[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 43 (Monday, April 14, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3128-S3130]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                               B-2 BOMBER

 Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, today I want to address a very 
serious issue, which is at the heart of the defense of our Nation's 
interests. I want to address the need to acquire a meaningful long-
range-strike weapons system. I want to address the procurement of nine 
more B-2 bombers, which are needed to complete a three-squadron fleet 
that will have the means to deter, the capabilities to defend against, 
and the power to defeat threats to our national interest.
  I speak today in support of America's most capable long-range-strike 
aircraft, the B-2 bomber. The B-2 is not just a bomber. When most 
people think of bombers, they think of World War II airpower films, 
with scores of bombers flying in tight formation, dropping strings of 
iron bombs on rail lines and oil refineries. The B-2 is more than a 
bomber. It is a long-range-strike aircraft, capable of reaching 
anywhere in the world and releasing highly sophisticated, explosive 
weapons with uncommon precision on specific targets. Unlike the bombers 
of old, which often missed their targets by miles, the B-2 strike 
aircraft can hit as many as 16 separate aim points, with deadly 
accuracy, in a single pass.
  Mr. President, it defies convention to think of the B-2, with its 
high sticker cost, as a cost-effective weapon. Only when we stop 
thinking of the B-2 as a bomber, and instead think of it as a long-
range-strike weapons system, do we realize that it is, indeed, the most 
cost-effective weapons system in our Nation's arsenal which can 
realistically be used to protect our citizens, our interests, and our 
allies around the world. It is the only weapons system that combines 
long-range, large payload, modern precision weapons, and stealth--a 
revolutionary and powerful combination.
  Since the end of the cold war, we have come to recognize that we no 
longer live in a bipolar world. Threats to our national security have 
taken on both familiar and unfamiliar forms: renewed territorial 
aggression, simmering regional and ethnic conflicts, state-sponsored 
terrorism, and now, for the first time since the Middle Ages, stateless 
terrorism. We send our forces abroad to protect air bases and oil 
fields and our sons and daughters are attacked by religious zealots. We 
all vividly recall the loss of life at our military barracks in 
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. It was attacked, not by the Iraqi forces we seek 
to deter, but by nameless terrorists from Iran, or from Lebanon, or 
from internal Saudi opposition groups, or from God knows where. With 
the B-2, the forward air bases would not be needed; the oil fields 
could be protected from afar.
  What happened when Saddam Hussein attacked the U.N.-protected Kurdish 
safe zone in northern Iraq? We attacked Baghdad and southern Iraq. 
Because the leadership in Jordan, in Saudi Arabia, in Turkey, and in 
other countries, where we have shorter range aircraft, was concerned 
with stirring up public opinion, United States forces were denied the 
freedom to launch counter strikes from air bases on their territory. 
With the B-2, we could have struck Saddam Hussein's forces in the 
North, from bases in the United States.
  The Secretary of Defense stated in his annual report for fiscal year 
1996: ``Because potential regional adversaries may be able to mount 
military threats against their neighbors with little or no warning, 
American forces must be postured to project power rapidly to support 
United States interests and allies.'' Clearly, the most appropriate 
weapon in our arsenal for rapid power projection is the B-2 long-range-
strike aircraft. Yet, because of legislation--which has now been 
repealed--we currently have only two squadrons of B-2's. In order to 
meet effectively our basic strategic objectives, just nine more B-2's, 
bringing the total to three squadrons, are essential. Mr. President, we 
must restart this program; we must provide funding for the B-2 this 
year.
  The B-2--a long-range, precision-strike aircraft--is the best, and 
perhaps only, option available to us to counter emerging threats in our 
security environment. We are not able to spend as much for defense as 
we have in the past, causing us to decrease our presence abroad and 
base more of our forces here at home. This, in turn, limits our forward 
presence and ability to rapidly respond to a crisis elsewhere in the 
world. In addition, access to foreign bases, closer to theaters of 
conflict, has become more and more uncertain. And above all, weapons of 
mass destruction and accurate delivery systems are becoming more 
prolific, possibly held by rogue states and organized terrorists alike. 
These chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons could be used with 
devastation to attack American ground, naval, and air forces based 
within a theater of conflict.

  How does the B-2 respond to these challenges? The B-2 uses stealth 
technology, technology more effective than that employed on F-117 
fighter bombers in the gulf war. As you recall, these planes were the 
key to securing the advantage immediately in the air war and remained 
impossible for the Iraqis to stop. However, the B-2 is a more powerful 
and flexible weapon, and offers several advantages over the F-117.
  First, it is a long-range system. The B-2 can fly anywhere in the 
world, from bases in the United States, with only one refueling. These 
factors also make the B-2 an important tool for deterrence, allowing 
the President the ability to strike anywhere in the world immediately. 
Thus, a counterstrike can be launched from the United States, as soon 
as the threat is apparent, without reliance on foreign bases, or troop 
buildup.
  Second, the B-2 carries a bigger, more accurate payload than the F-
117. The precision bombs carried by the B-2 use GPS-aided targeting 
systems, and GPS-aided munitions [GATS/GAM], which enables up to 16 
independent points to be targeted with extreme accuracy, in 1 pass. 
This precision is an important counter to the mobile and relocatable 
nature of many of our new potential enemies, such as scud missiles or 
terrorist encampments. The local release of a strike allows last minute 
adjustments to account for local conditions, or target movement. This 
is not possible with cruise missiles. In addition, delivering a strike 
via bomber also allows difficult targets, like the dark side of a 
mountain, or underground bunkers, to be attacked and destroyed.
  One of the most important points to make about the B-2 is that it 
will reduce the number of American soldiers put in harm's way, and 
ultimately reduce casualties. Because the President can choose to 
respond immediately, or preemptively, engagement in a conflict or its 
escalation, may be avoided. Because the aircraft is launched from 
outside the theater, all support personnel and equipment are also 
outside the theater of conflict. Because the B-2 utilizes stealth, the 
need for escort aircraft, which are also theater-based, is eliminated. 
I have read several estimates about the value of stealth and precision 
weapons, and one that sticks in my mind is that one B-2 bomber has the 
combat power of 75 non-Stealth aircraft.
  This last statistic illustrates another important factor in our 
consideration to build nine additional B-2's: the program will provide 
cost savings in the long run. This may be hard to believe, when we are 
talking about aircraft that cost $850 million each to build, but as I 
have explained--the B-2 requires less support; is more precise, 
requiring fewer sorties to accomplish the task; and, may reduce the 
need for further massive troop and aircraft involvement. Air Force 
analysis shows that, operating independently, free of the requirement 
for fighter escorts, electronic jamming aircraft, and tankers, a single 
B-2 with two crew members can accomplish missions currently requiring 
75 tactical aircraft and 147 crew members. The B-2's ability to 
penetrate air defenses, without the usual armada of support aircraft, 
means that we can, in some mission areas, replace dozens of aircraft 
with one bomber, potentially saving billions of dollars over the long 
run.
  Mr. President, the American bomber force currently relies most 
heavily on two aging conventional bomber aircraft--the B-52 and the B-
1. In order to maintain mission safety while attacking specific, above 
ground targets,

[[Page S3129]]

these bombers must use cruise missiles. These missiles are more 
expensive--the 44 cruise missiles fired against Iraq during the gulf 
war cost more than $100 million--over 100 times more expensive than 
what an equivalent number of precision, direct-attack weapons, 
delivered by the B-2, would cost. Moreover, these missiles are less 
effective--current-generation cruise missiles cannot be used against 
mobile or heavily hardened targets. The B-2 long-range-strike aircraft 
is cost effective.

  Mr. President, the last B-52 was built 35 years ago. It has been a 
very successful aircraft, but it will not last forever. As we look to 
the future, with the retirement of B-52's and the withdrawal of the B-1 
from active service, the B-2 will be the only long-range aircraft in 
the Air Force inventory. That is why the B-2 program also represents an 
important opportunity for the United States to maintain superiority in 
a critical field of production. This program is the only remaining 
component of the combat aircraft manufacturing industry in California. 
By building the remainder of the third squadron, the production lines 
would stay open another 10 years. Not only would this sustain American 
know-how in this important industry, but would also save tens of 
thousands of jobs within aerospace and related industries. When we buy 
the B-2 we are not only buying the best long-range-strike aircraft in 
the world, we are also investing in the industrial capacity to produce 
them. We preserve the industrial base, while preserving the ability to 
project power anywhere in the world to protect American interests.
  Another important cost factor to consider is what we have already 
invested in this revolutionary weapons system. If we do not have the 
foresight to approve the remaining nine bombers now, the costs to 
restart this program will be much greater in the future, as the need 
becomes more critical. Planning ahead will allow us to get more value 
from the money and effort already committed to this project.
  Mr. President, earlier, I mentioned Saddam Hussein's aggression 
against the Kurds last fall, as an example of new threats to our 
national security. This is especially true since administration 
officials have stated that we should expect to contend with Saddam on a 
yearly basis from now on. In response to Saddam's movements against the 
Kurds, on September 3, 1996, we attacked targets in the southern 
regions of Iraq. It would have been more effective to strike the 
Republican Guard, which was the actual threat to the Kurds in the 
north, or the hardened command and control centers of the Iraqi 
leadership in Baghdad. However, our insufficient response to Saddam's 
assault resulted from a lack of options available to us.
  Because Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Turkey each indicated that they 
would not permit American aircraft from launching air strikes from 
bases in their countries, we were forced to use other options not 
dependent on foreign governments: carrier airpower, bombers, and cruise 
missiles. The inherent limitations of each of these options imposed 
constraints on where and what we could attack--the northern targets 
were out of range of carrier-launched missions and, because the targets 
were mobile, cruise missiles could not be used. The most important 
targets in Baghdad were too heavily protected for conventional, non-
Stealth aircraft delivering cruise missiles that, in any event, could 
not penetrate underground bunkers. Thus, we had to choose targets that 
were easier to attack: fixed targets, which were above ground and not 
hardened and, therefore, vulnerable to cruise missile attacks within 
range of carrier-based aircraft in the southern no-fly zone.
  In order to more effectively attack Saddam and punish his aggressive 
actions, we would have had to use a stealth weapon to elude detection 
by Iraqi air defense; a long-range weapon, not based in a foreign 
country; and a precise weapon to strike the mobile and hardened targets 
presented in Iraq. Our B-2 is this weapon. It is the only tool in our 
arsenal that allows us to respond to the new threats we face in an 
unequivocal and decisive fashion.
  What about those who say we don't need any more B-2 bombers? The 
issue of our bomber capacity was addressed in the Department of Defense 
Heavy Bomber Force Study. This study concluded that our current force 
would be sufficient through sometime around 2015. I was very 
disappointed with the conclusions of this study, not only because I 
believe the study was fundamentally flawed and based on unrealistic 
assumptions, but also because I believe the B-2 is the most vital 
weapon of our future.

  The study utilizes a scenario of two regional conflicts, but assumes 
that our enemies would be incredibly considerate of our needs. It was 
assumed that we would have a 14-day advanced warning of an enemy 
attack, allowing time to deploy our forces; that the two regional 
conflicts would not be simultaneous, so our bombers could be used in 
both conflicts; and that no weapons of mass destruction would be used 
to poison the ground and air in the area where we would intend to 
deploy our troops. These were the assumptions.
  I ask my colleagues, with the furor aroused in the American populace 
by the gulf war syndrome and the conflicting stories which have emerged 
from the Pentagon, is there anyone who still believes that we would 
deploy forces into an area where we suspect the enemy has released 
chemical or biological weapons? What is to prevent an enemy from 
discharging chemical or biological agents in an area prior to the 
initiation of open hostilities? Would our troops be able to deploy into 
the theater of conflict without interference? Could they set up and 
operate air bases and troop reception centers while under the threat of 
chemical or biological weapons? I am confident that the answers point 
to the urgent need for long-range-strike aircraft and support the 
acquisition of nine more B-2 aircraft.
  The heavy bomber study also made some broad assumptions about other 
factors that may or may not be in our control. The study assumes that 
we will be able to move our troops and equipment faster than we ever 
have before; that all of our allies will be on board and welcome 
foreign troops into their bases and ports; that our forward locations 
will also be conveniently located near the regional conflicts; and that 
our current equipment, including bombers built in the 1950's and 
1960's, will be available and fully functional. Altogether, these are 
awfully big leaps of faith to make about uncertain enemies and unlikely 
conditions in the future.
  If any one of the unrealistic assumptions does not hold true, the B-2 
becomes our primary weapon and our only practical option. It is the 
only system that is not vulnerable to surprise attack. It is the only 
system that is independent of support aircraft based in the theater of 
conflict. It is the only system that is capable of operating beyond the 
range of weapons of mass destruction.
  Mr. President, we have also learned that our allies do not always 
cooperate readily with our requests to use bases in their countries, or 
fly through their airspace, when answering aggression--again, examples 
are the United States raid on Libya in 1986 in response to terrorist 
bombings and the attack on Iraq last year when organized Iraqi forces 
attacked Kurds in northern Iraq. To give the President the best option 
to protect American interests and citizens, while reducing to a minimum 
the risk to American soldiers, we need to have the most effective tool 
available--an independent, global, precision strike system. We need to 
give him this option and take advantage of the most advanced technology 
available; we must approve funding in order to complete the third 
squadron of B-2's.
  Mr. President, I am no military expert. But those whom I know and 
trust, men such as retired Air Force General Charles Horner, who ran 
the air campaign in the gulf war, have determined that three squadrons 
of B-2's represent the minimum operational capacity required to meet 
our basic military objectives. In order to halt an invasion from bases 
at home, and to conduct a strategic air campaign, like that of the gulf 
war, from bases at home, the Air Force needs three squadrons of B-2's. 
These three squadrons are also critical to neutralizing weapons of mass 
destruction and theater ballistic missiles; establishing air 
superiority and attacking enemy airfields; and suppressing enemy air 
defenses; all of which then enable the deployment of forces to the 
theater when necessary.

[[Page S3130]]

  Mr. President, history shows us that surprise attacks, both strategic 
and terrorist, do happen and are very effective--Pearl Harbor and 
Korea, as well as the attack on the Marine barracks in Beirut, and on 
our installation in Dhahran--are poignant examples of our past 
failures. We dare not fail again. We need to plan for surprise--to 
equip our military forces with the ability to blunt or defeat an attack 
anywhere, at any time, and with weapons that we will actually use and 
which others believe we will actually use. That means conventional 
explosives delivered with great accuracy and with immediacy and with 
little risk of U.S. casualties. That means the B-2 long-range-strike 
aircraft.
  Mr. President, with the B-2, our ability to respond effectively to 
diffuse global threats, through the projection of American power, is 
secure; without it, our foreign policy is one of dependence on others, 
our interests are hostage to public opinion in foreign countries, and 
our soldiers, whom we send to defend our interests abroad, are 
needlessly imperiled.
  Mr. President, I call upon my colleagues to support the acquisition 
of nine more B-2 aircraft, to establish the minimal, militarily 
effective force of three squadrons.

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