance
and verification would only fade accordingly. I would not be at all
surprised if Russia were to ratify this treaty very soon.
It is useful to recall that the Russian scientist who blew the
whistle in 1991 and 1992 on illicit Russian chemical weapons activities
is now a firm supporter of the CWC as a means to combat just such
activities. On November 1, 1995, Dr. Vil Mirzayanov testified as
follows before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations about the
risk of theft of chemical agents in Russia:
I am sure that the system of international inspections
provided for under the Chemical Weapons Convention will help
address this problem . . . These are very strong tools and I
hope that you will do your part to see that they are applied
in Russia by pressing for the Senate's ratification of the
Convention.
The fact that this statement came from someone who is one of Russia's
toughest critics on chemical weapons issues will, I hope, inspire other
treaty critics to reexamine their own views.
No, this is not the time to badger the CWC's verification system
because it is unable to guarantee perfect international compliance. I
wish we had some domestic criminal laws that would guarantee perfect
compliance. Today is a day to rejoice that the CWC's verification
system will soon be generating information that will be useful to our
national leaders in detecting, characterizing, and defending against
chemical weapons threats. When I hear all these criticisms about the
treaty's verification system, I can only wonder--if these arguments are
true, then why would Israel, which is located in one of the most
dangerous neighborhoods on Earth, and which has so much at stake, sign
such a treaty?
The answer is that the CWC serves Israel's national security
interests for precisely the same reason it serves our own national
security interests. It deserves the support of all nations, and the
more support it has, the better the verification system will become.
Remaining outside the CWC is no way to improve its verification system.
No. 3. Cost. Now with respect to cost, nobody can possibly predict
exactly what it will cost to implement this treaty. The International
Atomic Energy Agency's annual budget of about $200 million does not
serve as a useful indicator of the cost of implementing the CWC given
the many different functions of the respective treaty organizations,
the IAEA and the OPCW. For fiscal year 1998, the administration has
requested $25 million for meeting our CWC assessment and an additional
$21 million for multilateral verification at U.S. facilities should
that be necessary. This annual financial contribution approximates the
cost of a couple of F-16 aircraft.
The Chemical Manufacturers Association [CMA] has estimated that the
cost to industry of complying with this treaty is about ``. . . one-
onehundredth of one percent of the cost of environmental reporting in
the United States.'' CMA estimates that industry's total CWC reporting
costs for 1997 would come to less than $250,000 and will decline in
subsequent years. CMA has also estimated, however, that the cost to
industry of America not ratifying this treaty would be ``hundreds of
millions of dollars'' and thousands of jobs.
As for the claim by some critics that the treaty will place a heavy
regulatory burden on industry, CMA reports that in a recent field test
it took less than 2 hours for producers of the broadcast category of
materials--discrete organic chemicals--to fill out the appropriate
reporting form. Some plant managers have estimated that they could
complete this form in as little as 15 minutes. In recent field tests
involving materials that are more tightly controlled, it took companies
between 2-8 hours to complete the relevant paperwork. This does not
seem to me to be an unduly burdensome procedure.
We all know that the costs of destroying CW agent material will of
course be considerable, particularly in countries like the United
States and Russia which have tens of thousands of tons of this
material. But U.S. law already requires us to destroy these materials,
whether or not we join the CWC.
The costs of having to defend against the use of such weapons--costs
we have to pay regardless of whether America is a party to the CWC--
will remain considerable, though this expense will decline as the
world's stockpiles of CW materials gradually diminish in accordance
with the treaty. The treaty, it should be noted, does not outlaw
national defenses against chemical weapons nor does it ban military
retaliation for CW users.
When it comes to measuring the true costs of this treaty, there is an
absolute way and a relative way to measure these costs. The absolute
approach merely adds up the costs of implementing the treaty and
considers such costs in a vacuum. The relative approach compares these
costs against various alternatives, such as costs we would have to pay
in a world in which chemical war remains a clear and present danger, or
a world with a CWC without the United States as a party.
I think that any fair assessment would need to compare the costs of
implementing the CWC against the costs of chemical war--preparing for
one, fighting one, defending against one, deterring one, and
recuperating from one. Now there is no way that the absolute costs of
implementing this treaty would ever outweigh the devastating
[[Page S3514]]
costs of coping in a world armed to the teeth with chemical weapons. I
just do not accept the argument that the costs of implementing this
treaty are greater than the benefits to our national security from
membership.
No. 4. Sovereignty and secrecy. Under the Constitution, the CWC will
be a supreme law of the land. Ironically, some of the same critics of
the CWC who argue that the treaty is not verifiable because it is not
intrusive enough, also argue that the treaty is too intrusive insofar
as it allegedly jeopardizes the U.S. constitutional rights. These
questions have already been examined closely by the Congress, as well
they should, and most Members would agree that these arguments have
been overdrawn.
The main problem with this criticism is that it ignores the many
safeguards that exist in the treaty to protect sovereign rights. First
and most fundamentally, there is the right of withdrawal from the
treaty on 90-days' notice. Second, the treaty's inspection system is
far from a ``no-notice'' system--it prescribes a series of timetables
which allow a state party time to prepare a site for inspection. The
inspection itself is limited in time.
As the Department of State put it in its letter transmitting the
treaty to the President, ``The inspected State Party has the final say
in determining the extent and nature of access within the challenged
site.'' That is from the letter of November 20, 1993. This gets at the
whole notion of ``managed access,'' which lies at the heart of the CWC
inspections system. Under this approach, the State Department letter
continued, ``the inspected State Party may give only individual
inspectors access to certain parts of the inspection site, may shroud
sensitive pieces of equipment, such as computer or electronic systems,
and it may restrict sampling and sample analysis.'' Indeed, it is
highly improbable that the U.S. chemical industry would have been such
strong and chronic supporters of the CWC if this industry had concluded
that the treaty would harm the competitiveness of U.S. industry or
jeopardize company secrets.
Aside from industry, I can imagine that the scientific community
should be quite well informed about the merits of this treaty,
especially its alleged intrusiveness. Mr. President, I ask unanimous
consent to have printed at the end of my remarks a list of 151 members
of the National Academy of Scientists who are chemists or biochemists
and who support this treaty, and another list, compiled by the
Federation of American Scientists, of 45 Nobel laureates who also
endorse this treaty. No doubt about it, American support for this
treaty is both broad and deep.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection it is so ordered.
(See exhibits 1 and 2.)
Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, No. 5. Other Criticisms. These are not the
only lines of attack that critics have taken against the treaty in
recent years.
First, would the CWC require a new strategic nuclear doctrine that
actually encourages the use of tactical nuclear weapons, given the
unavailability of a CW alternative? Not very likely, given that our
military has unparalleled conventional military options that are
available to respond to and to deter any CW attack. In this respect,
critics who urge the retention of a CW arsenal underestimate the power
of our conventional military capabilities and overestimate both the
value and likelihood of the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Typically,
such critics also tend to ignore the impact of making such nuclear
threats upon our global nuclear nonproliferation policy.
Second, it is true that the parties to the CWC are nation states,
not nonstate entities such as terrorist groups that may seek to acquire
such weapons. Though the treaty offers no guarantee against CW
terrorism, the treaty's transparency provisions will at least operate
to make it more difficult for terrorists to acquire equipment or
materials for use in making such weapons and that in itself is a
positive feature of the treaty. In particular, it will make it much
more difficult for terrorists to engage in large-scale production of
chemical weapons without detection. Since the CWC has never been
intended to serve as a substitute for national efforts against sub-
national terrorism, I find this whole argument that the treaty is weak
on terrorism to be a red herring.
I find it quite interesting that Japan--which was the victim of a
recent chemical weapons attack by terrorists--has already ratified the
CWC. In fact, Japan's Diet ratified the CWC within a month of the Sarin
gas attack in the Tokyo subway. Though the treaty may not have been
able to guarantee that this specific attack would not occur, Japan's
leaders have obviously concluded that their country would still be
better off with this treaty than without it. So would our country.
Third, critics have argued that the treaty lacks teeth. In fact, the
CWC does not repeal the fundamental principle of national sovereignty
that has dominated world affairs for over 300 years. The treaty does
not intend for the OPCW to perform as a police force in a world state.
Though the treaty provides procedures for mobilizing international
action against treaty violators, sanctions must still be implemented by
individual state parties to the treaty.
Nonparties to the treaty, however, will feel the teeth of this
treaty. They will have a harder time participating in the world market
for chemicals and chemical equipment. The few remaining CW states will
in time feel the inevitable political pressures that come with the
possession of internationally outlawed weaponry. And as the taboo on
possession settles in the world community, so will the likelihood of
strong international action against countries that would actually use
such weapons. Sanctions against all forms of proliferation could always
be strengthened, and I would certainly hope that this would be a high
priority national security goal of this and future administrations. But
the lack of mandatory sanctions in this treaty should not be confused
with any lack of teeth--it will fall to the national diplomats, the
leaders, and ultimately the people of the states that are CWC parties
to sharpen this treaty's teeth. Though teething pains can be expected
in the years ahead, sharper teeth will come.
Fourth, and most recently, critics have pointed to trade and
cooperation provisions in the treaty as evidence of an alleged
obligation to provide chemicals and chemical equipment that will help
treaty cheaters to make chemical weapons. Frankly, this argument is
hogwash. The very first article of this treaty obligates its parties
``* * * never under any circumstances * * * to assist, encourage or
induce, in any way, anyone'' to acquire chemical weapons. Given this
obligation--and given the treaty's inspection system and national
intelligence capabilities to back it up--the only appropriate response
to the accusation that the treaty will encourage peaceful trade and
scientific exchanges is, so what?
The administration has been more than reasonable in accommodating the
concerns of the critics. The fact that agreement was reached on 28
conditions hardly suggests a posture of stonewalling by anybody. But I
cannot support any of the five additional conditions that have been
offered concerning Russian chemical weapons activities, requiring
terrorist states to join the CWC before we do, asserting a unilateral
U.S. right to bar certain inspectors from certain countries,
requiring the United States to seek the renegotiation of key provisions
of the treaty on certain trade and CW defense issues, and adopting a
verification standard based on a concept of military significance that
is both inappropriate and unworkable. To the limited extent that these
final conditions touch upon legitimate concerns, let us address these
concerns inside the tent of the CWC, not by howling in the wilderness
outside that tent.
conclusion
Mr. President, I would like to conclude my remarks on a personal
note. I have come a long way when it comes to the issue of CW
disarmament. On May 21, 1985, I joined with three of my Senate
colleague to argue in an Op-Ed in the Washington Post in favor of
modernizing America's chemical weapons arsenal. At the time, there was
scant prospect of a Chemical Weapons Convention. The Soviet Union was
sitting on a huge CW arsenal and was threatening United States
interests around the world. And our old so-called unitary chemical
weapons were at best a national embarrassment, at worst an
[[Page S3515]]
actual danger to American citizens and our own troops. I favored the
safer binary weapons--safer for our own troops if they ever had to use
them.
But times have changed. The Soviet Union has ceased to exist and
there is significant support inside the Russian Government to follow
through with Russia's obligations under the CWC, support which America
has every reason to encourage in any way it can. Yes, there still are
countries in the world today that have chemical weapons. There still is
a terrorist threat involving such weapons. There is still a CW
proliferation threat. Russia, though it will hardly be alone in this
respect, will no doubt still seek to compete with us in many arenas of
world affairs. And many of those old unitaries are still sitting around
like rusting relics of a by-gone age.
Yet the world today is closer than ever to outlawing one of the most
dangerous weapons that mankind has every devised. As a U.S. Senator for
over 20 years now, I have at times encountered some of my colleagues
who were simply unprepared to reconsider policy positions that they
took in considerably different times and circumstances. I am determined
not to follow that practice.
Mr. GLENN. In partial answer to Senator Kyl's comments on export
controls, I ask unanimous consent that this release by the Australia
Group, which deals with export controls, be printed at the end of my
remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 3.)
Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, the only other thing I would add is that I
have examined this treaty and listened to arguments both pro and con. I
am convinced the time has finally arrived to move the campaign to
eliminate chemical weapons into high gear. The CWC certainly offers no
panacea to all risks concerning their proliferation or use of chemical
weapons. It does, however, represent a substantial step along the way
to alleviating these risks and, therefore, deserves the full support of
the Senate and the people of the United States. I urge all my
colleagues to vote for ratification.
I thank the Chair.
Exhibit 1
February 24, 1997.
Hon. Trent Lott,
487 Russell Senate Office Building,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Lott: We, the undersigned scientists, urge you
to work as a matter of national urgency to bring the Chemical
Weapons Convention to a vote in the Senate before April 29 of
this year. That is the date when the Convention will
automatically enter into force, with or without the United
States.
Negotiated by the administrations of Presidents Reagan and
Bush, and signed by the United States under President Bush in
January 1993, the Convention was formally submitted to the
Senate for its advice and consent to ratification by
President Clinton in November 1993. Since then it has been
the subject of thirteen hearings before the Committee on
Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services and the
Select Committee on Intelligence. The Secretaries of State
and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Director
of Central Intelligence and the representatives of the
Chemical Manufacturers Association have all testified
strongly in favor of ratification. More than 65 countries,
including all of our major allies, have ratified.
If the Senate fails even to vote on the CWC, after three
administrations have been its leading architects and
proponents, the United States will have surrendered by
default its essential leadership in combating the
proliferation of chemical weapons.
Respectfully,
Julius Adler.
Robert A. Alberty.
Sidney Altman.\1\
Fred C. Anson.
W. O. Baker.
John D. Baldeschwieler.
Robert L. Baldwin.
Allen J. Bard.
Neil Bartlett.
Helmut Beinert.
Howard C. Berg.
R. Stephen Berry.
Richard Bersohn.
Jerome A. Berson.
Klaus Biemann.
Jacob Bigeleisen.
Virgil Boekelheide.
Jan L. Breslow.
Leo Brewer.
Herbert C. Brown.\1\
Giulio L. Cantoni.
John A. Carbon.
Herbert E. Carter.
Charles P. Casey.
Thomas R. Cech.\1\
David Chandler.
Carolyn Cohen.
Mildred Cohn.
Robert E. Connick.
John D. Corbett.
Stanley J. Cristol.
James E. Dahlberg.
Samuel Danishefsky.
Earl W. Davie.
David R. Davies.
Peter B. Dervan.
William Doering.
Paul Doty.
Harry G. Drickhamer.
James L. Dye.
Isidore S. Edelman.
Mary P. Edmonds.
David Eisenberg.
Mostafa A. El-Sayed.
Ernest L. Eliel.
David A. Evans.
John D. Ferry
Edmond H. Fischer.\1\
Marshall Fixman.
Marye Anne Fox.
Josef Fried.
Carl Frieden.
Gerhart Friedlander.
Joseph S. Fruton.
Marshall Gates.
E. Peter Geiduschek.
Martin Gellert.
Walter Gilbert.\1\
Roy G. Gordon.
Robert H. Grubbs.
Lowell P. Hager.
George S. Hammond.
Dudley Herschbach.\1\
George P. Hess.
Robert L. Hill.
Mahlon Hoagland.
Bernard L. Horecker.
Donald F. Hornig.
William P. Jencks.
Harold Johnston.
Isabella L. Karle.
Martin Karplus.
Joseph J. Katz.
Walter Kauzmann.
Sung-Hou Kim.
James L. Kinsey.
William Klemperer.
Judith P. Klinman.
Irving M. Klotz.
Edward D. Korn.
Roger Kornberg.
Daniel E. Koshland, Jr.
Henry Lardy.
Robert Lehman.
Nelson J. Leonard.
Robert L. Letsinger.
Stephen J. Lippard.
William N. Lipscomb.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Nobel Laureate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
F.W. McLafferty.
Jerrold Meinwald.
Matthew Meselson.
Thomas J. Meyer.
Josef Michl.
William H. Miller.
Kurt Mislow.
Mario J. Molina.\1\
C. Bradley Moore.
Manuel F. Morales.
Howard A. Nash.
Daniel Nathans.\1\
Elizabeth F. Neufeld.
Marshall Nirenberg.\1\
Harry F. Noller.
Leslie E. Orgel.
Mary J. Osborn.
Norman R. Pace.
Charles S. Parmenter.
Robert G. Parr.
George W. Parshall.
Ralph G. Pearson.
Gregory A. Petsko.
Kenneth S. Pitzer.
Charles M. Radding.
Julius Rebek.
Lester J. Reed.
Howard Reiss.
Stuart A. Rice.
Frederic M. Richards.
Irwin A. Rose.
F. Sherwood Rowland.\1\
William J. Rutter.
Lewis H. Sarett.
Robert T. Sauer.
Howard K. Schachman.
Peter G. Schultz.
Glenn T. Seaborg.\1\
K. Barry Sharpless.
Robert G. Shulman.
Maxine F. Singer.
Robert L. Sinsheimer.
Emil L. Smith.
David B. Sprinson.
George R. Stark.
Donald F. Steiner.
Joan A. Steitz.
Thomas A. Steitz.
Walter H. Stockmayer.
Gilbert Stork.
Jack L. Strominger.
Julian M. Sturtevant.
Dean Stanley Tarbell.
Henry Taube.\1\
H.E. Umbarger.
Peter H. von Hippel.
Salih J. Wakil.
Frederick T. Wall.
Cheves Walling.
James C. Wang.
Gregorio Weber.
Samuel I. Weissman.
Frank Westheimer.
Ralph S. Wolfe.
(All signatories are members of the United States National
Academy of Sciences in the field of Chemistry or
biochemistry)
Exhibit 2
Nobel Laureates Urges Senators To Ratify the Chemical Weapons
Convention
March 11, 1997.
The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) has sent a
letter to US Senators urging the Senate to ratify the
Chemical Weapons Convention without delay. Support for
[[Page S3516]]
the letter's goal of prompt ratification came from 45 Nobel
prize winners who specifically confirmed their desire for CWC
ratification.
The letter, signed by FAS Chairman, and former Deputy
National Security Adviser to the President, Carl Kaysen,
reminds Senators of the importance of U.S. ratification. The
treaty requires ``total elimination of chemical weapons
stocks, prohibits chemical weapons-related activities, bans
assistance for such activities, and bars trade with non-
parties in certain relevant chemicals.''
In ratifying the treaty, the U.S. would join 70 countries--
including all major NATO allies and all other G-7 members--
who have already ratified it.
The Federation of American Scientists is a national
organization of scientists and engineers concerned with
issues of science and global security.
____
Federation of American Scientists,
Washington, DC, March 7, 1997.
Hon. Trent Lott,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Lott: The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
will enter into force on April 29, 1997, following its
ratification by the 65th signatory nation in November, 1996.
It has not yet been ratified by the United States.
This treaty bans an entire class of weapons of mass
destruction. It is a nonproliferation treaty that requires
total elimination of chemical weapons stocks, prohibits
chemical weapons-related activities, bans assistance for such
activities, and bars trade with non-parties in certain
relevant chemicals. This treaty denies us no option we would
otherwise wish to exercise, for the United States has already
renounced chemical weapons and is in the process of
destroying them. The CWC is a critical instrument for
universalizing this policy and preventing the further spread
of chemical weapons.
With no military interest in chemical weapons, the United
States can only gain by ratifying the treaty, regardless of
its level of verification. US accession is necessary to give
the CWC the force of an international norm against the
possession of chemical weapons. That norm alone would be
powerful, providing a basis for joint action to enforce
compliance.
But, in addition, the CWC provides new tools for deterring
and detecting chemical weapons proliferation. The value of
its provisions will grow with time, as the treaty's
incentives work to increase the number of adherents. The
declaration and inspection requirements will improve our
knowledge of possible proliferation activities, whether
conducted by nations or terrorists. Access to declared and
undeclared sites will make clandestine operations more
difficult, risky and expensive; participating states will
have the right to demand short-notice inspections of sites in
other States Parties. The CWC's provisions constitute the
most rigorous verification regime ever negotiated. At the
same time, the treaty and the proposed US implementing
legislation explicitly protect Constitutional rights and
confidential and proprietary information.
During negotiation of the treaty, senior officials of the
U.S. Chemical Manufacturers Association participated at the
side of U.S. Government negotiators, and the chemical
industry has consistently and publicly advocated ratification
of the CWC. Now, if the treaty comes into force without U.S.
ratification, its constraints on the chemical exports of non-
parties will penalize the U.S. chemical industry. Should the
Senate not ratify the Convention, the U.S. Government would
also be excluded from a seat on the CWC's governing body, and
from participating in the establishment of operating
procedures. At the same time, as signatories we will be
obligated to abide by the treaty's prohibitions.
Since the treaty was opened for signature in 1993, the
United States and 166 other countries have signed it.
Further, 67 countries, including all the major NATO allies,
have deposited their instruments of ratifications, as have
all other G-7 members.
In order to draw the attention of the Senate to the
importance of this issue, the Federation of American
Scientists has secured the specific endorsement of 45 Nobel
Prize winners to the ratification of the Chemical Weapons
Convention, and records their names below.
Yours sincerely,
Carl Kaysen,
Chairman, FAS.
I urge the U.S. Senate to ratify the Chemical Weapons
Convention without delay.
Signed by: Sidney Altman, Philip W. Anderson, Kenneth J.
Arrow, Julius Axelrod, David Baltimore, Helmut Beinert,
Konrad Bloch, Baruch S. Blumberg, Herbert C. Brown, Stanley
Cohen, Leon N. Cooper, Johann Deisenhofer, Renato Dulbecco,
Gertrude B. Elion, and Val L. Fitch.
Walter Gilbert, Dudley R. Herschbach, David Hubel, Jerome
Karle, Arthur Kornberg, Edwin G. Krebs, Joshua Lederberg,
Leon Lederman, Wassily W. Leontief, Edward B. Lewis, William
N. Lipscomb, Mario J. Molina, Joseph E. Murray, Daniel
Nathans, Arno A. Penzias, and Norman F. Ramsey.
Burton Richter, Richard J. Roberts, Martin Rodbell, F.
Sherwood Rowland, Glenn T. Seaborg, Herbert A. Simon, Phillip
A. Sharp, R.E. Smalley, Robert M. Solow, Jack Steinberger,
Henry Taube, James Tobin, Charles H. Townes, and Eric
Weischaus.
Exhibit 3
Australia Group Meeting
Australia Group participants held informal consultations in
Paris between Oct. 14-17, to discuss the continuing problem
of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) proliferation.
Participants at these talks were Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the
European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom
and the United States, with the Republic of Korea taking part
for the first time.
Participants maintain a strong belief that full adherence
to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and to the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) will be the
best way to eliminate these types of particularly inhumane
weapons from the world's arsenals. In this context, the
maintenance of effective export controls will remain an
essential practical means of fulfilling obligations under the
CWC and the BTWC.
All participants at the meeting welcomed the expected entry
into force of the CWC, noting that this long-awaited step
will be an important, historic moment in international
efforts to prohibit chemical weapons. Participants agreed to
issue a separate statement on this matter, which is attached.
Participants also welcomed the progress of efforts to
strengthen the BTWC in the negotiations taking place in the
Ad Hoc Group of BTWC States Parties in Geneva. All Australia
Group participating countries are also States Parties to this
Treaty, and strongly support efforts to develop
internationally-agreed procedures for strengthening
international confidence in the treaty regime by verifying
compliance with BTWC obligations.
Experts from participating countries discussed national
export licensing systems aimed at preventing inadvertent
assistance to the production of CBW. They confirmed that
participants administered export controls in a streamlined
and effective manner which allows trade and the exchange of
technology for peaceful purposes to flourish. They agreed to
continue working to focus these national measures efficiently
and solely on preventing any contribution to chemical and
biological weapons programs. Participants noted that the
value of these measures in inhibiting CBW proliferation
benefited not only the countries participating in the
Australia Group, but the whole international community.
Participants also agreed to continue a wide range of
contacts, including a further program of briefings for
countries not participating in the Paris consultations to
further awareness and understanding of national policies in
this area. Participants endorsed in this context the
importance of regional seminars as valuable means of widening
contacts with other countries on these issues. In particular,
Romania's plans to host a seminar on CBW export controls for
Central and Eastern European countries and the Commonwealth
of Independent States in Bucharest on Oct. 21-22 and Japan's
plans to host a fourth Asian Export Control Seminar in Tokyo
in early 1997 were warmly welcomed by participants. Argentina
will also host a regional seminar on non-proliferation
matters, in Buenos Aires, in the first week of December 1996.
France will organize a seminar for French-speaking countries
on the implementation of the CWC. This will take place
shortly before entry into force of the Convention.
The meeting also discussed relevant aspects of terrorist
interest in CBW and agreed that this serious issue requires
continuing attention.
Participants agreed to hold further consultations in
October 1997.
____
Australia Group Countries Welcome Prospective Entry Into Force of the
Chemical Weapons Convention
The countries participating in the Australia Group warmly
welcomed the expected entry into force of the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC) during a meeting of the Group in
Paris in October 1996. They noted that the long awaited
commencement of the CWC regime, including the establishment
of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,
will be an historic watershed in global efforts to abolish
chemical weapons for all time. They also noted that all
states adhering to the CWC are obliged to ensure their
national activities support the goal of a world free of
chemical weapons.
All of the participating countries reiterated their
previous statements underlining their intention to be among
the original States Parties to the CWC. They noted that 24 of
the 30 countries participating in the Australia Group have
already ratified the Convention. Representatives also
recalled their previous expressions of support for the CWC,
and reaffirmed these commitments. They restated their view
that the effective operation and implementation of the CWC
offers the best means available to the international
community to rid the world of these weapons for all time.
They called on all signatories to ratify the CWC as soon as
possible, and on the small number of countries which have not
signed the Treaty to join the regime and thereby contribute
to international efforts to ban these weapons.
Representatives at the Australia Group meeting recalled
that all of the participating
[[Page S3517]]
countries are taking steps at the national level to ensure
that relevant national regulations promote the object and
purpose of the CWC and are fully consistent with the
Convention's provisions when the CWC enters into force for
each of these countries. They noted that the practical
experience each country had obtained in operating export
licensing systems intended to prevent assistance to chemical
weapons programs have been especially valuable in each
country's preparations for implementation of key obligations
under the CWC. They noted in this context, that these
national systems are aimed solely at avoiding assistance for
activities which are prohibited under the Convention, while
ensuring they do not restrict or impede trade and other
exchanges facilitated by the CWC.
Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from North
Carolina.
Mr. HELMS. I yield myself 1 minute.
Mr. President, I have received a very fine statement by a
distinguished former Member of this body, Malcolm Wallop of Wyoming, a
gentleman and Senator whom I admire very much. He is now chairman, by
the way, of the Frontiers of Freedom. I ask unanimous consent that his
statement be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Bad Treaties do Make Security Problems Worse
(By Malcolm Wallop)
On Thursday, April 24th, the U.S. Senate will debate and
vote on ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. As
is the case with many pieces of legislation like the
Endangered Species Act and The Comprehensive Antiterrorism
Act of 1995, the Chemical Weapons Convention sounds great.
Who can be against the Convention except those who like
chemical weapons? Dig deep, however, and you will find how
bankrupt and harmful the Chemical Weapons Convention can be,
if ratified. Ken Adelman, noted arms control expert an
proponent of this Convention, admits forthrightly, in a
Washington Post op-ed that ``no accord banning all chemical
weapons can be verifiable in any real sense. The convention's
verification provisions may help somewhat, but not all that
much.''
This reality virtually assures that the treaty will be
violated by many who sign up, as well as having no effect
whatsoever on several dangerous chemical weapon states--such
as Iraq, Syria, North Korea and Libya--that have said they
will not become parties.
With this devastating admission, virtually the only
argument left for the Chemical Weapons Convention is the
proposition, as Adelman puts it, that ``standards and values
violated are better than no standards or values at all.''
According to this logic, we will be better off being party to
a treaty that cannot and will not reduce the chemical weapons
threat because of the civilizing effect such ``international
norms'' create.
The implication is that the ``international norm'' will
somehow enhance our security. In fact, quite the contrary is
true--as former Secretaries of Defense James Schlesinger,
Donald Rumsfeld and Caspar Weinberger observed in a
Washington Post op-ed dated March 5th.
That this can happen with even relatively practical
``international norms'' can be seen in one cited by Adelman,
himself in a follow-up to the March 5th op-ed--the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty. Even its strongest admires
recognize that this treaty has a terrible flaw: Its ``Atoms
for Peace'' provision which permits the sharing of nuclear
weapons-relevant technology with countries that promise not
to apply it to that end. One rogue nation after another has
violated this promise, giving rise to a large and growing
number of undeclared or incipient nuclear weapon states.
Unfortunately, a similar flaw has been built into the
Chemical Weapons Convention, virtually assuring that this new
``norm'' will produce more proliferation of chemical
weaponry, not less.
If anything, Mr. Adelman, as a spokesperson for proponents
for the treaty; exaggerates the value of unverifiable,
unenforced ``international norms'' which validates a central
concern expressed by the three Secretaries: Such ``norms''
frequently induce a false sense of security in law-abiding
societies.
This dangerous placebo effect of defective arms control
agreements is especially evident with respect to another
``international norm'' lauded by Mr. Adelman, namely, the
Biological Weapons Convention. Adelman contends that this
treaty--which he acknowledges lacks ``even a pretense of
verifiability''--has, nonetheless, ``served us fairly well.''
Regrettably, this Convention has not prevented the spread
of biological weapons and related technology to virtually
every dangerous country on the planet. The ``international
norm'' created by the Biological Weapons Convention has,
however, encouraged the United States government to remain
woefully unprepared to deal with the threat such weapons
pose.
This point is dramatically made in the cover story of the
March 14-20, 1997 edition of Washington City Paper. This
article is entitled ``Margin of Terror--The Government has
One Clear Strategy for Responding to a Terrorist Attack on
Washington: Pray.''
It describes in detail how the United States' systematic
failure to ready the resources and emergency personnel--to
say nothing of the American people--to contend with the
nightmare of weapons of mass destruction in the subways or
other public spaces of cities like Washington could easily
translate into hundreds, if not many thousands, of
casualties.
The U.S. military has proven no more immune to the
seductive effects of ineffectual ``international norms''
created by unverifiable arms control treaties. Operation
Desert Storm illuminated serious shortfalls in the armed
services' capability to operate and prevail in combat should
chemical and/or biological weapons be used. These shortfalls
persist today to varying degrees thanks, in part, to illusion
that ``international norms'' will make that sort of combat
unlikely.
Overstating the value of international accords has one
other deleterious effect: It tends to make the United States
and other law-abiding states reluctant to respond to
violators of such accords. As with President Clinton's
successive decisions to grant MFN to China--despite its
repeated violations of undertakings concerning human rights
and the curbing the spread of nuclear weapons and missile
technology, the argument is always made that larger national
interests must be taken into account. When the Untied States
winds up ignoring violations in the interest of preserving an
arms control regime, however, the effect is not only to
invite further violations but to undermine the value of the
``international norm'' thus created.
Those who believe that arms control can make a measurable
contribution to U.S. security and civilized intercourse
between states have a special responsibility to avoid
debasing the currency of international law. Unverifiable,
unenforceable accords do not promote valuable ``international
norms'' any more than unverifiable, unenforceable domestic
statues like Prohibition lead to a sober and law-abiding
society. The difference is that the former threaten to make
arms control a sham--an outcome that can translate into
incalculable harm to our Nation and its people.
(Malcolm Wallop represented Wyoming in the United States
Senate from 1976-1995 and is currently chairman of the
Frontiers of Freedom Institute, a non-partisan, public policy
organization located in Arlington, VA.)
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I yield 20 minutes to the able Senator from
New Hampshire, a great patriot, Bob Smith.
Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Thank you very much, I say to Senator
Helms.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the distinguished Senator
from New Hampshire.
Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Thank you, Mr. President.
I thank the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee
for his tremendous leadership on this matter. He has been steadfast. I
have been in a number--several hours and days--of meetings with him as
he has tried very hard to get this treaty into a position where it
could be acceptable to some of us--to all of us. But in this case, Mr.
President, I have to maintain my opposition to this convention.
Contrary to the assertions of its proponents, this treaty will not
advance our national interests, and as a Member of the U.S. Senate, I
must put the national and sovereignty interests above all others when
it comes to votes here on the Senate floor. This is a flawed accord
that will undermine our security and create a massive, unfunded
regulatory burden on U.S. companies. And the Senate should reject it.
Let me make clear, I do not object to the goal of eliminating
chemical weapons, although those of us who have taken a position in
opposition to this treaty will be accused of that, and have been. In
fact, as a member of the Armed Services Committee, I have consistently
supported funding for our Nation's chemical demilitarization program.
Certainly, we all support the goal of eliminating chemical weapons.
But this treaty will not accomplish that goal. Sometimes we forget
that fact as we debate these issues that have a great-sounding name. It
does not even come close. For the benefit of my colleagues, I want to
highlight some of the most egregious problems with this treaty.
First of all, it is not a global treaty. Its advocates would have you
believe that it is. It is not global. In fact, many nations believed to
have active chemical weapons programs, such as Iraq, Libya, North
Korea, and Syria, have not even signed on to the treaty and they are
not bound by any provisions.
Additionally, other confirmed or suspected chemical weapons nations,
such as India, Iran, Pakistan, and Russia,
[[Page S3518]]
have signed the treaty but do not seem very likely to ratify it or even
comply with it.
For the life of me, I cannot understand how anyone could possibly
stand here on the floor of the U.S. Senate and say this is a global
treaty if the most heinous anti-American regimes on the face of the
Earth are not even a party to it. They are going to be making chemical
weapons, and nobody can do anything about it. That is like saying we
have a global treaty outlawing terrorism, but Iran, North Korea, Syria,
and Lebanon are not a part of it. Why not have another treaty and
outlaw terrorism? Well intended; great goal. Why not just pass a treaty
and we will outlaw it? That will be the end of it.
It is absurd, not to mention patently false, to allege that this
Chemical Weapons Convention is a global treaty. Iraq used chemical
weapons on its own citizens in the last decade--on its own people. How
can we have a global treaty banning chemical weapons without Iraq?
Could somebody please answer that question for me? It is not global.
And we are not banning chemical weapons in Iraq. We are inspecting the
devil out of Iraq and we still do not know what they are doing and what
they can and cannot do.
Mr. President, not only is this treaty not global, it is not
verifiable according to the U.S. intelligence community, not according
to Senator Smith, but the U.S. intelligence community.
In testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee, former Director
of Central Intelligence, James Woolsey stated:
The chemical weapons problem is so difficult from an
intelligence perspective that I cannot state that we have
high confidence in our ability to detect noncompliance,
especially on a small scale.
This is not exactly a ringing endorsement for this treaty,
particularly when it is coming from a person who is representing an
administration that supports it and that is bringing it here to the
Senate. Let us be honest, there is no way we are going to be able to
verify compliance, and everybody on this floor knows it. The
proponents, as well as the opponents, know that.
The United Nations Special Commission on Iraq was established
following the gulf war to oversee the dismantling of Iraq's chemical,
biological, and nuclear weapons programs. There have been over 1,000
inspectors searching every nook and cranny in Iraq for the past 5
years, yet we continue to uncover new evidence and new revelations
regarding Iraq's programs to develop weapons of mass destruction.
I say to my colleagues on the floor, now that you have seen all these
inspections, you all feel very comfortable, I am sure. Now you have the
full knowledge that Iraq does not have any chemical weapons or any
biological weapons or any nuclear weapons. Everybody feels real
comfortable with that. We have inspected them, so everybody is certain.
Right.
Iraq is the most heavily monitored and inspected country on Earth. We
have more access to Iraq than the chemical weapons treaty will ever
provide for any country. If we cannot determine after 5 years just how
large and sophisticated Iraq's chemical weapons program is, how on
Earth are we going to be able to verify compliance for the dozens and
dozens of countries supposedly bound by this treaty? The answer is
simple. We cannot. We are not going to be able to do it.
We will move into classified session later on, tomorrow, to more
fully examine the intelligence community's assessment. I urge my
colleagues to come to that session and listen to the facts from our
intelligence community.
Noncompliance is not something to take lightly. Without adherence by
all parties, no treaty is worth the paper it is written on--never has
been, never will be. But we cannot verify this treaty. We know for a
fact that some of its signatories have routinely and repeatedly
violated other treaties in the past. So they have a track record.
Russia has the world's largest chemical weapons arsenal. The former
Soviet Union routinely violated its arms control obligations whenever
it was convenient, whenever it was in their best interest. Russia
remains in violation of the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention and
the CFE treaty. Thus, it is clear that the cold war pattern of
noncompliance did not end when the Soviet Union ended.
Russia has also made clear that it has no intention of ratifying the
chemical weapons treaty or complying with its provisions unless the
United States provides a massive aid package to pay for destruction of
its arsenal. Mr. President, where I come from in New Hampshire, this is
called blackmail. That is what it is. And I object to it. We are
already committed to spending $12 billion to eliminate our own chemical
weapons arsenal. Are we supposed to foot the bill for Russia's as well
now?
Let us not forget we are already giving Russia billions of dollars in
ransom for the START I and START II treaties, even though they have yet
to ratify START II. With the hard-line Communists and nationalists
gaining 33 percent of Parliament seats in the recent Russian elections,
can anyone actually believe that this situation is likely to improve? I
do not think so.
Russia is not implementing the 1990 bilateral destruction agreement
in which it pledged to substantially reduce its chemical weapons
arsenal. The DIA stated Russia is moving so slowly that no meaningful
reduction of its arsenal is likely to occur in the next decade. These
are facts that the proponents do not want you to hear, Mr. President.
The DIA has expressed skepticism regarding the veracity of Russia's
data declarations. It appears highly likely that Russia has grossly
underreported its chemical weapons arsenal.
Finally, it has been widely reported in the international
publications that Russia is developing new binary weapons that are
highly lethal, yet contained none of the chemicals--none of the
chemicals--listed on the treaty's schedules. If this is true, Russia
will be capable of circumventing this treaty in a very significant and,
frankly, destabilizing way. We will be considering this issue in more
detail during the closed session, but I want to say here and now that
this is a very, very big problem and it ought to be looked at very
closely.
It gives me no pleasure to take the floor of the Senate and raise
these troubling issues. I would like to be for this treaty. I wish it
banned all chemical weapons. But the fact of the matter is, it does
not, and I have a constitutional responsibility to look carefully at
these issues and act in a manner that I believe advances our national
security.
This treaty is deeply flawed--deeply flawed. No amount of public
relations spin, no amount of pressure from the White House or from
anybody else can change that issue. Certainly it is not going to change
this Senator's mind.
I know that many of my colleagues think that since the cold war is
over arms control issues do not matter anymore. I know many Members who
would just as soon focus on issues that seem to be drawing more
attention in the polls. But as the stewards of national security, we do
not have that luxury. We cannot afford to sweep these issues under the
rug for the convenience of political expediency.
Mr. President, in addition to these important national security
considerations, I want to highlight for my colleagues the enormous
burden that this treaty will place on U.S. businesses. Under the
treaty, there would be two basic types of inspections: routine and
challenge. Routine inspections are to be directed at sites producing
chemicals that present the greatest risk of diversion to weapons uses.
A nation could be subject to up to 20 routine inspections per year, and
a specific site up to two routine inspections. Challenge inspections
would occur by request by a party to the treaty and can take place with
very little advance notice. There is no limit to the number of
challenge inspections that can take place.
The United States also, Mr. President, will be obligated to pay 25
percent of the operating expenses of this organization. Does that sound
familiar? Think of the United Nations and other international
organizations where we wind up footing most of the bill. Membership on
the Executive Council is determined by a rotating regional formula,
with the majority of seats allocated to third world countries. The
United States would not necessarily be represented on the council at
all times and there is no U.S. veto, as there is in the U.N. Security
Council.
This represents a new open-ended entitlement for another United
Nations-
[[Page S3519]]
style bureaucracy. I cannot believe that we are going to agree to pay
25 percent of the cost when we are having so much difficulty injecting
fiscal discipline into the existing foreign aid bureaucracy which
Senator Helms has been trying to change for years. Why should we pay
such a grossly disproportionate percentage when Russia, who has the
world's largest stockpile, pays 5.6 percent--while we pay the 25
percent?
It is estimated that somewhere between 3,000 and 8,000 companies,
perhaps more, will be affected by this treaty--3,000 to 8,000 U.S.
companies. The treaty creates a massive program of reporting
requirements for companies, companies that produce or use regulated
chemicals.
I would ask my colleagues, do you really think the rogue nations, the
North Koreas, the Libyas, the Irans, or the Iraqs, and others, are
going to be subject to this? Do you really think they care that we are
harassing our own companies? They are probably getting a good laugh out
of it, Mr. President.
The individual companies are required to assume all costs associated
with this compliance, including filings, escort and administration of
routine inspections, challenge inspections, and in some circumstances,
American businesses may even be required to shut down production during
the inspection period. Failure to comply with the regulations could
result in a company being fined up to $50,000 per incident--per
incident.
The Defense Department has estimated the cost imposed on a company
with a large facility could be as high as $500,000 per inspection,
while small businesses should expect inspections to cost between
$10,000 and $20,000, all on U.S. businesses on something that does not
ban chemical weapons in other countries.
Each international inspection team will be accompanied by
representatives of the U.S. Government. According to the
administration, it is possible the representatives of the Environmental
Protection Agency and OSHA could also serve as escorts to come into
your business and have a good look at what we you are doing--maybe
something very personal, very private, something you would not want
your competitors to have. But under the treaty, the EPA can walk right
in, have access to the whole facility, perhaps even take a few samples,
a few products. Who knows--take some records.
It is clear, Mr. President, that this treaty and the accompanying
implementing legislation that the administration has requested
represents a massive, unfunded mandate on U.S. businesses. It is
staggering. I cannot believe that this Senate is prepared to do this
injustice to businesses here in America and, frankly, injustice to
ourselves as a nation. At a time when your constituents are crying out
for relief from onerous and burdensome regulations, here we go again.
The problem is, other nations who get to inspect our facilities have a
lot more to gain than we do by inspecting theirs. The limited military-
related intelligence that we may gain is far outweighed by the
industrial and commercial intelligence that other nations will derive
from our companies. That is why nations like Iran are signing on to
this treaty, because they want that information. They will have access
to that information, if not directly, certainly indirectly even if they
are not one of the inspectors.
Most chemical manufacturers have not considered the effect of this
treaty. Frankly, I am disappointed in some of those manufacturers
because they have not thought it through. But they will be back, Mr.
President. If we pass this, they will be back and they will be back
with tears in their eyes because they are going to be very, very sorry
that they supported this treaty.
In fact, I know of one example where an individual called my office
purporting to represent the CMA in support of the treaty. When
questioned on the details of the treaty and the implications for U.S.
businesses, the individual became frustrated, claimed ignorance, and
stated that the CMA told him to make the calls. He admitted not knowing
much about the treaty and quickly ended the call. That is pretty sad,
Mr. President.
If that is the kind of expertise being brought to bear in this
lobbying campaign we are faced with, I think it raises more serious
questions as to the merit and true nature of this endorsement by CMA.
Additionally, while CMA's support is an important factor to consider,
it is important to recognize that CMA does not even represent a
majority of the businesses affected by the treaty. According to the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 60 percent of the companies
affected by the treaty are not CMA members.
In fact, most of these non-CMA companies are smaller businesses who
are most likely to be harmed by the increased regulatory burden. They
have the most to lose. Yet, they are the ones that are overlooked by
the treaty's proponents.
Mr. President, since last fall, when the Clinton administration
abruptly requested that the Senate defer consideration of the treaty, I
have worked very closely with my colleagues in the Senate, including
Senator Kyl and Senator Helms and others. I have attended numerous
meetings with the President's National Security Adviser to explore
possible conditions to protect U.S. national security, and, to their
credit, the administration and others did work hard to address many of
those concerns, and many have been addressed. But there are still some
that I just cannot, in good faith, allow to go unchallenged.
In the end, we are not able to agree on all of these issues. That is
the nature of democracy. We discuss issues, debate policy, find common
ground, and compromise where we can. We compromised 28 times.
It is important to understand, though, that reasonable people can and
do disagree on the merits of this treaty. I want to make it very clear
that I have no problem with any of my colleagues in terms of how they
arrived at their votes. That is their vote, and I respect that, I
recognize that. In fact, it is healthy. While I strongly oppose this
treaty, I don't impugn anyone's motives or character for taking an
opposing viewpoint. Having said that, it is regrettable that those of
us deeply troubled by the lack of participation in this treaty by Iran,
Syria, Libya, and North Korea, and by the inherent unverifiability of
the treaty, by the fact that nations such as Iran will gain access to
sensitive data on our chemical defenses. Now, people have said that is
not going to happen. Well, we will see. If this treaty passes, we will
see, because they can be part of the inspection team and can have
access to that information.
Anyway, we are accused of being somehow in favor of chemical weapons
because we take this position. It seems that when those of us who are
conservatives want to stand by our principles, we are ``crazy people''
or something. But when you are liberal and you stand by your
principles, you are thoughtful and considerate and compassionate. Well,
maybe I am missing something somewhere.
It is very easy for the media and the advocates of the treaty to
demagog this issue. Some in the media have demagoged it. Some in the
media in my own State are demagoging me and the treaty. That is their
prerogative. But they are not here on the Senate floor--I am. Some in
the media in my State may not like that fact, but I am here as an
elected representative for the State of New Hampshire. I am sworn to
uphold the Constitution and to defend the national security interests
of the United States. Yes, if there is a treaty violating those, I am
going to be opposed to it.
While I wholeheartedly support the objective of banning chemical
weapons, this doesn't ban chemical weapons. If somebody can stand up
here and tell me how we are going to get access to all of Iraq and be
certain that we are not going to have chemical weapons there, and all
of Libya and North Korea, and can prove that to me, I will support the
treaty. That is why we have this amendment, this provision on rogue
nations. I don't believe this requires that the Senate rubber stamp any
treaty dealing with chemical weapons. We have some very respected
people, including four former Secretaries of Defense--that was
testified to here before--who oppose this treaty.
In the medical world, the wrong medicine can kill a patient even if
it is prescribed with the best of intentions. The same holds true with
national security.
[[Page S3520]]
I have no doubt that the advocates of CWC believe that it will cure
the plague of chemical weapons. But that is the wrong medicine and it
won't work.
I want to conclude my remarks by summarizing some of the more
important arguments against this treaty.
First, it is not global.
Second, it is not effectively verifiable.
Third, there are no technical means to detect undeclared stockpiles
of chemical agents or weapons.
Many of those who have signed the treaty are either unlikely to
ratify it or to comply. Does anybody really believe that Iran will be a
responsible party to this treaty? When is the last time we had access
to all of the countryside in Iran and all of the industry and buildings
in Iran? Why should we believe that this treaty is going to make us do
that?
Article X of the treaty will require us to share detailed information
on our own chemical weapons defenses with all other signatories to the
treaty, good and bad signatories to the treaty, friends and enemies.
Thousands of U.S. businesses, many of them vulnerable small
businesses, will be exposed to costly annual reporting requirements
that they can't afford. Direct costs to U.S. industry are estimated to
be over $200 million a year.
It goes on and on and on, Mr. President. It is just incredible.
Challenge inspections, which basically you could not do under our
Constitution, are unlimited in number and may violate the fourth
amendment, which guarantees the rights of individuals and their
property against unreasonable search and seizure.
Mr. President, it is clear that this treaty falls short of achieving
its objectives and its goals. In fact, it doesn't even come close. As
we will see later in the classified session, the stakes are high. We
have little to gain and a great deal to lose.
I urge my colleagues to reject this treaty. I yield the floor.