[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 49 (Wednesday, April 23, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3468-S3477]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]



                         PRIVILEGE OF THE FLOOR

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent Jeanine Esperne, John 
Rood, and David Stephens be granted the privilege of the floor for the 
duration of the day.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from North Carolina.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, as the Senate begins final consideration of 
the Chemical Weapons Convention, the immortal words of Yogi Berra come 
to mind. Everybody remembers them. ``It's deja vu, all over again.''
  If anyone is wondering why Jesse Helms, Senator from North Carolina, 
is quoting a New York Yankee, it is because I always liked Yogi. And we 
have been here before, meaning the Senate. The point being that the 
Senate scheduled a time certain last September to take up this very 
same treaty. But, on the day of the scheduled vote, the White House 
asked to withdraw the treaty. Why? Well, because there were not 67 
votes necessary to pass it.
  The White House stonewalled and refused to address the key concerns 
raised by Senators about the treaty, concerns relating to its 
universality, its verifiability, and crushing effect on business 
because they had opposed even the most reasonable modifications 
proposed by this Senator and many others. That is why the treaty was 
withdrawn last year. So, here we go again, with most of those critical 
concerns remaining in the treaty: The Chemical Weapons Convention 
certainly is not global, it is not verifiable, and it will not work. 
Even its proponents admit it cannot effectively prevent the spread of 
chemical weaponry.

  Time and time again, the administration has portrayed this agreement 
as one that will provide for a global ban on chemical weapons. I 
recently read a poll showing that 84 percent of the American people 
believed that this body should ratify a treaty which would ``ban the 
production, possession, transfer and use of poison gas worldwide.'' 
That was the question asked in the poll. I quoted it verbatim. If this 
treaty accomplished such a ban, I would be the first Senator on this 
floor, along with Senator Kyl, urging its approval. Had the pollster 
called me at home, I--if I knew nothing about the treaty, as most 
Americans do not--I probably would have been among the 84 percent.
  In any event, more than 8 years ago, at the confirmation hearing of 
Jim Baker to be Secretary of State, I noted President Bush's statement 
that he wanted to be able to tell his grandchildren that he, ``was able 
to ban chemical and biological weapons from the face of the Earth.'' 
Quote, unquote, George Bush. I remarked at that hearing that I, too, 
would like to be able to tell my grandchildren that I helped the 
President and the Secretary of State attain such a goal. And that 
statement that I made then is just as true today as it was on the day 
that I made it. But I cannot and will not sign off on a multilateral 
treaty that accomplishes none--n-o-n-e--none of the goals it purports 
to address.
  I have, on 5 January first days of the Senate, stood right over there 
by the dais, raised my right hand, and pledged to support and defend 
our country and its Constitution. I have presided over many hearings 
dedicated to the careful examination of this treaty. Earlier this 
month, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee heard testimony by and 
from four former U.S. Defense Secretaries--Dick Cheney, Cap Weinberger, 
Jim Schlesinger, Don Rumsfeld, all four urging the Senate not--not to 
ratify this dangerously defective treaty.
  These distinguished Americans are by no means alone. More than 50 
generals and admirals and senior officials from previous 
administrations have joined them in opposing this chemical weapons 
treaty--convention--call it what you will. And why have all these great 
Americans urged that the Senate reject this treaty? I will tell you 
why. Their case can be summarized this simply: It is not global, it is 
not verifiable, and it will not work. No supporter of this treaty can 
tell us with a straight face how this treaty will actually accomplish 
the goals that they have advertised so profusely for it.
  The best argument they have mustered to date is, as I understand it, 
``Oh, yes, it is defective, but it is better than nothing,'' they say. 
Or they tell us that ``It creates an international norm against the 
production of these weapons.'' But, in fact, this treaty is worse then 
nothing.
  But, in fact, Mr. President, this treaty is worse than nothing, for 
this treaty gives the American people a false sense of security that 
something is being done in Washington, DC, to reduce the dangers of 
chemical weaponry when, in fact, nothing is being done with or by this 
treaty. If anything, this treaty puts the American people at greater 
risk.
  That is why the administration wants to avoid at all costs a real 
debate on the merits of this treaty. They know that they cannot defend 
it. They say it is better than nothing. No, it is not. So they have 
resorted to a number of assertions that simply do not hold up under 
scrutiny. They have put forward, for example, the ``America as a rogue 
state'' argument. They have said it over and over again. ``Rogue state, 
rogue state.''
  They say if we don't ratify the CWC, we will be left ``in the company 
of pariah nations, like Iraq and North Korea,'' who have refused to 
join. And then they have hit us with, ``Well, everybody's doing it. It 
is going to go into effect anyhow,'' they say, and have said over and 
over again, ``with or without the United States, so we might as well go 
with the flow and sign up.''
  Sorry, Mr. President--and I mean the distinguished Senator who is 
presiding, Mr. President, and I mean the President down on Pennsylvania 
Avenue as well--sorry, Mr. President, the oath that I have taken five 
times standing right over there forbids my taking part in such 
sophistry.
  Anyhow, since when did America start letting Belgium and Luxembourg 
and France and Bangladesh dictate our national security policy? The 
Senate should decide whether or not to approve this treaty on the basis 
of whether it is in the national interest of the United States and the 
American people, not to respond to diplomatic momentum of the moment. 
Frankly, I take offense at the argument that this administration is 
making widely and

[[Page S3469]]

frequently, that rejecting this dangerous and flawed treaty would make 
America the moral--get this--the moral equivalent of terrorist states--
that means governments, countries--terrorist governments like Syria and 
Iraq and Libya and North Korea. These pariahs are, at this very moment, 
manufacturing chemical weapons to use against us. Don't make any 
mistake about that. That is what they are doing right now as we meet.
  We are unilaterally destroying our chemical stockpiles with or 
without the Chemical Weapons Convention, and I think that such 
rhetorical blackmail may offend the American people. We will see. The 
polls are already turning around, by the way.
  Mr. President, I made a commitment to the American people that I 
would bring this chemical weapons treaty to the Senate floor only if it 
contained all the key protections necessary to ensure that this treaty 
does no harm, even if it can do no good, and that is exactly what is 
happening. That is exactly why this treaty is the pending business in 
the U.S. Senate at this moment.
  The resolution of ratification that is now pending before the Senate 
addresses all the inherent weaknesses of this treaty. With this 
resolution of ratification, I can vote for this treaty in good 
conscience, and I would dissuade no Senator from doing the same, 
obviously. But if those key protections are removed, taken out--and the 
administration says it is going to happen, they are going to be taken 
out, they boast--then we should refuse to ratify this treaty for the 
reasons that we will discuss in greater detail in the hours ahead.
  I doubt that there is a Senator in this body who has not heard a 
great deal about the 28 conditions in this resolution of ratification 
that have been agreed upon by the distinguished Senator Biden, who is 
the ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee, the 
administration, and me. I commend my friend, Joe Biden, for his 
willingness to work with me in good faith to address those issues. I 
have told him so privately, and I now tell him so publicly. As Joe 
Biden has pointed out, he spent many hours in my office in direct 
negotiations with me and my staff in an effort to reach some common 
ground.
  Many of the 28 conditions contain commonsense provisions that never 
should have been contested by the administration in the first place. 
For example, these conditions, among other things, require the creation 
of an inspector general. They limit the burden on the American 
taxpayer. They preserve the Australia Group. They assert the right to 
use tear gas in combat situations.

  Let me tell you something, if they had not yielded on that question 
about our using tear gas to help our downed pilots escape from the 
enemy, this treaty would never have come to the floor. Unfortunately, 
the Clinton administration has made clear--made clear--that it intends 
to remove five vital protections that Senator Lott and I and others 
have included to address the defects of the treaty, or some of them. By 
stripping those key conditions from this resolution, the administration 
is asking the Senate to ratify a treaty which, first, will affect 
almost none of the terrorist regimes whose possession of chemical 
weapons actually threatens the United States, such as Libya, Iraq, 
Syria, and North Korea; second, which the administration admits that 
they can't verify, and they can't verify this treaty. Do you remember 
what Ronald Reagan used to say? Trust but verify. Ronald Reagan is sort 
of halfway implicitly credited with this treaty. I think I knew Ronald 
Reagan as well as anybody. I was the first sitting Senator to support 
Ronald Reagan's candidacy, and I knew how he felt about treaties 
because he felt then as I feel now about treaties.
  Third, the administration knows that Russia is already violating the 
chemical weapons treaty, even before it goes into effect, by pursuing 
an entirely new generation of chemical agents specifically designed to 
circumvent the CWC, as we call it around this place, violating Russia's 
existing bilateral chemical weapons agreement with the United States 
signed some years ago and--I have to use this word--lying about their 
chemical stockpiles. And we are supposed to trot in and ratify this 
treaty? Not this Senator. Not this Senator.
  Fourth, the administration is supporting a treaty which allows 
inspectors from China and rogue states, such as Iran, to descend upon 
American businesses, rifle through the business confidential documents 
in each of these places, to interrogate the employees of the business, 
and to remove secret business information and chemical samples whenever 
they want to.
  A law enforcement officer in the United States cannot do that. You 
have to get a search warrant issued by a court.
  Fifth, the administration feels that under articles X and XI, which 
involve the transfer of dangerous chemicals, chemical manufacturing 
technology and advanced chemical defense gear to any nation who signs 
on, including terrorist states like Iran and Cuba and known 
proliferators, such as Russia and China, the administration said, ``No, 
no, we can't have that. We can't have that.'' That's what they say. We 
are going to find out tomorrow, or perhaps earlier, how the U.S. Senate 
feels about that, because there is going to be a vote on that specific 
question.
  We have protections in the current resolution of ratification which 
address all of these issues, as I have said before, and while all of 
these matters are vitally important, the final concluding issue, I 
believe, is the key to this entire debate. What is it?
  The proponents of this treaty have been telling the American people 
over and over and over again that this treaty will ``ban chemical 
weapons from the face of the Earth.'' How many times have I heard that 
by some very good friends of mine in the administration? Let me tell 
them something, and let me tell you something, Mr. President. With 
articles X and XI intact, this treaty will, in fact, do the exact 
opposite. It will, in fact, facilitate the spread of poison gas to the 
very rogue countries most likely to use it against American citizens.
  So I guess the question is, who would give the terrorist crowd in 
Iran chemical agents and chemical technology that they can use to build 
chemical weapons? Who would do that? Who would vote to give Iran the 
secrets to our most advanced chemical defensive equipment, the 
technology we have designed to protect our troops from poison-gas 
attack? Not this U.S. Senator. I will never, never vote to do that, 
because I stood over there five times and said I would not. But that is 
exactly what the Clinton administration is asking us to do by insisting 
that we ratify this treaty with articles X and XI intact.

  Do not take my word about all of this. Heed the warnings of some 
people that I believe most Americans admire and respect. Let's take 
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, who served in a previous 
administration, the Bush administration. Dick Cheney provided written 
testimony to the Foreign Relations Committee earlier this month. Let me 
quote him. This is Dick Cheney talking:

       Articles X and XI amount to a formula for greatly 
     accelerating the proliferation of chemical warfare 
     capabilities around the world.

  I have heard Dick Cheney make many a speech, but I never before heard 
him as emphatic in his declaration about anything previous to this.
  Mr. President, anybody who wants a road map for how this will work 
need only examine how Russia has taken advantage of similar provisions 
in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Today, Russia is using the 
NNPT to justify, what? To justify Russia's sale of nuclear reactors 
under a provision known as atoms for peace. Under the chemical weapons 
treaty, articles X and XI, or poisons for peace provisions, as we call 
them, Russia and/or China could decide, for example, to build a 
chemical manufacturing facility in Iran and argue not only that are 
they allowed to give Iran this technology, but that they are obligated 
to do it under a treaty, mind you, that a lot of people are advocating 
that the United States Senate ratify tomorrow before dark.
  Worse still, the Chemical Weapons Convention also requires that we 
share our latest advanced chemical defensive gear with all of these 
countries. What that means is that, through reverse engineering, Iran 
could figure out how to penetrate our chemical defense, increasing not 
only the risk of American

[[Page S3470]]

troops being exposed to poison gas but the chances of a chemical attack 
actually taking place by undermining the defensive deterrent value.
  The administration has agreed that it will not give such American 
technology to Iran. I think they mean it as far as it goes, but this 
agreement with the President will not stop other countries from doing 
it. Articles X and XI still facilitate trade in these technologies with 
more than 100 countries, many, if not most, of which do not share our 
policy of isolating Iran, don't you see. If they get access to United 
States defensive technology under the chemical weapons treaty, they 
will share it with other signatories, like Iran. And they could do so 
lawfully without violating the treaty. Further, they will share their 
own defense technology against dangerous dual-use chemicals regardless 
of what the United States says or does.
  What will happen once we put a plethora of chemical and defensive 
secrets out on the world market? I think you know, Mr. President. It 
will be only a matter of time, and a short time, before these rogue 
states which do not sign the treaty will get access to these defensive 
secrets. Iran will certainly share them with Syria and Libya. And who 
knows who they will, in turn, share them with.
  Ronald Reagan, as I said earlier, said that our policy in arms 
control--arms control of all types--must be ``trust but verify.'' With 
the Chemical Weapons Convention we can do neither. So why would we 
agree to a treaty which would share advanced chemicals and know-how and 
defensive gear with unworthy regimes? That is precisely the question 
before the U.S. Senate today.
  We can ratify the CWC with these key protections in place. But if the 
administration insists on stripping them out, taking them out, then 
they will have invited the Senate to refuse to ratify the chemical 
weapons treaty. It is up to them. Unless we include protections on 
these issues, any agreement we have reached on other matters amounts to 
little more than adding sweetener to hemlock. They may make the treaty 
easier to swallow, but it remains, Mr. President, just as deadly as 
ever before and just as injurious to the national security interest of 
the United States of America.
  Mr. President, we know Senators plan to address important aspects of 
this convention; therefore, at this time I shall defer to my colleagues 
who may wish to discuss this convention in greater detail, beginning 
with my distinguished friend, Senator Biden.
  For the reasons I have discussed and for the reasons that Senators 
will hear in the hours ahead, obviously, I am strongly urging the 
Senate to oppose any amendments to strike key protections from the 
resolution of ratification.
  Mr. President, I thank the Chair and I yield the floor.
  Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Hutchinson). The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. I yield myself as much time as may be necessary.
  Mr. President, as my distinguished friend, the chairman of the 
committee, leaves the floor, let me note that he and I came to the 
Senate the same year, 1972. I, like he, on five occasions --four here 
and one in a hospital--raised my right hand and swore to uphold the 
Constitution. We have both done that, to the best of my knowledge, for 
the past 24 years.
  Let me just say that just as beauty is in the eye of the beholder, 
security and upholding the oath of office, how to protect and defend 
the United States of America, is in the eye of the Senator. I do not 
doubt for one single second that my friend from North Carolina believes 
what he says, that he does not believe this treaty is in the interest 
of the United States of America and, by inference, he would not be 
upholding or defending the Constitution of the United States were he to 
vote for it, other than with the killer amendments attached to it that 
would effectively end the treaty.

  I think it is important for the listeners to put in perspective a 
little focus here as to how much verification is necessary to defend 
our interest and how much is enough and what tradeoffs constitute our 
interests.
  Let me just say that my friend and I have worked together for years 
and years. As I said, we came here together, 1972. We got elected in 
the same year. To the best of my knowledge, my friend has not voted on 
the floor for an arms control agreement, ever.
  Although the Senate overwhelmingly passed the START Treaty negotiated 
by Ronald Reagan--``trust but verify'' Reagan--my friend from North 
Carolina voted against it because he did not think it was verifiable. 
Ronald Reagan thought it was verifiable. Ronald Reagan, who said 
``trust but verify,'' he negotiated the treaty. He sent it to the U.S. 
Senate. We voted for it. Senator Helms did not.
  I do not say this as a criticism but an observation. Because if you 
listen to Senator Helms, it makes it sound as though he is just like 
Ronald Reagan. Well, he is not like Ronald Reagan. Bush finally 
concluded the START I agreement, but it was Reagan who had negotiated 
it. Reagan supported the START I agreement. President Reagan, I 
understand, supported the START II agreement. Senator Helms voted 
against both of them because he did not believe they were--and I 
believe he meant it--he did not believe they were in the security 
interests of the United States of America.
  So again the reason I mention it is that you will hear a lot of 
appeals to authority today. You will hear a number of ad hominem 
arguments and a number of infallible arguments invoked on the floor of 
the Senate today by all of us. It is a debating technique. But I think 
one of my objectives today is going to try to be sort of the truth 
squad here, to make sure we are comparing apples and apples and oranges 
and oranges and we remember who did what.
  So before the day is over, someone probably will invoke the name of 
George McGovern, somehow. I do not know how George McGovern will get 
into this, but I promise you that will happen as evidence that these 
arms control treaties are bad things that just soft-headed liberals do. 
Ronald Reagan is no soft-headed liberal.
  My friend from North Carolina is a staunch conservative, but he 
parted company with other staunch conservatives who thought START I, 
START II and the INF agreements were all bad treaties. We negotiated 
the INF agreement when Senator Helms and I were here. Ronald Reagan 
proposed that. I do not know how he voted on that. But I would not be 
surprised if he voted against that. And ``trust but verify'' Reagan not 
only negotiated it, but submitted it.
  Mr. President, the debate we are commencing today is not only about a 
global treaty--it is important, it is global, and it addresses the 
chemical weapons threat. Quite frankly--and my distinguished friend 
from Indiana, Senator Lugar, will speak to this at length because he is 
so articulate when he does--it is about nothing less than America's 
leadership in the post-cold-war era. I mean, it really is that simple.
  It is above and beyond the issue of merely the chemical weapons 
treaty, which I will speak to in detail, and why this treaty is such a 
good treaty. But it is well beyond that. It is well beyond that.
  Over the course of two decades and three administrations, the United 
States of America has led--has led--the world in developing a 
comprehensive treaty designed to outlaw chemical weapons. Now, less 
than a week before this treaty goes into effect, with or without the 
United States of America, the world watches to see what the world's 
greatest deliberative body is going to do. I mean, it sounds a bit 
melodramatic, but it is literally that serious. It is that fundamental.
  This treaty is going into effect no matter what happens, because the 
way the treaty is, if over 65 nations signed on to it, it automatically 
goes into effect 6 months later. So whether we vote for it or not, a 
total of 74 nations of the world have now said, ``This is a good 
treaty. We sign on to it. We commit to it.'' So it is going into 
effect.

  What is it going to look like, as the world watches us--and, believe 
it or not, they watch us; the American public may not watch us a lot 
here in the Senate but the rest of the world is watching--when the 
possessor of the one of the two largest stockpiles of chemical weapons 
in the world, who unilaterally agreed to destroy those weapons--us--
when we do not ratify a

[[Page S3471]]

treaty that 74 nations have already ratified?
  But there are the anti-arms controllers who believe there has never 
been an arms control agreement that is worth having. I respectfully 
suggest that the Senator from North Carolina is among them.
  He stood up on the floor when we were debating this before it came on 
the floor, and he said, quoting someone, that America ``has never lost 
a war, nor has it ever won a treaty.''
  Remember, that is what this is about. This dividing line is between 
people who believe that there is no way in the world you can 
multilaterally sign on to anything because you cannot trust anybody; 
the only thing we can trust is ourselves. Therefore, whatever we do, do 
it unilaterally. Senator Helms has never voted for an arms control 
treaty on the floor of the U.S. Senate, including the ones negotiated 
by Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, and Bush. We have all been here for all 
those Presidents.
  I am not being critical. I just want to make you understand the 
dividing line here. This is not about the little pieces. This is about 
whether or not you think we can have any kind of multilateral 
agreements relative to controlling any kind of arms.
  Our friend from Arizona, the distinguished Senator, Senator Kyl, 
introduced a unilateral effort to stem chemical weapons. It was great, 
but it does not affect any other nations. No one else signed on to it. 
That is sort of the mantra you get from our friends who oppose arms 
control--we can do it ourselves. But how can we control the rest of the 
world unless they are part of an agreement that we are part of?
  The real issue is, will we remain in the forefront of the battle to 
contain weapons of mass destruction, the preeminent security threat of 
this era, or will we retreat from the challenge and be lulled into 
believing we can combat this scourge of chemical weapons on our own? I 
know what the answer to that is. The answer is: We cannot do it on our 
own. I hope the Senate will answer in the affirmative that we have to 
do this globally.
  But before we face that moment of decision sometime tomorrow evening, 
we are going to spend 2 days in debate here, and we are going to vote 
when I move to strike five specific conditions on the Helms proposal 
that is before us.
  As we commence this debate, I think it is instructive to briefly 
trace the history of the problem of poison gas and the efforts of the 
world community to address the threat.
  Today is April 23. And 82 years ago, almost, today, 82 years ago 
yesterday, April 22, at 5 o'clock in the evening, a green cloud boiled 
up out of the east near the town of Ypres in Flanders.
  The modern use of chemical weapons had begun. On that day, the use of 
chlorine gas achieved a significant tactical advantage for the German 
attackers in World War I. But within 8 days, gas masks were made 
available to the allies and, thereafter, in World War I, the use of 
poison gas as a method of warfare was not especially effective as 
compared to the primary weapons of artillery and machine guns. But 
``terrible beauty had been born,'' to paraphrase Yeats--poison gas had 
been used.
  As a weapon of terror, poison gas continued to be exceedingly 
effective in World War I and had an appalling effect on its victims 
along the front lines. Soldiers in trenches knew all too well the 
terror and horror of gas. Wilfred Owen, who was killed in action in 
1918 described the terror in his poem, ``Dulce et Decorum Est.'' I 
would like to read from that poem.

     Gas! Gas! Quick, boys!--An ecstasy of fumbling,
     Fitting the clumsy helmets just in time,
     But someone still was yelling out and stumbling,
     And floundering like a man in fire or lime.
     Dim through the misty panes and thick green light,
     As under a green sea, I saw him drowning.
     In all my dreams, before my helpless sight.
     He plunges at me, guttering, choking, drowning.

     If in some smothering dreams, you too could pace
     Behind the wagon that we flung him in,
     And watch the white eyes writing in his face,
     His hanging face, like a devil's sick of sin;
     If you could hear, at every jolt the blood
     Come gargling from the froth-corrupted lungs,
     Obscene as cancer, bitter as the cud
     Of vile, incurable sores on innocent tongues,
     My friend, you would not tell with such high zest.
     To children ardent for some desperate glory,
     The old Lie: Dulce et decorum est,
     Pro patria mori.

Translated, it means: It is sweet and fitting to die for the 
fatherland.
  The international revulsion against the use of poison gas in World 
War I led the United States, once again, to press for an international 
agreement banning the practice. The result, in 1925, was the Geneva 
Protocol, which prohibits the use in war of poison gas and 
bacteriological weapons. For much of this century, with a few 
exceptions, this norm was honored. During the Second World War, where 
restraints were hardly the rule, no party saw fit to violate the norm. 
Even Adolf Hitler obeyed it, although presumably not out of any sense 
of honor, but out of fear of allied retaliation. Hitler's restraint on 
the battlefield, unfortunately, did not carry forward to the 
concentration camps where he used gas to slaughter defenseless 
innocents, millions of them.
  The norm contained in the Geneva Protocol eroded considerably in the 
1980's, when both parties in the Iran-Iraq War employed gas during a 
war of attrition that ended in stalemate. The use of chemical weapons 
in that war provided no significant breakthroughs on the battlefield, 
but it did give Saddam Hussein an idea, and that idea was to use poison 
gas against defenseless civilians in Iraqi Kurdistan following a cease-
fire in the war with Iran.
  In August 1988, Saddam launched his final offensive against dozens of 
villages, killing hundreds and causing tens of thousands to flee to 
neighboring countries. A staff report prepared for the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee by our present Ambassador to Croatia, Peter 
Galbraith, was based on interviews with survivors. He described the 
atrocities in vivid detail in that report: ``The bombs''--meaning the 
chemical bombs--``did not produce a large explosion, only a weak sound 
that could be heard, and then a yellowish cloud spread from the center 
of the explosion. Those who were very close to the bombs died almost 
instantly. Those who did not die instantly found it difficult to 
breathe and began to vomit. The gas stung the eyes, skin, and lungs of 
the villagers exposed to it. Many suffered temporary blindness. After 
the bombs exploded, many villagers ran and submerged themselves in 
nearby streams to escape the spreading gas. Many of those that made it 
to the streams survived. Those who could not run from the growing 
smell--mostly the very old and the very young--died. The survivors, who 
saw the dead reported that blood could be seen trickling out of the 
mouths of some of the bodies, a yellowish fluid could also be seen 
oozing out of the noses and mouths of some of the dead. Some said the 
bodies appeared frozen. Many of the dead bodies turned blackish blue.''
  Saddam's outrageous act, unfortunately, prompted only muted response 
from the world community. One of the few sounds of protest came from 
this body, where Senator Claiborne Pell, now retired, and the chairman 
of the committee, Senator Helms, promptly introduced legislation to 
impose sanctions against Iraq. The bill sailed through the Senate on a 
voice vote the day after it was introduced. Unfortunately, the Reagan 
administration, at that time still operating under the delusion that it 
could deal with Saddam, denounced the chairman's bill as premature and 
later succeeded in blocking its enactment in the final days of the 
100th Congress--a fact we tend to forget.
  Saddam's atrocities, although not a violation of the Geneva 
Protocol--you know, it wasn't a violation of the Geneva Protocol. That 
Geneva Protocol only banned the use of chemical weapons in war. This 
was not a war. So the irony of all ironies is that the first guy to use 
poison gas since the Italians in Ethiopia in the 1930's, didn't even 
violate the Geneva Protocol. It was used in the Iran-Iraq War, which 
was a violation because that was international war.
  The Geneva Protocol bans the use of chemical weapons in warfare, and 
the extensive use of gas in the Iran-Iraq War was banned but still 
occurred. Ironically, it had a positive effect, Mr. President. They 
catalyzed the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on 
strengthening the Geneva

[[Page S3472]]

Protocol, which were already underway. President Reagan gave the effort 
a very important push--that is, the effort to deal with containing 
chemical weapons--during his annual address to the U.N. General 
Assembly that fall, where he urged the parties to the protocol, as well 
as other concerned states, to convene a conference to review the 
deterioration of respect of the norm against the use of chemical 
weapons.

  France obliged President Reagan by hosting a special conference in 
January 1989. Eighteen months later, Saddam Hussein struck again by 
invading Kuwait this time. But this time the international community, 
led by President Bush, reacted forcefully to Saddam's latest outrage. 
Thankfully, chemical weapons were not used in the gulf war, although 
Saddam suggested he might do so. And an Iraqi weapons depot containing 
such weapons was destroyed by coalition forces after the war. 
Ironically, the only reported exposure to poison gas for allied troops 
resulted from an Iraqi stockpile that was perfectly legal under 
international law. The only thing illegal is to use it in international 
conflict--not to manufacture it, not to stockpile it, and not to use it 
internally.
  The specter that chemical weapons might have been used in the gulf 
war, however, gave a new urgency to the negotiations on the Chemical 
Weapons Convention. In May 1991, President Bush who, as Vice President, 
had first proposed the draft treaty in 1984 on behalf of President 
Reagan--so Reagan proposed the first draft--President Bush announced 
several steps that spurred the negotiations to a successful conclusion. 
Specifically, he declared that the United States would forswear the use 
of chemical weapons against any state, effective when the Chemical 
Weapons Convention enters into force. Additionally, the United States 
committed to destroy all its chemical weapons stockpile.
  So I want to get something straight here. Whether or not we are 
members of this treaty and have the benefits, we are going to destroy 
our chemical weapons anyway. We have already decided to do that. We 
have already pledged to do that. President Bush pledged that once the 
convention went into force, we would also forswear the use, period. The 
Bush proposal, made at the time, had the desired effect. Within months, 
the negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention were completed. The 
treaty was signed by Secretary of State Eagleburger on January 13, 
1993, 1 week before President Bush left office.
  Now, Mr. President, this review of the history of the Chemical 
Weapons Convention is necessary not only to set the stage for this 
debate, in my view, but also to rebut the myth which has arisen in some 
quarters that this is President Clinton's treaty. This is President 
Bush's treaty and President Reagan's treaty. The treaty was initiated 
by Reagan, concluded by Bush. This week, we can continue that 
Republican legacy by giving the Senate's consent to ratification of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention. So this is not a product of anything other 
than the intensive efforts on the part of this administration to pass a 
treaty signed by a Republican President, of which this President did 
not change a single word, did not have one bit of input on. The only 
input the present President had is on seeking the Senate's approval. 
Had President Bush been reelected, it would be real clear that this is 
a total Republican product, which is a good thing, not a bad thing. The 
reason I am bothering to say this is, if you listen here, you hear a 
lot of confusing talk, because some of my Republican friends 
understandably aren't real crazy about President Clinton, you will hear 
this talked about, saying the President did this and that, and the 
President promised this or that. This President had nothing to do with 
this treaty, zero, nothing. In getting it ratified, he has been 
tremendous in helping that process. So I do not want anybody getting 
confused here. If you do not like this treaty, dislike it for a good 
reason. Don't dislike it because you do not like the foreign policy of 
Clinton or you do not like the domestic policy of Clinton or you do not 
like President Clinton. This is a Republican treaty, born and bred.

  By the way, I think it is one of their proudest achievements. I think 
it is a fine thing, and they deserve the credit. But let's not get into 
these--you will hear these ad hominem arguments this day about this 
liberal President did this liberal thing; we got sucked in by these 
all-knowing and smarter nations to get us to do these things with the 
treaty. Malarkey. Bush and Reagan said we are not going to use any 
chemical weapons; we are going to destroy our stockpiles; whether there 
is a treaty, or not, we will put that in the legislation; we are going 
to destroy our stockpile. They negotiated a treaty and sent it up here. 
Unfortunately for President Bush, he was not reelected. So it is left 
on the watch of this President to get it ratified. There are the facts.
  The question still remains, though, regardless of who negotiated this 
treaty, why do we need it? The answer still, in essence in my view, is 
very simple. Notwithstanding the Herculean efforts of my friend from 
Arizona, Senator Kyl, who is on the floor, we cannot contain the threat 
of chemical weapons on our own. Let me repeat that. We cannot contain 
the threat of chemical weapons on our own. I would love it if we could. 
It should be obvious that our objective of combating the global threat 
of chemical weapons cannot be met without working in concert with other 
nations. We may be the world's lone superpower, Mr. President, but that 
does not empower us to solve the chemical weapons problem on our own.
  Mr. President, the convention is quite detailed, as it necessarily 
must be. This is the treaty. It is quite detailed in its several 
provisions upon which there will be specific debate over the course of 
the next 2 days. But, for the moment, let me highlight the reasons why 
this treaty will advance our national interests.
  First, the convention addresses two key flaws in the Geneva 
Protocol--that is the thing that outlaws the use of chemical weapons in 
international war--which focused on a single wrong. The Geneva Protocol 
focused on one thing. It banned the use of chemical weapons in 
international armed conflict, period. A good thing, but not nearly 
enough.
  The reason we need this treaty: The first reason is the Geneva 
Protocol doesn't ban the internal use of chemical weapons, and it says 
nothing about stockpiling the development of or the production of 
chemical weapons. Today, roughly 20 countries are believed to either 
possess chemical weapons or have a program aimed at acquiring such 
weapons. Included on this list are such pariah states as Iraq, Iran, 
Libya, or North Korea. Under current international law there is nothing 
illegal about these programs--nothing, zero, nothing illegal about 
these programs. The Chemical Weapons Convention will make them illegal 
and thus serve to isolate those who ignore this international norm.
  My friends will later point out today and tomorrow that unless these 
countries all ratify and become signatories, we should not. Let me 
explain to you why it is equally important that we determine who is 
inside the norm and who is outside the norm. The convention will 
provide a moral, if not legal, basis for taking military action against 
a chemical weapons program that poses a threat to peace whether or not 
that nation is a signatory to the convention. Let me explain what I 
mean by that.
  Let's assume that North Korea or Libya never entered this convention. 
Let's assume we enter it and the other nations who have signed it enter 
it. Let's assume that number, which I think is realistic to assume, 
gets closer to 100. Let's assume Libya, that we find out, or are able 
to demonstrate to the world through this international group of 
inspectors or through our own national technical means, that Libya is 
producing and stockpiling chemical weapons. Even though they have not 
signed onto the treaty, let's assume that we conclude that we should 
take military action to take out that capability--``take out'' meaning 
bomb it, destroy it, get rid of it--I believe, and I predict that you 
will see the world community sanctioning that action, at a minimum by 
their silence and probably with an overwhelming degree of support.

  But let my ask it another way. Let's say we don't sign onto this 
treaty. Libya develops a significant stockpile of chemical weapons. We 
identify it, show the world, and decide we are

[[Page S3473]]

going to take it out. What do you think will happen then? Do you think 
there is any reasonable prospect the world will coalesce around our 
effort to protect us and the rest of the world? I respectfully suggest 
to you that there is not a chance. So this is a significant inhibitor 
even to those nations that do not sign onto the treaty because it 
establishes an international norm.
  The second reason why this treaty is important is that the Chemical 
Weapons Convention provides this strict regime for controlling trade in 
precursor chemicals used in making chemical weapons because chemicals 
commonly used in industry are also able to be used to produce chemical 
weapons. The only way to effectively control chemical weapons on a 
global basis is to provide a strict control and monitoring regarding 
the commercial trade in these kinds of chemicals that can ultimately 
produce chemical weapons. Accordingly, the convention provides several 
mechanisms, including annual reporting by companies and export 
controls, to track the chemicals. Parties which do not join the treaty 
will be left on the outside of the system subject to cutting off trade 
in those certain chemicals, along with other restrictions that the 
convention will impose.
  Failure to ratify the convention will in time impose onerous costs on 
any chemical industry in any state that does not sign, including our 
own. In our case, it will be the loss of--at minimum--hundreds of 
millions of dollars in lost export earnings annually. This financial 
loss would be a cruel irony because the United States pushed to put 
these controls in the treaty.
  Do you all remember when we were trying to track down who sold the 
technology and the material to the Iraqis to build their nuclear and/or 
chemical capability? Remember all of that? We tried to track down, and 
we tracked down some German companies which had provided the 
engineering and other companies from France, and other countries had 
provided some of the material, et cetera.
  Guess what? It is important to know who is selling what. Any outfit 
that signs onto this treaty could not sell without reporting in detail 
what they sold to each of these countries who are signatories to the 
treaty. Guess what? If you don't ratify the treaty and you sell certain 
chemicals abroad, you will be unable to sell them to the countries that 
have ratified, including our largest trading partners. Chemicals are 
our single largest export. OK? I know people who think I am a little 
prejudiced on this because I come from Delaware, occasionally referred 
to by some facetiously as ``The State of DuPont.'' Chemicals and the 
chemical industry make up 51 percent of the industrial products of my 
State. If we do not sign onto this treaty, we are in real trouble 
because then we can't trade our chemicals. We can't trade certain 
chemicals, which is our State's biggest export and which produces the 
most jobs, other than agriculture. We can't trade. We will have tariffs 
put up against us in other countries.
  Why do we do that? We, the United States, President Bush did that 
because we were so sure that we would sign on and see the wisdom of 
this. We wanted to make sure that countries who didn't sign on suffered 
a penalty for not signing on.
  So now, if we vote this voice vote which we are going to have after 
our caucuses, as Senator Helms proposes, guess what? We kill the treaty 
and our chemical industry, and the jobs associated with it will be in 
real trouble.
  But remember why that was put in there. It was put in there because 
we want to track chemical trade. You know everybody is watching the 
Timothy McVeigh trial. You don't have to be a rocket scientist or an 
expert in chemicals to know that one of the things the prosecution is 
trying to do is they are trying to find out whether he purchased any 
material that could be used to make the bomb. So they are trying to 
find a chain. They are trying to work their way back. That is the way 
you stop the building of chemical weapons. If you are going to go make 
chemical weapons, you need certain chemicals. Countries like Iraq and 
countries like Libya don't have them. They need to buy them from 
someplace that manufactures them and then go make their chemical 
weapons.

  So another inducement to prevent the construction of chemical weapons 
is that we track the material that could be used, components, to make 
the chemical weapons. If company officials know they are going to be 
violating the law if they don't record that they sold 10 barrels of 
such and such, that is one side of the sanction. But they also know 
that, if they sell it to countries that use it to produce poison gas, 
and report it, then they are going to be responsible in the world's 
eyes.
  What do you think would happen if we knew today each of the chemical 
companies around the world that sold to Iraq the components of the 
chemical weapons that they used against the Kurds? What do you think 
would happen if we are able to identify company A, B, C, and D? I bet 
you that there would be a serious change in attitudes on the part of 
those companies.
  There is no reason to believe this, but let's assume that we 
identified American corporations which had sold the material to the 
Iraqis to build their chemical weapons stockpiles. I will lay you 8 to 
5 that the Senators on the floor of this Senate and Congressmen in the 
House of Representatives would immediately be introducing legislation 
to sanction those companies, and those companies would know that was 
about to happen to them.
  So you see the logic here. If you can trace the chemicals being sold 
to produce the weapons, you inhibit the likelihood that any company 
will sell that precursor because they don't want to be listed as the 
company or the nation that helped North Korea build chemical weapons.
  Technically, not all trade in the chemicals on what they call 
schedule 2 of this treaty would be banned immediately if we do not sign 
on, and trade in schedule 3 chemicals, would also not be banned 
immediately. But trade between countries that ratify and countries that 
don't in all of those chemicals that appear in schedule 2 will be 
banned in 3 years, and in schedule 3, possibly in 5 years. That means 
that, if we are not signed onto that at the front end or along the way, 
all those chemicals that have legitimate uses could not be sold for 
legitimate purposes without the chemical company being at a distinct 
disadvantage with the competitors in Europe and elsewhere.
  The third reason we need the Chemical Weapons Convention is that the 
United States has already decided by law--voted on in this body--to 
destroy most of our chemical weapons stocks anyway, a decision jointly 
made by the Congress and, guess who, ``trust but verify'' Reagan. In 
the 1980's, President Reagan, after consulting with his military 
advisers, said, look, these chemical stockpiles, the hundreds and 
hundreds of tons of chemicals weapons that we have stockpiled in the 
United States, have little or no efficacy. Our military tells us we 
don't need them to defend against other nations that use chemical 
weapons, and we don't need them for offensive purposes and they are 
unstable, so we are going to independently destroy them. And we passed 
a law saying you are right, Mr. President Reagan, destroy them.

  So think of the irony. We are going to destroy our chemical weapons 
no matter what, and we may not join a treaty that requires other 
nations to destroy their chemical weapons.
  After the gulf war, President Bush announced that we would destroy 
the rest of our chemical weapons other than the ones that President 
Reagan said we are going to destroy anyway. Then President Bush, after 
the Gulf war, said we are going to destroy anything that is left once 
we ratify the chemical weapons treaty.
  There is a connection here. I used to practice law with a guy who was 
a very good trial lawyer, Sidney Balick, still a great trial lawyer. He 
would stand before a jury, teaching me how to do jury trials, and he 
would look at the jury and say now look, it is very important you keep 
your eye on the ball here. The issue is whether or not my client robbed 
the store, not whether my client is a nice guy, not whether or not you 
would want my client to go out with your daughter, not whether my 
client is well dressed, not whether my client is nice looking. It is 
about whether or not he robbed the store. So keep your eye on the ball 
and connect the dots.
  Well, one of the things we have to do is keep our eye on the ball 
here and connect the dots. One of the reasons

[[Page S3474]]

why President Bush said we will destroy the rest of our chemical 
weapons was to help get ratified this treaty that we were the major 
architects of--a Republican President. And so because we have already 
decided to dismantle our chemical stockpiles, this convention we are 
talking about, this treaty will ensure that other nations do so as 
well.
  As Secretary of State Albright said: ``This treaty is about other 
people's weapons, not our own.''
  Let me repeat that. ``This treaty is about other people's weapons, 
not our own.'' We are going to destroy our own anyway. This is about 
other people's weapons. You are going to hear our colleagues stand up 
and say, you know, we should not ratify this treaty, although it has 
been signed by Russia, until it is ratified by their Duma, their 
Congress.
  Now, we are going to destroy our weapons anyway. We then do not 
ratify this treaty. Failure to ratify this treaty then gives Russia the 
excuse not to ratify the treaty. We will have destroyed all of our 
chemical weapons and Russia will still have millions of tons of 
stockpiled chemical weapons. Now, isn't that smart. Isn't that smart. 
What are we talking about here? This is about other people's weapons, 
not ours, not ours.
  The conclusion that we do not need chemical weapons to protect our 
military superiority, by the way, is based not on some reckless 
idealism but on hardheaded pragmatism on the part of the Joint Chiefs. 
Military leaders like Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, Gen. Colin Powell, 
former Secretaries of Defense Harold Brown and William Perry tell us 
that we do not need chemical weapons to defeat any potential adversary 
whether or not that adversary is armed with chemical weapons. We can 
engage in massive retaliation.
  This treaty, by the way, is also endorsed by several highly respected 
veterans organizations. The list includes the Reserve Officers 
Association, the Vietnam Veterans Association, the Veterans of Foreign 
Wars, and the Jewish War Veterans of the United States.
  Of course, Mr. President, we have to maintain a capacity and 
capability to defend against chemical weapons, against parties that may 
choose not to join the treaty or those which do not abide by its norms. 
But the danger that our forces will face chemical attack will in time 
be greatly reduced once this treaty is passed. So too will the threat 
that innocent civilians will be subject to such attacks by rogue 
states.
  The fourth reason we need this convention is because it will greatly 
enhance our ability to detect and deter chemical weapons programs. 
Through a detailed accounting procedure and an elaborate regime of on-
site inspection, the most intrusive inspection regime of any arms 
control agreement ever negotiated, the Chemical Weapons Convention will 
strengthen our ability to ensure compliance.

  You are going to hear another argument which I kind of find 
fascinating. As the Senator from Indiana and I tried to answer each of 
the arguments of the opponents of this treaty, we realized that by 
answering one we make their other argument. They argue at cross-
purposes. For example, you will hear some stand up one moment and say 
this treaty is not adequately verifiable. And we say OK, we have an 
inspection regime that allows you to go into plants in other countries, 
challenge inspections without notice, et cetera. They say, well, it is 
not enough. It is not enough. And we say OK, want to do more? They say, 
no, no, no, no, we can't do more. We don't want to do more. We don't 
want to verify.
  Why don't we want to verify? Because to verify intrudes upon your 
sovereignty.
  So you hear a second argument. Senator Helms made it. He says, you 
know, this treaty will allow people to go into the plants of chemical 
industries in the United States and pharmaceutical industries--and soap 
manufacturers, which is not true--and steal their trade secrets. So 
someone is going to challenge the DuPont Co., the international 
community, saying we think you are making chemical weapons. So this 
team of inspectors will go into the DuPont Co., they will have us 
believe, and they will root around the DuPont Co.'s books and look at 
all their patents and look at everything and steal their trade secrets, 
take them back to Iraq and now make nylon or make Corfam, which no one 
uses anymore. And we say, well, to the degree we protect against that, 
we lessen the ability to verify. And to the degree we increase the 
verification, we can protect less against that.
  The truth is neither are real. There is an entire regime built into 
this convention that will prevent anybody from being able to steal any 
trade secrets. But the point is you will hear these arguments. Ask 
yourself as this debate is going on, if they are really concerned about 
verification, why do they not want a greater ability to verify. And if 
they are really concerned about the loss of proprietary business 
interests and secrets, why do they not understand that they really do 
not want to verify.
  With or without the treaty, Mr. President--this is a key point--
whether we sign this treaty or not, the United States intelligence 
community, the defense intelligence establishment, the CIA, our entire 
intelligence apparatus, is still going to have the duty to monitor 
chemical weapons programs in other States. The President will demand no 
less, nor would we as a Nation. So no matter what we do, we are still 
going to be attempting to monitor through any means we can what is 
going on in Iran with regard to chemical weapons or Iraq with regard to 
chemical weapons, whether or not we verify. But what happens if we do 
not verify? Well, if we do not verify, then we do not get the ability 
to go into Iran, a signatory to this convention--and look at their 
companies, look at their facilities, challenge whether or not they are 
in fact lying to us. We do not get to be part of that. We have to do it 
from a distance.
  Now, how does that help us? No matter how weak you think the 
inspection regime is, how are we better off in our ultimate objective--
and that is finding and getting rid of chemical weapons programs around 
the world--how are we better off by not having access to the 
inspections that we could be part of conducting if we are part of the 
treaty?
  In my view, every single criticism you will hear of this treaty is 
worse without the treaty. Every single problem you will hear raised is 
worse for the United States if we are not in the treaty. I will not 
take the time now to go into all of them but this is just one. Since we 
have to have our intelligence guys and women find out what other 
countries are doing, how are we better off when we do not give them the 
tools that this treaty provides to find out what other nations are 
doing.

  This view is confirmed by George Tenet, the acting director of 
Central Intelligence, who testified:

       In the absence of the tools that the Convention gives . . . 
     us, it will be much harder for us to apprise . . . the 
     military and policymakers (about) developments.

  Developments meaning chemical weapons. Of course, there are going to 
be cheaters. But the extensive verification regime will surely raise 
the stakes considerably for cheaters and act as a deterrent.
  Ron Lehman, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
under President Bush and the Deputy National Security Adviser under 
President Reagan, stated:

       We do not have the highest confidence that we will detect 
     cheating, but the cheater must still worry that we might. 
     Should we deny ourselves the strategic warning that comes 
     from the detection of indications of chemical weapons 
     activity, even if there is not complete proof? With the 
     inherent difficulties in monitoring chemical weapons 
     activities, we need all the help we can get.

  Mr. President, it comes down to a simple question. Given that the 
treaty will enter into force next week without regard to our action, 
will we be better off inside the treaty or outside the treaty grouped 
with the pariah nations? I believe the answer is absolutely clear. We 
should be on the inside helping to implement the treaty that can be a 
powerful instrument in containing the threat posed by chemical weapons. 
It is not perfect, but we should not let the perfect be the enemy of 
the good. This is a good treaty and the Senate should consent to its 
ratification forthwith.
  Before we go to the final vote on the treaty itself, however, we will 
have a full day of debate and then tomorrow consider the various 
conditions contained in the proposed resolution of ratification. As 
provided for in the unanimous consent agreement reached last week, we 
will consider two sets of conditions. The first is a group of 28

[[Page S3475]]

conditions upon which all the parties have negotiated.
  Senator Helms laid out how long and hard he and I negotiated. I asked 
him and all opponents, I said list the entire universe of objections 
you have to this treaty, every single, solitary, conceivable reason to 
be against the treaty. And after months they listed them all. It came 
to 33 there was no agreement on. I sat down with Senator Helms and we 
worked out agreement on 28 of the 33. Hear what I said, 28 of the 33. I 
asked every argument of the treaty; list it; let me try to answer it 
for you--every single one. So the entire universe of objections comes 
down to 33. We agreed after laborious negotiations on 28 of the 33, 
leaving five in disagreement.
  We are going to, at some point, move to adopt all 28 of those by 
voice vote. But that leaves the five, the five that are killer 
conditions.
  Mr. McCAIN. Will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. BIDEN. Sure.
  Mr. McCAIN. Was the Senator aware that Senator Dole, former majority 
leader, has just announced his support of the treaty with the changes 
that have been made, which the Senator from Delaware was able to 
achieve in this agreement? I think this is a very important expression 
of support and one that I feel will be very much respected by our 
colleagues on both sides of the aisle.
  Also, I was curious, for purposes of the time, how much longer the 
Senator from Delaware statement will be?
  Mr. BIDEN. I will just take a few more minutes and reserve the 
remainder of my time. But let me answer the question. As the Senator 
from Arizona stood up to tell me that, my staff just handed me the news 
release. I was not aware until he just told me, but it does not 
surprise me and it pleases me a great deal. You and I worked with 
Senator Dole for a long time, I for 24 years, and have great respect 
for him. I was absolutely convinced that the conditions that we agreed 
on would take care of every conceivable problem he had with the treaty. 
I think it does for everyone, frankly.
  I know my friend from Arizona was very concerned about several 
provisions of this treaty. He has been deeply involved in the 
negotiations relating to this, and I think we have taken care of every 
condition that can possibly be dealt with, without killing the treaty.
  The remaining five conditions are conditions that cannot be met and 
will kill the treaty. So the reason we could not agree to the last five 
is they are what we call, in the parlance of the Senate, ``killer 
amendments,'' or ``killer conditions.''
  But I am very pleased, as I say, not surprised. Because in all the 
years I have worked with Senator Dole I have had the greatest respect 
for him and I have no doubt that he has thought about this long and 
hard. I am glad to see he has spoken out, now, which is very important.
  As I said, as provided for in the unanimous-consent agreement reached 
last week, we will consider two sets of conditions. The first is a 
group of 28 conditions, upon which all parties to the negotiations 
agree. The second is a set of five conditions that remain in 
disagreement among the parties; these five will be the subject of a 
separate debate and vote tomorrow.

  The 28 agreed conditions are the product of hours of negotiation that 
occurred in two complimentary phases. The first involved discussions 
between the administration and a task force of Republican Senators 
established by the majority leader. The second involved extensive 
negotiations between the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee 
and me.
  At this point, I would like to express my personal appreciation to 
the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and his able staff, 
for engaging in hours of discussions with me and my staff. Throughout 
the past few months, we held over 40 hours of meetings. Although we did 
not always agree--obviously, we would have been here on the floor a lot 
sooner if we had--the discussions were carried out in good faith, and 
the Senator from North Carolina was always a gentleman.
  I would also like to pause here to express my appreciation to the 
majority and minority leaders, who spent many hours on this over the 
past few months, and to the President, the National Security Adviser 
and his dedicated team, and the Secretary of State, for all their 
efforts in trying to forge common ground and narrow the issues.
  And we have narrowed the issues considerably. The negotiations 
succeeded in addressing many key issues of concern. Let me elaborate 
briefly on these conditions.
  Among the 28 agreed conditions are the following:
  A condition [No. 28] ensuring that fourth amendment rights will be 
protected by requiring search warrants in cases where consent to search 
a facility is not granted.
  A condition [No. 26] providing for the continued use of riot control 
agents by U.S. troops to save lives when rescuing pilots or when 
attacked by both combatants and civilians.
  Several conditions which augment existing protections for industry, 
including: No. 9, which requires an annual certification that the CWC 
is not significantly harming legitimate commercial activities; 
condition No. 16, which adds teeth to the convention's provision on 
protecting confidential business information by withholding U.S. 
contributions to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons--the body that will implement the treaty--if an employee 
discloses information that results in financial loss to a U.S. firm; 
the money will be withheld until the immunity of that employee is 
waived; and condition No. 18, which prohibits samples collected from 
U.S. firms from being taken to foreign laboratories, thus reducing the 
risk of the loss of proprietary information to foreign espionage.
  Conditions No. 2, 3, and 4, which hold down U.S. costs under the 
convention and require establishment of an inspector general for the 
body that will implement it.
  A condition [No. 5] which establishes strict standards for the 
sharing of U.S. intelligence information.
  And a condition [No. 14] which rejects any attempt by Russia to link 
its own ratification of the CWC to the receipt of U.S. assistance for 
chemical weapons destruction.
  Some treaty opponents have attempted to characterize these 
achievements as relatively minor. That is hardly the case.
  For example, throughout the debate on the convention, opponents have 
contended that it would violate the fourth amendment prohibition 
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Though this was never the 
case, condition No. 28 makes it explicitly clear that search warrants 
will be required whenever consent is withheld for an inspection.
  Similarly, CWC opponents have frequently criticized the Clinton 
administration's decision to interpret the convention as requiring 
modifications to U.S. policy, codified in Executive Order 11850 of 
April 8, 1975, on the use of riot control agents by U.S. forces in 
certain situations.
  Condition No. 26 states, unequivocally, that Executive Order 11850 
shall not be altered or eliminated.
  In short, many arguments about the treaty's perceived flaws are 
simply no longer valid in light of the agreed conditions contained in 
Senate Executive Resolution 75.
  Unfortunately, our success in addressing so many concerns has not 
been enough for some treaty opponents. They insist on voting on five 
extreme conditions, which, if adopted, will prevent the United States 
from ratifying the convention or will significantly undermine the 
convention.
  An opportunity to vote on these extreme conditions was coupled with a 
refusal to give the supporters of the treaty an opportunity to offer 
any substitutes.
  So we will be left with one course--to vote against the conditions 
offered by the opponents of this treaty. I regret that outcome--but 
that is the hand we have been dealt.
  During the next 2 days, we will debate these five conditions, and at 
an appropriate time, I will discuss them in detail. Let me now address 
a few of them briefly.
  First, the opponents of the convention will argue that we shouldn't 
join the convention until Russia, as well as several countries with 
offensive chemical weapons programs, do so, too. We will have 2 hours 
of debate on these issues tomorrow, but for now let me just say this: 
this approach holds American policy hostage to the decisions of other 
nations, which is not only bad policy,

[[Page S3476]]

but it also undermines our claim to international leadership.
  Opponents will also say that even if the rogue states join, the 
treaty won't be worth much because they will cheat. To this charge, 
there is an easy answer, provided by our Secretary of State: to say 
that we shouldn't try to make chemical weapons illegal because there 
will be cheaters, is like saying that we shouldn't have laws because 
people will break them.
  Next, you will hear the argument that we must amend article XI of the 
treaty, or else it will lead to the end of export controls on dangerous 
chemicals. This argument is based not only on a flawed reading of the 
treaty text, but on a willful ignorance of commitments already made.
  The CWC is completely consistent with continued enforcement of 
existing controls enforced by the Australia Group, an informal alliance 
of supplier countries.
  Moreover, the 30 nations that comprise the Australia Group have 
specifically stated their intention--individually and collectively--to 
maintain export controls that are equal to, or exceed, those in place 
today.
  Finally, we have added a condition--condition No. 7--which makes 
clear our interpretation that we may maintain export controls, and 
which requires the President to certify annually that the Australia 
Group continues to control the trade in vital chemicals.
  Even after all of this debate--and all of the voting--I suspect that 
the opponents of this treaty will still not be satisfied, even if they 
succeed in attaching killer conditions. That is because, at bottom, 
they have a theological opposition to arms control. That is defensible 
position. I respect it. But I strongly disagree with it.
  In essence, opponents of arms control fear that a treaty like this 
will lull us into a false sense of security. This proposition, I 
concede, has considerable force. But I am not persuaded.
  There is, of course, always a risk that a nation will lower its guard 
in the face of a reduced threat. But today's debate is not the end of 
our efforts on the chemical weapons problem. To borrow a phrase from 
Winston Churchill, it is not even the beginning of the end; it is the 
end of the beginning.
  From this day forward, if we approve this convention, as I sincerely 
hope we will, both the Senate and the executive must remain ever 
vigilant against the threat of chemical weapons--and ensure that we 
have an effective convention.
  We have added several conditions to the resolution of ratification to 
advance this objective. We have made a commitment, in condition No. 11; 
that requires the Secretary of Defense to ensure that U.S. forces are 
capable of carrying out military missions regardless of any foreign 
threat or use of chemical weapons. We have required, in condition No. 
10, an annual report on compliance issues. We have established, in 
condition No. 13, a mechanism for ensuring that the President promptly 
pursues potential violations that threaten our national security 
interests.
  Aside from these concrete conditions, however, our experience with 
other arms control agreements demonstrates that the political 
commitment remains, and that the dangers of complacency are greatly 
exaggerated.
  Nearly 30 years ago, we signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
amid predictions that dozens of states would have nuclear weapons 
within a decade. Today, we are more concerned than ever about the 
threat of nuclear proliferation, the Non-Proliferation Treaty has been 
extended permanently, and just a handful of states have the bomb.
  During the 1980's, we had constant debates about whether the Soviet 
Union was complying with its obligations under the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Treaty. Not once did we let down our guard against the Soviet 
threat.
  The thesis that we will be lulled into a false sense of security 
applies not to the convention, but to the alternative: to doing nothing 
other than strengthening our domestic laws against chemical weapons--
which was all the Senate achieved last week in passing S. 495.
  Revision of our domestic laws to criminalize possession and 
stockpiling of chemical weapons is necessary--with or without the 
treaty. But it is a delusion to believe that merely enacting domestic 
legislation will suffice to combat an international problem of this 
magnitude and gravity. Rather, it will take close cooperation by the 
civilized nations of the world to enforce the new international norm 
set forth in the Chemical Weapons Convention.
  Mr. President, as I stated at the outset, the world--and this is no 
exaggeration--is watching the U.S. Senate today and tomorrow. They are 
waiting for the answer to the question, will we, the United States, 
remain in the forefront of the battle to combat proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction? We must answer that in the affirmative. 
Put it another way, does anybody believe that 74 nations would have 
signed onto this treaty if they believed the United States of America 
was not going to support them? We have led people down the primrose 
path, if in fact we do not sign onto this treaty.
  I see that my friend from Indiana, who probably knows more about the 
chemical weapons treaty than anyone in the U.S. Senate, or maybe anyone 
in the country, has risen. I will be happy, if he is seeking 
recognition, to yield as much time to him as he believes he needs.
  Mr. LUGAR addressed the chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Grams). The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from Delaware for a 
remarkable speech in favor of the Chemical Weapons Convention, and for 
his leadership. I thank the distinguished Senator from Arizona, Senator 
McCain, for a very important announcement. I have in front of me the 
statement given by Senator Dole at the White House. I point out the 
context of this statement was a meeting with Senator Dole and President 
Clinton, in which these two statesmen came together this morning for a 
very important purpose, namely to say to America, in a unanimous way, 
the Chemical Weapons Convention is important for our security.
  Senator Dole stated:

       Last September, the Senate Majority Leader, Trent Lott, 
     asked me to express my opinion on the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention. In my response, I raised concerns about the 
     Chemical Weapons Convention and expressed hope that the 
     President and the Senate work together to ensure that the 
     treaty is effectively verifiable and genuinely global. They 
     have, and as a result, 28 conditions to the Senate's 
     Resolution of Ratification have been agreed to. These 28 
     agreed conditions address major concerns.
       I commend Senator Lott, Senator Helms, Senator Lugar, and 
     many other former colleagues, as well as President Clinton 
     and administration officials for their constructive efforts, 
     is it perfect--no--but I believe there are now adequate 
     safeguards to protect American interests. We should keep in 
     mind that the United States is already destroying its 
     chemical weapons in accordance with legislation passed more 
     than 10 years ago. The CWC would require all other parties to 
     destroy their stockpiles by April 2007.
       In addition, the Administration has agreed to a number of 
     provisions dealing with rogue states that remain outside the 
     treaty.

  The Senator attaches a letter from President Clinton to Senator Dole 
dated April 22, 1997, outlining those provisions. And then Senator Dole 
continues:

       I also understand there is a possibility of an additional 
     agreement with respect to sharing of information. If so, it 
     would further strengthen the treaty. I understand that even 
     with all the added safeguards, not every Senator, for their 
     own good reasons, will support ratification.
       As a member of the Senate, I supported the START I, START 
     II, INF, and CFE treaties because they met the crucial tests 
     of effective verification, real reductions, and stability. If 
     I were presently in the Senate, I would vote for ratification 
     of the CWC because of the many improvements agreed to.
       Those who may still have concerns can look to Article XVI, 
     which allows withdrawal from the treaty on 90 days notice if 
     it fails to serve America's vital interests. There is little 
     doubt in my mind that if this convention increases 
     proliferation of chemical weapons, it would lead to public 
     outrage which would compel any President to act. The bottom 
     line is that when it comes to America's security, we must 
     maintain a strong national defense that is second to none.

  As the Senator has pointed out, we will have in front of the body 
this afternoon, first of all, all 33 conditions, including 5 that are 
killer amendments. We must vote those down. We will have, then, before 
us, 28 agreed amendments that Senator Dole has referenced. We should 
vote in favor of those, and then proceed in this debate to strike the 
other 5.
  We are here today to discuss the ratification of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention.

[[Page S3477]]

  I say to my colleagues that, in performing its constitutional 
responsibilities with respect to treaties and international agreements, 
the Senate has to reach a judgment as to whether, on balance, U.S. 
acceptance of the obligations contained in the treaty serves the 
national interests of the United States. That phrase, on balance, is 
important, because in arriving at our judgment, we have to weigh the 
strengths and weaknesses of a treaty's provisions and decide whether 
the advantages or benefits outweigh any real or potential costs.
  If one believes that the benefits outweigh the costs, one will write 
and support one kind of resolution of ratification that consents to the 
treaty while utilizing conditional language to clarify or minimize 
perceived weaknesses. However, if one believes that the costs of U.S. 
participation outweigh the benefits, one will write and support a very 
different kind of resolution of ratification.
  It is my belief that the Chemical Weapons Convention, on balance, is 
in the national security interests of the United States, and thus I 
believe the Senate should ratify a resolution of ratification which 
allows the United States to deposit its instrument of ratification and 
become a state-party to the CWC.
  As Senator Biden pointed out, this international treaty was 
negotiated by Presidents Reagan and Bush and was signed by Secretary of 
State Eagleburger in January 1993--just before George Bush left office.
  Senator Biden was generous in pointing out that these were two 
Republican Presidents, Secretary Eagleburger was a Republican Secretary 
of State. It is appropriate that Senator Dole, as Republican candidate 
for President, join with President Clinton today, once again affirming 
that the CWC is in the best national interests of our country.