[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 43 (Monday, April 14, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3114-S3116]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




     THE U.S. ARMY'S TASK FORCE XXI ADVANCED WARFIGHTING EXPERIMENT

  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, during the recent congressional recess I 
visited the U.S. Army's National Training Center at Fort Irwin, CA, 
with Army Chief of Staff Gen. Dennis Reimer. The purpose of my visit 
was to observe the culmination of the Army's brigade-size Task Force 
XXI warfighting experiment. I want to take a few moments

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today to describe this important and far-reaching exercise for my 
colleagues.
  The Army's National Training Center is probably the best training 
center for mechanized ground combat forces in the world. Army brigades 
rotate through the NTC to test their skills in a 2-week exercise 
against the NTC's vaunted opposing force, or OPFOR--the 11th Armored 
Cavalry Regiment, currently commanded by Col. Guy Swan. This opposing 
force uses equipment and tactics similar to those used by the military 
forces of the former Warsaw Pact. Many in the Army consider this force 
to be the best-trained brigade-size force of any army in the world.
  The exercise I observed with General Reimer was part of the Army's 
Task Force XXI advanced warfighting experiment. It involved the so-
called experimental force of the 1st Brigade of the 4th Infantry 
Division, Mechanized--the EXFOR--commanded by Col. Tom Goedkoop. This 
was a long anticipated exercise, Mr. President, because it was the 
first brigade-level test of a range of digital technology capabilities 
designed to bring the power of information warfare to ground combat 
forces.
  The goal of the Army's Task Force XXI advanced warfighting experiment 
is to increase the combat power of Army divisions and to make them more 
versatile, more deployable and more agile across a broad range of 
missions. Some people have even compared the 2-week exercise at the 
National Training Center with the historic Louisiana maneuvers of the 
1930's which established the structure and warfighting doctrine of our 
World War II Army.
  The Army began this experiment with digitization with the decision 
over a year ago to use the 4th Infantry Division, Mechanized, stationed 
at Fort Hood as a testbed for this technology. The Army established a 
factory-like operation at Fort Hood to modify over 900 vehicles into 
over 180 different configurations. The EXFOR was equipped with 87 
different digital systems--over 5,000 individual pieces of equipment in 
total. This digital equipment included unmanned aerial vehicles, a 
networked computer system, global positioning satellite receivers, 
position reporting transmitters, digital radios, and the most advanced 
night vision and thermal imaging equipment.
  This equipment was developed and designed to dramatically improve the 
situational awareness capability of the experimental force. Situational 
awareness refers to the ability to determine and track the location of 
all forces on the battlefield at a given time. It is the ability to 
answer the three questions--Where am I? Where are my buddies? Where is 
the enemy?--which are critical to success on the modern battlefield. 
Each vehicle in the EXFOR brigade was outfitted with a computer 
terminal that gave the members of the brigade unprecedented and real-
time friendly situational awareness from the individual infantry 
fighting vehicles and tanks all the way up to division level, as well 
as unprecedented intelligence on enemy, or OPFOR, operations.
  The digital equipment also provided the EXFOR with integrated and 
automated mission planning, mission execution, and command and control 
capabilities never before available to any army in the world. For 
intelligence information, commanders down to battalion level could 
access all levels of support, including national satellite systems, 
overhead reconnaissance aircraft like the U-2, the SR-71, and JSTARS, 
the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System.
  During my visit to the NTC, I observed the combat battalions of the 
experimental force in a deep attack against the opposing force. I 
watched as the EXFOR conducted breach operations against the OPFOR's 
formidable obstacle system as the OPFOR fought to defend its battle 
position. While this specific engagement turned out to be a tactical 
draw, there were many instances where the technology available to the 
experimental force demonstrated the potential for greatly enhanced 
capabilities in the Army of the future.
  Before a combat operation the commander generally conducts what is 
called the intelligence preparation of the battlefield. In the case of 
offensive operations, the commander and his staff compare a doctrinal 
template of the way they expect the enemy to array his forces in the 
defense to that dictated by the actual terrain in the area of 
operations. The resultant situational template allows the commander to 
target his reconnaissance effort against the suspected enemy defensive 
positions to confirm or deny the accuracy of the template. He then 
adjusts his scheme of firing and maneuvering to effectively attack and 
destroy the enemy in his confirmed positions.
  Today, Army units rely principally on their integral aerial and 
ground scouts with their current optical, thermal, or radar systems to 
conduct this reconnaissance. Very often scouts are destroyed before 
reaching their positions, or are unable to send back accurate or timely 
spot reports for any number of reasons. In that case a commander is 
forced to attack against an unconfirmed or incomplete situational 
template of the enemy defense, or is forced to change his scheme of 
maneuver at the last minute--a particularly difficult and dangerous 
endeavor.

  With its enhanced situational awareness capability, the EXFOR was 
able to conduct the intelligence preparation of the battlefield much 
quicker and with greater accuracy than normal Army brigades. The 
situational template was developed and transmitted digitally to all 
echelons of command. The commander used all reconnaissance assets, 
including national satellite systems, overhead aircraft, UAV 
reconnaissance, and the Joint Surveillance Target Attack System, as 
well as his integral aerial and ground scouts who were equipped with 
enhanced sights and other surveillance equipment. OPFOR positions were 
detected and transmitted digitally to all of the EXFOR vehicle computer 
systems to update the situational template. With such accurate and 
timely intelligence the commander was able to quickly change the scheme 
of fires and maneuver for his attack with ample time and information 
for subordinate commanders to plan and react effectively.
  During the EXFOR attack the OPFOR employed an artillery delivered 
minefield across the EXFOR's avenue of approach in an attempt to 
confuse and slow the EXFOR attack. With its superior situational 
awareness provided by its digital systems, the EXFOR was able to 
transmit the locations of the minefield quickly and accurately to 
follow-on attacking battalions. These battalions were able to avoid the 
minefield and resort to an alternate route of attack. Likewise, 
superior situational awareness permitted those battalions, in the dead 
of night, to rapidly traverse the more difficult terrain of the 
alternate route and surprise an OPFOR unaccustomed to such a rapid 
response on the part of a training unit.
  During this attack highly accurate situational awareness permitted 
rapid and effective EXFOR response in other situations as well. In the 
battle I observed, the EXFOR placed very accurate counter-battery radar 
coverage zones around its units that needed priority protection. This 
proved critical when the EXFOR combat engineers were breaching the 
obstacles in front of the OPFOR defensive position and came under OPFOR 
mortar attack. The counter-battery radars detected the first incoming 
rounds and alerted EXFOR artillery, which immediately responded with 
counter-battery fires that destroyed the OPFOR mortars before they 
could fire another round against the engineers.
  During the later stages of the battle I visited the brigade and 
divisional tactical operations centers and saw the soldiers and 
officers of the EXFOR using the digital equipment in the most realistic 
combat environment the Army can simulate short of actual war. I 
observed the unmanned aerial vehicle--or UAV--being flown from a van 
attached to the brigade tactical operations center under the direction 
of one of the brigade operations officers, providing the brigade with 
real-time intelligence and tremendous targeting information. The 
commander of the OPFOR brigade later told me that he had to devote 
significantly more resources to protecting his own forces in this 
exercise compared to others. He said that all of his soldiers, for 
example, spent a lot of time during the 2-week exercise looking up in 
the sky and watching for the EXFOR's UAV's.

[[Page S3116]]

  Madam President, an important aspect of the Army's effort to 
incorporate digital technology into its divisions is the unprecedented 
cooperation between the Army and the contractor community. This 
cooperation extended to the exercise at the National Training Center. 
During my visit I toured what the Army calls the Central Technical 
Support Facility, a facility jointly manned by Army personnel and 
contractor personnel. The Army established this unique organization to 
act as an enabler for rapid integration of software and hardware 
systems through interaction of soldiers, contractors, and program 
managers. Any problems identified by the soldier-users of the tactical 
internet and digital systems were immediately dealt with by hardware 
and software engineers at the Central Technical Support Facility. In 
some cases, their solutions resulted in design changes which were 
immediately incorporated into the experiment, shaving months or years 
off the normal time-lines for the testing and acquisition process. 
Senior Army officials believe this concept is a prototype which holds 
great potential for changing the way users and contractors interact in 
the future. I share the Army's interest in further development of this 
arrangement.
  I have inevitably been asked who won the 2-week exercise--was it the 
EXFOR with its new technology, or was it the OPFOR who lacked the newer 
technology but had a tremendous home-field advantage with its intimate 
knowledge of the terrain and long experience of fighting together? The 
answer to that question is not nearly as important as the answer to the 
question of how effective were the various new technologies used by the 
EXFOR.
  The answer to both will have to wait for the results of the 
comprehensive after-action review that is being conducted by the Army. 
My own discussions during my visit left me with the overall impression 
that this digitization technology can be a tremendously powerful tool 
for the Army. UAV's--unmanned aerial vehicles--were a great force 
multiplier, as were the latest generation night vision equipment and 
the situational awareness technology. The Apache Longbow helicopter, 
the new Javelin antitank weapon and the Paladin howitzer were all 
combat systems available to the EXFOR which gave them a clear advantage 
over the OPFOR, and these systems were made even more effective by 
UAV's and other systems that provided real-time targeting data.
  In some significant instances, the NTC exercise did not reflect the 
full potential of some new technologies that are already reaching the 
deployed forces. For example, the M1A2 tank is in such short supply at 
this time that the Army is fielding this system only with the early 
deploying combat forces. The EXFOR was using M1A1 tanks with internally 
mounted computer terminals to provide situational awareness. Although 
these internally mounted terminals are a great help, they are not a 
long-term solution and do not adequately represent the target 
acquisition and situational awareness capability of the embedded 
information warfare systems fielded with the M1A2.

  The technologies that the Army is testing under their advanced 
warfighting experiments are not without bugs and problems. Some 
echelons of command, for example, were reluctant to rely on the real-
time situational awareness reported digitally over the EXFOR's tactical 
internet and preferred instead to rely on traditional acetate maps and 
voice communications. With much of the technology still in development, 
this reliance on traditional methods of command and control was 
understandable, and some backup capability to the tactical internet 
will need to be retained in the future. In general, though, much of the 
technology that I saw on display during the exercise can be 
incorporated into systems that will significantly improve the 
survivability and lethality of our Army combat forces. The commander of 
the OPFOR brigade acknowledged that his brigade had been tested more 
than usual by the EXFOR brigade. He also said that he would not like to 
fight the EXFOR brigade after they had a year to train with their new 
equipment.
  There is an old saying that knowledge is power. The advanced 
warfighting experiment at the National Training Center demonstrated 
that knowledge is also military power--particularly the knowledge of 
the battlefield that comes from the tremendous situational awareness 
available through the digital technology of information warfare. No 
amount of technology is going to change the basic requirement for Army 
combat forces to be able to close with and destroy the enemy. But the 
information dominance that the Army is developing through the Force XXI 
effort can be a tremendous force multiplier.
  Earlier this year General Shalikashvili told the Armed Services 
Committee that the Defense Department will have to change the way it 
does business. ``Where possible,'' General Shalikashvili stated, ``we 
will also have to trim personnel end strength especially where 
technological changes such as improved weapons systems afford us the 
possibility to consider fewer and smaller units.'' The technology of 
information warfare tested at the National Training Center last month 
is a good example of technology that may in fact allow a smaller force 
to have the same or even greater lethality and combat effectiveness as 
the forces we have today.
  Madam President, I want to congratulate General Reimer, the Army 
Chief of Staff and his predecessor Gen. Gordon Sullivan; Gen. William 
Hartzog, the commander of the Army's Training and Doctrine Command; and 
Maj. Gen. Paul Kern, the commander of the 4th Infantry Division for 
their vision and determination to make information technology a force 
multiplier for the Army of the future. I also want to congratulate the 
thousands of soldiers, Department of the Army civilians, and civilian 
contractors responsible for their contributions to this important 
effort.

  The job, however, is not complete. There are a number of challenges 
that must be addressed before the decision is made to expand this 
technology throughout the Army, including questions of cost; the 
integration of new technology into existing systems; the impact of this 
technology on the Army's organizational structure and doctrine, and on 
the tactics, techniques and procedures to execute this doctrine; the 
impact on the training base; and the impact on personnel systems, 
including leader development.
  Madam President, the Armed Services Committee will look closely at 
the results and lessons learned from the advanced warfighting 
experiment in the coming weeks and months. I look forward to working 
with the Army and with my colleagues on the Armed Services Committee to 
bring the best of this experiment to the rest of the Army in a timely 
manner.

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