[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 46 (Thursday, April 17, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3339-S3343]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




      CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS THREAT REDUCTION ACT OF 1977

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise in support of S. 495, the 
Chemical and Biological Threat Reduction Act of 1997, offered by the 
Senator from Arizona, Senator Kyl, and others.
  There has been criticism of this legislation by Members of the Senate 
as well as by the administration. The criticism largely centers around 
charges that it falls short as an alternative to the Chemical Weapons 
Convention [CWC].
  I do not know what the outcome will be of the Senate vote on advice 
and consent to ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. This 
legislation could possibly be an alternative in the event two-thirds of 
the Members present do not vote for the treaty. On the other hand, it 
may also complement the treaty, if it passes.
  I want the Record to be clear, whatever the outcome of the vote on 
the CWC, I support efforts by the Senate to provide comprehensive 
criminal, civil, and other penalties for the acquisition, possession, 
transfer, or use of chemical or biological weapons. I also want the 
Record to reflect my continued support for the destruction of the U.S. 
unitary stockpile.
  I urge my colleagues to vote for S. 495.
  Mr. HUTCHINSON. Mr. President, I proudly stand here today as a 
cosponsor of S. 495, Senator Jon Kyl's Chemical and Biological Weapons 
Threat Reduction Act of 1997. First and foremost, I want to thank the 
good Senator from Arizona for his commitment and hard work regarding 
chemical and biological weapon threats. This legislation certainly 
provides a comprehensive domestic and international plan to reduce the 
threat of chemical and biological weapon use.
  It sets forth practical, realistic, and achievable nonproliferation 
measures to combat the very real dangers posed by these weapons.
  Today the U.S. Senate will vote on the Chemical and Biological 
Weapons Threat Reduction Act. Mr. President, for the first time in U.S. 
history, we will have legislation that provides the needed criminal and 
civil penalties against those who produce, stockpile, and transfer 
chemical weapons in the United States.
  Mr. President, as this body begins debate on the chemical weapons 
issue, I wholeheartedly believe that S. 495 will not only reinforce our 
strong commitment to eliminating chemical and biological weapons, but 
more importantly this legislation will provide our domestic law 
enforcement authorities the needed legal basis to enforce prohibitions 
on chemical weapons activities within the United States.
  I have heard the arguments against S. 495, including that it amounts 
to the ``U.S. go at it alone,'' approach. However, Mr. President, this 
bill sets forth a strong moral example for other nations to follow and 
in doing so underscores our commitment to global nonproliferation 
efforts.
  Furthermore, through the Australia Group, the United States and its 
principal international partners have worked together to prevent the 
transfer of dual-use chemicals and chemical

[[Page S3340]]

weapon-related equipment. The Australia Group must remain a cornerstone 
of our international nonproliferation effort and Mr. President, the 
passage of this legislation accomplishes this goal.
  Mr. President, let me emphasize the strong points of this bill:
  It requires U.S. sanctions against any country that uses chemical 
and/or biological weapons against another country. In effect a range of 
sanctions can be imposed: arms sales, trade restrictions, foreign 
assistance, etc.;
  It outlaws the entire range of chemical and biological weapons 
activities within the United States. This bill mandates a $100,000 
penalty for civil violations and provides the death penalty where 
chemical and/or biological weapons use leads to the loss of life;
  It establishes criteria for continued United States aid to Russia for 
chemical and biological weapons dismantlement and destruction;
  Most importantly, the assistance for dismantling Russia's chemical 
weapons stockpiles is contingent upon Russia's commitment to abide by 
already existing bilateral and multilateral agreements on chemical and 
biological weapons; and
  This legislation requires calling an international conference to 
strengthen the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which prohibits the use of 
biological and chemical weapons. The Geneva Protocol has been violated 
on numerous occasions with little or no response from the states 
observing its prohibitions. Section 205 of this legislation would call 
for the creation of an international body whose purpose would be to 
ensure that the participating states will penalize any state violating 
the Geneva Protocol.
  Mr. President, we must, to the best of our ability, avoid the 
horrible events of the 1980's, when the international community 
witnessed the horrors of Iraq's use of chemical weapons against its own 
people. However, we took no action despite the clear and compelling 
evidence that this atrocity had taken place.
  To answer this threat, Senator Kyl's legislation directs the 
Secretary of State to convene an international negotiating forum for 
the purpose of concluding an international agreement on the enforcement 
of the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of poison gas in war.
  Mr. President, one of the most important provisions of S. 495 is that 
it strengthens U.S. biological and chemical defense programs. The bill 
recommends three steps to improve the readiness of U.S. military forces 
in the area of biological and chemical defense. First, it would require 
the Secretary of Defense to ensure that U.S. military forces are 
prepared to conduct operations in a contaminated environment, 
particularly in the areas of operating ports and air fields. Second, it 
would seek improved allied support for biological and chemical defense 
to sustain operations in a contaminated environment. Third, it would 
require that the U.S. Army Chemical School remain under the oversight 
of a general officer.
  Mr. President, as we begin the debate on the Chemical Weapons 
Convention and whether to ratify or not, I believe that this 
legislation, S. 495, is significant because it establishes substantive 
and workable national policies for confronting the chemical weapons 
threat.
  The American people, with justification, will ask their leaders how 
and where they stand on the issue of chemical weapons.
  Mr. President, the passage of S. 495 will send a clear and 
unmistakable message to the American people that this Congress will do 
everything in its power to rid our world of all chemical and biological 
weapons. I urge my colleagues to adopt this measure.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan. The Senator has 11 
minutes remaining.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, how much time is remaining on the bill 
itself?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan and the Senator from 
Delaware have 11 minutes each, the Senator from Arizona has 13, and the 
Senator from Vermont has 4\1/2\.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the bill before the Senate is an unusual 
piece of legislation. It comes to the Senate in an expedited fashion 
rarely witnessed in this body. The so-called Chemical and Biological 
Weapons Threat Reduction Act has been presented as something of an 
alternative to or substitute for the Chemical Weapons Convention.
  In contrast, though, to the Chemical Weapons Convention, which has 
taken 3\1/2\ years and counting to reach the Senate floor, S. 495 comes 
to us a mere 3\1/2\ weeks following its introduction. The substitute 
amendment to S. 495 that the Senate is now considering--all 64 pages of 
bill language--was made available to Senators just a few hours ago. So 
it is so new, the substitute, that copies of the amendment are just 
practically warm to the touch.
  The CWC has undergone a thorough and rigorous evaluation in the 
Senate since its submission in November 1993, the subject of 17 
hearings, dozens of witnesses, 1,500 pages of testimony, questions and 
answers, letters, reports, and other documentation.
  By contrast, the bill before us, S. 495, arrives fresh and green, 
never having been reported out of committee, never having been the 
subject of a single congressional hearing.
  This is not the way the Senate should consider important legislation, 
particularly given the gravity of the subject matter contained in this 
bill. S. 495 changes existing American law with respect to domestic law 
enforcement, criminal penalties, international sanctions, and export 
controls. From what I can determine in these few hours, many of the 
changes contained in S. 495 would weaken existing law.

  Also, S. 495 conditions United States assistance to Russia for the 
safeguarding and destruction of its vast chemical and biological weapon 
stockpile of 40,000 tons. These changes and others contained in S. 495 
significantly alter American domestic and foreign policy, and as such 
should be carefully studied by the Judiciary Committee, the Armed 
Services Committee, and the Foreign Relations Committee at a minimum 
before the Senate acts on it. But that has not happened.
  The timing of this bill as a prelude to considering the Chemical 
Weapons Convention leaves the unmistakable impression that proponents 
of S. 495, or some of them, see it as an alternative or substitute to 
the treaty. It is nothing of the kind.
  The Chemical Weapons Convention has been signed by 161 nations and 
ratified by 72. It is a global treaty that bans an entire class of 
weapons of mass destruction. It prohibits the production, acquisition, 
stockpiling, transfer, and use of chemical weapons. The treaty, 
negotiated and signed under Republican administrations and strongly 
supported by our military leaders and battlefield commanders, is the 
product of American leadership in combating the international 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The CWC joins the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty as the 
triumvirate of multinational nonproliferation treaties that strengthen 
U.S. national security while at the same time enhancing global 
stability.
  The bill, S. 495, falls well short of what U.S. participation in the 
Chemical Weapons Convention can deliver. It does not have the depth, 
the scope and the boldness of the CWC. More importantly, if this bill 
is passed as an alternative to the CWC, it would undermine our efforts 
to deprive aggressor nations and terrorist organizations of the use of 
chemical weapons.
  The CWC makes illegal the development, production, or possession of 
chemical weapons by signatory states. S. 495 applies only to the United 
States. Furthermore, S. 495 would require sanctions against countries 
only if they use chemical weapons, punishment already existing in U.S. 
law. Nations that produce, possess, or transfer chemical weapons would 
not be affected by S. 495.
  The CWC requires that signatory states begin destruction of their 
chemical weapons within 1 year of the treaty's entry into force and 
complete that destruction in 10 years, a commitment the United States 
has already made independently of the CWC. By contrast, S. 495 does not 
require the destruction of a single chemical bomb or warhead.
  The CWC, our Chemical Weapons Convention that will come before us 
next week, creates a verification regime to provide for on-site 
inspection of signatory nations to ensure compliance with the 
prohibitions created in the treaty. S. 495 concerns itself with 
punishing individuals and/or nations

[[Page S3341]]

after chemical weapons are used and lives are lost, not with the 
abolition of the insidious weapons prior to their use.
  Countries that are not signatories to the CWC are isolated from the 
world community and prohibited from buying certain dual-use chemicals 
from member states that could be fashioned into weapons of mass 
destruction, in the process hampering the economic potential of their 
domestic industries, chemical and otherwise. S. 495 does nothing to 
leverage nonsignatory nations to forswear the production and possession 
of chemical weapons, thereby leaving open the door for the spread of 
these destabilizing weapons.
  Those are some of the major shortcomings of S. 495 as an alternative 
to Senate ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention and its 
implementation legislation.
  S. 495 is not simply an ineffective tool in ridding the world of 
chemical weapons; it also contains a number of legal ambiguities and 
policy flaws that weaken existing U.S. law and add weight to why the 
Senate should reject the bill. Even a quick reading of S. 495 reveals 
significant problems with the bill from both a legal and national 
security perspective. I think a more careful analysis by the committees 
of jurisdiction would undoubtedly reveal more problems.
  There are two sections in S. 495, and I ask unanimous consent that 
the analysis of these two sections of S. 495 be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

       S. 495 is divided into two sections: Title I sets forth 
     penalties for unlawful activities within the United States or 
     by United States nationals abroad. Title II makes changes to 
     the Arms Export Control Act and other portions of existing 
     law regarding the imposition of economic and diplomatic 
     sanctions against any foreign government determined to have 
     used chemical or biological weapons illegally. Other 
     significant changes are contained in Title II, including 
     placing limits on U.S. assistance to Russia for the 
     transportation, safeguarding and destruction of such weapons 
     of mass destruction.

  Mr. LEVIN. There are a number of policy flaws in S. 495 which I want 
to highlight in the few minutes remaining, Mr. President. Specifically, 
this bill would substantially weaken current criminal provisions in at 
least five significant areas. This bill weakens existing criminal law 
in at least five areas, from even a cursory view.
  First, new provisions in title I of the bill would expressly 
authorize ownership, production, sale or use of chemical and biological 
weapons for a broad array of purposes described as exempted conduct. 
The FBI has expressed concern about this new exemption in law, stating 
if this approach is taken, ``the legitimate purpose allowed must be 
specifically defined and narrowly tailored'' to avoid rendering the 
prohibitions toothless.
  But, unfortunately, section 229(b) defines the term ``exempted 
conduct'' to include:

       (A) any peaceful purpose related to an industrial, 
     agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical activity,
       (B) any protective purpose directly related to protection 
     against the chemical or biological weapon.

  The FBI has found significant ambiguities in this definition that can 
become major loopholes in the statute. For instance, any research 
purpose could mean a terrorist group or cult conducting research into 
chemical or biological weapons. Obviously they would assert it was for 
a peaceful purpose, but under this new provision of law would it fall 
within the realm of research intended to be prohibited? The Aum 
Shinrikyo was conducting research and testing. If they were discovered 
before they released deadly chemical agents into the subway in Tokyo in 
1995, they would not have necessarily violated this act, especially 
since they were recognized at the time as a legitimate religious group 
and were not viewed at that time as a terrorist organization.
  The phrase in this bill ``any protective purpose'' which is used in 
exemption (B) is too broad, as well. Although hopefully not intended, 
this exemption could be asserted in self-defense claims. A case 
involving an individual in possession of Ricin, a potent toxin, who 
used it as a form of a booby-trap is illustrative of a potential 
protective purpose. This could be asserted by survivalist-type groups 
that may store these types of weapons, as was the case, according to 
the FBI, in 1985 when a white supremacist organization had a drum of 
chemical agents at their wooded compound.
  Second, section 229(c)(2) of the new provision contains an exclusion 
permitting any ownership and possession of chemical and biological 
weapons by any member of the U.S. Armed Forces. This provision is 
poorly written. It does not appear to require official authorization 
for the ownership or possession of the weapon. Just if you are in 
uniform, then you are exempted, whether or not you have authority or 
not to be in possession of the weapon.
  The same paragraph contains broad language authorizing ownership and 
possession of chemical and biological weapons by any person who is 
``attempting to seize the weapon.'' That language could conceivably 
include a terrorist who is attempting to seize chemical or biological 
weapons. By contrast, the existing law that it would replace covers any 
use that is without lawful authority. That is a big difference. Again, 
this bill weakens current law. Current law says if you have it without 
lawful authority, you violate the law. This provision substitutes a 
weaker law, a weaker provision, for what is in current law and exempts 
people who are attempting to seize a weapon, whether or not they have 
lawful authority or not. That is a significant weakening of current 
law.
  Third, current law authorizes a life sentence for any person who 
``knowingly assists a foreign state or any organization'' to acquire 
biological warfare agents--or delivery systems for use with such 
weapons--or who attempts, threatens, or conspires to do so. This aspect 
of the law would be repealed by title I of S. 495 with no substitute.
  Fourth, section 229C(a) of the new provision would authorize a 
maximum sentence of 10 years for any person who knowingly uses riot 
control agents as an act of terrorism, or knowingly assists any person 
to do so. By contrast, the existing law it would replace subjects any 
person who uses chemical weapons, including riot control agents, 
without lawful authority to a life sentence.
  Fifth, section 229C of the new provision would prohibit the 
unauthorized use of riot control agents only if use is an act of 
terrorism. Before any penalty could be imposed, law enforcement 
officials would be required to prove that the chemicals were used to 
intimidate or coerce a civilian population, to influence the policy of 
a government by intimidation or coercion, or to affect the conduct of a 
government by assassination or kidnaping. The existing law it would 
replace contains no similar requirement; requires no proof. Possession 
is enough.
  Turning attention to title II of S. 495, one of the most troublesome 
and counterproductive provisions of this bill is section 203 entitled 
``Criteria for United States Assistance to Russia.'' This section is a 
conglomeration of several of the conditions that have been proposed to 
the CWC resolution of ratification, but which the administration cannot 
accept. Section 203 would require four Presidential certifications 
concerning Russian compliance with existing chemical/biological 
agreements before United States assistance under the cooperative Threat 
Reduction Program--also known as the Nunn-Lugar program--can be 
provided. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Shalikashvili 
articulated to the Senate Armed Services Committee earlier this year, 
the CWC's greatest attraction from a military standpoint is the 
requirement for all parties to destroy their chemical weapons 
stockpiles, including the eventual destruction of approximately 40,000 
tons of declared Russian chemical agents, the largest stockpile in the 
world. Limiting cooperative threat reduction funding for this purpose 
might endanger prospects for Russian ratification of the CWC as well as 
remove the most effective United States tool for inducing Russia to 
dismantle its massive chemical weapons stockpile.
  Another section of the bill that should concern Senators is section 
208, entitled ``Negative Security Assurances.'' This provision calls 
for classified and unclassified reports to Congress on ``the 
appropriate range of nuclear and conventional responses to the use of 
chemical or biological weapons against the United States Armed

[[Page S3342]]

Forces, United States citizens, allies and third parties.'' The text of 
this provision is different from the agreed-to condition contained in 
the CWC Resolution of Ratification and requires the submission of the 
report to the Senate Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations 
and the Speaker of the House, a peculiar designation to say the least. 
Furthermore, the Office of the Secretary of Defense has indicated that 
an unclassified report on this issue is not possible and, more 
importantly, is concerned that the language in section 208 is designed 
to lead to a major change in U.S. Government policy in this area.
  Mr. President, 1997 marks 80 years since the advent of chemical 
warfare on the western front during World War I. It was in 1917 that 
stymied field commanders lifted the lid of Pandora's Box and unleashed 
on the world a new kind of warfare, horrifying in its effects and 
insidious in its indiscriminate application on the battlefield. It was 
80 years ago that dense, yellowish-green vapors, pushed along by light 
winds, crept across the desolation of no-mans land and filled the 
bloodied trenches of a doomed generation of soldiers. Thousands of 
unprotected men suffocated to death in an excruciatingly painful and 
protracted fashion, the inner lining of their lungs eaten away by the 
pervasive gas. The world's abhorrence over the use of gas warfare in 
the latter years of World War I led to the Geneva protocol of 1925 
prohibiting the use of these weapons of mass destruction.

  Now, decades later, we are on the verge of the united world community 
dedicated to the complete abolition of these battlefield poisons. The 
only question is whether the United States will follow through with the 
leadership it has shown in the past 15 years by joining the community 
of civilized nations and ratifying the CWC. The CWC has languished in 
the Senate for 3\1/2\ years and time is short for us to act. We should 
not be distracted by S. 495, a bill so rushed, so flawed, and so 
counterproductive to our law enforcement, counterterrorism and national 
security interests.
  Its approval would constitute a step backward from the commitments we 
made as a nation when President Bush signed the CWC in January, 1993. 
In its descriptive title, S. 495 claims to be the Chemical and 
Biological Weapons Threat Reduction Act. But, in fact, it is nothing of 
the sort. Nothing in this bill will remove chemical or biological 
weapons from foreign military weapons arsenals. Nothing in this bill 
will deprive terrorists of the chemical or biological ingredients 
necessary to threaten and kill innocent men, women and children in a 
subway or at a shopping mall. S. 495 concerns itself with reacting to 
the use of these weapons, not preventing their use.
  History has shown that the threat of criminal penalties and economic 
sanctions will do little to deter those with no regard for 
international law and the sanctity of human life. The best way to 
prevent a chemical weapons attack is by preventing the attacker from 
obtaining such a weapon in the first place. This is the philosophical 
underpinning of the CWC. It seeks to prevent the use of chemical 
weapons through abolition, while S. 495 relies on the deterrent effect 
of criminal penalties and economic sanctions, already contained in U.S. 
and international law, to inhibit their use.
  Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to vote against S. 495. Even 
after a cursory review, the shortcomings of S. 495 are sufficiently 
numerous and serious enough to warrant its defeat. The real test of 
this body's resolve to strengthen our national security interests and 
promote global stability will come when the Senate turns its attention 
to the consideration of the Chemical Weapons Convention. To endorse S. 
495 prior to our vote on ratification would send mixed signals to our 
allies and the rest of the international community about America's 
willingness to lead in the fight against chemical weapons. At a time 
when the world community looks to us for leadership in the effort to 
counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, we cannot 
afford to renege on such an important obligation.
  Mr. KYL. In the interest of time, since we would like to get on with 
the vote, I respond by saying that is a misreading of the bill. The 
exemptions are the same as the implementing legislation submitted by 
the administration. The same for protective purposes. And he misreads 
the exemption he spoke to about seizing the weapon. That is related 
only to the pending destruction of the weapon authorized by law.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I have 15 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware has 11 minutes.
  Mr. BIDEN. I have colleagues who have planes to catch, so I will try 
to be brief.
  Let me be very, very blunt, as the Chair knows I usually am, much to 
my detriment on occasion. This is not about anything, this vote. This 
vote is really designed to try to come up with a substitute for the 
chemical weapons treaty--to give people who want to say they voted 
against chemical weapons an ability, then, to vote against the Chemical 
Weapons Convention.
  I know we are supposed to be more diplomatic than that, and I know 
all that, and I am not suggesting that things in the bill are not 
worthwhile. They are. But this is what happens after we pass the 
treaty, that is, the implementing legislation. The way treaties work 
is, if we pass a treaty like the Chemical Weapons Convention, then we 
will come back here and pass implementing legislation. Just today, 
Senator Lugar and I have introduced legislation called the implementing 
legislation. That is, how do we domestically implement what we have 
just signed on to internationally.
  Now, this bill does some of those things. Some of the things in here, 
in this bill--and I have great respect for my friend from Arizona, I 
really do. I always kid him and say my problem with him is he is too 
bright. I always prefer people who I am usually in disagreement with 
philosophically that are not very bright. He is very bright. That is a 
problem. So he is more effective. But I hope he will not be offended. I 
think he would be willing to tell you not only does he believe in what 
is in here, he also hopes it has the political benefit of gathering 
enough votes to allow people the option to vote against the Chemical 
Weapons Convention.
  So, when I give this short shrift, I am not giving short shrift to 
the ideas, please understand. But the Record should note that this is 
not the norm; nobody that I am aware of, at least as long as I have 
been here, is usually willing to allow, without any hearings, a major 
bill to be brought up that is 64 pages long that most of us have not 
had a chance to read.
  I just want the Record to reflect why I am going to truncate this a 
great deal because this debate is not really about the substance here 
but about the treaty. I will tell you why we need a treaty and why this 
legislation, even if I knew all that was in it, and even if I agreed 
with all that was in it, would not get the job done.
  First, the treaty addresses two flaws in the Geneva Protocol which 
focused on a single wrong. It said we would ban the use of chemical 
weapons. The Chemical Weapons Treaty says you cannot produce chemical 
weapons, you cannot own chemical weapons, you cannot stockpile them. 
This legislation does nothing to affect any other country. Nothing we 
do in here in any way puts or imposes a prohibition on other countries 
other than as it relates to how we will deal with them on a bilateral 
basis.
  Second, we need a Chemical Weapons Convention because it will 
strengthen the ability of nations of the world to cooperate in placing 
strict global controls on trade and chemicals. We want to be able to 
trace the precursor chemicals that go from one country to another 
country, from one country or company to an individual, because that is 
the thing that will allow us to trace down and see whether the bad 
guys, whether they be terrorists and or countries at large, are doing 
bad things. That is, possessing, building, or designing chemical 
capability. This does nothing on that score.

  Third, we need a Chemical Weapons Convention because we have decided 
to get rid of most of our chemical stockpile, and that decision was 
jointly made by the Congress and the President in the 1980's. After the 
Gulf War, George Bush announced we would destroy the rest.
  The fourth reason is we need a treaty because it greatly enhances our 
ability

[[Page S3343]]

to detect and deter a chemical weapons program. This will do nothing to 
affect anybody else's chemical weapons programs.
  In sum, the CWC will be a powerful instrument. This, at best, you 
could say, would be something along the line of implementing 
legislation, if we had that treaty passed, which I hope we will.
  I might add, I agreed to allow this bill to come up before the 
treaty, which is a very unusual way to do this because, quite frankly, 
I had no other way of getting the treaty up. Had I not agreed to this, 
my colleagues could have filibustered or prevented it from coming out 
of committee. Even though I have the votes in the committee for the 
treaty I could have prevented it from coming to the floor. This must be 
confusing to people listening to this debate today, because why would 
we vote on this before the international treaty? The answer is that we 
have no choice. The answer is they've got me by the procedural ears 
here. If we don't get a chance to vote on the CWC by the 28th, we are 
not in the deal and we, as a nation, are very much out of sync.

  I will conclude by suggesting that Senator Kyl's bill calls for a 
couple of things that already are in the treaty. The bill does nothing 
to eliminate other nations' chemical weapons. It requires us to go back 
and renegotiate the Chemical Weapons Convention, which, as General 
Brent Scowcroft, not a man known for hyperbole, said the concept of 
starting over was pure fantasy.
  Next, this bill does nothing to strengthen trade controls 
internationally. It has language about the Australia Group--an 
organization that is already in place and will stay in place. There is 
nothing extraordinary about that. The Australia Group exists and will 
continue to enforce trade controls.
  Third, the Kyl bill provides sanctions against nations that use 
chemical weapons. That's already in law. The bill does strengthen this 
in minor respects, but it weakens it in others. It doesn't make it 
illegal to produce or stockpile these weapons.
  Fourth, the Kyl bill does nothing to address trade sanctions that 
will apply against U.S. companies if the Chemical Weapons Convention 
enters into force with us.
  In sum, the Kyl bill is not a substitute for the Chemical Weapons 
Treaty, although there are things in the Kyl bill that I would vote 
for.
  As I told my friend--and I really do think he is my friend, and we 
have been completely straight with one another--I am going to vote 
against this and urge my colleagues to do the same, because I don't 
know enough to know what is in here. I will never forget that when I 
first got here, Senator Pastore of Rhode Island, an old fellow, was a 
very powerful Senator; I asked him about something and he said, ``Boy, 
let me tell you something. If you don't know what's in it, it's always 
safer to vote no.'' So I am voting no. Although there might be some 
merit to this, I can't find it. It is clearly not a substitute for the 
CWC.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I am prepared to yield my time back. I hope 
Senator Leahy will yield his time. In passing, at another time I will 
respond to my friend from Delaware. I make the point that there is 
nothing in this legislation that requires any renegotiation of the 
treaty. I assure my colleague of that.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, we yield back all of our time.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to support the 
legislation.
  I yield back all my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has been yielded back.
  The bill is before the Senate and open to amendment. If there be no 
amendment to be proposed, the question is on the engrossment and third 
reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, and was 
read the third time.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays are ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. 
Faircloth], the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. Cochran], and the Senator 
from Missouri [Mr. Bond] are necessarily absent.
  I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from 
Missouri [Mr. Bond] would vote ``yea.''
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 53, nays 44, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 45 Leg.]

                                YEAS--53

     Abraham
     Allard
     Ashcroft
     Bennett
     Brownback
     Burns
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Coats
     Collins
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     DeWine
     Domenici
     Enzi
     Frist
     Gorton
     Gramm
     Grams
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Hatch
     Helms
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Jeffords
     Kempthorne
     Kyl
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     McCain
     McConnell
     Murkowski
     Nickles
     Roberts
     Roth
     Santorum
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith (NH)
     Smith (OR)
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Warner

                                NAYS--44

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Byrd
     Cleland
     Conrad
     Daschle
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Glenn
     Graham
     Harkin
     Hollings
     Inouye
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Landrieu
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Mikulski
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murray
     Reed
     Reid
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Sarbanes
     Torricelli
     Wellstone
     Wyden

                             NOT VOTING--3

     Bond
     Cochran
     Faircloth
  The bill (S. 495) was passed.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
bill, as modified, was passed.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the motion to lay on the 
table is agreed to.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I might 
proceed as if in morning business for the next 15 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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