[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 46 (Thursday, April 17, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3327-S3339]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS THREAT REDUCTION ACT OF 1997
Mr. LOTT. I ask unanimous consent that the Senate now proceed to the
consideration of S. 495, under the previous order.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The clerk will report the bill.
The bill clerk read as follows:
A bill (S. 495) to provide criminal and civil penalties for
the unlawful acquisition, transfer, or use of any chemical
weapon or biological weapon, and to reduce the threat of acts
of terrorism or armed aggression involving the use of any
such weapon against the United States, its citizens, or Armed
Forces, or those of any allied country, and for other
purposes.
The Senate proceeded to consider the bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona is recognized.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, first of all, I understand that the amendment
which was referred to in the unanimous-consent agreement as the
modified bill is at the desk.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The modification is at the desk.
The modification follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Chemical
and Biological Weapons Threat Reduction Act of 1997''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings.
Sec. 3. Policy.
Sec. 4. Definitions.
TITLE I--PENALTIES FOR UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO THE JURISDICTION
OF THE UNITED STATES
Subtitle A--Criminal and Civil Penalties
Sec. 101. Criminal and civil provisions.
Subtitle B--Revocations of Export Privileges
Sec. 111. Revocations of export privileges.
TITLE II--FOREIGN RELATIONS AND DEFENSE-RELATED PROVISIONS
Sec. 201. Sanctions for use of chemical or biological weapons.
Sec. 202. Continuation and enhancement of multilateral control regimes.
Sec. 203. Criteria for United States assistance to Russia relating to
the elimination of chemical and biological weapons.
Sec. 204. Report on the state of chemical and biological weapons
proliferation.
Sec. 205. International conference to strengthen the 1925 Geneva
Protocol.
Sec. 206. Restriction on use of funds for the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
Sec. 207. Enhancements to robust chemical and biological defenses.
Sec. 208. Negative security assurances.
Sec. 209. Riot control agents.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
The Congress finds that--
(1) the United States eliminated its stockpile of
biological weapons pursuant to the 1972 Biological Weapons
Convention and has pledged to destroy its entire inventory of
chemical weapons by 2004, independent of the Chemical Weapons
Convention entering into force;
(2) the use of chemical or biological weapons in
contravention of international law is abhorrent and should
trigger immediate and effective sanctions;
(3) United Nations Security Council Resolution 620, adopted
on August 26, 1988, states the intention of the Security
Council to consider immediately ``appropriate and effective''
sanctions against any nation using chemical and biological
weapons in violation of international law;
(4) the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade recognizes
that national security concerns may serve as legitimate
grounds for limiting trade; title XXI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade states that ``nothing in this
Agreement shall be construed . . . to prevent any contracting
party from taking any action which it considers necessary for
the protection of its essential security interests. . .'';
(5) on September 30, 1993, the President declared by
Executive Order No. 12868 a national emergency to deal with
``the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national
security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States''
posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological and
chemical weapons, and of the means for delivering such
weapons;
(6) Russia has not implemented the 1990 United States-
Russian Bilateral Agreement on Destruction and Non-Production
of Chemical Weapons and on Measures to Facilitate the
Multilateral Convention on Banning Chemical Weapons, known as
the ``BDA'', nor has the United States and Russia resolved,
to the satisfaction of the United States, the outstanding
compliance issues under the Memorandum of Understanding
Between the United States of America and
[[Page S3328]]
the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Regarding a Bilateral Verification Experiment and Data
Exchange Related To Prohibition on Chemical Weapons, known as
the ``1989 Wyoming MOU'';
(7) the Intelligence Community has stated that a number of
countries, among them China, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North
Korea, Syria, and Russia, possess chemical and biological
weapons and the means to deliver them;
(8) four countries in the Middle East--Iran, Iraq, Libya,
and Syria--have, as a national policy, supported
international terrorism;
(9) chemical and biological weapons have been used by
states in the past for intimidation and military aggression,
most recently during the Iran-Iraq war and by Iraq against
its Kurdish minority;
(10) the grave new threat of chemical and biological
terrorism has been demonstrated by the 1995 nerve gas attack
on the Tokyo subway by the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo;
(11) the urgent need to improve domestic preparedness to
protect against chemical and biological threats was
underscored by enactment of the 1997 Defense Against Weapons
of Mass Destruction Act;
(12) the Department of Defense, in light of growing
chemical and biological threats in regions of key concern,
including Northeast Asia, and the Middle East, has stated
that United States forces must be properly trained and
equipped for all missions, including those in which opponents
might threaten use of chemical or biological weapons; and
(13) Australia Group controls on the exports of chemical
and biological agents, and related equipment, and the Missile
Technology Control Regime, together provide an indispensable
foundation for international and national efforts to curb the
spread of chemical and biological weapons, and their delivery
means.
SEC. 3. POLICY.
It should be the policy of the United States to take all
appropriate measures to--
(1) prevent and deter the threat or use of chemical and
biological weapons against the citizens, Armed Forces, and
territory of the United States and its allies, and to protect
against, and manage the consequences of, such use should it
occur;
(2) discourage the proliferation of chemical and biological
weapons, their means of delivery, and related equipment,
material, and technology;
(3) prohibit within the United States the development,
production, acquisition, stockpiling, possession, and
transfer to third parties of chemical or biological weapons,
their precursors and related technology; and
(4) impose unilateral sanctions, and seek immediately
international sanctions, against any nation using chemical
and biological weapons in violation of international law.
SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Australia group.--The term ``Australia Group'' refers
to the informal forum of countries, formed in 1984 and
chaired by Australia, whose goal is to discourage and impede
chemical and biological weapons proliferation by harmonizing
national export controls on precursor chemicals for chemical
weapons, biological weapons pathogens, and dual-use
equipment, sharing information on target countries, and
seeking other ways to curb the use of chemical weapons and
biological weapons.
(2) Biological weapon.--The term ``biological weapon''
means the following, together or separately:
(A) Any micro-organism (including bacteria, viruses, fungi,
rickettsiae or protozoa), pathogen, or infectious substance,
or any naturally occurring, bio-engineered or synthesized
component of any such micro-organism, pathogen, or infectious
substance, whatever its origin or method of production,
capable of causing--
(i) death, disease, or other biological malfunction in a
human, an animal, a plant, or another living organism;
(ii) deterioration of food, water, equipment, supplies, or
materials of any kind; or
(iii) deleterious alteration of the environment.
(B) Any munition or device specifically designed to cause
death or other harm through the release, dissemination, or
impact of the toxic or poisonous properties of those
biological weapons specified in subparagraph (A).
(C) Any equipment specifically designed for use directly in
connection with the employment of munitions or devices
specified in subparagraph (B).
(D) Any living organism specifically designed to carry a
biological weapon specified in subparagraph (A) to a host.
(3) Chemical weapon.--The term ``chemical weapon'' means
the following, together or separately:
(A) Any of the following chemical agents: tabun, Sarin,
Soman, GF, VX, sulfur mustard, nitrogen mustard, phosgene
oxime, lewisite, phenyldichloroarsine, ethyldichloroarsine,
methyldichloroarsine, phosgene, diphosgene, hydrogen cyanide,
cyanogen chloride, and arsine.
(B) Any of the 54 chemicals other than a riot control agent
that is controlled by the Australia Group as of the date of
the enactment of this Act.
(C) Any other chemical agent that may be developed if the
use of the agent would be intended to produce an effect
consistent with that of a chemical agent or other chemical
described in subparagraph (A) or (B).
(D) Any munition or device specifically designed to cause
death or other harm through the release, dissemination, or
impact of the toxic or poisonous properties of a chemical
weapon specified in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).
(E) Any equipment specifically designed for use directly in
connection with the employment of munitions or devices
specified in subparagraph (D).
(4) Knowingly.--The term ``knowingly'' is used within the
meaning of ``knowing'' as that term is defined in section 104
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (15 U.S.C. 78dd-
2).
(5) National of the united states.--The term ``national of
the United States'' has the same meaning given such term in
section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8
U.S.C. 1101(a)(22)).
(6) Person.--The term ``person'' means any individual,
corporation, partnership, firm, association, or other legal
entity.
(7) Riot control agent.--The term ``riot control agent''
means any substance, including diphenylchloroarsine,
diphenylcyanoarsine, adamsite, chloroacetophenone,
chloropicrin, bromobenzyl cyanide, 0-chlorobenzylidene
malononitrile, or 3-Quinuclidinyl benzilate, that is designed
or used to produce rapidly in humans any nonlethal sensory
irritation or disabling physical effect that disappears
within a short time following termination of exposure.
(8) United states.--The term ``United States'' means the
several States of the United States, the District of
Columbia, and the commonwealths, territories, and possessions
of the United States and includes all places under the
jurisdiction or control of the United States, including--
(A) any of the places within the provisions of paragraph
(41) of section 40102 of title 49, United States Code;
(B) any civil aircraft or public aircraft of the United
States, as such terms are defined in paragraphs (18) and (36)
of section 40102 of title 49, United States Code; and
(C) any vessel of the United States, as such term is
defined in section 3(b) of the Maritime Drug Enforcement Act,
as amended (46 U.S.C., App. sec. 1903(b)).
TITLE I--PENALTIES FOR UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO THE JURISDICTION
OF THE UNITED STATES
Subtitle A--Criminal and Civil Penalties
SEC. 101. CRIMINAL AND CIVIL PROVISIONS.
(a) In General.--Part I of title 18, United States Code, is
amended by inserting after chapter 11A the following new
chapter:
``CHAPTER 11B--CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
``Sec.
``229. Prohibited activities.
``229A. Penalties.
``229B. Criminal forfeitures; destruction of weapons.
``229C. Other prohibitions.
``229D. Injunctions.
``229E. Requests for military assistance to enforce prohibition in
certain emergencies.
``229F. Definitions.
``Sec. 229. Prohibited activities.
``(a) Unlawful Conduct.--Except as provided in subsections
(b) and (c), it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly--
``(1) to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, transfer,
directly or indirectly, receive, stockpile, retain, own,
possess, or use, or threaten to use, any chemical weapon or
any biological weapon; or
``(2) to assist or induce, in any way, any person to
violate paragraph (1), or to attempt or conspire to violate
paragraph (1).
``(b) Exempted Conduct.--Subsection (a) does not apply to
conduct that satisfies the following requirements of both
paragraphs (1) and (2):
``(1) Lawful purpose.--The chemical weapon or biological
weapon is intended for any of the following purposes:
``(A) Peaceful purposes.--Any peaceful purpose related to
an industrial, agricultural, research, medical, or
pharmaceutical activity or other activity.
``(B) Protective purposes.--Any purpose directly related to
protection against a chemical or biological weapon.
``(C) Unrelated military purposes.--Any military purpose of
the United States that is not connected with the use of a
chemical weapon or biological weapon or that is not dependent
on the use of the toxic or poisonous properties of the
chemical weapon or biological weapon to cause death or other
harm.
``(D) Law enforcement purposes.--Any law enforcement
purpose, including any domestic riot control purpose.
``(E) Individual self-defense purposes.--Any individual
self-defense purpose involving a pepper spray or chemical
mace.
``(2) Limitation on type and quantity.--
``(A) In general.--The type and quantity of the chemical
weapon or biological weapon is strictly limited to the type
and quantity that can be justified for the purpose intended
under paragraph (1).
``(B) Excessive quantities per person.--The requirement of
this paragraph is not satisfied if the quantity per person at
any given time is, under the circumstances, inconsistent with
the purpose intended under paragraph (1).
``(c) Exempted Agencies and Persons.--
``(1) In general.--Subsection (a) does not apply to the
retention, ownership, possession, transfer, or receipt of a
chemical weapon or a biological weapon by a department,
[[Page S3329]]
agency, or other entity of the United States, or by a person
described in paragraph (2), pending destruction of the
weapon.
``(2) Exempted persons.--A person referred to in paragraph
(1) is--
``(A) a member of the Armed Forces of the United States or
any other person that is authorized by law or by an
appropriate officer of the United States to retain, own,
possess, transfer, or receive the chemical or biological
weapon; or
``(B) in an emergency situation, any other person if the
person is attempting to destroy or seize the weapon or if the
person is a victim of the use of the weapon.
``(d) Jurisdiction.--Conduct prohibited by subsection (a)
is within the jurisdiction of the United States if the
prohibited conduct--
``(1) takes place in the United States;
``(2) takes place outside of the United States and is
committed by a national of the United States;
``(3) is committed against a national of the United States
while the national is outside the United States; or
``(4) is committed against any property that is owned,
leased, or used by the United States or by any department or
agency of the United States, whether the property is within
or outside the United States.
``Sec. 229A. Penalties
``(a) Criminal Penalties.--
``(1) In general.--Any person who violates section 229 of
this title shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for
any term of years, or both.
``(2) Death penalty.--Any person who violates section 229
of this title and by whose action the death of another person
is the result shall be punished by death or imprisoned for
life.
``(b) Civil Penalties.--
``(1) In general.--The Attorney General may bring a civil
action in the appropriate United States district court
against any person who violates section 229 of this title
and, upon proof of such violation by a preponderance of the
evidence, such person shall be subject to pay a civil penalty
in an amount not to exceed $100,000 for each such violation.
``(2) Relation to other proceedings.--The imposition of a
civil penalty under this subsection does not preclude any
other criminal or civil statutory, common law, or
administrative remedy, which is available by law to the
United States or any other person.
``(c) Reimbursement of Costs.--The court shall order any
person convicted of an offense under subsection (a) to
reimburse the United States for any expenses incurred by the
United States incident to the seizure, storage, handling,
transportation, and destruction or other disposition of any
property that was seized in connection with an investigation
of the commission of the offense by that person. A person
ordered to reimburse the United States for expenses under
this subsection shall be jointly and severally liable for
such expenses with each other person, if any, who is ordered
under this subsection to reimburse the United States for the
same expenses.
``Sec. 229B. Criminal forfeitures; destruction of weapons
``(a) Property Subject to Criminal Forfeiture.--Any person
convicted under section 229A(a) shall forfeit to the United
States irrespective of any provision of State law--
``(1) any property, real or personal, involved in the
offense, including any chemical weapon or biological weapon;
``(2) any property constituting, or derived from, and
proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the
result of such violation; and
``(3) any of the person's property used, or intended to be
used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the
commission of, such violation.
The court, in imposing sentence on such person, shall order,
in addition to any other sentence imposed pursuant to section
229A(a), that the person forfeit to the United States all
property described in this subsection. In lieu of a fine
otherwise authorized by section 229A(a), a defendant who
derived profits or other proceeds from an offense may be
fined not more than twice the gross profits or other
proceeds.
``(b) Procedures.--Property subject to forfeiture under
this section, any seizure and disposition thereof, and any
administrative or judicial proceeding in relation thereto,
shall be governed by subsections (b) through (p) of section
413 of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Act of 1970 (21 U.S.C. 853), except that any reference under
those subsections to--
``(1) `this subchapter or subchapter II' shall be deemed to
be a reference to section 229A(a); and
``(2) `subsection (a)' shall be deemed to be a reference to
subsection (a) of this section.
``(c) Destruction or Other Disposition.--The Attorney
General shall provide for the destruction or other
appropriate disposition of any chemical or biological weapon
seized and forfeited pursuant to this section.
``(d) Assistance.--The Attorney General may request the
head of any agency of the United States to assist in the
handling, storage, transportation, or destruction of property
seized under this section.
``Sec. 229C. Other prohibitions
``(a) In General.--Whoever knowingly uses riot control
agents as an act of terrorism, or knowingly assists any
person to do so, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned for a term of not more than 10 years, or both.
``(b) Jurisdiction.--Conduct prohibited by this section is
within the jurisdiction of the United States if the
prohibited conduct--
``(1) takes place in the United States;
``(2) takes place outside of the United States and is
committed by a national of the United States;
``(3) is committed against a national of the United States
while the national is outside the United States; or
``(4) is committed against any property that is owned,
leased, or used by the United States or by any department or
agency of the United States, whether the property is within
or outside the United States.
``Sec. 229D. Injunctions
``The United States may obtain in a civil action an
injunction against--
``(1) the conduct prohibited under section 229 or 229C of
this title; or
``(2) the preparation or solicitation to engage in conduct
prohibited under section 229 or 229C of this title.
``Sec. 229E. Requests for military assistance to enforce
prohibition in certain emergencies
``The Attorney General may request the Secretary of Defense
to provide assistance under section 382 of title 10 in
support of Department of Justice activities relating to the
enforcement of section 229 of this title in an emergency
situation involving a biological weapon or chemical weapon.
The authority to make such a request may be exercised by
another official of the Department of Justice in accordance
with section 382(f)(2) of title 10.
``Sec. 229F. Definitions
``In this chapter:
``(1) Australia group.--The term `Australia Group' refers
to the informal forum of countries, formed in 1984 and
chaired by Australia, whose goal is to discourage and impede
chemical and biological weapons proliferation by harmonizing
national export controls on precursor chemicals for chemical
weapons, biological weapons pathogens, and dual-use
equipment, sharing information on target countries, and
seeking other ways to curb the use of chemical and biological
weapons.
``(2) Biological weapon.--The term `biological weapon'
means the following, together or separately:
``(A) Any micro-organism (including bacteria, viruses,
fungi, rickettsiae or protozoa), pathogen, or infectious
substance, or any naturally occurring, bio-engineered or
synthesized component of any such micro-organism, pathogen,
or infectious substance, whatever its origin or method of
production, capable of causing--
``(i) death, disease, or other biological malfunction in a
human, an animal, a plant, or another living organism;
``(ii) deterioration of food, water, equipment, supplies,
or materials of any kind; or
``(iii) deleterious alteration of the environment.
``(B) Any munition or device specifically designed to cause
death or other harm through the release, dissemination, or
impact of the toxic or poisonous properties of those
biological weapons specified in subparagraph (A).
``(C) Any equipment specifically designed for use directly
in connection with the employment of munitions or devices
specified in subparagraph (B).
``(D) Any living organism specifically designed to carry a
biological weapon specified in subparagraph (A) to a host.
``(3) Chemical weapon.--The term `chemical weapon' means
the following, together or separately:
``(A) Any of the following chemical agents: tabun, Sarin,
Soman, GF, VX, sulfur mustard, nitrogen mustard, phosgene
oxime, lewisite, phenyldichloroarsine, ethyldichloroarsine,
methyldichloroarsine, phosgene, diphosgene, hydrogen cyanide,
cyanogen chloride, and arsine.
``(B) Any of the 54 chemicals, other than a riot control
agent, controlled by the Australia Group as of the date of
the enactment of this Act.
``(C) Any other chemical agent that may be developed if the
use of the agent would be intended to produce an effect
consistent with that of a chemical agent or other chemical
described in subparagraph (A) or (B).
``(D) Any munition or device specifically designed to cause
death or other harm through the release, dissemination, or
impact of the toxic or poisonous properties of a chemical
weapon specified in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).
``(E) Any equipment specifically designed for use directly
in connection with the employment of munitions or devices
specified in subparagraph (D).
``(4) Knowingly.--The term `knowingly' is used within the
meaning of `knowing' as that term is defined in section 104
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (15 U.S.C. 78dd-
2).
``(5) National of the united states.--The term `national of
the United States' has the same meaning given such term in
section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8
U.S.C. 1101(a)(22)).
``(6) Person.--The term `person' means any individual,
corporation, partnership, firm, association, or other legal
entity.
``(7) Riot control agent.--The term `riot control agent'
means any substance, including diphenylchloroarsine,
diphenylcyanoarsine, adamsite, chloroacetophenone,
chloropicrin, bromobenzyl cyanide, 0-chlorobenzylidene
malononitrile, or 3-Quinuclidinyl benzilate that is designed
or used to produce rapidly in
[[Page S3330]]
humans any nonlethal sensory irritation or disabling physical
effect that disappears within a short time following
termination of exposure.
``(8) Terrorism.--The term `terrorism' means activities
that--
``(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life
that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United
States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation
if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or
of any State; and
``(B) appear to be intended--
``(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
``(ii) to influence the policy of a government by
intimidation or coercion; or
``(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by
assassination or kidnapping.
``(9) United states.--The term `United States' means the
several States of the United States, the District of
Columbia, and the commonwealths, territories, and possessions
of the United States and includes all places under the
jurisdiction or control of the United States, including--
``(A) any of the places within the provisions of section
40102(41) of title 49, United States Code;
``(B) any civil aircraft or public aircraft of the United
States, as such terms are defined in paragraphs (16) and
(37), respectively, of section 40102 of title 49, United
States Code; and
``(C) any vessel of the United States, as such term is
defined in section 3(b) of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement
Act (46 U.S.C. App. 1903(b)).''.
(b) Conforming Amendments.--
(1) Weapons of mass destruction.--Section 2332a of title
18, United States Code, is amended--
(A) by striking ``Sec. 2332a. Use of weapons of mass
destruction'' and inserting ``Sec. 2332a. Use of certain
weapons of mass destruction'';
(B) in subsection (a), by striking ``, including any
biological agent, toxin, or vector (as those terms are
defined in section 178)'' and inserting ``other than a
chemical weapon or biological weapon (as those terms are
defined in section 229F)''; and
(C) in subsection (b), by inserting ``(other than a
chemical weapon or biological weapon (as those terms are
defined in section 229F))'' after ``weapon of mass
destruction''.
(2) Table of chapters.--The table of chapters for part I of
title 18, United States Code, is amended--
(A) by striking the item relating to chapter 10; and
(B) by inserting after the item for chapter 11A the
following new item:
``11B. Chemical and Biological Weapons.......................229''.....
(c) Repeals.--The following provisions of law are repealed:
(1) Chapter 10 of title 18, United States Code, relating to
biological weapons.
(2) Section 2332c of title 18, United States Code, relating
to chemical weapons.
(3) In the table of sections for chapter 113B of title 18,
United States Code, the item relating to section 2332c.
Subtitle B--Revocations of Export Privileges
SEC. 111. REVOCATIONS OF EXPORT PRIVILEGES.
If the President determines, after notice and an
opportunity for a hearing in accordance with section 554 of
title 5, United States Code, that any person within the
United States, or any national of the United States located
outside the United States, has committed any violation of
section 229 of title 18, United States Code, the President
may issue an order for the suspension or revocation of the
authority of the person to export from the United States any
goods or technology (as such terms are defined in section 16
of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App.
2415)).
TITLE II--FOREIGN RELATIONS AND DEFENSE-RELATED PROVISIONS
SEC. 201. SANCTIONS FOR USE OF CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL
WEAPONS.
Title III of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control
and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (title III of Public Law
102-182) is amended--
(1) by redesignating section 309 as section 312; and
(2) by striking sections 306 through 308 and inserting the
following new sections:
``SEC. 306. PURPOSE.
``The purpose of sections 306 through 311 is--
``(1) to provide for the imposition of sanctions against
any foreign government--
``(A) that has used chemical or biological weapons in
violation of international law; or
``(B) that has used chemical or biological weapons against
its own nationals; and
``(2) to ensure that the victims of the use of chemical or
biological weapons shall be compensated and awarded punitive
damages, as may be determined.
``SEC. 307. PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION.
``(a) Bilateral Sanctions.--Except as provided in
subsections (c) and (d), the President shall, after the
consultation with Congress, impose the sanctions described in
subsections (a) and (b) of section 308 if the President
determines that any foreign government--
``(1) has used a chemical weapon or biological weapon in
violation of international law; or
``(2) has used a chemical weapon or biological weapon
against its own nationals.
``(b) Multilateral Sanctions.--The sanctions imposed
pursuant to subsection (a) are in addition to any
multilateral sanction or measure that may be otherwise
agreed.
``(c) Presidential Waiver.--The President may waive the
application of any of the sanctions imposed pursuant to
subsection (a) if the President determines and certifies in
writing to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that
implementing such measures would have a substantial negative
impact upon the supreme national interests of the United
States.
``(d) Sanctions Not Applied to Certain Existing
Contracts.--A sanction described in section 308 shall not
apply to any activity pursuant to a contract or international
agreement entered into before the date of the Presidential
determination under subsection (a) if the President
determines that performance of the activity would reduce the
potential for the use of a chemical weapon or biological
weapon by the sanctioned country.
``SEC. 308. MANDATORY SANCTIONS.
``(a) Minimum Number of Sanctions.--After consultation with
Congress and making a determination under section 307 with
respect to the actions of a foreign government, the President
shall impose not less than 5 of the following sanctions
against that government for a period of three years:
``(1) Foreign assistance.--The United States Government
shall terminate assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961, except for urgent humanitarian assistance and food
or other agricultural commodities or products.
``(2) Arms sales.--The United States Government shall not
sell any item on the United States Munitions List and shall
terminate sales to that country under this Act of any defense
articles, defense services, or design and construction
services. Licenses shall not be issued for the export to the
sanctioned country of any item on the United States Munitions
List, or for commercial satellites.
``(3) Arms sale financing.--The United States Government
shall terminate all foreign military financing under this
Act.
``(4) Denial of united states government credit or other
financial assistance.--The United States Government shall
deny any credit, credit guarantees, or other financial
assistance by any department, agency, or instrumentality of
the United States Government, including the Export-Import
Bank of the United States.
``(5) Export controls.--The authorities of section 6 of the
Export Administration Act of 1979 shall be used to prohibit
the export of any goods or technology on that part of the
control list established under section 5(c)(1) of that Act,
and all other goods and technology under this Act (excluding
food and other agricultural commodities and products) as the
President may determine to be appropriate.
``(6) Multilateral bank assistance.--The United States
shall oppose, in accordance with section 701 of the
International Financial Institutions Act, the extension of
any loan or financial or technical assistance by
international financial institutions.
``(7) Bank loans.--The United States Government shall
prohibit any United States bank from making any loan or
providing any credit, including to any agency or
instrumentality of the government, except for loans or
credits for the purpose of purchasing food or other
agricultural commodities or products.
``(8) Aviation rights.--
``(A) In general.--
``(i) Notification.--The President is authorized to notify
the government of a country with respect to which the
President has made a determination pursuant to section 307(a)
of his intention to suspend the authority of foreign air
carriers owned or controlled by the government of that
country to engage in foreign air transportation to or from
the United States.
``(ii) Suspension of aviation rights.--Within 10 days after
the date of notification of a government under subclause (I),
the Secretary of Transportation shall take all steps
necessary to suspend at the earliest possible date the
authority of any foreign air carrier owned or controlled,
directly or indirectly, by that government to engage in
foreign air transportation to or from the United States,
notwithstanding any agreement relating to air services.
``(B) Termination of air service agreements.--
``(i) In general.--The President may direct the Secretary
of State to terminate any air service agreement between the
United States and a country with respect to which the
President has made a determination pursuant to section
307(a), in accordance with the provisions of that agreement.
``(ii) Termination of aviation rights.--Upon termination of
an agreement under this clause, the Secretary of
Transportation shall take such steps as may be necessary to
revoke at the earliest possible date the right of any foreign
air carrier owned, or controlled, directly or indirectly, by
the government of that country to engage in foreign air
transportation to or from the United States.
``(C) Exception.--The Secretary of Transportation may
provide for such exceptions from the sanction contained in
subparagraph (A) as the Secretary considers necessary to
provide for emergencies in which the safety of an aircraft or
its crew or passengers is threatened.
``(D) Definitions.--For purposes of this paragraph, the
terms `aircraft', `air transportation', and `foreign air
carrier' have the meanings given those terms in section 40102
of title 49, United States Code.
[[Page S3331]]
``(9) Diplomatic relations.--The President shall use his
constitutional authorities to downgrade or suspend diplomatic
privileges between the United States and that country.
``(b) Blocking of Assets.--Upon making a determination
under section 307, the President shall take all steps
necessary to block any transactions in any property subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States in which the foreign
country or any national thereof has any interest whatsoever,
for the purpose of compensating the victims of the chemical
or biological weapons use and for punitive damages as may be
assessed.
``(c) Statutory Construction.--Nothing in this section
limits the authority of the President to impose a sanction
that is not specified in this section.
``SEC. 309. REMOVAL OF SANCTIONS.
``(a) Certification Requirement.--The President shall
remove the sanctions imposed with respect to a foreign
government pursuant to this section if the President
determines and so certifies to the Congress, after the end of
the three-year period beginning on the date on which
sanctions were initially imposed on that country pursuant to
section 307, that--
``(1) the government of that country has provided reliable
assurances that it will not use any chemical weapon or
biological weapon in violation of international law and will
not use any chemical weapon or biological weapon against its
own nationals;
``(2) the government of the country is willing to accept
onsite inspections or other reliable measures to verify that
the government is not making preparations to use any chemical
weapon or biological weapon in violation of international law
or to use any chemical weapon or biological weapon against
its own nationals; and
``(3) the government of the country is making restitution
to those affected by any use of any chemical weapon or
biological weapon in violation of international law or
against its own nationals.
``(b) Reasons for Determination.--The certification made
under this subsection shall set forth the reasons supporting
such determination in each particular case.
``(c) Effective Date.--The certification made under this
subsection shall take effect on the date on which the
certification is received by the Congress.
``SEC. 310. NOTIFICATIONS AND REPORTS OF CHEMICAL OR
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS USE AND APPLICATION OF
SANCTIONS.
``(a) Notification.--Not later than 30 days after
persuasive information becomes available to the executive
branch of Government indicating the substantial possibility
of the use of chemical or biological weapons by any person or
government, the President shall so notify Congress in
writing.
``(b) Report.--Not later than 60 days after making a
notification under subsection (a), the President shall submit
a report to Congress that contains--
``(1) an assessment by the President in both classified and
unclassified form of the circumstances of the suspected use
of chemical or biological weapons, including any
determination by the President made under section 307 with
respect to a foreign government; and
``(2) a description of the actions the President intends to
take pursuant to the assessment, including the imposition of
any sanctions or other measures pursuant to section 307.
``(c) Progress Report.--Not later than 60 days after
submission of a report under subsection (b), the President
shall submit a progress report to Congress describing actions
undertaken by the President under sections 306 through 311,
including the imposition of unilateral and multilateral
sanctions and other punitive measures, in response to the use
of any chemical weapon or biological weapon described in the
report.
``(d) Recipients of Notifications and Reports.--Any
notification or report required by this section shall be
submitted to the following:
``(1) The Majority Leader of the Senate and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives.
``(2) The Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
``(3) The Committee on International Relations and the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives.
``SEC. 311. DEFINITIONS.
``In sections 306 through 310:
``(1) Biological weapon.--The term `biological weapon'
means the following, together or separately:
``(A) Any micro-organism (including bacteria, viruses,
fungi, rickettsiae or protozoa), pathogen, or infectious
substance, or any naturally occurring, bio-engineered or
synthesized component of any such micro-organism, pathogen,
or infectious substance, whatever its origin or method of
production, capable of causing--
``(i) death, disease, or other biological malfunction in a
human, an animal, a plant, or another living organism;
``(ii) deterioration of food, water, equipment, supplies,
or materials of any kind; or
``(iii) deleterious alteration of the environment.
``(B) Any munition or device specifically designed to cause
death or other harm through the release, dissemination, or
impact of the toxic or poisonous properties of those
biological weapons specified in subparagraph (A).
``(C) Any equipment specifically designed for use directly
in connection with the employment of munitions or devices
specified in subparagraph (B).
``(D) Any living organism specifically designed to carry a
biological weapon specified in subparagraph (A) to a host.
``(2) Chemical weapon.--The term `chemical weapon' means
the following, together or separately:
``(A) Any of the following chemical agents: tabun, Sarin,
Soman, GF, VX, sulfur mustard, nitrogen mustard, phosgene
oxime, lewisite, phenyldichloroarsine, ethyldichloroarsine,
methyldichloroarsine, phosgene, diphosgene, hydrogen cyanide,
cyanogen chloride, and arsine.
``(B) Any of the 54 chemicals, other than a riot control
agent, controlled by the Australia Group as of the date of
the enactment of this Act.
``(C) Any other chemical agent that may be developed if the
use of the agent would be intended to produce an effect
consistent with that of a chemical agent or other chemical
described in subparagraph (A) or (B).
``(D) Any munition or device specifically designed to cause
death or other harm through the release, dissemination, or
impact of the toxic or poisonous properties of a chemical
weapon specified in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).
``(E) Any equipment specifically designed for use directly
in connection with the employment of munitions or devices
specified in subparagraph (D).
``(3) Person.--The term `person' means any individual,
corporation, partnership, firm, association, or other legal
entity.''.
SEC. 202. CONTINUATION AND ENHANCEMENT OF MULTILATERAL
CONTROL REGIMES.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
any collapse of the informal forum of states known as the
``Australia Group'', either through changes in membership or
lack of compliance with common export controls, or any
substantial weakening of common Australia Group export
controls and nonproliferation measures in force as of the
date of enactment of this Act, would seriously undermine
international and national efforts to curb the spread of
chemical and biological weapons and related equipment.
(b) Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United States--
(1) to continue close cooperation with other countries in
the Australia Group in support of its current efforts and in
devising additional means to monitor and control the supply
of chemicals and biological agents applicable to weapons
production;
(2) to maintain an equivalent or more comprehensive level
of control over the export of toxic chemicals and their
precursors, dual-use processing equipment, human, animal and
plant pathogens and toxins with potential biological weapons
application, and dual-use biological equipment, as that
afforded by the Australia Group as of the date of enactment
of this Act;
(3) to block any effort by any Australia Group member to
achieve Australia Group consensus on any action that would
substantially weaken existing common Australia Group export
controls and nonproliferation measures or otherwise undermine
the effectiveness of the Australia Group; and
(4) to work closely with other countries also capable of
supplying equipment, materials, and technology with
particular applicability to the production of chemical or
biological weapons in order to devise and harmonize the most
effective national controls possible on the transfer of such
materials, equipment, and technology.
(c) Certification.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the
President shall determine and certify to Congress whether--
(1) the Australia Group continues to maintain an equivalent
or more comprehensive level of control over the export of
toxic chemicals and their precursors, dual-use processing
equipment, human, animal, and plant pathogens and toxins with
potential biological weapons application, and dual-use
biological equipment, as that afforded by the Australia Group
as of the date of the last certification under this
subsection, or, in the case of the first certification, the
level of control maintained as of the date of enactment of
this Act; and
(2) the Australia Group remains a viable mechanism for
curtailing the spread of chemical and biological weapons-
related materials and technology, and whether the
effectiveness of the Australia Group has been undermined by
changes in membership, lack of compliance with common export
controls, or any weakening of common controls and measures
that are in effect as of the date of enactment of this Act.
(d) Consultations.--
(1) In general.--The President shall consult periodically,
but not less frequently than twice a year, with the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on
International Relations of the House of Representatives, on
Australia Group export controls and nonproliferation
measures.
(2) Resulting from presidential certification.--If the
President certifies that either of the conditions in
subsection (c) are not met, the President shall consult
within 60 days of such certification with the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on
International Relations of the House of Representatives on
steps the United States should take to maintain effective
international controls on chemical and
[[Page S3332]]
biological weapons-related materials and technology.
SEC. 203. CRITERIA FOR UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA
RELATING TO THE ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL AND
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS.
(a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, United States assistance described in subsection (d) may
not be obligated or expended unless a certification by the
President is in effect under subsection (b) or subsection
(c).
(b) Certification With Respect to Russian Chemical and
Biological Program.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the
President shall certify that--
(1) Russia is making reasonable progress toward the
implementation of the Bilateral Destruction Agreement;
(2) the United States and Russia have made substantial
progress toward resolution, to the satisfaction of the United
States, of outstanding compliance issues under the Wyoming
Memorandum of Understanding and the Bilateral Destruction
Agreement;
(3) Russia has fully and accurately declared all
information regarding its unitary and binary chemical
weapons, chemical weapons production facilities, and other
facilities associated with the development of chemical
weapons; and
(4) Russia is in compliance with its obligations under the
Biological Weapons Convention.
(c) Alternative Certification.--A certification under this
subsection is a certification by the President that the
President is unable to make a certification under subsection
(b).
(d) Period of Effectiveness of Certifications.--Each
certification made under this section shall not be effective
for a period of more than one year.
(e) United States Assistance Covered.--United States
assistance described in this subsection is United States
assistance out of funds made available for fiscal year 1998
or any fiscal year thereafter that is provided with respect
to Russia only for the purposes of--
(1) facilitating the transport, storage, safeguarding, and
elimination of any chemical weapon or biological weapon or
its delivery vehicle;
(2) planning, designing, or construction of any destruction
facility for a chemical weapon or biological weapon; or
(3) supporting any international science and technology
center.
(f) Definitions.--
(1) Bilateral destruction agreement.--The term ``Bilateral
Destruction Agreement'' means Agreement Between the United
States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
on Destruction and Nonproduction of Chemical Weapons and on
Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral Convention on Banning
Chemical Weapons, signed on June 1, 1990.
(2) Biological weapons convention.--The term ``Biological
Weapons Convention'' means the Convention on the Prohibition
of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their
Destruction, done at Washington, London, and Moscow on April
10, 1972.
(3) Wyoming memorandum of understanding.--The term
``Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding'' means the Memorandum
of Understanding Between the Government of the United States
of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics Regarding a Bilateral Verification
Experiment and Data Exchange Related to Prohibition on
Chemical Weapons, signed at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, on
September 23, 1989.
(4) United states assistance.--The term ``United States
assistance'' has the meaning given the term in section
481(e)(4) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
2291(e)(4)).
SEC. 204. REPORT ON THE STATE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL
WEAPONS PROLIFERATION.
Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this
Act, and every year thereafter, the President shall submit to
the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee
on Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence
of the Senate a report containing the following:
(1) Proliferation by foreign countries.--A description of
any efforts by China, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North
Korea, Pakistan, Russia, and Syria, and any country that has,
during the five years prior to submission of the report, used
any chemical weapon or biological weapon or attempted to
acquire the material and technology to produce and deliver
chemical or biological agents, together with an assessment of
the present and future capability of the country to produce
and deliver such agents.
(2) Foreign persons assisting in proliferation.--An
identification of--
(A) those persons that in the past have assisted the
government of any country described in paragraph (1) in that
effort; and
(B) those persons that continue to assist the government of
the country described in paragraph (1) in that effort as of
the date of the report.
(3) Third country assistance in proliferation.--An
assessment of whether and to what degree other countries have
assisted any government or country described in paragraph (1)
in its effort to acquire the material and technology
described in that paragraph.
(4) Intelligence information on third country assistance.--
A description of any confirmed or credible intelligence or
other information that any country has assisted the
government of any country described in paragraph (1) in that
effort, either directly or by facilitating the activities of
the persons identified in subparagraph (A) or (B) of
paragraph (3) or had knowledge of the activities of the
persons identified in subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph
(3), but took no action to halt or discourage such
activities.
(5) Intelligence information on subnational groups.--A
description of any confirmed or credible intelligence or
other information of the development, production,
stockpiling, or use, of any chemical weapon or biological
weapon by subnational groups, including any terrorist or
paramilitary organization.
(6) Funding priorities for detection and monitoring
capabilities.--An identification of the priorities of the
executive branch of Government for the development of new
resources relating to detection and monitoring capabilities
with respect to chemical weapons and biological weapons.
SEC. 205. INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE TO STRENGTHEN THE 1925
GENEVA PROTOCOL.
(a) Definition.--In this section, the term ``1925 Geneva
Protocol'' means the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use
in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, done at Geneva June 17,
1925 (26 UST 71; TIAS 8061).
(b) Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United States--
(1) to work to obtain multilateral agreement to effective,
international enforcement mechanisms to existing
international agreements that prohibit the use of chemical
and biological weapons, to which the United States is a state
party; and
(2) pursuant to paragraph (1), to work to obtain
multilateral agreement regarding the collective imposition of
sanctions and other measures described in title III of the
Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare
Elimination Act of 1991, as amended by this Act.
(c) Responsibility.--The Secretary of State shall, as a
priority matter, take steps necessary to achieve United
States objectives, as set forth in this section.
(d) Sense of the Senate.--The Senate urges and directs the
Secretary of State to work to convene an international
negotiating forum for the purpose of concluding an
international agreement on enforcement of the 1925 Geneva
Protocol.
(e) Allocation of Funds.--Of the amount authorized to be
appropriated to the Department of State for fiscal year 1998
under the appropriations account entitled ``International
Conferences and Contingencies'', $5,000,000 shall be
available only for payment of salaries and expenses in
connection with efforts of the Secretary of State to conclude
an international agreement described in subsection (d).
SEC. 206. RESTRICTION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR THE ORGANIZATION
FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS.
(a) Prohibition.--None of the funds appropriated pursuant
to any provision of law, including previously appropriated
funds, may be available to make any voluntary or assessed
contribution to the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons, or to reimburse any account for the
transfer of in-kind items to the Organization, unless or
until the Convention on the Prohibition of Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on
Their Destruction, opened for signature at Paris January 13,
1993, enters into force for the United States.
(b) Statutory Construction.--Nothing in subsection (a) may
be construed to apply to the Preliminary Commission for the
establishment of the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons.
SEC. 207. ENHANCEMENTS TO ROBUST CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL
DEFENSES.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the threats posed by chemical and biological weapons to
United States Armed Forces deployed in regions of concern
will continue to grow and will undermine United States
strategies for the projection of United States military power
and the forward deployment of United States Armed Forces;
(2) the use of chemical or biological weapons will be a
likely condition of future conflicts in regions of concern;
(3) it is essential for the United States and key regional
allies of the United States to preserve and further develop
robust chemical and biological defenses;
(4) the United States Armed Forces, both active and
nonactive duty, are inadequately equipped, organized,
trained, and exercised for operations in chemically and
biologically contaminated environments;
(5) the lack of readiness stems from a deemphasis by the
executive branch of Government and the United States Armed
Forces on chemical and biological defense;
(6) the armed forces of key regional allies and likely
coalition partners, as well as civilians necessary to support
United States military operations, are inadequately prepared
and equipped to carry out essential missions in chemically
and biologically contaminated environments;
(7) congressional direction contained in the 1997 Defense
Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act is intended to lead
to enhanced domestic preparedness to protect against the use
of chemical and biological weapons; and
[[Page S3333]]
(8) the United States Armed Forces should place increased
emphasis on potential threats to deployed United States Armed
Forces and, in particular, should make countering the use of
chemical and biological weapons an organizing principle for
United States defense strategy and for the development of
force structure, doctrine, planning, training, and exercising
policies of the United States Armed Forces.
(b) Defense Readiness Training.--The Secretary of Defense
shall take those actions that are necessary to ensure that
the United States Armed Forces are capable of carrying out
required military missions in United States regional
contingency plans despite the threat or use of chemical or
biological weapons. In particular, the Secretary of Defense
shall ensure that the United States Armed Forces are
effectively equipped, organized, trained, and exercised
(including at the large unit and theater level) to conduct
operations in chemically and biologically contaminated
environments that are critical to the success of United
States military plans in regional conflicts, including--
(1) deployment, logistics, and reinforcement operations at
key ports and airfields;
(2) sustained combat aircraft sortie generation at critical
regional airbases; and
(3) ground force maneuvers of large units and divisions.
(c) Discussions With Allied Countries on Readiness.--
(1) High-priority joint responsibility of secretaries of
defense and state.--The Secretary of Defense and the
Secretary of State shall give a high priority to discussions
with key regional allies and likely regional coalition
partners, including those countries where the United States
currently deploys forces, where United States forces would
likely operate during regional conflicts, or which would
provide civilians necessary to support United States military
operations, to determine what steps are necessary to ensure
that allied and coalition forces and other critical civilians
are adequately equipped and prepared to operate in chemically
and biologically contaminated environments.
(2) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense and the
Secretary of State shall jointly submit to the Committee on
Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the
Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives a
report describing--
(A) the results of the discussions held under paragraph (1)
and plans for future discussions;
(B) the measures agreed to improve the preparedness of
foreign armed forces and civilians; and
(C) any proposals for increased military assistance,
including assistance provided through--
(i) the sale of defense articles and defense services under
the Arms Export Control Act;
(ii) the Foreign Military Financing program under section
23 of that Act; and
(iii) chapter 5 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 (relating to international military education and
training).
(d) United States Army Chemical School.--
(1) Command of school.--The Secretary of Defense shall take
those actions that are necessary to ensure that the United
States Army Chemical School remains under the oversight of a
general officer of the United States Army.
(2) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(A) the transfer, consolidation, and reorganization of the
United States Army Chemical School should not disrupt or
diminish the training and readiness of the United States
Armed Forces to fight in a chemical-biological warfare
environment; and
(B) the Army should continue to operate the Chemical
Defense Training Facility at Fort McClellan until such time
as the replacement facility at Fort Leonard Wood is
functional.
(e) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, and on January 1 every year
thereafter, the President shall submit a report to the
Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed
Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate
and the Committee on International Relations, the Committee
on National Security, and the Committee on Appropriations of
the House of Representatives, and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives on previous, current, and planned chemical
and biological weapons defense activities of the United
States Armed Forces.
(2) Content of report.--Each report required by paragraph
(1) shall include the following information for the previous
fiscal year and for the next three fiscal years:
(A) Enhancement of defense and readiness.--Proposed
solutions to each of the deficiencies in chemical and
biological warfare defenses identified in the March 1996
General Accounting Office Report, titled ``Chemical and
Biological Defense: Emphasis Remains Insufficient to Resolve
Continuing Problems'', and steps being taken pursuant to
subsection (b) to ensure that the United States Armed Forces
are capable of conducting required military operations to
ensure the success of United States regional contingency
plans despite the threat or use of chemical or biological
weapons.
(B) Priorities.--An identification of priorities of the
executive branch of Government in the development of both
active and passive defenses against the use of chemical and
biological weapons.
(C) RDT&E and procurement of defenses.--A detailed summary
of all budget activities associated with the research,
development, testing, and evaluation, and procurement of
chemical and biological defenses, set forth by fiscal year,
program, department, and agency.
(D) Vaccine production and stocks.--A detailed assessment
of current and projected vaccine production capabilities and
vaccine stocks, including progress in researching and
developing a multivalent vaccine.
(E) Decontamination of infrastructure and installations.--A
detailed assessment of procedures and capabilities necessary
to protect and decontaminate infrastructure and installations
that support the ability of the United States to project
power through the use of its Armed Forces, including progress
in developing a nonaqueous chemical decontamination
capability.
(F) Protective gear.--A description of the progress made in
procuring lightweight personal protective gear and steps
being taken to ensure that programmed procurement quantities
are sufficient to replace expiring battledress overgarments
and chemical protective overgarments to maintain required
wartime inventory levels.
(G) Detection and identification capabilities.--A
description of the progress made in developing long-range
standoff detection and identification capabilities and other
battlefield surveillance capabilities for biological and
chemical weapons, including progress on developing a
multichemical agent detector, unmanned aerial vehicles, and
unmanned ground sensors.
(H) Theater missile defenses.--A description of the
progress made in developing and deploying layered theater
missile defenses for deployed United States Armed Forces
which will provide greater geographic coverage against
current and expected ballistic missile threats and will
assist the mitigation of chemical and biological
contamination through higher altitude intercepts and boost-
phase intercepts.
(I) Training and readiness.--An assessment of the training
and readiness of the United States Armed Forces to operate in
chemically and biologically contaminated environments and
actions taken to sustain training and readiness, including at
national combat training centers.
(J) Military exercises.--A description of the progress made
in incorporating consideration about the threat or use of
chemical and biological weapons into service and joint
exercises as well as simulations, models, and wargames,
together with the conclusions drawn from these efforts about
the United States capability to carry out required missions,
including with coalition partners, in military contingencies.
(K) Military doctrine.--A description of the progress made
in developing and implementing service and joint doctrine for
combat and noncombat operations involving adversaries armed
with chemical or biological weapons, including efforts to
update the range of service and joint doctrine to better
address the wide range of military activities, including
deployment, reinforcement, and logistics operations in
support of combat operations, and for the conduct of such
operations in concert with coalition forces.
(L) Defense of civilian population.--A description of the
progress made in resolving issues relating to the protection
of United States population centers from chemical and
biological attack and from the consequences of such an
attack, including plans for inoculation of populations,
consequence management, and progress made in developing and
deploying effective cruise missile defenses and a national
ballistic missile defense.
SEC. 208. NEGATIVE SECURITY ASSURANCES.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that in
order to achieve an effective deterrence against attacks of
the United States and United States Armed Forces by chemical
weapons, the President should reevaluate the extension of
negative security assurances by the United States to
nonnuclear-weapon states in the context of the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
(b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the
Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives a report, both in classified and unclassified
forms, setting forth--
(1) the findings of a detailed review of United States
policy on negative security assurances as a deterrence
strategy; and
(2) a determination by the President of the appropriate
range of nuclear and conventional responses to the use of
chemical or biological weapons against the United States
Armed Forces, United States citizens, allies, and third
parties.
(c) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Negative security assurances.--The term ``negative
security assurances'' means the assurances provided by the
United States to nonnuclear-weapon states in the context of
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (21
UST 483) that the United States will forswear the use of
certain weapons unless the United States is attacked by that
nonnuclear-weapon state in alliance with a nuclear-weapon
state.
(2) Nonnuclear-weapon states.--The term ``nonnuclear-weapon
states'' means states
[[Page S3334]]
that are not nuclear-weapon states, as defined in Article
IX(3) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968
(21 UST 483).
SEC. 209. RIOT CONTROL AGENTS.
(a) Prohibition.--The President shall not issue any order
or directive that diminishes, abridges, or alters the right
of the United States to use riot control agents--
(1) in any circumstance not involving international armed
conflict; or
(2) in a defensive military mode to save lives in an
international armed conflict, as provided for in Executive
Order No. 11850 of April 9, 1975.
(b) Circumstances Not Involving International Armed
Conflict.--The use of riot control agents under subsection
(a)(1) includes the use of such agents in--
(1) peacekeeping or peace support operations;
(2) humanitarian or disaster relief operations;
(3) noncombatant evacuation operations;
(4) counterterrorist operations and the rescue of hostages;
and
(5) law enforcement operations and other internal
conflicts.
(c) Defensive Military Mode.--The use of riot control
agents under subsection (a)(2) may include the use of such
agents--
(1) in areas under direct and distinct United States
military control, including the use of such agents for the
purposes of controlling rioting or escaping enemy prisoners
of war;
(2) to protect personnel or material from civil
disturbances, terrorists, and paramilitary organizations;
(3) to minimize casualties during rescue missions of downed
air crews and passengers, prisoners of war, or hostages;
(4) in situations where combatants and noncombatants are
intermingled; and
(5) in support of base defense, rear area operations,
noncombatant evacuation operations, and operations to protect
or recover nuclear weapons.
(d) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
international law permits the United States to use
herbicides, under regulations applicable to their domestic
use, for control of vegetation within United States bases and
installations or around their immediate defensive perimeters.
(e) Authority of the President.--The President shall take
all necessary measures, and prescribe such rules and
regulations as may be necessary, to ensure that the policy
contained in this section is observed by the Armed Forces of
the United States.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Abraham
be added as cosponsor to S. 495.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, let me say for the benefit of my colleagues,
to whom we had indicated that we would try to ensure that we would have
a vote on this matter at about 3:45, that even though, under the
unanimous consent agreement, we have a half-hour to discuss this
legislation in order to try to accommodate my colleagues, to set an
example for those on the other side who may wish not to take their full
compliment of time, that at this time I am going to express a
willingness to discuss this bill no further but just take a couple of
minutes to close and to relinquish the floor to those who may be in
opposition, again with the plea to them that since we had earlier
advised colleagues that a vote would occur on this matter at about 3:45
that anyone who can possibly do so truncate their remarks in order to
accommodate our colleagues.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, has the
unanimous consent agreement not yet been agreed to?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes. The unanimous consent agreement has been
reached.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I was in my office. I still have not had an
opportunity--I am not blaming anyone for that--to read this agreement.
But in listening to what was said, I thought I heard that a part of the
agreement was to the effect that certain votes would occur by voice. Am
I correct?
Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, if the distinguished Senator will yield,
the agreement calls for a vote on the Helms amendments, and on the 28
amendments in agreement. It was stated by at least one of our
colleagues that it was his hope that these votes would be voice votes,
and the majority leader indicated that it was his desire to have a
voice vote. But no one is precluded, of course, from calling for a
rollcall as is his constitutional right.
So the distinguished Senator from West Virginia makes a good point. A
Senator is not precluded. It is my hope, working with the majority
leader, that we can have voice votes on these matters and that we can
move ahead as the agreement anticipates. But certainly it is anyone's
right to call for a rollcall on this or any other vote.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, my concerns have been allayed, and I thank
the distinguished leader.
Mr. LEAHY addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I understand the concern of the Senator
from Arizona and others in wanting to move forward with S. 495.
Frankly, Mr. President, we may be seeking a greater good here on the
chemical weapons treaty. Those who are opposed to it will feel that it
isn't important that they have a chance to vote against it; but those
who are for it, as am I, will feel it is important to have a chance to
vote for it.
But S. 495 in my mind does not have such urgency.
In an effort to cooperate with the Democratic leader, and with the
Republican leader, who is seeking to fulfill, I think, a responsible
commitment to the President of the United States to have this bill up
here, or to have the treaty up here, I did not object to S. 495, the
Kyl bill, coming up. But, Mr. President, I would point out that this is
a bill that was introduced--the first version of it was introduced and
referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee a day or two before our last
recess. There has never been a hearing on it. There has not been 21
seconds of debate on it in the Senate Judiciary Committee, and today we
have before us a 70-page and a 70-page substitute for it. We are going
to be asked sometime in the next few minutes to vote on a substitute
for S. 495. We are going to be asked to vote on a bill that has had no
hearings, no debate in committee, no markups, no votes, no report, and
no discussion.
I am willing to wager that there will not be more than five Senators
who can walk off the floor and tell people honestly, looking them
straight in the eye, and say they read it and understood what is in it.
In fact, I would make this challenge to the press. I would make this
challenge to the press of every one of the 50 States. I would ask, if
the press really wants to do their job, to do this: Call each of the
Senators. All it requires is for the press in each State to call up
only two people immediately after the vote on S. 495, and say, ``Did
you read this bill that you just voted on? Did you understand what was
in this bill you just voted on? Could you explain this bill to me that
you just voted on?'' And if somebody says they voted for a major issue
like this, then I think it is reasonable to ask, ``Did you read it? Did
you understand it? Do you know what is in it?''
There may be some very good things in the bill. I have heard that it
borrows much from the administration's proposals for implementation
legislation. I understand that there are some aspects of it that are
very similar to legislation that I introduced. And that may very well
be so. There may well be some parts of this bill that I would eagerly
support and vote for. But the fact of the matter is I do not know and
am not being given an opportunity to find out, let alone have hearings
or an opportunity to seek to improve the bill.
We have not had an opportunity or the benefit of discussion. We have
not had the opportunity or the benefit of debate--and we will not have
debate on it today.
The sole reason it is up here under this expedited procedure is to
give some kind of cover one way or the other to bring up the chemical
weapons treaty. What we have is the majority insisting that we
consider, without review, a revised substitute version of a bill that
was not made available to us until this afternoon.
Nobody has said in the Senate Judiciary Committee this could not have
a prompt hearing. Certainly I would support the chairman of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, Senator Hatch, if he wanted to have a prompt
hearing on it.
The principal sponsor of the bill, the distinguished Senator from
Arizona, would certainly pursue it strongly through the committee, and
I have no doubts that he would be able to explain it very, very well in
the committee and answer any questions that might come up. He is a
diligent and hard-working Senator who would be able to do that. But
under this procedure, we will never know. This committee has a majority
[[Page S3335]]
of Republicans, as all Senate committees do, but yet the committee will
never vote on it.
The majority leader, who is my good friend, has always described
himself as one who seeks regular order. I think the Washington Post had
a front-page story on December 3, 1996, in which they quote the Senator
describing himself as an ``order'' kind of guy.
I recall when our distinguished majority leader came to the floor and
said:
There is a way to do things around here. You bring up a
bill reported by a committee, have debate, offer amendments,
you vote, and win or lose, and you move on, and then it goes
to conference.
Well, we are not bringing up a bill reported by a committee. We are
really not going to have debate. We are not going to offer amendments.
We will vote. And that is about the only reflection of order.
If we were considering a resolution to commend the cherry blossom
princess or to say we will open the doors of the Senate 5 minutes early
or something like that, I could understand. Instead, we are talking
about a 70-page bill which is to provide criminal and civil penalties
for acquisition, transfer, or use of any chemical weapon or biological
weapon, to reduce the threats of acts of terrorism, armed aggression,
and so on. This bill refers to patent law, to chemical and biological
weapons, to aircraft, and to continuation and enhancements of
multilateral control regimes. It refers to the Australia group--I would
like to have five Senators stand up and tell me what the Australia
group is, to the Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding and the 1990
Bilateral Destruction Agreement. These are major things. Vaccine
production and stocks, decontamination of infrastructure are also
serious matters and we have not had any hearing, any debate, any
discussion of it. The bill refers to owner or possessor liability and
warrantless seizures and seizures on warrants and reimbursement of
costs, saying how people will have to pay the United States certain
amounts of money under certain circumstances and all. This may be heady
stuff, Mr. President, very heady stuff.
Now, we have had the Chemical Weapons Convention before us since
November 1993. It has been bottled up in committee. We have the April
28, 1997, deadline approaching after which our lack of ratification
risks economic sanctions against our chemical industry. This could cost
U.S. chemical companies hundreds of millions of dollars. We are talking
about thousands of jobs and hundreds of millions of dollars on
something that has been stalled, stalled for years.
Now but all of a sudden, whoop-de-do, we have a bill and a substitute
bill and the Senate is to take 12 minutes and go ahead with it.
I am afraid that without proper review of the domestic law changes in
criminal laws against chemical and biological weapons, we may
inadvertently weaken protections already in the law. I know my friend
from Arizona does not intend to weaken our laws, but that could be the
effect of this bill.
There is no need for this irregular procedure. We ought to be able to
take a look at S. 495. I would have no objection to its coming up in
regular order after hearings, but it is not a substitute for the
Chemical Weapons Convention. It is not a substitute or alternative to
implementing legislation.
After we delayed something that President Reagan had negotiated,
something that President Bush had negotiated, something that President
Clinton had negotiated, the Chemical Weapons Convention, after we
delayed it for year after year after year, now we are going to take up
in less than 3 hours and pass this 70-page bill that nobody has read.
We delay something that has been debated, argued, considered, we delay
that for years, but then we take a major piece of legislation that
nobody has seen and do not even debate it and it is out the door.
Something has gone wrong here.
On April 15, every American had to file their taxes or the IRS comes
after them. That is the law. We also have a law that says that the
House and the Senate shall pass a budget by April 15. With all due
respect to my friends on the Republican side, they control the Speaker
of the House, they control the majority in the House, they control the
majority leader and a majority in the Senate, but we have not had one
second of debate on a budget resolution even though the law requires
them to pass it by April 15.
April 15 comes and goes. Can you imagine, Mr. President, if you took
that same attitude in filing your taxes and said well, you know, I am
busy, I cannot do it. You would hear the doorbell ring and there would
be the IRS after you. But nobody comes after us for doing the same
thing.
We have nearly 100 vacancies on the Federal bench, and we cannot get
a quorum in the Judiciary Committee to report them out.
Yet this 70-page major piece of legislation suddenly comes zipping
forth. There are a lot of problems in it. As I said, there may be some
things I like. But it says, for example, the bill would prohibit the
production of 16 specific chemicals and 54 more already controlled by
the Australia group. Do we know what chemicals are in this bill that
would be criminalized? I doubt that any one of us could even pronounce
the chemicals. We do not know what we are voting to ban?
The bill prohibits any other chemical that may be developed that
produces the same effect as the other listed chemicals. I take it this
means chemicals developed in the future. But what about other terrible
weapons that now exist? Would chemical weapons that exist now but not
listed in the bill be OK? What deadly chemicals that are prohibited
under current law, which has a far broader definition of chemical
weapons, would be freed from criminal penalties?
We have had no answer. This bill repeals the two major chapters of
the Federal Criminal Code dealing with biological weapons and with
chemical weapons. The ink is barely dry on the chemical weapons law
that this legislation would repeal. The chemical weapons statute became
law as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996. It was enacted April 14, 1996. It is barely 1 year old and we are
going to repeal it without a single hearing, single expert comment
about what might be wrong with a bill that we passed a year ago. Do we
replace it with a stronger law? No.
First, the definition of chemical weapons that will be banned under
this bill is far more limited than the chemical weapons banned under
current law.
The bill has a number of exemptions to the overall prohibitions on
chemical and biological weapons that are far broader in scope than what
are in current law. For example, current law bars chemical weapons for
anything but lawful authority. This bill replaces that limited,
circumscribed rule with five extensive exemptions including for any
peaceful purpose related to any activity.
What does that mean? Is that an exemption any enterprising terrorist
or criminal caught with a chemical weapon could use to great advantage?
Someone could make a strong argument that way.
While there are parts of the bill I may well like, there are a lot of
other parts that raise unanswered questions. Again, any Senator who
votes for this, I would challenge the press in his or her State to ask:
You voted for it, do you know what was in it? Did you read the bill?
Did you understand the bill? Were all your questions answered? Did you
feel you repealed any criminal laws we now have that we should have
kept?
Mr. President, we spent far, far, far more time this week in quorum
calls when we did nothing than we have on hearings on this bill. We
spent more time voting on a 100-to-0 resolution on assisted suicide to
make us all feel good. We spent far more time on that than we have
hearings on this bill. Mr. President, we spent more time with the
Chaplain's prayer this morning than we spent on hearings on this 70-
page bill. We spent more time saying good morning to each other this
morning than we have had in hearings on this 70-page bill. It takes
more time for the elevator to go from the second floor to the first
than we have had in hearings on this 70-page bill.
I do not fault the Senator from Arizona for this. The leadership is
willing to bring it forward, and if it is his legislation, then he is
obviously going to go for it.
But before the Senate becomes irrelevant, if we do not have time and
will not even follow the law, which requires
[[Page S3336]]
us to have a budget by April 15, if we only had time to confirm two
Federal judges in 4 months and we have a 100-judge vacancy, if we do
not have time to have 18 seconds of debate on the budget, if we can
bottle up the chemical weapons treaty for years, following the support
of President Reagan, President Bush and President Clinton, why in
Heaven's name do we suddenly have to come rushing forth with something
we do not need now and we do not have to have now?
If we are going to have an expedited process, I think the emergency
should be the leadership bringing forward the budget that the law
requires. If we have urgency for something, fill some of those
judgeships. After all, the Chief Justice has said that is a judicial
crisis. If we have urgency for something, let us take something that
has actually had a hearing.
So with all due respect to the sponsors of this bill and knowing
there are parts of the bill as I have read them that I like, there are
a lot of other parts that raise far more questions than are answered in
my mind. I will oppose it. I would find extremely interesting the
explanations of those who vote for it.
I see the distinguished sponsor of the bill, and I yield the floor.
Mr. KYL addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. KYL. I just want to respond to a couple of things my
distinguished colleague has raised. He is certainly correct to point
out the fact that in my view there has been inadequate attention paid
to this entire subject. I wish we could spend a lot more time debating
the Chemical Weapons Convention, as a matter of fact, but in an effort
to meet the deadline imposed or that the administration has indicated
it needs to meet, we have had to accordion a great deal of debate and
consideration of items into a very small period of time.
I desperately wanted to spend more time on the Chemical Weapons
Convention, but in order to agree to get that done on time, we have all
made some compromise agreements of how much time to take on things.
That is why there is not much time taken on this legislation. The one
thing I did want to assure my colleague of, and that is the portions
where he sees sections having been repealed, those sections were picked
up in a new title under title I, section 101, chapter 11(B) and the
following.
Essentially what was done, I assure my colleague, is the chemical and
biological provisions of the code were combined and the same activities
that are illegal as to one are now illegal as to both with the same
penalties. So nothing was dropped from the law; it was merely
consolidated in a different place. The definition of chemicals,
incidentally, is the same definition that is contemplated by the
Chemical Weapons Convention.
I might also note, the subject matter here has been debated and was
the subject of hearings really for the last 3 years in the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, by and large, and the exact language of
this legislation has been aided by the FBI and others in the
administration as well.
My colleague is correct, it would be better to have more time to
spend not only on this bill but on the Chemical Weapons Convention
itself. In an effort to try to get all of this done under the timeframe
the administration is working under, we have all made compromises. I
would like a lot more time to brag about what is in this bill, but I
agreed to keep my remarks to a couple minutes.
I will not take more time at this point. I appreciate the spirit in
which the comments of the Senator from Vermont were made.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, what is the time situation?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont controls 10 minutes
35 seconds. The Senator from Arizona controls 25 minutes 33 seconds.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, the opposition will soon be led by the
ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee. I guess I will yield
my time to him. I will speak 1 more minute until he arrives, and then I
will yield the floor.
I understand what my friend from Arizona says about wanting to vote
for it now, but we do not need S. 495 now. The clock is ticking on the
chemical weapons treaty. It was ticking on it last year, the year
before, and the year before that. It ticks right up until midnight
April 28. If there is anything we have to vote on and should vote on as
responsible Senators, either vote up or down, it is the chemical
weapons treaty. S. 495 can wait for the normal hearing route.
When you have the merger of current chemical and biological weapons
chapters in the criminal code but with different definitions and
different exemptions for lawful conduct, this is a matter we ought to
at least debate.
Again, I urge everybody to ask and whether members can look their
constituents in the eye and say in this 70-page major piece of
legislation on chemical weapons, can they say they read it, they
understood it, and they are prepared to vote on it?
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I have time remaining, and I am perfectly
happy to yield back almost all of that time in an effort to get this
matter to a vote. I urge my colleagues on the other side, if they have
opposition, to please make their arguments in opposition so we can
bring this to a vote and our colleagues can try to catch their
airplanes, which I know they are trying to do.
Until someone is here to speak, I will reiterate the basic point of
the legislation. I do urge my colleagues who may be in opposition to
please come to the floor to make their arguments to try to accommodate
our colleagues.
This legislation, again, Mr. President, is simply designed to
complement the provisions of existing law and is also complementary to
the Chemical Weapons Convention. It does not create a great deal that
is new, but rather plugs loopholes in existing law. We noted, for
example, that while it is illegal for one to manufacture and possess
and use biological weapons in the United States, we have overlooked
passing a law that makes it illegal to manufacture or possess chemical
weapons. If we are going to be serious about the chemical weapons
business and trying to prevent proliferation, obviously we need to make
that conduct illegal as well. We do that in this legislation.
It is not anything Members should have concern about. In fact, they
should want that. Who would be against providing the President a little
more flexibility and imposing sanctions on countries that violate
international law by using chemical or biological weapons?
Who could be against asking the President of the United States to do
his best to keep the Australia group together, working as a group of
countries in the world that do not sell chemicals, precursor chemicals,
to nations that might make chemical weapons of them? It is the policy
of the United States, and a sense of the Senate, that the President
should ensure that the Australia group restrictions are not weakened in
any way. That is consistent totally with the Chemical Weapons
Convention. Again, I cannot imagine anyone objecting to that.
We continue the conditions that were imposed in the 1996 defense
authorization bill on aid to Russia, which is designed to help them
dismantle their chemical weapons. We say they have to demonstrate
reasonable progress toward that dismantlement. We pick the same
language that was the subject of the Nunn-Lugar compromise in the 1996
defense authorization bill. What we have done is simply to continue
that same requirement of Presidential certification of compliance by
Russia, or, if all else fails, the President can certify that he cannot
certify, and we still send the money to them. So it is not a condition
I can imagine anyone would object to. If anything, we would want to
make it stronger.
Our legislation calls for an annual report on the state of
proliferation of
[[Page S3337]]
chemical and biological weapons, something that the Congress needs in
order to work with the President in doing everything we can to stop the
proliferation of these weapons.
We ask the President to convene a group of nations to try to put some
teeth into the Geneva protocol, which is the treaty that currently bans
the use of chemical weapons. Like the Chemical Weapons Convention, it
does not have strong teeth in it. So we are urging the President to try
to get a group of nations together to try to do that. Again, I cannot
imagine any opposition to that.
We provide our military be better protected against chemical warfare.
The GAO issued a report last year that found grave deficiencies in the
way that our troops were being equipped and trained to deal with
chemical warfare and biological warfare. That needs to be remedied, and
we have three specific things in here that we think will help the
Defense Department in ensuring that our troops are adequately
protected.
One of the things that we recommend, for example, is that the U.S.
Army Chemical School remain under the oversight of a general officer,
just to make our point that we think this is an important matter, and
certainly at least a one-star general ought to be in charge of that
facility and that operation.
We provide for a fixed riot-control agent problem, Mr. President.
This is the problem that has arisen because this administration has
signaled an intention to change the understanding that has been in
existence since President Ford's days when the opportunity to use riot-
control agents, or tear gas, was said to be permitted in certain
instances where it would help to save lives. For example, where we have
a downed pilot that is being held by a group of hostile civilians, we
can rescue that downed pilot, not by shooting civilians but by the use
of tear gas. Where you have a group of civilians protecting someone
that you want to get out, or you want to control a group of hostile
prisoners of war, that kind of thing, you do not want to shoot anybody,
you can do it with riot-control agents, tear gas. We want to assure
that is possible under the law.
These are the things that are the key elements of S. 495, Mr.
President, and there should not be anything controversial here. It
should be provisions that all of us can support. We simply identified
each of these items in the course of all of the hearings and all of the
debate about the Chemical Weapons Convention and found there were a lot
of practical things we could do in legislation.
Bear in mind, this legislation has to go over to the House, it has to
pass the House, it has to go to the President. Therefore, there are
plenty of scrubs on it, even though the Senate has not had a great deal
of opportunity to debate it.
I hope that our colleagues, if there is anyone else in opposition,
will say so and we can get on with a vote on this matter pursuant to
the unanimous-consent agreement.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that if there are any more
quorum calls, that the time be subtracted equally from both sides.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is
so ordered.
Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I would like to begin my comments on S.
495 with two observations. First, if the United States desires to be an
original member of the Chemical Weapons Convention, this body must act
to ratify this treaty within the next 7 days. Second, the whole world
is watching what we say and do on the CWC--a treaty that I believe is
one of the most important arms control agreements this body will
consider for many years to come.
Having made these observations, one would think the Senate would be
moving to immediate consideration of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Instead, the Senate unfortunately finds itself debating S. 495--a bill
that its most ardent supporters have characterized in recent days as
the conservatives' substitute to the Chemical Weapons Convention.
I must tell the Senate that despite these claims, S. 495 is not the
Chemical Weapons Convention. In fact, I think it's safe to say S. 495
is not even a distant relative of the Chemical Weapons Convention. And,
as former Democratic leader George Mitchell was fond of reminding many
of his colleagues at moments like this, saying something repeatedly
does not make it so.
Mr. President, the Chemical Weapons Convention offers this Nation an
oasis of security in an increasingly threatening world. S. 495 offers
us a mirage--a mirage, that if pursued, would jeopardize our national
security and our economy.
First, Mr. President, S. 495 only requires the United States to do
what it is already doing under an existing law signed by President
Reagan in 1986--destroy our stockpile of chemical weapons. S. 495 does
absolutely nothing to force other nations to eliminate their stocks of
these deadly materials.
Second, the supporters of S. 495 act as if the CWC does not exist at
all. S. 495 directs the Secretary of State to negotiate a whole new
agreement. The purpose of this new agreement would be to enhance
enforcement of an old agreement--the 1925 Geneva protocol. The Geneva
protocol merely prohibits the use of chemical weapons. If you care
about getting tough on chemical weapons, CWC is the only real answer.
CWC bans the development, production, and stockpiling of chemical
weapons as well as their use.
Third, S. 495 does nothing to address the trade sanctions that would
hit the American chemical industry if we fail to ratify the CWC.
Everyone needs to understand that this treaty will take effect with or
without us on April 29. Without U.S. ratification of the CWC, U.S.
firms will immediately have to secure end-user certificates for the
export of chemicals. The implications for U.S. business will be as
swift as they are costly.
Finally, I must note with a bit of irony that, according to legal
experts who have examined this bill, S. 495, the so-called Chemical and
Biological Weapons Threat Reduction Act of 1997, may actually weaken
existing law in the very same areas it seeks to toughen them up. As a
result of exemption clauses in this bill, passage of S. 495 could
undercut the very purpose of the bill itself.
In closing, Mr. President, I ask the Senate not to pursue this
mirage. S. 495 is not a real substitute for the Chemical Weapons
Convention. I ask that the Senate reject this false vision and that we
then get on with the real debate--consideration of the Chemical Weapons
Convention.
Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, the Chemical Weapons Convention has such
far-reaching domestic and national security implications that it
deserves the most thorough and thoughtful examination by the Senate. I
have given this matter a careful review and now rise to discuss some of
the conclusions I have reached.
If I thought supporting this treaty would make chemical weapons
disappear, and give us all greater security from these heinous weapons,
I would not hesitate in giving my support. Unfortunately, the facts do
not demonstrate this; indeed, implementing this treaty may actually
create opportunities for security breaches.
The Convention has been signed by 160 nations and ratified by only
70--less than 50 percent. Five countries who are thought to have
chemical weapons are not even signatories of the Convention: Egypt,
Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Syria. Another six nations have signed,
but not ratified the Convention: China, India, Iran, Pakistan, Israel,
and Russia. In short, this Convention is not global in scale.
Mr. President, even if it were true that this treaty had been signed
and ratified by 160 nations, serious problems would remain. Compliance
with the Chemical Weapons Convention is not verifiable. I think it is
timely and appropriate to remember the principle President Reagan
insisted upon when negotiating an arms control treaty--trust, but
verify. Unlike nuclear weapons which require a large, specialized
industrial base, chemical weapons can be manufactured almost anywhere.
Moreover, many lethal chemicals are common and have peaceful uses.
Chemicals help us to manufacture products such as pesticides,
pharmaceuticals, plastics, and paints. With such a broad spectrum of
uses, it would be difficult to discern the legitimate from the illicit.
Even if verification of compliance were not a concern, this treaty
would
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be difficult to enforce. In a sound arms control treaty, the United
States must be able to punish other countries caught in violation of
the agreement. The Chemical Weapons Convention provides only vague,
unspecified sanctions to be imposed on a country found in breach of the
Convention. Ultimately, the Chemical Weapons Convention leaves the U.N.
Security Council to impose penalties severe enough to change behavior
out an outlaw nation. Since any one of the five members of the Security
Council can veto any enforcement resolution lodged against them or
their friends, China and Russia, for example, could simply veto
resolutions imposing sanctions if they disagreed with other Security
Council members. In sum, Mr. President, it does not appear that this
agreement is verifiable or enforceable.
Appropriate questions have also been raised about the treaty's
compatibility with our Constitution. The Convention creates an
international monitoring regime called the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, or OPCW. The OPCW will be granted the
most extensive and intrusive monitoring power of any arms control
treaty ever because it extends coverage to governmental and civilian
facilities.
The intrusive nature of this treaty brings up important issues in
regards to our citizens' constitutional protection against unreasonable
search and seizure of private property. Mr. John Yoo, an acting
professor of law at the University of California at Berkeley wrote
yesterday in a Wall Street Journal op-ed that ``Under the CWC, a drug
dealer running a crack house will have more constitutional rights than
the law-abiding operator of a chemical plant.'' Proponents of the
Chemical Weapons Convention have suggested that there are a wide
variety of solutions to the constitutional problem. However, the
Chemical Weapons Convention states that it is ``unlawful to disrupt,
delay, impede an inspection or refuse entry of an inspection team.'' It
appears as though this treaty is incompatible with our Constitution.
Furthermore, Mr. President, I do not want to look for ways to get
around the so-called constitutional problem. If the treaty flies in the
face of rights protected under the fourth and fifth amendments, we
cannot and should not ratify.
The authority of the international monitoring regime also raises
concern about foreign nationals having such broad authority to obtain
access to property held by private U.S. citizens. The U.S. chemical
industry is known to be one of the top industries targeted for
espionage by foreign companies and governments. There is legitimate
worry that international inspections could jeopardize confidential
business information, trade secrets, and other proprietary data. Since
the United States will be expected to pay 25 percent, or approximately
$50 million, of the OPCW's operating costs, American tax dollars could
be subsidizing increased risk for U.S. business interests. And even
though we would pay the lion's share of the OPCW's budget, the United
States would have no special status over other signatory nations, no
veto power, and no assurance of being a member of the executive
council.
Despite my objections to ratification of the Chemical Weapons
Convention, I believe Senator Kyl's Chemical and Biological Threat
Reduction Act will help protect our citizens and troops from the threat
of chemical and biological weapons. This bill would establish workable
national policies for confronting the chemical and biological weapons
threats, while not jeopardizing our national security like the CWC.
Currently, there exists no U.S. law providing comprehensive criminal,
civil, and other penalties for the acquisition, possession, transfer,
or use of chemical or biological weapons. Senator Kyl's bill would
impose stiff criminal and civil penalties for illegal possession of
chemical weapons. The death penalty could be a punishment for an
individual who causes the death of another through this bill.
The Chemical and Biological Threat Reduction Act also imposes
mandatory sanctions against nations that use biological and chemical
weapons against other countries or their own citizens. Unlike the
Chemical Weapons Convention that only vaguely defines sanctions which
could be thwarted by the U.N. Security Council, this bill would
automatically terminate foreign assistance, suspend arms sales, impose
import and export restrictions, and end financial assistance from
multilateral banks. This act also would improve the readiness of U.S.
military forces against chemical weapons attacks by improving troop
preparedness.
In view of some of the contacts I've had from Idahoans concerning
Senator Kyl's bill, I think it's important to point out that this bill
does not ratify the flawed Chemical Weapons Convention. It would
enhance our own methods to deal with chemical terrorism without making
us vulnerable to the defects of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Mr. President, making the production and possession of chemical
weapons illegal according to international law will not make them
disappear. Use of such weapons has been prohibited since 1907, yet we
have seen the results of their use. We all know about the tens of
thousands of deaths from poison gas in World War I, and no one could
forget the tragic photographs of the Iranian children killed during the
1980's by the Iraqi Government. Illegal? Yes, but still in use,
nonetheless.
Mr. President, I stand today with all Americans expressing a grave
concern over the increasing proliferation of chemical and biological
weapons. The real question here seems to be whether ratification of the
Chemical Weapons Convention will increase our own national security.
Unfortunately, the answer is no. There is little value in implementing
international laws which do little to decrease illegal research,
development, and proliferation of chemical weapons worldwide.
I support the goal of making the world safe from the threat of
chemical weapons. I applaud the honorable statement the CWC makes
against these heinous weapons. However, I believe the best way to
protect ourselves from this threat is by rejecting this treaty. The
Convention does nothing to better our security, but may even open the
door to increasing risks against our vital security interests and
infringing on the rights of innocent citizens. For these reason, I am
compelled to vote against the ratification of the Chemical Weapons
Convention.
Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, today I rise as a cosponsor and supporter
of S. 495, The Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat Reduction Act of
1997. This bill will truly provide the United States the tools it needs
and deserves from chemical and biological weapons. It is a
comprehensive domestic and international plan to reduce the threat of
chemical and biological weapons use, setting forth practical,
realistic, and achievable nonproliferation measures to combat the very
real dangers posed by these weapons.
Because of the horrible nature of these weapons, the United States
has dismantled its biological weapons program and is now unilaterally
destroying its entire stockpile of chemical weapons. This bill
reinforces our commitment to finish the job.
S. 495 contains many provisions that will improve our ability to
protect our citizens and military against these deadly weapons. The
bill imposes criminal, as well as civil, penalties for the development,
production, stockpiling, and transfer of chemical and biological
weapons. Penalties range from civil action of up to $100,000 per
violation to the death penalty on individuals who use chemical weapons
which cause death to another.
Also, the export privileges of violators can be revoked as well. And,
it preserves the system of multilateral export controls on biological
and chemical materials and technologies, better known as the Australia
group.
For our Armed Services, it strengthens U.S. biological and chemical
defense programs and it preserves the military's ability to use riot
control agents, such as tear gas. It also requires the President to
review the policy of negative security assurance to widen U.S. options
to respond with nuclear weapons against such an attack by a nonnuclear
weapons state.
For foreign countries who use biological or chemical weapons in war
or against its own citizens, mandatory 3-year sanctions are imposed as
listed in the bill. Plus, it calls an international conference to
strengthen the existing 1925 Geneva Protocol. Lastly, it requires
Russian cooperation in disarmament of CW/BW weapons in return
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for continued U.S. assistance for dismantling these weapons of mass
destruction. This applies only to CW/BW destruction and not to any
other Russian assistance, such as the Nunn-Lugar programs.
I hope all my colleagues support S. 495. It toughens our domestic
laws on those who use these weapons. For all the talk about chemical
weapons, little has been done domestically to punish users of these
horrible weapons. This bill will do just that. Support this bill and
let's make it known that we will not tolerate the use of these weapons
against American citizens or any other people.
Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I rise today in support of S. 495, the
Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat Reduction Act of 1997. In the
wake of World War I, nations from all around the world came together to
sign the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Having witnessed the horrible effects of
poison gas in battle, this agreement banned its use in interstate
conflict. However, at the time no provisions were made in U.S. law to
establish criminal or civil penalties pertaining to such weapons.
Today, for the first time, legislation has come to the Senate floor
that provides criminal and civil penalties for the unlawful
acquisition, transfer, or use of any chemical or biological weapon and
gives domestic law enforcement authorities the needed legal basis to
enforce prohibitions on chemical weapons activities within the United
States. Most importantly, in light of recent domestic terrorist attacks
and the actual release of Sarin gas in a Tokyo subway, S. 495 allows
the death penalty for the use of chemical or biological weapons that
leads to the loss of life.
From the international perspective, this legislation conditions
continued United States aid to Russia for chemical and biological
weapons dismantlement and destruction upon Russia demonstrating that it
is abiding by existing agreements in this area. It urges enhancement of
multilateral regimes to control trade in chemical and biological
weapons-related materials, while requiring that the United States
continue strengthening chemical and biological defenses, particularly
in terms of equipment and training. Finally, S. 495 establishes, for
the world, U.S. policy on the use of riot control agents and permits
the use of tear gas for such things as the rescuing of downed pilots.
The Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat Reduction Act of 1997
augments existing international norms and agreements by establishing a
framework for U.S. sanctions against nations which use chemical or
biological weapons and by directing the Secretary of State to convene
an international negotiating forum for the purpose of reaching an
agreement on the enforcement of the 1925 Geneva Protocol which bans the
use of chemical weapons in war.
I wish to point out that supporting S. 495 is not in conflict with
the ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Instead it
complements the CWC by reducing the threat of acts of terrorism and
armed aggression against the United States involving chemical and
biological weapons. Therefore, I urge my colleagues to support this
legislation and take a step toward making our country safer with a
comprehensive plan that provides realistic and practical measures to
combat the dangers of these repugnant weapons.
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for not
to exceed 1 minute as in morning business.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is
so ordered. The Senator from Vermont may proceed.
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