[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 49 (Wednesday, April 23, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3484-S3486]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]



                               CONCLUSION

  In conclusion Mr. President, the Defense Department's position on the 
CWC is simple. As offensive weapons, chemical munitions are overrated. 
Therefore, keeping them in our arsenal offers scant military advantage. 
DOD does not believe that chemical weapons are needed for deterrence. 
They believe there are plenty of other options.
  We have heard a good deal of discussion about the verification 
problems associated with the CWC, and past and current intelligence 
officials will be quoted in and out of context on Intelligence 
Community's confidence levels. But let us remember that the 
Intelligence Community has to monitor the chemical-weapons capabilities 
of foreign powers in any event. In open and closed briefings and 
hearings over the past 3 years, the community has been consistent in 
saying that its ability to monitor various provisions of the convention 
is severely limited. But the community has also been consistent in 
arguing that the convention will provide it with additional tools to go 
along with national technical means in monitoring developments in 
chemical-weapons states, something that the intelligence community must 
do whether there is a CWC or not. The intelligence community believes 
that, the convention is a net plus to its efforts to monitor the 
activities of chemical-weapons states around the globe.
  The CWC is not without blemishes. The United States had to make 
concessions in a negotiating process that involved nearly 40 states 
representing all possible world views. These are not easy to accept in 
a U.S. political process that has a hard time accepting tradeoffs in 
bilateral negotiations and, increasingly, even in domestic political 
bargaining. The Senate should not be surprised that the treaty is not 
perfect. But that is not the point. The proper question is whether, on 
balance, does the CWC serve the national interest.
  For some, no arms control treaty is good enough. Indeed, the very 
high stakes of the cold war and the fact that arms control cheating by 
the Soviet Union represented a potential threat to the survival of the 
United States led to a legitimate focus on treaties with high 
standards, especially for verification and the ability to detect even 
minor violations.
  The cold war, is over, and treaty requirements must suit U.S. 
national interests as they exist today. Despite the CWC's tradeoffs, it 
is widely supported by U.S. industry, the U.S. military, and 
nonproliferation experts. They know it not to be a panacea or perfect--
but nonetheless clearly in the service of U.S. military, economic and 
political interests. They also know it to be better than the 
alternative defined by CWC opponents as reliance on chemical weapons 
retaliation in kind and unilateral enforcement of export controls or 
other punitive actions. This alternative is a recipe for broader 
proliferation extending well beyond chemical weapons. The United States 
is much better served by a choice to help lead a cooperative 
international effort to manage the problem than by one that manifestly 
has not worked as these weapons have proliferated in recent decades. 
Senators must look beyond the shouting match between the two camps 
of treaty supporters and treaty opponents and look at arguments based 
on the national interests as they exist today.

  Failure to ratify the CWC this year would harm that national interest 
and accentuate the image among both friends and foes of a rudderless 
America unable to chart a course on uncertain new seas. A belief that 
the United States is unreliable and uncooperative--or simply confused--
will harm not just the chemical arms control effort but 
nonproliferation goals more broadly. If the United States drops the CWC 
ball, the consequences for stable alliance relationships, for U.S. 
security in an era of rapid technology diffusion, and for a free and 
open trading regime will prove far reaching.
  The Congress completed legislation last fall on how best to respond 
to terrorism and to the threats posed by the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction, including nuclear, biological, and chemical 
weapons and materials. The so-called Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislative 
response to these threats passed the Senate unanimously and was agreed 
to in the House-Senate conference on the DOD authorization bill. If the 
Senate were to vote against ratification of the CWC, we would in effect 
be taking a large step backward in our positive efforts to work toward 
denying our enemies the tools of destruction they desire and protecting 
U.S. citizens from acts of terror and war.
  Mr. President, the time has come for us to join the growing worldwide 
consensus to ratify the treaty we invented. I believe that we are far 
better off with the CWC than without it. We have always been the 
world's leader in fighting the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and we must not recoil from that challenge at this critical 
juncture. Further, we must not betray the American chemical industry 
who worked with us for so many years to develop this treaty and who 
would be badly disadvantaged in world markets if we fail to act 
responsibly. We asked them for their help; they gave it willingly and 
now face the possibility of an international Mark of Cain if we fail to 
ratify. The time is now. The choice is clear.
  I urge my colleagues first, to support the motions to strike the five 
conditions in disagreement in the resolution of ratification, second, 
to then vote yes to approve the resolution of ratification and consent 
to treaty ratification, and third, to then proceed quickly to

[[Page S3485]]

pass the domestic implementing legislation that is a necessary 
companion of this treaty.
  The Chemical Weapons Convention offers the United States one more 
tool in our arsenal to help prevent, deter, or to manage the threat 
posed by chemical weapons. It is up to the Senate, after weighing the 
benefits and costs of the Convention, to determine whether the CWC 
tool, on balance, provides major value-added to the United States in 
achieving that objective. I believe it does.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. We have a previous order to recess.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, before you rule, I would like to be heard.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will the Senator from Indiana yield?
  Mr. LUGAR. Is the order that the Senate should recess at 12:30? Has 
that been adopted earlier?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes. Under a previous order, we would recess 
from 12:30 to 2:15 for the policy luncheons.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina is recognized.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask to be recognized for at least 10 
minutes so that the distinguished occupant of the chair can be 
recognized to make a statement. While we get a replacement for him in 
the chair, let me say this before the matter gets too cold. The 
distinguished Senator from Indiana, in good faith, I know, raised a 
number of concerns about the Chemical Weapons Convention in terms of 
this. Senator Dole, in a letter dated September 11, 1996, contrary to 
what the distinguished Senator from Indiana said, said the following:

       To achieve this goal, a treaty must be effectively 
     verifiable and genuinely global--encompassing all countries 
     that possess, or could possess, chemical weapons. If the 
     Chemical Weapons Convention now before you achieves this 
     goal, I will support it.

  Now, of course, Senator Dole wrote that letter in good faith, and I 
suppose that the administration has assured him, incorrectly, that all 
of his concerns have been taken care of.
  In any case, I ask unanimous consent that the letter written by Bob 
Dole on September 11, 1996, be printed in the Record at this point.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                               September 11, 1996.
     Hon. Trent Lott,
     Majority Leader, U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Trent: Thank you for seeking my views on the Chemical 
     Weapons Convention which will soon be considered by the 
     United States Senate. You do indeed have an important 
     national security decision before you and I am pleased to 
     offer you my views.
       I am sure that I share with all my former colleagues--on 
     both sides of the aisle--a strong aversion to chemical 
     weapons. They are horrible, and there should be no doubt that 
     I am unequivocally opposed to their use, production or 
     stockpiling. Their widespread use during World War I provoked 
     an outcry which resulted in the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which 
     bans the use of chemical weapons in war. Unfortunately, the 
     Geneva Protocol has not prevented all use of chemical 
     weapons, and we have been reminded just in the last week of 
     the dangers presented by tyrants such as Saddam Hussein.
       In fact, Saddam used chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq War 
     and against his own Kurdish population in the North. And, 
     lest anyone think this is no concern of ours, there is a 
     distinct possibility that American troops were exposed to 
     Saddam's chemical weapons during the Gulf War. The United 
     States needs and wants a treaty which effectively bans 
     chemical weapons from every point on earth. To achieve this 
     goal, a treaty must be effectively verifiable and genuinely 
     global--encompassing all countries that possess, or could 
     possess, chemical weapons. If the Chemical Weapons Convention 
     now before you achieves this goal, I will support it. If it 
     does not, I believe we should pass up illusory arms control 
     measures. As President, I would work to achieve a treaty 
     which really does the job instead of making promises of 
     enhanced security which will not be achieved.
       I supported the START I, START II, INF and CFE Treaties 
     because these agreements met three simple criteria 
     established by President Reagan: effective verification, real 
     reductions and stability. In evaluating the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention, I suggest you apply these same criteria, adapted 
     to these particular weapons and to the post-Cold War multi-
     polar world. Thus, I have three concerns. First, effective 
     verification: do we have high confidence that our 
     intelligence will detect violations? Second, real reductions, 
     in this case down to zero: will the treaty really eliminate 
     chemical weapons? Third, stability; will the treaty be truly 
     global or will countries like Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya and 
     North Korea still be able to destabilize others with the 
     threat of chemical weapons?
       Furthermore, I believe it is important that the Senate 
     insure that the implementation of this treaty recognize and 
     safeguard American Constitutional protections against 
     unwarranted searches.
       It is my understanding that the Senate will have the 
     opportunity to address these matters in debate and, perhaps, 
     in amending the Resolution of Ratification. It is my hope 
     that President Clinton will assist you in resolving them. If 
     we work together, we can achieve a treaty which truly 
     enhances American security.
           Best regards,
                                                         Bob Dole.

  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, in connection with that, statements were 
made about the chemical industry losing $600 and $800 million. It is a 
moving target. They say several things at one time.
  I ask unanimous consent that this statement correctly altering the 
misstatements already made, and probably will be reiterated, be printed 
in the Record at this time.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:


   the united states chemical industry will not lose $600 million in 
                annual exports from u.s. nonratification

       The argument that U.S. chemical companies will be subject 
     to trade sanctions and will have their exports dramatically 
     harmed if the U.S. does not ratify the CWC is patently 
     untrue.
       The Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA), which has 
     been making this argument, has contradicted itself time and 
     again, calling into serious doubt the credibility of its 
     claims.
       Throughout the fall of 1996, the Senate was bombarded with 
     claims from the Administration and CMA that $600 million in 
     export sales would be ``placed at risk'' if the U.S. did not 
     ratify the treaty.
       Unable to substantiate such claims, the CMA cut its 
     estimate by more than half in February, 1997, to $280 million 
     in potential lost sales.
       On March 10, 1997, under further scrutiny, CMA dropped its 
     estimate to $227 million in potential lost exports.
       However, $142 million of CMA's estimate comes from the sale 
     of Amiton, a pesticide which Western countries do not use 
     (for environmental reasons) but which is sold to many African 
     countries (many of which have not ratified the CWC).
       The truth of the matter is that less than one-quarter of 
     one percent of CMA's annual exports could be subject to trade 
     restrictions if the U.S. does not ratify the CWC.
       CMA is now claiming that European countries will impose 
     broader ``non-tariff'' barriers on U.S. chemicals, despite 
     the fact that 30 percent of all CMA members are owned by 
     Europeans or other countries (such as Akzo Nobel Chemicals, 
     which is Dutch).
       CMA companies must not be all that concerned since CMA 
     admitted in March that no CMA member company had filed a 
     report with the Securities and Exchange Commission to notify 
     stockholder regarding the impact of U.S. nonratification.


    just what types of chemicals are subject to trade restrictions?

       The CWC has three schedules of chemicals. Schedule 1 
     compounds are those which constitute chemical weapons or only 
     have chemical weapons applications. They are not traded by 
     U.S. companies anyway.
       Schedule 2 chemicals are also usable in or as weapons, and 
     they are ``not produced in large commercial quantities for 
     purposes not prohibited under [the CWC].'' (Annex A, 
     paragraph 2 of the CWC) Thus, these chemicals also are not 
     traded, or are traded in insignificant quantities, by U.S. 
     companies.
       Schedule 1 and 2 chemicals are controlled under U.S. export 
     regulations and would not be traded freely by U.S. companies 
     regardless of membership of the U.S. in the CWC.
       Schedule 3 chemicals are common commercial chemicals which 
     may be used in chemical weapons, but which have many other 
     uses. These chemicals, together with chemicals not on any of 
     the three schedules, comprise the vast majority--virtually 
     all--of U.S. chemical trade.
       There are no restrictions on trade of Schedule 3 chemicals 
     implied or stated in the CWC. U.S. nonmembership in the 
     treaty will not affect trade in chemicals on Schedule 3 or 
     which do not appear on any schedule.
       The CWC states that ``Schedule 2 chemicals shall only be 
     transferred to or received from States Parties.'' Therefore, 
     if the U.S. is not a party, it cannot export to or receive 
     from CWC member states any Schedule 2 chemicals. This does 
     not matter to U.S. trade, however, because the U.S. 
     manufactures all of the Schedule 2 chemicals it needs and 
     does not export them in significant quantities.
       There is no basis in the claim that nonmembership in the 
     CWC will harm U.S. imports or exports, or harm U.S. industry 
     in any significant manner. In fact, the opportunity for 
     smaller chemical companies to break into the domestic market 
     and compete in the production of the limited amount of 
     Schedule 2 chemicals that cannot be imported would prove a 
     net plus for the economy.


[[Page S3486]]


  Mr. HELMS. Now, I am taking this advantage as the chairman of the 
committee. I spoke for 26 minutes this morning. The distinguished 
ranking member spoke for an hour. Just for the record, how long did the 
distinguished Senator from Indiana speak? I ask that of the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Lugar). The Senator from Indiana spoke for 
41 minutes.
  Mr. HELMS. I see. So the Senator from North Carolina feels that maybe 
they have had ample opportunity thus far into the debate.
  Now, I ask that the distinguished Senator from Minnesota be 
recognized for 7 minutes, after which time we will stand in recess for 
the policy luncheon.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senator from Minnesota 
is recognized.
  Mr. GRAMS. Mr. President, I rise to express my support for the 
Chemical Weapons Convention [CWC] with the full complement of 33 
conditions on U.S. participation, which are now being considered by the 
Senate.
  As a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, I have been reviewing 
and studying this treaty for over a year now and have had some serious 
reservations about the CWC throughout that process.
  Therefore, I believe the conditions in Senate Executive Resolution 75 
are essential to ensuring that the CWC has real benefits for American 
national security and will be truly verifiable and effective. Before we 
commit the American taxpayers to paying more than $100 million annually 
for U.S. participation in the treaty, we owe them nothing less.
  Let me outline the conditions I believe are the most important.
  First, I am pleased the Clinton administration has finally reversed 
its long-standing position that the CWC would prevent U.S. soldiers 
from using tear gas to rescue downed pilots or to avoid deadly force 
when enemy troops are using civilians as human shields.
  Second, we must be sure that Russia will both comply with the 
existing chemical weapons destruction agreements it has already signed, 
and that it will ratify the CWC. Russia has the largest chemical 
weapons stockpile in the world and its compliance with earlier 
agreements will help the United States be more confident of its ability 
to monitor Russian compliance with the CWC.
  This is especially important given reports that Russia has already 
developed new chemical weapons programs specifically designed to evade 
the treaty. More than 15 months after the United States ratified the 
START II Treaty, Russia has refused to follow suit. What makes us think 
that if we join the CWC before Russia does, it will then follow our 
example?
  Third, the CWC will not protect American soldiers from chemical 
attack unless it has a serious and immediate impact on those countries 
that have hostile intentions toward the United States. This means that 
countries which are suspected of having chemical weapons programs and 
are sponsors of terrorism--such as Libya, Syria, Iraq, and North 
Korea--must participate in the CWC. Just this morning, a newspaper 
article reported that a prominent North Korean defector has warned that 
his former country is fully prepared to launch a chemical weapons 
attack on its neighbors. North Korea has not yet signed the CWC.
  Fourth, we need to provide as much protection as possible for U.S. 
Government facilities and businesses when faced with international 
inspections. While the CWC does allow the United States to refuse 
specific inspectors, it should be a matter of policy that we will not 
accept inspectors from terrorist states like Iran. We are certainly 
justified in suspecting that these inspectors would be intent on 
gaining access to classified or confidential business information.
  Fifth, I understand the administration has offered assurances that 
the United States will not seek to transfer chemical technology or 
information about chemical defenses to countries that might put it to 
harmful use. But because of the vagueness of the treaty language, we 
need to go further to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons. We 
need to close off the possibility that other countries could use 
language in the treaty as cover for their desires to transfer chemical 
technology to countries like Iran. As we have seen in Iraq and North 
Korea, nuclear technology acquired supposedly for peaceful purposes can 
advance weapon capabilities.

  Sixth and finally, we need to be sure that the CWC is effectively 
verifiable, meaning that the United States has a high degree of 
confidence in its ability to detect significant violations. I strongly 
supported the START II Treaty because it met this traditional standard. 
If we don't think we can detect cheating under the CWC, it seriously 
calls into question the value of the treaty.
  Recently, there have been reports that China is selling chemical 
weapons components to Iran. Both countries have signed the CWC and, 
therefore, are supposedly committed to banning such activity.
  In conclusion, Mr. President, there are conditions in the current 
resolution of ratification for the CWC that address every single one of 
the concerns I have mentioned.
  I sincerely intend to support and vote for the Chemical Weapons 
Convention as long as the resolution of ratification is fortified with 
such strong conditions. They will help ensure that this treaty will 
have a real impact on the proliferation of chemical weapons and provide 
proven protection for U.S. forces.
  However, I understand that some of my colleagues may try to strip out 
these important conditions on the CWC. This would be very unfortunate 
and would cause me to reconsider my current support for the treaty.
  I urge my colleagues to vote against any killer amendments that would 
strike these conditions and, therefore, deprive the United States of 
assurances that the Chemical Weapons Convention is effective, 
enforceable and verifiable. The American taxpayers, who will be funding 
U.S. participation in the CWC, deserve a treaty that unquestionably and 
unambiguously advances our national security.
  I yield the floor.

                          ____________________