[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 49 (Wednesday, April 23, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Page S3481]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]



                       Condition No. 29 on Russia

  One of the items on which the Senate will be asked to vote is a 
condition--proposed condition 29--that would prohibit the United States 
from ratifying the CWC until the President certifies that Russia has 
done the following: ratified the CWC, complied with the 1990 Bilateral 
Destruction Agreement [BDA], fulfilled its obligations under the 1989 
Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding [MOU], and ceased all chemical 
weapons activities.
  This is a killer condition that would prevent the United States from 
joining the CWC. It must be struck.
  This condition effectively holds hostage U.S. participation in the 
CWC to a group of hardliners in the Duma. It would let Russia off the 
hook and give them an excuse to withhold ratification. Why should we 
let Russia decide our foreign policy?
  This condition would hold hostage our ability to join the CWC to the 
hardliners in the Russian Duma. As the President said, ``this is 
precisely backwards. The best way to secure Russian ratification is to 
ratify the treaty ourselves. Failure to do so will only give hardliners 
in Russia an excuse to hold out and hold on to their chemical 
weapons.''
  The prospect of Senate ratification is clearly putting pressure on 
Russia to ratify. The Duma announced last week that it will begin 
debate on the CWC today. Russia does not want to be left behind, 
especially if the United States is on the inside setting the rules.
  In sum, we should not give Russia the power to decide our 
participation in and leadership of this crucial treaty. As General 
Rowny testified, ``I think if we fail to ratify this Chemical Weapons 
Convention, it is going to give the Russians an excuse on a silver 
platter to say well, the United States did not ratify and we won't 
either.''
  Vil Mirzayanov, a Russian scientist who blew the whistle on the 
Soviet Union's chemical weapons programs and strongly supports the 
treaty, recently wrote to me and said: ``Senate ratification of the 
Convention is crucial to securing action on the treaty in Moscow * * * 
the Russian government does not want America to dominate the 
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the important 
decisions that the body will soon be making about the Convention's 
implications.''
  By not ratifying, the United States would be giving a present to 
hardline opponents of the CWC and of relations with the West more 
generally. By ratifying, the United States would not be giving a 
Christmas present to Russia; instead, it would provide a powerful tool 
for bringing further pressure to bear on Moscow to get on with chemical 
disarmament--and to stay engaged more generally in cooperative 
international measures that promote arms control and nonproliferation.
  The 1990 BDA was never ratified by the United States or Russia. It 
was explicitly designed to provide a boost to negotiations on the CWC 
and gain Russian ascent to the United States position for an immediate 
cessation of chemical weapons production and the destruction of the 
chemical weapons stockpiles. It served that purpose. Many of the BDA's 
provisions were adopted by the CWC. The BDA has several shortcomings 
that are corrected in the CWC. For example, the BDA allows both 
countries to retain 5,000 tons of chemical weapons, while the CWC 
requires the destruction of all chemical weapons. Also, the BDA has no 
provision for challenge inspections that are contained in the CWC.
  The 1989 Wyoming MOU was also designed to jumpstart CWC negotiations 
by providing for reciprocal data exchanges and inspections of chemical 
weapons facilities by the United States and Russia. It, too, served its 
purpose. The United States has some questions that linger over Russian 
data, but we can gain valuable information about Russia through the 
CWC's verification provisions.
  Key officials in Moscow do not dispute that there are individuals, 
both civilian and military, who wish to retain an offensive chemical 
weapons capability and thus oppose CWC ratification. This is hardly 
surprising, given the fact that we have individuals in an out of the 
American Government who oppose CWC ratification for the same reason. 
Many of these individuals associated with Russian chemical weapons 
research and development as well as production are the very ones tasked 
to provide the data called for under the Wyoming MOU. Moreover, various 
Russian military officials have argued that, given the near 
disintegration of the Russian conventional military capability, only 
nuclear and chemical weapons may be able to compensate for such 
conventional weaknesses.

  While Russian Government officials express their concerns about the 
political and economic costs of finalizing the BDA and/or ratifying the 
CWC before it enters into force, they do acknowledge, however 
grudgingly, that only United States ratification of the CWC will force 
them to deal decisively with the economic, political, and military 
dilemmas associated with chemical weapons. They also acknowledge that 
if the United States fails to ratify the CWC, then those military and 
civilian voices in Russia who favor the retention of an offensive 
chemical weapons capability could well become the majority.
  The fourth certification requirement of this condition is apparently 
driven by reports of Russian ``novel'' chemical agents. If these 
reports are correct, then the CWC and its challenge inspection regime 
is the best tool for exposing and ending such activities. Without the 
CWC, we will be denied important information and Russia will be under 
no legal obligation to end its suspected activities.