[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 49 (Wednesday, April 23, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3468-S3477]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
PRIVILEGE OF THE FLOOR
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent Jeanine Esperne, John
Rood, and David Stephens be granted the privilege of the floor for the
duration of the day.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from North Carolina.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, as the Senate begins final consideration of
the Chemical Weapons Convention, the immortal words of Yogi Berra come
to mind. Everybody remembers them. ``It's deja vu, all over again.''
If anyone is wondering why Jesse Helms, Senator from North Carolina,
is quoting a New York Yankee, it is because I always liked Yogi. And we
have been here before, meaning the Senate. The point being that the
Senate scheduled a time certain last September to take up this very
same treaty. But, on the day of the scheduled vote, the White House
asked to withdraw the treaty. Why? Well, because there were not 67
votes necessary to pass it.
The White House stonewalled and refused to address the key concerns
raised by Senators about the treaty, concerns relating to its
universality, its verifiability, and crushing effect on business
because they had opposed even the most reasonable modifications
proposed by this Senator and many others. That is why the treaty was
withdrawn last year. So, here we go again, with most of those critical
concerns remaining in the treaty: The Chemical Weapons Convention
certainly is not global, it is not verifiable, and it will not work.
Even its proponents admit it cannot effectively prevent the spread of
chemical weaponry.
Time and time again, the administration has portrayed this agreement
as one that will provide for a global ban on chemical weapons. I
recently read a poll showing that 84 percent of the American people
believed that this body should ratify a treaty which would ``ban the
production, possession, transfer and use of poison gas worldwide.''
That was the question asked in the poll. I quoted it verbatim. If this
treaty accomplished such a ban, I would be the first Senator on this
floor, along with Senator Kyl, urging its approval. Had the pollster
called me at home, I--if I knew nothing about the treaty, as most
Americans do not--I probably would have been among the 84 percent.
In any event, more than 8 years ago, at the confirmation hearing of
Jim Baker to be Secretary of State, I noted President Bush's statement
that he wanted to be able to tell his grandchildren that he, ``was able
to ban chemical and biological weapons from the face of the Earth.''
Quote, unquote, George Bush. I remarked at that hearing that I, too,
would like to be able to tell my grandchildren that I helped the
President and the Secretary of State attain such a goal. And that
statement that I made then is just as true today as it was on the day
that I made it. But I cannot and will not sign off on a multilateral
treaty that accomplishes none--n-o-n-e--none of the goals it purports
to address.
I have, on 5 January first days of the Senate, stood right over there
by the dais, raised my right hand, and pledged to support and defend
our country and its Constitution. I have presided over many hearings
dedicated to the careful examination of this treaty. Earlier this
month, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee heard testimony by and
from four former U.S. Defense Secretaries--Dick Cheney, Cap Weinberger,
Jim Schlesinger, Don Rumsfeld, all four urging the Senate not--not to
ratify this dangerously defective treaty.
These distinguished Americans are by no means alone. More than 50
generals and admirals and senior officials from previous
administrations have joined them in opposing this chemical weapons
treaty--convention--call it what you will. And why have all these great
Americans urged that the Senate reject this treaty? I will tell you
why. Their case can be summarized this simply: It is not global, it is
not verifiable, and it will not work. No supporter of this treaty can
tell us with a straight face how this treaty will actually accomplish
the goals that they have advertised so profusely for it.
The best argument they have mustered to date is, as I understand it,
``Oh, yes, it is defective, but it is better than nothing,'' they say.
Or they tell us that ``It creates an international norm against the
production of these weapons.'' But, in fact, this treaty is worse then
nothing.
But, in fact, Mr. President, this treaty is worse than nothing, for
this treaty gives the American people a false sense of security that
something is being done in Washington, DC, to reduce the dangers of
chemical weaponry when, in fact, nothing is being done with or by this
treaty. If anything, this treaty puts the American people at greater
risk.
That is why the administration wants to avoid at all costs a real
debate on the merits of this treaty. They know that they cannot defend
it. They say it is better than nothing. No, it is not. So they have
resorted to a number of assertions that simply do not hold up under
scrutiny. They have put forward, for example, the ``America as a rogue
state'' argument. They have said it over and over again. ``Rogue state,
rogue state.''
They say if we don't ratify the CWC, we will be left ``in the company
of pariah nations, like Iraq and North Korea,'' who have refused to
join. And then they have hit us with, ``Well, everybody's doing it. It
is going to go into effect anyhow,'' they say, and have said over and
over again, ``with or without the United States, so we might as well go
with the flow and sign up.''
Sorry, Mr. President--and I mean the distinguished Senator who is
presiding, Mr. President, and I mean the President down on Pennsylvania
Avenue as well--sorry, Mr. President, the oath that I have taken five
times standing right over there forbids my taking part in such
sophistry.
Anyhow, since when did America start letting Belgium and Luxembourg
and France and Bangladesh dictate our national security policy? The
Senate should decide whether or not to approve this treaty on the basis
of whether it is in the national interest of the United States and the
American people, not to respond to diplomatic momentum of the moment.
Frankly, I take offense at the argument that this administration is
making widely and
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frequently, that rejecting this dangerous and flawed treaty would make
America the moral--get this--the moral equivalent of terrorist states--
that means governments, countries--terrorist governments like Syria and
Iraq and Libya and North Korea. These pariahs are, at this very moment,
manufacturing chemical weapons to use against us. Don't make any
mistake about that. That is what they are doing right now as we meet.
We are unilaterally destroying our chemical stockpiles with or
without the Chemical Weapons Convention, and I think that such
rhetorical blackmail may offend the American people. We will see. The
polls are already turning around, by the way.
Mr. President, I made a commitment to the American people that I
would bring this chemical weapons treaty to the Senate floor only if it
contained all the key protections necessary to ensure that this treaty
does no harm, even if it can do no good, and that is exactly what is
happening. That is exactly why this treaty is the pending business in
the U.S. Senate at this moment.
The resolution of ratification that is now pending before the Senate
addresses all the inherent weaknesses of this treaty. With this
resolution of ratification, I can vote for this treaty in good
conscience, and I would dissuade no Senator from doing the same,
obviously. But if those key protections are removed, taken out--and the
administration says it is going to happen, they are going to be taken
out, they boast--then we should refuse to ratify this treaty for the
reasons that we will discuss in greater detail in the hours ahead.
I doubt that there is a Senator in this body who has not heard a
great deal about the 28 conditions in this resolution of ratification
that have been agreed upon by the distinguished Senator Biden, who is
the ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee, the
administration, and me. I commend my friend, Joe Biden, for his
willingness to work with me in good faith to address those issues. I
have told him so privately, and I now tell him so publicly. As Joe
Biden has pointed out, he spent many hours in my office in direct
negotiations with me and my staff in an effort to reach some common
ground.
Many of the 28 conditions contain commonsense provisions that never
should have been contested by the administration in the first place.
For example, these conditions, among other things, require the creation
of an inspector general. They limit the burden on the American
taxpayer. They preserve the Australia Group. They assert the right to
use tear gas in combat situations.
Let me tell you something, if they had not yielded on that question
about our using tear gas to help our downed pilots escape from the
enemy, this treaty would never have come to the floor. Unfortunately,
the Clinton administration has made clear--made clear--that it intends
to remove five vital protections that Senator Lott and I and others
have included to address the defects of the treaty, or some of them. By
stripping those key conditions from this resolution, the administration
is asking the Senate to ratify a treaty which, first, will affect
almost none of the terrorist regimes whose possession of chemical
weapons actually threatens the United States, such as Libya, Iraq,
Syria, and North Korea; second, which the administration admits that
they can't verify, and they can't verify this treaty. Do you remember
what Ronald Reagan used to say? Trust but verify. Ronald Reagan is sort
of halfway implicitly credited with this treaty. I think I knew Ronald
Reagan as well as anybody. I was the first sitting Senator to support
Ronald Reagan's candidacy, and I knew how he felt about treaties
because he felt then as I feel now about treaties.
Third, the administration knows that Russia is already violating the
chemical weapons treaty, even before it goes into effect, by pursuing
an entirely new generation of chemical agents specifically designed to
circumvent the CWC, as we call it around this place, violating Russia's
existing bilateral chemical weapons agreement with the United States
signed some years ago and--I have to use this word--lying about their
chemical stockpiles. And we are supposed to trot in and ratify this
treaty? Not this Senator. Not this Senator.
Fourth, the administration is supporting a treaty which allows
inspectors from China and rogue states, such as Iran, to descend upon
American businesses, rifle through the business confidential documents
in each of these places, to interrogate the employees of the business,
and to remove secret business information and chemical samples whenever
they want to.
A law enforcement officer in the United States cannot do that. You
have to get a search warrant issued by a court.
Fifth, the administration feels that under articles X and XI, which
involve the transfer of dangerous chemicals, chemical manufacturing
technology and advanced chemical defense gear to any nation who signs
on, including terrorist states like Iran and Cuba and known
proliferators, such as Russia and China, the administration said, ``No,
no, we can't have that. We can't have that.'' That's what they say. We
are going to find out tomorrow, or perhaps earlier, how the U.S. Senate
feels about that, because there is going to be a vote on that specific
question.
We have protections in the current resolution of ratification which
address all of these issues, as I have said before, and while all of
these matters are vitally important, the final concluding issue, I
believe, is the key to this entire debate. What is it?
The proponents of this treaty have been telling the American people
over and over and over again that this treaty will ``ban chemical
weapons from the face of the Earth.'' How many times have I heard that
by some very good friends of mine in the administration? Let me tell
them something, and let me tell you something, Mr. President. With
articles X and XI intact, this treaty will, in fact, do the exact
opposite. It will, in fact, facilitate the spread of poison gas to the
very rogue countries most likely to use it against American citizens.
So I guess the question is, who would give the terrorist crowd in
Iran chemical agents and chemical technology that they can use to build
chemical weapons? Who would do that? Who would vote to give Iran the
secrets to our most advanced chemical defensive equipment, the
technology we have designed to protect our troops from poison-gas
attack? Not this U.S. Senator. I will never, never vote to do that,
because I stood over there five times and said I would not. But that is
exactly what the Clinton administration is asking us to do by insisting
that we ratify this treaty with articles X and XI intact.
Do not take my word about all of this. Heed the warnings of some
people that I believe most Americans admire and respect. Let's take
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, who served in a previous
administration, the Bush administration. Dick Cheney provided written
testimony to the Foreign Relations Committee earlier this month. Let me
quote him. This is Dick Cheney talking:
Articles X and XI amount to a formula for greatly
accelerating the proliferation of chemical warfare
capabilities around the world.
I have heard Dick Cheney make many a speech, but I never before heard
him as emphatic in his declaration about anything previous to this.
Mr. President, anybody who wants a road map for how this will work
need only examine how Russia has taken advantage of similar provisions
in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Today, Russia is using the
NNPT to justify, what? To justify Russia's sale of nuclear reactors
under a provision known as atoms for peace. Under the chemical weapons
treaty, articles X and XI, or poisons for peace provisions, as we call
them, Russia and/or China could decide, for example, to build a
chemical manufacturing facility in Iran and argue not only that are
they allowed to give Iran this technology, but that they are obligated
to do it under a treaty, mind you, that a lot of people are advocating
that the United States Senate ratify tomorrow before dark.
Worse still, the Chemical Weapons Convention also requires that we
share our latest advanced chemical defensive gear with all of these
countries. What that means is that, through reverse engineering, Iran
could figure out how to penetrate our chemical defense, increasing not
only the risk of American
[[Page S3470]]
troops being exposed to poison gas but the chances of a chemical attack
actually taking place by undermining the defensive deterrent value.
The administration has agreed that it will not give such American
technology to Iran. I think they mean it as far as it goes, but this
agreement with the President will not stop other countries from doing
it. Articles X and XI still facilitate trade in these technologies with
more than 100 countries, many, if not most, of which do not share our
policy of isolating Iran, don't you see. If they get access to United
States defensive technology under the chemical weapons treaty, they
will share it with other signatories, like Iran. And they could do so
lawfully without violating the treaty. Further, they will share their
own defense technology against dangerous dual-use chemicals regardless
of what the United States says or does.
What will happen once we put a plethora of chemical and defensive
secrets out on the world market? I think you know, Mr. President. It
will be only a matter of time, and a short time, before these rogue
states which do not sign the treaty will get access to these defensive
secrets. Iran will certainly share them with Syria and Libya. And who
knows who they will, in turn, share them with.
Ronald Reagan, as I said earlier, said that our policy in arms
control--arms control of all types--must be ``trust but verify.'' With
the Chemical Weapons Convention we can do neither. So why would we
agree to a treaty which would share advanced chemicals and know-how and
defensive gear with unworthy regimes? That is precisely the question
before the U.S. Senate today.
We can ratify the CWC with these key protections in place. But if the
administration insists on stripping them out, taking them out, then
they will have invited the Senate to refuse to ratify the chemical
weapons treaty. It is up to them. Unless we include protections on
these issues, any agreement we have reached on other matters amounts to
little more than adding sweetener to hemlock. They may make the treaty
easier to swallow, but it remains, Mr. President, just as deadly as
ever before and just as injurious to the national security interest of
the United States of America.
Mr. President, we know Senators plan to address important aspects of
this convention; therefore, at this time I shall defer to my colleagues
who may wish to discuss this convention in greater detail, beginning
with my distinguished friend, Senator Biden.
For the reasons I have discussed and for the reasons that Senators
will hear in the hours ahead, obviously, I am strongly urging the
Senate to oppose any amendments to strike key protections from the
resolution of ratification.
Mr. President, I thank the Chair and I yield the floor.
Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Hutchinson). The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. I yield myself as much time as may be necessary.
Mr. President, as my distinguished friend, the chairman of the
committee, leaves the floor, let me note that he and I came to the
Senate the same year, 1972. I, like he, on five occasions --four here
and one in a hospital--raised my right hand and swore to uphold the
Constitution. We have both done that, to the best of my knowledge, for
the past 24 years.
Let me just say that just as beauty is in the eye of the beholder,
security and upholding the oath of office, how to protect and defend
the United States of America, is in the eye of the Senator. I do not
doubt for one single second that my friend from North Carolina believes
what he says, that he does not believe this treaty is in the interest
of the United States of America and, by inference, he would not be
upholding or defending the Constitution of the United States were he to
vote for it, other than with the killer amendments attached to it that
would effectively end the treaty.
I think it is important for the listeners to put in perspective a
little focus here as to how much verification is necessary to defend
our interest and how much is enough and what tradeoffs constitute our
interests.
Let me just say that my friend and I have worked together for years
and years. As I said, we came here together, 1972. We got elected in
the same year. To the best of my knowledge, my friend has not voted on
the floor for an arms control agreement, ever.
Although the Senate overwhelmingly passed the START Treaty negotiated
by Ronald Reagan--``trust but verify'' Reagan--my friend from North
Carolina voted against it because he did not think it was verifiable.
Ronald Reagan thought it was verifiable. Ronald Reagan, who said
``trust but verify,'' he negotiated the treaty. He sent it to the U.S.
Senate. We voted for it. Senator Helms did not.
I do not say this as a criticism but an observation. Because if you
listen to Senator Helms, it makes it sound as though he is just like
Ronald Reagan. Well, he is not like Ronald Reagan. Bush finally
concluded the START I agreement, but it was Reagan who had negotiated
it. Reagan supported the START I agreement. President Reagan, I
understand, supported the START II agreement. Senator Helms voted
against both of them because he did not believe they were--and I
believe he meant it--he did not believe they were in the security
interests of the United States of America.
So again the reason I mention it is that you will hear a lot of
appeals to authority today. You will hear a number of ad hominem
arguments and a number of infallible arguments invoked on the floor of
the Senate today by all of us. It is a debating technique. But I think
one of my objectives today is going to try to be sort of the truth
squad here, to make sure we are comparing apples and apples and oranges
and oranges and we remember who did what.
So before the day is over, someone probably will invoke the name of
George McGovern, somehow. I do not know how George McGovern will get
into this, but I promise you that will happen as evidence that these
arms control treaties are bad things that just soft-headed liberals do.
Ronald Reagan is no soft-headed liberal.
My friend from North Carolina is a staunch conservative, but he
parted company with other staunch conservatives who thought START I,
START II and the INF agreements were all bad treaties. We negotiated
the INF agreement when Senator Helms and I were here. Ronald Reagan
proposed that. I do not know how he voted on that. But I would not be
surprised if he voted against that. And ``trust but verify'' Reagan not
only negotiated it, but submitted it.
Mr. President, the debate we are commencing today is not only about a
global treaty--it is important, it is global, and it addresses the
chemical weapons threat. Quite frankly--and my distinguished friend
from Indiana, Senator Lugar, will speak to this at length because he is
so articulate when he does--it is about nothing less than America's
leadership in the post-cold-war era. I mean, it really is that simple.
It is above and beyond the issue of merely the chemical weapons
treaty, which I will speak to in detail, and why this treaty is such a
good treaty. But it is well beyond that. It is well beyond that.
Over the course of two decades and three administrations, the United
States of America has led--has led--the world in developing a
comprehensive treaty designed to outlaw chemical weapons. Now, less
than a week before this treaty goes into effect, with or without the
United States of America, the world watches to see what the world's
greatest deliberative body is going to do. I mean, it sounds a bit
melodramatic, but it is literally that serious. It is that fundamental.
This treaty is going into effect no matter what happens, because the
way the treaty is, if over 65 nations signed on to it, it automatically
goes into effect 6 months later. So whether we vote for it or not, a
total of 74 nations of the world have now said, ``This is a good
treaty. We sign on to it. We commit to it.'' So it is going into
effect.
What is it going to look like, as the world watches us--and, believe
it or not, they watch us; the American public may not watch us a lot
here in the Senate but the rest of the world is watching--when the
possessor of the one of the two largest stockpiles of chemical weapons
in the world, who unilaterally agreed to destroy those weapons--us--
when we do not ratify a
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treaty that 74 nations have already ratified?
But there are the anti-arms controllers who believe there has never
been an arms control agreement that is worth having. I respectfully
suggest that the Senator from North Carolina is among them.
He stood up on the floor when we were debating this before it came on
the floor, and he said, quoting someone, that America ``has never lost
a war, nor has it ever won a treaty.''
Remember, that is what this is about. This dividing line is between
people who believe that there is no way in the world you can
multilaterally sign on to anything because you cannot trust anybody;
the only thing we can trust is ourselves. Therefore, whatever we do, do
it unilaterally. Senator Helms has never voted for an arms control
treaty on the floor of the U.S. Senate, including the ones negotiated
by Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, and Bush. We have all been here for all
those Presidents.
I am not being critical. I just want to make you understand the
dividing line here. This is not about the little pieces. This is about
whether or not you think we can have any kind of multilateral
agreements relative to controlling any kind of arms.
Our friend from Arizona, the distinguished Senator, Senator Kyl,
introduced a unilateral effort to stem chemical weapons. It was great,
but it does not affect any other nations. No one else signed on to it.
That is sort of the mantra you get from our friends who oppose arms
control--we can do it ourselves. But how can we control the rest of the
world unless they are part of an agreement that we are part of?
The real issue is, will we remain in the forefront of the battle to
contain weapons of mass destruction, the preeminent security threat of
this era, or will we retreat from the challenge and be lulled into
believing we can combat this scourge of chemical weapons on our own? I
know what the answer to that is. The answer is: We cannot do it on our
own. I hope the Senate will answer in the affirmative that we have to
do this globally.
But before we face that moment of decision sometime tomorrow evening,
we are going to spend 2 days in debate here, and we are going to vote
when I move to strike five specific conditions on the Helms proposal
that is before us.
As we commence this debate, I think it is instructive to briefly
trace the history of the problem of poison gas and the efforts of the
world community to address the threat.
Today is April 23. And 82 years ago, almost, today, 82 years ago
yesterday, April 22, at 5 o'clock in the evening, a green cloud boiled
up out of the east near the town of Ypres in Flanders.
The modern use of chemical weapons had begun. On that day, the use of
chlorine gas achieved a significant tactical advantage for the German
attackers in World War I. But within 8 days, gas masks were made
available to the allies and, thereafter, in World War I, the use of
poison gas as a method of warfare was not especially effective as
compared to the primary weapons of artillery and machine guns. But
``terrible beauty had been born,'' to paraphrase Yeats--poison gas had
been used.
As a weapon of terror, poison gas continued to be exceedingly
effective in World War I and had an appalling effect on its victims
along the front lines. Soldiers in trenches knew all too well the
terror and horror of gas. Wilfred Owen, who was killed in action in
1918 described the terror in his poem, ``Dulce et Decorum Est.'' I
would like to read from that poem.
Gas! Gas! Quick, boys!--An ecstasy of fumbling,
Fitting the clumsy helmets just in time,
But someone still was yelling out and stumbling,
And floundering like a man in fire or lime.
Dim through the misty panes and thick green light,
As under a green sea, I saw him drowning.
In all my dreams, before my helpless sight.
He plunges at me, guttering, choking, drowning.
If in some smothering dreams, you too could pace
Behind the wagon that we flung him in,
And watch the white eyes writing in his face,
His hanging face, like a devil's sick of sin;
If you could hear, at every jolt the blood
Come gargling from the froth-corrupted lungs,
Obscene as cancer, bitter as the cud
Of vile, incurable sores on innocent tongues,
My friend, you would not tell with such high zest.
To children ardent for some desperate glory,
The old Lie: Dulce et decorum est,
Pro patria mori.
Translated, it means: It is sweet and fitting to die for the
fatherland.
The international revulsion against the use of poison gas in World
War I led the United States, once again, to press for an international
agreement banning the practice. The result, in 1925, was the Geneva
Protocol, which prohibits the use in war of poison gas and
bacteriological weapons. For much of this century, with a few
exceptions, this norm was honored. During the Second World War, where
restraints were hardly the rule, no party saw fit to violate the norm.
Even Adolf Hitler obeyed it, although presumably not out of any sense
of honor, but out of fear of allied retaliation. Hitler's restraint on
the battlefield, unfortunately, did not carry forward to the
concentration camps where he used gas to slaughter defenseless
innocents, millions of them.
The norm contained in the Geneva Protocol eroded considerably in the
1980's, when both parties in the Iran-Iraq War employed gas during a
war of attrition that ended in stalemate. The use of chemical weapons
in that war provided no significant breakthroughs on the battlefield,
but it did give Saddam Hussein an idea, and that idea was to use poison
gas against defenseless civilians in Iraqi Kurdistan following a cease-
fire in the war with Iran.
In August 1988, Saddam launched his final offensive against dozens of
villages, killing hundreds and causing tens of thousands to flee to
neighboring countries. A staff report prepared for the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee by our present Ambassador to Croatia, Peter
Galbraith, was based on interviews with survivors. He described the
atrocities in vivid detail in that report: ``The bombs''--meaning the
chemical bombs--``did not produce a large explosion, only a weak sound
that could be heard, and then a yellowish cloud spread from the center
of the explosion. Those who were very close to the bombs died almost
instantly. Those who did not die instantly found it difficult to
breathe and began to vomit. The gas stung the eyes, skin, and lungs of
the villagers exposed to it. Many suffered temporary blindness. After
the bombs exploded, many villagers ran and submerged themselves in
nearby streams to escape the spreading gas. Many of those that made it
to the streams survived. Those who could not run from the growing
smell--mostly the very old and the very young--died. The survivors, who
saw the dead reported that blood could be seen trickling out of the
mouths of some of the bodies, a yellowish fluid could also be seen
oozing out of the noses and mouths of some of the dead. Some said the
bodies appeared frozen. Many of the dead bodies turned blackish blue.''
Saddam's outrageous act, unfortunately, prompted only muted response
from the world community. One of the few sounds of protest came from
this body, where Senator Claiborne Pell, now retired, and the chairman
of the committee, Senator Helms, promptly introduced legislation to
impose sanctions against Iraq. The bill sailed through the Senate on a
voice vote the day after it was introduced. Unfortunately, the Reagan
administration, at that time still operating under the delusion that it
could deal with Saddam, denounced the chairman's bill as premature and
later succeeded in blocking its enactment in the final days of the
100th Congress--a fact we tend to forget.
Saddam's atrocities, although not a violation of the Geneva
Protocol--you know, it wasn't a violation of the Geneva Protocol. That
Geneva Protocol only banned the use of chemical weapons in war. This
was not a war. So the irony of all ironies is that the first guy to use
poison gas since the Italians in Ethiopia in the 1930's, didn't even
violate the Geneva Protocol. It was used in the Iran-Iraq War, which
was a violation because that was international war.
The Geneva Protocol bans the use of chemical weapons in warfare, and
the extensive use of gas in the Iran-Iraq War was banned but still
occurred. Ironically, it had a positive effect, Mr. President. They
catalyzed the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on
strengthening the Geneva
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Protocol, which were already underway. President Reagan gave the effort
a very important push--that is, the effort to deal with containing
chemical weapons--during his annual address to the U.N. General
Assembly that fall, where he urged the parties to the protocol, as well
as other concerned states, to convene a conference to review the
deterioration of respect of the norm against the use of chemical
weapons.
France obliged President Reagan by hosting a special conference in
January 1989. Eighteen months later, Saddam Hussein struck again by
invading Kuwait this time. But this time the international community,
led by President Bush, reacted forcefully to Saddam's latest outrage.
Thankfully, chemical weapons were not used in the gulf war, although
Saddam suggested he might do so. And an Iraqi weapons depot containing
such weapons was destroyed by coalition forces after the war.
Ironically, the only reported exposure to poison gas for allied troops
resulted from an Iraqi stockpile that was perfectly legal under
international law. The only thing illegal is to use it in international
conflict--not to manufacture it, not to stockpile it, and not to use it
internally.
The specter that chemical weapons might have been used in the gulf
war, however, gave a new urgency to the negotiations on the Chemical
Weapons Convention. In May 1991, President Bush who, as Vice President,
had first proposed the draft treaty in 1984 on behalf of President
Reagan--so Reagan proposed the first draft--President Bush announced
several steps that spurred the negotiations to a successful conclusion.
Specifically, he declared that the United States would forswear the use
of chemical weapons against any state, effective when the Chemical
Weapons Convention enters into force. Additionally, the United States
committed to destroy all its chemical weapons stockpile.
So I want to get something straight here. Whether or not we are
members of this treaty and have the benefits, we are going to destroy
our chemical weapons anyway. We have already decided to do that. We
have already pledged to do that. President Bush pledged that once the
convention went into force, we would also forswear the use, period. The
Bush proposal, made at the time, had the desired effect. Within months,
the negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention were completed. The
treaty was signed by Secretary of State Eagleburger on January 13,
1993, 1 week before President Bush left office.
Now, Mr. President, this review of the history of the Chemical
Weapons Convention is necessary not only to set the stage for this
debate, in my view, but also to rebut the myth which has arisen in some
quarters that this is President Clinton's treaty. This is President
Bush's treaty and President Reagan's treaty. The treaty was initiated
by Reagan, concluded by Bush. This week, we can continue that
Republican legacy by giving the Senate's consent to ratification of the
Chemical Weapons Convention. So this is not a product of anything other
than the intensive efforts on the part of this administration to pass a
treaty signed by a Republican President, of which this President did
not change a single word, did not have one bit of input on. The only
input the present President had is on seeking the Senate's approval.
Had President Bush been reelected, it would be real clear that this is
a total Republican product, which is a good thing, not a bad thing. The
reason I am bothering to say this is, if you listen here, you hear a
lot of confusing talk, because some of my Republican friends
understandably aren't real crazy about President Clinton, you will hear
this talked about, saying the President did this and that, and the
President promised this or that. This President had nothing to do with
this treaty, zero, nothing. In getting it ratified, he has been
tremendous in helping that process. So I do not want anybody getting
confused here. If you do not like this treaty, dislike it for a good
reason. Don't dislike it because you do not like the foreign policy of
Clinton or you do not like the domestic policy of Clinton or you do not
like President Clinton. This is a Republican treaty, born and bred.
By the way, I think it is one of their proudest achievements. I think
it is a fine thing, and they deserve the credit. But let's not get into
these--you will hear these ad hominem arguments this day about this
liberal President did this liberal thing; we got sucked in by these
all-knowing and smarter nations to get us to do these things with the
treaty. Malarkey. Bush and Reagan said we are not going to use any
chemical weapons; we are going to destroy our stockpiles; whether there
is a treaty, or not, we will put that in the legislation; we are going
to destroy our stockpile. They negotiated a treaty and sent it up here.
Unfortunately for President Bush, he was not reelected. So it is left
on the watch of this President to get it ratified. There are the facts.
The question still remains, though, regardless of who negotiated this
treaty, why do we need it? The answer still, in essence in my view, is
very simple. Notwithstanding the Herculean efforts of my friend from
Arizona, Senator Kyl, who is on the floor, we cannot contain the threat
of chemical weapons on our own. Let me repeat that. We cannot contain
the threat of chemical weapons on our own. I would love it if we could.
It should be obvious that our objective of combating the global threat
of chemical weapons cannot be met without working in concert with other
nations. We may be the world's lone superpower, Mr. President, but that
does not empower us to solve the chemical weapons problem on our own.
Mr. President, the convention is quite detailed, as it necessarily
must be. This is the treaty. It is quite detailed in its several
provisions upon which there will be specific debate over the course of
the next 2 days. But, for the moment, let me highlight the reasons why
this treaty will advance our national interests.
First, the convention addresses two key flaws in the Geneva
Protocol--that is the thing that outlaws the use of chemical weapons in
international war--which focused on a single wrong. The Geneva Protocol
focused on one thing. It banned the use of chemical weapons in
international armed conflict, period. A good thing, but not nearly
enough.
The reason we need this treaty: The first reason is the Geneva
Protocol doesn't ban the internal use of chemical weapons, and it says
nothing about stockpiling the development of or the production of
chemical weapons. Today, roughly 20 countries are believed to either
possess chemical weapons or have a program aimed at acquiring such
weapons. Included on this list are such pariah states as Iraq, Iran,
Libya, or North Korea. Under current international law there is nothing
illegal about these programs--nothing, zero, nothing illegal about
these programs. The Chemical Weapons Convention will make them illegal
and thus serve to isolate those who ignore this international norm.
My friends will later point out today and tomorrow that unless these
countries all ratify and become signatories, we should not. Let me
explain to you why it is equally important that we determine who is
inside the norm and who is outside the norm. The convention will
provide a moral, if not legal, basis for taking military action against
a chemical weapons program that poses a threat to peace whether or not
that nation is a signatory to the convention. Let me explain what I
mean by that.
Let's assume that North Korea or Libya never entered this convention.
Let's assume we enter it and the other nations who have signed it enter
it. Let's assume that number, which I think is realistic to assume,
gets closer to 100. Let's assume Libya, that we find out, or are able
to demonstrate to the world through this international group of
inspectors or through our own national technical means, that Libya is
producing and stockpiling chemical weapons. Even though they have not
signed onto the treaty, let's assume that we conclude that we should
take military action to take out that capability--``take out'' meaning
bomb it, destroy it, get rid of it--I believe, and I predict that you
will see the world community sanctioning that action, at a minimum by
their silence and probably with an overwhelming degree of support.
But let my ask it another way. Let's say we don't sign onto this
treaty. Libya develops a significant stockpile of chemical weapons. We
identify it, show the world, and decide we are
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going to take it out. What do you think will happen then? Do you think
there is any reasonable prospect the world will coalesce around our
effort to protect us and the rest of the world? I respectfully suggest
to you that there is not a chance. So this is a significant inhibitor
even to those nations that do not sign onto the treaty because it
establishes an international norm.
The second reason why this treaty is important is that the Chemical
Weapons Convention provides this strict regime for controlling trade in
precursor chemicals used in making chemical weapons because chemicals
commonly used in industry are also able to be used to produce chemical
weapons. The only way to effectively control chemical weapons on a
global basis is to provide a strict control and monitoring regarding
the commercial trade in these kinds of chemicals that can ultimately
produce chemical weapons. Accordingly, the convention provides several
mechanisms, including annual reporting by companies and export
controls, to track the chemicals. Parties which do not join the treaty
will be left on the outside of the system subject to cutting off trade
in those certain chemicals, along with other restrictions that the
convention will impose.
Failure to ratify the convention will in time impose onerous costs on
any chemical industry in any state that does not sign, including our
own. In our case, it will be the loss of--at minimum--hundreds of
millions of dollars in lost export earnings annually. This financial
loss would be a cruel irony because the United States pushed to put
these controls in the treaty.
Do you all remember when we were trying to track down who sold the
technology and the material to the Iraqis to build their nuclear and/or
chemical capability? Remember all of that? We tried to track down, and
we tracked down some German companies which had provided the
engineering and other companies from France, and other countries had
provided some of the material, et cetera.
Guess what? It is important to know who is selling what. Any outfit
that signs onto this treaty could not sell without reporting in detail
what they sold to each of these countries who are signatories to the
treaty. Guess what? If you don't ratify the treaty and you sell certain
chemicals abroad, you will be unable to sell them to the countries that
have ratified, including our largest trading partners. Chemicals are
our single largest export. OK? I know people who think I am a little
prejudiced on this because I come from Delaware, occasionally referred
to by some facetiously as ``The State of DuPont.'' Chemicals and the
chemical industry make up 51 percent of the industrial products of my
State. If we do not sign onto this treaty, we are in real trouble
because then we can't trade our chemicals. We can't trade certain
chemicals, which is our State's biggest export and which produces the
most jobs, other than agriculture. We can't trade. We will have tariffs
put up against us in other countries.
Why do we do that? We, the United States, President Bush did that
because we were so sure that we would sign on and see the wisdom of
this. We wanted to make sure that countries who didn't sign on suffered
a penalty for not signing on.
So now, if we vote this voice vote which we are going to have after
our caucuses, as Senator Helms proposes, guess what? We kill the treaty
and our chemical industry, and the jobs associated with it will be in
real trouble.
But remember why that was put in there. It was put in there because
we want to track chemical trade. You know everybody is watching the
Timothy McVeigh trial. You don't have to be a rocket scientist or an
expert in chemicals to know that one of the things the prosecution is
trying to do is they are trying to find out whether he purchased any
material that could be used to make the bomb. So they are trying to
find a chain. They are trying to work their way back. That is the way
you stop the building of chemical weapons. If you are going to go make
chemical weapons, you need certain chemicals. Countries like Iraq and
countries like Libya don't have them. They need to buy them from
someplace that manufactures them and then go make their chemical
weapons.
So another inducement to prevent the construction of chemical weapons
is that we track the material that could be used, components, to make
the chemical weapons. If company officials know they are going to be
violating the law if they don't record that they sold 10 barrels of
such and such, that is one side of the sanction. But they also know
that, if they sell it to countries that use it to produce poison gas,
and report it, then they are going to be responsible in the world's
eyes.
What do you think would happen if we knew today each of the chemical
companies around the world that sold to Iraq the components of the
chemical weapons that they used against the Kurds? What do you think
would happen if we are able to identify company A, B, C, and D? I bet
you that there would be a serious change in attitudes on the part of
those companies.
There is no reason to believe this, but let's assume that we
identified American corporations which had sold the material to the
Iraqis to build their chemical weapons stockpiles. I will lay you 8 to
5 that the Senators on the floor of this Senate and Congressmen in the
House of Representatives would immediately be introducing legislation
to sanction those companies, and those companies would know that was
about to happen to them.
So you see the logic here. If you can trace the chemicals being sold
to produce the weapons, you inhibit the likelihood that any company
will sell that precursor because they don't want to be listed as the
company or the nation that helped North Korea build chemical weapons.
Technically, not all trade in the chemicals on what they call
schedule 2 of this treaty would be banned immediately if we do not sign
on, and trade in schedule 3 chemicals, would also not be banned
immediately. But trade between countries that ratify and countries that
don't in all of those chemicals that appear in schedule 2 will be
banned in 3 years, and in schedule 3, possibly in 5 years. That means
that, if we are not signed onto that at the front end or along the way,
all those chemicals that have legitimate uses could not be sold for
legitimate purposes without the chemical company being at a distinct
disadvantage with the competitors in Europe and elsewhere.
The third reason we need the Chemical Weapons Convention is that the
United States has already decided by law--voted on in this body--to
destroy most of our chemical weapons stocks anyway, a decision jointly
made by the Congress and, guess who, ``trust but verify'' Reagan. In
the 1980's, President Reagan, after consulting with his military
advisers, said, look, these chemical stockpiles, the hundreds and
hundreds of tons of chemicals weapons that we have stockpiled in the
United States, have little or no efficacy. Our military tells us we
don't need them to defend against other nations that use chemical
weapons, and we don't need them for offensive purposes and they are
unstable, so we are going to independently destroy them. And we passed
a law saying you are right, Mr. President Reagan, destroy them.
So think of the irony. We are going to destroy our chemical weapons
no matter what, and we may not join a treaty that requires other
nations to destroy their chemical weapons.
After the gulf war, President Bush announced that we would destroy
the rest of our chemical weapons other than the ones that President
Reagan said we are going to destroy anyway. Then President Bush, after
the Gulf war, said we are going to destroy anything that is left once
we ratify the chemical weapons treaty.
There is a connection here. I used to practice law with a guy who was
a very good trial lawyer, Sidney Balick, still a great trial lawyer. He
would stand before a jury, teaching me how to do jury trials, and he
would look at the jury and say now look, it is very important you keep
your eye on the ball here. The issue is whether or not my client robbed
the store, not whether my client is a nice guy, not whether or not you
would want my client to go out with your daughter, not whether my
client is well dressed, not whether my client is nice looking. It is
about whether or not he robbed the store. So keep your eye on the ball
and connect the dots.
Well, one of the things we have to do is keep our eye on the ball
here and connect the dots. One of the reasons
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why President Bush said we will destroy the rest of our chemical
weapons was to help get ratified this treaty that we were the major
architects of--a Republican President. And so because we have already
decided to dismantle our chemical stockpiles, this convention we are
talking about, this treaty will ensure that other nations do so as
well.
As Secretary of State Albright said: ``This treaty is about other
people's weapons, not our own.''
Let me repeat that. ``This treaty is about other people's weapons,
not our own.'' We are going to destroy our own anyway. This is about
other people's weapons. You are going to hear our colleagues stand up
and say, you know, we should not ratify this treaty, although it has
been signed by Russia, until it is ratified by their Duma, their
Congress.
Now, we are going to destroy our weapons anyway. We then do not
ratify this treaty. Failure to ratify this treaty then gives Russia the
excuse not to ratify the treaty. We will have destroyed all of our
chemical weapons and Russia will still have millions of tons of
stockpiled chemical weapons. Now, isn't that smart. Isn't that smart.
What are we talking about here? This is about other people's weapons,
not ours, not ours.
The conclusion that we do not need chemical weapons to protect our
military superiority, by the way, is based not on some reckless
idealism but on hardheaded pragmatism on the part of the Joint Chiefs.
Military leaders like Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, Gen. Colin Powell,
former Secretaries of Defense Harold Brown and William Perry tell us
that we do not need chemical weapons to defeat any potential adversary
whether or not that adversary is armed with chemical weapons. We can
engage in massive retaliation.
This treaty, by the way, is also endorsed by several highly respected
veterans organizations. The list includes the Reserve Officers
Association, the Vietnam Veterans Association, the Veterans of Foreign
Wars, and the Jewish War Veterans of the United States.
Of course, Mr. President, we have to maintain a capacity and
capability to defend against chemical weapons, against parties that may
choose not to join the treaty or those which do not abide by its norms.
But the danger that our forces will face chemical attack will in time
be greatly reduced once this treaty is passed. So too will the threat
that innocent civilians will be subject to such attacks by rogue
states.
The fourth reason we need this convention is because it will greatly
enhance our ability to detect and deter chemical weapons programs.
Through a detailed accounting procedure and an elaborate regime of on-
site inspection, the most intrusive inspection regime of any arms
control agreement ever negotiated, the Chemical Weapons Convention will
strengthen our ability to ensure compliance.
You are going to hear another argument which I kind of find
fascinating. As the Senator from Indiana and I tried to answer each of
the arguments of the opponents of this treaty, we realized that by
answering one we make their other argument. They argue at cross-
purposes. For example, you will hear some stand up one moment and say
this treaty is not adequately verifiable. And we say OK, we have an
inspection regime that allows you to go into plants in other countries,
challenge inspections without notice, et cetera. They say, well, it is
not enough. It is not enough. And we say OK, want to do more? They say,
no, no, no, no, we can't do more. We don't want to do more. We don't
want to verify.
Why don't we want to verify? Because to verify intrudes upon your
sovereignty.
So you hear a second argument. Senator Helms made it. He says, you
know, this treaty will allow people to go into the plants of chemical
industries in the United States and pharmaceutical industries--and soap
manufacturers, which is not true--and steal their trade secrets. So
someone is going to challenge the DuPont Co., the international
community, saying we think you are making chemical weapons. So this
team of inspectors will go into the DuPont Co., they will have us
believe, and they will root around the DuPont Co.'s books and look at
all their patents and look at everything and steal their trade secrets,
take them back to Iraq and now make nylon or make Corfam, which no one
uses anymore. And we say, well, to the degree we protect against that,
we lessen the ability to verify. And to the degree we increase the
verification, we can protect less against that.
The truth is neither are real. There is an entire regime built into
this convention that will prevent anybody from being able to steal any
trade secrets. But the point is you will hear these arguments. Ask
yourself as this debate is going on, if they are really concerned about
verification, why do they not want a greater ability to verify. And if
they are really concerned about the loss of proprietary business
interests and secrets, why do they not understand that they really do
not want to verify.
With or without the treaty, Mr. President--this is a key point--
whether we sign this treaty or not, the United States intelligence
community, the defense intelligence establishment, the CIA, our entire
intelligence apparatus, is still going to have the duty to monitor
chemical weapons programs in other States. The President will demand no
less, nor would we as a Nation. So no matter what we do, we are still
going to be attempting to monitor through any means we can what is
going on in Iran with regard to chemical weapons or Iraq with regard to
chemical weapons, whether or not we verify. But what happens if we do
not verify? Well, if we do not verify, then we do not get the ability
to go into Iran, a signatory to this convention--and look at their
companies, look at their facilities, challenge whether or not they are
in fact lying to us. We do not get to be part of that. We have to do it
from a distance.
Now, how does that help us? No matter how weak you think the
inspection regime is, how are we better off in our ultimate objective--
and that is finding and getting rid of chemical weapons programs around
the world--how are we better off by not having access to the
inspections that we could be part of conducting if we are part of the
treaty?
In my view, every single criticism you will hear of this treaty is
worse without the treaty. Every single problem you will hear raised is
worse for the United States if we are not in the treaty. I will not
take the time now to go into all of them but this is just one. Since we
have to have our intelligence guys and women find out what other
countries are doing, how are we better off when we do not give them the
tools that this treaty provides to find out what other nations are
doing.
This view is confirmed by George Tenet, the acting director of
Central Intelligence, who testified:
In the absence of the tools that the Convention gives . . .
us, it will be much harder for us to apprise . . . the
military and policymakers (about) developments.
Developments meaning chemical weapons. Of course, there are going to
be cheaters. But the extensive verification regime will surely raise
the stakes considerably for cheaters and act as a deterrent.
Ron Lehman, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
under President Bush and the Deputy National Security Adviser under
President Reagan, stated:
We do not have the highest confidence that we will detect
cheating, but the cheater must still worry that we might.
Should we deny ourselves the strategic warning that comes
from the detection of indications of chemical weapons
activity, even if there is not complete proof? With the
inherent difficulties in monitoring chemical weapons
activities, we need all the help we can get.
Mr. President, it comes down to a simple question. Given that the
treaty will enter into force next week without regard to our action,
will we be better off inside the treaty or outside the treaty grouped
with the pariah nations? I believe the answer is absolutely clear. We
should be on the inside helping to implement the treaty that can be a
powerful instrument in containing the threat posed by chemical weapons.
It is not perfect, but we should not let the perfect be the enemy of
the good. This is a good treaty and the Senate should consent to its
ratification forthwith.
Before we go to the final vote on the treaty itself, however, we will
have a full day of debate and then tomorrow consider the various
conditions contained in the proposed resolution of ratification. As
provided for in the unanimous consent agreement reached last week, we
will consider two sets of conditions. The first is a group of 28
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conditions upon which all the parties have negotiated.
Senator Helms laid out how long and hard he and I negotiated. I asked
him and all opponents, I said list the entire universe of objections
you have to this treaty, every single, solitary, conceivable reason to
be against the treaty. And after months they listed them all. It came
to 33 there was no agreement on. I sat down with Senator Helms and we
worked out agreement on 28 of the 33. Hear what I said, 28 of the 33. I
asked every argument of the treaty; list it; let me try to answer it
for you--every single one. So the entire universe of objections comes
down to 33. We agreed after laborious negotiations on 28 of the 33,
leaving five in disagreement.
We are going to, at some point, move to adopt all 28 of those by
voice vote. But that leaves the five, the five that are killer
conditions.
Mr. McCAIN. Will the Senator yield for a question?
Mr. BIDEN. Sure.
Mr. McCAIN. Was the Senator aware that Senator Dole, former majority
leader, has just announced his support of the treaty with the changes
that have been made, which the Senator from Delaware was able to
achieve in this agreement? I think this is a very important expression
of support and one that I feel will be very much respected by our
colleagues on both sides of the aisle.
Also, I was curious, for purposes of the time, how much longer the
Senator from Delaware statement will be?
Mr. BIDEN. I will just take a few more minutes and reserve the
remainder of my time. But let me answer the question. As the Senator
from Arizona stood up to tell me that, my staff just handed me the news
release. I was not aware until he just told me, but it does not
surprise me and it pleases me a great deal. You and I worked with
Senator Dole for a long time, I for 24 years, and have great respect
for him. I was absolutely convinced that the conditions that we agreed
on would take care of every conceivable problem he had with the treaty.
I think it does for everyone, frankly.
I know my friend from Arizona was very concerned about several
provisions of this treaty. He has been deeply involved in the
negotiations relating to this, and I think we have taken care of every
condition that can possibly be dealt with, without killing the treaty.
The remaining five conditions are conditions that cannot be met and
will kill the treaty. So the reason we could not agree to the last five
is they are what we call, in the parlance of the Senate, ``killer
amendments,'' or ``killer conditions.''
But I am very pleased, as I say, not surprised. Because in all the
years I have worked with Senator Dole I have had the greatest respect
for him and I have no doubt that he has thought about this long and
hard. I am glad to see he has spoken out, now, which is very important.
As I said, as provided for in the unanimous-consent agreement reached
last week, we will consider two sets of conditions. The first is a
group of 28 conditions, upon which all parties to the negotiations
agree. The second is a set of five conditions that remain in
disagreement among the parties; these five will be the subject of a
separate debate and vote tomorrow.
The 28 agreed conditions are the product of hours of negotiation that
occurred in two complimentary phases. The first involved discussions
between the administration and a task force of Republican Senators
established by the majority leader. The second involved extensive
negotiations between the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee
and me.
At this point, I would like to express my personal appreciation to
the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and his able staff,
for engaging in hours of discussions with me and my staff. Throughout
the past few months, we held over 40 hours of meetings. Although we did
not always agree--obviously, we would have been here on the floor a lot
sooner if we had--the discussions were carried out in good faith, and
the Senator from North Carolina was always a gentleman.
I would also like to pause here to express my appreciation to the
majority and minority leaders, who spent many hours on this over the
past few months, and to the President, the National Security Adviser
and his dedicated team, and the Secretary of State, for all their
efforts in trying to forge common ground and narrow the issues.
And we have narrowed the issues considerably. The negotiations
succeeded in addressing many key issues of concern. Let me elaborate
briefly on these conditions.
Among the 28 agreed conditions are the following:
A condition [No. 28] ensuring that fourth amendment rights will be
protected by requiring search warrants in cases where consent to search
a facility is not granted.
A condition [No. 26] providing for the continued use of riot control
agents by U.S. troops to save lives when rescuing pilots or when
attacked by both combatants and civilians.
Several conditions which augment existing protections for industry,
including: No. 9, which requires an annual certification that the CWC
is not significantly harming legitimate commercial activities;
condition No. 16, which adds teeth to the convention's provision on
protecting confidential business information by withholding U.S.
contributions to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons--the body that will implement the treaty--if an employee
discloses information that results in financial loss to a U.S. firm;
the money will be withheld until the immunity of that employee is
waived; and condition No. 18, which prohibits samples collected from
U.S. firms from being taken to foreign laboratories, thus reducing the
risk of the loss of proprietary information to foreign espionage.
Conditions No. 2, 3, and 4, which hold down U.S. costs under the
convention and require establishment of an inspector general for the
body that will implement it.
A condition [No. 5] which establishes strict standards for the
sharing of U.S. intelligence information.
And a condition [No. 14] which rejects any attempt by Russia to link
its own ratification of the CWC to the receipt of U.S. assistance for
chemical weapons destruction.
Some treaty opponents have attempted to characterize these
achievements as relatively minor. That is hardly the case.
For example, throughout the debate on the convention, opponents have
contended that it would violate the fourth amendment prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Though this was never the
case, condition No. 28 makes it explicitly clear that search warrants
will be required whenever consent is withheld for an inspection.
Similarly, CWC opponents have frequently criticized the Clinton
administration's decision to interpret the convention as requiring
modifications to U.S. policy, codified in Executive Order 11850 of
April 8, 1975, on the use of riot control agents by U.S. forces in
certain situations.
Condition No. 26 states, unequivocally, that Executive Order 11850
shall not be altered or eliminated.
In short, many arguments about the treaty's perceived flaws are
simply no longer valid in light of the agreed conditions contained in
Senate Executive Resolution 75.
Unfortunately, our success in addressing so many concerns has not
been enough for some treaty opponents. They insist on voting on five
extreme conditions, which, if adopted, will prevent the United States
from ratifying the convention or will significantly undermine the
convention.
An opportunity to vote on these extreme conditions was coupled with a
refusal to give the supporters of the treaty an opportunity to offer
any substitutes.
So we will be left with one course--to vote against the conditions
offered by the opponents of this treaty. I regret that outcome--but
that is the hand we have been dealt.
During the next 2 days, we will debate these five conditions, and at
an appropriate time, I will discuss them in detail. Let me now address
a few of them briefly.
First, the opponents of the convention will argue that we shouldn't
join the convention until Russia, as well as several countries with
offensive chemical weapons programs, do so, too. We will have 2 hours
of debate on these issues tomorrow, but for now let me just say this:
this approach holds American policy hostage to the decisions of other
nations, which is not only bad policy,
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but it also undermines our claim to international leadership.
Opponents will also say that even if the rogue states join, the
treaty won't be worth much because they will cheat. To this charge,
there is an easy answer, provided by our Secretary of State: to say
that we shouldn't try to make chemical weapons illegal because there
will be cheaters, is like saying that we shouldn't have laws because
people will break them.
Next, you will hear the argument that we must amend article XI of the
treaty, or else it will lead to the end of export controls on dangerous
chemicals. This argument is based not only on a flawed reading of the
treaty text, but on a willful ignorance of commitments already made.
The CWC is completely consistent with continued enforcement of
existing controls enforced by the Australia Group, an informal alliance
of supplier countries.
Moreover, the 30 nations that comprise the Australia Group have
specifically stated their intention--individually and collectively--to
maintain export controls that are equal to, or exceed, those in place
today.
Finally, we have added a condition--condition No. 7--which makes
clear our interpretation that we may maintain export controls, and
which requires the President to certify annually that the Australia
Group continues to control the trade in vital chemicals.
Even after all of this debate--and all of the voting--I suspect that
the opponents of this treaty will still not be satisfied, even if they
succeed in attaching killer conditions. That is because, at bottom,
they have a theological opposition to arms control. That is defensible
position. I respect it. But I strongly disagree with it.
In essence, opponents of arms control fear that a treaty like this
will lull us into a false sense of security. This proposition, I
concede, has considerable force. But I am not persuaded.
There is, of course, always a risk that a nation will lower its guard
in the face of a reduced threat. But today's debate is not the end of
our efforts on the chemical weapons problem. To borrow a phrase from
Winston Churchill, it is not even the beginning of the end; it is the
end of the beginning.
From this day forward, if we approve this convention, as I sincerely
hope we will, both the Senate and the executive must remain ever
vigilant against the threat of chemical weapons--and ensure that we
have an effective convention.
We have added several conditions to the resolution of ratification to
advance this objective. We have made a commitment, in condition No. 11;
that requires the Secretary of Defense to ensure that U.S. forces are
capable of carrying out military missions regardless of any foreign
threat or use of chemical weapons. We have required, in condition No.
10, an annual report on compliance issues. We have established, in
condition No. 13, a mechanism for ensuring that the President promptly
pursues potential violations that threaten our national security
interests.
Aside from these concrete conditions, however, our experience with
other arms control agreements demonstrates that the political
commitment remains, and that the dangers of complacency are greatly
exaggerated.
Nearly 30 years ago, we signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
amid predictions that dozens of states would have nuclear weapons
within a decade. Today, we are more concerned than ever about the
threat of nuclear proliferation, the Non-Proliferation Treaty has been
extended permanently, and just a handful of states have the bomb.
During the 1980's, we had constant debates about whether the Soviet
Union was complying with its obligations under the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty. Not once did we let down our guard against the Soviet
threat.
The thesis that we will be lulled into a false sense of security
applies not to the convention, but to the alternative: to doing nothing
other than strengthening our domestic laws against chemical weapons--
which was all the Senate achieved last week in passing S. 495.
Revision of our domestic laws to criminalize possession and
stockpiling of chemical weapons is necessary--with or without the
treaty. But it is a delusion to believe that merely enacting domestic
legislation will suffice to combat an international problem of this
magnitude and gravity. Rather, it will take close cooperation by the
civilized nations of the world to enforce the new international norm
set forth in the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Mr. President, as I stated at the outset, the world--and this is no
exaggeration--is watching the U.S. Senate today and tomorrow. They are
waiting for the answer to the question, will we, the United States,
remain in the forefront of the battle to combat proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction? We must answer that in the affirmative.
Put it another way, does anybody believe that 74 nations would have
signed onto this treaty if they believed the United States of America
was not going to support them? We have led people down the primrose
path, if in fact we do not sign onto this treaty.
I see that my friend from Indiana, who probably knows more about the
chemical weapons treaty than anyone in the U.S. Senate, or maybe anyone
in the country, has risen. I will be happy, if he is seeking
recognition, to yield as much time to him as he believes he needs.
Mr. LUGAR addressed the chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Grams). The Senator from Indiana.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from Delaware for a
remarkable speech in favor of the Chemical Weapons Convention, and for
his leadership. I thank the distinguished Senator from Arizona, Senator
McCain, for a very important announcement. I have in front of me the
statement given by Senator Dole at the White House. I point out the
context of this statement was a meeting with Senator Dole and President
Clinton, in which these two statesmen came together this morning for a
very important purpose, namely to say to America, in a unanimous way,
the Chemical Weapons Convention is important for our security.
Senator Dole stated:
Last September, the Senate Majority Leader, Trent Lott,
asked me to express my opinion on the Chemical Weapons
Convention. In my response, I raised concerns about the
Chemical Weapons Convention and expressed hope that the
President and the Senate work together to ensure that the
treaty is effectively verifiable and genuinely global. They
have, and as a result, 28 conditions to the Senate's
Resolution of Ratification have been agreed to. These 28
agreed conditions address major concerns.
I commend Senator Lott, Senator Helms, Senator Lugar, and
many other former colleagues, as well as President Clinton
and administration officials for their constructive efforts,
is it perfect--no--but I believe there are now adequate
safeguards to protect American interests. We should keep in
mind that the United States is already destroying its
chemical weapons in accordance with legislation passed more
than 10 years ago. The CWC would require all other parties to
destroy their stockpiles by April 2007.
In addition, the Administration has agreed to a number of
provisions dealing with rogue states that remain outside the
treaty.
The Senator attaches a letter from President Clinton to Senator Dole
dated April 22, 1997, outlining those provisions. And then Senator Dole
continues:
I also understand there is a possibility of an additional
agreement with respect to sharing of information. If so, it
would further strengthen the treaty. I understand that even
with all the added safeguards, not every Senator, for their
own good reasons, will support ratification.
As a member of the Senate, I supported the START I, START
II, INF, and CFE treaties because they met the crucial tests
of effective verification, real reductions, and stability. If
I were presently in the Senate, I would vote for ratification
of the CWC because of the many improvements agreed to.
Those who may still have concerns can look to Article XVI,
which allows withdrawal from the treaty on 90 days notice if
it fails to serve America's vital interests. There is little
doubt in my mind that if this convention increases
proliferation of chemical weapons, it would lead to public
outrage which would compel any President to act. The bottom
line is that when it comes to America's security, we must
maintain a strong national defense that is second to none.
As the Senator has pointed out, we will have in front of the body
this afternoon, first of all, all 33 conditions, including 5 that are
killer amendments. We must vote those down. We will have, then, before
us, 28 agreed amendments that Senator Dole has referenced. We should
vote in favor of those, and then proceed in this debate to strike the
other 5.
We are here today to discuss the ratification of the Chemical Weapons
Convention.
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I say to my colleagues that, in performing its constitutional
responsibilities with respect to treaties and international agreements,
the Senate has to reach a judgment as to whether, on balance, U.S.
acceptance of the obligations contained in the treaty serves the
national interests of the United States. That phrase, on balance, is
important, because in arriving at our judgment, we have to weigh the
strengths and weaknesses of a treaty's provisions and decide whether
the advantages or benefits outweigh any real or potential costs.
If one believes that the benefits outweigh the costs, one will write
and support one kind of resolution of ratification that consents to the
treaty while utilizing conditional language to clarify or minimize
perceived weaknesses. However, if one believes that the costs of U.S.
participation outweigh the benefits, one will write and support a very
different kind of resolution of ratification.
It is my belief that the Chemical Weapons Convention, on balance, is
in the national security interests of the United States, and thus I
believe the Senate should ratify a resolution of ratification which
allows the United States to deposit its instrument of ratification and
become a state-party to the CWC.
As Senator Biden pointed out, this international treaty was
negotiated by Presidents Reagan and Bush and was signed by Secretary of
State Eagleburger in January 1993--just before George Bush left office.
Senator Biden was generous in pointing out that these were two
Republican Presidents, Secretary Eagleburger was a Republican Secretary
of State. It is appropriate that Senator Dole, as Republican candidate
for President, join with President Clinton today, once again affirming
that the CWC is in the best national interests of our country.