[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 49 (Wednesday, April 23, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3477-S3478]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]



                         WHY MUST WE RATIFY NOW

  Mr. President, we should not let the CWC enter into force without 
United States participation. In fact, I regret that we have waited as 
long as we have to debate this treaty. On April 29, 1997, this 
multilateral convention will enter into force whether the Senate has 
acted or not.
  What are the consequences for the United States if it is not a party 
to the CWC when it enters into force.
  First, instruments lost: First of all, without the CWC, there is no 
basis on which the United States can ``bound'' the chemical weapons 
problem. The CWC will help diminish the challenge in a way that allows 
the full panoply of policy tools--export controls, economic sanctions, 
diplomacy, chemical defense, and military options--to be brought to 
bear against the real miscreants such as Syria, Libya, and North Korea.
  The existing 1925 Geneva Protocol only bans use; there are currently 
no

[[Page S3478]]

restrictions on anything related to chemical weapons short of use 
including development, production, storage, deployment, or transfer. 
Iraq demonstrates that states interested enough to develop and produce 
chemical weapons have a reason to use them and would likely do so, 
regardless of the Geneva Protocol. There is no certainty that states 
who may have--undeclared--CW stockpiles will be under obligation to 
destroy them, as the United States has already unilaterally decided to 
do.
  Without the CWC the international norms against chemical weapons will 
erode, increasing the likelihood of their use. Despite the emphasis on 
power in international politics, norms do count. They provide the 
standards by which acceptable behavior of states can be judged and 
serve as the basis for action by the international community when 
certain behavior is deemed unacceptable. Strong global norms against 
chemical weapons could be one factor shaping the decision not to pursue 
them by countries who might consider exploring the option.
  U.S. credibility in pushing its specific positions in arms control 
forums will be undermined. Why should other countries pay attention to 
the United States and seek to accommodate its concerns if the United 
States is not going to support the final product at the end of the day? 
The standards on which the CWC is based are those put forward by 
President Reagan and President Bush. The balance of intrusion and 
constitutional and commercial protection displayed in the CWC is the 
end product of a long and deliberate debate by both Republican 
administrations in an attempt to reach an appropriate balance.
  Second, a credibility problem: If the United States is not a state 
party to the treaty, the United States will have no legal basis--no 
legal basis--to take actions against other nonstates parties. On what 
grounds, for example, could we contemplate action against Libya for 
proceeding with the Tarhuna facility if it decided to proceed? Nor 
would the United States have any moral grounds for criticizing the 
decision of others to stay outside the treaty.
  U.S. credibility and leadership will be undermined, not just on arms 
control but more broadly. Washington will have to deal with a 
perception that already exists but that nonparticipation in the CWC 
will only reinforce: that the United States bullies countries into 
assuming obligations that it is not willing to assume itself. Such 
views only strengthen the sense that others already have that the 
United States sees itself as not bound by the constraints it tries to 
impose on others. In a world that increasingly requires cooperation to 
accomplish major objectives, such a perception is damaging to the point 
of endangering vital American interests.
  Third, lacking U.S. leadership: If the United States is not a state 
party to the CWC when it enters into force on April 29 we will have no 
role in the governing body of the CWC. This is important because while 
the procedures for conducting the OPCW's business will be agreed on 
paper, how they are in fact translated into actual practice will be the 
real point at which precedents are set and work habits established.
  The United States will not have a seat on the executive council, the 
critical policy decisionmaking group of the CWC. The United States will 
not have any representation in the inspection regime. We will have no 
access to the information that inspectors and others accumulate on 
chemical weapons use, proliferation, and terrorism.
  The information that will be provided to the governing body through 
declarations and inspections will be important in its own right. Even 
more important, when it is put together with other information 
available to our intelligence community, it will help to provide a more 
accurate picture of a state's activities which may provide leads to 
uncover illicit, noncompliant activities. Not being a part of the 
governing body will mean that this valuable source of information for 
the intelligence community will be closed off.
  Why do the critics wish to hamstring our own intelligence community 
and deny it the additional pieces of information that could prove 
critical to an intelligence determination and finding that bears on 
threats to our national security interests.
  Fourth, U.S. industry will pay the price: On April 29 the clock will 
start on the 3-year period after which trade in schedule 2 chemicals--
those which can serve as direct pre-cursors to chemical weapons--with 
nonstates parties will be cut off. The U.S. chemical industry estimates 
that as much as $600 million in overseas chemical trade could be at 
risk. In fact, the impact of the cutoff is likely to be felt sooner 
than the 3 years, as trading partners begin to change their trading 
patterns--that is, shifting to new suppliers--in anticipation of the 
cutoff.
  If the United States is not a party to the CWC, it will also play no 
role in the OPCW's decision regarding whether or not the trade cutoff 
will be extended to schedule 3 chemicals--dual-purpose chemicals which 
can be used in chemical weapons--a decision that will likely be made 
soon after entry into force. Given the chemicals on schedule 3, if the 
decision is made to extend the trade cutoff, the economic impact on the 
U.S. chemical industry could be enormous, making the $600 million look 
like small change.

  Some critics have sought to intimidate American business by spreading 
unsubstantiated rumors and fears that ``Iranian inspectors are coming'' 
or that proprietary information will be at risk. But those large firms 
that might, in fact, be inspected support the treaty and the small 
firms have determined it will have no impact on them.