[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 46 (Thursday, April 17, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3339-S3343]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS THREAT REDUCTION ACT OF 1977
The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise in support of S. 495, the
Chemical and Biological Threat Reduction Act of 1997, offered by the
Senator from Arizona, Senator Kyl, and others.
There has been criticism of this legislation by Members of the Senate
as well as by the administration. The criticism largely centers around
charges that it falls short as an alternative to the Chemical Weapons
Convention [CWC].
I do not know what the outcome will be of the Senate vote on advice
and consent to ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. This
legislation could possibly be an alternative in the event two-thirds of
the Members present do not vote for the treaty. On the other hand, it
may also complement the treaty, if it passes.
I want the Record to be clear, whatever the outcome of the vote on
the CWC, I support efforts by the Senate to provide comprehensive
criminal, civil, and other penalties for the acquisition, possession,
transfer, or use of chemical or biological weapons. I also want the
Record to reflect my continued support for the destruction of the U.S.
unitary stockpile.
I urge my colleagues to vote for S. 495.
Mr. HUTCHINSON. Mr. President, I proudly stand here today as a
cosponsor of S. 495, Senator Jon Kyl's Chemical and Biological Weapons
Threat Reduction Act of 1997. First and foremost, I want to thank the
good Senator from Arizona for his commitment and hard work regarding
chemical and biological weapon threats. This legislation certainly
provides a comprehensive domestic and international plan to reduce the
threat of chemical and biological weapon use.
It sets forth practical, realistic, and achievable nonproliferation
measures to combat the very real dangers posed by these weapons.
Today the U.S. Senate will vote on the Chemical and Biological
Weapons Threat Reduction Act. Mr. President, for the first time in U.S.
history, we will have legislation that provides the needed criminal and
civil penalties against those who produce, stockpile, and transfer
chemical weapons in the United States.
Mr. President, as this body begins debate on the chemical weapons
issue, I wholeheartedly believe that S. 495 will not only reinforce our
strong commitment to eliminating chemical and biological weapons, but
more importantly this legislation will provide our domestic law
enforcement authorities the needed legal basis to enforce prohibitions
on chemical weapons activities within the United States.
I have heard the arguments against S. 495, including that it amounts
to the ``U.S. go at it alone,'' approach. However, Mr. President, this
bill sets forth a strong moral example for other nations to follow and
in doing so underscores our commitment to global nonproliferation
efforts.
Furthermore, through the Australia Group, the United States and its
principal international partners have worked together to prevent the
transfer of dual-use chemicals and chemical
[[Page S3340]]
weapon-related equipment. The Australia Group must remain a cornerstone
of our international nonproliferation effort and Mr. President, the
passage of this legislation accomplishes this goal.
Mr. President, let me emphasize the strong points of this bill:
It requires U.S. sanctions against any country that uses chemical
and/or biological weapons against another country. In effect a range of
sanctions can be imposed: arms sales, trade restrictions, foreign
assistance, etc.;
It outlaws the entire range of chemical and biological weapons
activities within the United States. This bill mandates a $100,000
penalty for civil violations and provides the death penalty where
chemical and/or biological weapons use leads to the loss of life;
It establishes criteria for continued United States aid to Russia for
chemical and biological weapons dismantlement and destruction;
Most importantly, the assistance for dismantling Russia's chemical
weapons stockpiles is contingent upon Russia's commitment to abide by
already existing bilateral and multilateral agreements on chemical and
biological weapons; and
This legislation requires calling an international conference to
strengthen the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which prohibits the use of
biological and chemical weapons. The Geneva Protocol has been violated
on numerous occasions with little or no response from the states
observing its prohibitions. Section 205 of this legislation would call
for the creation of an international body whose purpose would be to
ensure that the participating states will penalize any state violating
the Geneva Protocol.
Mr. President, we must, to the best of our ability, avoid the
horrible events of the 1980's, when the international community
witnessed the horrors of Iraq's use of chemical weapons against its own
people. However, we took no action despite the clear and compelling
evidence that this atrocity had taken place.
To answer this threat, Senator Kyl's legislation directs the
Secretary of State to convene an international negotiating forum for
the purpose of concluding an international agreement on the enforcement
of the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of poison gas in war.
Mr. President, one of the most important provisions of S. 495 is that
it strengthens U.S. biological and chemical defense programs. The bill
recommends three steps to improve the readiness of U.S. military forces
in the area of biological and chemical defense. First, it would require
the Secretary of Defense to ensure that U.S. military forces are
prepared to conduct operations in a contaminated environment,
particularly in the areas of operating ports and air fields. Second, it
would seek improved allied support for biological and chemical defense
to sustain operations in a contaminated environment. Third, it would
require that the U.S. Army Chemical School remain under the oversight
of a general officer.
Mr. President, as we begin the debate on the Chemical Weapons
Convention and whether to ratify or not, I believe that this
legislation, S. 495, is significant because it establishes substantive
and workable national policies for confronting the chemical weapons
threat.
The American people, with justification, will ask their leaders how
and where they stand on the issue of chemical weapons.
Mr. President, the passage of S. 495 will send a clear and
unmistakable message to the American people that this Congress will do
everything in its power to rid our world of all chemical and biological
weapons. I urge my colleagues to adopt this measure.
I yield the floor.
Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan. The Senator has 11
minutes remaining.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, how much time is remaining on the bill
itself?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan and the Senator from
Delaware have 11 minutes each, the Senator from Arizona has 13, and the
Senator from Vermont has 4\1/2\.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the bill before the Senate is an unusual
piece of legislation. It comes to the Senate in an expedited fashion
rarely witnessed in this body. The so-called Chemical and Biological
Weapons Threat Reduction Act has been presented as something of an
alternative to or substitute for the Chemical Weapons Convention.
In contrast, though, to the Chemical Weapons Convention, which has
taken 3\1/2\ years and counting to reach the Senate floor, S. 495 comes
to us a mere 3\1/2\ weeks following its introduction. The substitute
amendment to S. 495 that the Senate is now considering--all 64 pages of
bill language--was made available to Senators just a few hours ago. So
it is so new, the substitute, that copies of the amendment are just
practically warm to the touch.
The CWC has undergone a thorough and rigorous evaluation in the
Senate since its submission in November 1993, the subject of 17
hearings, dozens of witnesses, 1,500 pages of testimony, questions and
answers, letters, reports, and other documentation.
By contrast, the bill before us, S. 495, arrives fresh and green,
never having been reported out of committee, never having been the
subject of a single congressional hearing.
This is not the way the Senate should consider important legislation,
particularly given the gravity of the subject matter contained in this
bill. S. 495 changes existing American law with respect to domestic law
enforcement, criminal penalties, international sanctions, and export
controls. From what I can determine in these few hours, many of the
changes contained in S. 495 would weaken existing law.
Also, S. 495 conditions United States assistance to Russia for the
safeguarding and destruction of its vast chemical and biological weapon
stockpile of 40,000 tons. These changes and others contained in S. 495
significantly alter American domestic and foreign policy, and as such
should be carefully studied by the Judiciary Committee, the Armed
Services Committee, and the Foreign Relations Committee at a minimum
before the Senate acts on it. But that has not happened.
The timing of this bill as a prelude to considering the Chemical
Weapons Convention leaves the unmistakable impression that proponents
of S. 495, or some of them, see it as an alternative or substitute to
the treaty. It is nothing of the kind.
The Chemical Weapons Convention has been signed by 161 nations and
ratified by 72. It is a global treaty that bans an entire class of
weapons of mass destruction. It prohibits the production, acquisition,
stockpiling, transfer, and use of chemical weapons. The treaty,
negotiated and signed under Republican administrations and strongly
supported by our military leaders and battlefield commanders, is the
product of American leadership in combating the international
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The CWC joins the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty as the
triumvirate of multinational nonproliferation treaties that strengthen
U.S. national security while at the same time enhancing global
stability.
The bill, S. 495, falls well short of what U.S. participation in the
Chemical Weapons Convention can deliver. It does not have the depth,
the scope and the boldness of the CWC. More importantly, if this bill
is passed as an alternative to the CWC, it would undermine our efforts
to deprive aggressor nations and terrorist organizations of the use of
chemical weapons.
The CWC makes illegal the development, production, or possession of
chemical weapons by signatory states. S. 495 applies only to the United
States. Furthermore, S. 495 would require sanctions against countries
only if they use chemical weapons, punishment already existing in U.S.
law. Nations that produce, possess, or transfer chemical weapons would
not be affected by S. 495.
The CWC requires that signatory states begin destruction of their
chemical weapons within 1 year of the treaty's entry into force and
complete that destruction in 10 years, a commitment the United States
has already made independently of the CWC. By contrast, S. 495 does not
require the destruction of a single chemical bomb or warhead.
The CWC, our Chemical Weapons Convention that will come before us
next week, creates a verification regime to provide for on-site
inspection of signatory nations to ensure compliance with the
prohibitions created in the treaty. S. 495 concerns itself with
punishing individuals and/or nations
[[Page S3341]]
after chemical weapons are used and lives are lost, not with the
abolition of the insidious weapons prior to their use.
Countries that are not signatories to the CWC are isolated from the
world community and prohibited from buying certain dual-use chemicals
from member states that could be fashioned into weapons of mass
destruction, in the process hampering the economic potential of their
domestic industries, chemical and otherwise. S. 495 does nothing to
leverage nonsignatory nations to forswear the production and possession
of chemical weapons, thereby leaving open the door for the spread of
these destabilizing weapons.
Those are some of the major shortcomings of S. 495 as an alternative
to Senate ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention and its
implementation legislation.
S. 495 is not simply an ineffective tool in ridding the world of
chemical weapons; it also contains a number of legal ambiguities and
policy flaws that weaken existing U.S. law and add weight to why the
Senate should reject the bill. Even a quick reading of S. 495 reveals
significant problems with the bill from both a legal and national
security perspective. I think a more careful analysis by the committees
of jurisdiction would undoubtedly reveal more problems.
There are two sections in S. 495, and I ask unanimous consent that
the analysis of these two sections of S. 495 be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
S. 495 is divided into two sections: Title I sets forth
penalties for unlawful activities within the United States or
by United States nationals abroad. Title II makes changes to
the Arms Export Control Act and other portions of existing
law regarding the imposition of economic and diplomatic
sanctions against any foreign government determined to have
used chemical or biological weapons illegally. Other
significant changes are contained in Title II, including
placing limits on U.S. assistance to Russia for the
transportation, safeguarding and destruction of such weapons
of mass destruction.
Mr. LEVIN. There are a number of policy flaws in S. 495 which I want
to highlight in the few minutes remaining, Mr. President. Specifically,
this bill would substantially weaken current criminal provisions in at
least five significant areas. This bill weakens existing criminal law
in at least five areas, from even a cursory view.
First, new provisions in title I of the bill would expressly
authorize ownership, production, sale or use of chemical and biological
weapons for a broad array of purposes described as exempted conduct.
The FBI has expressed concern about this new exemption in law, stating
if this approach is taken, ``the legitimate purpose allowed must be
specifically defined and narrowly tailored'' to avoid rendering the
prohibitions toothless.
But, unfortunately, section 229(b) defines the term ``exempted
conduct'' to include:
(A) any peaceful purpose related to an industrial,
agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical activity,
(B) any protective purpose directly related to protection
against the chemical or biological weapon.
The FBI has found significant ambiguities in this definition that can
become major loopholes in the statute. For instance, any research
purpose could mean a terrorist group or cult conducting research into
chemical or biological weapons. Obviously they would assert it was for
a peaceful purpose, but under this new provision of law would it fall
within the realm of research intended to be prohibited? The Aum
Shinrikyo was conducting research and testing. If they were discovered
before they released deadly chemical agents into the subway in Tokyo in
1995, they would not have necessarily violated this act, especially
since they were recognized at the time as a legitimate religious group
and were not viewed at that time as a terrorist organization.
The phrase in this bill ``any protective purpose'' which is used in
exemption (B) is too broad, as well. Although hopefully not intended,
this exemption could be asserted in self-defense claims. A case
involving an individual in possession of Ricin, a potent toxin, who
used it as a form of a booby-trap is illustrative of a potential
protective purpose. This could be asserted by survivalist-type groups
that may store these types of weapons, as was the case, according to
the FBI, in 1985 when a white supremacist organization had a drum of
chemical agents at their wooded compound.
Second, section 229(c)(2) of the new provision contains an exclusion
permitting any ownership and possession of chemical and biological
weapons by any member of the U.S. Armed Forces. This provision is
poorly written. It does not appear to require official authorization
for the ownership or possession of the weapon. Just if you are in
uniform, then you are exempted, whether or not you have authority or
not to be in possession of the weapon.
The same paragraph contains broad language authorizing ownership and
possession of chemical and biological weapons by any person who is
``attempting to seize the weapon.'' That language could conceivably
include a terrorist who is attempting to seize chemical or biological
weapons. By contrast, the existing law that it would replace covers any
use that is without lawful authority. That is a big difference. Again,
this bill weakens current law. Current law says if you have it without
lawful authority, you violate the law. This provision substitutes a
weaker law, a weaker provision, for what is in current law and exempts
people who are attempting to seize a weapon, whether or not they have
lawful authority or not. That is a significant weakening of current
law.
Third, current law authorizes a life sentence for any person who
``knowingly assists a foreign state or any organization'' to acquire
biological warfare agents--or delivery systems for use with such
weapons--or who attempts, threatens, or conspires to do so. This aspect
of the law would be repealed by title I of S. 495 with no substitute.
Fourth, section 229C(a) of the new provision would authorize a
maximum sentence of 10 years for any person who knowingly uses riot
control agents as an act of terrorism, or knowingly assists any person
to do so. By contrast, the existing law it would replace subjects any
person who uses chemical weapons, including riot control agents,
without lawful authority to a life sentence.
Fifth, section 229C of the new provision would prohibit the
unauthorized use of riot control agents only if use is an act of
terrorism. Before any penalty could be imposed, law enforcement
officials would be required to prove that the chemicals were used to
intimidate or coerce a civilian population, to influence the policy of
a government by intimidation or coercion, or to affect the conduct of a
government by assassination or kidnaping. The existing law it would
replace contains no similar requirement; requires no proof. Possession
is enough.
Turning attention to title II of S. 495, one of the most troublesome
and counterproductive provisions of this bill is section 203 entitled
``Criteria for United States Assistance to Russia.'' This section is a
conglomeration of several of the conditions that have been proposed to
the CWC resolution of ratification, but which the administration cannot
accept. Section 203 would require four Presidential certifications
concerning Russian compliance with existing chemical/biological
agreements before United States assistance under the cooperative Threat
Reduction Program--also known as the Nunn-Lugar program--can be
provided. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Shalikashvili
articulated to the Senate Armed Services Committee earlier this year,
the CWC's greatest attraction from a military standpoint is the
requirement for all parties to destroy their chemical weapons
stockpiles, including the eventual destruction of approximately 40,000
tons of declared Russian chemical agents, the largest stockpile in the
world. Limiting cooperative threat reduction funding for this purpose
might endanger prospects for Russian ratification of the CWC as well as
remove the most effective United States tool for inducing Russia to
dismantle its massive chemical weapons stockpile.
Another section of the bill that should concern Senators is section
208, entitled ``Negative Security Assurances.'' This provision calls
for classified and unclassified reports to Congress on ``the
appropriate range of nuclear and conventional responses to the use of
chemical or biological weapons against the United States Armed
[[Page S3342]]
Forces, United States citizens, allies and third parties.'' The text of
this provision is different from the agreed-to condition contained in
the CWC Resolution of Ratification and requires the submission of the
report to the Senate Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations
and the Speaker of the House, a peculiar designation to say the least.
Furthermore, the Office of the Secretary of Defense has indicated that
an unclassified report on this issue is not possible and, more
importantly, is concerned that the language in section 208 is designed
to lead to a major change in U.S. Government policy in this area.
Mr. President, 1997 marks 80 years since the advent of chemical
warfare on the western front during World War I. It was in 1917 that
stymied field commanders lifted the lid of Pandora's Box and unleashed
on the world a new kind of warfare, horrifying in its effects and
insidious in its indiscriminate application on the battlefield. It was
80 years ago that dense, yellowish-green vapors, pushed along by light
winds, crept across the desolation of no-mans land and filled the
bloodied trenches of a doomed generation of soldiers. Thousands of
unprotected men suffocated to death in an excruciatingly painful and
protracted fashion, the inner lining of their lungs eaten away by the
pervasive gas. The world's abhorrence over the use of gas warfare in
the latter years of World War I led to the Geneva protocol of 1925
prohibiting the use of these weapons of mass destruction.
Now, decades later, we are on the verge of the united world community
dedicated to the complete abolition of these battlefield poisons. The
only question is whether the United States will follow through with the
leadership it has shown in the past 15 years by joining the community
of civilized nations and ratifying the CWC. The CWC has languished in
the Senate for 3\1/2\ years and time is short for us to act. We should
not be distracted by S. 495, a bill so rushed, so flawed, and so
counterproductive to our law enforcement, counterterrorism and national
security interests.
Its approval would constitute a step backward from the commitments we
made as a nation when President Bush signed the CWC in January, 1993.
In its descriptive title, S. 495 claims to be the Chemical and
Biological Weapons Threat Reduction Act. But, in fact, it is nothing of
the sort. Nothing in this bill will remove chemical or biological
weapons from foreign military weapons arsenals. Nothing in this bill
will deprive terrorists of the chemical or biological ingredients
necessary to threaten and kill innocent men, women and children in a
subway or at a shopping mall. S. 495 concerns itself with reacting to
the use of these weapons, not preventing their use.
History has shown that the threat of criminal penalties and economic
sanctions will do little to deter those with no regard for
international law and the sanctity of human life. The best way to
prevent a chemical weapons attack is by preventing the attacker from
obtaining such a weapon in the first place. This is the philosophical
underpinning of the CWC. It seeks to prevent the use of chemical
weapons through abolition, while S. 495 relies on the deterrent effect
of criminal penalties and economic sanctions, already contained in U.S.
and international law, to inhibit their use.
Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to vote against S. 495. Even
after a cursory review, the shortcomings of S. 495 are sufficiently
numerous and serious enough to warrant its defeat. The real test of
this body's resolve to strengthen our national security interests and
promote global stability will come when the Senate turns its attention
to the consideration of the Chemical Weapons Convention. To endorse S.
495 prior to our vote on ratification would send mixed signals to our
allies and the rest of the international community about America's
willingness to lead in the fight against chemical weapons. At a time
when the world community looks to us for leadership in the effort to
counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, we cannot
afford to renege on such an important obligation.
Mr. KYL. In the interest of time, since we would like to get on with
the vote, I respond by saying that is a misreading of the bill. The
exemptions are the same as the implementing legislation submitted by
the administration. The same for protective purposes. And he misreads
the exemption he spoke to about seizing the weapon. That is related
only to the pending destruction of the weapon authorized by law.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I have 15 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware has 11 minutes.
Mr. BIDEN. I have colleagues who have planes to catch, so I will try
to be brief.
Let me be very, very blunt, as the Chair knows I usually am, much to
my detriment on occasion. This is not about anything, this vote. This
vote is really designed to try to come up with a substitute for the
chemical weapons treaty--to give people who want to say they voted
against chemical weapons an ability, then, to vote against the Chemical
Weapons Convention.
I know we are supposed to be more diplomatic than that, and I know
all that, and I am not suggesting that things in the bill are not
worthwhile. They are. But this is what happens after we pass the
treaty, that is, the implementing legislation. The way treaties work
is, if we pass a treaty like the Chemical Weapons Convention, then we
will come back here and pass implementing legislation. Just today,
Senator Lugar and I have introduced legislation called the implementing
legislation. That is, how do we domestically implement what we have
just signed on to internationally.
Now, this bill does some of those things. Some of the things in here,
in this bill--and I have great respect for my friend from Arizona, I
really do. I always kid him and say my problem with him is he is too
bright. I always prefer people who I am usually in disagreement with
philosophically that are not very bright. He is very bright. That is a
problem. So he is more effective. But I hope he will not be offended. I
think he would be willing to tell you not only does he believe in what
is in here, he also hopes it has the political benefit of gathering
enough votes to allow people the option to vote against the Chemical
Weapons Convention.
So, when I give this short shrift, I am not giving short shrift to
the ideas, please understand. But the Record should note that this is
not the norm; nobody that I am aware of, at least as long as I have
been here, is usually willing to allow, without any hearings, a major
bill to be brought up that is 64 pages long that most of us have not
had a chance to read.
I just want the Record to reflect why I am going to truncate this a
great deal because this debate is not really about the substance here
but about the treaty. I will tell you why we need a treaty and why this
legislation, even if I knew all that was in it, and even if I agreed
with all that was in it, would not get the job done.
First, the treaty addresses two flaws in the Geneva Protocol which
focused on a single wrong. It said we would ban the use of chemical
weapons. The Chemical Weapons Treaty says you cannot produce chemical
weapons, you cannot own chemical weapons, you cannot stockpile them.
This legislation does nothing to affect any other country. Nothing we
do in here in any way puts or imposes a prohibition on other countries
other than as it relates to how we will deal with them on a bilateral
basis.
Second, we need a Chemical Weapons Convention because it will
strengthen the ability of nations of the world to cooperate in placing
strict global controls on trade and chemicals. We want to be able to
trace the precursor chemicals that go from one country to another
country, from one country or company to an individual, because that is
the thing that will allow us to trace down and see whether the bad
guys, whether they be terrorists and or countries at large, are doing
bad things. That is, possessing, building, or designing chemical
capability. This does nothing on that score.
Third, we need a Chemical Weapons Convention because we have decided
to get rid of most of our chemical stockpile, and that decision was
jointly made by the Congress and the President in the 1980's. After the
Gulf War, George Bush announced we would destroy the rest.
The fourth reason is we need a treaty because it greatly enhances our
ability
[[Page S3343]]
to detect and deter a chemical weapons program. This will do nothing to
affect anybody else's chemical weapons programs.
In sum, the CWC will be a powerful instrument. This, at best, you
could say, would be something along the line of implementing
legislation, if we had that treaty passed, which I hope we will.
I might add, I agreed to allow this bill to come up before the
treaty, which is a very unusual way to do this because, quite frankly,
I had no other way of getting the treaty up. Had I not agreed to this,
my colleagues could have filibustered or prevented it from coming out
of committee. Even though I have the votes in the committee for the
treaty I could have prevented it from coming to the floor. This must be
confusing to people listening to this debate today, because why would
we vote on this before the international treaty? The answer is that we
have no choice. The answer is they've got me by the procedural ears
here. If we don't get a chance to vote on the CWC by the 28th, we are
not in the deal and we, as a nation, are very much out of sync.
I will conclude by suggesting that Senator Kyl's bill calls for a
couple of things that already are in the treaty. The bill does nothing
to eliminate other nations' chemical weapons. It requires us to go back
and renegotiate the Chemical Weapons Convention, which, as General
Brent Scowcroft, not a man known for hyperbole, said the concept of
starting over was pure fantasy.
Next, this bill does nothing to strengthen trade controls
internationally. It has language about the Australia Group--an
organization that is already in place and will stay in place. There is
nothing extraordinary about that. The Australia Group exists and will
continue to enforce trade controls.
Third, the Kyl bill provides sanctions against nations that use
chemical weapons. That's already in law. The bill does strengthen this
in minor respects, but it weakens it in others. It doesn't make it
illegal to produce or stockpile these weapons.
Fourth, the Kyl bill does nothing to address trade sanctions that
will apply against U.S. companies if the Chemical Weapons Convention
enters into force with us.
In sum, the Kyl bill is not a substitute for the Chemical Weapons
Treaty, although there are things in the Kyl bill that I would vote
for.
As I told my friend--and I really do think he is my friend, and we
have been completely straight with one another--I am going to vote
against this and urge my colleagues to do the same, because I don't
know enough to know what is in here. I will never forget that when I
first got here, Senator Pastore of Rhode Island, an old fellow, was a
very powerful Senator; I asked him about something and he said, ``Boy,
let me tell you something. If you don't know what's in it, it's always
safer to vote no.'' So I am voting no. Although there might be some
merit to this, I can't find it. It is clearly not a substitute for the
CWC.
I yield the floor.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I am prepared to yield my time back. I hope
Senator Leahy will yield his time. In passing, at another time I will
respond to my friend from Delaware. I make the point that there is
nothing in this legislation that requires any renegotiation of the
treaty. I assure my colleague of that.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, we yield back all of our time.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to support the
legislation.
I yield back all my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has been yielded back.
The bill is before the Senate and open to amendment. If there be no
amendment to be proposed, the question is on the engrossment and third
reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, and was
read the third time.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays are ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from North Carolina [Mr.
Faircloth], the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. Cochran], and the Senator
from Missouri [Mr. Bond] are necessarily absent.
I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from
Missouri [Mr. Bond] would vote ``yea.''
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber
desiring to vote?
The result was announced--yeas 53, nays 44, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 45 Leg.]
YEAS--53
Abraham
Allard
Ashcroft
Bennett
Brownback
Burns
Campbell
Chafee
Coats
Collins
Coverdell
Craig
D'Amato
DeWine
Domenici
Enzi
Frist
Gorton
Gramm
Grams
Grassley
Gregg
Hagel
Hatch
Helms
Hutchinson
Hutchison
Inhofe
Jeffords
Kempthorne
Kyl
Lieberman
Lott
Lugar
Mack
McCain
McConnell
Murkowski
Nickles
Roberts
Roth
Santorum
Sessions
Shelby
Smith (NH)
Smith (OR)
Snowe
Specter
Stevens
Thomas
Thompson
Thurmond
Warner
NAYS--44
Akaka
Baucus
Biden
Bingaman
Boxer
Breaux
Bryan
Bumpers
Byrd
Cleland
Conrad
Daschle
Dodd
Dorgan
Durbin
Feingold
Feinstein
Ford
Glenn
Graham
Harkin
Hollings
Inouye
Johnson
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Kohl
Landrieu
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Mikulski
Moseley-Braun
Moynihan
Murray
Reed
Reid
Robb
Rockefeller
Sarbanes
Torricelli
Wellstone
Wyden
NOT VOTING--3
Bond
Cochran
Faircloth
The bill (S. 495) was passed.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the
bill, as modified, was passed.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the motion to lay on the
table is agreed to.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I might
proceed as if in morning business for the next 15 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
____________________