[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 46 (Thursday, April 17, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3373-S3379]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




   SENATE EXECUTIVE RESOLUTION 75--RELATIVE TO THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS 
                               CONVENTION

  Mr. HELMS submitted the following executive resolution; which was 
referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

                            S. Exec. Res. 75

       Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring 
     therein),

     SECTION 1. SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS.

       The Senate advises and consents to the ratification of the 
     Chemical Weapons Convention (as defined in section 3 of this 
     resolution), subject to the conditions in section 2.

     SEC. 2. CONDITIONS.

       The Senate's advice and consent to the ratification of the 
     Chemical Weapons Convention is subject to the following 
     conditions, which shall be binding upon the President:
       (1) Effect of article XXII.--Upon the deposit of the United 
     State instrument of ratification, the President shall certify 
     to the Congress that the United States has informed all other 
     States Parties to the Convention that the Senate reserves the 
     right, pursuant to the Constitution of the United States, to 
     give its advice and consent to ratification of the Convention 
     subject to reservations, notwithstanding Article XXII of the 
     Convention.
       (2) Financial contributions.--Notwithstanding any provision 
     of the Convention, no funds may be drawn from the Treasury of 
     the United States for payments or assistance (including the 
     transfer of in-kind items) under paragraph 16 of Article IV, 
     paragraph 19 of Article V, paragraph 7 of Article VIII, 
     paragraph 23 of Article IX, Article X, or any other provision 
     of the Convention, without statutory authorization and 
     appropriation.
       (3) Establishment of an internal oversight office.--
       (A) Certification.--Not later than 240 days after the 
     deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the 
     President shall certify to the Congress that the current 
     internal audit office of the Preparatory Commission has been 
     expanded into an independent internal oversight office whose 
     functions will be transferred to the Organization for the 
     Prohibition of Chemical Weapons upon the establishment of the 
     Organization. The independent internal oversight office shall 
     be obligated to protect confidential information pursuant to 
     the obligations of the Confidentiality Annex. The independent 
     internal oversight office shall--
       (i) make investigations and reports relating to all 
     programs of the Organization;
       (ii) undertake both management and financial audits, 
     including--

       (I) an annual assessment verifying that classified and 
     confidential information is stored and handled securely 
     pursuant to the general obligations set forth in Article VIII 
     and in accordance with all provisions of the Annex on the 
     Protection of Confidential Information; and
       (II) an annual assessment of laboratories established 
     pursuant to paragraph 55 of Part II of the Verification Annex 
     to ensure that the Director General of the Technical 
     Secretariat is carrying out his functions pursuant to 
     paragraph 56 of Part II of the Verification Annex;

[[Page S3374]]

       (iii) undertake performance evaluations annually to ensure 
     the Organization has complied to the extent practicable with 
     the recommendations of the independent internal oversight 
     office;
       (iv) have access to all records relating to the programs 
     and operations of the Organization;
       (v) have direct and prompt access to any official of the 
     Organization; and
       (vi) be required to protect the identity of, and prevent 
     reprisals against, all complainants.
       (B) Compliance with recommendations.--The Organization 
     shall ensure, to the extent practicable, compliance with 
     recommendations of the independent internal oversight office, 
     and shall ensure that annual and other relevant reports by 
     the independent internal oversight office are made available 
     to all member states pursuant to the requirements established 
     in the Confidentiality Annex.
       (C) Withholding a portion of contributions.--Until a 
     certification is made under subparagraph (A), 50 percent of 
     the amount of United States contributions to the regular 
     budget of the Organization assessed pursuant to paragraph 7 
     of Article VIII shall be withheld from disbursement, in 
     addition to any other amounts required to be withheld from 
     disbursement by any other provision of law.
       (D) Assessment of first year contributions.--
     Notwithstanding the requirements of this paragraph, for the 
     first year of the Organization's operation, ending on April 
     29, 1998, the United States shall make its full contribution 
     to the regular budget of the Organization assessed pursuant 
     to paragraph 7 of Article VIII.
       (E) Definition.--For purposes of this paragraph, the term 
     ``internal oversight office'' means the head of an 
     independent office (or other independent entity) established 
     by the Organization to conduct and supervise objective 
     audits, inspections, and investigations relating to the 
     programs and operations of the Organization.
       (4) Cost sharing arrangements.--
       (A) Annual reports.--Prior to the deposit of the United 
     States instrument of ratification, and annually thereafter, 
     the President shall submit a report to Congress identifying 
     all cost-sharing arrangements with the Organization.
       (B) Cost-sharing arrangement required.--The United States 
     shall not undertake any new research or development 
     expenditures for the primary purpose of refining or improving 
     the Organization's regime for verification of compliance 
     under the Convention, including the training of inspectors 
     and the provision of detection equipment and on-site analysis 
     sampling and analysis techniques, or share the articles, 
     items, or services resulting from any research and 
     development undertaken previously, without first having 
     concluded and submitted to the Congress a cost-sharing 
     arrangement with the Organization.
       (C) Construction.--Nothing in this paragraph may be 
     construed as limiting or constricting in any way the ability 
     of the United States to pursue unilaterally any project 
     undertaken solely to increase the capability of the United 
     States means for monitoring compliance with the Convention.
       (5) Intelligence sharing and safeguards.--
       (A) Provision of intelligence information to the 
     organization.--
       (i) In general.--No United States intelligence information 
     may be provided to the Organization or any organization 
     affiliated with the Organization, or to any official or 
     employee thereof, unless the President certifies to the 
     appropriate committees of Congress that the Director of 
     Central Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of 
     State and the Secretary of Defense, has established and 
     implemented procedures, and has worked with the Organization 
     to ensure implementation of procedures, for protecting from 
     unauthorized disclosure United States intelligence sources 
     and methods connected to such information. These procedures 
     shall include the requirement of--

       (I) the offer and provision of advice and assistance to the 
     Organization in establishing and maintaining the necessary 
     measures to ensure that inspectors and other staff members of 
     the Technical Secretariat meet the highest standards of 
     efficiency, competence, and integrity, pursuant to paragraph 
     1(b) of the Confidentiality Annex, and in establishing and 
     maintaining a stringent regime governing the handling of 
     confidential information by the Technical Secretariat, 
     pursuant to paragraph 2 of the Confidentiality Annex;
       (II) a determination that any unauthorized disclosure of 
     United States intelligence information to be provided to the 
     Organization or any organization affiliated with the 
     Organization, or any official or employee thereof, would 
     result in no more than minimal damage to United States 
     national security, in light of the risks of the unauthorized 
     disclosure of such information;
       (III) sanitization of intelligence information that is to 
     be provided to the Organization to remove all information 
     that could betray intelligence sources and methods; and
       (IV) interagency United States intelligence community 
     approval for any release of intelligence information to the 
     Organization, no matter how thoroughly it has been sanitized.

       (ii) Waiver authority.--

       (I) In general.--The Director of Central Intelligence may 
     waive the application of clause (i) if the Director of 
     Central Intelligence certifies in writing to the appropriate 
     committees of Congress that providing such information to the 
     Organization or an organization affiliated with the 
     Organization, or to any official or employee thereof, is in 
     the vital national security interests of the United States 
     and that all possible measures to protect such information 
     have been taken, except that such waiver must be made for 
     each instance such information is provided, or for each such 
     document provided. In the event that multiple waivers are 
     issued within a single week, a single certification to the 
     appropriate committees of Congress may be submitted, 
     specifying each waiver issued during that week.
       (II) Delegation of duties.--The Director of Central 
     Intelligence may not delegate any duty of the Director under 
     this paragraph.

       (B) Periodic and special reports.--
       (i) In general.--The President shall report periodically, 
     but not less frequently than semiannually, to the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives on the types and volume of intelligence 
     information provided to the Organization or affiliated 
     organizations and the purposes for which it was provided 
     during the period covered by the report.
       (ii) Exemption.--For purposes of this subparagraph, 
     intelligence information provided to the Organization or 
     affiliated organizations does not cover information that is 
     provided only to, and only for the use of, appropriately 
     cleared United States Government personnel serving with the 
     Organization or an affiliated organization.
       (C) Special reports.--
       (i) Report on procedures.--Accompanying the certification 
     provided pursuant to subparagraph (A)(i), the President shall 
     provide a detailed report to the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee 
     on Intelligence of the House of Representatives identifying 
     the procedures established for protecting intelligence 
     sources and methods when intelligence information is provided 
     pursuant to this section.
       (ii) Reports on unauthorized disclosures.--The President 
     shall submit a report to the Select Committee on Intelligence 
     of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the House of Representatives within 15 days 
     after it has become known to the United States Government 
     regarding any unauthorized disclosure of intelligence 
     provided by the United States to the Organization.
       (D) Delegation of duties.--The President may not delegate 
     or assign the duties of the President under this section.
       (E) Relationship to existing law.--Nothing in this 
     paragraph may be construed to--
       (i) impair or otherwise affect the authority of the 
     Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence 
     sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure pursuant to 
     section 103(c)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 403-3(c)(5)); or
       (ii) supersede or otherwise affect the provisions of title 
     V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et 
     seq.).
       (F) Definitions.--In this section:
       (i) Appropriate committees of congress.--The term 
     ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means the Committee on 
     Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of 
     the Senate and the Committee on International Relations and 
     the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House 
     of Representatives.
       (ii) Organization.--The term ``Organization'' means the 
     Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
     established under the Convention and includes any organ of 
     that Organization and any board or working group, such as the 
     Scientific Advisory Board, that may be established by it.
       (iii) Organization affiliated with the organization.--The 
     terms ``organization affiliated with the Organization'' and 
     ``affiliated organizations'' include the Provisional 
     Technical Secretariat under the Convention and any laboratory 
     certified by the Director-General of the Technical 
     Secretariat as designated to perform analytical or other 
     functions.
       (6) Amendments to the convention.--
       (A) Voting representation of the united states.--A United 
     States representative will be present at all Amendment 
     Conferences and will cast a vote, either affirmative or 
     negative, on all proposed amendments made at such 
     conferences.
       (B) Submission of amendments as treaties.--The President 
     shall submit to the Senate for its advice and consent to 
     ratification under Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the 
     Constitution of the United States any amendment to the 
     Convention adopted by an Amendment Conference.
       (7) Continuing vitality of the australia group and national 
     export controls.--
       (A) Declaration.--The Senate declares that the collapse of 
     the informal forum of states known as the ``Australia 
     Group,'' either through changes in membership or lack of 
     compliance with common export controls, or the substantial 
     weakening of common Australia Group export controls and non-
     proliferation measures in force on the date of United States 
     ratification of the Convention, would constitute a 
     fundamental change in circumstances to United States 
     ratification of the Convention.
       (B) Certification requirement.--Prior to the deposit of the 
     United States instrument of ratification, the President shall 
     certify to Congress that--
       (i) nothing in the Convention obligates the United States 
     to accept any modification,

[[Page S3375]]

     change in scope, or weakening of its national export 
     controls;
       (ii) the United States understands that the maintenance of 
     national restrictions on trade in chemicals and chemical 
     production technology is fully compatible with the provisions 
     of the Convention, including Article XI(2), and solely within 
     the sovereign jurisdiction of the United States;
       (iii) the Convention preserves the right of State Parties, 
     unilaterally or collectively, to maintain or impose export 
     controls on chemicals and related chemical production 
     technology for foreign policy or national security reasons, 
     notwithstanding Article XI(2); and
       (iv) each Australia Group member, at the highest diplomatic 
     levels, has officially communicated to the United States 
     Government its understanding and agreement that export 
     control and nonproliferation measures which the Australia 
     Group has undertaken are fully compatible with the provisions 
     of the Convention, including Article XI(2), and its 
     commitment to maintain in the future such export controls and 
     nonproliferation measures against non-Australia Group 
     members.
       (C) Annual certification.--
       (i) Effectiveness of australia group.--The President shall 
     certify to Congress on an annual basis that--

       (I) Australia Group members continue to maintain an equally 
     effective or more comprehensive control over the export of 
     toxic chemicals and their precursors, dual-use processing 
     equipment, human, animal and plant pathogens and toxins with 
     potential biological weapons application, and dual-use 
     biological equipment, as that afforded by the Australia Group 
     as of the date of ratification of the Convention by the 
     United States; and
       (II) the Australia Group remains a viable mechanism for 
     limiting the spread of chemical and biological weapons-
     related materials and technology, and that the effectiveness 
     of the Australia Group has not been undermined by changes in 
     membership, lack of compliance with common export controls 
     and nonproliferation measures, or the weakening of common 
     controls and nonproliferation measures, in force as of the 
     date of ratification of the Convention by the United States.

       (ii) Consultation with senate required.--In the event that 
     the President is, at any time, unable to make the 
     certifications described in clause (i), the President shall 
     consult with the Senate for the purposes of obtaining a 
     resolution of continued adherence to the Convention, 
     notwithstanding the fundamental change in circumstance.
       (D) Periodic consultation with congressional committees.--
     The President shall consult periodically, but not less 
     frequently than twice a year, with the Committee on Foreign 
     Relations of the Senate and the Committee on International 
     Relations of the House of Representatives, on Australia Group 
     export control and nonproliferation measures. If any 
     Australia Group member adopts a position at variance with the 
     certifications and understandings provided under subparagraph 
     (B), or should seek to gain Australia Group acquiescence or 
     approval for an interpretation that various provisions of the 
     Convention require it to remove chemical-weapons related 
     export controls against any State Party to the Convention, 
     the President shall block any effort by that Australia Group 
     member to secure Australia Group approval of such a position 
     or interpretation.
       (E) Definitions.--In this paragraph:
       (i) Australia group.--The term ``Australia Group'' means 
     the informal forum of states, chaired by Australia, whose 
     goal is to discourage and impede chemical and biological 
     weapons proliferation by harmonizing national export controls 
     chemical weapons precursor chemicals, biological weapons 
     pathogens, and dual-use production equipment, and through 
     other measures.
       (ii) Highest diplomatic levels.--The term ``highest 
     diplomatic levels'' means at the levels of senior officials 
     with the power to authoritatively represent their 
     governments, and does not include diplomatic representatives 
     of those governments to the United States.
       (8) Negative security assurances.--
       (A) Reevaluation.--In forswearing under the Convention the 
     possession of a chemical weapons retaliatory capability, the 
     Senate understands that deterrence of attack by chemical 
     weapons requires a reevaluation of the negative security 
     assurances extended to non-nuclear-weapon states.
       (B) Classified report.--Accordingly, 180 days after the 
     deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the 
     President shall submit to the Congress a classified report 
     setting forth the findings of a detailed review of United 
     States policy on negative security assurances, including a 
     determination of the appropriate responses to the use of 
     chemical or biological weapons against the Armed Forces of 
     the United States, United States citizens, allies, and third 
     parties.
       (9) Protection of advanced biotechnology.--Prior to the 
     deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, and 
     on January 1 of every year thereafter, the President shall 
     certify to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Speaker 
     of the House of Representatives that the legitimate 
     commercial activities and interests of chemical, 
     biotechnology, and pharmaceutical firms in the United States 
     are not being significantly harmed by the limitations of the 
     Convention on access to, and production of, those chemicals 
     and toxins listed in Schedule 1 of the Annex on Chemicals.
       (10) Monitoring and verification of compliance.--
       (A) Declaration.--The Senate declares that--
       (i) the Convention is in the interests of the United States 
     only if all State Parties are in strict compliance with the 
     terms of the Convention as submitted to the Senate for its 
     advice and consent to ratification, such compliance being 
     measured by performance and not by efforts, intentions, or 
     commitments to comply; and
       (ii) the Senate expects all State Parties to be in strict 
     compliance with their obligations under the terms of the 
     Convention, as submitted to the Senate for its advice and 
     consent to ratification;
       (B) Briefings on compliance.--Given its concern about the 
     intelligence community's low level of confidence in its 
     ability to monitor compliance with the Convention, the Senate 
     expects the executive branch of the Government to offer 
     regular briefings, not less than four times a year, to the 
     Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the 
     Committee on International Relations of the House of 
     Representatives on compliance issues related to the 
     Convention. Such briefings shall include a description of all 
     United States efforts in bilateral and multilateral 
     diplomatic channels and forums to resolve compliance issues 
     and shall include a complete description of--
       (i) any compliance issues the United States plans to raise 
     at meetings of the Organization, in advance of such meetings;
       (ii) any compliance issues raised at meetings of the 
     Organization, within 30 days of such meeting;
       (iii) any determination by the President that a State Party 
     is in noncompliance with or is otherwise acting in a manner 
     inconsistent with the object or purpose of the Convention, 
     within 30 days of such a determination.
       (C) Annual reports on compliance.--The President shall 
     submit on January 1 of each year to the Committee on Foreign 
     Relations of the Senate and the Committee on International 
     Relations of the House of Representatives a full and complete 
     classified and unclassified report setting forth--
       (i) a certification of those countries included in the 
     Intelligence Community's Monitoring Strategy, as set forth by 
     the Director of Central Intelligence's Arms Control Staff and 
     the National Intelligence Council (or any successor document 
     setting forth intelligence priorities in the field of the 
     proliferation of weapons of mass destruction) that are 
     determined to be in compliance with the Convention, on a 
     country-by-country basis;
       (ii) for those countries not certified pursuant to clause 
     (i), an identification and assessment of all compliance 
     issues arising with regard to the adherence of the country to 
     its obligation under the Convention;
       (iii) the steps the United States has taken, either 
     unilaterally or in conjunction with another State Party--

       (I) to initiate challenge inspections of the noncompliant 
     party with the objective of demonstrating to the 
     international community the act of noncompliance;
       (II) to call attention publicly to the activity in 
     question; and
       (III) to seek on an urgent basis a meeting at the highest 
     diplomatic level with the noncompliant party with the 
     objective of bringing the noncompliant party into compliance;

       (iv) a determination of the military significance and 
     broader security risks arising from any compliance issue 
     identified pursuant to clause (ii); and
       (v) a detailed assessment of the responses of the 
     noncompliant party in question to action undertaken by the 
     United States described in clause (iii).
       (D) Countries previously included in compliance reports.--
     For any country that was previously included in a report 
     submitted under subparagraph (C), but which subsequently is 
     not included in the Intelligence Community's Monitoring 
     Strategy (or successor document), such country shall continue 
     to be included in the report submitted under subparagraph (C) 
     unless the country has been certified under subparagraph 
     (C)(i) for each of the previous two years.
       (E) Form of certifications.--For those countries that have 
     been publicly and officially identified by a representative 
     of the intelligence community as possessing or seeking to 
     develop chemical weapons, the certification described in 
     subparagraph (C)(i) shall in be unclassified form.
       (F) Annual reports on intelligence.--On January 1, 1998, 
     and annually thereafter, the Director of Central Intelligence 
     shall submit to the Committees on Foreign Relations, Armed 
     Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     Senate and to the Committees on International Relations, 
     National Security, and Permanent Select Committee of the 
     House of Representatives, a full and complete classified and 
     unclassified report regarding--
       (i) the status of chemical weapons development, production, 
     stockpiling, and use, within the meanings of those terms 
     under the Convention, on a country-by-country basis;
       (ii) any information made available to the United States 
     Government concerning the development, production, 
     acquisition, stockpiling, retention, use, or direct or 
     indirect transfer of novel agents, including any unitary or 
     binary chemical weapon comprised of chemical components not 
     identified on the schedules of the Annex on Chemicals, on a 
     country-by-country basis;

[[Page S3376]]

       (iii) the extent of trade in chemicals potentially relevant 
     to chemical weapons programs, including all Australia Group 
     chemicals and chemicals identified on the schedules of the 
     Annex on Chemicals, on a country-by-country basis;
       (iv) the monitoring responsibilities, practices, and 
     strategies of the intelligence community (as defined in 
     section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947) and a 
     determination of the level of confidence of the intelligence 
     community with respect to each specific monitoring task 
     undertaken, including an assessment by the intelligence 
     community of the national aggregate data provided by State 
     Parties to the Organization, on a country-by-country basis;
       (v) an identification of how United States national 
     intelligence means, including national technical means and 
     human intelligence, is being marshaled together with the 
     Convention's verification provisions to monitor compliance 
     with the Convention; and
       (vi) the identification of chemical weapons development, 
     production, stockpiling, or use, within the meanings of those 
     terms under the Convention, by subnational groups, including 
     terrorist and paramilitary organizations.
       (G) Reports on resources for monitoring.--Each report 
     required under subparagraph (F) shall include a full and 
     complete classified annex submitted solely to the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and to the Permanent 
     Select Committee of the House of Representatives regarding--
       (i) a detailed and specific identification of all United 
     States resources devoted to monitoring the Convention, 
     including information on all expenditures associated with the 
     monitoring of the Convention; and
       (ii) an identification of the priorities of the executive 
     branch of Government for the development of new resources 
     relating to detection and monitoring capabilities with 
     respect to chemical and biological weapons, including a 
     description of the steps being taken and resources being 
     devoted to strengthening United States monitoring 
     capabilities.
       (11) Enhancements to robust chemical and biological 
     defenses.--
       (A) Sense of the senate.--It is the sense of the Senate 
     that--
       (i) chemical and biological threats to deployed United 
     States Armed Forces will continue to grow in regions of 
     concern around the world, and pose serious threats to United 
     States power projection and forward deployment strategies;
       (ii) chemical weapons or biological weapons use is a 
     potential element of future conflicts in regions of concern;
       (iii) it is essential for the United States and key 
     regional allies to preserve and further develop robust 
     chemical and biological defenses;
       (iv) the United States Armed Forces are inadequately 
     equipped, organized, trained and exercised for chemical and 
     biological defense against current and expected threats, and 
     that too much reliance is placed on non-active duty forces, 
     which receive less training and less modern equipment, for 
     critical chemical and biological defense capabilities;
       (v) the lack of readiness stems from a de-emphasis of 
     chemical and biological defenses within the executive branch 
     of Government and the United States Armed Forces;
       (vi) the armed forces of key regional allies and likely 
     coalition partners, as well as civilians necessary to support 
     United States military operations, are inadequately prepared 
     and equipped to carry out essential missions in chemically 
     and biologically contaminated environments;
       (vii) congressional direction contained in the Defense 
     Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (title XIV of 
     Public Law 104-201) should lead to enhanced domestic 
     preparedness to protect against chemical and biological 
     weapons threats; and
       (viii) the United States Armed Forces should place 
     increased emphasis on potential threats to forces deployed 
     abroad and, in particular, make countering chemical and 
     biological weapons use an organizing principle for United 
     States defense strategy and development of force structure, 
     doctrine, planning, training, and exercising policies of the 
     United States Armed Forces.
       (B) Actions to strengthen defense capabilities.--The 
     Secretary of Defense shall take those actions necessary to 
     ensure that the United States Armed Forces are capable of 
     carrying out required military missions in United States 
     regional contingency plans, despite the threat or use of 
     chemical or biological weapons. In particular, the Secretary 
     of Defense shall ensure that the United States Armed Forces 
     are effectively equipped, organized, trained, and exercised 
     (including at the large unit and theater level) to conduct 
     operations in a chemically or biologically contaminated 
     environment that are critical to the success of the United 
     States military plans in regional conflicts, including--
       (i) deployment, logistics, and reinforcement operations at 
     key ports and airfields;
       (ii) sustained combat aircraft sortie generation at 
     critical regional airbases; and
       (iii) ground force maneuvers of large units and divisions.
       (C) Discussions with regional allies and likely coalition 
     partners.--
       (i) In general.--The Secretaries of Defense and State 
     shall, as a priority matter, initiate discussions with key 
     regional allies and likely regional coalition partners, 
     including those countries where the United States currently 
     deploys forces, where United States forces would likely 
     operate during regional conflicts, or which would provide 
     civilians necessary to support United States military 
     operations, to determine what steps are necessary to ensure 
     that allied and coalition forces and other critical civilians 
     are adequately equipped and prepared to operate in chemically 
     and biologically contaminated environments.
       (ii) Reporting requirement.--Not later than one year after 
     deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the 
     Secretaries of Defense and State shall submit a report to the 
     Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services of the 
     Senate and to the Speaker of the House on the result of these 
     discussions, plans for future discussions, measures agreed to 
     improve the preparedness of foreign forces and civilians, and 
     proposals for increased military assistance, including 
     through the Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military 
     Financing, and the International Military Education and 
     Training programs pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 
     1961.
       (D) United states army chemical school.--The Secretary of 
     Defense shall take those actions necessary to ensure that the 
     United States Army Chemical School remains under the 
     oversight of a general officer of the United States Army.
       (E) Sense of the senate.--Given its concerns about the 
     present state of chemical and biological defense readiness 
     and training, it is the sense of the Senate that--
       (i) in the transfer, consolidation, and reorganization of 
     the United States Army Chemical School, the Army should not 
     disrupt or diminish the training and readiness of the United 
     States Armed Forces to fight in a chemical-biological warfare 
     environment;
       (ii) the Army should continue to operate the Chemical 
     Defense Training Facility at Fort McClellan until such time 
     as the replacement training facility at Fort Leonard Wood is 
     functional.
       (F) Annual reports on chemical and biological weapons 
     defense activities.--On January 1, 1998, and annually 
     thereafter, the President shall submit a report to the 
     Committees on Foreign Relations, Appropriations, and Armed 
     Services of the Senate and the Committee on International 
     Relations, National Security, and Appropriations of the House 
     of Representatives, and Speaker of the House on previous, 
     current, and planned chemical and biological weapons defense 
     activities. The report shall contain for the previous fiscal 
     year and for the next three fiscal years--
       (i) proposed solutions to each of the deficiencies in 
     chemical and biological warfare defenses identified in the 
     March 1996 report of the General Accounting Office entitled 
     ``Chemical and Biological Defense: Emphasis Remains 
     Insufficient to Resolve Continuing Problems'', and steps 
     being taken pursuant to subparagraph (B) to ensure that the 
     United States Armed Forces are capable of conducting required 
     military operations to ensure the success of United States 
     regional contingency plans despite the threat or use of 
     chemical or biological weapons;
       (ii) identification of the priorities of the executive 
     branch of Government in the development of both active and 
     passive chemical and biological defenses;
       (iii) a detailed summary of all budget activities 
     associated with the research, development, testing, and 
     evaluation of chemical and biological defense programs;
       (iv) a detailed summary of expenditures on research, 
     development, testing, and evaluation, and procurement of 
     chemical and biological defenses by fiscal years defense 
     programs, department, and agency;
       (v) a detailed assessment of current and projected vaccine 
     production capabilities and vaccine stocks, including 
     progress in researching and developing a multivalent vaccine;
       (vi) a detailed assessment of procedures and capabilities 
     necessary to protect and decontaminate infrastructure to 
     reinforce United States power-projection forces, including 
     progress in developing a nonaqueous chemical decontamination 
     capability;
       (vii) a description of progress made in procuring light-
     weight personal protective gear and steps being taken to 
     ensure that programmed procurement quantities are sufficient 
     to replace expiring battle-dress overgarments and chemical 
     protective overgarments to maintain required wartime 
     inventory levels;
       (viii) a description of progress made in developing long-
     range standoff detection and identification capabilities and 
     other battlefield surveillance capabilities for biological 
     and chemical weapons, including progress on developing a 
     multi-chemical agent detector, unmanned aerial vehicles, and 
     unmanned ground sensors;
       (ix) a description of progress made in developing and 
     deploying layered theater missile defenses for deployed 
     United States Armed Forces which will provide greater 
     geographic coverage against current and expected ballistic 
     missile threats and will assist in mitigating chemical and 
     biological contamination through higher altitude intercepts 
     and boost-phase intercepts;
       (x) an assessment of--

       (I) the training and readiness of the United States Armed 
     Forces to operate in a chemically or biologically 
     contaminated environment; and
       (II) actions taken to sustain training and readiness, 
     including training and readiness carried out at national 
     combat training centers;

[[Page S3377]]

       (xi) a description of progress made in incorporating 
     chemical and biological considerations into service and joint 
     exercises as well as simulations, models, and war games and 
     the conclusions drawn from these efforts about the United 
     States capability to carry out required missions, including 
     missions with coalition partners, in military contingencies;
       (xii) a description of progress made in developing and 
     implementing service and joint doctrine for combat and non-
     combat operations involving adversaries armed with chemical 
     or biological weapons, including efforts to update the range 
     of service and joint doctrine to better address the wide 
     range of military activities, including deployment, 
     reinforcement, and logistics operations in support of combat 
     operations, and for the conduct of such operations in concert 
     with coalition forces; and
       (xiii) a description of progress made in resolving issues 
     relating to the protection of United States population 
     centers from chemical and biological attack, including plans 
     for inoculation of populations, consequence management, and a 
     description of progress made in developing and deploying 
     effective cruise missile defenses and a national ballistic 
     missile defense.
       (12) Primacy of the united states constitution.--Nothing in 
     the Convention requires or authorizes legislation, or other 
     action, by the United States prohibited by the Constitution 
     of the United States, as interpreted by the United States.
       (13) Noncompliance.--
       (A) In general.--If the President determines that 
     persuasive information exists that a State Party to the 
     Convention is maintaining a chemical weapons production or 
     production mobilization capability, is developing new 
     chemical agents, or is in violation of the Convention in any 
     other manner so as to threaten the national security 
     interests of the United States, then the President shall--
       (i) consult with the Senate, and promptly submit to it, a 
     report detailing the effect of such actions;
       (ii) seek on an urgent basis a challenge inspection of the 
     facilities of the relevant party in accordance with the 
     provisions of the Convention with the objective of 
     demonstrating to the international community the act of 
     noncompliance;
       (iii) seek, or encourage, on an urgent basis a meeting at 
     the highest diplomatic level with the relevant party with the 
     objective of bringing the noncompliant party into compliance;
       (iv) implement prohibitions and sanctions against the 
     relevant party as required by law;
       (v) if noncompliance has been determined, seek on an urgent 
     basis within the Security Council of the United Nations a 
     multilateral imposition of sanctions against the noncompliant 
     party for the purposes of bringing the noncompliant party 
     into compliance; and
       (vi) in the event that the noncompliance continues for a 
     period of longer than one year after the date of the 
     determination made pursuant to subparagraph (A), promptly 
     consult with the Senate for the purposes of obtaining a 
     resolution of support of continued adherence to the 
     Convention, notwithstanding the changed circumstances 
     affecting the object and purpose of the Convention.
       (B) Construction.--Nothing in this section may be construed 
     to impair or otherwise affect the authority of the Director 
     of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and 
     methods from unauthorized disclosure pursuant to section 
     103(c)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     403-3(c)(5)).
       (C) Presidential determinations.--If the President 
     determines that an action otherwise required under 
     subparagraph (A) would impair or otherwise affect the 
     authority of the Director of Central Intelligence to protect 
     intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized 
     disclosure, the President shall report that determination, 
     together with a detailed written explanation of the basis for 
     that determination, to the chairmen of the Senate Select 
     Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence not later than 15 days after making 
     such determination.
       (14) Financing russian implementation.--The United States 
     understands that, in order to be assured of the Russian 
     commitment to a reduction in chemical weapons stockpiles, 
     Russia must maintain a substantial stake in financing the 
     implementation of both the 1990 Bilateral Destruction 
     Agreement and the Convention. The United States shall not 
     accept any effort by Russia to make deposit of Russia's 
     instrument of ratification contingent upon the United States 
     providing financial guarantees to pay for implementation of 
     commitments by Russia under the 1990 Bilateral Destruction 
     Agreement or the Convention.
       (15) Assistance under article x.--
       (A) In general.--Prior to the deposit of the United States 
     instrument of ratification, the President shall certify to 
     the Congress that the United States shall not provide 
     assistance under paragraph 7(a) of Article X.
       (B) Countries ineligible for certain assistance under the 
     foreign assistance act.--Prior to the deposit of the United 
     States instrument of ratification, the President shall 
     certify to the Congress that for any State Party the 
     government of which is not eligible for assistance under 
     chapter 2 of part II (relating to military assistance) or 
     chapter 4 of part II (relating to economic support 
     assistance) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961--
       (i) no assistance under paragraph 7(b) of Article X will be 
     provided to the State Party; and
       (ii) no assistance under paragraph 7(c) of Article X other 
     than medical antidotes and treatment will be provided to the 
     State Party.
       (16) Protection of confidential information.--
       (A) Unauthorized disclosure of united states business 
     information.--Whenever the President determines that 
     persuasive information is available indicating that--
       (i) an officer of employee of the Organization has 
     willfully published, divulged, disclosed, or made known in 
     any manner or to any extent not authorized by the Convention 
     any United States confidential business information coming to 
     him in the course of his employment or official duties or by 
     reason of any examination or investigation of any return, 
     report, or record made to or filed with the Organization, or 
     any officer or employee thereof, and
       (ii) such practice or disclosure has resulted in financial 
     losses or damages to a United States person,

     the President shall, within 30 days after the receipt of such 
     information by the executive branch of Government, notify the 
     Congress in writing of such determination.
       (B) Waiver of immunity from jurisdiction.--
       (i) Certification.--Not later than 270 days after 
     notification of Congress under subparagraph (A), the 
     President shall certify to Congress that the immunity from 
     jurisdiction of such foreign person has been waived by the 
     Director-General of the Technical Secretariat.
       (ii) Withholding of portion of contributions.--If the 
     President is unable to make the certification described under 
     clause (i), then 50 percent of the amount of each annual 
     United States contribution to the regular budget of the 
     Organization that is assessed pursuant to paragraph 7 of 
     Article VIII shall be withheld from disbursement, in addition 
     to any other amounts required to be withheld from 
     disbursement by any other provision of law, until--

       (I) the President makes such certification, or
       (II) the President certifies to Congress that the situation 
     has been resolved in a manner satisfactory to the United 
     States person who has suffered the damages due to the 
     disclosure of United States confidential business 
     information.

       (C) Breaches of confidentiality.--
       (i) Certification.--In the case of any breach of 
     confidentiality involving both a State Party and the 
     Organization, including any officer or employee thereof, the 
     President shall, within 270 days after providing written 
     notification to Congress pursuant to subparagraph (A), 
     certify to Congress that the Commission described under 
     paragraph 23 of the Confidentiality Annex has been 
     established to consider the breach.
       (ii) Withholding of portion of contributions.--If the 
     President is unable to make the certification described under 
     clause (i), then 50 percent of the amount of each annual 
     United States contribution to the regular budget of the 
     Organization that is assessed pursuant to paragraph 7 of 
     Article VIII shall be withheld from disbursement, in addition 
     to any other amounts required to be withheld from 
     disbursement by any other provision of law, until--

       (I) the President makes such certification, or
       (II) the President certifies to Congress that the situation 
     has been resolved in a manner satisfactory to the United 
     States person who has suffered the damages due to the 
     disclosure of United States confidential business 
     information.

       (D) Definitions.--In this paragraph:
       (i) United states confidential business information.--The 
     term ``United States confidential business information'' 
     means any trade secrets or commercial or financial 
     information that is privileged and confidential, as described 
     in section 552(b)(4) of title 5, United States Code, and that 
     is obtained--

       (I) from a United States person; and
       (II) through the United States National Authority or the 
     conduct of an inspection on United States territory under the 
     Convention.

       (ii) United states person.--The term ``United States 
     person'' means any natural person or any corporation, 
     partnership, or other juridical entity organized under the 
     laws of the United States.
       (iii) United states.--The term ``United States'' means the 
     several States, the District of Columbia, and the 
     commonwealths, territories, and possessions of the United 
     States.
       (17) Constitutional prerogatives.--
       (A) Findings.--The Senate makes the following findings:
       (i) Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the United States 
     Constitution states that the President ``shall have Power, by 
     and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make 
     Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present 
     concur''.
       (ii) At the turn of the century, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge 
     took the position that the giving of advice and consent to 
     treaties constitutes a stage in negotiation on the treaties 
     and that Senate amendments or reservations to a treaty are 
     propositions ``offered at a later stage of the negotiation by

[[Page S3378]]

     the other part of the American treaty making power in the 
     only manner in which they could then be offered''.
       (iii) The executive branch of Government has begun a 
     practice of negotiating and submitting to the Senate treaties 
     which include provisions that have the purported effect of--

       (I) inhibiting the Senate from attaching reservations that 
     the Senate considers necessary in the national interest; or
       (II) preventing the Senate from exercising its 
     constitutional duty to give its advice and consent to treaty 
     commitments before ratification of the treaties.

       (iv) During the 85th Congress, and again during the 102d 
     Congress, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate 
     made its position on this issue clear when stating that ``the 
     President's agreement to such a prohibition cannot constrain 
     the Senate's constitutional right and obligation to give its 
     advice and consent to a treaty subject to any reservation it 
     might determine is required by the national interest''.
       (B) Sense of the senate.--It is the sense of the Senate 
     that--
       (i) the advice and consent given by the Senate in the past 
     to ratification of treaties containing provisions which 
     prohibit amendments or reservations should not be construed 
     as a precedent for such provisions in future treaties;
       (ii) United States negotiators to a treaty should not agree 
     to any provision that has the effect of inhibiting the Senate 
     from attaching reservations or offering amendments to the 
     treaty; and
       (iii) the Senate should not consent in the future to any 
     article or other provision of any treaty that would prohibit 
     the Senate from giving its advice and consent to ratification 
     of the treaty subject to amendment or reservation.
       (18) Laboratory sample analysis.--Prior to the deposit of 
     the United States instrument of ratification, the President 
     shall certify to the Senate that no sample collected in the 
     United States pursuant to the Convention will be transferred 
     for analysis to any laboratory outside the territory of the 
     United States.
       (19) Effect on terrorism.--The Senate finds that--
       (A) without regard to whether the Convention enters into 
     force, terrorists will likely view chemical weapons as a 
     means to gain greater publicity and instill widespread fear; 
     and
       (B) the March 1995 Tokyo subway attack by the Aum Shinrikyo 
     would not have been prevented by the Convention.
       (20) Constitutional separation of powers.--
       (A) Findings.--The Senate makes the following findings:
       (i) Article VIII(8) of the Convention allows a State Party 
     to vote in the Organization if the State Party is in arrears 
     in the payment of financial contributions and the 
     Organization is satisfied that such nonpayment is due to 
     conditions beyond the control of the State Party.
       (ii) Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution 
     vests in Congress the exclusive authority to ``pay the 
     Debts'' of the United States.
       (iii) Financial contributions to the Organization may be 
     appropriated only by Congress.
       (B) Sense of senate.--It is therefore the sense of the 
     Senate that--
       (i) such contributions thus should be considered, for 
     purposes of Article VIII(8) of the Convention, beyond the 
     control of the executive branch of the United States 
     Government; and
       (ii) the United States vote in the Organization should not 
     be denied in the event that Congress does not appropriate the 
     full amount of funds assessed for the United States financial 
     contribution to the Organization.
       (21) On-site inspection agency.--It is the sense of the 
     Senate that the On-Site Inspection Agency of the Department 
     of Defense should have the authority to provide assistance in 
     advance of any inspection to any facility in the United 
     States that is subject to a routine inspection under the 
     Convention, or to any facility in the United States that is 
     the object of a challenge inspection conducted pursuant to 
     Article IX, if the consent of the owner or operator of the 
     facility has first been obtained.
       (22) Limitation on the scale of assessment.--
       (A) Limitation on annual assessment.--Notwithstanding any 
     provision of the Convention, and subject to the requirements 
     of subparagraphs (B), (C), and (D) the United States shall 
     pay as a total annual assessment of the costs of the 
     Organization pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article VIII not more 
     than $25,000,000.
       (B) Recalculation of limitation.--On January 1, 2000, and 
     at each 3-year interval thereafter, the amount specified in 
     subparagraph (A) is to be recalculated by the Administrator 
     of General Services, in consultation with the Secretary of 
     State, to reflect changes in the consumer price index for the 
     immediately preceding 3-year period.
       (C) Additional contributions requiring congressional 
     approval.--
       (i) Authority.--Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), the 
     President may furnish additional contributions which would 
     otherwise be prohibited under subparagraph (A) if--

       (I) the President determines and certifies in writing to 
     the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee 
     on Foreign Relations of the Senate that the failure to 
     provide such contributions would result in the inability of 
     the Organization to conduct challenge inspections pursuant to 
     Article IX or would otherwise jeopardize the national 
     security interests of the United States; and
       (II) Congress enacts a joint resolution approving the 
     certification of the President.

       (ii) Statement of reasons.--The President shall transmit 
     with such certification a detailed statement setting forth 
     the specific reasons therefor, and the specific uses to which 
     the additional contributions provided to the Organization 
     would be applied.
       (D) Additional contributions for verification.--
     Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), for a period of not more 
     than ten years, the President may furnish additional 
     contributions to the Organization for the purposes of meeting 
     the costs of verification under Articles IV and V.
       (23) Additions to the annex on chemicals.--
       (A) Presidential notification.--Not later than 10 days 
     after the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat 
     communicates information to all States Parties pursuant to 
     Article XV(5)(a) of a proposal for the addition of a chemical 
     or biological substance to a schedule of the Annex on 
     Chemicals, the President shall notify the Committee on 
     Foreign Relations of the Senate of the proposed addition.
       (B) Presidential report.--Not later than 60 days after the 
     Director-General of the Technical Secretariat communicates 
     information of such a proposal pursuant to Article XV(5)(a) 
     or not later than 30 days after a positive recommendation by 
     the Executive Council pursuant to Article XV(5)(c), whichever 
     is sooner, the President shall submit to the Committee on 
     Foreign Relations of the Senate a report, in classified and 
     unclassified form, detailing the likely impact of the 
     proposed addition to the Annex on Chemicals. Such report 
     shall include--
       (i) an assessment of the likely impact on United States 
     industry of the proposed addition of the chemical or 
     biological substance to a schedule of the Annex on Chemicals;
       (ii) a description of the likely costs and benefits, if 
     any, to United States national security of the proposed 
     addition of such chemical or biological substance to a 
     schedule of the Annex on Chemicals; and
       (iii) a detailed assessment of the effect of the proposed 
     addition on United States obligations under the Verification 
     Annex.
       (C) Presidential consultation.--The President shall, after 
     the submission of the notification required under 
     subparagraph (A) and prior to any action on the proposal by 
     the Executive Council under Article XV(5)(c), consult 
     promptly with the Senate as to whether the United States 
     should object to the proposed addition of a chemical or 
     biological substance pursuant to Article XV(5)(c).
       (24) Treaty interpretation.--The Senate affirms the 
     applicability to all treaties of the Constitutionally based 
     principles of treaty interpretation set forth in Condition 
     (1) of the resolution of ratification with respect to the INF 
     Treaty. For purposes of this declaration, the term ``INF 
     Treaty'' refers to the Treaty Between the United States of 
     America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 
     Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter Range 
     Missiles, together with the related memorandum of 
     understanding and protocols, approved by the Senate on May 
     27, 1988.
       (25) Further arms reductions obligations.--The Senate 
     declares its intention to consider for approval international 
     agreements that would obligate the United States to reduce or 
     limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States in a 
     militarily significant manner only pursuant to the treaty 
     power as set forth in Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the 
     Constitution.
       (26) Riot control agents.--
       (A) Permitted uses.--Prior the the deposit of the United 
     States instrument of ratification, the President shall 
     certify to Congress that the United States is not restricted 
     by the Convention in its use of riot control agents, 
     including the use against combatants who are parties to a 
     conflict, in any of the following cases:
       (i) United states not a party.--The conduct of peacetime 
     muilitary operations within an area of ongoing armed conflict 
     when the United States is not a party to the conflict (such 
     as recent use of the United States Armed Forces in Somalia, 
     Bosnia, and Ruanda).
       (ii) Consensual peacekeeping.--Consensual peacekeeping 
     operations when the use of force is authorized by the 
     receiving state, including operations pursuant to Chapter VI 
     of the United Nations Charter.
       (iii) Chapter vii peacekeeping.--Peacekeeping operations 
     when force is authorized by the Securtity Council under 
     Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.
       (B) Implementation.--The President shall take no measure, 
     and prescribe no rule or regulation, which would alter or 
     eliminate Executive Order 11850 of April 8, 1975.
       (C) Definition.--In this paragraph, the term ``riot control 
     agent'`` has the meaning given the term in Article II(7) of 
     the Convention.
       (27) Chemical weapons destruction.--Prior to the deposit of 
     the United States instrument of ratification of the 
     Convention, the President shall certify to the Congress that 
     all of the following conditions are satisfied:

[[Page S3379]]

       (A) Exploration of alternative technologies.--The President 
     has agreed to explore alternative technologies for the 
     destruction of the United States stockpile of chemical 
     weapons in order to ensure that the United States has the 
     safest, most effective and environmentally sound plans and 
     programs for meeting its obligations under the Convention for 
     the destruction of chemical weapons.
       (B) Convention extends destruction deadline.--The 
     requirement in section 1412 of Public Law 99-145 (50 U.S.C. 
     1521) for completion of the destruction of the United States 
     stockpile of chemical weapons by December 31, 2004, will be 
     superseded upon the date the Convention enters into force 
     with respect to the United States by the deadline required by 
     the Convention of April 29, 2007.
       (C) Authority to employ a different destruction 
     technology.--The requirement in Article III(1)(a)(v) of the 
     Convention for a declaration by each State Party not later 
     than 30 days after the date the Convention enters into force 
     with respect to that Party, on general plans of the State 
     Party for destruction of its chemical weapons does not 
     preclude in any way the United States from deciding in the 
     future to employ a technology for the destruction of chemical 
     weapons different than that declared under that Article.
       (D) Procedures for extension of deadline.--The President 
     will consult with Congress on whether to submit a request to 
     the Executive Council of the Organization for an extension of 
     the deadline for the destruction of chemical weapons under 
     the Convention, as provided under part IV(A) of the Annex on 
     Implementation and Verification to the Convention, if, as a 
     result of the program of alternative technologies for the 
     destruction of chemical munitions carried out under section 
     8065 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1997 
     (as contained in Public Law 104-208), the President 
     determines that alternatives to the incineration of chemical 
     weapons are available that are safer and more environmentally 
     sound but whose use would preclude the United States from 
     meeting the deadlines of the Convention.
       (28) Constitutional protection against unreasonable search 
     and seizure.--
       (A) In general.--In order to protect United States citizens 
     against unreasonable searches and seizures, prior to the 
     deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the 
     President shall certify to Congress that--
       (i) for any challenge inspection conducted on the territory 
     of the United States pursuant to Article IX, where consent 
     has been withheld, the United States National Authority will 
     first obtain a criminal search warrant based upon probable 
     cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and describing with 
     particularity the place to be searched and the persons or 
     things to be seized; and
       (ii) for any routine inspection of a declared facility 
     under the Convention that is conducted on an involuntary 
     basis on the territory of the United States, the United 
     States National Authority first will obtain an administrative 
     search warrant from a United States magistrate judge.
       (B) Definition.--For purposes of this resolution, the term 
     ``National Authority'' means the agency or office of the 
     United States Government designated by the United States 
     pursuant to Article VII(4) of the Convention.
       (29) Russian elimination of chemical weapons.--Prior to the 
     deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the 
     President shall certify to the Congress that--
       (A) Russia is making reasonable progress in the 
     implementation of the Agreement between the United States of 
     America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 
     Destruction and Nonproduction of Chemical Weapons and on 
     Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral Convention on Banning 
     Chemical Weapons, signed on June 1, 1990 (in this resolution 
     referred to as the ``1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement'');
       (B) the United States and Russia have resolved, to the 
     satisfaction of the United States, outstanding compliance 
     issues under the Memorandum of Understanding Between the 
     Government of the United States of America and the Union of 
     Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding a Bilateral Verification 
     Experiment and Data Exchange Related to Prohibition on 
     Chemical Weapons, signed at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, on 
     September 23, 1989, also known as the ``1989 Wyoming 
     Memorandum of Understanding'', and the 1990 Bilateral 
     Destruction Agreement;
       (C) Russia has deposited the Russian instrument of 
     ratification for the Convention and is in compliance with its 
     obligations under the Convention; and
       (D) Russia is committed to forgoing any chemical weapons 
     capability, chemical weapons modernization program, 
     production mobilization capability, or any other activity 
     contrary to the object and purpose of the Convention.
       (30) Chemical weapons in other states.--
       (A) Certification requirement.--Prior to the deposit of the 
     United States instrument of ratification the President, in 
     consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence, shall 
     certify to the Congress that countries which have been 
     determined to have offensive chemical weapons programs, 
     including Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, the Democratic People's 
     Republic of Korea, China, and all other countries determined 
     to be state sponsors of international terrorism, have 
     ratified or otherwise acceded to the Convention.
       (31) Exercise of right to bar certain inspectors.--
       (i) In general.--The President shall exercise United States 
     rights under paragraphs 2 and 4 of Part II of the 
     Verification Annex to indicate United States non-acceptance 
     of all inspectors and inspection assistants who are nationals 
     of countries designated by the Secretary of State as 
     supporters of international terrorism under section 40(d) of 
     the Arms Export Control Act, or nationals of countries that 
     have been determined by the President, in the last five 
     years, to have violated United States nonproliferation law, 
     including--

       (I) chapters 7, 8, and 10 of the Arms Export Control Act;
       (II) sections 821 and 824 of the Nuclear Proliferation 
     Prevention Act of 1994;
       (III) sections 11b and 11c of the Export Administration Act 
     of 1979;
       (IV) the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945; and
       (V) sections 1604 and 1605 of the Iran-Iraq 
     Nonproliferation Act of 1992.

       (ii) Other grounds of exclusion.--The President shall also 
     bar such nationals from entering United States territory for 
     the purpose of conducting any activity associated with the 
     Convention, notwithstanding paragraph 7 of Part II of the 
     Verification Annex.
       (32) Stemming the proliferation of chemical weapons.--Prior 
     to the deposit of the United States instrument of 
     ratification, the President shall certify to Congress that--
       (A) the State Parties have concluded an agreement amending 
     the Convention--
       (i) by striking Article X; and
       (ii) by amending Article XI to strike any provision that 
     states or implies disapproval of trade restrictions in the 
     field of chemical activities, including paragraphs 2(b), 
     2(c), 2(d), and 2(e); and
       (B) no provision has been added to the Convention or to any 
     of its annexes, and no statement, written or oral, has been 
     issued by the Organization, stating or implying the right or 
     obligation of States Parties to share or facilitate the 
     exchange among themselves of chemical weapons defense 
     technology, chemicals, equipment, or scientific and technical 
     information.
       (33) Effective verification.--
       (A) Certification.--Prior to the deposit of the United 
     States instrument of ratification, the President shall 
     certify to Congress that compliance with the Convention is 
     effectively verifiable.
       (B) Definitions.--In this paragraph:
       (i) Effectively verifiable.--The term ``effectively 
     verifiable'' means that the Director of Central Intelligence 
     has certified to the President that the United States 
     intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the 
     National Security Act of 1947) has a high degree of 
     confidence in its ability to detect militarily significant 
     violations of the Convention, including the production, 
     possession, or storage of militarily significant quantities 
     of lethal chemicals, in a timely fashion, and to detect 
     patterns of marginal violation over time.
       (ii) Militarily significant.--The term ``militarily 
     significant'' means one metric ton or more of chemical 
     weapons agent.
       (iii) Timely fashion.--The term ``timely fashion'' means 
     detection within one year of the violation having occurred.

     SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

       As used in this resolution:
       (1) Chemical weapons convention or convention.--The terms 
     ``Chemical Weapons Convention'' and ``Convention'' mean the 
     Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production, 
     Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their 
     Destruction, Opened for Signature and Signed by the United 
     States at Paris on January 13, 1993, including the following 
     protocols and memorandum of understanding, all such documents 
     being integral parts of and collectively referred to as the 
     ``Chemical Weapons Convention'' or the ``Convention'' 
     (contained in Treaty Document 103-21):
       (A) The Annex on Chemicals.
       (B) The Annex on Implementation and Verification.
       (C) The Annex on the Protection of Confidential 
     Information.
       (D) The Resolution Establishing the Preparatory Commission 
     for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
       (E) The Text on the Establishment of a Preparatory 
     Commission.
       (2) Organization.--The term ``Organization'' means the 
     Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
     established under the Convention.
       (3) State party.--The term ``State Party'' means any nation 
     that is a party to the Convention.
       (4) United states instrument of ratification.--The term 
     ``United States instrument of ratification'' means the 
     instrument of ratification of the United States of the 
     Convention.

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