[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 45 (Wednesday, April 16, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3237-S3243]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                      THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS TREATY

  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, next week we will have an enormously 
important vote in the U.S. Senate.
  There are days when people come to the floor of the Senate and debate 
almost nothing or find almost nothing to debate about. But, of course, 
almost nothing can provoke a debate in the Senate. We tend to get 
involved in discussions back and forth and find reasons to dispute each 
other over the smallest word or the smallest nuance in a piece of 
legislation. Sometimes that is a little frustrating, especially if you 
came here wanting to do some important things and some big things.
  Next week we will do something important and tackle a big issue. It's 
the chemical weapons treaty. It is an attempt by a group of countries, 
hopefully including our country, to ban an entire class of weapons of 
mass destruction.
  The negotiation on a Chemical Weapons Convention to ban chemical 
weapons was begun by President Ronald Reagan. President Bush was active 
as Vice President and as President in supporting the treaty. The treaty 
was the great achievement of the last month of his administration. 
Today, he very strongly supports ratification. President Clinton back 
in 1993 submitted the treaty to the Senate for ratification.
  This treaty is the result of decades of negotiation and leadership by 
our country. The treaty which came from those negotiations needs to be 
ratified by the U.S. Senate, and it has been hanging around for some 
long while. It was supposed to be voted on last year, but it got caught 
up in Presidential politics. We need to ratify it by April 29 if we, as 
a country, are to be involved in the regime that sets up the monitoring 
and the processes by which this treaty is implemented.
  We are told that next week we will vote on this treaty. We also 
understand that it is going to be a close vote. I want to tell you why 
I think this is important. We will have several other Members of the 
Senate here in the next hour to describe why it is important from their 
standpoint.
  What are chemical weapons? Well, simply, they are poison gases, 
horrible weapons of war, highly toxic gases or liquids that can be used 
in bombs, rockets, missiles, artillery shells, mines, or grenades. This 
treaty says let us ban entirely poison gases, let us outlaw this class 
of weapons completely.
  Some do not like any treaties on arms. Some in this Senate will stand 
up and say we should not have arms treaties. Some have opposed START I, 
START II, the nuclear arms treaties. They are inappropriate, they say.
  Well, I held up on the floor of the Senate about a year ago a piece 
of metal about the size of my fist. The piece of metal came from a 
missile silo, a silo that housed a missile in Pervomaisk, Ukraine, a 
silo that held a missile with a nuclear warhead that was aimed at the 
United States of America.
  I held up a piece of that silo in my hand because the silo has been 
destroyed, the missile has been destroyed, the warhead is gone, and 
where a missile once sat, aimed at the United States of America, is now 
a patch of dirt planted with sunflowers.
  Why was a missile taken out, a silo destroyed, and sunflowers planted 
where there once was a missile aimed at the United States? Because the 
arms control treaties required it--required it--required that missiles 
be destroyed. We are destroying missiles on nuclear weapons. So is the 
former Soviet Union. The Ukraine is now nuclear free. The fact is, we 
have had success with arms control agreements. Are they perfect? No. Do 
they work? Yes. We have had success with arms control agreements. This 
is a treaty on arms control. We need to ratify it. We will vote on that 
next week.

  Let me describe, again, what this is about. It is a treaty to try to 
ban a class of weapons of mass destruction. Not many people probably 
know what chemical weapons are. I really don't. I have obviously not 
seen chemical weapons used. Very few people have.
  Let me read from a poet, Wilfred Owen, a famous poet from World War 
I, and the lines he wrote about a gas attack. Germany was the first 
nation in modern times to use chemical weapons, in the World War I 
battle at Ypres, a town in Belgium, April 22, 1915. It is said that a 
hissing sound came from German trenches as 6,000 cylinders spewed 
chlorine gas aimed at the allied lines. That is a gas that attacks the 
lungs, causes severe coughing and choking and death. It had a 
devastating effect on the allied soldiers, who were unprepared. 
Soldiers breathing that gas began to cough up blood, their faces 
turning purple, their bodies writhing in the trenches. There were 
15,000 casualties that day, we are told. Chlorine gas, mustard gas, and 
blister gas caused a million casualties in World War I.
  Wilfred Owen, the poet, wrote a description of a gas attack in the 
First World War. A company of exhausted soldiers is marching back from 
the front lines, when suddenly someone shouts:

       ``Gas! GAS! Quick, boys!''
       An ecstasy of fumbling,
       Fitting the clumsy helmets just in time;
       But someone still was yelling out and stumbling;
       And flound'ring like a man in fire or lime. . . .
       Dim, through the misty panes and thick green light,
       As under a green sea, I saw him drowning.
       In all my dreams, before my helpless sight,
       He plunges at me, guttering, choking, drowning.
       If in some smothering dreams you too could pace
       Behind the wagon we flung him in,
       And watch the white eyes writhing in his face,
       His hanging face, like a devil's sick of sin;
       If you could hear, at every jolt, the blood
       Come gargling from the froth-corrupted lungs,
       Obscene as cancer, bitter as the cud
       Of incurable sores on innocent tongues. . . .

  That is Wilfred Owen describing a gas attack, an attack using 
chemical weapons.
  Modern armies have the capability of protecting themselves in many 
circumstances against chemical weapons with protective devices and 
protective gear.
  But of course civilians are the most vulnerable to chemical weapons. 
Perhaps the example that most of us remember was the attack at the 
Tokyo subway by a terrorist group, a cult headquartered in Japan but 
active in America. They used the nerve gas sarin in a terrorist attack. 
The cult released the gas on March 20, 1995, during the morning rush 
hour at a busy Tokyo subway station. In that attack, 12 were killed, 
over 5,000 were injured. We are told that it was very close to a 
circumstance in which thousands would have been killed from that 
attack. We all remember the frightening television images of people 
staggering up out of the subway with their handkerchiefs over their 
mouths and collapsing on the street. Not surprisingly, the Japanese 
Diet, or parliament, ratified the chemical weapons treaty within a 
month of the Tokyo subway attack.
  This raises the question of why the Senate has yet to do the same.
  Why would people come to the floor of the Senate and say this is an 
inappropriate treaty and they intend to oppose it with every fiber of 
their being? Let me go through some of the myths we will hear about the 
chemical weapons treaty.
  Myth one: by ratifying the chemical weapons treaty the United States 
will

[[Page S3238]]

surrender a vital deterrent to chemical attack. That is not true at 
all. This is not about our weapons. It is about other countries' 
weapons. President Reagan already made a decision back in the 1980's 
that we were going to get rid of our stock of chemical weapons. The 
question now is whether other countries will similarly abandon their 
stock of chemical weapons and join us in an approach that will verify 
that other countries in the world are not producing chemical weapons.

  Myth two: rogue states will refuse to join the treaty, so it will 
only tie our hands, not theirs. As I just indicated, we are not 
producing chemical weapons, we are destroying the stock of chemical 
weapons we now have. So it will not tie our hands. But the Chemical 
Weapons Convention will shrink the chemical weapon problem down to a 
few rogue states and help curb their ability to get the materials 
necessary to make chemical weapons.
  Some say if you cannot prevent murder why should you have a law 
against murder. Common sense says murder is wrong, you have a law that 
provides penalties for murder. The production of chemical gasses ought 
to be wrong and we ought to have a convention that says we intend as a 
country to be part of an effort to ban it from the world. The fact we 
might have a few rogue nations wanting to produce them does not mean we 
ought not decide to ratify this treaty. What we ought to do is join all 
of our friends around the world who feel similarly and go after the 
rogue nations to demand and make certain that they are not producing 
chemical weapons.
  The treaty is unverifiable, people say. Well, no treaty is perfectly 
verifiable. We should not be making the perfect the enemy of the good. 
We will be able to adequately verify this treaty.
  The military use of chemical weapons requires significant testing and 
equipping or training of forces that will be difficult to hide in the 
face of the kind of investigation that will occur if this treaty is 
approved.
  I will intend to proceed further with the myths that we will hear on 
the floor of the Senate about the Chemical Weapons Convention, but let 
me do that at another time, because I intend to come to the floor on a 
number of additional occasions and talk about this subject. But other 
Senators are joining me on the floor to speak about this. Senator Levin 
from the State of Michigan is here. He has been one of the most 
eloquent spokesman on this issue in the U.S. Senate and feels 
passionately about it. I am pleased he has joined me. Senator Bingaman 
is also coming to the floor, as are a couple of others.
  I yield such time as he may consume to the Senator from Michigan, 
Senator Levin.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Hutchinson). The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair, and I thank my good friend from North 
Dakota. His eloquent voice is indeed critical to the ratification of 
this convention.
  It is long overdue, Mr. President, that the Senate take up the 
Chemical Weapons Convention and that we promptly provide our advice and 
our consent to its ratification so that the United States can join the 
convention as an original party.
  I will focus just for a few moments this morning on the military 
issues and the military implications as they relate to the Chemical 
Weapons Convention from my perspective as the ranking member on the 
Armed Services Committee.
  Under the 1985 treaty which was signed by President Reagan, we are 
already unilaterally destroying our stockpile of unitary chemical 
weapons. We are doing this without a treaty, without being required to 
do so, because of our own decision as to their limited military 
usefulness. This process is scheduled to be completed by the year 2004. 
This is a point which Secretary Cohen makes very, very effectively.
  This is not an issue of saying we will give up our chemical weapons 
if the other guys do the same thing. We are already unilaterally 
destroying our chemical weapons. The question now is whether we will 
join a convention where other countries are going to do what we are 
already doing unilaterally. So the destruction of our chemical weapons 
will take place whether or not the Senate ratifies this convention. It 
will require other nations to do what we are already doing and will 
reduce the risk of chemical attacks against our troops and our country 
in the process.

  This convention will enter into force on April 29, with or without 
the United States being a party. So the question before the Senate is 
not whether the Chemical Weapons Convention is a perfect treaty. It is 
whether or not we want the United States to have a role in overseeing 
and implementing this convention so that it greatly enhances our 
security. Our military and our civilian defense leadership give a 
resounding yes to the question of whether or not the United States 
should ratify this convention.
  First, here is the testimony of General Shalikashvili, the Chairman 
of our Joint Chiefs of Staff, before the Foreign Relations Committee, 
last March 28, 1996. This is what General Shalikashvili said:

       From a military perspective, the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention is clearly in our national interest. The 
     Convention's advantages outweigh its shortcomings. The United 
     States and all other CW capable state parties incur the same 
     obligation to destroy their chemical weapon stockpile. While 
     less than perfect, the verification regime allows for 
     intrusive inspections while protecting national security 
     concerns. The nonproliferation aspects of the convention will 
     retard the spread of chemical weapons and, in so doing, 
     reduce the probability that U.S. forces may encounter 
     chemical weapons in a regional conflict. Finally, while 
     foregoing the ability to retaliate in kind, the U.S. military 
     retains the wherewithal to deter and defend against a 
     chemical weapons attack. I strongly support this convention 
     and respectfully request your consent to ratification.
  General Shalikashvili told this to the Foreign Relations Committee a 
year ago.
  Then he said in another point in his testimony to the Armed Services 
Committee last month that all of the chiefs of staff and the commanders 
in chief of our combatant commanders support the Chemical Weapons 
Convention. He told the Senate Armed Services Committee, ``I fully 
support early ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention and in 
that respect I reflect the views of the Joint Chiefs and the combatant 
commanders.''
  Now, this is really quite an important point, I believe, for the U.S. 
Senate. We have the Chairman of our Joint Chiefs, we have all of the 
Chiefs, all of our combatant commanders urging us to ratify the 
Chemical Weapons Convention because our troops will be safer with the 
convention in effect than if it is not in effect. That ought to count 
heavily with the U.S. Senate. It is not always true that you have that 
kind of a unified position on the part of our uniformed military. It is 
not always true that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs can say that all 
of the Chiefs, all of the combatant commanders, agree that a certain 
course of action ought to be taken in the U.S. Senate. But it is true 
in this case.
  As I mentioned, Secretary Cohen, when he was still the Secretary-
designate for his current position, testified as follows, before the 
Armed Services Committee, when asked whether or not he supports the 
ratification of the convention prior to the April 29 deadline, and 
this, basically, is his answer:

       Yes. The CWC, as both a disarmament and a nonproliferation 
     treaty, is very much in our national security interest 
     because it:
       No. 1, establishes an international mandate for the 
     destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles;
       No. 2, prohibits the development, retention, storage, 
     preparations for use, and use of chemical weapons;
       No. 3, increases the probability of detecting militarily 
     significant violations of the CWC; and
       No. 4, hinders the development of clandestine CW 
     stockpiles.

  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the detailed explanation 
of Secretary Cohen for each of those conclusions be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

       Establishes an international mandate for the destruction of 
     chemical weapons (CW) stockpiles. Congress has mandated that 
     the Army, as executive agent for CW destruction, eliminate 
     its unitary CW, which constitute the bulk of its CW 
     stockpile, by 31 December 2004. That destruction process is 
     well under way at the CW destruction facilities at Johnston 
     Atoll and Tooele, UT. The CWC mandates that state parties 
     destroy, under a strict verification regime, their entire CW 
     stockpiles within 10 years after the

[[Page S3239]]

     Convention enters into force (April 2007). Given that the 
     U.S. does not need CW for its security, and given that we are 
     currently legally committed to eliminating unilaterally the 
     vast majority of our CW stockpile, common sense suggests that 
     it would be preferable to secure a commitment from other 
     nations to do the same.
       Prohibits the development, retention, storage, preparations 
     for use, and use of CW. These expansive prohibitions 
     establish a broadly accepted international norm that will 
     form a basis for international action against those states 
     parties that violate the CWC. Unlike the 1925 Geneva 
     Protocol, which only bans the use of CW in war, the CWC: 
     includes a verification regime; restricts the export of 
     certain dual-use CW precursor chemicals to non-state parties; 
     prohibits assisting other states, organizations, or personnel 
     in acquiring CW; and requires state parties to implement 
     legislation prohibiting its citizens and organizations from 
     engaging in activities prohibited by the Convention. The CWC 
     also contains mechanisms for recommending multilateral 
     sanctions, including recourse to the UN Security Council.
       Increases the probability of detecting militarily 
     significant violations of the CWC. While no treaty is 100% 
     verifiable, the CWC contains complementary and overlapping 
     declaration and inspection requirements. These requirements 
     increase the probability of detecting militarily significant 
     violations of the Convention. While detecting illicit 
     production of small quantities of CW will be extremely 
     difficult, it is easier to detect large scale production, 
     filling and stockpiling of chemical weapons. Over time, 
     through declaration, routine inspections, fact-finding, 
     consultation, and challenge inspection mechanisms, the CWC's 
     verification regime should prove effective in providing 
     information on significant CW programs that would not 
     otherwise be available.
       Hinders the development of clandestine CW stockpiles. 
     Through systematic on-site verification, routine declarations 
     and trade restrictions, the Convention makes it more 
     difficult for would-be proliferators to acquire, from CWC 
     state parties precursor chemicals required for developing 
     chemical weapons. The mutually supportive trade restrictions 
     and verification provisions of the Convention increase the 
     transparency of CW-relevant activities. These provisions will 
     provide the U.S. with otherwise unavailable information that 
     will facilitate U.S. detection and monitoring of illicit CW 
     activities.

  Mr. LEVIN. Secretary Cohen concluded by saying the following:

       I strongly support the Chemical Weapons Convention and the 
     goal of U.S. ratification of the convention by April 29, 1997 
     . . . U.S. ratification of the Convention prior to this date 
     will ensure that the U.S. receives one of the 41 seats on the 
     Executive Council of the Organization for the Prohibition of 
     Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the international organization that 
     will oversee CWC implementation. Early ratification will also 
     ensure that U.S. citizens will fill key positions within the 
     OPCW and act as inspectors for the Organization. Direct U.S. 
     involvement and leadership will ensure the efficacy and 
     efficiency of the OPCW during the critical early stages of 
     the Convention's implementation. The U.S., upon ratification 
     and implementation of the CWC, will also receive CW-related 
     information from other state parties. As a state party and a 
     member of the Executive Council, the U.S. will be in the best 
     position to assure the effective implementation of the 
     Convention's verification provisions.
  Now, that is our former colleague, Bill Cohen. It is an exceptionally 
clear and cogent statement of why the CWC is in our international 
interest. Defense Secretary Perry before him, said the following before 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on March 28, 1996:

       In conclusion, the Department of Defense considers the 
     Chemical Weapons Convention a well-balanced treaty that, in 
     conjunction with our other efforts against CW proliferation, 
     a robust chemical protection program and maintenance of a 
     range of nonchemical response capabilities, will serve the 
     best interests of the United States and the world community. 
     The Department of Defense strongly supports the Convention. I 
     respectfully request that the Senate give its advice and 
     consent to ratification this spring.

  Mr. President, our military, today, enjoys a high level of protection 
against chemical weapons. The treaty specifically permits that level of 
protection and any additional level of protection to continue. We spend 
about $500 million a year on chemical and biological defenses. The 
Senate should help assure that our forces maintain an effective 
capability to defend themselves. We plan on doing just that in the 
budget that we will be submitting to the Senate.
  But by not ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention, we would be 
giving other nations an excuse for delaying or rejecting ratification, 
while taking the pressure off of pariah states to join the treaty.
  General Schwarzkopf, retired now, recently testified as follows:

       I am very, very much in favor of the ratification of that 
     treaty. We don't need chemical weapons to fight our future 
     warfares. And, frankly, by not ratifying that treaty, we 
     align ourselves with nations like Libya and North Korea, and 
     I'd just as soon not be associated with those thugs in this 
     particular matter. So I am very, very much in favor of 
     ratification of that particular treaty.

  Admiral Zumwalt, now retired, said the following relative to this 
treaty. He was the Chief of Naval operations in the early 1970's. He 
said:

       If we refuse to ratify, some governments will use our 
     refusal as an excuse to keep their chemical weapons. 
     Worldwide availability of chemical weapons will be higher, 
     and we will know less about other countries' chemical 
     activities. The diplomatic credibility of our threat of 
     retaliation against anyone who uses chemical weapons on our 
     troops will be undermined by our lack of ``clean hands.''

  Admiral Zumwalt, who, in this article I am quoting from in the 
Washington Post of January 6, 1997, pointed out that he is not a dove. 
As a matter of fact, he said he helped lead the opposition to the SALT 
II treaty because he was convinced that it would give the Soviet Union 
a strategic advantage. This is someone who has a history of being 
skeptical in terms of arms control agreements. Admiral Zumwalt in the 
Washington Post that day added the following:

       At the bottom line, our failure to ratify will 
     substantially increase the risk of a chemical attack against 
     American service personnel.

  I ask unanimous consent that Admiral Zumwalt's entire article in the 
Washington Post of January 6, 1997, be printed in the Record at this 
time.
  There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                [From the Washington Post, Jan. 6, 1997]

                    A Needless Risk for U.S. Troops

                         (By E.R. Zumwalt Jr.)

       It has been more than 80 years since poison gas was first 
     used in modern warfare--in April 1915 during the first year 
     of World War I. It is long past time to do something about 
     such weapons.
       I am not a dove. As a young naval officer in 1945, I 
     supported the use of nuclear weapons against Japan. As chief 
     of naval operations two decades ago, I pressed for 
     substantially higher military spending than the nation's 
     political leadership was willing to grant. After retiring 
     from the Navy, I helped lead the opposition to the SALT II 
     treaty because I was convinced it would give the Soviet Union 
     strategic advantage.
       Now the Senate is considering whether to approve the 
     Chemical Weapons Convention. This is a worldwide treaty, 
     negotiated by the Reagan administration and signed by the 
     Bush administration. It bans the development, production, 
     possession, transfer and use of chemical weapons. Senate 
     opposition to ratification is led by some with whom I often 
     agree. But in this case, I believe they do a grave disservice 
     to America's men and women in uniform.
       To a Third World leader indifferent to the health of his 
     own troops and seeking to cause large-scale pain and death 
     for its own sake, chemical weapons have a certain attraction. 
     They don't require the advanced technology needed to build 
     nuclear weapons. Nor do they require the educated populace 
     needed to crate a modern conventional military. But they 
     cannot give an inferior force a war-winning capability. In 
     the Persian Gulf war, the threat of our uncompromising 
     retaliation with convention weapons deterred Saddam Hussein 
     from using his chemical arsenal against us.
       Next time, our adversary may be more berserk than Saddam, 
     and deterrence may fail. If that happens, our retaliation 
     will be decisive, devastating--and no help to the young 
     American men and women coming home dead or bearing grevious 
     chemical injuries. What will help is a treaty removing 
     huge quanities of chemical weapons that could otherwise be 
     used against us.
       Militarily, this treaty will make us stronger. During the 
     Bush administration, our nation's military and political 
     leadership decided to retire our chemical weapons. This wise 
     move was not made because of treaties. Rather, it was based 
     on the fact that chemical weapons are not useful for us.
       Politically and diplomatically, the barriers against their 
     use by a First World country are massive. Militarily, they 
     are risky and unpredictable to use, difficult and dangerous 
     to store. They serve no purpose that can't be met by our 
     overwhelming convention at forces.
       So the United States has no deployed chemical weapons today 
     and will have none in the future. But the same is not true of 
     our potential adversaries. More than a score of nations now 
     seeks or possesses chemical weapons. Some are rogue states 
     which we may some day clash.
       This treaty is entirely about eliminating other people's 
     weapons--weapons that may some day be used against Americans. 
     For the American military, U.S. ratification of the Chemical 
     Weapons Convention is high gain and low or no pain. In that 
     light, I find it astonishing that any American opposes 
     ratification.

[[Page S3240]]

       Opponents argue that the treaty isn't perfect: Verification 
     isn't absolute, forms must be filled out, not every nation 
     will join at first and so forth. This is unperuasive. Nothing 
     in the real world is perfect. If the U.S. Navy had refused to 
     buy any weapon unless it worked perfectly every time, we 
     would have bought nothing and now would be diarmed. The 
     question is not how this treaty compares with perfection. The 
     question is now U.S. ratification compares with its absence.
       If we refuse to ratify, some governments will use our 
     refusal as an exuse to keep their chemical weapons. Worldwide 
     availability of chemical weapons will be higher, and we will 
     know less about other countries' chemical activities. The 
     diplomatic credibility of our threat of retaliation against 
     anyone who uses chemical weapons on our troops will be 
     undermined by our lack of ``clean hands.'' At the bottom 
     line, our failure to ratify will substantially increase the 
     risk of a chemical attack against American service personnel.
       If such as attack occurs, the news reports of its victims 
     in our military hospitals will of course produce rapid 
     ratification of the treaty and rapid replacement of senators 
     who enabled the horror by opposing ratification. But for the 
     victims, it will be too late.
       Every man and woman who puts on a U.S. military uniform 
     faces possible injury or death in the national interest. They 
     don't complain; risk is part of their job description. But it 
     is also part of the job description of every U.S. senator to 
     see that this risk not be increased unnecessarily.

  Mr. LEVIN. Finally, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a 
letter written by a very distinguished group of retired four-star 
generals and admirals who support the Chemical Weapons Convention be 
printed in the Record at this time.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                                    April 3, 1997.
     Hon. William J. Clinton,
     The White House, 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, 
         DC.
       Dear Mr. President: As former members of the United States 
     Armed Forces, we write to express our strong support for 
     Senate ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). 
     This landmark treaty serves the national security interests 
     of the United States.
       Each of us can point to decades of military experience in 
     command positions. We have all trained and commanded troops 
     to prepare for the wartime use of chemical weapons and for 
     defenses against them. We all recognize the limited military 
     utility of these weapons, and supported President Bush's 
     decision to renounce the use of an offensive chemical weapons 
     capability and to unilaterally destroy U.S. stockpiles. The 
     CWC simply mandates that other countries follow our lead. 
     This is the primary contribution of the CWC: to destroy 
     militarily-significant stockpiles of chemical weapons around 
     the globe.
       We recognize that the proliferation of weapons of mass 
     destruction, including chemical agents, presents a major 
     national security threat to the U.S. The CWC cannot eliminate 
     this threat, as terrorists and rogue states may still be able 
     to evade the treaty's strict controls. However, the treaty 
     does destroy existing stockpiles and improves our abilities 
     to gather intelligence on emerging threats. These new 
     intelligence tools deserve the Senate's support.
       On its own, the CWC cannot guarantee complete security 
     against chemical weapons. We must continue to support robust 
     defense capabilities, and remain willing to respond--through 
     the CWC or by unilateral action--to violators of the 
     Convention. Our focus is not on the treaty's limitations, but 
     instead on its many strengths. The CWC destroys stockpiles 
     that could threaten our troops; it significantly improves our 
     intelligence capabilities; and it creates new international 
     sanctions to punish those states who remain outside of the 
     treaty. For these reasons, we strongly support the CWC.
         Stanley R. Arthur, Admiral, USN (Ret); Michael Dugan, 
           General, USAF (Ret); Charles A. Horner, General, USAF 
           (Ret); David Jones, General, USAF (Ret); Wesley L. 
           McDonald, Admiral, USN (Ret); Merrill A. McPeak, 
           General, USAF (Ret); Carl E. Mundy, Jr., General, USMC 
           (Ret); William A. Owens, Admiral, USN (Ret); Colin L. 
           Powell, General, USA (Ret); Robert RisCassi, General, 
           USA (Ret); H. Norman Schwartzkopf, General, USA (Ret); 
           Gordon R. Sullivan, General, USA (Ret); Richard H. 
           Truly, Vice Admiral, USN (Ret); Stansfield Turner, 
           Admiral, USN (Ret); John W. Vessey, General, USA (Ret); 
           Fred F. Woerner, General, USA (Ret); Admiral E.R. 
           Zumwalt, Jr., Admiral, USN (Ret).

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, one paragraph from that letter says the 
following:

       On its own, the CWC cannot guarantee complete security 
     against chemical weapons. We must continue to support robust 
     defense capabilities, and remain willing to respond--through 
     the CWC or by unilateral action--to violators of the 
     Convention. Our focus is not on the treaty's limitations, but 
     instead on its many strengths. The CWC destroys stockpiles 
     that could threaten our troops; it significantly improves our 
     intelligence capabilities, and it creates new international 
     sanctions to punish those states who remain outside of the 
     treaty. For these reasons, we strongly support the CWC.

  Former Secretary of State, Jim Baker, spoke out very strongly in 
support of the CWC the other day and said:

       If we fail to ratify the convention, we will imperil our 
     leadership in the entire area of nonproliferation, perhaps 
     the most vital security issue of the post-cold war era.

  Mr. President, before we have a chance to vote on the CWC, we will be 
voting on a bill introduced by Senator Kyl, S. 495. It is a 70-page 
bill that effects our efforts relative to chemical and biological 
weapons. The contrast between the lack of analysis of that bill, the 
contrast between the absence of hearings on that bill and the 
thoroughness with which the Chemical Weapons Convention has been 
analyzed, is enormous. We have had about 18 hearings on the Chemical 
Weapons Convention. We have had dozens of briefings for Senators and 
our staffs. We have had 1,500 pages of information on the CWC, which 
has been provided to the Senate by the administration: 300 pages of 
testimony; 500 pages of answers to letters and reports; 400 pages of 
answers to questions for the record; 300 pages of other documentation. 
That is what we have had in the 3\1/2\ years that the Chemical Weapons 
Convention has been before us. The bill introduced by Senator Kyl has 
been in front of us for a few weeks.
  So we have had the convention before us for 3\1/2\ years, with 18 
hearings, hundreds of pages of documents, answers, et cetera, a 
thorough and complete and exhaustive analysis of this convention. It is 
long, long overdue that it come before the Senate. Hopefully, we are 
going to ratify it and not be deterred from ratification in any way by 
a bill recently introduced, just a few weeks ago, with 70 pages of 
complicated text relative to the same subject, but which doesn't affect 
anybody else's weapons, only our own.
  Mr. President, I want, again, to thank the Senator from North Dakota 
for his leadership in this area. It is important to this Nation's 
position and posture in the world as a leader that a convention that 
was designed by us, negotiated by Presidents Reagan and Bush, supported 
by them, a bipartisan convention, be finally brought before the Senate 
for debate and ratification.
  I thank the Chair and my friend from North Dakota for yielding me 
some time.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. BINGAMAN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. How much time remains?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are 25 minutes remaining.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. I thank the Chair. Mr. President, let me, first of all, 
compliment my colleague from Michigan on his excellent statement. I 
agree with each of his points. It is past time for the Senate to bring 
this issue to the floor for debate, to debate it seriously, to make 
whatever modifications or changes or conditions the Senate believes is 
appropriate, if any, and to get on with ratifying the Chemical Weapons 
Convention.
  Mr. President, one of the challenges in discussing the Chemical 
Weapons Convention is to figure out how to bring this home to the 
average American that this is an issue and a concern that is important 
to them. Many people say, well, this is long term, this is 
international, this doesn't relate to me right here in River City, or 
Santa Fe, NM, or Silver City, NM, or wherever their hometown happens to 
be. But, in fact, the convention intends to reduce the likelihood that 
any of our troops or any American civilians in the future will be 
injured or killed as a result of chemical weapons.

  The history of the use of chemical weapons is better known by others 
than by me. My understanding is that the first time there was 
significant use of chemical weapons was in the First World War. There 
have been instances since then. We have heard much in the news 
recently, for example, about the injuries that some of our personnel in 
the gulf war encountered by virtue of the accidental destruction of 
Iraqi chemical weapons by some of our own military actions.
  So the issue is real, and the question is, what can we do as a 
nation? What can we do as a Senate to lessen the risk that chemical 
weapons will, in fact, injure Americans in the future? I think

[[Page S3241]]

ratifying this treaty at this time is clearly the most important thing 
we can do.
  I hope very much that we go ahead and enter a into a unanimous-
consent agreement today and begin formal debate of the treaty. We are 
not in formal debate as of yet because we have been unable to get 
agreement among all Senators to bring the treaty to the floor. We need 
to get that agreement and bring it to the floor, and we need to go 
ahead with the debate. The reason that it is time-sensitive, Mr. 
President, is that the treaty goes into effect on the 29th of this 
month. Now, some say it doesn't matter whether we are part of it at the 
time it goes into effect or whether we are not part of it. They say we 
can come along later. The problem is that international agreements have 
been made for the treaty to go into effect. American experts have been 
working with experts from other countries in putting together protocols 
and plans for implementing this treaty and the inspections that would 
be made under the treaty. All of that has been ongoing. If we are not 
part of the initial group of ratifying nations--it's a very large 
group; I think 161 nations have signed this treaty. If we are not part 
of that group when the treaty goes into effect, then the experts from 
our country that have been involved in establishing protocols and plans 
for inspection will be excluded from management and inspection teams 
and others will be put in their place. Perhaps at a later date we could 
join, but, clearly, it is not in our interest to have an international 
treaty of this importance begin without us being a part of it.
  I also point out an obvious point, which I am sure has been made many 
times in this debate. The sanctions called for in this treaty against 
countries that are not party to the treaty will be imposed on our own 
chemical companies. Many of the objections that have been raised about 
the treaty are, in fact, in my view, groundless for the simple reason 
that our own chemical manufacturers in this country have come out in 
strong support of the treaty. They want to be part of this. They 
understand the inspections that will be taking place. They readily 
subject themselves to those inspections, and they do not want sanctions 
imposed upon them that keep them from selling chemicals that can be 
used for chemical weapons, but can also have commercial uses at the 
same time. They would like to continue to be major participants in the 
world market in chemicals. They estimate that the loss to our chemical 
manufacturers could be around $600 million per year if we don't ratify 
the treaty and if sanctions are imposed on us because we are outside 
the treaty.
  Mr. President, there are various objections that have been raised. In 
my opinion, I have never seen a treaty where there has been more effort 
to accommodate very groundless objections. We have some objections 
which are not groundless--I will acknowledge that--and concerns that 
are valid and need to be considered and addressed. We are doing that. 
But many of the objections that have been raised, in my opinion, are 
really grasping at straws by people who are trying to find some basis 
upon which to oppose this treaty.
  The context in which this needs to be considered--this, again, has 
been said many times here, and I have said it myself--is that we passed 
a law while President Reagan was in the White House that renounced the 
use of chemical weapons by this country and which put us on a path to 
destroy our own chemical weapons capability. President Reagan signed 
that law. That has been the policy of our Government through the Reagan 
administration, through the Bush administration, through the Clinton 
administration, and now into the second Clinton administration.
  We have unilaterally made the decision that we do not need chemical 
weapons in order to look out for national security concerns. We have 
many other ways to deal with countries that would use chemical weapons.
  By signing this agreement, by going ahead and ratifying the Chemical 
Weapons Convention, we are not giving up any of the other arrows in our 
quiver, so to speak. We have the ability to retaliate against the use 
of chemical weapons in any way we determine to retaliate, whether we 
are a signatory or not. So we do not lose anything by ratifying it and 
becoming part of this convention. We gain, however, a substantial 
amount. For that reason, I think the treaty should go forward.
  Since we have unilaterally decided not to have chemical weapons, not 
to produce chemical weapons, not to maintain a stockpile of chemical 
weapons, and not to use chemical weapons in the future, how can it not 
be in our interest to try to ensure that other countries make that same 
decision? How can it not be in our interest to join with international 
inspection groups to investigate and ascertain that the countries that 
are signatories to this treaty do not in fact violate the convention?
  As I indicated before, our manufacturers agree. If you want to 
inspect us, come on in. We are glad to have you come in and inspect our 
plants. We are not going to have chemical weapons, we are not going to 
stockpile chemical weapons, and, therefore, come on in and investigate 
us.
  If we ratify this treaty, we can be part of the inspection teams that 
go to other countries to make the same determination. Some people say, 
``Well, the problem with it is that not all nations are going to sign 
onto the treaty.'' That is true. Not all nations are. That is very, 
very true. To deal with that circumstance, the treaty calls for 
sanctions against those countries that don't ratify the treaty. We 
cannot enforce the treaty against countries that don't ratify the 
treaty, but we can impose sanctions upon their ability to purchase or 
to sell chemicals that have dual use--that can be used in chemical 
weapons as well as in commercial purposes. That is a significant tool 
that this convention will give us.
  I do not know of another circumstance--at least in the time I have 
been here in the Senate--where we have made the unilateral decision to 
take action that a treaty calls for us to take. For us to now say, 
``OK, we have already decided to take the actions that the treaty calls 
for us to take, but we do not know whether we want to go ahead and 
ratify the treaty so that others also will take those same actions'' is 
nonsensical to me. We need to recognize that in the large scheme of 
things, this country needs to provide leadership in the world. That 
leadership includes ratifying this treaty and going forward with 
putting the protocols for its enforcement in place and participating in 
the inspection teams required for its implementation. That is exactly 
what is required. There have been endless negotiations within the 
Foreign Relations Committee in an effort to accommodate concerns that 
have been raised. I was not party to those negotiations. I have seen 
the results of them. Quite frankly, I am amazed at the extent of the 
conditions that we have agreed should be adopted to allay concerns of 
different Members. I think that is fine. I have no problem with any of 
the conditions. I also support whatever is acceptable to the 
administration, which has primary authority in this area and primary 
responsibility to enforce the treaty. If they believe these conditions 
are acceptable, then fine, they are acceptable to me as well. But we do 
need to get on with ratifying the treaty. We need to get on with 
providing the additional confidence we can to the American public and 
to assure them that their security concerns are being dealt with 
responsibly.

  I believe very strongly that this treaty is in the best interest of 
our country and the best interest of the people of my State. I think it 
would be a travesty for us to fail to ratify it, and particularly it 
would be a travesty if we failed to even bring it before the Senate for 
a vote. That has not happened. I understand the majority leader has 
worked very diligently to bring that about, and I believe he is on the 
verge of doing so. I commend him for that. But the reality of the 
situation is very straightforward--this treaty needs to be ratified. It 
needs to be ratified soon. The clock is ticking. Our leadership 
position in the world is at stake, and the security of future 
generations is also at stake.
  I see that we have both Senators from Massachusetts ready to speak. I 
do not want to delay them. I ask if either of them wishes to speak on 
the treaty at this point.
  How much time remains on the treaty?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There remain 11 minutes 50 seconds.
  Mr. KERRY addressed the Chair.

[[Page S3242]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be permitted 
to speak for 15 minutes in morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, we have had a long history in the world of 
attempts to rid the planet of the scourge of chemical weapons. That 
effort began after World War I, as a result of the searing experiences 
of troops in Europe during that war near the beginning of this century 
when chemical weapons were used for the first time in a general way in 
warfare. Those efforts in the early part of the century resulted, in 
1925, in the negotiation in Geneva of an accord that bans the use of 
chemical weapons.
  Since that time, the world's more powerful nations have not used them 
in war, including World War II. There are a couple of rogue states that 
have used them. Iraq's use against the Kurds and in its war with Iran 
is the instance most often cited. But despite the progress in seeking 
to eliminate the use of chemical weapons, the fact is that efforts to 
ban the manufacture and storage of poisonous gas has hit one brick wall 
after another over the years.
  In the past 25 years a substantial effort has been made to achieve an 
international agreement to ban manufacture and storage of chemical 
weapons. The Nixon and Ford administrations--both of whom, of course, 
were Republicans--worked toward this objective, albeit without success. 
The administration of Republican President Ronald Reagan reinvigorated 
international efforts to achieve such an agreement during the early 
1980's. When Vice President Bush was elected President, his 
administration assumed the responsibility for continuing those 
negotiations that were handed off by the predecessor administration in 
which he had served as Vice President, and I believe most people 
ultimately will judge that President Bush and his administration's 
negotiators acquitted themselves well in this regard.
  After intense and lengthy negotiations, initial success was achieved 
in 1992 when the Chemical Weapons Convention was completed in Geneva 
and was approved by the United Nations. In early 1993, shortly before 
leaving office, the Bush administration, representing the United 
States, joined with 129 other nations to sign the convention, and the 
process of ratification of the treaty began. On November 23 of that 
year, the Clinton administration submitted the convention formally to 
the Senate for its advice and consent.
  So here we are now, 4 years from the time when the convention became 
available for ratification, finally about to exercise our 
constitutional responsibility in the Senate.
  I wish that we had acted sooner. But it is my understanding that we 
now are going to act--that the majority leader has made a commitment to 
bring up the resolution of ratification on the Senate floor next week 
so that we can act prior to the critical day of April 29.
  Let me digress to address the subject of the importance of April 29 
to this treaty. April 29, less than 2 weeks from today, is the day on 
which the convention takes effect. Some Members and others have 
suggested in hearings and elsewhere that this is not a critical date; 
that we somehow have an extraordinary power to unilaterally dictate the 
United States can impose changes in the convention beyond that date. 
The fact is that April 29 is the date on which all the nations that 
have ratified the convention expect the convention to take effect, per 
its terms to which all signatory nations including the United States 
agreed. They believe they have a right to expect that others will have 
lived by the same rules by which they have lived.
  There is a certain contradiction in suggesting that you are going to 
take the leadership in drafting and seeking support for a treaty which 
is designed to become international law, and which establishes a set of 
rules that you and others propose to follow, and before it even takes 
effect you unilaterally decide you are going to break the first rule it 
contains which is the date by which you must agree to be a full 
supporter and participant in order to have a part in setting up on the 
ongoing procedures and regulations that will apply its terms to all 
participants. I think those who suggest the United States can simply 
ignore this deadline--while still seeking international support for 
some treaty to address the chemical weapons concern, a treaty they 
believe should be altered in various ways from the treaty that is now 
before the Senate--are evidencing a kind of arrogance on behalf of our 
country that often gets us in trouble with our allies and friends and 
with nations we would like to have as allies and friends.
  Even more troubling, Mr. President, is the fact that there are some 
in the Senate, some Members of the Republican Party, who seem to have a 
deep-seated aversion to any kind of arms control treaty. As we draw 
close to the point where the Senate will exercise its constitutional 
role of advise and consent, we are seeing a desperate effort launched 
to grab onto any kind of straw to suggest that this treaty is not good 
for the United States of America. We are seeing a host of problems 
conjured up, and I do mean literally conjured up, to prevent the 
assembly of a two-thirds majority of the Senate to approve the 
resolution of ratification.
  I only have a brief amount of time in the Chamber today, but I want 
to address some of the principal arguments that are being advanced as a 
rationale for suggesting that this treaty is not in the best interests 
of the United States. I have spoken previously at some length in this 
Chamber about the convention, and I will speak again as we formally 
take up the debate, but today I want to address briefly several of the 
claims made by opponents.
  First, opponents say that the convention could jeopardize 
confidential business information through frivolous so-called challenge 
inspections that the critics claim would provide international 
inspectors with extraordinary access to files, data, and equipment of 
U.S. chemical companies, and that the inspectors themselves could be 
spies for adversary nations or for nations whose chemical industries 
compete with our own. These critics, in effect, are anointing 
themselves the great protectors of the U.S. chemical industry from an 
espionage threat they perceive.
  Mr. President, I do not believe there is a person in this Chamber 
that does not want to take all needed steps to thwart espionage, but 
let me note the facts. The Chemical Manufacturers Association strongly 
supports the Chemical Weapons Convention. Its representatives helped 
write the rules contained in the convention pertaining to treatment of 
confidential business information. Not surprisingly, protecting trade 
secrets was at the very top of their priority list during the treaty 
negotiations.
  Further, the CMA conducted seven full-fledged trial inspections of 
chemical facilities just as would be conducted under the treaty's 
terms, to make certain that the protections against industrial 
espionage were strong. The Chemical Manufacturers Association is 
satisfied that those protections are sufficient to safeguard U.S. trade 
secrets. Furthermore, the treaty gives our Government the right to 
reject ahead of time for any reason whatsoever any inspectors that we 
believe would try to spy at U.S. facilities.

  Second, Mr. President, opponents say that the convention inspection 
requirements may involve unreasonable search and seizure which would 
violate the fourth amendment to the Constitution.
  Again, they are wrong. The facts are that at the insistence of our 
own negotiators who were fully cognizant of issues of search and 
seizure, the Chemical Weapons Convention explicitly allows party 
nations to take into account their own constitutional obligations when 
providing access for a challenge inspection. Constitutional rights in 
the United States have not been weakened or relinquished. Both the CWC 
and its draft implementing legislation fully protect U.S. citizens, 
including businesses, from unreasonable search and seizure. In 
addition, the treaty allows sensitive equipment information or areas of 
an inspected facility not related to chemical production or storage 
that are the subjects of the inspection to be protected during any 
challenge inspection by adhering to approved managed access techniques.
  Further, treaty proponents are prepared to accept, and Senator Biden 
has

[[Page S3243]]

negotiated with Senator Helms, a condition of ratification which will 
provide that search warrants will be obtained through the normal 
process for all challenge inspections.
  A third issue: Opponents say that adherence to the convention's 
provisions by party nations cannot be perfectly verified. What is 
occurring here is that the opponents are trying to make the perfect the 
enemy of the good. I can say that, in the 12 years I have been in the 
Senate as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee and deeply 
involved in work on a number of arms control agreements, I do not think 
I have ever seen an arms control agreement that is absolutely, 
perfectly, 100 percent verifiable. I do not think anybody who 
negotiates arms control agreements believes such perfection is 
attainable.
  Perfection is not the standard by which we should make a judgment as 
to whether we have a good or bad treaty. Both our national defense 
leadership and intelligence community leadership have testified 
repeatedly that this treaty will provide them with additional tools 
that they do not have today which will help them gain more and better 
knowledge about what is happening in the world regarding chemical 
weapons and their precursors.
  So the test is not can you perfectly verify compliance with the 
Convention's requirements; the test is do you enhance the security and 
intelligence interests of your country beyond where they would be 
without the treaty. Our defense and intelligence community leaders 
answer a resounding yes to that question.
  Fourth, opponents say that the nations about whose chemical 
activities we are most greatly concerned, the rogue nations like Iraq 
and Libya and North Korea, will not become parties to the treaty and, 
if they are not parties to the treaty, it will not give us enough 
protection from chemical weapons to warrant our being a party to it.
  This is a red herring of enormous proportions for the following 
reasons. As I stand in the Chamber today and the Presiding Officer sits 
on the dais, there is absolutely nothing to prevent those rogue nations 
from doing exactly what people say they fear. There is not even an 
international regime in place that makes manufacture and storage of 
chemical weapons illegal, or that provides a way to track the movement 
of such chemicals and their precursors so that there is a greater 
likelihood the world will know when rogues are engaging in conduct we 
believe should not occur, or that gives the world a way in which to 
hold such nations accountable.
  I pose a simple question: Is the United States in a stronger position 
if it is a party to an international treaty in force, to which most 
nations of the world are trying to adhere, when a nation not a party to 
the treaty is seen to be engaging in behavior violating the treaty's 
terms, or is the United States better off with every nation just going 
about its own business without any protocol at all, without any 
international standard, without any means to obtain accountability when 
a nation violates a standard of behavior to which the great majority of 
the world's nations have formally decreed they believe all nations 
should adhere.

  I think most people would say that if the United States ratifies this 
Convention, our circumstance relative to rogue nations is in no way 
worse than it is now. We give up nothing, but we gain important 
advantages. What are they?
  First, under present circumstances, the manufacture and storage of 
chemical weapons is not illegal under international law or custom. The 
Convention will provide that law and custom. It will then be possible 
to focus international opprobrium on nations violating its standards, 
be they participant or nonparticipant nations.
  Moreover, with 72 nations already having ratified, and others certain 
to follow, especially if the United States ratifies before April 29, 
there will be a quantum leap forward in the capacity to track the 
manufacture and sale of chemicals that can be used as weapons, or 
precursor chemicals, and this enhanced capacity will help us determine 
what nations might be acting in a way that ultimately could do injury 
to our country.
  It is important for everyone to remember that this treaty will 
greatly assist our efforts to impede the production and storage of 
chemical weapons. Therefore, it will make it less likely that our 
troops or our civilians will ever be put in harm's way by being 
subjected to an attack by chemical weapons.
  I might remind my colleagues that, no matter what we do with respect 
to this treaty, we are not going to be manufacturing chemical weapons 
in the United States. That is the track we are on under our current 
law. The logic seems unassailable to me that the United States will be 
a lot better off if we bring the family of nations into a regimen which 
helps us guard against trafficking in those chemicals and which 
requires party nations to dispose of their own stocks of chemical 
weapons and not manufacture others.
  Fifth, opponents say that participating in the chemical weapons 
treaty will make the United States less vigilant about the risks of 
chemical attacks by organized armies or by terrorists and about the 
need to maintain defenses against those threats. Well, shame on us if 
that were to be true. I do not think anybody who is supportive of this 
treaty wants--and I know I do not want--to let down our guard with 
respect to the possibility of another nation, rogue or otherwise, 
creating a chemical weapon and using it against us. I absolutely 
believe it is vital that we have a robust defense which will protect us 
in the event that someone were to try to break out and do that. But I 
think this is a tactic of desperation, because if you follow the logic 
of this criticism to its conclusion, we ought to make certain that our 
adversaries have chemical weapons to be sure we have sufficient 
incentive to defend against them, if that is what it takes in order to 
build our defenses.
  I emphasize two points here. First, there is nothing whatsoever that 
any arms control agreement does that necessarily lessens our resolve to 
defend against the threat that the agreement is intended to reduce. 
And, second, neither the Clinton administration nor this Congress is 
going to play ostrich on this issue. The Clinton administration's 
budget calls for $225 million in increases in the Defense Department's 
funding for chemical and biological defense over the next 6 years. A 
$225 million increase hardly equates to a notion that we are being 
lulled to sleep or into some kind of complacency. I am willing to bet 
with any Member of this body that the ratification of the CWC will not 
result in a reduction of our chemical weapons defense efforts.
  Mr. President, in the next few days we will face a debate which I 
hope will be conducted on the facts. I devoutly hope that we do not 
waste time debating the question of whether this treaty is a perfect 
treaty--of course it is not. Instead, I hope we squarely face and 
debate the question of whether the security of the United States of 
America and of the entire world is improved by United States 
ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
  I respectfully submit to my colleagues that when they look at the 
facts, when they measure what the U.S. chemical industry has done to 
protect itself, when they measure what we are doing to strengthen our 
defenses against chemical weapons, when they measure what being a party 
nation to the Convention will provide us in terms of intelligence and 
information, when they measure what this does in terms of the ability 
to track chemicals throughout the rest of the world, when they measure 
the importance to the United States of our being part of this effort 
before the Convention takes effect on April 29, I believe our 
colleagues will decide that the answer to the question of whether the 
Convention improves the security of the United States is an unequivocal 
yes, and that they will respond by voting to approve the resolution of 
ratification and against any debilitating amendments that any treaty 
opponents offer to it.
  I yield back any remaining time.

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