[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 46 (Thursday, April 17, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3322-S3324]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




          CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS THREAT REDUCTION ACT

  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I am pleased to speak in support of this 
legislation that has been drafted by Senator Kyl and joined in with 
cosponsorship from Senators Helms, Nickles, Mack, Coverdell, Shelby, 
Hutchison, and myself, as well as others. We introduced this 
legislation on March 21. This is important legislation. I know there 
are a lot of people who are trying to assess will this legislation 
favorably or unfavorably affect the final vote on the Chemical Weapons 
Convention. I do not think you can really judge that. Senators that 
will vote on both sides of the issue on this bill and that bill will 
view it in different ways depending on their own personal perspective. 
The most important thing is this is a bill we should have passed. We 
should already have passed it irrespective of what might happen on the 
Chemical Weapons Convention.
  As I have gotten into this issue and studied this bill, I am amazed 
that we do not already have laws on the books dealing with sanctions 
against any country that uses chemical and biological weapons against 
another country or its own nationals, that we do not allow a range of 
chemical and biological weapons within the United States. I cannot 
believe we have not already done it.
  This is very good legislation. I hope action on this legislation will 
put one myth to rest once and for all: No one supports chemical weapons 
in the United States. Everyone is opposed to them. We all know they are 
terrible things. Whether they are used in a military situation or 
civilian situation like we have seen in recent instances in other parts 
of the world, they are a horrendous thing and they should be eliminated 
from the face of the Earth in any way we can do it.
  As a matter of U.S law, our chemical weapons stockpile will be 
destroyed by 2004. No matter what happens on the chemical weapons 
treaty, we already made a commitment and in fact are in the process of 
destroying our own stockpiles by 2004. Whether or not we pass this bill 
or whether or not we ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention, the 
weapons in the United States are being destroyed.
  Next week, when we get this UC agreement worked out, the Senate will 
debate and vote on the Chemical Weapons Convention. I have a number of 
key concerns about the convention which have not yet been resolved, but 
to the credit of the proponents and the administration, they have been 
working with us, I believe, in good faith. We have had a number of 
minor and some major improvements. We are still working on that 
language at this very moment. But fundamental issues exist, some of 
which have not been resolved.

  I do think that requiring search warrants for involuntary searches is 
essential. Protecting United States intelligence information is vital; 
ensuring United States chemical defensive technology and equipment, 
making sure it is not shared with Iran or other countries that could 
possibly under this convention get access to United States information 
or information from other parts of the world in terms of how chemical 
technology can be utilized for chemical weapons or also how that 
technology or equipment could be used in defense capability. We do not 
want that kind of information spread throughout the globe to those 
rogue countries that in fact have already been using chemical weapons, 
have that capability and have indicated they either will be in the 
convention or may not.
  But serious concerns remain. Whether the convention is verifiable 
enough, whether Russia is taking steps to perhaps violate the treaty 
and, most importantly, whether provisions in the convention actually 
increase the likelihood of chemical weapons proliferation, those are 
all very important questions and we will vote on those issues next week 
in one form or another through a motion to strike or on final passage. 
I know all Senators are weighing the information very seriously. To the 
credit of our committee, the Foreign Relations Committee, in the 
hearings they have been having, we have been hearing testimony from 
very distinguished Americans on both sides of the issue.
  It is being analyzed and critiqued in articles and editorials. I 
believe the Senate now is focusing on this issue, and that is as it 
should be. This bill will help to do that.
  Today, though, the Senate will have an opportunity to take real 
enforceable and effective action to address the threat of chemical 
weapons. The Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat Reduction Act 
includes comprehensive domestic and international steps to act against 
these horrible weapons.
  Domestically, this bill provides for civil and criminal penalties for 
the acquisition, possession, transfer or use of chemical or biological 
weapons. Again, it is amazing we do not already have this on the books.
  It designates the FBI as the lead domestic agency to address chemical 
weapons threats.
  Our bill provides for a Federal death penalty in cases when the use 
of weapons results in the loss of life. Swift and certain punishment 
can help ensure that terrorists do not use chemical weapons against 
America, and ending bureaucratic struggles can help ensure any 
terrorists get caught quickly.
  Internationally, this legislation directs the administration to add 
enforcement provisions to existing international bans on the use of 
chemical weapons. Use of chemical weapons has been banned since 1925 in 
the Geneva Protocol, but the world knows this ban has not been 
effective. In fact, in the 1980's, after clear evidence--clear 
evidence--of Iraq's use of chemical weapons against its own people, the 
international community did nothing--did nothing. It is time to add 
enforcement mechanisms to that Geneva Protocol.
  S. 495 includes a number of provisions to stem chemical and 
biological weapons proliferation around the world. It requires 
mandatory sanctions on countries which use these weapons.
  It mandates enhancements to our chemical and biological defenses.
  It requires the administration to name names in an annual report to 
identify the people and the countries

[[Page S3323]]

which are aiming for and aiding the chemical weapons programs of rogue 
states.
  I believe these provisions make good common sense. I believe the 
American people would want us to upgrade our chemical defenses and to 
impose sanctions on countries that use weapons of mass destruction.
  Much has been said about another provision of the legislation 
requiring certain minimum criteria be met before United States 
taxpayers send dollars to Russia. Our legislation calls on Russia to 
implement and comply with the bilateral destruction agreement it signed 
5 years ago to present accurate information about its chemical weapons 
program and to comply with the Biological Weapons Convention signed 
more than 20 years ago.
  I cannot understand why anyone would oppose this provision. U.S. aid 
is not an entitlement to be given no matter how recipients behave. If 
Russia complies with its agreements, Russia should get assistance as it 
moves toward more free enterprise and more toward democracy. If they do 
not comply, why in the world should they get aid? But there have been 
concerns about the impact this legislation might have on the so-called 
Nunn-Lugar legislation.
  Senator Kyl from Arizona has heard those concerns, and, as I 
understand it, he has a modification that has addressed that problem.
  We have heard much over the past few weeks about what the Senate 
should do to prevent the spread of chemical weapons and related 
technologies and equipment. Many people say the Chemical Weapons 
Convention will do that. I have my doubts. I am not sure that the day 
after that vote--if, in fact, it should pass--that we will have fewer 
chemical weapons in the world. I fear that without further action, we 
could have more. That is a basic, fundamental part of the concerns that 
I have and that I have enumerated over the past few days and weeks to 
the proponents of the legislation.
  Today, though, the Senate can vote for the Kyl bill and take serious 
steps for enforcement of effective and achievable chemical weapons arms 
control.
  Once we enter into this unanimous consent request and, hopefully, its 
agreement, we will begin the actual debate under a time arrangement 
that we have worked out, I believe, and go to completion of this bill, 
hopefully, by a relatively early hour this afternoon. Hopefully, we can 
get it done between 4 and 5 o'clock. We will be prepared to make that 
request shortly.
  Mr. President, we have another 5 minutes, I believe, remaining in 
morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
  Mr. LOTT. I suggest the absence of a quorum, Mr. President.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, we are still in the process of trying to work 
out the details of a unanimous-consent agreement. Part of the question 
is whether we can get to a vote on this matter by 3:45, or thereabouts, 
this afternoon. We are trying to leap to that conclusion, and in order 
to allow people to continue to talk about that and perhaps reach that 
point, I am going to begin discussing this bill now as if it were 
before us, so I will not have to speak later and, therefore, we will 
not have to use more time, hoping to be helpful in that regard.
  What we are talking about doing here this afternoon is having a 
couple hours of debate on a bill called the Chemical and Biological 
Weapons Threat Reduction Act. The bill is S. 495. This legislation is 
before us because in the process of leading up to the debate on the 
Chemical Weapons Convention itself--which, if there is a unanimous-
consent agreement, will be taken up next week--we discovered there were 
several things actually we could do right now, very practical, 
realistic steps we could take to help ameliorate the threat. Senator 
Hutchison from Texas has already spoken to it. Let me detail what those 
things are.
  It, basically, involves closing some loopholes in existing law and 
ensuring that the administration and the Congress work together in 
those ways that we can, right here at home, irrespective of whether the 
Chemical Weapons Convention passes or does not pass, to actually reduce 
this threat. One example of the kind of thing we are talking about is 
the fact that existing U.S. law does not make it a crime to manufacture 
or possess chemical weapons in the United States. If we are going to 
have this big debate about the chemical weapons treaty, the first thing 
you want to do is make sure that kind of activity is outlawed here at 
home. It is a provision of the law we add as a result of S. 495.
  There are several things like that in this bill, and I will go 
through them briefly. I want to assure my colleagues, whether you are 
for the Chemical Weapons Convention or opposed to the Chemical Weapons 
Convention, this legislation is legislation you can support. If you are 
against the convention, you can see this as an alternative. If you are 
for it, you can see it as a supplement. I am not trying to sell it as 
either one. I am saying these are good, practical steps we can take 
right now, and we should do it.
  Let me quickly go through the specifics of the provisions of the 
legislation. I think my colleagues will see it is exactly as we have 
said that it is.
  For the first time in history, we would be criminalizing the entire 
range of chemical weapons activities. The current law only prohibits 
the use or attempt or conspiracy to use chemical weapons. It does 
outlaw, with respect to biological weapons, the possession or 
manufacture. We combine the two and say that it is against the law to 
manufacture, to possess, to use or to conspire to use either chemical 
or biological weapons. So, for the first time, we contain all of those 
things in our criminal code, and that is against the law in the United 
States. That is the first thing this bill would do.
  The second thing it would do is to revoke certain export privileges 
of companies that violate the law. That is a commonsense proposition, 
and it has the additional benefit, by the way, of helping us to prevent 
American companies from assisting countries who we believe should not 
have chemicals, the precursors to making their biological or chemical 
weapons.
  The third section deals with sanctions against the use of chemical or 
biological weapons. Mr. President, today under existing law, the 
President of the United States is obligated to impose sanctions against 
countries that use chemical or biological weapons, and he is given a 
list of 10 sanctions that he is to impose. They are in two different 
tiers--five in one tier and five in another tier. He also has a waiver 
authority.
  What we do in this legislation is to grant him more flexibility, to 
keep the same sanctions, but not to have the one tier and two tier. So 
he can actually decide, based upon the circumstances at the time, 
exactly how he wants to proceed. The price for that flexibility is that 
we reduce somewhat his flexibility on the waiver, but he still has the 
ability, under the supreme-national-interest-waiver clause to waive the 
imposition of those sanctions should he deem it appropriate.
  Obviously, that waiver would not likely be used by a President if a 
country actually used chemical or biological weapons. He would, under 
the law today, under the law as we have it written today, want to 
impose sanctions. As I said, we provide more flexibility in those 
sanctions.
  In addition, in this section, we call on the President to block 
transactions of any property that is owned by a country found to have 
used chemical or biological weapons. In other words, just to use a 
hypothetical, country A uses biological or chemical weapons, and they 
have assets in banks in the United States. The President could block 
any transaction of that property, basically freeze those assets as a 
way of preparing to indemnify victims of the use of that chemical 
weapon. This is a way we can provide real, meaningful relief. This is 
new in law. This does not exist today. We would have a way, therefore, 
at least of providing a fund should we be able to indemnify victims of 
such a horrible, horrible crime.

  Another thing we do is have a section on continuation and enhancement 
of

[[Page S3324]]

multilateral control regimes, which is really a fancy way of saying 
that we are expressing the sense of the Senate and establishing United 
States policy that the President continue to maintain our role in the 
Australia group, that group of countries that has agreed among itself 
not to trade chemicals to countries we believe might want to use them 
to create a biological or chemical weapon with them.
  We establish the policy that the President will attempt to block any 
attempt to substantially weaken the controls established by the 
Australia group. I believe that as a general proposition--this is the 
administration's policy anyway--I do not think that this is 
particularly new, but it puts into statute our policy expressing this 
strong position. It should, therefore, assist the President in the 
advocacy of that position in the Australia group meetings.
  There is another section dealing with assistance to Russia. A year 
ago, in the 1996 Defense Authorization Act, the Congress actually 
fenced, meaning it set aside the expenditure of funds under the so-
called Nunn-Lugar provision for chemical- and biological-related 
activities. We did this because we felt there was some question about 
whether Russia was actually proceeding in good faith to dismantle their 
chemical and biological capability. As a result of the compromise that 
was struck by Senators Nunn and Lugar, there was actually a provision 
for four conditions in that legislation that had to be certified by the 
President prior to the release of part of these funds.
  What we have done in this legislation is to reinstate--essentially 
the same language that was in that 1996 defense authorization bill--and 
to reestablish those four conditions for certification by the 
President. Those conditions, as I said, are essentially the same 
conditions that existed before and would be certified by the President 
or, as was done in that defense authorization bill, the President could 
also release the funds if he formally certifies that he is unable to 
make the certification.
  So the President has total flexibility here, but at least it focuses 
attention on the degree of cooperation by the Russians with respect to 
the dismantlement of their CW and BW programs.
  The next section calls for reports on the state of chemical and 
biological weapons proliferation. It asks the administration to provide 
us an annual classified report that will enable us to better understand 
the threat that is out there.
  The next section would strengthen the 1925 Geneva Protocol. It is a 
sense of the Senate, but what it does do is urge and direct the 
Secretary of State to work to convene an international negotiating 
forum for the purpose of putting some teeth into this 1925 Geneva 
Protocol, which is the agreement that actually prevents or prohibits 
the use of chemical weapons, not just the manufacture or possession of 
them. We provide $5 million for the State Department to begin this 
process.

  We think this would be useful because countries of greatest concern 
to us, like Iran and Iraq, North Korea, Russia, China, Syria, and 
Libya, are all signatories to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. If we could 
make an international agreement that puts some teeth into that, it 
would be clearly useful. As I say, it is a sense of the Senate, but we 
believe it is useful nonetheless.
  Next it says, until the United States has developed its resolution of 
ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention--if it does--we would 
not be providing funding for that organization.
  The next section is that it is the sense of the Senate that we 
actually do some things to beef up our military defenses against the 
use of chemical or biological weapons.
  The General Accounting Office, in 1996, issued a report that was very 
distressing in that it reported that U.S. forces are inadequately 
equipped, organized, trained and exercised for operations in 
battlefields in which chemical and biological weapons are being used.
  So this bill recommends three specific corrective steps to deal with 
that and, as a result, we think, will help to actually improve and 
enhance our defensive capability should our forces ever be confronted 
with the use of these weapons.
  The last two sections, Mr. President.
  The first is relating to negative security assurances. It is a sense 
of the Senate that calls on the President to reevaluate the current 
policy of the United States on negative assurances and its impact on 
deterrent strategy.
  In effect, what this is all about is the following. In return for a 
nation's decision to join the nuclear nonproliferation treaty as a 
nonnuclear weapons state, the United States pledges never to threaten 
or use nuclear weapons against that state unless it was allied with a 
nuclear weapons state in aggression against the United States.
  So today, when chemical and biological threats seem like the larger 
concern, this negative security assurance could undermine our effective 
deterrence against such an attack. Would Saddam Hussein, for example, 
feel free to use chemical weapons if he did not think we would possibly 
retaliate with nuclear weapons? As a result, that is in here.
  Finally, we have the riot control agent provision which has been much 
spoken of. We think it is important for the rescue of downed pilots or 
in a situation where civilians are present that riot control agents be 
used. And our act provides for that.
  These are all, I would say, very helpful, very specific, very 
realistic provisions that constructively deal with the proliferation of 
this threat. As a result, we think this legislation is important. 
Again, as I say, whether you are pro or con on the treaty, this 
legislation enhances the security of the United States. I certainly 
request my colleagues to consider it and to support the vote, assuming 
we have the vote here before long.
  Mr. LOTT addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is recognized.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, again, I want to thank the Senator from 
Arizona, Senator Kyl, for his work on this legislation.
  We do have a unanimous-consent request ready to offer now.

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