[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 45 (Wednesday, April 16, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3237-S3243]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS TREATY
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, next week we will have an enormously
important vote in the U.S. Senate.
There are days when people come to the floor of the Senate and debate
almost nothing or find almost nothing to debate about. But, of course,
almost nothing can provoke a debate in the Senate. We tend to get
involved in discussions back and forth and find reasons to dispute each
other over the smallest word or the smallest nuance in a piece of
legislation. Sometimes that is a little frustrating, especially if you
came here wanting to do some important things and some big things.
Next week we will do something important and tackle a big issue. It's
the chemical weapons treaty. It is an attempt by a group of countries,
hopefully including our country, to ban an entire class of weapons of
mass destruction.
The negotiation on a Chemical Weapons Convention to ban chemical
weapons was begun by President Ronald Reagan. President Bush was active
as Vice President and as President in supporting the treaty. The treaty
was the great achievement of the last month of his administration.
Today, he very strongly supports ratification. President Clinton back
in 1993 submitted the treaty to the Senate for ratification.
This treaty is the result of decades of negotiation and leadership by
our country. The treaty which came from those negotiations needs to be
ratified by the U.S. Senate, and it has been hanging around for some
long while. It was supposed to be voted on last year, but it got caught
up in Presidential politics. We need to ratify it by April 29 if we, as
a country, are to be involved in the regime that sets up the monitoring
and the processes by which this treaty is implemented.
We are told that next week we will vote on this treaty. We also
understand that it is going to be a close vote. I want to tell you why
I think this is important. We will have several other Members of the
Senate here in the next hour to describe why it is important from their
standpoint.
What are chemical weapons? Well, simply, they are poison gases,
horrible weapons of war, highly toxic gases or liquids that can be used
in bombs, rockets, missiles, artillery shells, mines, or grenades. This
treaty says let us ban entirely poison gases, let us outlaw this class
of weapons completely.
Some do not like any treaties on arms. Some in this Senate will stand
up and say we should not have arms treaties. Some have opposed START I,
START II, the nuclear arms treaties. They are inappropriate, they say.
Well, I held up on the floor of the Senate about a year ago a piece
of metal about the size of my fist. The piece of metal came from a
missile silo, a silo that housed a missile in Pervomaisk, Ukraine, a
silo that held a missile with a nuclear warhead that was aimed at the
United States of America.
I held up a piece of that silo in my hand because the silo has been
destroyed, the missile has been destroyed, the warhead is gone, and
where a missile once sat, aimed at the United States of America, is now
a patch of dirt planted with sunflowers.
Why was a missile taken out, a silo destroyed, and sunflowers planted
where there once was a missile aimed at the United States? Because the
arms control treaties required it--required it--required that missiles
be destroyed. We are destroying missiles on nuclear weapons. So is the
former Soviet Union. The Ukraine is now nuclear free. The fact is, we
have had success with arms control agreements. Are they perfect? No. Do
they work? Yes. We have had success with arms control agreements. This
is a treaty on arms control. We need to ratify it. We will vote on that
next week.
Let me describe, again, what this is about. It is a treaty to try to
ban a class of weapons of mass destruction. Not many people probably
know what chemical weapons are. I really don't. I have obviously not
seen chemical weapons used. Very few people have.
Let me read from a poet, Wilfred Owen, a famous poet from World War
I, and the lines he wrote about a gas attack. Germany was the first
nation in modern times to use chemical weapons, in the World War I
battle at Ypres, a town in Belgium, April 22, 1915. It is said that a
hissing sound came from German trenches as 6,000 cylinders spewed
chlorine gas aimed at the allied lines. That is a gas that attacks the
lungs, causes severe coughing and choking and death. It had a
devastating effect on the allied soldiers, who were unprepared.
Soldiers breathing that gas began to cough up blood, their faces
turning purple, their bodies writhing in the trenches. There were
15,000 casualties that day, we are told. Chlorine gas, mustard gas, and
blister gas caused a million casualties in World War I.
Wilfred Owen, the poet, wrote a description of a gas attack in the
First World War. A company of exhausted soldiers is marching back from
the front lines, when suddenly someone shouts:
``Gas! GAS! Quick, boys!''
An ecstasy of fumbling,
Fitting the clumsy helmets just in time;
But someone still was yelling out and stumbling;
And flound'ring like a man in fire or lime. . . .
Dim, through the misty panes and thick green light,
As under a green sea, I saw him drowning.
In all my dreams, before my helpless sight,
He plunges at me, guttering, choking, drowning.
If in some smothering dreams you too could pace
Behind the wagon we flung him in,
And watch the white eyes writhing in his face,
His hanging face, like a devil's sick of sin;
If you could hear, at every jolt, the blood
Come gargling from the froth-corrupted lungs,
Obscene as cancer, bitter as the cud
Of incurable sores on innocent tongues. . . .
That is Wilfred Owen describing a gas attack, an attack using
chemical weapons.
Modern armies have the capability of protecting themselves in many
circumstances against chemical weapons with protective devices and
protective gear.
But of course civilians are the most vulnerable to chemical weapons.
Perhaps the example that most of us remember was the attack at the
Tokyo subway by a terrorist group, a cult headquartered in Japan but
active in America. They used the nerve gas sarin in a terrorist attack.
The cult released the gas on March 20, 1995, during the morning rush
hour at a busy Tokyo subway station. In that attack, 12 were killed,
over 5,000 were injured. We are told that it was very close to a
circumstance in which thousands would have been killed from that
attack. We all remember the frightening television images of people
staggering up out of the subway with their handkerchiefs over their
mouths and collapsing on the street. Not surprisingly, the Japanese
Diet, or parliament, ratified the chemical weapons treaty within a
month of the Tokyo subway attack.
This raises the question of why the Senate has yet to do the same.
Why would people come to the floor of the Senate and say this is an
inappropriate treaty and they intend to oppose it with every fiber of
their being? Let me go through some of the myths we will hear about the
chemical weapons treaty.
Myth one: by ratifying the chemical weapons treaty the United States
will
[[Page S3238]]
surrender a vital deterrent to chemical attack. That is not true at
all. This is not about our weapons. It is about other countries'
weapons. President Reagan already made a decision back in the 1980's
that we were going to get rid of our stock of chemical weapons. The
question now is whether other countries will similarly abandon their
stock of chemical weapons and join us in an approach that will verify
that other countries in the world are not producing chemical weapons.
Myth two: rogue states will refuse to join the treaty, so it will
only tie our hands, not theirs. As I just indicated, we are not
producing chemical weapons, we are destroying the stock of chemical
weapons we now have. So it will not tie our hands. But the Chemical
Weapons Convention will shrink the chemical weapon problem down to a
few rogue states and help curb their ability to get the materials
necessary to make chemical weapons.
Some say if you cannot prevent murder why should you have a law
against murder. Common sense says murder is wrong, you have a law that
provides penalties for murder. The production of chemical gasses ought
to be wrong and we ought to have a convention that says we intend as a
country to be part of an effort to ban it from the world. The fact we
might have a few rogue nations wanting to produce them does not mean we
ought not decide to ratify this treaty. What we ought to do is join all
of our friends around the world who feel similarly and go after the
rogue nations to demand and make certain that they are not producing
chemical weapons.
The treaty is unverifiable, people say. Well, no treaty is perfectly
verifiable. We should not be making the perfect the enemy of the good.
We will be able to adequately verify this treaty.
The military use of chemical weapons requires significant testing and
equipping or training of forces that will be difficult to hide in the
face of the kind of investigation that will occur if this treaty is
approved.
I will intend to proceed further with the myths that we will hear on
the floor of the Senate about the Chemical Weapons Convention, but let
me do that at another time, because I intend to come to the floor on a
number of additional occasions and talk about this subject. But other
Senators are joining me on the floor to speak about this. Senator Levin
from the State of Michigan is here. He has been one of the most
eloquent spokesman on this issue in the U.S. Senate and feels
passionately about it. I am pleased he has joined me. Senator Bingaman
is also coming to the floor, as are a couple of others.
I yield such time as he may consume to the Senator from Michigan,
Senator Levin.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Hutchinson). The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair, and I thank my good friend from North
Dakota. His eloquent voice is indeed critical to the ratification of
this convention.
It is long overdue, Mr. President, that the Senate take up the
Chemical Weapons Convention and that we promptly provide our advice and
our consent to its ratification so that the United States can join the
convention as an original party.
I will focus just for a few moments this morning on the military
issues and the military implications as they relate to the Chemical
Weapons Convention from my perspective as the ranking member on the
Armed Services Committee.
Under the 1985 treaty which was signed by President Reagan, we are
already unilaterally destroying our stockpile of unitary chemical
weapons. We are doing this without a treaty, without being required to
do so, because of our own decision as to their limited military
usefulness. This process is scheduled to be completed by the year 2004.
This is a point which Secretary Cohen makes very, very effectively.
This is not an issue of saying we will give up our chemical weapons
if the other guys do the same thing. We are already unilaterally
destroying our chemical weapons. The question now is whether we will
join a convention where other countries are going to do what we are
already doing unilaterally. So the destruction of our chemical weapons
will take place whether or not the Senate ratifies this convention. It
will require other nations to do what we are already doing and will
reduce the risk of chemical attacks against our troops and our country
in the process.
This convention will enter into force on April 29, with or without
the United States being a party. So the question before the Senate is
not whether the Chemical Weapons Convention is a perfect treaty. It is
whether or not we want the United States to have a role in overseeing
and implementing this convention so that it greatly enhances our
security. Our military and our civilian defense leadership give a
resounding yes to the question of whether or not the United States
should ratify this convention.
First, here is the testimony of General Shalikashvili, the Chairman
of our Joint Chiefs of Staff, before the Foreign Relations Committee,
last March 28, 1996. This is what General Shalikashvili said:
From a military perspective, the Chemical Weapons
Convention is clearly in our national interest. The
Convention's advantages outweigh its shortcomings. The United
States and all other CW capable state parties incur the same
obligation to destroy their chemical weapon stockpile. While
less than perfect, the verification regime allows for
intrusive inspections while protecting national security
concerns. The nonproliferation aspects of the convention will
retard the spread of chemical weapons and, in so doing,
reduce the probability that U.S. forces may encounter
chemical weapons in a regional conflict. Finally, while
foregoing the ability to retaliate in kind, the U.S. military
retains the wherewithal to deter and defend against a
chemical weapons attack. I strongly support this convention
and respectfully request your consent to ratification.
General Shalikashvili told this to the Foreign Relations Committee a
year ago.
Then he said in another point in his testimony to the Armed Services
Committee last month that all of the chiefs of staff and the commanders
in chief of our combatant commanders support the Chemical Weapons
Convention. He told the Senate Armed Services Committee, ``I fully
support early ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention and in
that respect I reflect the views of the Joint Chiefs and the combatant
commanders.''
Now, this is really quite an important point, I believe, for the U.S.
Senate. We have the Chairman of our Joint Chiefs, we have all of the
Chiefs, all of our combatant commanders urging us to ratify the
Chemical Weapons Convention because our troops will be safer with the
convention in effect than if it is not in effect. That ought to count
heavily with the U.S. Senate. It is not always true that you have that
kind of a unified position on the part of our uniformed military. It is
not always true that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs can say that all
of the Chiefs, all of the combatant commanders, agree that a certain
course of action ought to be taken in the U.S. Senate. But it is true
in this case.
As I mentioned, Secretary Cohen, when he was still the Secretary-
designate for his current position, testified as follows, before the
Armed Services Committee, when asked whether or not he supports the
ratification of the convention prior to the April 29 deadline, and
this, basically, is his answer:
Yes. The CWC, as both a disarmament and a nonproliferation
treaty, is very much in our national security interest
because it:
No. 1, establishes an international mandate for the
destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles;
No. 2, prohibits the development, retention, storage,
preparations for use, and use of chemical weapons;
No. 3, increases the probability of detecting militarily
significant violations of the CWC; and
No. 4, hinders the development of clandestine CW
stockpiles.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the detailed explanation
of Secretary Cohen for each of those conclusions be printed in the
Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Establishes an international mandate for the destruction of
chemical weapons (CW) stockpiles. Congress has mandated that
the Army, as executive agent for CW destruction, eliminate
its unitary CW, which constitute the bulk of its CW
stockpile, by 31 December 2004. That destruction process is
well under way at the CW destruction facilities at Johnston
Atoll and Tooele, UT. The CWC mandates that state parties
destroy, under a strict verification regime, their entire CW
stockpiles within 10 years after the
[[Page S3239]]
Convention enters into force (April 2007). Given that the
U.S. does not need CW for its security, and given that we are
currently legally committed to eliminating unilaterally the
vast majority of our CW stockpile, common sense suggests that
it would be preferable to secure a commitment from other
nations to do the same.
Prohibits the development, retention, storage, preparations
for use, and use of CW. These expansive prohibitions
establish a broadly accepted international norm that will
form a basis for international action against those states
parties that violate the CWC. Unlike the 1925 Geneva
Protocol, which only bans the use of CW in war, the CWC:
includes a verification regime; restricts the export of
certain dual-use CW precursor chemicals to non-state parties;
prohibits assisting other states, organizations, or personnel
in acquiring CW; and requires state parties to implement
legislation prohibiting its citizens and organizations from
engaging in activities prohibited by the Convention. The CWC
also contains mechanisms for recommending multilateral
sanctions, including recourse to the UN Security Council.
Increases the probability of detecting militarily
significant violations of the CWC. While no treaty is 100%
verifiable, the CWC contains complementary and overlapping
declaration and inspection requirements. These requirements
increase the probability of detecting militarily significant
violations of the Convention. While detecting illicit
production of small quantities of CW will be extremely
difficult, it is easier to detect large scale production,
filling and stockpiling of chemical weapons. Over time,
through declaration, routine inspections, fact-finding,
consultation, and challenge inspection mechanisms, the CWC's
verification regime should prove effective in providing
information on significant CW programs that would not
otherwise be available.
Hinders the development of clandestine CW stockpiles.
Through systematic on-site verification, routine declarations
and trade restrictions, the Convention makes it more
difficult for would-be proliferators to acquire, from CWC
state parties precursor chemicals required for developing
chemical weapons. The mutually supportive trade restrictions
and verification provisions of the Convention increase the
transparency of CW-relevant activities. These provisions will
provide the U.S. with otherwise unavailable information that
will facilitate U.S. detection and monitoring of illicit CW
activities.
Mr. LEVIN. Secretary Cohen concluded by saying the following:
I strongly support the Chemical Weapons Convention and the
goal of U.S. ratification of the convention by April 29, 1997
. . . U.S. ratification of the Convention prior to this date
will ensure that the U.S. receives one of the 41 seats on the
Executive Council of the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the international organization that
will oversee CWC implementation. Early ratification will also
ensure that U.S. citizens will fill key positions within the
OPCW and act as inspectors for the Organization. Direct U.S.
involvement and leadership will ensure the efficacy and
efficiency of the OPCW during the critical early stages of
the Convention's implementation. The U.S., upon ratification
and implementation of the CWC, will also receive CW-related
information from other state parties. As a state party and a
member of the Executive Council, the U.S. will be in the best
position to assure the effective implementation of the
Convention's verification provisions.
Now, that is our former colleague, Bill Cohen. It is an exceptionally
clear and cogent statement of why the CWC is in our international
interest. Defense Secretary Perry before him, said the following before
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on March 28, 1996:
In conclusion, the Department of Defense considers the
Chemical Weapons Convention a well-balanced treaty that, in
conjunction with our other efforts against CW proliferation,
a robust chemical protection program and maintenance of a
range of nonchemical response capabilities, will serve the
best interests of the United States and the world community.
The Department of Defense strongly supports the Convention. I
respectfully request that the Senate give its advice and
consent to ratification this spring.
Mr. President, our military, today, enjoys a high level of protection
against chemical weapons. The treaty specifically permits that level of
protection and any additional level of protection to continue. We spend
about $500 million a year on chemical and biological defenses. The
Senate should help assure that our forces maintain an effective
capability to defend themselves. We plan on doing just that in the
budget that we will be submitting to the Senate.
But by not ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention, we would be
giving other nations an excuse for delaying or rejecting ratification,
while taking the pressure off of pariah states to join the treaty.
General Schwarzkopf, retired now, recently testified as follows:
I am very, very much in favor of the ratification of that
treaty. We don't need chemical weapons to fight our future
warfares. And, frankly, by not ratifying that treaty, we
align ourselves with nations like Libya and North Korea, and
I'd just as soon not be associated with those thugs in this
particular matter. So I am very, very much in favor of
ratification of that particular treaty.
Admiral Zumwalt, now retired, said the following relative to this
treaty. He was the Chief of Naval operations in the early 1970's. He
said:
If we refuse to ratify, some governments will use our
refusal as an excuse to keep their chemical weapons.
Worldwide availability of chemical weapons will be higher,
and we will know less about other countries' chemical
activities. The diplomatic credibility of our threat of
retaliation against anyone who uses chemical weapons on our
troops will be undermined by our lack of ``clean hands.''
Admiral Zumwalt, who, in this article I am quoting from in the
Washington Post of January 6, 1997, pointed out that he is not a dove.
As a matter of fact, he said he helped lead the opposition to the SALT
II treaty because he was convinced that it would give the Soviet Union
a strategic advantage. This is someone who has a history of being
skeptical in terms of arms control agreements. Admiral Zumwalt in the
Washington Post that day added the following:
At the bottom line, our failure to ratify will
substantially increase the risk of a chemical attack against
American service personnel.
I ask unanimous consent that Admiral Zumwalt's entire article in the
Washington Post of January 6, 1997, be printed in the Record at this
time.
There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the Washington Post, Jan. 6, 1997]
A Needless Risk for U.S. Troops
(By E.R. Zumwalt Jr.)
It has been more than 80 years since poison gas was first
used in modern warfare--in April 1915 during the first year
of World War I. It is long past time to do something about
such weapons.
I am not a dove. As a young naval officer in 1945, I
supported the use of nuclear weapons against Japan. As chief
of naval operations two decades ago, I pressed for
substantially higher military spending than the nation's
political leadership was willing to grant. After retiring
from the Navy, I helped lead the opposition to the SALT II
treaty because I was convinced it would give the Soviet Union
strategic advantage.
Now the Senate is considering whether to approve the
Chemical Weapons Convention. This is a worldwide treaty,
negotiated by the Reagan administration and signed by the
Bush administration. It bans the development, production,
possession, transfer and use of chemical weapons. Senate
opposition to ratification is led by some with whom I often
agree. But in this case, I believe they do a grave disservice
to America's men and women in uniform.
To a Third World leader indifferent to the health of his
own troops and seeking to cause large-scale pain and death
for its own sake, chemical weapons have a certain attraction.
They don't require the advanced technology needed to build
nuclear weapons. Nor do they require the educated populace
needed to crate a modern conventional military. But they
cannot give an inferior force a war-winning capability. In
the Persian Gulf war, the threat of our uncompromising
retaliation with convention weapons deterred Saddam Hussein
from using his chemical arsenal against us.
Next time, our adversary may be more berserk than Saddam,
and deterrence may fail. If that happens, our retaliation
will be decisive, devastating--and no help to the young
American men and women coming home dead or bearing grevious
chemical injuries. What will help is a treaty removing
huge quanities of chemical weapons that could otherwise be
used against us.
Militarily, this treaty will make us stronger. During the
Bush administration, our nation's military and political
leadership decided to retire our chemical weapons. This wise
move was not made because of treaties. Rather, it was based
on the fact that chemical weapons are not useful for us.
Politically and diplomatically, the barriers against their
use by a First World country are massive. Militarily, they
are risky and unpredictable to use, difficult and dangerous
to store. They serve no purpose that can't be met by our
overwhelming convention at forces.
So the United States has no deployed chemical weapons today
and will have none in the future. But the same is not true of
our potential adversaries. More than a score of nations now
seeks or possesses chemical weapons. Some are rogue states
which we may some day clash.
This treaty is entirely about eliminating other people's
weapons--weapons that may some day be used against Americans.
For the American military, U.S. ratification of the Chemical
Weapons Convention is high gain and low or no pain. In that
light, I find it astonishing that any American opposes
ratification.
[[Page S3240]]
Opponents argue that the treaty isn't perfect: Verification
isn't absolute, forms must be filled out, not every nation
will join at first and so forth. This is unperuasive. Nothing
in the real world is perfect. If the U.S. Navy had refused to
buy any weapon unless it worked perfectly every time, we
would have bought nothing and now would be diarmed. The
question is not how this treaty compares with perfection. The
question is now U.S. ratification compares with its absence.
If we refuse to ratify, some governments will use our
refusal as an exuse to keep their chemical weapons. Worldwide
availability of chemical weapons will be higher, and we will
know less about other countries' chemical activities. The
diplomatic credibility of our threat of retaliation against
anyone who uses chemical weapons on our troops will be
undermined by our lack of ``clean hands.'' At the bottom
line, our failure to ratify will substantially increase the
risk of a chemical attack against American service personnel.
If such as attack occurs, the news reports of its victims
in our military hospitals will of course produce rapid
ratification of the treaty and rapid replacement of senators
who enabled the horror by opposing ratification. But for the
victims, it will be too late.
Every man and woman who puts on a U.S. military uniform
faces possible injury or death in the national interest. They
don't complain; risk is part of their job description. But it
is also part of the job description of every U.S. senator to
see that this risk not be increased unnecessarily.
Mr. LEVIN. Finally, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a
letter written by a very distinguished group of retired four-star
generals and admirals who support the Chemical Weapons Convention be
printed in the Record at this time.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
April 3, 1997.
Hon. William J. Clinton,
The White House, 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington,
DC.
Dear Mr. President: As former members of the United States
Armed Forces, we write to express our strong support for
Senate ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
This landmark treaty serves the national security interests
of the United States.
Each of us can point to decades of military experience in
command positions. We have all trained and commanded troops
to prepare for the wartime use of chemical weapons and for
defenses against them. We all recognize the limited military
utility of these weapons, and supported President Bush's
decision to renounce the use of an offensive chemical weapons
capability and to unilaterally destroy U.S. stockpiles. The
CWC simply mandates that other countries follow our lead.
This is the primary contribution of the CWC: to destroy
militarily-significant stockpiles of chemical weapons around
the globe.
We recognize that the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, including chemical agents, presents a major
national security threat to the U.S. The CWC cannot eliminate
this threat, as terrorists and rogue states may still be able
to evade the treaty's strict controls. However, the treaty
does destroy existing stockpiles and improves our abilities
to gather intelligence on emerging threats. These new
intelligence tools deserve the Senate's support.
On its own, the CWC cannot guarantee complete security
against chemical weapons. We must continue to support robust
defense capabilities, and remain willing to respond--through
the CWC or by unilateral action--to violators of the
Convention. Our focus is not on the treaty's limitations, but
instead on its many strengths. The CWC destroys stockpiles
that could threaten our troops; it significantly improves our
intelligence capabilities; and it creates new international
sanctions to punish those states who remain outside of the
treaty. For these reasons, we strongly support the CWC.
Stanley R. Arthur, Admiral, USN (Ret); Michael Dugan,
General, USAF (Ret); Charles A. Horner, General, USAF
(Ret); David Jones, General, USAF (Ret); Wesley L.
McDonald, Admiral, USN (Ret); Merrill A. McPeak,
General, USAF (Ret); Carl E. Mundy, Jr., General, USMC
(Ret); William A. Owens, Admiral, USN (Ret); Colin L.
Powell, General, USA (Ret); Robert RisCassi, General,
USA (Ret); H. Norman Schwartzkopf, General, USA (Ret);
Gordon R. Sullivan, General, USA (Ret); Richard H.
Truly, Vice Admiral, USN (Ret); Stansfield Turner,
Admiral, USN (Ret); John W. Vessey, General, USA (Ret);
Fred F. Woerner, General, USA (Ret); Admiral E.R.
Zumwalt, Jr., Admiral, USN (Ret).
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, one paragraph from that letter says the
following:
On its own, the CWC cannot guarantee complete security
against chemical weapons. We must continue to support robust
defense capabilities, and remain willing to respond--through
the CWC or by unilateral action--to violators of the
Convention. Our focus is not on the treaty's limitations, but
instead on its many strengths. The CWC destroys stockpiles
that could threaten our troops; it significantly improves our
intelligence capabilities, and it creates new international
sanctions to punish those states who remain outside of the
treaty. For these reasons, we strongly support the CWC.
Former Secretary of State, Jim Baker, spoke out very strongly in
support of the CWC the other day and said:
If we fail to ratify the convention, we will imperil our
leadership in the entire area of nonproliferation, perhaps
the most vital security issue of the post-cold war era.
Mr. President, before we have a chance to vote on the CWC, we will be
voting on a bill introduced by Senator Kyl, S. 495. It is a 70-page
bill that effects our efforts relative to chemical and biological
weapons. The contrast between the lack of analysis of that bill, the
contrast between the absence of hearings on that bill and the
thoroughness with which the Chemical Weapons Convention has been
analyzed, is enormous. We have had about 18 hearings on the Chemical
Weapons Convention. We have had dozens of briefings for Senators and
our staffs. We have had 1,500 pages of information on the CWC, which
has been provided to the Senate by the administration: 300 pages of
testimony; 500 pages of answers to letters and reports; 400 pages of
answers to questions for the record; 300 pages of other documentation.
That is what we have had in the 3\1/2\ years that the Chemical Weapons
Convention has been before us. The bill introduced by Senator Kyl has
been in front of us for a few weeks.
So we have had the convention before us for 3\1/2\ years, with 18
hearings, hundreds of pages of documents, answers, et cetera, a
thorough and complete and exhaustive analysis of this convention. It is
long, long overdue that it come before the Senate. Hopefully, we are
going to ratify it and not be deterred from ratification in any way by
a bill recently introduced, just a few weeks ago, with 70 pages of
complicated text relative to the same subject, but which doesn't affect
anybody else's weapons, only our own.
Mr. President, I want, again, to thank the Senator from North Dakota
for his leadership in this area. It is important to this Nation's
position and posture in the world as a leader that a convention that
was designed by us, negotiated by Presidents Reagan and Bush, supported
by them, a bipartisan convention, be finally brought before the Senate
for debate and ratification.
I thank the Chair and my friend from North Dakota for yielding me
some time.
I yield the floor.
Mr. BINGAMAN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
Mr. BINGAMAN. How much time remains?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are 25 minutes remaining.
Mr. BINGAMAN. I thank the Chair. Mr. President, let me, first of all,
compliment my colleague from Michigan on his excellent statement. I
agree with each of his points. It is past time for the Senate to bring
this issue to the floor for debate, to debate it seriously, to make
whatever modifications or changes or conditions the Senate believes is
appropriate, if any, and to get on with ratifying the Chemical Weapons
Convention.
Mr. President, one of the challenges in discussing the Chemical
Weapons Convention is to figure out how to bring this home to the
average American that this is an issue and a concern that is important
to them. Many people say, well, this is long term, this is
international, this doesn't relate to me right here in River City, or
Santa Fe, NM, or Silver City, NM, or wherever their hometown happens to
be. But, in fact, the convention intends to reduce the likelihood that
any of our troops or any American civilians in the future will be
injured or killed as a result of chemical weapons.
The history of the use of chemical weapons is better known by others
than by me. My understanding is that the first time there was
significant use of chemical weapons was in the First World War. There
have been instances since then. We have heard much in the news
recently, for example, about the injuries that some of our personnel in
the gulf war encountered by virtue of the accidental destruction of
Iraqi chemical weapons by some of our own military actions.
So the issue is real, and the question is, what can we do as a
nation? What can we do as a Senate to lessen the risk that chemical
weapons will, in fact, injure Americans in the future? I think
[[Page S3241]]
ratifying this treaty at this time is clearly the most important thing
we can do.
I hope very much that we go ahead and enter a into a unanimous-
consent agreement today and begin formal debate of the treaty. We are
not in formal debate as of yet because we have been unable to get
agreement among all Senators to bring the treaty to the floor. We need
to get that agreement and bring it to the floor, and we need to go
ahead with the debate. The reason that it is time-sensitive, Mr.
President, is that the treaty goes into effect on the 29th of this
month. Now, some say it doesn't matter whether we are part of it at the
time it goes into effect or whether we are not part of it. They say we
can come along later. The problem is that international agreements have
been made for the treaty to go into effect. American experts have been
working with experts from other countries in putting together protocols
and plans for implementing this treaty and the inspections that would
be made under the treaty. All of that has been ongoing. If we are not
part of the initial group of ratifying nations--it's a very large
group; I think 161 nations have signed this treaty. If we are not part
of that group when the treaty goes into effect, then the experts from
our country that have been involved in establishing protocols and plans
for inspection will be excluded from management and inspection teams
and others will be put in their place. Perhaps at a later date we could
join, but, clearly, it is not in our interest to have an international
treaty of this importance begin without us being a part of it.
I also point out an obvious point, which I am sure has been made many
times in this debate. The sanctions called for in this treaty against
countries that are not party to the treaty will be imposed on our own
chemical companies. Many of the objections that have been raised about
the treaty are, in fact, in my view, groundless for the simple reason
that our own chemical manufacturers in this country have come out in
strong support of the treaty. They want to be part of this. They
understand the inspections that will be taking place. They readily
subject themselves to those inspections, and they do not want sanctions
imposed upon them that keep them from selling chemicals that can be
used for chemical weapons, but can also have commercial uses at the
same time. They would like to continue to be major participants in the
world market in chemicals. They estimate that the loss to our chemical
manufacturers could be around $600 million per year if we don't ratify
the treaty and if sanctions are imposed on us because we are outside
the treaty.
Mr. President, there are various objections that have been raised. In
my opinion, I have never seen a treaty where there has been more effort
to accommodate very groundless objections. We have some objections
which are not groundless--I will acknowledge that--and concerns that
are valid and need to be considered and addressed. We are doing that.
But many of the objections that have been raised, in my opinion, are
really grasping at straws by people who are trying to find some basis
upon which to oppose this treaty.
The context in which this needs to be considered--this, again, has
been said many times here, and I have said it myself--is that we passed
a law while President Reagan was in the White House that renounced the
use of chemical weapons by this country and which put us on a path to
destroy our own chemical weapons capability. President Reagan signed
that law. That has been the policy of our Government through the Reagan
administration, through the Bush administration, through the Clinton
administration, and now into the second Clinton administration.
We have unilaterally made the decision that we do not need chemical
weapons in order to look out for national security concerns. We have
many other ways to deal with countries that would use chemical weapons.
By signing this agreement, by going ahead and ratifying the Chemical
Weapons Convention, we are not giving up any of the other arrows in our
quiver, so to speak. We have the ability to retaliate against the use
of chemical weapons in any way we determine to retaliate, whether we
are a signatory or not. So we do not lose anything by ratifying it and
becoming part of this convention. We gain, however, a substantial
amount. For that reason, I think the treaty should go forward.
Since we have unilaterally decided not to have chemical weapons, not
to produce chemical weapons, not to maintain a stockpile of chemical
weapons, and not to use chemical weapons in the future, how can it not
be in our interest to try to ensure that other countries make that same
decision? How can it not be in our interest to join with international
inspection groups to investigate and ascertain that the countries that
are signatories to this treaty do not in fact violate the convention?
As I indicated before, our manufacturers agree. If you want to
inspect us, come on in. We are glad to have you come in and inspect our
plants. We are not going to have chemical weapons, we are not going to
stockpile chemical weapons, and, therefore, come on in and investigate
us.
If we ratify this treaty, we can be part of the inspection teams that
go to other countries to make the same determination. Some people say,
``Well, the problem with it is that not all nations are going to sign
onto the treaty.'' That is true. Not all nations are. That is very,
very true. To deal with that circumstance, the treaty calls for
sanctions against those countries that don't ratify the treaty. We
cannot enforce the treaty against countries that don't ratify the
treaty, but we can impose sanctions upon their ability to purchase or
to sell chemicals that have dual use--that can be used in chemical
weapons as well as in commercial purposes. That is a significant tool
that this convention will give us.
I do not know of another circumstance--at least in the time I have
been here in the Senate--where we have made the unilateral decision to
take action that a treaty calls for us to take. For us to now say,
``OK, we have already decided to take the actions that the treaty calls
for us to take, but we do not know whether we want to go ahead and
ratify the treaty so that others also will take those same actions'' is
nonsensical to me. We need to recognize that in the large scheme of
things, this country needs to provide leadership in the world. That
leadership includes ratifying this treaty and going forward with
putting the protocols for its enforcement in place and participating in
the inspection teams required for its implementation. That is exactly
what is required. There have been endless negotiations within the
Foreign Relations Committee in an effort to accommodate concerns that
have been raised. I was not party to those negotiations. I have seen
the results of them. Quite frankly, I am amazed at the extent of the
conditions that we have agreed should be adopted to allay concerns of
different Members. I think that is fine. I have no problem with any of
the conditions. I also support whatever is acceptable to the
administration, which has primary authority in this area and primary
responsibility to enforce the treaty. If they believe these conditions
are acceptable, then fine, they are acceptable to me as well. But we do
need to get on with ratifying the treaty. We need to get on with
providing the additional confidence we can to the American public and
to assure them that their security concerns are being dealt with
responsibly.
I believe very strongly that this treaty is in the best interest of
our country and the best interest of the people of my State. I think it
would be a travesty for us to fail to ratify it, and particularly it
would be a travesty if we failed to even bring it before the Senate for
a vote. That has not happened. I understand the majority leader has
worked very diligently to bring that about, and I believe he is on the
verge of doing so. I commend him for that. But the reality of the
situation is very straightforward--this treaty needs to be ratified. It
needs to be ratified soon. The clock is ticking. Our leadership
position in the world is at stake, and the security of future
generations is also at stake.
I see that we have both Senators from Massachusetts ready to speak. I
do not want to delay them. I ask if either of them wishes to speak on
the treaty at this point.
How much time remains on the treaty?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There remain 11 minutes 50 seconds.
Mr. KERRY addressed the Chair.
[[Page S3242]]
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be permitted
to speak for 15 minutes in morning business.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, we have had a long history in the world of
attempts to rid the planet of the scourge of chemical weapons. That
effort began after World War I, as a result of the searing experiences
of troops in Europe during that war near the beginning of this century
when chemical weapons were used for the first time in a general way in
warfare. Those efforts in the early part of the century resulted, in
1925, in the negotiation in Geneva of an accord that bans the use of
chemical weapons.
Since that time, the world's more powerful nations have not used them
in war, including World War II. There are a couple of rogue states that
have used them. Iraq's use against the Kurds and in its war with Iran
is the instance most often cited. But despite the progress in seeking
to eliminate the use of chemical weapons, the fact is that efforts to
ban the manufacture and storage of poisonous gas has hit one brick wall
after another over the years.
In the past 25 years a substantial effort has been made to achieve an
international agreement to ban manufacture and storage of chemical
weapons. The Nixon and Ford administrations--both of whom, of course,
were Republicans--worked toward this objective, albeit without success.
The administration of Republican President Ronald Reagan reinvigorated
international efforts to achieve such an agreement during the early
1980's. When Vice President Bush was elected President, his
administration assumed the responsibility for continuing those
negotiations that were handed off by the predecessor administration in
which he had served as Vice President, and I believe most people
ultimately will judge that President Bush and his administration's
negotiators acquitted themselves well in this regard.
After intense and lengthy negotiations, initial success was achieved
in 1992 when the Chemical Weapons Convention was completed in Geneva
and was approved by the United Nations. In early 1993, shortly before
leaving office, the Bush administration, representing the United
States, joined with 129 other nations to sign the convention, and the
process of ratification of the treaty began. On November 23 of that
year, the Clinton administration submitted the convention formally to
the Senate for its advice and consent.
So here we are now, 4 years from the time when the convention became
available for ratification, finally about to exercise our
constitutional responsibility in the Senate.
I wish that we had acted sooner. But it is my understanding that we
now are going to act--that the majority leader has made a commitment to
bring up the resolution of ratification on the Senate floor next week
so that we can act prior to the critical day of April 29.
Let me digress to address the subject of the importance of April 29
to this treaty. April 29, less than 2 weeks from today, is the day on
which the convention takes effect. Some Members and others have
suggested in hearings and elsewhere that this is not a critical date;
that we somehow have an extraordinary power to unilaterally dictate the
United States can impose changes in the convention beyond that date.
The fact is that April 29 is the date on which all the nations that
have ratified the convention expect the convention to take effect, per
its terms to which all signatory nations including the United States
agreed. They believe they have a right to expect that others will have
lived by the same rules by which they have lived.
There is a certain contradiction in suggesting that you are going to
take the leadership in drafting and seeking support for a treaty which
is designed to become international law, and which establishes a set of
rules that you and others propose to follow, and before it even takes
effect you unilaterally decide you are going to break the first rule it
contains which is the date by which you must agree to be a full
supporter and participant in order to have a part in setting up on the
ongoing procedures and regulations that will apply its terms to all
participants. I think those who suggest the United States can simply
ignore this deadline--while still seeking international support for
some treaty to address the chemical weapons concern, a treaty they
believe should be altered in various ways from the treaty that is now
before the Senate--are evidencing a kind of arrogance on behalf of our
country that often gets us in trouble with our allies and friends and
with nations we would like to have as allies and friends.
Even more troubling, Mr. President, is the fact that there are some
in the Senate, some Members of the Republican Party, who seem to have a
deep-seated aversion to any kind of arms control treaty. As we draw
close to the point where the Senate will exercise its constitutional
role of advise and consent, we are seeing a desperate effort launched
to grab onto any kind of straw to suggest that this treaty is not good
for the United States of America. We are seeing a host of problems
conjured up, and I do mean literally conjured up, to prevent the
assembly of a two-thirds majority of the Senate to approve the
resolution of ratification.
I only have a brief amount of time in the Chamber today, but I want
to address some of the principal arguments that are being advanced as a
rationale for suggesting that this treaty is not in the best interests
of the United States. I have spoken previously at some length in this
Chamber about the convention, and I will speak again as we formally
take up the debate, but today I want to address briefly several of the
claims made by opponents.
First, opponents say that the convention could jeopardize
confidential business information through frivolous so-called challenge
inspections that the critics claim would provide international
inspectors with extraordinary access to files, data, and equipment of
U.S. chemical companies, and that the inspectors themselves could be
spies for adversary nations or for nations whose chemical industries
compete with our own. These critics, in effect, are anointing
themselves the great protectors of the U.S. chemical industry from an
espionage threat they perceive.
Mr. President, I do not believe there is a person in this Chamber
that does not want to take all needed steps to thwart espionage, but
let me note the facts. The Chemical Manufacturers Association strongly
supports the Chemical Weapons Convention. Its representatives helped
write the rules contained in the convention pertaining to treatment of
confidential business information. Not surprisingly, protecting trade
secrets was at the very top of their priority list during the treaty
negotiations.
Further, the CMA conducted seven full-fledged trial inspections of
chemical facilities just as would be conducted under the treaty's
terms, to make certain that the protections against industrial
espionage were strong. The Chemical Manufacturers Association is
satisfied that those protections are sufficient to safeguard U.S. trade
secrets. Furthermore, the treaty gives our Government the right to
reject ahead of time for any reason whatsoever any inspectors that we
believe would try to spy at U.S. facilities.
Second, Mr. President, opponents say that the convention inspection
requirements may involve unreasonable search and seizure which would
violate the fourth amendment to the Constitution.
Again, they are wrong. The facts are that at the insistence of our
own negotiators who were fully cognizant of issues of search and
seizure, the Chemical Weapons Convention explicitly allows party
nations to take into account their own constitutional obligations when
providing access for a challenge inspection. Constitutional rights in
the United States have not been weakened or relinquished. Both the CWC
and its draft implementing legislation fully protect U.S. citizens,
including businesses, from unreasonable search and seizure. In
addition, the treaty allows sensitive equipment information or areas of
an inspected facility not related to chemical production or storage
that are the subjects of the inspection to be protected during any
challenge inspection by adhering to approved managed access techniques.
Further, treaty proponents are prepared to accept, and Senator Biden
has
[[Page S3243]]
negotiated with Senator Helms, a condition of ratification which will
provide that search warrants will be obtained through the normal
process for all challenge inspections.
A third issue: Opponents say that adherence to the convention's
provisions by party nations cannot be perfectly verified. What is
occurring here is that the opponents are trying to make the perfect the
enemy of the good. I can say that, in the 12 years I have been in the
Senate as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee and deeply
involved in work on a number of arms control agreements, I do not think
I have ever seen an arms control agreement that is absolutely,
perfectly, 100 percent verifiable. I do not think anybody who
negotiates arms control agreements believes such perfection is
attainable.
Perfection is not the standard by which we should make a judgment as
to whether we have a good or bad treaty. Both our national defense
leadership and intelligence community leadership have testified
repeatedly that this treaty will provide them with additional tools
that they do not have today which will help them gain more and better
knowledge about what is happening in the world regarding chemical
weapons and their precursors.
So the test is not can you perfectly verify compliance with the
Convention's requirements; the test is do you enhance the security and
intelligence interests of your country beyond where they would be
without the treaty. Our defense and intelligence community leaders
answer a resounding yes to that question.
Fourth, opponents say that the nations about whose chemical
activities we are most greatly concerned, the rogue nations like Iraq
and Libya and North Korea, will not become parties to the treaty and,
if they are not parties to the treaty, it will not give us enough
protection from chemical weapons to warrant our being a party to it.
This is a red herring of enormous proportions for the following
reasons. As I stand in the Chamber today and the Presiding Officer sits
on the dais, there is absolutely nothing to prevent those rogue nations
from doing exactly what people say they fear. There is not even an
international regime in place that makes manufacture and storage of
chemical weapons illegal, or that provides a way to track the movement
of such chemicals and their precursors so that there is a greater
likelihood the world will know when rogues are engaging in conduct we
believe should not occur, or that gives the world a way in which to
hold such nations accountable.
I pose a simple question: Is the United States in a stronger position
if it is a party to an international treaty in force, to which most
nations of the world are trying to adhere, when a nation not a party to
the treaty is seen to be engaging in behavior violating the treaty's
terms, or is the United States better off with every nation just going
about its own business without any protocol at all, without any
international standard, without any means to obtain accountability when
a nation violates a standard of behavior to which the great majority of
the world's nations have formally decreed they believe all nations
should adhere.
I think most people would say that if the United States ratifies this
Convention, our circumstance relative to rogue nations is in no way
worse than it is now. We give up nothing, but we gain important
advantages. What are they?
First, under present circumstances, the manufacture and storage of
chemical weapons is not illegal under international law or custom. The
Convention will provide that law and custom. It will then be possible
to focus international opprobrium on nations violating its standards,
be they participant or nonparticipant nations.
Moreover, with 72 nations already having ratified, and others certain
to follow, especially if the United States ratifies before April 29,
there will be a quantum leap forward in the capacity to track the
manufacture and sale of chemicals that can be used as weapons, or
precursor chemicals, and this enhanced capacity will help us determine
what nations might be acting in a way that ultimately could do injury
to our country.
It is important for everyone to remember that this treaty will
greatly assist our efforts to impede the production and storage of
chemical weapons. Therefore, it will make it less likely that our
troops or our civilians will ever be put in harm's way by being
subjected to an attack by chemical weapons.
I might remind my colleagues that, no matter what we do with respect
to this treaty, we are not going to be manufacturing chemical weapons
in the United States. That is the track we are on under our current
law. The logic seems unassailable to me that the United States will be
a lot better off if we bring the family of nations into a regimen which
helps us guard against trafficking in those chemicals and which
requires party nations to dispose of their own stocks of chemical
weapons and not manufacture others.
Fifth, opponents say that participating in the chemical weapons
treaty will make the United States less vigilant about the risks of
chemical attacks by organized armies or by terrorists and about the
need to maintain defenses against those threats. Well, shame on us if
that were to be true. I do not think anybody who is supportive of this
treaty wants--and I know I do not want--to let down our guard with
respect to the possibility of another nation, rogue or otherwise,
creating a chemical weapon and using it against us. I absolutely
believe it is vital that we have a robust defense which will protect us
in the event that someone were to try to break out and do that. But I
think this is a tactic of desperation, because if you follow the logic
of this criticism to its conclusion, we ought to make certain that our
adversaries have chemical weapons to be sure we have sufficient
incentive to defend against them, if that is what it takes in order to
build our defenses.
I emphasize two points here. First, there is nothing whatsoever that
any arms control agreement does that necessarily lessens our resolve to
defend against the threat that the agreement is intended to reduce.
And, second, neither the Clinton administration nor this Congress is
going to play ostrich on this issue. The Clinton administration's
budget calls for $225 million in increases in the Defense Department's
funding for chemical and biological defense over the next 6 years. A
$225 million increase hardly equates to a notion that we are being
lulled to sleep or into some kind of complacency. I am willing to bet
with any Member of this body that the ratification of the CWC will not
result in a reduction of our chemical weapons defense efforts.
Mr. President, in the next few days we will face a debate which I
hope will be conducted on the facts. I devoutly hope that we do not
waste time debating the question of whether this treaty is a perfect
treaty--of course it is not. Instead, I hope we squarely face and
debate the question of whether the security of the United States of
America and of the entire world is improved by United States
ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
I respectfully submit to my colleagues that when they look at the
facts, when they measure what the U.S. chemical industry has done to
protect itself, when they measure what we are doing to strengthen our
defenses against chemical weapons, when they measure what being a party
nation to the Convention will provide us in terms of intelligence and
information, when they measure what this does in terms of the ability
to track chemicals throughout the rest of the world, when they measure
the importance to the United States of our being part of this effort
before the Convention takes effect on April 29, I believe our
colleagues will decide that the answer to the question of whether the
Convention improves the security of the United States is an unequivocal
yes, and that they will respond by voting to approve the resolution of
ratification and against any debilitating amendments that any treaty
opponents offer to it.
I yield back any remaining time.
____________________