[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 44 (Tuesday, April 15, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3175-S3178]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INDEPENDENT COUNSEL DECISION
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I want to comment on the independent
counsel decision of the Attorney General.
The Attorney General's obligation is to follow the law. It is not to
respond to political pressure from whatever source.
Now, over the last weekend, there were some extraordinary attempts
made by a number of House Republican leaders to literally scare the
Attorney General into doing what they wanted. Both Speaker Gingrich and
Majority Leader Armey said Sunday, in effect, that if the Attorney
General did not seek an independent counsel, it is because she caved in
to administration pressure.
I ask unanimous consent that the April 14 article of the Washington
Post, entitled ``Republicans Warn Reno on Independent Counsel,'' be
printed in the Record following my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, those comments by the Speaker and the
majority leader of the House constitute an attempt at political
intimidation and coercion. Their message to the Attorney General was
that if she doesn't seek the appointment of an independent counsel, she
would run the risk of being brought before a congressional committee
and that she would be investigated, she would be put under oath, as
though she, somehow or other, is violating her oath.
The statements by the Republican leaders in the House fly in the face
of the very purpose of our independent counsel law. Now, this is a
statute that we passed, on a bipartisan basis, to take politics out of
criminal investigations of high-level officials. But the Speaker of the
House and the majority leader of the House worked mighty hard to put
politics right back into the law. Their threats to the Attorney
General--and that is exactly what they were--to make her do what they
want were inappropriate, and they jeopardize the very law that they are
demanding she invoke.
She is required and was required to follow the law, wherever it leads
her, despite the clumsy efforts at political intimidation of the
Speaker of the House and the majority leader of the House. Their
comments and their efforts to intimidate and coerce her to reach a
conclusion that they believe is the right conclusion are inappropriate;
they undermine a very important law, and they put that law's usefulness
into jeopardy.
There are thresholds in the independent counsel law. The Attorney
General has gone through, very carefully, in her letter to the Congress
why it is she does not at this time seek the appointment of an
independent counsel. She has gone through the evidence that she has and
has indicated why the thresholds in the statute have not been met. She
has done so carefully and professionally.
I urge every Member of this body to read the Attorney General's
letter to Senator Hatch before they join any partisan effort to attempt
to undermine the purpose of the law and to partisanize it.
Now, Senator Cohen and I worked mighty hard to reauthorize this law.
We did it more than once. We did it because it holds out the hope that
serious allegations against high-level officials can be dealt with on a
nonpartisan basis. That hope is being dashed by the kind of excessive
comments that the Speaker of the House and majority leader of the House
engaged in last weekend when they engaged in threats and coercion,
attempting to politically intimidate the Attorney General of the United
States. She has not shown a reluctance to use the independent counsel
statute when the threshold has been met. She is following the law to
the best of her conscience and ability. She has done a professional
job. I commend her for following the law and the public integrity
section recommendation in her Department, rather than bowing to
political pressure. I emphasize that she has not, and I believe will
not, bow to political pressure from whatever source or whatever
direction.
I ask unanimous consent that the Attorney General's letter to Senator
Hatch be printed in the Record at this time.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
Office of the Attorney General,
Washington, DC, April 14, 1997.
Hon. Orrin G. Hatch,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: On March 13, 1997, you and nine other
majority party members of the Committee on the Judiciary of
the United States Senate wrote to me requesting the
appointment of an independent counsel to investigate possible
fundraising violations in connection with the 1996
presidential campaign. You made that request pursuant to a
provision of the Independent Counsel Act, 28 U.S.C.
Sec. 592(g)(1), which provides that ``a majority of majority
party members [of the Committee on the Judiciary] * * * may
request in writing that the Attorney General apply for the
appointment of an independent counsel.'' The Act requires me
to respond within 30 days, setting forth the reasons for my
decision on each of the matters with respect to which your
request is made. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 592(g)(2).
I am writing to inform you that I have not initiated a
``preliminary investigations'' (as that term is defined in
the Independent Counsel Act) of any of the matters mentioned
in your letter. Rather, as you know, matters relating to
campaign financing in the 1996 Federal elections have been
under active investigation since November by a task force of
career Justice Department prosecutors and Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) agents. This task force is pursuing the
investigation vigorously and diligently, and it will continue
to do so. I can assure you that I have given your views and
your arguments careful thought, but at this time, I am unable
to agree, based on the facts and the law, that an independent
counsel should be appointed to handle this investigation.
1. The Independent Counsel Act:
In order to explain my reasons, I would like to outline
briefly the relevant provisions of the Independent Counsel
Act. The Act can be invoked in two circumstances that are
relevant here:
First, if there are sufficient allegations (as further
described below) of criminal activity by a covered person,
defined as the President and Vice President, cabinet
officers, certain other enumerated high Federal officials, or
certain specified officers of the President's election
campaign (not party officials), see 28 U.S.C. Sec. 591(b), I
must seek appointment of an independent counsel.
[[Page S3176]]
Second, if there are sufficient allegations of criminal
activity by a person other than a covered person, and I
determine that ``an investigation or prosecution of [that]
person by the Department of Justice may result in a personal,
financial or political conflict of interest,'' see 28 U.S.C.
Sec. 591(c)(1), I may seek appointment of an independent
counsel.
In either case, I must follow a two-step process to
determine whether the allegations are sufficient. First, I
must determine whether the allegations are sufficiently
specific and credible to constitute grounds to investigate
whether an individual may have violated Federal criminal law.
28 U.S.C. Sec. 591(d). If so, the Department commences a
``preliminary investigation'' for up to 90 days (which can be
extended an additional 60 days upon a showing of good cause).
28 U.S.C. Sec. 592(a). If, at the conclusion of this
``preliminary investigation,'' I determine that further
investigation of the matters is warranted, I must seek an
independent counsel.
Certain important features of the Act are critical to my
decision in this case:
First, the Act sets forth the only circumstances in which I
may seek an independent counsel pursuant to its provisions. I
may not invoke its procedures unless the statutory
requirements are met.
Second, the Act does not permit or require me to commence a
preliminary investigation unless there is specific and
credible evidence that a crime may have been committed. In
your letter, you suggest that it is not the responsibility of
the Department of Justice to determine whether a particular
set of facts suggests a potential Federal crime, but that
such legal determinations should be left to an independent
counsel. I do not agree. Under the Independent Counsel
Act, it is the Department's obligation to determine in the
first instance whether particular conduct potentially
falls within the scope of a particular criminal statute
such that criminal investigation is warranted. If it is
our conclusion that the alleged conduct is not criminal,
then there is no basis for appointment of an independent
counsel, because there would be no specific and credible
allegation of a violation of criminal law. See 28 U.S.C.
Sec. 592(a)(1).
Third, there is an important difference between the
mandatory and discretionary provisions of the Act. Once I
have received specific and credible allegations of criminal
conduct by a covered person, I must commence a preliminary
investigation and, if further investigation is warranted at
the end of the preliminary investigation, seek appointment of
an independent counsel. If, on the other hand, I receive
specific and credible evidence that a person not covered by
the mandatory provisions of the Act has committed a crime,
and I determine that a conflict of interest exists with
respect to the investigation of that person, I may--but need
not--commence a preliminary investigation pursuant to the
provisions of the Act. This provision gives me the
flexibility to decide whether, overall, the national interest
would be best served by appointment of an independent counsel
in such a case, or whether it would be better for the
Department of Justice to continue a vigorous investigation of
the matter.
Fourth, even this discretionary provision is not available
unless I find a conflict of interest of the sort contemplated
by the Act. The Congress has made it very clear that this
provision should be invoked only in certain narrow
circumstances. Under the Act, I must conclude that there is a
potential for an actual conflict of interest, rather than
merely an appearance of a conflict of interest. The Congress
expressly adopted this higher standard to ensure that the
provision would not be invoked unnecessarily. See 128 Cong.
Rec. H 9507 (daily ed. December 13, 1982) (statement of Rep.
Hall). Moreover, I must find that there is the potential for
such an actual conflict with respect to the investigation of
a particular person, not merely with respect to the overall
matter. Indeed, when the Act was reauthorized in 1994,
Congress considered a proposal for a more flexible standard
for invoking the discretionary clause, which would have
permitted its use to refer any ``matter'' to an Independent
Counsel when the purposes of the Act would be served.
Congress rejected this suggestion, explaining that such a
standard would ``substantially lower the threshold for use of
the general discretionary provision.'' H.R. Conf. Rep. No.
511, 103rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 9 (1994).
2. Covered Persons--The Mandatory Provisions of the Act:
Let me now turn to the specific allegations in your letter.
You assert that there are ``new questions of possible
wrongdoing by senior White House officials themselves,'' and
you identify a number of particular types of conduct in
support of this claim. While all of the specific issues you
mention are under review or active investigation by the task
force, at this time we have no specific, credible evidence
that any covered White House official may have committed a
Federal crime in respect of any of these issues.
Nevertheless, I will discuss separately each area that you
raise.
a. Fundraising on Federal Property. First, you suggest that
``federal officials may have illegally solicited and/or
received contributions on federal property.'' The conduct you
describe could be a violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 607. We are
aware of a number of allegations of this sort; all are being
evaluated, and where appropriate, investigations have been
commenced. The Department takes allegations of political
fundraising by Federal employees on Federal property
seriously, and in appropriate cases would not hesitate to
prosecute such matters. Indeed, the Public Integrity Section,
which is overseeing the work of the campaign financing task
force, recently obtained a number of guilty pleas from
individuals who were soliciting and accepting political
contributions within the Department of Agriculture.
The analysis of a potential section 607 violation is a
fact-specific inquiry. A number of different factors must be
considered when reviewing allegations that this law may have
been violated:
First, the law specifically applies only to contributions
as technically defined by the Federal Election Campaign Act
(FECA)--funds commonly referred to as ``hard money.'' The
statute originally applied broadly to any political
fundraising, but in 1979, over the objection of the
Department of Justice, Congress narrowed the scope of section
607 to render it applicable only to FECA contributions.
Before concluding that section 607 may have been violated, we
must have evidence that a particular solicitation involved a
``contribution'' within the definition of the FECA.
Second, there are private areas of the White House that, as
a general rule, fall outside the scope of the statute,
because of the statutory requirement that the particular
solicitation occur in an area ``occupied in the discharge of
official duties.'' 3 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 31 (1979). The
distinction recognizes that while the Federal Government
provides a residence to the President, similar to the housing
that it might provide to foreign service officers, this
residence is still the personal home of an individual within
which restrictions that might validly apply to the Federal
workplace should not be imposed. Before we can conclude that
section 607 may have been violated, we must have evidence
that fundraising took place in locations covered by the
provisions of the statute.
Thus, while you express concerns about the possibility of
``specific solicitation . . . made by federal officials at
the numerous White House overnights, coffees, and other
similar events,'' we do not at this time have any specific
and credible evidence of any such solicitation by any covered
person that may constitute a violation of section 607.
We do not suggest, of course, that our consideration of
information concerning fundraising on Federal property is
limited to whether the conduct constituted a violation only
of section 607. However, at this point in time, we have no
specific and credible evidence to suggest that any crime was
committed by any covered person in connection with these
allegations.
b. Misuse of Government Resources. You next assert that
Government property and employees may have been used
illegally to further campaign interests--conduct which might,
in some circumstances, constitute a theft or conversion of
Government property in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 651.
Again, we are actively investigating allegations that such
misconduct may have occurred. However, we are unaware at this
time of any evidence that any covered person participated in
any such activity, other than use of Government property that
is permitted under Federal law, such as the reports that the
Vice President used a Government telephone, charging the
calls to a nongovernment credit card. Federal regulations
permit such incidental use of Government property for
otherwise lawful personal purposes. See, e.g., 5 C.F.R.
Sec. 2635.704; 41 C.F.R. Sec. 201-21.601 (personal long
distance telephone calls). Thus, for example, allegations
that a Government telephone or telefacsimile machine may have
been used on a few occasions by a covered person for personal
purposes does not amount to an allegation of a Federal crime.
To the extent that there are allegations warranting
investigation that individuals not covered by the Independent
Counsel Act diverted Government resources, it is my
conclusion, as I explain below, that there is at present no
conflict of interest for the Department of Justice to
investigate and, if appropriate, prosecute those involved in
any such activity.
c. Foreign Efforts to Influence U.S. Policy. You next cite
reports suggesting the possibility that foreign contributions
may have been made in hopes of influencing American policy
decisions. These allegations are under active investigation
by the task force. The facts known at this time, however, do
not indicate the criminal involvement of any covered person
in such conduct.
It is neither unique nor unprecedented or the Department to
receive information that foreign interests might be seeking
to infuse money into American political campaigns. That was
precisely the scenario that underlay the criminal
investigations, prosecutions and congressional hearings
during the late 1970s involving allegations that a Korean
businessman was making illegal campaign contributions, among
other things, to Members of Congress to curry congressional
support for the Government of South Korea. In a more recent
example, in 1996 an individual was prosecuted and convicted
for funneling Indian Government funds into Federal elections
through the cover of a political action committee.
Absent specific and credible evidence of complicity by a
covered person, it has never been suggested that the mere
allegation that a foreign government may have been trying to
provide funds to Federal campaigns should warrant appointment
of an independent counsel. Nor can it be the case that an
independent counsel is required to investigate because
campaign contributors or
[[Page S3177]]
those who donated to political parties believed their
largesse would influence policy or achieve access. The
Department of Justice routinely handles such allegations, and
because of its experience in reviewing and investigating
these sensitive matters, embracing, among other things,
issues of national security, is particularly well-equipped to
do so.
d. Coordination of Campaign Fundraising and Expenditures.
You also suggest that the ``close coordination by the White
House over the raising and spending of `soft'--and
purportedly independent--DNC funds violated Federal election
laws, and/or had the legal effect of rendering those funds
subject to campaign finance limitations they otherwise would
not be subject to.'' We believe this statement misapprehends
the law. The FECA does not prohibit the coordination of
fundraising or expenditures between a party and its
candidates for office. Indeed, the Federal Election
Commission (FEC), the body charged by Congress with
primary responsibility for interpreting and enforcing the
FECA, has historically assumed coordination between a
candidate and his or her political party.
Of course, coordinated expenditures may be unlawful under
the FECA if they are made with funds from prohibited sources,
if they were misreported, or if they exceed applicable
expenditure limits. However, we presently lack specific and
credible evidence suggesting that any covered person
participated in any such violations, if they occurred.
With respect to coordinated media advertisements by
political parties (an area that has received much attention
of late), the proper characterization of a particular
expenditure depends not on the degree of coordination, but
rather on the content of the message. Indeed, just last year
the FEC and the Department of Justice took this position in a
brief filed before the Supreme Court, in a case decided on
other grounds. See generally, Brief for the Respondent,
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC, (S.
Ct. No. 95-489) at 2-3, 18 n.15, 23-24. In this connection,
the FEC has concluded that party media advertisements that
focus on ``national legislative activity'' and that do not
contain an ``electioneering message'' may be financed, in
part, using ``soft'' money, i.e., money that does not comply
with FECA's contribution limits. FEC Advisory Op. 1995-25, 2
Fed. Elec. Camp. Fin. Guide (CCH) para. 6162, at 12,109-
12,110 (August 24, 1995); FEC Advisory Op. 1985-14, 2 Fed.
Elec. Camp. Fin. Guide (CCH) para. 5819, at 11,185-11,186
(May 30, 1985). Moreover, such advertisements are not subject
to any applicable limitations on coordinated Expenditures by
the party on behalf of its candidates. AO 1985-14 at 11-185-
11,186.
We recognize that there are allegations that both
presidential candidates and both national political parties
engaged in a concerted effort to take full advantage of every
funding option available to them under the law, to craft
advertisements that took advantage of the lesser regulation
applicable to legislative issue advertising, and to raise
large quantities of soft political funding to finance these
ventures. However, at the present time, we lack specific and
credible evidence suggesting that these activities violated
the FECA. Moreover, even assuming that, after a thorough
investigation, the FEC were to conclude that regulatory
violations occurred, we presently lack specific and credible
evidence suggesting that any covered person participated in
any such violations.
3. Conflict of Interest--The Discretionary Provisions of
the Act:
In urging me to conclude that the investigation poses the
type of potential conflict of interest contemplated by the
Act, you rely heavily on my testimony before the Senate
Committee on Government Affairs in 1993 in support of
reauthorization of the Independent Counsel Act. I stand by
those views and continue to support the overall concept
underlying the Act. My decisions pursuant to the Act have
been, I believe, fully consistent with those views.
The remarks you quote from my testimony should be
interpreted within the context of the statutory language I
was discussing. When, for example, I referred to the need for
the Act to deal with the inherent conflict of interest when
the Department of Justice investigates ``high-level Executive
Branch officials,'' I was referring to persons covered under
the mandatory provisions of the Act. With respect to the
conflict of interest provision, my testimony expressed the
conviction that the Act ``would in no way preempt this
Department's authority to investigate public corruption,''
and that the Department was clearly capable of ``vigorous
investigation of wrongdoing by public officials, whatever
allegiance or stripes they may wear. I will vigorously defend
and continue this tradition.'' While I endorsed the concept
of the discretionary clause to deal with unforeseeable
situations, I strongly emphasized that ``it is part of the
Attorney General's job to make difficult decisions in tough
cases. I have no intention of abdicating that
responsibility[.]'' These principles continue to guide my
decisionmaking today.
There are times when reliance on the discretionary clause
is appropriate, and indeed, as you point out, I have done so
myself on a few occasions. However, in each of those cases, I
considered the particular factual context in which the
allegations against those persons arose and the history of
the matter. Moreover, even after finding the existence of a
potential conflict, I must consider whether under all the
circumstances discretionary appointment of an independent
counsel is appropriate. In each case, therefore, the final
decision has been an exercise of my discretion, as provided
for under the Act.
I have undertaken the same examination here. Based on the
facts as we know them now, I have not concluded that any
conflict of interest would ensure from our vigorous and
thorough investigation of the allegations contained in your
letter.
Your letter relies upon press reports, certain documents
and various public statements which you assert demonstrate
that ``officials at the highest level of the White House were
involved in formulating, coordinating and implementing the
[Democratic National Committee's (DNC's)] fundraising efforts
for the 1996 presidential campaign.'' You suggest that a
thorough investigation of ``fundraising improprieties'' will
therefore necessarily include an inquiry into the ``knowledge
and/or complicity of very senior White House officials,'' and
that the Department of Justice would therefore have a
conflict of interest investigating these allegations.
To the extent that ``improprieties'' comprise crimes, they
are being thoroughly investigated by the agents and
prosecutors assigned to the task force. Should that
investigation develop at any time specific and credible
evidence that any covered person may have committed a crime,
the Act will be triggered, and I will fulfill my
responsibilities under the Act. In addition, should that
investigation develop specific and credible evidence that a
crime may have been committed by a ``very senior'' White
House official who is not covered by the Act, I will decide
whether investigation of that person by the Department might
result in a conflict of interest, and, if so, whether the
discretionary clause should be invoked. Until then, however,
the mere fact that employees of the White House and the DNC
worked closely together in the course of President Clinton's
reelection campaign does not warrant appointment of an
independent counsel. As I have stated above, the Department
has a long history of investigating allegations of criminal
activity by high-ranking Government officials without fear or
favor, and will do so in this case.
I also do not accept the suggestion that there will be
widespread public distrust of the actions and conclusions of
the Department if it continues to investigate this matter,
creating a conflict of interest warranting the appointment of
an independent counsel. First, unless I find that the
investigation of a particular person against whom specific
and credible allegations have been made would pose a
conflict, I have no authority to utilize the procedures of
the Act. Moreover, I have confidence that the career
professionals in the Department will investigate this matter
in a fashion that will satisfy the American people that
justice has been done.
Finally, even were I to determine that a conflict of
interest of the sort contemplated by the statute exists in
this case--and as noted above I do not find such a conflict
at this time--there would be a number of weighty
considerations that I would have to consider in determining
whether to exercise my discretion to seek an independent
counsel at this time. Because invocation of the conflict of
interest provision is discretionary, it would still be my
responsibility in that circumstance to weigh all the factors
and determine whether appointment of an independent counsel
would best serve the national interest. If in the future this
investigation reveals evidence indicating that a conflict of
interest exists, these factors will continue to weigh heavily
in my evaluation of whether or not to invoke the
discretionary provisions of the Act.
* * * * *
I assure you, once again, that allegations of violations of
Federal criminal law with respect to campaign financing in
the course of the 1996 Federal elections will be thoroughly
investigated and, if appropriate, prosecuted. At this point
it appears to me that that task should be performed by the
Department of Justice and its career investigators and
prosecutors. I want to emphasize, however, that the task
force continues to receive new information (much has been
discovered even since I received your letter), and I will
continue to monitor the investigation closely in light of my
responsibilities under the Independent Counsel Act. Should
future developments make it appropriate to invoke the
procedures of the Act, I will do so without hesitation.
Sincerely,
Janet Reno.
Exhibit 1
[From the Washington Post, Apr. 14, 1997]
Republicans Warn Reno on Independent Counsel
(By John E. Wang)
House Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.) said yesterday Attorney
General Janet Reno should be called before Congress to
testify under oath if she does not tell Congress today that
she will seek an independent counsel to investigate alleged
abuses in Democratic Party fund-raising.
Gingrich declared he has no confidence in Reno as attorney
general and, when asked if she should resign, said: ``We'll
know tomorrow,'' the deadline for Reno to respond to a
request from congressional Republicans that she call for an
independent counsel in the matter.
[[Page S3178]]
``The evidence mounts every day of lawbreaking in this
administration,'' Gingrich said on ``Fox News Sunday.''
``If she can look at the day-after-day revelations about
this administration and not conclude it's time for an
independent counsel, how can any serious citizen have any
sense of faith in her judgment?''
Late last week, the indications were that Reno would likely
not seek a counsel in the case, which is already being
investigated by career Justice Department prosecutors, but
aides emphasized no final decision had been made.
If she decides not to ask a three-judge panel to name an
independent counsel, Gingrich said, Reno needs to explain her
decision. ``She needs to answer in public, she needs to
answer, I think, under oath,'' he said.
Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Orrin G. Hatch (R-Utah)
said Reno ``becomes a major issue'' if she does not call for
an independent counsel.
``The conflict of interest, both apparent and real, it
seems to me, would necessitate her choosing an independent
counsel,'' he said on ABC's ``This Week.'' ``If she doesn't,
then I think there's going to be a swirl of criticism that's
going to be, I think, very much justified.''
Justice Department spokesman Bert Brandenburg dismissed
such talk. ``Unfortunately, this has become a battle between
law and politics,'' he said in a telephone interview. ``The
Justice Department will adhere to the law.''
Reno routinely asks the career prosecutors looking into the
matter whether any development requires the appointment of an
independent counsel, according to Brandenburg. So far, they
have not said that an independent counsel is indicated, he
said.
The law says the attorney general must ask for an
independent counsel if there is specific, credible
information of criminal wrongdoing by top administration
officials--including the president, vice president and
Cabinet officers--the head of a president's election or
reelection campaign or anyone else for whom it would be a
conflict of interest for the Justice Department to
investigate.
House Judiciary Committee Chairman Henry J. Hyde (R-Ill.)
said an independent counsel was needed to maintain public
confidence in the investigation. ``In-house investigations,
as honorable as they might well be, don't sell the public on
the fact that they are independent,'' he said on ABC.
While Hyde said he retains his confidence in Reno as
attorney general, Gingrich was sharply critical of her for
not telling White House officials the FBI suspected China was
planning to make illegal campaign contributions. Reno has
said she telephoned national security adviser Anthony Lake,
failed to reach him and never called back.
``If you're the top law enforcement officer of this country
. . . wouldn't you say to the White House, `Gee, the
president and the secretary of state ought to know we think
the Chinese communists may be trying to buy the American
election'?'' he said.
House Majority Leader Richard K. Armey (R-Tex.) suggested
Reno is victim of the political pressures within the
administration.
``This is a person that would like to be professional and
responsible in their job, and that makes her out of place in
this administration,'' Armey said on CBS's ``Face the
Nation.'' ``She is in a hopeless situation. . . . If I were
Janet Reno, I would just say, `I can't function with people
that stand with these standards of conduct and behavior and
I'm leaving.' ''
On another topic, Gingrich said the United States should
``consider very seriously'' military action against ``certain
very high-value targets in Iran'' if there is strong evidence
linking a senior Iranian government official to a group of
Shiite Muslims suspected of bombing a U.S. military compound
in Saudi Arabia last year.
``We have to take whatever steps are necessary to convince
Iran that state-sponsored terrorism is not acceptable,'' he
said. ``The indirect killing of Americans is still an act of
war.''
The Washington Post reported yesterday that intelligence
information indicates that Brig. Ahmad Sherifi, a senior
Iranian intelligence officer and a top official in Iran's
Revolutionary Guards, met roughly two years before the
bombing with a Saudi Shiite arrested March 18 in Canada.
According to Canadian court records, the man, Hani Abd Rahim
Sayegh, had fled Saudi Arabia shortly after the June 25
bombing that killed 19 U.S. servicemen and wounded more than
500 others.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois is recognized.
____________________