[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 46 (Thursday, April 17, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3327-S3339]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




      CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS THREAT REDUCTION ACT OF 1997

  Mr. LOTT. I ask unanimous consent that the Senate now proceed to the 
consideration of S. 495, under the previous order.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will report the bill.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       A bill (S. 495) to provide criminal and civil penalties for 
     the unlawful acquisition, transfer, or use of any chemical 
     weapon or biological weapon, and to reduce the threat of acts 
     of terrorism or armed aggression involving the use of any 
     such weapon against the United States, its citizens, or Armed 
     Forces, or those of any allied country, and for other 
     purposes.

  The Senate proceeded to consider the bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona is recognized.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, first of all, I understand that the amendment 
which was referred to in the unanimous-consent agreement as the 
modified bill is at the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The modification is at the desk.
  The modification follows:
       Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
     following:

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Chemical 
     and Biological Weapons Threat Reduction Act of 1997''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings.
Sec. 3. Policy.
Sec. 4. Definitions.

TITLE I--PENALTIES FOR UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO THE JURISDICTION 
                          OF THE UNITED STATES

                Subtitle A--Criminal and Civil Penalties

Sec. 101. Criminal and civil provisions.

              Subtitle B--Revocations of Export Privileges

Sec. 111. Revocations of export privileges.

       TITLE II--FOREIGN RELATIONS AND DEFENSE-RELATED PROVISIONS

Sec. 201. Sanctions for use of chemical or biological weapons.
Sec. 202. Continuation and enhancement of multilateral control regimes.
Sec. 203. Criteria for United States assistance to Russia relating to 
              the elimination of chemical and biological weapons.
Sec. 204. Report on the state of chemical and biological weapons 
              proliferation.
Sec. 205. International conference to strengthen the 1925 Geneva 
              Protocol.
Sec. 206. Restriction on use of funds for the Organization for the 
              Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
Sec. 207. Enhancements to robust chemical and biological defenses.
Sec. 208. Negative security assurances.
Sec. 209. Riot control agents.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       The Congress finds that--
       (1) the United States eliminated its stockpile of 
     biological weapons pursuant to the 1972 Biological Weapons 
     Convention and has pledged to destroy its entire inventory of 
     chemical weapons by 2004, independent of the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention entering into force;
       (2) the use of chemical or biological weapons in 
     contravention of international law is abhorrent and should 
     trigger immediate and effective sanctions;
       (3) United Nations Security Council Resolution 620, adopted 
     on August 26, 1988, states the intention of the Security 
     Council to consider immediately ``appropriate and effective'' 
     sanctions against any nation using chemical and biological 
     weapons in violation of international law;
       (4) the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade recognizes 
     that national security concerns may serve as legitimate 
     grounds for limiting trade; title XXI of the General 
     Agreement on Tariffs and Trade states that ``nothing in this 
     Agreement shall be construed . . . to prevent any contracting 
     party from taking any action which it considers necessary for 
     the protection of its essential security interests. . .'';
       (5) on September 30, 1993, the President declared by 
     Executive Order No. 12868 a national emergency to deal with 
     ``the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national 
     security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States'' 
     posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological and 
     chemical weapons, and of the means for delivering such 
     weapons;
       (6) Russia has not implemented the 1990 United States-
     Russian Bilateral Agreement on Destruction and Non-Production 
     of Chemical Weapons and on Measures to Facilitate the 
     Multilateral Convention on Banning Chemical Weapons, known as 
     the ``BDA'', nor has the United States and Russia resolved, 
     to the satisfaction of the United States, the outstanding 
     compliance issues under the Memorandum of Understanding 
     Between the United States of America and

[[Page S3328]]

     the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
     Regarding a Bilateral Verification Experiment and Data 
     Exchange Related To Prohibition on Chemical Weapons, known as 
     the ``1989 Wyoming MOU'';
       (7) the Intelligence Community has stated that a number of 
     countries, among them China, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North 
     Korea, Syria, and Russia, possess chemical and biological 
     weapons and the means to deliver them;
       (8) four countries in the Middle East--Iran, Iraq, Libya, 
     and Syria--have, as a national policy, supported 
     international terrorism;
       (9) chemical and biological weapons have been used by 
     states in the past for intimidation and military aggression, 
     most recently during the Iran-Iraq war and by Iraq against 
     its Kurdish minority;
       (10) the grave new threat of chemical and biological 
     terrorism has been demonstrated by the 1995 nerve gas attack 
     on the Tokyo subway by the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo;
       (11) the urgent need to improve domestic preparedness to 
     protect against chemical and biological threats was 
     underscored by enactment of the 1997 Defense Against Weapons 
     of Mass Destruction Act;
       (12) the Department of Defense, in light of growing 
     chemical and biological threats in regions of key concern, 
     including Northeast Asia, and the Middle East, has stated 
     that United States forces must be properly trained and 
     equipped for all missions, including those in which opponents 
     might threaten use of chemical or biological weapons; and
       (13) Australia Group controls on the exports of chemical 
     and biological agents, and related equipment, and the Missile 
     Technology Control Regime, together provide an indispensable 
     foundation for international and national efforts to curb the 
     spread of chemical and biological weapons, and their delivery 
     means.

     SEC. 3. POLICY.

       It should be the policy of the United States to take all 
     appropriate measures to--
       (1) prevent and deter the threat or use of chemical and 
     biological weapons against the citizens, Armed Forces, and 
     territory of the United States and its allies, and to protect 
     against, and manage the consequences of, such use should it 
     occur;
       (2) discourage the proliferation of chemical and biological 
     weapons, their means of delivery, and related equipment, 
     material, and technology;
       (3) prohibit within the United States the development, 
     production, acquisition, stockpiling, possession, and 
     transfer to third parties of chemical or biological weapons, 
     their precursors and related technology; and
       (4) impose unilateral sanctions, and seek immediately 
     international sanctions, against any nation using chemical 
     and biological weapons in violation of international law.

     SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act:
       (1) Australia group.--The term ``Australia Group'' refers 
     to the informal forum of countries, formed in 1984 and 
     chaired by Australia, whose goal is to discourage and impede 
     chemical and biological weapons proliferation by harmonizing 
     national export controls on precursor chemicals for chemical 
     weapons, biological weapons pathogens, and dual-use 
     equipment, sharing information on target countries, and 
     seeking other ways to curb the use of chemical weapons and 
     biological weapons.
       (2) Biological weapon.--The term ``biological weapon'' 
     means the following, together or separately:
       (A) Any micro-organism (including bacteria, viruses, fungi, 
     rickettsiae or protozoa), pathogen, or infectious substance, 
     or any naturally occurring, bio-engineered or synthesized 
     component of any such micro-organism, pathogen, or infectious 
     substance, whatever its origin or method of production, 
     capable of causing--
       (i) death, disease, or other biological malfunction in a 
     human, an animal, a plant, or another living organism;
       (ii) deterioration of food, water, equipment, supplies, or 
     materials of any kind; or
       (iii) deleterious alteration of the environment.
       (B) Any munition or device specifically designed to cause 
     death or other harm through the release, dissemination, or 
     impact of the toxic or poisonous properties of those 
     biological weapons specified in subparagraph (A).
       (C) Any equipment specifically designed for use directly in 
     connection with the employment of munitions or devices 
     specified in subparagraph (B).
       (D) Any living organism specifically designed to carry a 
     biological weapon specified in subparagraph (A) to a host.
       (3) Chemical weapon.--The term ``chemical weapon'' means 
     the following, together or separately:
       (A) Any of the following chemical agents: tabun, Sarin, 
     Soman, GF, VX, sulfur mustard, nitrogen mustard, phosgene 
     oxime, lewisite, phenyldichloroarsine, ethyldichloroarsine, 
     methyldichloroarsine, phosgene, diphosgene, hydrogen cyanide, 
     cyanogen chloride, and arsine.
       (B) Any of the 54 chemicals other than a riot control agent 
     that is controlled by the Australia Group as of the date of 
     the enactment of this Act.
       (C) Any other chemical agent that may be developed if the 
     use of the agent would be intended to produce an effect 
     consistent with that of a chemical agent or other chemical 
     described in subparagraph (A) or (B).
       (D) Any munition or device specifically designed to cause 
     death or other harm through the release, dissemination, or 
     impact of the toxic or poisonous properties of a chemical 
     weapon specified in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).
       (E) Any equipment specifically designed for use directly in 
     connection with the employment of munitions or devices 
     specified in subparagraph (D).
       (4) Knowingly.--The term ``knowingly'' is used within the 
     meaning of ``knowing'' as that term is defined in section 104 
     of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (15 U.S.C. 78dd-
     2).
       (5) National of the united states.--The term ``national of 
     the United States'' has the same meaning given such term in 
     section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 
     U.S.C. 1101(a)(22)).
       (6) Person.--The term ``person'' means any individual, 
     corporation, partnership, firm, association, or other legal 
     entity.
       (7) Riot control agent.--The term ``riot control agent'' 
     means any substance, including diphenylchloroarsine, 
     diphenylcyanoarsine, adamsite, chloroacetophenone, 
     chloropicrin, bromobenzyl cyanide, 0-chlorobenzylidene 
     malononitrile, or 3-Quinuclidinyl benzilate, that is designed 
     or used to produce rapidly in humans any nonlethal sensory 
     irritation or disabling physical effect that disappears 
     within a short time following termination of exposure.
       (8) United states.--The term ``United States'' means the 
     several States of the United States, the District of 
     Columbia, and the commonwealths, territories, and possessions 
     of the United States and includes all places under the 
     jurisdiction or control of the United States, including--
       (A) any of the places within the provisions of paragraph 
     (41) of section 40102 of title 49, United States Code;
       (B) any civil aircraft or public aircraft of the United 
     States, as such terms are defined in paragraphs (18) and (36) 
     of section 40102 of title 49, United States Code; and
       (C) any vessel of the United States, as such term is 
     defined in section 3(b) of the Maritime Drug Enforcement Act, 
     as amended (46 U.S.C., App. sec. 1903(b)).
TITLE I--PENALTIES FOR UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO THE JURISDICTION 
                          OF THE UNITED STATES
                Subtitle A--Criminal and Civil Penalties

     SEC. 101. CRIMINAL AND CIVIL PROVISIONS.

       (a) In General.--Part I of title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended by inserting after chapter 11A the following new 
     chapter:

             ``CHAPTER 11B--CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

``Sec.
``229. Prohibited activities.
``229A. Penalties.
``229B. Criminal forfeitures; destruction of weapons.
``229C. Other prohibitions.
``229D. Injunctions.
``229E. Requests for military assistance to enforce prohibition in 
              certain emergencies.
``229F. Definitions.

     ``Sec. 229. Prohibited activities.

       ``(a) Unlawful Conduct.--Except as provided in subsections 
     (b) and (c), it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly--
       ``(1) to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, transfer, 
     directly or indirectly, receive, stockpile, retain, own, 
     possess, or use, or threaten to use, any chemical weapon or 
     any biological weapon; or
       ``(2) to assist or induce, in any way, any person to 
     violate paragraph (1), or to attempt or conspire to violate 
     paragraph (1).
       ``(b) Exempted Conduct.--Subsection (a) does not apply to 
     conduct that satisfies the following requirements of both 
     paragraphs (1) and (2):
       ``(1) Lawful purpose.--The chemical weapon or biological 
     weapon is intended for any of the following purposes:
       ``(A) Peaceful purposes.--Any peaceful purpose related to 
     an industrial, agricultural, research, medical, or 
     pharmaceutical activity or other activity.
       ``(B) Protective purposes.--Any purpose directly related to 
     protection against a chemical or biological weapon.
       ``(C) Unrelated military purposes.--Any military purpose of 
     the United States that is not connected with the use of a 
     chemical weapon or biological weapon or that is not dependent 
     on the use of the toxic or poisonous properties of the 
     chemical weapon or biological weapon to cause death or other 
     harm.
       ``(D) Law enforcement purposes.--Any law enforcement 
     purpose, including any domestic riot control purpose.
       ``(E) Individual self-defense purposes.--Any individual 
     self-defense purpose involving a pepper spray or chemical 
     mace.
       ``(2) Limitation on type and quantity.--
       ``(A) In general.--The type and quantity of the chemical 
     weapon or biological weapon is strictly limited to the type 
     and quantity that can be justified for the purpose intended 
     under paragraph (1).
       ``(B) Excessive quantities per person.--The requirement of 
     this paragraph is not satisfied if the quantity per person at 
     any given time is, under the circumstances, inconsistent with 
     the purpose intended under paragraph (1).
       ``(c) Exempted Agencies and Persons.--
       ``(1) In general.--Subsection (a) does not apply to the 
     retention, ownership, possession, transfer, or receipt of a 
     chemical weapon or a biological weapon by a department,

[[Page S3329]]

     agency, or other entity of the United States, or by a person 
     described in paragraph (2), pending destruction of the 
     weapon.
       ``(2) Exempted persons.--A person referred to in paragraph 
     (1) is--
       ``(A) a member of the Armed Forces of the United States or 
     any other person that is authorized by law or by an 
     appropriate officer of the United States to retain, own, 
     possess, transfer, or receive the chemical or biological 
     weapon; or
       ``(B) in an emergency situation, any other person if the 
     person is attempting to destroy or seize the weapon or if the 
     person is a victim of the use of the weapon.
       ``(d) Jurisdiction.--Conduct prohibited by subsection (a) 
     is within the jurisdiction of the United States if the 
     prohibited conduct--
       ``(1) takes place in the United States;
       ``(2) takes place outside of the United States and is 
     committed by a national of the United States;
       ``(3) is committed against a national of the United States 
     while the national is outside the United States; or
       ``(4) is committed against any property that is owned, 
     leased, or used by the United States or by any department or 
     agency of the United States, whether the property is within 
     or outside the United States.

     ``Sec. 229A. Penalties

       ``(a) Criminal Penalties.--
       ``(1) In general.--Any person who violates section 229 of 
     this title shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for 
     any term of years, or both.
       ``(2) Death penalty.--Any person who violates section 229 
     of this title and by whose action the death of another person 
     is the result shall be punished by death or imprisoned for 
     life.
       ``(b) Civil Penalties.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Attorney General may bring a civil 
     action in the appropriate United States district court 
     against any person who violates section 229 of this title 
     and, upon proof of such violation by a preponderance of the 
     evidence, such person shall be subject to pay a civil penalty 
     in an amount not to exceed $100,000 for each such violation.
       ``(2) Relation to other proceedings.--The imposition of a 
     civil penalty under this subsection does not preclude any 
     other criminal or civil statutory, common law, or 
     administrative remedy, which is available by law to the 
     United States or any other person.
       ``(c) Reimbursement of Costs.--The court shall order any 
     person convicted of an offense under subsection (a) to 
     reimburse the United States for any expenses incurred by the 
     United States incident to the seizure, storage, handling, 
     transportation, and destruction or other disposition of any 
     property that was seized in connection with an investigation 
     of the commission of the offense by that person. A person 
     ordered to reimburse the United States for expenses under 
     this subsection shall be jointly and severally liable for 
     such expenses with each other person, if any, who is ordered 
     under this subsection to reimburse the United States for the 
     same expenses.

     ``Sec. 229B. Criminal forfeitures; destruction of weapons

       ``(a) Property Subject to Criminal Forfeiture.--Any person 
     convicted under section 229A(a) shall forfeit to the United 
     States irrespective of any provision of State law--
       ``(1) any property, real or personal, involved in the 
     offense, including any chemical weapon or biological weapon;
       ``(2) any property constituting, or derived from, and 
     proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the 
     result of such violation; and
       ``(3) any of the person's property used, or intended to be 
     used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the 
     commission of, such violation.

     The court, in imposing sentence on such person, shall order, 
     in addition to any other sentence imposed pursuant to section 
     229A(a), that the person forfeit to the United States all 
     property described in this subsection. In lieu of a fine 
     otherwise authorized by section 229A(a), a defendant who 
     derived profits or other proceeds from an offense may be 
     fined not more than twice the gross profits or other 
     proceeds.
       ``(b) Procedures.--Property subject to forfeiture under 
     this section, any seizure and disposition thereof, and any 
     administrative or judicial proceeding in relation thereto, 
     shall be governed by subsections (b) through (p) of section 
     413 of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control 
     Act of 1970 (21 U.S.C. 853), except that any reference under 
     those subsections to--
       ``(1) `this subchapter or subchapter II' shall be deemed to 
     be a reference to section 229A(a); and
       ``(2) `subsection (a)' shall be deemed to be a reference to 
     subsection (a) of this section.
       ``(c) Destruction or Other Disposition.--The Attorney 
     General shall provide for the destruction or other 
     appropriate disposition of any chemical or biological weapon 
     seized and forfeited pursuant to this section.
       ``(d) Assistance.--The Attorney General may request the 
     head of any agency of the United States to assist in the 
     handling, storage, transportation, or destruction of property 
     seized under this section.

     ``Sec. 229C. Other prohibitions

       ``(a) In General.--Whoever knowingly uses riot control 
     agents as an act of terrorism, or knowingly assists any 
     person to do so, shall be fined under this title or 
     imprisoned for a term of not more than 10 years, or both.
       ``(b) Jurisdiction.--Conduct prohibited by this section is 
     within the jurisdiction of the United States if the 
     prohibited conduct--
       ``(1) takes place in the United States;
       ``(2) takes place outside of the United States and is 
     committed by a national of the United States;
       ``(3) is committed against a national of the United States 
     while the national is outside the United States; or
       ``(4) is committed against any property that is owned, 
     leased, or used by the United States or by any department or 
     agency of the United States, whether the property is within 
     or outside the United States.

     ``Sec. 229D. Injunctions

       ``The United States may obtain in a civil action an 
     injunction against--
       ``(1) the conduct prohibited under section 229 or 229C of 
     this title; or
       ``(2) the preparation or solicitation to engage in conduct 
     prohibited under section 229 or 229C of this title.

     ``Sec. 229E. Requests for military assistance to enforce 
       prohibition in certain emergencies

       ``The Attorney General may request the Secretary of Defense 
     to provide assistance under section 382 of title 10 in 
     support of Department of Justice activities relating to the 
     enforcement of section 229 of this title in an emergency 
     situation involving a biological weapon or chemical weapon. 
     The authority to make such a request may be exercised by 
     another official of the Department of Justice in accordance 
     with section 382(f)(2) of title 10.

     ``Sec. 229F. Definitions

       ``In this chapter:
       ``(1) Australia group.--The term `Australia Group' refers 
     to the informal forum of countries, formed in 1984 and 
     chaired by Australia, whose goal is to discourage and impede 
     chemical and biological weapons proliferation by harmonizing 
     national export controls on precursor chemicals for chemical 
     weapons, biological weapons pathogens, and dual-use 
     equipment, sharing information on target countries, and 
     seeking other ways to curb the use of chemical and biological 
     weapons.
       ``(2) Biological weapon.--The term `biological weapon' 
     means the following, together or separately:
       ``(A) Any micro-organism (including bacteria, viruses, 
     fungi, rickettsiae or protozoa), pathogen, or infectious 
     substance, or any naturally occurring, bio-engineered or 
     synthesized component of any such micro-organism, pathogen, 
     or infectious substance, whatever its origin or method of 
     production, capable of causing--
       ``(i) death, disease, or other biological malfunction in a 
     human, an animal, a plant, or another living organism;
       ``(ii) deterioration of food, water, equipment, supplies, 
     or materials of any kind; or
       ``(iii) deleterious alteration of the environment.
       ``(B) Any munition or device specifically designed to cause 
     death or other harm through the release, dissemination, or 
     impact of the toxic or poisonous properties of those 
     biological weapons specified in subparagraph (A).
       ``(C) Any equipment specifically designed for use directly 
     in connection with the employment of munitions or devices 
     specified in subparagraph (B).
       ``(D) Any living organism specifically designed to carry a 
     biological weapon specified in subparagraph (A) to a host.
       ``(3) Chemical weapon.--The term `chemical weapon' means 
     the following, together or separately:
       ``(A) Any of the following chemical agents: tabun, Sarin, 
     Soman, GF, VX, sulfur mustard, nitrogen mustard, phosgene 
     oxime, lewisite, phenyldichloroarsine, ethyldichloroarsine, 
     methyldichloroarsine, phosgene, diphosgene, hydrogen cyanide, 
     cyanogen chloride, and arsine.
       ``(B) Any of the 54 chemicals, other than a riot control 
     agent, controlled by the Australia Group as of the date of 
     the enactment of this Act.
       ``(C) Any other chemical agent that may be developed if the 
     use of the agent would be intended to produce an effect 
     consistent with that of a chemical agent or other chemical 
     described in subparagraph (A) or (B).
       ``(D) Any munition or device specifically designed to cause 
     death or other harm through the release, dissemination, or 
     impact of the toxic or poisonous properties of a chemical 
     weapon specified in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).
       ``(E) Any equipment specifically designed for use directly 
     in connection with the employment of munitions or devices 
     specified in subparagraph (D).
       ``(4) Knowingly.--The term `knowingly' is used within the 
     meaning of `knowing' as that term is defined in section 104 
     of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (15 U.S.C. 78dd-
     2).
       ``(5) National of the united states.--The term `national of 
     the United States' has the same meaning given such term in 
     section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 
     U.S.C. 1101(a)(22)).
       ``(6) Person.--The term `person' means any individual, 
     corporation, partnership, firm, association, or other legal 
     entity.
       ``(7) Riot control agent.--The term `riot control agent' 
     means any substance, including diphenylchloroarsine, 
     diphenylcyanoarsine, adamsite, chloroacetophenone, 
     chloropicrin, bromobenzyl cyanide, 0-chlorobenzylidene 
     malononitrile, or 3-Quinuclidinyl benzilate that is designed 
     or used to produce rapidly in

[[Page S3330]]

     humans any nonlethal sensory irritation or disabling physical 
     effect that disappears within a short time following 
     termination of exposure.
       ``(8) Terrorism.--The term `terrorism' means activities 
     that--
       ``(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life 
     that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United 
     States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation 
     if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or 
     of any State; and
       ``(B) appear to be intended--
       ``(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
       ``(ii) to influence the policy of a government by 
     intimidation or coercion; or
       ``(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by 
     assassination or kidnapping.
       ``(9) United states.--The term `United States' means the 
     several States of the United States, the District of 
     Columbia, and the commonwealths, territories, and possessions 
     of the United States and includes all places under the 
     jurisdiction or control of the United States, including--
       ``(A) any of the places within the provisions of section 
     40102(41) of title 49, United States Code;
       ``(B) any civil aircraft or public aircraft of the United 
     States, as such terms are defined in paragraphs (16) and 
     (37), respectively, of section 40102 of title 49, United 
     States Code; and
       ``(C) any vessel of the United States, as such term is 
     defined in section 3(b) of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement 
     Act (46 U.S.C. App. 1903(b)).''.
       (b) Conforming Amendments.--
       (1) Weapons of mass destruction.--Section 2332a of title 
     18, United States Code, is amended--
       (A) by striking ``Sec. 2332a. Use of weapons of mass 
     destruction'' and inserting ``Sec. 2332a. Use of certain 
     weapons of mass destruction'';
       (B) in subsection (a), by striking ``, including any 
     biological agent, toxin, or vector (as those terms are 
     defined in section 178)'' and inserting ``other than a 
     chemical weapon or biological weapon (as those terms are 
     defined in section 229F)''; and
       (C) in subsection (b), by inserting ``(other than a 
     chemical weapon or biological weapon (as those terms are 
     defined in section 229F))'' after ``weapon of mass 
     destruction''.
       (2) Table of chapters.--The table of chapters for part I of 
     title 18, United States Code, is amended--
       (A) by striking the item relating to chapter 10; and
       (B) by inserting after the item for chapter 11A the 
     following new item:

``11B. Chemical and Biological Weapons.......................229''.....

       (c) Repeals.--The following provisions of law are repealed:
       (1) Chapter 10 of title 18, United States Code, relating to 
     biological weapons.
       (2) Section 2332c of title 18, United States Code, relating 
     to chemical weapons.
       (3) In the table of sections for chapter 113B of title 18, 
     United States Code, the item relating to section 2332c.
              Subtitle B--Revocations of Export Privileges

     SEC. 111. REVOCATIONS OF EXPORT PRIVILEGES.

       If the President determines, after notice and an 
     opportunity for a hearing in accordance with section 554 of 
     title 5, United States Code, that any person within the 
     United States, or any national of the United States located 
     outside the United States, has committed any violation of 
     section 229 of title 18, United States Code, the President 
     may issue an order for the suspension or revocation of the 
     authority of the person to export from the United States any 
     goods or technology (as such terms are defined in section 16 
     of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 
     2415)).
       TITLE II--FOREIGN RELATIONS AND DEFENSE-RELATED PROVISIONS

     SEC. 201. SANCTIONS FOR USE OF CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL 
                   WEAPONS.

       Title III of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control 
     and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (title III of Public Law 
     102-182) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating section 309 as section 312; and
       (2) by striking sections 306 through 308 and inserting the 
     following new sections:

     ``SEC. 306. PURPOSE.

       ``The purpose of sections 306 through 311 is--
       ``(1) to provide for the imposition of sanctions against 
     any foreign government--
       ``(A) that has used chemical or biological weapons in 
     violation of international law; or
       ``(B) that has used chemical or biological weapons against 
     its own nationals; and
       ``(2) to ensure that the victims of the use of chemical or 
     biological weapons shall be compensated and awarded punitive 
     damages, as may be determined.

     ``SEC. 307. PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION.

       ``(a) Bilateral Sanctions.--Except as provided in 
     subsections (c) and (d), the President shall, after the 
     consultation with Congress, impose the sanctions described in 
     subsections (a) and (b) of section 308 if the President 
     determines that any foreign government--
       ``(1) has used a chemical weapon or biological weapon in 
     violation of international law; or
       ``(2) has used a chemical weapon or biological weapon 
     against its own nationals.
       ``(b) Multilateral Sanctions.--The sanctions imposed 
     pursuant to subsection (a) are in addition to any 
     multilateral sanction or measure that may be otherwise 
     agreed.
       ``(c) Presidential Waiver.--The President may waive the 
     application of any of the sanctions imposed pursuant to 
     subsection (a) if the President determines and certifies in 
     writing to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and 
     the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that 
     implementing such measures would have a substantial negative 
     impact upon the supreme national interests of the United 
     States.
       ``(d) Sanctions Not Applied to Certain Existing 
     Contracts.--A sanction described in section 308 shall not 
     apply to any activity pursuant to a contract or international 
     agreement entered into before the date of the Presidential 
     determination under subsection (a) if the President 
     determines that performance of the activity would reduce the 
     potential for the use of a chemical weapon or biological 
     weapon by the sanctioned country.

     ``SEC. 308. MANDATORY SANCTIONS.

       ``(a) Minimum Number of Sanctions.--After consultation with 
     Congress and making a determination under section 307 with 
     respect to the actions of a foreign government, the President 
     shall impose not less than 5 of the following sanctions 
     against that government for a period of three years:
       ``(1) Foreign assistance.--The United States Government 
     shall terminate assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act 
     of 1961, except for urgent humanitarian assistance and food 
     or other agricultural commodities or products.
       ``(2) Arms sales.--The United States Government shall not 
     sell any item on the United States Munitions List and shall 
     terminate sales to that country under this Act of any defense 
     articles, defense services, or design and construction 
     services. Licenses shall not be issued for the export to the 
     sanctioned country of any item on the United States Munitions 
     List, or for commercial satellites.
       ``(3) Arms sale financing.--The United States Government 
     shall terminate all foreign military financing under this 
     Act.
       ``(4) Denial of united states government credit or other 
     financial assistance.--The United States Government shall 
     deny any credit, credit guarantees, or other financial 
     assistance by any department, agency, or instrumentality of 
     the United States Government, including the Export-Import 
     Bank of the United States.
       ``(5) Export controls.--The authorities of section 6 of the 
     Export Administration Act of 1979 shall be used to prohibit 
     the export of any goods or technology on that part of the 
     control list established under section 5(c)(1) of that Act, 
     and all other goods and technology under this Act (excluding 
     food and other agricultural commodities and products) as the 
     President may determine to be appropriate.
       ``(6) Multilateral bank assistance.--The United States 
     shall oppose, in accordance with section 701 of the 
     International Financial Institutions Act, the extension of 
     any loan or financial or technical assistance by 
     international financial institutions.
       ``(7) Bank loans.--The United States Government shall 
     prohibit any United States bank from making any loan or 
     providing any credit, including to any agency or 
     instrumentality of the government, except for loans or 
     credits for the purpose of purchasing food or other 
     agricultural commodities or products.
       ``(8) Aviation rights.--
       ``(A) In general.--
       ``(i) Notification.--The President is authorized to notify 
     the government of a country with respect to which the 
     President has made a determination pursuant to section 307(a) 
     of his intention to suspend the authority of foreign air 
     carriers owned or controlled by the government of that 
     country to engage in foreign air transportation to or from 
     the United States.
       ``(ii) Suspension of aviation rights.--Within 10 days after 
     the date of notification of a government under subclause (I), 
     the Secretary of Transportation shall take all steps 
     necessary to suspend at the earliest possible date the 
     authority of any foreign air carrier owned or controlled, 
     directly or indirectly, by that government to engage in 
     foreign air transportation to or from the United States, 
     notwithstanding any agreement relating to air services.
       ``(B) Termination of air service agreements.--
       ``(i) In general.--The President may direct the Secretary 
     of State to terminate any air service agreement between the 
     United States and a country with respect to which the 
     President has made a determination pursuant to section 
     307(a), in accordance with the provisions of that agreement.
       ``(ii) Termination of aviation rights.--Upon termination of 
     an agreement under this clause, the Secretary of 
     Transportation shall take such steps as may be necessary to 
     revoke at the earliest possible date the right of any foreign 
     air carrier owned, or controlled, directly or indirectly, by 
     the government of that country to engage in foreign air 
     transportation to or from the United States.
       ``(C) Exception.--The Secretary of Transportation may 
     provide for such exceptions from the sanction contained in 
     subparagraph (A) as the Secretary considers necessary to 
     provide for emergencies in which the safety of an aircraft or 
     its crew or passengers is threatened.
       ``(D) Definitions.--For purposes of this paragraph, the 
     terms `aircraft', `air transportation', and `foreign air 
     carrier' have the meanings given those terms in section 40102 
     of title 49, United States Code.

[[Page S3331]]

       ``(9) Diplomatic relations.--The President shall use his 
     constitutional authorities to downgrade or suspend diplomatic 
     privileges between the United States and that country.
       ``(b) Blocking of Assets.--Upon making a determination 
     under section 307, the President shall take all steps 
     necessary to block any transactions in any property subject 
     to the jurisdiction of the United States in which the foreign 
     country or any national thereof has any interest whatsoever, 
     for the purpose of compensating the victims of the chemical 
     or biological weapons use and for punitive damages as may be 
     assessed.
       ``(c) Statutory Construction.--Nothing in this section 
     limits the authority of the President to impose a sanction 
     that is not specified in this section.

     ``SEC. 309. REMOVAL OF SANCTIONS.

       ``(a) Certification Requirement.--The President shall 
     remove the sanctions imposed with respect to a foreign 
     government pursuant to this section if the President 
     determines and so certifies to the Congress, after the end of 
     the three-year period beginning on the date on which 
     sanctions were initially imposed on that country pursuant to 
     section 307, that--
       ``(1) the government of that country has provided reliable 
     assurances that it will not use any chemical weapon or 
     biological weapon in violation of international law and will 
     not use any chemical weapon or biological weapon against its 
     own nationals;
       ``(2) the government of the country is willing to accept 
     onsite inspections or other reliable measures to verify that 
     the government is not making preparations to use any chemical 
     weapon or biological weapon in violation of international law 
     or to use any chemical weapon or biological weapon against 
     its own nationals; and
       ``(3) the government of the country is making restitution 
     to those affected by any use of any chemical weapon or 
     biological weapon in violation of international law or 
     against its own nationals.
       ``(b) Reasons for Determination.--The certification made 
     under this subsection shall set forth the reasons supporting 
     such determination in each particular case.
       ``(c) Effective Date.--The certification made under this 
     subsection shall take effect on the date on which the 
     certification is received by the Congress.

     ``SEC. 310. NOTIFICATIONS AND REPORTS OF CHEMICAL OR 
                   BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS USE AND APPLICATION OF 
                   SANCTIONS.

       ``(a) Notification.--Not later than 30 days after 
     persuasive information becomes available to the executive 
     branch of Government indicating the substantial possibility 
     of the use of chemical or biological weapons by any person or 
     government, the President shall so notify Congress in 
     writing.
       ``(b) Report.--Not later than 60 days after making a 
     notification under subsection (a), the President shall submit 
     a report to Congress that contains--
       ``(1) an assessment by the President in both classified and 
     unclassified form of the circumstances of the suspected use 
     of chemical or biological weapons, including any 
     determination by the President made under section 307 with 
     respect to a foreign government; and
       ``(2) a description of the actions the President intends to 
     take pursuant to the assessment, including the imposition of 
     any sanctions or other measures pursuant to section 307.
       ``(c) Progress Report.--Not later than 60 days after 
     submission of a report under subsection (b), the President 
     shall submit a progress report to Congress describing actions 
     undertaken by the President under sections 306 through 311, 
     including the imposition of unilateral and multilateral 
     sanctions and other punitive measures, in response to the use 
     of any chemical weapon or biological weapon described in the 
     report.
       ``(d) Recipients of Notifications and Reports.--Any 
     notification or report required by this section shall be 
     submitted to the following:
       ``(1) The Majority Leader of the Senate and the Speaker of 
     the House of Representatives.
       ``(2) The Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
       ``(3) The Committee on International Relations and the 
     Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives.

     ``SEC. 311. DEFINITIONS.

       ``In sections 306 through 310:
       ``(1) Biological weapon.--The term `biological weapon' 
     means the following, together or separately:
       ``(A) Any micro-organism (including bacteria, viruses, 
     fungi, rickettsiae or protozoa), pathogen, or infectious 
     substance, or any naturally occurring, bio-engineered or 
     synthesized component of any such micro-organism, pathogen, 
     or infectious substance, whatever its origin or method of 
     production, capable of causing--
       ``(i) death, disease, or other biological malfunction in a 
     human, an animal, a plant, or another living organism;
       ``(ii) deterioration of food, water, equipment, supplies, 
     or materials of any kind; or
       ``(iii) deleterious alteration of the environment.
       ``(B) Any munition or device specifically designed to cause 
     death or other harm through the release, dissemination, or 
     impact of the toxic or poisonous properties of those 
     biological weapons specified in subparagraph (A).
       ``(C) Any equipment specifically designed for use directly 
     in connection with the employment of munitions or devices 
     specified in subparagraph (B).
       ``(D) Any living organism specifically designed to carry a 
     biological weapon specified in subparagraph (A) to a host.
       ``(2) Chemical weapon.--The term `chemical weapon' means 
     the following, together or separately:
       ``(A) Any of the following chemical agents: tabun, Sarin, 
     Soman, GF, VX, sulfur mustard, nitrogen mustard, phosgene 
     oxime, lewisite, phenyldichloroarsine, ethyldichloroarsine, 
     methyldichloroarsine, phosgene, diphosgene, hydrogen cyanide, 
     cyanogen chloride, and arsine.
       ``(B) Any of the 54 chemicals, other than a riot control 
     agent, controlled by the Australia Group as of the date of 
     the enactment of this Act.
       ``(C) Any other chemical agent that may be developed if the 
     use of the agent would be intended to produce an effect 
     consistent with that of a chemical agent or other chemical 
     described in subparagraph (A) or (B).
       ``(D) Any munition or device specifically designed to cause 
     death or other harm through the release, dissemination, or 
     impact of the toxic or poisonous properties of a chemical 
     weapon specified in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).
       ``(E) Any equipment specifically designed for use directly 
     in connection with the employment of munitions or devices 
     specified in subparagraph (D).
       ``(3) Person.--The term `person' means any individual, 
     corporation, partnership, firm, association, or other legal 
     entity.''.

     SEC. 202. CONTINUATION AND ENHANCEMENT OF MULTILATERAL 
                   CONTROL REGIMES.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     any collapse of the informal forum of states known as the 
     ``Australia Group'', either through changes in membership or 
     lack of compliance with common export controls, or any 
     substantial weakening of common Australia Group export 
     controls and nonproliferation measures in force as of the 
     date of enactment of this Act, would seriously undermine 
     international and national efforts to curb the spread of 
     chemical and biological weapons and related equipment.
       (b) Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United States--
       (1) to continue close cooperation with other countries in 
     the Australia Group in support of its current efforts and in 
     devising additional means to monitor and control the supply 
     of chemicals and biological agents applicable to weapons 
     production;
       (2) to maintain an equivalent or more comprehensive level 
     of control over the export of toxic chemicals and their 
     precursors, dual-use processing equipment, human, animal and 
     plant pathogens and toxins with potential biological weapons 
     application, and dual-use biological equipment, as that 
     afforded by the Australia Group as of the date of enactment 
     of this Act;
       (3) to block any effort by any Australia Group member to 
     achieve Australia Group consensus on any action that would 
     substantially weaken existing common Australia Group export 
     controls and nonproliferation measures or otherwise undermine 
     the effectiveness of the Australia Group; and
       (4) to work closely with other countries also capable of 
     supplying equipment, materials, and technology with 
     particular applicability to the production of chemical or 
     biological weapons in order to devise and harmonize the most 
     effective national controls possible on the transfer of such 
     materials, equipment, and technology.
       (c) Certification.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the 
     President shall determine and certify to Congress whether--
       (1) the Australia Group continues to maintain an equivalent 
     or more comprehensive level of control over the export of 
     toxic chemicals and their precursors, dual-use processing 
     equipment, human, animal, and plant pathogens and toxins with 
     potential biological weapons application, and dual-use 
     biological equipment, as that afforded by the Australia Group 
     as of the date of the last certification under this 
     subsection, or, in the case of the first certification, the 
     level of control maintained as of the date of enactment of 
     this Act; and
       (2) the Australia Group remains a viable mechanism for 
     curtailing the spread of chemical and biological weapons-
     related materials and technology, and whether the 
     effectiveness of the Australia Group has been undermined by 
     changes in membership, lack of compliance with common export 
     controls, or any weakening of common controls and measures 
     that are in effect as of the date of enactment of this Act.
       (d) Consultations.--
       (1) In general.--The President shall consult periodically, 
     but not less frequently than twice a year, with the Committee 
     on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on 
     International Relations of the House of Representatives, on 
     Australia Group export controls and nonproliferation 
     measures.
       (2) Resulting from presidential certification.--If the 
     President certifies that either of the conditions in 
     subsection (c) are not met, the President shall consult 
     within 60 days of such certification with the Committee on 
     Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on 
     International Relations of the House of Representatives on 
     steps the United States should take to maintain effective 
     international controls on chemical and

[[Page S3332]]

     biological weapons-related materials and technology.

     SEC. 203. CRITERIA FOR UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA 
                   RELATING TO THE ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL AND 
                   BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS.

       (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, United States assistance described in subsection (d) may 
     not be obligated or expended unless a certification by the 
     President is in effect under subsection (b) or subsection 
     (c).
       (b) Certification With Respect to Russian Chemical and 
     Biological Program.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the 
     President shall certify that--
       (1) Russia is making reasonable progress toward the 
     implementation of the Bilateral Destruction Agreement;
       (2) the United States and Russia have made substantial 
     progress toward resolution, to the satisfaction of the United 
     States, of outstanding compliance issues under the Wyoming 
     Memorandum of Understanding and the Bilateral Destruction 
     Agreement;
       (3) Russia has fully and accurately declared all 
     information regarding its unitary and binary chemical 
     weapons, chemical weapons production facilities, and other 
     facilities associated with the development of chemical 
     weapons; and
       (4) Russia is in compliance with its obligations under the 
     Biological Weapons Convention.
       (c) Alternative Certification.--A certification under this 
     subsection is a certification by the President that the 
     President is unable to make a certification under subsection 
     (b).
       (d) Period of Effectiveness of Certifications.--Each 
     certification made under this section shall not be effective 
     for a period of more than one year.
       (e) United States Assistance Covered.--United States 
     assistance described in this subsection is United States 
     assistance out of funds made available for fiscal year 1998 
     or any fiscal year thereafter that is provided with respect 
     to Russia only for the purposes of--
       (1) facilitating the transport, storage, safeguarding, and 
     elimination of any chemical weapon or biological weapon or 
     its delivery vehicle;
       (2) planning, designing, or construction of any destruction 
     facility for a chemical weapon or biological weapon; or
       (3) supporting any international science and technology 
     center.
       (f) Definitions.--
       (1) Bilateral destruction agreement.--The term ``Bilateral 
     Destruction Agreement'' means Agreement Between the United 
     States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
     on Destruction and Nonproduction of Chemical Weapons and on 
     Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral Convention on Banning 
     Chemical Weapons, signed on June 1, 1990.
       (2) Biological weapons convention.--The term ``Biological 
     Weapons Convention'' means the Convention on the Prohibition 
     of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
     Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their 
     Destruction, done at Washington, London, and Moscow on April 
     10, 1972.
       (3) Wyoming memorandum of understanding.--The term 
     ``Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding'' means the Memorandum 
     of Understanding Between the Government of the United States 
     of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet 
     Socialist Republics Regarding a Bilateral Verification 
     Experiment and Data Exchange Related to Prohibition on 
     Chemical Weapons, signed at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, on 
     September 23, 1989.
       (4) United states assistance.--The term ``United States 
     assistance'' has the meaning given the term in section 
     481(e)(4) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 
     2291(e)(4)).

     SEC. 204. REPORT ON THE STATE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL 
                   WEAPONS PROLIFERATION.

       Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this 
     Act, and every year thereafter, the President shall submit to 
     the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee 
     on Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence 
     of the Senate a report containing the following:
       (1) Proliferation by foreign countries.--A description of 
     any efforts by China, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North 
     Korea, Pakistan, Russia, and Syria, and any country that has, 
     during the five years prior to submission of the report, used 
     any chemical weapon or biological weapon or attempted to 
     acquire the material and technology to produce and deliver 
     chemical or biological agents, together with an assessment of 
     the present and future capability of the country to produce 
     and deliver such agents.
       (2) Foreign persons assisting in proliferation.--An 
     identification of--
       (A) those persons that in the past have assisted the 
     government of any country described in paragraph (1) in that 
     effort; and
       (B) those persons that continue to assist the government of 
     the country described in paragraph (1) in that effort as of 
     the date of the report.
       (3) Third country assistance in proliferation.--An 
     assessment of whether and to what degree other countries have 
     assisted any government or country described in paragraph (1) 
     in its effort to acquire the material and technology 
     described in that paragraph.
       (4) Intelligence information on third country assistance.--
     A description of any confirmed or credible intelligence or 
     other information that any country has assisted the 
     government of any country described in paragraph (1) in that 
     effort, either directly or by facilitating the activities of 
     the persons identified in subparagraph (A) or (B) of 
     paragraph (3) or had knowledge of the activities of the 
     persons identified in subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph 
     (3), but took no action to halt or discourage such 
     activities.
       (5) Intelligence information on subnational groups.--A 
     description of any confirmed or credible intelligence or 
     other information of the development, production, 
     stockpiling, or use, of any chemical weapon or biological 
     weapon by subnational groups, including any terrorist or 
     paramilitary organization.
       (6) Funding priorities for detection and monitoring 
     capabilities.--An identification of the priorities of the 
     executive branch of Government for the development of new 
     resources relating to detection and monitoring capabilities 
     with respect to chemical weapons and biological weapons.

     SEC. 205. INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE TO STRENGTHEN THE 1925 
                   GENEVA PROTOCOL.

       (a) Definition.--In this section, the term ``1925 Geneva 
     Protocol'' means the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use 
     in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of 
     Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, done at Geneva June 17, 
     1925 (26 UST 71; TIAS 8061).
       (b) Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United States--
       (1) to work to obtain multilateral agreement to effective, 
     international enforcement mechanisms to existing 
     international agreements that prohibit the use of chemical 
     and biological weapons, to which the United States is a state 
     party; and
       (2) pursuant to paragraph (1), to work to obtain 
     multilateral agreement regarding the collective imposition of 
     sanctions and other measures described in title III of the 
     Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare 
     Elimination Act of 1991, as amended by this Act.
       (c) Responsibility.--The Secretary of State shall, as a 
     priority matter, take steps necessary to achieve United 
     States objectives, as set forth in this section.
       (d) Sense of the Senate.--The Senate urges and directs the 
     Secretary of State to work to convene an international 
     negotiating forum for the purpose of concluding an 
     international agreement on enforcement of the 1925 Geneva 
     Protocol.
       (e) Allocation of Funds.--Of the amount authorized to be 
     appropriated to the Department of State for fiscal year 1998 
     under the appropriations account entitled ``International 
     Conferences and Contingencies'', $5,000,000 shall be 
     available only for payment of salaries and expenses in 
     connection with efforts of the Secretary of State to conclude 
     an international agreement described in subsection (d).

     SEC. 206. RESTRICTION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR THE ORGANIZATION 
                   FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

       (a) Prohibition.--None of the funds appropriated pursuant 
     to any provision of law, including previously appropriated 
     funds, may be available to make any voluntary or assessed 
     contribution to the Organization for the Prohibition of 
     Chemical Weapons, or to reimburse any account for the 
     transfer of in-kind items to the Organization, unless or 
     until the Convention on the Prohibition of Development, 
     Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on 
     Their Destruction, opened for signature at Paris January 13, 
     1993, enters into force for the United States.
       (b) Statutory Construction.--Nothing in subsection (a) may 
     be construed to apply to the Preliminary Commission for the 
     establishment of the Organization for the Prohibition of 
     Chemical Weapons.

     SEC. 207. ENHANCEMENTS TO ROBUST CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL 
                   DEFENSES.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the threats posed by chemical and biological weapons to 
     United States Armed Forces deployed in regions of concern 
     will continue to grow and will undermine United States 
     strategies for the projection of United States military power 
     and the forward deployment of United States Armed Forces;
       (2) the use of chemical or biological weapons will be a 
     likely condition of future conflicts in regions of concern;
       (3) it is essential for the United States and key regional 
     allies of the United States to preserve and further develop 
     robust chemical and biological defenses;
       (4) the United States Armed Forces, both active and 
     nonactive duty, are inadequately equipped, organized, 
     trained, and exercised for operations in chemically and 
     biologically contaminated environments;
       (5) the lack of readiness stems from a deemphasis by the 
     executive branch of Government and the United States Armed 
     Forces on chemical and biological defense;
       (6) the armed forces of key regional allies and likely 
     coalition partners, as well as civilians necessary to support 
     United States military operations, are inadequately prepared 
     and equipped to carry out essential missions in chemically 
     and biologically contaminated environments;
       (7) congressional direction contained in the 1997 Defense 
     Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act is intended to lead 
     to enhanced domestic preparedness to protect against the use 
     of chemical and biological weapons; and

[[Page S3333]]

       (8) the United States Armed Forces should place increased 
     emphasis on potential threats to deployed United States Armed 
     Forces and, in particular, should make countering the use of 
     chemical and biological weapons an organizing principle for 
     United States defense strategy and for the development of 
     force structure, doctrine, planning, training, and exercising 
     policies of the United States Armed Forces.
       (b) Defense Readiness Training.--The Secretary of Defense 
     shall take those actions that are necessary to ensure that 
     the United States Armed Forces are capable of carrying out 
     required military missions in United States regional 
     contingency plans despite the threat or use of chemical or 
     biological weapons. In particular, the Secretary of Defense 
     shall ensure that the United States Armed Forces are 
     effectively equipped, organized, trained, and exercised 
     (including at the large unit and theater level) to conduct 
     operations in chemically and biologically contaminated 
     environments that are critical to the success of United 
     States military plans in regional conflicts, including--
       (1) deployment, logistics, and reinforcement operations at 
     key ports and airfields;
       (2) sustained combat aircraft sortie generation at critical 
     regional airbases; and
       (3) ground force maneuvers of large units and divisions.
       (c) Discussions With Allied Countries on Readiness.--
       (1) High-priority joint responsibility of secretaries of 
     defense and state.--The Secretary of Defense and the 
     Secretary of State shall give a high priority to discussions 
     with key regional allies and likely regional coalition 
     partners, including those countries where the United States 
     currently deploys forces, where United States forces would 
     likely operate during regional conflicts, or which would 
     provide civilians necessary to support United States military 
     operations, to determine what steps are necessary to ensure 
     that allied and coalition forces and other critical civilians 
     are adequately equipped and prepared to operate in chemically 
     and biologically contaminated environments.
       (2) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense and the 
     Secretary of State shall jointly submit to the Committee on 
     Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the 
     Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives a 
     report describing--
       (A) the results of the discussions held under paragraph (1) 
     and plans for future discussions;
       (B) the measures agreed to improve the preparedness of 
     foreign armed forces and civilians; and
       (C) any proposals for increased military assistance, 
     including assistance provided through--
       (i) the sale of defense articles and defense services under 
     the Arms Export Control Act;
       (ii) the Foreign Military Financing program under section 
     23 of that Act; and
       (iii) chapter 5 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
     1961 (relating to international military education and 
     training).
       (d) United States Army Chemical School.--
       (1) Command of school.--The Secretary of Defense shall take 
     those actions that are necessary to ensure that the United 
     States Army Chemical School remains under the oversight of a 
     general officer of the United States Army.
       (2) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (A) the transfer, consolidation, and reorganization of the 
     United States Army Chemical School should not disrupt or 
     diminish the training and readiness of the United States 
     Armed Forces to fight in a chemical-biological warfare 
     environment; and
       (B) the Army should continue to operate the Chemical 
     Defense Training Facility at Fort McClellan until such time 
     as the replacement facility at Fort Leonard Wood is 
     functional.
       (e) Report.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, and on January 1 every year 
     thereafter, the President shall submit a report to the 
     Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed 
     Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate 
     and the Committee on International Relations, the Committee 
     on National Security, and the Committee on Appropriations of 
     the House of Representatives, and the Speaker of the House of 
     Representatives on previous, current, and planned chemical 
     and biological weapons defense activities of the United 
     States Armed Forces.
       (2) Content of report.--Each report required by paragraph 
     (1) shall include the following information for the previous 
     fiscal year and for the next three fiscal years:
       (A) Enhancement of defense and readiness.--Proposed 
     solutions to each of the deficiencies in chemical and 
     biological warfare defenses identified in the March 1996 
     General Accounting Office Report, titled ``Chemical and 
     Biological Defense: Emphasis Remains Insufficient to Resolve 
     Continuing Problems'', and steps being taken pursuant to 
     subsection (b) to ensure that the United States Armed Forces 
     are capable of conducting required military operations to 
     ensure the success of United States regional contingency 
     plans despite the threat or use of chemical or biological 
     weapons.
       (B) Priorities.--An identification of priorities of the 
     executive branch of Government in the development of both 
     active and passive defenses against the use of chemical and 
     biological weapons.
       (C) RDT&E and procurement of defenses.--A detailed summary 
     of all budget activities associated with the research, 
     development, testing, and evaluation, and procurement of 
     chemical and biological defenses, set forth by fiscal year, 
     program, department, and agency.
       (D) Vaccine production and stocks.--A detailed assessment 
     of current and projected vaccine production capabilities and 
     vaccine stocks, including progress in researching and 
     developing a multivalent vaccine.
       (E) Decontamination of infrastructure and installations.--A 
     detailed assessment of procedures and capabilities necessary 
     to protect and decontaminate infrastructure and installations 
     that support the ability of the United States to project 
     power through the use of its Armed Forces, including progress 
     in developing a nonaqueous chemical decontamination 
     capability.
       (F) Protective gear.--A description of the progress made in 
     procuring lightweight personal protective gear and steps 
     being taken to ensure that programmed procurement quantities 
     are sufficient to replace expiring battledress overgarments 
     and chemical protective overgarments to maintain required 
     wartime inventory levels.
       (G) Detection and identification capabilities.--A 
     description of the progress made in developing long-range 
     standoff detection and identification capabilities and other 
     battlefield surveillance capabilities for biological and 
     chemical weapons, including progress on developing a 
     multichemical agent detector, unmanned aerial vehicles, and 
     unmanned ground sensors.
       (H) Theater missile defenses.--A description of the 
     progress made in developing and deploying layered theater 
     missile defenses for deployed United States Armed Forces 
     which will provide greater geographic coverage against 
     current and expected ballistic missile threats and will 
     assist the mitigation of chemical and biological 
     contamination through higher altitude intercepts and boost-
     phase intercepts.
       (I) Training and readiness.--An assessment of the training 
     and readiness of the United States Armed Forces to operate in 
     chemically and biologically contaminated environments and 
     actions taken to sustain training and readiness, including at 
     national combat training centers.
       (J) Military exercises.--A description of the progress made 
     in incorporating consideration about the threat or use of 
     chemical and biological weapons into service and joint 
     exercises as well as simulations, models, and wargames, 
     together with the conclusions drawn from these efforts about 
     the United States capability to carry out required missions, 
     including with coalition partners, in military contingencies.
       (K) Military doctrine.--A description of the progress made 
     in developing and implementing service and joint doctrine for 
     combat and noncombat operations involving adversaries armed 
     with chemical or biological weapons, including efforts to 
     update the range of service and joint doctrine to better 
     address the wide range of military activities, including 
     deployment, reinforcement, and logistics operations in 
     support of combat operations, and for the conduct of such 
     operations in concert with coalition forces.
       (L) Defense of civilian population.--A description of the 
     progress made in resolving issues relating to the protection 
     of United States population centers from chemical and 
     biological attack and from the consequences of such an 
     attack, including plans for inoculation of populations, 
     consequence management, and progress made in developing and 
     deploying effective cruise missile defenses and a national 
     ballistic missile defense.

     SEC. 208. NEGATIVE SECURITY ASSURANCES.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that in 
     order to achieve an effective deterrence against attacks of 
     the United States and United States Armed Forces by chemical 
     weapons, the President should reevaluate the extension of 
     negative security assurances by the United States to 
     nonnuclear-weapon states in the context of the Treaty on the 
     Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
       (b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the 
     Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign 
     Relations of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of 
     Representatives a report, both in classified and unclassified 
     forms, setting forth--
       (1) the findings of a detailed review of United States 
     policy on negative security assurances as a deterrence 
     strategy; and
       (2) a determination by the President of the appropriate 
     range of nuclear and conventional responses to the use of 
     chemical or biological weapons against the United States 
     Armed Forces, United States citizens, allies, and third 
     parties.
       (c) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Negative security assurances.--The term ``negative 
     security assurances'' means the assurances provided by the 
     United States to nonnuclear-weapon states in the context of 
     the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (21 
     UST 483) that the United States will forswear the use of 
     certain weapons unless the United States is attacked by that 
     nonnuclear-weapon state in alliance with a nuclear-weapon 
     state.
       (2) Nonnuclear-weapon states.--The term ``nonnuclear-weapon 
     states'' means states

[[Page S3334]]

     that are not nuclear-weapon states, as defined in Article 
     IX(3) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
     Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968 
     (21 UST 483).

     SEC. 209. RIOT CONTROL AGENTS.

       (a) Prohibition.--The President shall not issue any order 
     or directive that diminishes, abridges, or alters the right 
     of the United States to use riot control agents--
       (1) in any circumstance not involving international armed 
     conflict; or
       (2) in a defensive military mode to save lives in an 
     international armed conflict, as provided for in Executive 
     Order No. 11850 of April 9, 1975.
       (b) Circumstances Not Involving International Armed 
     Conflict.--The use of riot control agents under subsection 
     (a)(1) includes the use of such agents in--
       (1) peacekeeping or peace support operations;
       (2) humanitarian or disaster relief operations;
       (3) noncombatant evacuation operations;
       (4) counterterrorist operations and the rescue of hostages; 
     and
       (5) law enforcement operations and other internal 
     conflicts.
       (c) Defensive Military Mode.--The use of riot control 
     agents under subsection (a)(2) may include the use of such 
     agents--
       (1) in areas under direct and distinct United States 
     military control, including the use of such agents for the 
     purposes of controlling rioting or escaping enemy prisoners 
     of war;
       (2) to protect personnel or material from civil 
     disturbances, terrorists, and paramilitary organizations;
       (3) to minimize casualties during rescue missions of downed 
     air crews and passengers, prisoners of war, or hostages;
       (4) in situations where combatants and noncombatants are 
     intermingled; and
       (5) in support of base defense, rear area operations, 
     noncombatant evacuation operations, and operations to protect 
     or recover nuclear weapons.
       (d) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     international law permits the United States to use 
     herbicides, under regulations applicable to their domestic 
     use, for control of vegetation within United States bases and 
     installations or around their immediate defensive perimeters.
       (e) Authority of the President.--The President shall take 
     all necessary measures, and prescribe such rules and 
     regulations as may be necessary, to ensure that the policy 
     contained in this section is observed by the Armed Forces of 
     the United States.

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Abraham 
be added as cosponsor to S. 495.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, let me say for the benefit of my colleagues, 
to whom we had indicated that we would try to ensure that we would have 
a vote on this matter at about 3:45, that even though, under the 
unanimous consent agreement, we have a half-hour to discuss this 
legislation in order to try to accommodate my colleagues, to set an 
example for those on the other side who may wish not to take their full 
compliment of time, that at this time I am going to express a 
willingness to discuss this bill no further but just take a couple of 
minutes to close and to relinquish the floor to those who may be in 
opposition, again with the plea to them that since we had earlier 
advised colleagues that a vote would occur on this matter at about 3:45 
that anyone who can possibly do so truncate their remarks in order to 
accommodate our colleagues.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, has the 
unanimous consent agreement not yet been agreed to?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes. The unanimous consent agreement has been 
reached.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I was in my office. I still have not had an 
opportunity--I am not blaming anyone for that--to read this agreement. 
But in listening to what was said, I thought I heard that a part of the 
agreement was to the effect that certain votes would occur by voice. Am 
I correct?
  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, if the distinguished Senator will yield, 
the agreement calls for a vote on the Helms amendments, and on the 28 
amendments in agreement. It was stated by at least one of our 
colleagues that it was his hope that these votes would be voice votes, 
and the majority leader indicated that it was his desire to have a 
voice vote. But no one is precluded, of course, from calling for a 
rollcall as is his constitutional right.
  So the distinguished Senator from West Virginia makes a good point. A 
Senator is not precluded. It is my hope, working with the majority 
leader, that we can have voice votes on these matters and that we can 
move ahead as the agreement anticipates. But certainly it is anyone's 
right to call for a rollcall on this or any other vote.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, my concerns have been allayed, and I thank 
the distinguished leader.
  Mr. LEAHY addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I understand the concern of the Senator 
from Arizona and others in wanting to move forward with S. 495.
  Frankly, Mr. President, we may be seeking a greater good here on the 
chemical weapons treaty. Those who are opposed to it will feel that it 
isn't important that they have a chance to vote against it; but those 
who are for it, as am I, will feel it is important to have a chance to 
vote for it.
  But S. 495 in my mind does not have such urgency.
  In an effort to cooperate with the Democratic leader, and with the 
Republican leader, who is seeking to fulfill, I think, a responsible 
commitment to the President of the United States to have this bill up 
here, or to have the treaty up here, I did not object to S. 495, the 
Kyl bill, coming up. But, Mr. President, I would point out that this is 
a bill that was introduced--the first version of it was introduced and 
referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee a day or two before our last 
recess. There has never been a hearing on it. There has not been 21 
seconds of debate on it in the Senate Judiciary Committee, and today we 
have before us a 70-page and a 70-page substitute for it. We are going 
to be asked sometime in the next few minutes to vote on a substitute 
for S. 495. We are going to be asked to vote on a bill that has had no 
hearings, no debate in committee, no markups, no votes, no report, and 
no discussion.

  I am willing to wager that there will not be more than five Senators 
who can walk off the floor and tell people honestly, looking them 
straight in the eye, and say they read it and understood what is in it.
  In fact, I would make this challenge to the press. I would make this 
challenge to the press of every one of the 50 States. I would ask, if 
the press really wants to do their job, to do this: Call each of the 
Senators. All it requires is for the press in each State to call up 
only two people immediately after the vote on S. 495, and say, ``Did 
you read this bill that you just voted on? Did you understand what was 
in this bill you just voted on? Could you explain this bill to me that 
you just voted on?'' And if somebody says they voted for a major issue 
like this, then I think it is reasonable to ask, ``Did you read it? Did 
you understand it? Do you know what is in it?''
  There may be some very good things in the bill. I have heard that it 
borrows much from the administration's proposals for implementation 
legislation. I understand that there are some aspects of it that are 
very similar to legislation that I introduced. And that may very well 
be so. There may well be some parts of this bill that I would eagerly 
support and vote for. But the fact of the matter is I do not know and 
am not being given an opportunity to find out, let alone have hearings 
or an opportunity to seek to improve the bill.
  We have not had an opportunity or the benefit of discussion. We have 
not had the opportunity or the benefit of debate--and we will not have 
debate on it today.
  The sole reason it is up here under this expedited procedure is to 
give some kind of cover one way or the other to bring up the chemical 
weapons treaty. What we have is the majority insisting that we 
consider, without review, a revised substitute version of a bill that 
was not made available to us until this afternoon.
  Nobody has said in the Senate Judiciary Committee this could not have 
a prompt hearing. Certainly I would support the chairman of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, Senator Hatch, if he wanted to have a prompt 
hearing on it.
  The principal sponsor of the bill, the distinguished Senator from 
Arizona, would certainly pursue it strongly through the committee, and 
I have no doubts that he would be able to explain it very, very well in 
the committee and answer any questions that might come up. He is a 
diligent and hard-working Senator who would be able to do that. But 
under this procedure, we will never know. This committee has a majority

[[Page S3335]]

of Republicans, as all Senate committees do, but yet the committee will 
never vote on it.
  The majority leader, who is my good friend, has always described 
himself as one who seeks regular order. I think the Washington Post had 
a front-page story on December 3, 1996, in which they quote the Senator 
describing himself as an ``order'' kind of guy.
  I recall when our distinguished majority leader came to the floor and 
said:

       There is a way to do things around here. You bring up a 
     bill reported by a committee, have debate, offer amendments, 
     you vote, and win or lose, and you move on, and then it goes 
     to conference.

  Well, we are not bringing up a bill reported by a committee. We are 
really not going to have debate. We are not going to offer amendments. 
We will vote. And that is about the only reflection of order.
  If we were considering a resolution to commend the cherry blossom 
princess or to say we will open the doors of the Senate 5 minutes early 
or something like that, I could understand. Instead, we are talking 
about a 70-page bill which is to provide criminal and civil penalties 
for acquisition, transfer, or use of any chemical weapon or biological 
weapon, to reduce the threats of acts of terrorism, armed aggression, 
and so on. This bill refers to patent law, to chemical and biological 
weapons, to aircraft, and to continuation and enhancements of 
multilateral control regimes. It refers to the Australia group--I would 
like to have five Senators stand up and tell me what the Australia 
group is, to the Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding and the 1990 
Bilateral Destruction Agreement. These are major things. Vaccine 
production and stocks, decontamination of infrastructure are also 
serious matters and we have not had any hearing, any debate, any 
discussion of it. The bill refers to owner or possessor liability and 
warrantless seizures and seizures on warrants and reimbursement of 
costs, saying how people will have to pay the United States certain 
amounts of money under certain circumstances and all. This may be heady 
stuff, Mr. President, very heady stuff.
  Now, we have had the Chemical Weapons Convention before us since 
November 1993. It has been bottled up in committee. We have the April 
28, 1997, deadline approaching after which our lack of ratification 
risks economic sanctions against our chemical industry. This could cost 
U.S. chemical companies hundreds of millions of dollars. We are talking 
about thousands of jobs and hundreds of millions of dollars on 
something that has been stalled, stalled for years.
  Now but all of a sudden, whoop-de-do, we have a bill and a substitute 
bill and the Senate is to take 12 minutes and go ahead with it.
  I am afraid that without proper review of the domestic law changes in 
criminal laws against chemical and biological weapons, we may 
inadvertently weaken protections already in the law. I know my friend 
from Arizona does not intend to weaken our laws, but that could be the 
effect of this bill.

  There is no need for this irregular procedure. We ought to be able to 
take a look at S. 495. I would have no objection to its coming up in 
regular order after hearings, but it is not a substitute for the 
Chemical Weapons Convention. It is not a substitute or alternative to 
implementing legislation.
  After we delayed something that President Reagan had negotiated, 
something that President Bush had negotiated, something that President 
Clinton had negotiated, the Chemical Weapons Convention, after we 
delayed it for year after year after year, now we are going to take up 
in less than 3 hours and pass this 70-page bill that nobody has read. 
We delay something that has been debated, argued, considered, we delay 
that for years, but then we take a major piece of legislation that 
nobody has seen and do not even debate it and it is out the door. 
Something has gone wrong here.
  On April 15, every American had to file their taxes or the IRS comes 
after them. That is the law. We also have a law that says that the 
House and the Senate shall pass a budget by April 15. With all due 
respect to my friends on the Republican side, they control the Speaker 
of the House, they control the majority in the House, they control the 
majority leader and a majority in the Senate, but we have not had one 
second of debate on a budget resolution even though the law requires 
them to pass it by April 15.
  April 15 comes and goes. Can you imagine, Mr. President, if you took 
that same attitude in filing your taxes and said well, you know, I am 
busy, I cannot do it. You would hear the doorbell ring and there would 
be the IRS after you. But nobody comes after us for doing the same 
thing.
  We have nearly 100 vacancies on the Federal bench, and we cannot get 
a quorum in the Judiciary Committee to report them out.
  Yet this 70-page major piece of legislation suddenly comes zipping 
forth. There are a lot of problems in it. As I said, there may be some 
things I like. But it says, for example, the bill would prohibit the 
production of 16 specific chemicals and 54 more already controlled by 
the Australia group. Do we know what chemicals are in this bill that 
would be criminalized? I doubt that any one of us could even pronounce 
the chemicals. We do not know what we are voting to ban?
  The bill prohibits any other chemical that may be developed that 
produces the same effect as the other listed chemicals. I take it this 
means chemicals developed in the future. But what about other terrible 
weapons that now exist? Would chemical weapons that exist now but not 
listed in the bill be OK? What deadly chemicals that are prohibited 
under current law, which has a far broader definition of chemical 
weapons, would be freed from criminal penalties?
  We have had no answer. This bill repeals the two major chapters of 
the Federal Criminal Code dealing with biological weapons and with 
chemical weapons. The ink is barely dry on the chemical weapons law 
that this legislation would repeal. The chemical weapons statute became 
law as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996. It was enacted April 14, 1996. It is barely 1 year old and we are 
going to repeal it without a single hearing, single expert comment 
about what might be wrong with a bill that we passed a year ago. Do we 
replace it with a stronger law? No.
  First, the definition of chemical weapons that will be banned under 
this bill is far more limited than the chemical weapons banned under 
current law.
  The bill has a number of exemptions to the overall prohibitions on 
chemical and biological weapons that are far broader in scope than what 
are in current law. For example, current law bars chemical weapons for 
anything but lawful authority. This bill replaces that limited, 
circumscribed rule with five extensive exemptions including for any 
peaceful purpose related to any activity.

  What does that mean? Is that an exemption any enterprising terrorist 
or criminal caught with a chemical weapon could use to great advantage? 
Someone could make a strong argument that way.
  While there are parts of the bill I may well like, there are a lot of 
other parts that raise unanswered questions. Again, any Senator who 
votes for this, I would challenge the press in his or her State to ask: 
You voted for it, do you know what was in it? Did you read the bill? 
Did you understand the bill? Were all your questions answered? Did you 
feel you repealed any criminal laws we now have that we should have 
kept?
  Mr. President, we spent far, far, far more time this week in quorum 
calls when we did nothing than we have on hearings on this bill. We 
spent more time voting on a 100-to-0 resolution on assisted suicide to 
make us all feel good. We spent far more time on that than we have 
hearings on this bill. Mr. President, we spent more time with the 
Chaplain's prayer this morning than we spent on hearings on this 70-
page bill. We spent more time saying good morning to each other this 
morning than we have had in hearings on this 70-page bill. It takes 
more time for the elevator to go from the second floor to the first 
than we have had in hearings on this 70-page bill.
  I do not fault the Senator from Arizona for this. The leadership is 
willing to bring it forward, and if it is his legislation, then he is 
obviously going to go for it.
  But before the Senate becomes irrelevant, if we do not have time and 
will not even follow the law, which requires

[[Page S3336]]

us to have a budget by April 15, if we only had time to confirm two 
Federal judges in 4 months and we have a 100-judge vacancy, if we do 
not have time to have 18 seconds of debate on the budget, if we can 
bottle up the chemical weapons treaty for years, following the support 
of President Reagan, President Bush and President Clinton, why in 
Heaven's name do we suddenly have to come rushing forth with something 
we do not need now and we do not have to have now?
  If we are going to have an expedited process, I think the emergency 
should be the leadership bringing forward the budget that the law 
requires. If we have urgency for something, fill some of those 
judgeships. After all, the Chief Justice has said that is a judicial 
crisis. If we have urgency for something, let us take something that 
has actually had a hearing.
  So with all due respect to the sponsors of this bill and knowing 
there are parts of the bill as I have read them that I like, there are 
a lot of other parts that raise far more questions than are answered in 
my mind. I will oppose it. I would find extremely interesting the 
explanations of those who vote for it.
  I see the distinguished sponsor of the bill, and I yield the floor.
  Mr. KYL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. I just want to respond to a couple of things my 
distinguished colleague has raised. He is certainly correct to point 
out the fact that in my view there has been inadequate attention paid 
to this entire subject. I wish we could spend a lot more time debating 
the Chemical Weapons Convention, as a matter of fact, but in an effort 
to meet the deadline imposed or that the administration has indicated 
it needs to meet, we have had to accordion a great deal of debate and 
consideration of items into a very small period of time.
  I desperately wanted to spend more time on the Chemical Weapons 
Convention, but in order to agree to get that done on time, we have all 
made some compromise agreements of how much time to take on things. 
That is why there is not much time taken on this legislation. The one 
thing I did want to assure my colleague of, and that is the portions 
where he sees sections having been repealed, those sections were picked 
up in a new title under title I, section 101, chapter 11(B) and the 
following.
  Essentially what was done, I assure my colleague, is the chemical and 
biological provisions of the code were combined and the same activities 
that are illegal as to one are now illegal as to both with the same 
penalties. So nothing was dropped from the law; it was merely 
consolidated in a different place. The definition of chemicals, 
incidentally, is the same definition that is contemplated by the 
Chemical Weapons Convention.
  I might also note, the subject matter here has been debated and was 
the subject of hearings really for the last 3 years in the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, by and large, and the exact language of 
this legislation has been aided by the FBI and others in the 
administration as well.
  My colleague is correct, it would be better to have more time to 
spend not only on this bill but on the Chemical Weapons Convention 
itself. In an effort to try to get all of this done under the timeframe 
the administration is working under, we have all made compromises. I 
would like a lot more time to brag about what is in this bill, but I 
agreed to keep my remarks to a couple minutes.
  I will not take more time at this point. I appreciate the spirit in 
which the comments of the Senator from Vermont were made.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, what is the time situation?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont controls 10 minutes 
35 seconds. The Senator from Arizona controls 25 minutes 33 seconds.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, the opposition will soon be led by the 
ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee. I guess I will yield 
my time to him. I will speak 1 more minute until he arrives, and then I 
will yield the floor.
  I understand what my friend from Arizona says about wanting to vote 
for it now, but we do not need S. 495 now. The clock is ticking on the 
chemical weapons treaty. It was ticking on it last year, the year 
before, and the year before that. It ticks right up until midnight 
April 28. If there is anything we have to vote on and should vote on as 
responsible Senators, either vote up or down, it is the chemical 
weapons treaty. S. 495 can wait for the normal hearing route.
  When you have the merger of current chemical and biological weapons 
chapters in the criminal code but with different definitions and 
different exemptions for lawful conduct, this is a matter we ought to 
at least debate.
  Again, I urge everybody to ask and whether members can look their 
constituents in the eye and say in this 70-page major piece of 
legislation on chemical weapons, can they say they read it, they 
understood it, and they are prepared to vote on it?
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I have time remaining, and I am perfectly 
happy to yield back almost all of that time in an effort to get this 
matter to a vote. I urge my colleagues on the other side, if they have 
opposition, to please make their arguments in opposition so we can 
bring this to a vote and our colleagues can try to catch their 
airplanes, which I know they are trying to do.
  Until someone is here to speak, I will reiterate the basic point of 
the legislation. I do urge my colleagues who may be in opposition to 
please come to the floor to make their arguments to try to accommodate 
our colleagues.
  This legislation, again, Mr. President, is simply designed to 
complement the provisions of existing law and is also complementary to 
the Chemical Weapons Convention. It does not create a great deal that 
is new, but rather plugs loopholes in existing law. We noted, for 
example, that while it is illegal for one to manufacture and possess 
and use biological weapons in the United States, we have overlooked 
passing a law that makes it illegal to manufacture or possess chemical 
weapons. If we are going to be serious about the chemical weapons 
business and trying to prevent proliferation, obviously we need to make 
that conduct illegal as well. We do that in this legislation.
  It is not anything Members should have concern about. In fact, they 
should want that. Who would be against providing the President a little 
more flexibility and imposing sanctions on countries that violate 
international law by using chemical or biological weapons?
  Who could be against asking the President of the United States to do 
his best to keep the Australia group together, working as a group of 
countries in the world that do not sell chemicals, precursor chemicals, 
to nations that might make chemical weapons of them? It is the policy 
of the United States, and a sense of the Senate, that the President 
should ensure that the Australia group restrictions are not weakened in 
any way. That is consistent totally with the Chemical Weapons 
Convention. Again, I cannot imagine anyone objecting to that.
  We continue the conditions that were imposed in the 1996 defense 
authorization bill on aid to Russia, which is designed to help them 
dismantle their chemical weapons. We say they have to demonstrate 
reasonable progress toward that dismantlement. We pick the same 
language that was the subject of the Nunn-Lugar compromise in the 1996 
defense authorization bill. What we have done is simply to continue 
that same requirement of Presidential certification of compliance by 
Russia, or, if all else fails, the President can certify that he cannot 
certify, and we still send the money to them. So it is not a condition 
I can imagine anyone would object to. If anything, we would want to 
make it stronger.
  Our legislation calls for an annual report on the state of 
proliferation of

[[Page S3337]]

chemical and biological weapons, something that the Congress needs in 
order to work with the President in doing everything we can to stop the 
proliferation of these weapons.
  We ask the President to convene a group of nations to try to put some 
teeth into the Geneva protocol, which is the treaty that currently bans 
the use of chemical weapons. Like the Chemical Weapons Convention, it 
does not have strong teeth in it. So we are urging the President to try 
to get a group of nations together to try to do that. Again, I cannot 
imagine any opposition to that.
  We provide our military be better protected against chemical warfare. 
The GAO issued a report last year that found grave deficiencies in the 
way that our troops were being equipped and trained to deal with 
chemical warfare and biological warfare. That needs to be remedied, and 
we have three specific things in here that we think will help the 
Defense Department in ensuring that our troops are adequately 
protected.
  One of the things that we recommend, for example, is that the U.S. 
Army Chemical School remain under the oversight of a general officer, 
just to make our point that we think this is an important matter, and 
certainly at least a one-star general ought to be in charge of that 
facility and that operation.
  We provide for a fixed riot-control agent problem, Mr. President. 
This is the problem that has arisen because this administration has 
signaled an intention to change the understanding that has been in 
existence since President Ford's days when the opportunity to use riot-
control agents, or tear gas, was said to be permitted in certain 
instances where it would help to save lives. For example, where we have 
a downed pilot that is being held by a group of hostile civilians, we 
can rescue that downed pilot, not by shooting civilians but by the use 
of tear gas. Where you have a group of civilians protecting someone 
that you want to get out, or you want to control a group of hostile 
prisoners of war, that kind of thing, you do not want to shoot anybody, 
you can do it with riot-control agents, tear gas. We want to assure 
that is possible under the law.

  These are the things that are the key elements of S. 495, Mr. 
President, and there should not be anything controversial here. It 
should be provisions that all of us can support. We simply identified 
each of these items in the course of all of the hearings and all of the 
debate about the Chemical Weapons Convention and found there were a lot 
of practical things we could do in legislation.
  Bear in mind, this legislation has to go over to the House, it has to 
pass the House, it has to go to the President. Therefore, there are 
plenty of scrubs on it, even though the Senate has not had a great deal 
of opportunity to debate it.
  I hope that our colleagues, if there is anyone else in opposition, 
will say so and we can get on with a vote on this matter pursuant to 
the unanimous-consent agreement.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that if there are any more 
quorum calls, that the time be subtracted equally from both sides.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I would like to begin my comments on S. 
495 with two observations. First, if the United States desires to be an 
original member of the Chemical Weapons Convention, this body must act 
to ratify this treaty within the next 7 days. Second, the whole world 
is watching what we say and do on the CWC--a treaty that I believe is 
one of the most important arms control agreements this body will 
consider for many years to come.
  Having made these observations, one would think the Senate would be 
moving to immediate consideration of the Chemical Weapons Convention. 
Instead, the Senate unfortunately finds itself debating S. 495--a bill 
that its most ardent supporters have characterized in recent days as 
the conservatives' substitute to the Chemical Weapons Convention.
  I must tell the Senate that despite these claims, S. 495 is not the 
Chemical Weapons Convention. In fact, I think it's safe to say S. 495 
is not even a distant relative of the Chemical Weapons Convention. And, 
as former Democratic leader George Mitchell was fond of reminding many 
of his colleagues at moments like this, saying something repeatedly 
does not make it so.
  Mr. President, the Chemical Weapons Convention offers this Nation an 
oasis of security in an increasingly threatening world. S. 495 offers 
us a mirage--a mirage, that if pursued, would jeopardize our national 
security and our economy.
  First, Mr. President, S. 495 only requires the United States to do 
what it is already doing under an existing law signed by President 
Reagan in 1986--destroy our stockpile of chemical weapons. S. 495 does 
absolutely nothing to force other nations to eliminate their stocks of 
these deadly materials.
  Second, the supporters of S. 495 act as if the CWC does not exist at 
all. S. 495 directs the Secretary of State to negotiate a whole new 
agreement. The purpose of this new agreement would be to enhance 
enforcement of an old agreement--the 1925 Geneva protocol. The Geneva 
protocol merely prohibits the use of chemical weapons. If you care 
about getting tough on chemical weapons, CWC is the only real answer. 
CWC bans the development, production, and stockpiling of chemical 
weapons as well as their use.
  Third, S. 495 does nothing to address the trade sanctions that would 
hit the American chemical industry if we fail to ratify the CWC. 
Everyone needs to understand that this treaty will take effect with or 
without us on April 29. Without U.S. ratification of the CWC, U.S. 
firms will immediately have to secure end-user certificates for the 
export of chemicals. The implications for U.S. business will be as 
swift as they are costly.
  Finally, I must note with a bit of irony that, according to legal 
experts who have examined this bill, S. 495, the so-called Chemical and 
Biological Weapons Threat Reduction Act of 1997, may actually weaken 
existing law in the very same areas it seeks to toughen them up. As a 
result of exemption clauses in this bill, passage of S. 495 could 
undercut the very purpose of the bill itself.
  In closing, Mr. President, I ask the Senate not to pursue this 
mirage. S. 495 is not a real substitute for the Chemical Weapons 
Convention. I ask that the Senate reject this false vision and that we 
then get on with the real debate--consideration of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention.
  Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, the Chemical Weapons Convention has such 
far-reaching domestic and national security implications that it 
deserves the most thorough and thoughtful examination by the Senate. I 
have given this matter a careful review and now rise to discuss some of 
the conclusions I have reached.
  If I thought supporting this treaty would make chemical weapons 
disappear, and give us all greater security from these heinous weapons, 
I would not hesitate in giving my support. Unfortunately, the facts do 
not demonstrate this; indeed, implementing this treaty may actually 
create opportunities for security breaches.
  The Convention has been signed by 160 nations and ratified by only 
70--less than 50 percent. Five countries who are thought to have 
chemical weapons are not even signatories of the Convention: Egypt, 
Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Syria. Another six nations have signed, 
but not ratified the Convention: China, India, Iran, Pakistan, Israel, 
and Russia. In short, this Convention is not global in scale.
  Mr. President, even if it were true that this treaty had been signed 
and ratified by 160 nations, serious problems would remain. Compliance 
with the Chemical Weapons Convention is not verifiable. I think it is 
timely and appropriate to remember the principle President Reagan 
insisted upon when negotiating an arms control treaty--trust, but 
verify. Unlike nuclear weapons which require a large, specialized 
industrial base, chemical weapons can be manufactured almost anywhere. 
Moreover, many lethal chemicals are common and have peaceful uses. 
Chemicals help us to manufacture products such as pesticides, 
pharmaceuticals, plastics, and paints. With such a broad spectrum of 
uses, it would be difficult to discern the legitimate from the illicit.
  Even if verification of compliance were not a concern, this treaty 
would

[[Page S3338]]

be difficult to enforce. In a sound arms control treaty, the United 
States must be able to punish other countries caught in violation of 
the agreement. The Chemical Weapons Convention provides only vague, 
unspecified sanctions to be imposed on a country found in breach of the 
Convention. Ultimately, the Chemical Weapons Convention leaves the U.N. 
Security Council to impose penalties severe enough to change behavior 
out an outlaw nation. Since any one of the five members of the Security 
Council can veto any enforcement resolution lodged against them or 
their friends, China and Russia, for example, could simply veto 
resolutions imposing sanctions if they disagreed with other Security 
Council members. In sum, Mr. President, it does not appear that this 
agreement is verifiable or enforceable.
  Appropriate questions have also been raised about the treaty's 
compatibility with our Constitution. The Convention creates an 
international monitoring regime called the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, or OPCW. The OPCW will be granted the 
most extensive and intrusive monitoring power of any arms control 
treaty ever because it extends coverage to governmental and civilian 
facilities.
  The intrusive nature of this treaty brings up important issues in 
regards to our citizens' constitutional protection against unreasonable 
search and seizure of private property. Mr. John Yoo, an acting 
professor of law at the University of California at Berkeley wrote 
yesterday in a Wall Street Journal op-ed that ``Under the CWC, a drug 
dealer running a crack house will have more constitutional rights than 
the law-abiding operator of a chemical plant.'' Proponents of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention have suggested that there are a wide 
variety of solutions to the constitutional problem. However, the 
Chemical Weapons Convention states that it is ``unlawful to disrupt, 
delay, impede an inspection or refuse entry of an inspection team.'' It 
appears as though this treaty is incompatible with our Constitution.

  Furthermore, Mr. President, I do not want to look for ways to get 
around the so-called constitutional problem. If the treaty flies in the 
face of rights protected under the fourth and fifth amendments, we 
cannot and should not ratify.
  The authority of the international monitoring regime also raises 
concern about foreign nationals having such broad authority to obtain 
access to property held by private U.S. citizens. The U.S. chemical 
industry is known to be one of the top industries targeted for 
espionage by foreign companies and governments. There is legitimate 
worry that international inspections could jeopardize confidential 
business information, trade secrets, and other proprietary data. Since 
the United States will be expected to pay 25 percent, or approximately 
$50 million, of the OPCW's operating costs, American tax dollars could 
be subsidizing increased risk for U.S. business interests. And even 
though we would pay the lion's share of the OPCW's budget, the United 
States would have no special status over other signatory nations, no 
veto power, and no assurance of being a member of the executive 
council.
  Despite my objections to ratification of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention, I believe Senator Kyl's Chemical and Biological Threat 
Reduction Act will help protect our citizens and troops from the threat 
of chemical and biological weapons. This bill would establish workable 
national policies for confronting the chemical and biological weapons 
threats, while not jeopardizing our national security like the CWC.
  Currently, there exists no U.S. law providing comprehensive criminal, 
civil, and other penalties for the acquisition, possession, transfer, 
or use of chemical or biological weapons. Senator Kyl's bill would 
impose stiff criminal and civil penalties for illegal possession of 
chemical weapons. The death penalty could be a punishment for an 
individual who causes the death of another through this bill.
  The Chemical and Biological Threat Reduction Act also imposes 
mandatory sanctions against nations that use biological and chemical 
weapons against other countries or their own citizens. Unlike the 
Chemical Weapons Convention that only vaguely defines sanctions which 
could be thwarted by the U.N. Security Council, this bill would 
automatically terminate foreign assistance, suspend arms sales, impose 
import and export restrictions, and end financial assistance from 
multilateral banks. This act also would improve the readiness of U.S. 
military forces against chemical weapons attacks by improving troop 
preparedness.
  In view of some of the contacts I've had from Idahoans concerning 
Senator Kyl's bill, I think it's important to point out that this bill 
does not ratify the flawed Chemical Weapons Convention. It would 
enhance our own methods to deal with chemical terrorism without making 
us vulnerable to the defects of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
  Mr. President, making the production and possession of chemical 
weapons illegal according to international law will not make them 
disappear. Use of such weapons has been prohibited since 1907, yet we 
have seen the results of their use. We all know about the tens of 
thousands of deaths from poison gas in World War I, and no one could 
forget the tragic photographs of the Iranian children killed during the 
1980's by the Iraqi Government. Illegal? Yes, but still in use, 
nonetheless.
  Mr. President, I stand today with all Americans expressing a grave 
concern over the increasing proliferation of chemical and biological 
weapons. The real question here seems to be whether ratification of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention will increase our own national security. 
Unfortunately, the answer is no. There is little value in implementing 
international laws which do little to decrease illegal research, 
development, and proliferation of chemical weapons worldwide.
  I support the goal of making the world safe from the threat of 
chemical weapons. I applaud the honorable statement the CWC makes 
against these heinous weapons. However, I believe the best way to 
protect ourselves from this threat is by rejecting this treaty. The 
Convention does nothing to better our security, but may even open the 
door to increasing risks against our vital security interests and 
infringing on the rights of innocent citizens. For these reason, I am 
compelled to vote against the ratification of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention.
  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, today I rise as a cosponsor and supporter 
of S. 495, The Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat Reduction Act of 
1997. This bill will truly provide the United States the tools it needs 
and deserves from chemical and biological weapons. It is a 
comprehensive domestic and international plan to reduce the threat of 
chemical and biological weapons use, setting forth practical, 
realistic, and achievable nonproliferation measures to combat the very 
real dangers posed by these weapons.
  Because of the horrible nature of these weapons, the United States 
has dismantled its biological weapons program and is now unilaterally 
destroying its entire stockpile of chemical weapons. This bill 
reinforces our commitment to finish the job.
  S. 495 contains many provisions that will improve our ability to 
protect our citizens and military against these deadly weapons. The 
bill imposes criminal, as well as civil, penalties for the development, 
production, stockpiling, and transfer of chemical and biological 
weapons. Penalties range from civil action of up to $100,000 per 
violation to the death penalty on individuals who use chemical weapons 
which cause death to another.
  Also, the export privileges of violators can be revoked as well. And, 
it preserves the system of multilateral export controls on biological 
and chemical materials and technologies, better known as the Australia 
group.
  For our Armed Services, it strengthens U.S. biological and chemical 
defense programs and it preserves the military's ability to use riot 
control agents, such as tear gas. It also requires the President to 
review the policy of negative security assurance to widen U.S. options 
to respond with nuclear weapons against such an attack by a nonnuclear 
weapons state.
  For foreign countries who use biological or chemical weapons in war 
or against its own citizens, mandatory 3-year sanctions are imposed as 
listed in the bill. Plus, it calls an international conference to 
strengthen the existing 1925 Geneva Protocol. Lastly, it requires 
Russian cooperation in disarmament of CW/BW weapons in return

[[Page S3339]]

for continued U.S. assistance for dismantling these weapons of mass 
destruction. This applies only to CW/BW destruction and not to any 
other Russian assistance, such as the Nunn-Lugar programs.
  I hope all my colleagues support S. 495. It toughens our domestic 
laws on those who use these weapons. For all the talk about chemical 
weapons, little has been done domestically to punish users of these 
horrible weapons. This bill will do just that. Support this bill and 
let's make it known that we will not tolerate the use of these weapons 
against American citizens or any other people.
  Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I rise today in support of S. 495, the 
Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat Reduction Act of 1997. In the 
wake of World War I, nations from all around the world came together to 
sign the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Having witnessed the horrible effects of 
poison gas in battle, this agreement banned its use in interstate 
conflict. However, at the time no provisions were made in U.S. law to 
establish criminal or civil penalties pertaining to such weapons.
  Today, for the first time, legislation has come to the Senate floor 
that provides criminal and civil penalties for the unlawful 
acquisition, transfer, or use of any chemical or biological weapon and 
gives domestic law enforcement authorities the needed legal basis to 
enforce prohibitions on chemical weapons activities within the United 
States. Most importantly, in light of recent domestic terrorist attacks 
and the actual release of Sarin gas in a Tokyo subway, S. 495 allows 
the death penalty for the use of chemical or biological weapons that 
leads to the loss of life.
  From the international perspective, this legislation conditions 
continued United States aid to Russia for chemical and biological 
weapons dismantlement and destruction upon Russia demonstrating that it 
is abiding by existing agreements in this area. It urges enhancement of 
multilateral regimes to control trade in chemical and biological 
weapons-related materials, while requiring that the United States 
continue strengthening chemical and biological defenses, particularly 
in terms of equipment and training. Finally, S. 495 establishes, for 
the world, U.S. policy on the use of riot control agents and permits 
the use of tear gas for such things as the rescuing of downed pilots.
  The Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat Reduction Act of 1997 
augments existing international norms and agreements by establishing a 
framework for U.S. sanctions against nations which use chemical or 
biological weapons and by directing the Secretary of State to convene 
an international negotiating forum for the purpose of reaching an 
agreement on the enforcement of the 1925 Geneva Protocol which bans the 
use of chemical weapons in war.
  I wish to point out that supporting S. 495 is not in conflict with 
the ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Instead it 
complements the CWC by reducing the threat of acts of terrorism and 
armed aggression against the United States involving chemical and 
biological weapons. Therefore, I urge my colleagues to support this 
legislation and take a step toward making our country safer with a 
comprehensive plan that provides realistic and practical measures to 
combat the dangers of these repugnant weapons.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for not 
to exceed 1 minute as in morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered. The Senator from Vermont may proceed.

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