[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 49 (Wednesday, April 23, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Page S3477]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]



                          THE NEED FOR THE CWC

  Mr. President, we need as many tools as possible to combat the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, given the fact that many 
countries of concern have the capability to manufacture these weapons. 
We need this treaty as a global norm whereby nations foreswear the use 
of their domestic capabilities to produce chemical weapons. In this 
regard, the CWC is the most comprehensive nonproliferation and arms 
control treaty in history and is a critical supplement to the Geneva 
Convention of 1925.
  The CWC fills the gap that the Geneva Convention does not address. 
While, the Geneva Convention bans the use of chemical weapons as an 
instrument of warfare, the CWC forbids even the mere possession of 
chemical weapons.
  It prohibits member-states assistance to any chemical weapons 
program, thereby helping to cut off supplies to rogue nations such as 
North Korea and Libya who are not likely to subscribe to the CWC. Some 
have criticized the treaty because they say participation will not be 
truly global. I certainly recognize that a number of problem countries 
are not likely to join the CWC. So be it. The CWC will serve to isolate 
them in the international community and compel participating countries 
to restrict chemical trade with them. Participating countries who may 
now support the chemical weapons proliferation projects of outlaw 
states in a variety of ways will be obliged to terminate any such help 
as soon as the treaty enters into force. In this context, it is 
important to note that the CWC prohibits any assistance to another 
country's chemical weapons program--not just chemical transfers.
  As Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf has said, ``We don't need chemical weapons 
to fight our future warfares. And frankly, by not ratifying that 
treaty, we align ourselves with nations like Libya and North Korea, and 
I'd just as soon not be associated with those thugs in that particular 
matter.''
  Some of my colleagues have argued that we shouldn't ratify the CWC 
until the Russians do so. I disagree. United States ratification of the 
CWC will put pressure on Russia to follow suit since they don't want to 
be outside of the broad consensus of the international community. 
However, even if the Russians fail to ratify, the treaty still serves 
United States national interests because we have already made a 
unilateral decision never to deploy CW, even if such weapons are used 
against us. This treaty commits other nations to do what we have 
already done. It will make less likely that U.S. forces will face 
chemical weapons in future confrontations.
  On April 4, 16 retired generals and admirals wrote to President 
Clinton supporting the Senate's consent to ratification of the CWC. 
Gen. Colin Powell, Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, Gen. John Vessey, Adm. 
William Owens, Adm. Stansfield Turner, Adm. Zumwalt and others joined 
Gen. Brent Scowcroft and the current Joint Chiefs of Staff in 
supporting the treaty. They wrote:

       Each of us can point to decades of military experience in 
     command positions. We have all trained and commanded troops 
     to prepare for the wartime use of chemical weapons and for 
     defenses against them. We all recognize the limited military 
     utility of these weapons, and supported President Bush's 
     decision to renounce the use of an offensive chemical weapons 
     capability and to unilaterally destroy U.S. stockpiles. The 
     CWC simply mandates that other countries follow our lead. 
     This is the primary contribution of the CWC: to destroy 
     militarily-significant stockpiles of chemical weapons around 
     the globe.

  Our military leaders concluded:

       On its own, the CWC cannot guarantee complete security 
     against chemical weapons. We must continue to support robust 
     defense capabilities, and remain willing to respond--through 
     the CWC or by unilateral action--to violators of the 
     Convention. Our focus is not on the treaty's limitations, but 
     instead on its many strengths. The CWC destroys stockpiles 
     that could threaten our troops; it significantly improves our 
     intelligence capabilities; and it creates new international 
     sanctions to punish those states who remain outside of the 
     treaty. For these reasons, we strongly support the CWC.
  The CWC will compel other countries to pass domestic laws 
criminalizing all chemical weapons related activities on their soil and 
thereby give them an effective tool to deal with terrorists. In this 
regard, it is interesting to note how quickly Japan ratified the CWC 
after the poison gas attack in the Tokyo subway.
  Mr. President, I understand well that some have argued that the 
treaty is not completely verifiable and therefore not worthy of U.S. 
ratification. No--the treaty is not 100 percent verifiable and we who 
support the CWC do not argue that it is a perfect and infallible 
instrument. We all recognize that a dedicated proliferator may be able 
to conduct a clandestine chemical weapons program and not be 
discovered. But that's not a fair test for an up or down vote on 
ratification. The CWC will complicate life for proliferators by making 
access to technical assistance and supplies more difficult and 
expensive to acquire. The treaty's verification provisions cover every 
aspect of a chemical weapons program from development through 
production, stockpiling, transfer, and use.
  The CWC provides the necessary incentives for states who are 
considering entering the chemical weapons business to refrain from so 
doing. It provides an incremental yet substantial step forward in the 
fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
  The allegation that the treaty is unverifiable is ironic, given 
fearmongering from the same quarters about the treaty's allegedly 
draconian inspection and reporting requirements. How can it be both too 
tough and not tough enough? How can critics who supported, during the 
negotiations of the CWC, an inspection regime based on the principle of 
``any time, anywhere'' now argue that the present inspection regime is 
too intrusive.