[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 49 (Wednesday, April 23, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3481-S3482]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]



                    Condition No. 30 on Rogue States

  Proposed condition 30 would prohibit the United States from ratifying 
the CWC until all states determined to possess offensive chemical 
weapons programs, including China, North Korea, Libya, Syria, Iran, and 
Iraq, as well as other state sponsors of terrorism, have ratified.
  This is a killer condition that would prevent the United States from 
ever joining the CWC. It, too, must be struck.
  This condition would make our joining this treaty hostage to Saddam 
Hussein, Qadhafi, other leaders of rogue states. This condition would 
allow these outlaw states to continue business as usual with no 
constraints, while our industry suffers, our leadership is undermined, 
and our ability to influence and benefit from the CWC regime is 
compromised.
  By allowing the world's most recalcitrant regimes to decide for us 
when we join the CWC, this condition borders on a dangerous surrender 
of U.S. national sovereignty. It effectively lets the world's villains 
write the rules of international conduct.
  Supporters of this condition say that we should not have a CWC 
because there will be cheaters. As Secretary of State Albright has 
said, that is a bit like saying that we shouldn't have laws because 
people will break them. But the CWC was not written with the illusory 
expectation that all of the world's bad actors would immediately sign 
up. Instead, it was negotiated with the cold-eyed recognition that 
rogue states

[[Page S3482]]

would stay out and, therefore, should be isolated and targeted. That is 
why the CWC contains mandatory sanctions for those states that remain 
outside of the regime.
  After years of providing international leadership in the fight to 
stop the spread of chemical weapons, we would be siding, not with our 
allies, on the inside, but with Libya, Syria, and Iraq on the outside. 
As General Norman Schwarzkopf has testified, ``by not ratifying that 
treaty, we align ourselves with nations like Libya and North Korea, and 
I just as soon not be associated with those thugs in this particular 
matter.''
  Our industry will be subject to automatic trade restraints beginning 
on April 29 if we don't ratify. Ironically, these are the same 
restrictions the United States fought for in the negotiations to put 
pressure on the rogue states to join the treaty.
  Today, there is nothing illegal in international law about the 
chemical weapons programs in any of the countries mentioned in this 
condition. That will change once the CWC enters into force. It will 
establish a norm against the stockpiling, development, transfer, and 
production of chemical weapons--all perfectly legitimate activities 
today. It will provide the basis for harsh action against those that 
violate this norm. In plain English, that means the CWC will legitimize 
military action we might take against a rogue state that develops 
chemical weapons illegally. It will also increase the likelihood of 
forging international coalitions. Conversely, accepting this condition 
would undermine our ability to lead on nonproliferation matters.
  This condition also ignores the fact that regardless of what these 
countries do, we are unilaterally destroying our chemical weapons 
stockpile. Chemical weapons are no longer a part of our military 
doctrine. Instead, as the gulf war demonstrated, we will rely on our 
overwhelming nonchemical capabilities to deter chemical weapons use.
  In sum, this condition will not promote ratification in any of the 
rogue states but instead will give leverage to those factions within 
these countries who do not want their governments to be parties. As 
Gen. Brent Scowcroft has testified, ``by remaining outside the CWC, we 
let these rogue states off the hook by making it easier for them to 
ignore pressures to abandon the chemical weapons option. In all these 
cases, we undermine the effectiveness of the CWC to do unto others what 
we have decided to do for ourselves: get out of the chemical weapons 
business.''
  This condition turns the present global arrangement on its head. 
Instead of the United States sustaining our historic leadership role in 
setting nonproliferation norms, this condition would have us take a 
backseat to the likes of Saddam Hussein and Mu'ammar Qadhafi. That does 
a grave disservice to our record of leadership over the past 40 years 
from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, to the missile technology 
control regime, to the CWC itself.
  No country, especially outlaw states, should have a veto over our 
national security. As Jim Baker has stated, ``It makes no sense to 
argue that because a few pariah states refuse to join the convention 
the United States should line up with them rather than with the rest of 
the world.''