[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 43 (Monday, April 14, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3078-S3110]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                  NUCLEAR WASTE POLICY ACT AMENDMENTS

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. I am going to for a moment, until the Senator from 
Alaska comes, suggest the absence of a quorum because the Senator is 
not here. In order to have debate, it is important that he be here, and 
I do not want to go forward with an amendment and not give him an 
opportunity to respond. So for a brief period of time, I suggest the 
absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Hagel). The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. I thank the Chair. I welcome my colleague, Senator 
Murkowski from Alaska.


                  Amendment No. 29 to Amendment No. 26

  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
pending amendment be set aside and that the Senate now consider 
amendment No. 29. My understanding is that we have an hour on this 
amendment to be equally divided.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct. Is there objection? Without 
objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Nevada (Mr. Reid) for Mr. Wellstone 
     proposes an amendment numbered 29 to amendment No. 26.

  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 22 of the substitute, line 5, after ``(3)(B)'' 
     insert the Secretary has made a determination that personnel 
     in all State, local, and tribal jurisdictions on primary and 
     alternative shipping routes have met acceptable standards of 
     training for emergency responses to accidents involving spent 
     nuclear fuel and high-level nuclear waste, as established by 
     the Secretary, and''.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, let me start out by giving some context 
to this amendment. I feel strongly that the Federal Government should 
live up to its obligation to take possession of nuclear waste. That is 
my framework. I am with this amendment not operating outside of that 
framework.
  I also add that Minnesotans and other customers of nuclear power have 
been paying into a nuclear waste fund over the years, and the reason 
was and the understanding is that the Federal Government would make 
this commitment and live up to this commitment. That part of this 
legislation, that premise, I fully support.
  Mr. President, I have been concerned in the past--and still am 
although I don't have an amendment today that deals with this--about 
what happens when the Federal Government actually takes title under 
this bill because I do think that over the years you are going to have 
a huge taxpayer liability. So while I want the Federal Government to be 
responsible and live up to its national commitment to do something 
about it, I worry about the transfer of over 10,000 years all of a 
sudden to the taxpayers. The GAO has estimated that the taxpayers' 
future burden could be about $77 billion. This is assuming a 100-year 
program. But we are talking about a program of nuclear waste that is 
over thousands of years.
  Mr. President, concerns about this legislation. First of all, the 
legislation still attempts to skirt some of the requirements of the 
National Environmental Policy Act. There is a reason for that piece of 
legislation, and I do think, when you are talking about the transport 
of highly radioactive nuclear waste material, this is a time, if there 
ever was a time, when you want to have full environmental review, when 
you want to be absolutely certain that you are talking about the 
transportation of this kind of material taking into full account the 
health and safety and protection of families all across the country.
  My esteemed colleagues from Nevada have discussed some of the risks 
and problems associated with transporting highly radioactive nuclear 
waste in their struggle against this bill. They also feel that Nevada 
has been unfairly singled out, and I respect them for that. My 
framework is a little different. But I do want to point out there are 
going to be some 16,000 shipments on our highways and our railways over 
the coming years. We are talking about some significant distance 
traveled. There are legitimate concerns that people have about the 
transportation of this highly radioactive nuclear waste material; 
people are going to be concerned about it, and in addition there is 
some debate about whether or not the containers themselves are safe.
  We already transport hazardous materials, but I want to argue there 
is a significant difference when we are talking about nuclear waste 
material, especially highly radioactive nuclear waste. Consider it this 
way. If you have an accident involving nuclear waste as opposed to many 
hazardous wastes, you can have a dramatically different outcome. 
Radiation, without doubt, kills people, and it is a different scale we 
are talking about. God forbid--worst case scenario--we have an 
accident. We have to do everything we can to guard against that 
accident. We could be talking about something catastrophic. We cannot 
afford to have such an accident in our country which results in

[[Page S3079]]

this kind of radiation leak that could have such dire consequences for 
people, such dire consequences for our families, and therefore I think 
we have to do everything possible to assure safety. That is what this 
amendment is about.
  Now, this bill calls for a transportation planning process, and I 
note--and I thank the distinguished Senator from Alaska--that part of 
the amendment I proposed last week calling for more public 
participation has been incorporated. That is to say, there is some 
language about public comment when it comes to these plans. But in 
Minnesota we currently have 641 metric tons of high-level nuclear waste 
and spent nuclear fuel. That is a conservative estimate. And by the 
year 2014 we expect there will be around 987 metric tons, all of which 
will travel the roads and rails of Minnesota and States between us and 
Nevada, if this bill succeeds. So I think we have to do everything 
possible to ensure the safety and security of these shipments, and I 
would add that I think to talk about public comment really does not go 
far enough.
  Initially, our amendment said that in the actual planning process, as 
you chart out the routes, those citizens who are affected by the 
transportation of this material ought to be able to be involved in the 
planning process, as should local officials. They should at least be 
consulted. I did not say they would have a veto because I know that 
would not work. But I did talk about consultation. I did talk about 
involving citizens who will be affected, who are going to be worried 
about themselves and their families, and local officials who are going 
to be worried, I talked about involving them in a more integral and 
real and substantive way in the planning process. I wish that amendment 
had been accepted.
  My friends from Alaska, Mr. Murkowski, and from Oregon, Mr. Wyden, 
have made sure that this legislation really does take some steps 
forward from the last bill. Grants can be provided for training, and in 
addition there are going to be training standards which are going to be 
set. I still think, again, that we have to do everything possible to 
ensure the safety of these shipments. We have to do everything 
possible, leave no stone unturned, in making sure that we prevent the 
worst case scenario, which could be a nightmare scenario for our 
country. If we do not do that, we are going to be asking ourselves, 
when such an accident takes place, did we do everything possible when 
we transported this poisonous waste all across America.
  The brave men and women who are likely to be first on the scene when 
an accident occurs, local firefighters, do not support this bill 
because they believe it inadequately provides for their needs such as 
the training, funding, and technical assistance.
  I ask unanimous consent that a letter from the International 
Association of Firefighters be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                         International Association


                                             of Fire Fighters,

                                   Washington, DC, April 14, 1997.
     Hon. Paul Wellstone,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Wellstone: On behalf of the nation's more than 
     225,000 professional fire fighters, I wish to express our 
     enthusiastic support for your amendment to S.104 which would 
     ensure that emergency response personnel along the proposed 
     shipping routes are adequately trained to respond to an 
     emergency incident.
       Currently, only a fraction of all emergency responders have 
     adequate training and equipment to respond to an incident 
     involving radiological material. Indeed, more than 40% of the 
     fire departments along the proposed routes do not even meet 
     minimum training requirements for basic hazardous materials 
     response. The training needed for radiological materials is 
     far more complex.
       Put quite simply, America's emergency responders are 
     currently not equipped to deal with an incident along the 
     routes to the Yucca Mountain facility. If an incident were to 
     occur, whether it be an accident or a terrorist act, lives 
     would be unnecessarily lost because the local emergency 
     response personnel lack the necessary training and equipment 
     to effectively respond.
       We are indebted to you, Senator, for your leadership on 
     this vital public safety issue. Please feel free to call on 
     us if we can be of any assistance to you.
           Sincerely,
                                              Alfred K. Whitehead,
                                                General President.

  Mr. WELLSTONE. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. President, what the firefighters are saying is, look, you are 
going to have $150,000 which is going to be offered by each State that 
is to be affected by this along this transportation route but the 
question we are asking, says the firefighters, is how do we know that 
in 2 years or 5 years we are going to be ready? We want to make sure 
there is enough funding for our training, and we want to make sure we 
are adequately prepared for this because it is our responsibility to 
protect the citizens in our communities.
  I am told that the International Association of Firefighters, which 
represents 95 percent of professional firefighters in the United 
States, did a survey of departments along a potential test shipping 
route in Ohio, and they found that 40 percent of the departments along 
the route were not prepared, according to current standards, to deal 
with hazardous material accidents. Let us face it. When it comes to 
hazardous material and when it comes to highly radioactive nuclear 
waste, we are going to try, whether it be by rail or road, to go in the 
less populated of our rural areas. And by the way, all too often, 
people in rural America are familiar with the saying let's go where 
fewer people live, but they say there may be fewer of us but we count 
as much as anybody living in any metropolitan area.
  We are also hearing from a lot of communities: We are worried that we 
are not going to be trained; we don't feel we are even ready when it 
comes to the transportation of hazardous materials.
  So, Mr. President, let us assume the grants have been made and a 
State takes advantage of these funds. Two years pass and shipments of 
nuclear waste begin to pass through the State. What guarantee do we 
have that local fire departments are fully trained and equipped and 
that if the worst thing possible happens, they can respond in such a 
way as to minimize disaster.
  What this amendment says is that the Department of Energy must 
determine--in other words, we talked about training. We have talked 
about some grants, but nowhere in this piece of legislation do we have 
the fail-safe, ironclad guarantee that as a matter of fact these local 
fire departments, these local emergency response personnel will have 
received adequate training. This amendment proposes that the Department 
of Energy must determine that emergency response personnel along the 
routes where over 16,000 shipments of highly radioactive waste will 
pass have met an acceptable standard of training before these shipments 
begin. That is all this amendment says.
  Again, what we want to do is to verify that these brave men and 
women--they are asking this. They are going to be on the frontline, the 
first line of response to an accident, people who are going to be 
putting their lives on the line--in fact have received the training 
they need. This amendment says that no shipments will occur until the 
Department of Energy has determined that the emergency response 
personnel in all jurisdictions along a given shipping route will have 
met an acceptable level of training. It seems to me that is very 
reasonable. I think this is a logical extension of the Wyden amendment 
in committee.
  Yes, we have some funding, although we do not know whether it is 
going to be enough. Most communities do not think it is. Yes, we have 
some training standards. But what we are saying is we have to make 
sure, above and beyond some funding and some standards for acceptable 
levels of training, that level of training is met before any deadly 
cargo under this bill hits the road. In other words, no training, no 
shipments. That is a pretty reasonable amendment.
  This bill in its current form calls for training standards to be 
established by the Department of Transportation, but I am concerned 
that the bill is ambiguous at best about who is really responsible for 
making sure these standards are met. That is what this amendment speaks 
to. By requiring the Secretary of the Department of Energy to determine 
that every jurisdiction has met the standards, this amendment holds the 
processor of the waste responsible for making sure all safety 
precautions have been taken.
  If requiring a determination by the DOE just simply adds one 
additional

[[Page S3080]]

signoff to this process, then I say this makes all the sense in the 
world.
  One more time. What we have is a situation where we are going to be 
talking about the shipment of highly radioactive nuclear waste. This is 
of a different order than hazardous material. We have the firefighters 
and other people who are concerned about this living in the local 
communities saying we are worried about whether or not we are going to 
receive adequate funding for training and whether or not we are in fact 
going to be trained.
  There is some funding. I do not think it is going to be enough. We do 
not want this to become an unfunded mandate. And there is some setting 
of the level of standards by the Department of Transportation but 
nowhere in this legislation do we have a clear line of accountability 
that as a matter of fact firefighters and other local safety personnel 
will be trained to deal with a crisis if they have to do so.
  It seems to me that the very least we can do is to make sure that 
happens.
  Let me simply conclude by quoting the last part of this letter from 
the International Association of Firefighters:

       Put quite simply, America's emergency responders are not 
     equipped to deal with an incident along the routes to the 
     Yucca Mountain facility. If an incident were to occur, 
     whether it is an accident or terrorist act, lives would be 
     unnecessarily lost because the local emergency response 
     personnel lack the necessary training and equipment to 
     effectively respond.

  All this amendment does is say let us make sure, Department of 
Energy, you are accountable; you have to make a determination that 
before we ship this waste, the local fire departments, the local safety 
personnel have, in fact, received the training and they are equipped to 
deal with, if, God forbid, there is, a serious accident. I believe this 
amendment should be accepted. It is imminently reasonable, and it seems 
to me we ought to take every step necessary to make sure we guarantee 
the safety and security of people in our communities.
  Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 16 minutes.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I reserve the rest of my time to 
respond to my colleague.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. I thank the Chair.
  I very much appreciate the amendment from my friend from Minnesota, 
and I know of his interest in this matter because there is substantial 
amounts of spent nuclear fuel from reactors in Minnesota. I am sure the 
Senator from Minnesota is aware of the transportation route where high-
level nuclear waste has been transferred across the United States, some 
2,400 shipments, and I have a map here that shows the manner in which 
these shipments have occurred from 1979 to 1995.
  I think the Senator was out in his State Friday when we were talking 
about this. This chart shows that shipments of nuclear waste have been 
made over an extended period of time, all over the Nation. And during 
those 2,400 shipments there have been seven accidents. Most of those 
accident were minor ones. In the most serious accident, the tractor 
trailer swerved off the road to avoid another car that was out of 
control, turned over and the cask rolled off. But there was no leakage 
of radioactivity. The cask did not break. It was not perforated in any 
manner or form.

  As the Senator from Minnesota knows, this type of nuclear waste, 
while it is highly radioactive, does not go up in the air and vaporize 
or move with the wind currents or whatever. It has a tendency, because 
of its weight and denseness, to stay wherever it occurs. And these are 
high-level waste rods from the reactors.
  I think the intent of the Senator from Minnesota is parallel with my 
own intent. We want to safeguard, in every possible way, the 
transportation of this material.
  Here is an example of the type of truck and the cask. You can see the 
cask up on top. These have been designed to withstand any foreseeable 
accident of any kind that would be determined to be possible on a 
highway. In testing, they have been dropped. They have been hit by 
trains. They have been incinerated and so forth. I go into this detail, 
not to suggest there could not be some type of accident that would 
cause a penetration but, clearly, the best scientists, the best 
engineers we have have concluded that these casks have been designed in 
such a way as to survive real-world accidents and ensure the public 
safety.
  The concern the Senator from Alaska has, relative to the amendment 
offered by my friend from Minnesota, is how to determine just what is 
adequate, relative to training? I think, if you look at the safeguards 
we have attempted to put in S. 104, we have put in funding for 
technical assistance for emergency responders along the routes to be 
used to transport the fuel. The Wyden language, which we adopted, 
provided more detail. Rigorous provisions regarding route selection and 
training for emergency responders were included. We had left it to the 
Department of Transportation to choose the preferred routes. Again, 
considerations in route selection would include concerns over 
population, hazards, shipping time, and so forth.
  But I want to point out to my friend that this is nothing new. The 
only reason these other 2,400 shipments were not news is because 
nothing happened. These were in connection with moving high-level 
material from experimental reactors and other reactors around the 
country for disposition. So, to suggest that what we have had before 
was adequate is inconsistent, I think, with reality. The question we 
are looking at now is, Can we do everything possible to ensure that we 
have the safest possible transportation route and have made the maximum 
effort to protect public safety? It is also important to recognize that 
this plan is fully integrated with State notification, inspection, 
emergency response plans, as well as should it go through any tribal or 
native lands.
  It also grants at least $150,000 in State and tribal funding. I think 
this was something the Senator from Minnesota brought up in his debate. 
If there is no training, there are no shipments. That is a provision of 
our bill. We make it clear the Department of Energy cannot transport 
fuel under this act unless the technical assistance and funding 
required by the bill have been provided for at least 3 years prior to 
the shipments. As I understand the Wellstone amendment, it would add as 
a requirement that the Department of Energy make a formal determination 
that personnel along the routes have met acceptable standards of 
training for emergency response to accident. It does not provide 
additional training. And it requires the Department of Energy to make 
an official determination.
  My concern, and I am sure the concern of the Senator from Minnesota, 
is to get this stuff moved out of his State. That is a legitimate 
concern that he and others have, other States have, where this material 
is piled up. So we have to make sure we do not tie this process up in 
litigation so every State or every tribe or every local community could 
come in under a determination of adequacy. I am concerned here as to 
how I can meet the concerns of the Senator from Minnesota and still 
ensure that we have a viable and practical situation where this 
oversight does not throttle our objective here, and that is to move 
this material to an appropriate repository.

  I am concerned if this amendment is adopted as it is now, we might 
find ourselves tied up in litigation and it would not be that the DOE 
had or had not followed the Department of Transportation's regulations 
to the letter. I do not think it matters that the Department of Energy 
has followed the NRC regulations with care and precision. It might not 
matter the Department of Energy has integrated emergency response plans 
with all the State tribes. And it will not matter the DOE has provided 
funding for emergency responders. What will matter is we might have a 
lawyer along the way who has decided that a new volunteer fireman has 
not had acceptable level of training. The next thing you know, the 
Department of Energy is in court trying to prove that every individual 
firefighter along every single route has been trained to an acceptable 
level. I do not know how we are going to prove that. What is an 
acceptable level? That would be in the eyes of a court to determine.
  I just wonder if we might confer a little bit, or perhaps here on the 
floor, if the Senator wished, to discuss how we

[[Page S3081]]

would address that concern of what is acceptable, because I think we 
both want to get there from here. I would defer to my colleague, on my 
own time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Let me thank the Senator from Alaska. I have some 
ideas about how we might do that. I wonder whether I might yield some 
of my time to the Senator from Oregon. While he is speaking, the two of 
us might talk this over.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. If the Senator from Oregon is not ready, I wonder 
whether or not I could, just for a moment, call for a quorum call that 
would not be charged to either side so we might be able to discuss 
this. I ask unanimous consent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I have conferred with the distinguished 
Senator from Minnesota with regard to the suggestion that has been made 
for a change in the wording of the amendment, by adding the word 
``preliminary.'' That would be in line 2. It is my understanding the 
amendment would read:

       On page 22 of the substitute, line 5 after ``(3) (B)'' 
     insert, ``until the Secretary has made a'' [and the 
     additional would be ``preliminary''] ``determination. . . .''

  The rest of the amendment would be the same.
  That is satisfactory to our side. I leave it up to the other side for 
discussion and analysis, but we are prepared on this side to accept the 
amendment in that form.
  Mr. REID. We object to the modification. Objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. It would take unanimous consent to modify the 
amendment. Objection is heard. The Senator from Minnesota.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I understand I had been clear with 
colleagues from Nevada about this amendment. I always--my own people 
have their own goals here. I really do believe something has to be 
done. The Federal Government has made a commitment and I want to see 
the Federal Government live up to it.
  What I was trying to do in this amendment is to assure the safety and 
security of the shipments. I understand why my colleagues have taken 
the position they have taken. I say to the Senator from Alaska that I 
do think the change that we proposed on preliminary determination makes 
good sense. I am sorry we cannot do this.
  Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Alaska.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. I wonder if it would satisfy the Senator from 
Minnesota if I gave him a commitment that we would accept his 
amendment, at least I would attempt to accept his amendment, in 
conference, because, obviously, I will be on the conference committee.
  I would accept the underlying amendment now with the provision that I 
would give him my commitment to do my very best in conference to adopt 
his amendment, but I am willing to accept the underlying amendment now.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I want to again suggest the absence of 
a quorum for a moment. My concern is--I have no reason to doubt the 
good work of my colleague from Alaska--but I sometimes have not fared 
so well in conference committee, and I am a little worried about it. I 
have to make a decision. I think it would take unanimous consent to do 
it.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. I think there is a misunderstanding. I am prepared to 
accept the amendment with the commitment that I will try to get the 
Senator's revision which we talked about--adding the word 
``preliminary''--adopted in conference.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. I see. Mr. President, I do not need time to confer 
with my colleague from Alaska on that. I am pleased that he is willing 
to do so. We do not need a vote on it if the Senator from Alaska will 
accept this amendment. I have some additional time. Maybe my colleague 
from Oregon, who has done so much work on this, might want to speak on 
this amendment for a moment. Does the Senator from Oregon want to speak 
for a moment on this?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon.
  Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Minnesota for 
yielding me time.
  Transportation of defense- and commercial-grade nuclear fuel and 
high-level radioactive waste is a great concern to the people of 
Oregon. Virtually every shipment to and from the Department of Energy's 
Hanford site requires at least 200 miles of transport on the roads in 
our State. As we have heard these past several days, the transportation 
of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste is a major 
concern to many Senators on both sides of the aisle in this debate with 
respect to how to handle nuclear waste in the next century.
  During the Energy Committee markup on S. 104, my amendment on 
transportation safety of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive 
waste was adopted. A key component of that amendment is the no 
shipments if no training provision. It literally means what it says, 
that there will be no shipment of spent nuclear fuel or high-level 
radioactive waste through the jurisdiction of any State or reservation 
lands of any Indian tribe eligible unless technical assistance and 
funds to implement procedures for the safe routing transportation are 
available for at least 3 years prior to any shipments.
  This provision was carefully crafted to ensure safe transportation 
while also preventing anyone from using this provision to obstruct 
shipment by refusing to accept the grants or by failing to use the 
grants for training.
  Senator Wellstone's amendment further tightens this requirement, and, 
it seems to me, Mr. President, that our Government, built on checks and 
balances, ought to be ensuring this kind of mechanism, the kind of 
mechanism envisaged by the Senator from Minnesota, to ensure 
accountability and to ensure public safety.
  I also point out that it is not necessary to reinvent the wheel to 
transport spent nuclear fuel or high-level radioactive waste. What this 
amendment does, as did the amendment that I offered in committee, is to 
essentially build on the good system already in place to provide for 
the safest method possible for the transportation of spent nuclear fuel 
and high-level radioactive waste. That is the system now being used for 
the transportation of plutonium from the Hanford nuclear reservation 
and other Department of Energy facilities to the WIPP facility in New 
Mexico.
  For the past 5 years, the Department of Energy has worked 
cooperatively with States and Indian tribes to develop the WIPP Land 
Withdrawal Act transportation system. It has been applied with success 
to a variety of shipments of nuclear materials moving literally from 
coast to coast. The Department of Energy has been working well with 
Western States in preparing shipments of transuranic wastes to the WIPP 
facility.
  I believe the WIPP Act, which the Senator from Minnesota builds on 
with his amendment, takes the right approach to address issues such as 
advance notification to the States of shipments, agreement of avoiding 
adverse weather conditions, qualification of carriers and emergency 
training and response of emergency responders. I do believe that this 
issue is one of bipartisan concern.
  In the Senate Energy Committee, my colleague from Oregon, Senator 
Smith, joined me in offering the amendment that was adopted in 
committee, now strengthened by the Wellstone amendment.
  I thank the Senator from Minnesota for yielding me this time, and I 
am very hopeful that it will be possible on a bipartisan basis to 
accept the Wellstone amendment, which I believe builds on the progress 
that was made in committee with respect to tightening safety measures, 
to proving accountability for moving these dangerous wastes across the 
country.
  I thank the Senator from Minnesota for yielding me time.
  Mr. WELLSTONE addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota.

[[Page S3082]]

  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I probably only have a couple of 
minutes left. Let me thank the Senator from Oregon and also, again, my 
colleague from Alaska. I do think this is a logical extension of what 
the Senator from Oregon had done in committee. I do think, again, what 
we want to make sure of is that there is enough funding, and, of 
course, we are talking about setting standards by the Department of 
Transportation, and the Department of Energy will be involved in it. We 
want to make sure, in fact, those standards have been met.
  I would like to thank the National Association of Firefighters and 
the firefighters of Minnesota. What they have said is, ``Look, we want 
to make sure you have some kind of process, some kind of fail-safe 
mechanism to make sure we are adequately trained to deal with this 
disaster.'' That is what this amendment does. It holds someone 
accountable--the Department of Energy. It says the Department of Energy 
is going to make a preliminary determination, whatever the operative 
language is, that, in fact, before we have the actual transportation of 
this highly radioactive nuclear waste material, that the local 
personnel, firefighters, and others, are ready, trained and equipped to 
deal with an emergency if they have to do so.
  I am very pleased that my colleagues have accepted the amendment. I 
yield the floor.
  Mr. REID addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.
  Mr. REID. How much time does the Senator from Minnesota have?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Seven minutes 45 seconds.
  Mr. REID. Will the Senator yield me 3 or 4 minutes?
  Mr. WELLSTONE. I will be pleased to yield the final 7 minutes to the 
Senator from Nevada.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, let me say to my friend from Minnesota and 
my colleagues, I think this amendment improves the bill, but it is 
still a lousy bill. This bill is opposed by every environmental 
organization in America. We know from the record that has been laid 
before this body that you cannot transport nuclear waste at this stage 
safely. The dry cask storage containers simply will not allow it. If 
you go 30 miles an hour, have an accident and there is a fire, you are 
in big trouble carrying this product.
  This is a bad bill. It is a bad bill for the environment. As 
indicated by the experience in Germany, you cannot transport nuclear 
waste. I say to anyone who has any care about the environment, listen 
to what the environmental community is saying about this legislation. 
This legislation is bad. This amendment, while directed toward safety 
procedures for transporting nuclear waste, is a pinpoint in the 
universe. It does not help the legislation. This is bad legislation, as 
indicated by the scientific community and the environmental community.
  I yield back the remainder of the time.
  Mr. WELLSTONE addressed the Chair.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I thought the Senator left the floor. 
Whatever time is left is under the control of the Senator from 
Minnesota.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Before I go forward with the second amendment that I 
think is next in order, previously agreed to, I would like to suggest 
the absence of a quorum just for a few minutes, no more than 5 minutes, 
and then I will be ready to offer that amendment.
  Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum without it being 
charged to either side.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk 
will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, it is the intent of this side to not 
prolong this discussion. Therefore, I am willing to yield back the 
remainder of our time on this side. It will be my intention to have a 
voice vote, I believe, to dispose of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota has 5 minutes 
remaining on his time.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I have been informed that my colleague from 
Minnesota is willing to yield back the remainder of his time. So I 
yield back, on behalf of Senator Wellstone, the remainder of his time. 
It is my understanding that there is no time left on either side.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 29) was agreed to.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which 
the amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I say to my colleague, if he would be 
gracious enough to give me 2 more minutes, I will be ready with the 
second amendment. I have looked at the second-degree amendment, and I 
think we will be able to work together. If I could have 2 more minutes. 
I suggest the absence of a quorum, with the time not to be charged to 
either side.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk 
will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                  Amendment No. 30 To Amendment No. 26

  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
pending amendment be set aside and that the Senate now consider 
amendment No. 30.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will report.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Minnesota [Mr. Wellstone] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 30.
       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

     SEC.  . SENSE OF THE SENATE REGARDING FEDERAL ASSISTANCE FOR 
                   ELDERLY AND DISABLED LEGAL IMMIGRANTS.

       It is the sense of the Senate that Congress should take 
     steps to ensure that elderly and disabled legal immigrants 
     who are unable to work, will not be left without Federal 
     assistance essential to their well-being.

  Mr. WELLSTONE addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, let me start off by reading a March 19, 
1997, article in the New York Times about Luz Gross, 88 years old, a 
widow who resides in New York City. She is from the Dominican Republic 
and is suffering from severe Alzheimer's.
  When asked when she was born, Mrs. Gross says, ``When I came to the 
United States, I wasn't born.'' Asked if she wanted to become a 
citizen, she began talking about her childhood when she lived close to 
the sea in Santo Domingo.
  Mrs. Gross' only child Felix is 72 himself, retired and living on 
$10,320 a year from Social Security and a small union pension earned 
after working 18 years as a building handyman in Manhattan. He visits 
his mother every day repairing whatever breaks in her apartment and 
watching television with her. But he said he cannot afford to support 
her, and there is no room for her to live in his small one-bedroom 
apartment. ``I feel in denial,'' he said. ``I can't believe this is 
happening.''
  Mr. President, Nouphanh is 65 years old, and she has been in the 
United States since 1984. Before she left Laos, she had no access to 
education because her parents moved from place to place to get away 
from the war. She does not understand English and has no family here. 
She is alone. She is on disability income, $484 a month, and she lives 
in a housing project. She is severely depressed and currently 
undergoing treatment. She says, ``Sometimes in this country I feel like 
I am deaf, I am

[[Page S3083]]

blind, I am mute, because I cannot learn English.'' Every day she lives 
in fear, and every day she asks herself what will happen to her if she 
does not have SSI and food stamps.
  Mr. President, let me, one more time, bring to the attention of my 
colleagues this amendment. I am hoping for a good, strong, positive 
vote. It is the sense of the Senate that Congress should take steps to 
ensure that elderly and disabled legal immigrants who are unable to 
work will not be left without Federal assistance essential to their 
well-being.
  Mr. President, I said it earlier before my colleague arrived. The 
reason that I bring this sense-of-the-Senate amendment to the floor of 
the U.S. Senate today is because I think we are confronted with the 
fierce urgency of now--Arizona being one good example of one State in 
the country--we have all heard from legal immigrants and we have all 
heard from 80-year-old women living alone, and partially disabled. They 
have received letters. They are now, as a result of the legislation we 
passed last year, going to be cut off assistance. They are terrified. 
They live in fear.
  I said earlier, and I am not being melodramatic, I was a community 
organizer for 20 years before I was fortunate enough to become a U.S. 
Senator from Minnesota. I have worked with lots of people who have been 
struggling with lots of different issues, many of them very poor, and I 
have never in my whole life seen people with such fear in their faces. 
I have never seen people so terrified.

  Mr. President, what in God's name does eliminating supplemental 
security income and food nutrition assistance for an 80-year-old Hmong 
woman, partially disabled, living alone in Minnesota have to do with 
reform? It is not reform. It is unconscionable. It is shameful.
  Mr. President, I said earlier I am going to have a chance to speak at 
a rally this afternoon, going on right now, organized by groups and 
organizations that have worked with Soviet Jewry over the years. I am 
the son of a Jewish immigrant who fled persecution in Russia. Maybe 
that is why I feel so strongly about this. But, Mr. President, it is 
not just Jewish immigrants from Russia or Eastern Europe; it is legal 
immigrants, people who have come to our country, many of whom have 
worked and paid taxes.
  There have been reports by the Urban Institute and others that show 
that these legal immigrants have given much more to our country in 
taxes than any benefit that they have ever received.
  Mr. President, last Congress we passed a piece of legislation, all in 
the name of deficit reduction, that eliminated $22 billion worth of 
assistance to these vulnerable citizens. Mr. President, it was easy to 
do. They are among the most vulnerable citizens in this country with 
the least amount of political power and, therefore, we chose to make 
the cuts there.
  But, Mr. President, I think there is goodness--I am sorry--in my 
colleagues. I think we did not realize what we were doing. That happens 
often. I have voted for legislation for which I did not fully 
understand all of the consequences, and later on I changed my mind. 
Please, let us change our minds.
  We are hearing from our Governors, Mr. President. We are hearing from 
our mayors. We are hearing from our county officials. They are all 
saying, ``Wait a minute. These people, by definition, on supplemental 
security income are not going to make it to self-sufficiency.'' By 
definition we are talking about people who are either very elderly or 
people who are disabled and people who need the support.
  Mr. President, at one of many community meetings I attended in 
Minnesota there was a man who came up to me who was a Hmong. He fought 
on our side during the Vietnam war. He has--I know this is hard to 
believe; but it is true--he has one bullet still in his brain and one 
bullet still in his knee. He is disabled. We are going to eliminate his 
supplemental security income assistance. What does that have to do with 
reform?
  Mr. President, I was at a gathering on the west side of St. Paul. I 
will never forget it. It sent chills down my spine. A woman came up to 
me. I thought that she was 80. She was bent over. Certainly she looked 
every bit 80 years of age. She came up to me, and her hands were 
shaking, and she began to wail. That was the kind of crying that she 
was doing. She began to wail. And she had in her hands a picture of her 
husband, and then I realized he was my age and, therefore, she was 
probably about my age. Her husband fought in the Vietnam war.
  Again, she was a Hmong who came over to our country. We have a large 
Hmong community in Minnesota. Her husband apparently had just passed 
away about a month earlier.
  Mr. President, this woman is not going to learn our language. She is 
not going to become a citizen. But these people fought the war in 
Indochina. They came to our country. We made a commitment that there 
would be some assistance for them. She has nowhere to go. She has 
nowhere to go.
  What I hated about that community meeting, and what I hate about all 
of these meetings, is that I keep thinking to myself, people really 
think that as a Senator from Minnesota I can change this. It scares me, 
because I am afraid we will not do anything at all.
  Mr. President, this sense-of-the-Senate amendment is an amendment 
that I think all of my colleagues can vote for. It does not specify a 
course of action that we should take. But it at least gives the 
religious community, all of the legal immigrants, and many local 
officials who feel like we are dumping the cost on them some 
assurances. Much less it gives us some reassurance that we have 
rediscovered part of our soul again if we would at least go on record 
saying it is the sense of the Senate that Congress should take steps to 
ensure that elderly and disabled legal immigrants who are unable to 
work will not be left without Federal assistance essential to their 
well-being.

  Mr. President, I think it would be a very important statement for us 
to make. I think this is a very important position for us to take. We 
are heading into the budget negotiations. We are hearing from people in 
our States. We are hearing from people in the country. And that is why 
I come to the floor of the Senate.
  I told that Hmong woman, who was about 50 years of age, though she 
looked like she was going on 80--she has had such a difficult life, 
holding the picture of her husband, no longer alive, who served on our 
side during the war in Vietnam--I told her, through a translator, 
because she does not speak English, all these people who have come to 
these community meetings, that although I did not know whether I would 
win or not, I would come to the floor and fight for people.
  This is just the beginning of this effort. I am lucky to have a 
strong colleague, Luis Gutierrez, in the House who is pushing very 
hard. I am really hoping Senators, Democrats and Republicans alike, 
will accept this amendment or will vote for this amendment. It is time 
that we correct this.
  We did the wrong thing, colleagues. You may not agree with me on all 
issues, and I know quite often you do not, but we did the wrong thing. 
These are people that we should not literally throw out in the cold. 
These are people who really need this assistance. These are some very 
good people. These are, for many of us, our parents or our 
grandparents.
  Mr. President, we have to do something. We have to take some 
corrective action, and this amendment, I think, is the beginning of our 
doing that.
  I yield the floor.
  I reserve the remainder of my time.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. I yield to the Senator from Oregon.


                       Unanimous-Consent Request

  Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Ms. Moira 
Shea, a congressional fellow in my office who is visually impaired, be 
granted floor access during the course of debate on S. 104, the Nuclear 
Waste Policy Act, and that Ms. Shea's guide dog also be granted floor 
access during the course of debate on S. 104.
  Mr. REID. Reserving the right to object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I shall not personally object because I have 
no personal objection to the request of my friend from Oregon, but on 
behalf of another Member who just called the cloakroom, I do voice an 
objection.

[[Page S3084]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
  Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, in light of the objection, I ask unanimous 
consent that I be permitted to proceed for 10 minutes as in morning 
business for the purpose of submitting a resolution.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Kyl). Is there objection? Without 
objection, it is so ordered.
  (The remarks of Mr. Wyden pertaining to the submission of Senate 
Resolution 71 are located in today's Record under ``Submission of 
Concurrent and Senate Resolutions.'')


                  Amendment No. 44 to Amendment No. 30

 (Purpose: To express the sense of the Senate regarding assistance for 
                elderly and disabled legal immigrants.)

  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I have a second-degree amendment to the 
Wellstone amendment, which I understand may be acceptable. Therefore, I 
ask unanimous consent to offer the second-degree amendment at this time 
on behalf of Senator Lott. The only change it would make to the 
Wellstone amendment would be to add the words ``the President'' on line 
2--* * * that the President, Congress, the States, and faith-based and 
other organizations * * *'' et cetera. I send this second-degree 
amendment to the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment will be in 
order at this time.
  The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Alaska [Mr. Murkowski], for Mr. Lott, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 44 to amendment No. 30.

  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       In the pending amendment, strike all after ``Sec.  .'' and 
     insert the following:

     ``SENSE OF THE SENATE REGARDING ASSISTANCE FOR ELDERLY AND 
                   DISABLED LEGAL IMMIGRANTS.

       ``It is the sense of the Senate that elderly and disabled 
     legal immigrants who are unable to work should receive 
     assistance essential to their well-being, and that the 
     President, Congress, the States, and faith-based and other 
     organizations should continue to work together toward that 
     end.''
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, first of all, I ask unanimous consent 
that I be included as an original cosponsor of this amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I thank my colleague. I came to the 
floor of the Senate today to try to make sure that we make a 
commitment, albeit a preliminary commitment. I will read the operative 
language. ``* * * take steps to ensure that elderly and disabled legal 
immigrants who are unable to work, will not be left without Federal 
assistance essential to their well-being.''
  I believe that, ``It is the sense of the Senate that elderly and 
disabled legal immigrants who are unable to work should receive 
assistance essential to their well-being, and that the President, 
Congress, the States, and faith-based and other organizations should 
continue to work together toward that end,'' is in the same spirit.
  We are going to have to define this with concrete language and with a 
decision made about investment of resources. I think it is an important 
step forward. I thank my colleague from Alaska. I would be pleased if 
we could have a voice vote if that is what my colleague wants to do.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is time yielded back on the amendment?
  Mr. WELLSTONE. I yield back our time.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. I yield our time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 44) was agreed to.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                            Amendment No. 30

  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, has the first-degree amendment been 
adopted?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The first-degree amendment has not been 
adopted. The question is whether Senators yield back their time on that 
amendment if they wish to vote.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. I yield back my time.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. I yield back my time and urge adoption of the 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 30) was agreed to.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I believe we are waiting for another 
Member to come down to the Chamber. We have two more amendments, is my 
understanding.
  Mr. President, I think it is fair to say that no Member of this body 
intended, by any means, that last year's welfare bill would place the 
elderly and the disabled legal immigrants out of their residence and 
into the streets of this country. I am sure that when our President 
signed the reform bill, that certainly was not his intention.
  Since the bill was signed into law, many State Governors have 
attempted to address the concerns raised by my good friend from 
Minnesota. Many of the State's Governors and representatives have large 
budget surpluses that can be used to alleviate some of the potential 
problems that have surfaced. That is not in all States, by any means, 
but in those that have that capability, I think there is an appropriate 
expenditure suggested. In addition, the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service has recently issued new guidelines that should facilitate 
citizenship applications by many elderly disabled immigrants.

  Mr. President, I am certain that Congress, working with the 
administration, State Governors, and other organizations, will surely 
come up with a solution that ensures the well-being and safety of all 
legal immigrants, especially the elderly and the disabled. This is not 
to suggest, however, that we are going to rewrite the historic welfare 
legislation we passed last year. As many colleagues stated on the floor 
last year, if and when unanticipated problems arise resulting from the 
welfare bill, we will address those problems in an appropriate fashion.
  There are some in this body who want to restore, piecemeal, the old 
AFDC welfare entitlement. That program has been unanimously adjudged a 
dismal failure. Piecemeal attempts to restore that failed system are 
simply not going to happen. I want to assure my friend from Minnesota 
that I am committed to working with my colleagues on the Finance 
Committee, along with the help of the administration and Governors, to 
ensure that necessary assistance is made available to resolve this 
unintended problem.
  Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                            Amendment No. 43

  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I understand amendment No. 43 to S. 104 
is pending.
  Mr. President, let me go into the purpose of the amendment. It is 
establishing a fee cap and is a second-degree amendment to protect the 
ratepayers. These are the ratepayers who pay into a special fund and 
use and generate power from nuclear reactors. It is to protect the 
ratepayers who are the ones who ultimately pay the nuclear waste fee by 
making it clear that the nuclear waste user fee cannot exceed 1 mill 
per kilowatt hour without specific congressional authorization.
  The spent fuel disposal program is paid for with a fee collected from 
the consumers of nuclear energy. This fee is currently set at 1 mill 
per kilowatt hour. While the nuclear waste program has had problems, 
collecting sufficient amount of money from the ratepayers certainly 
hasn't been one of them. After all, we collected over $13 billion and 
have expended only $6 billion on a

[[Page S3085]]

permanent repository at Yucca Mountain. But we have a problem created 
by the fact that our budgetary system forces the program to compete 
against other DOE programs for funding even though this fee is 
earmarked for nuclear waste disposal. This situation has contributed to 
the problem where ratepayers have spent some $13 billion in the fund 
but have only received excuses in return.

  Our budget system also creates an incentive to use nuclear waste fund 
receipts to disguise the size of the budget. Senate bill S. 104 
addresses these problems by providing for two fees. One is a user fee 
that is equal to the appropriations provided to the program. The other 
is mandatorily created that makes up the difference between 
appropriations and the current level of the fee which is 1 mill per 
kilowatt-hour. The user fee goes directly to fund the ongoing programs. 
The mandatory fee goes into the nuclear waste fund to continue to bill 
the balance to ensure there will still be money in the fund to deal 
with the waste even after the reactors stop operating.
  With that background, let me briefly explain what my amendment does. 
My amendment simply makes it clear that the user fee cannot exceed 1 
mill without congressional authorization. This is designed to protect 
ratepayers. Critics will say perhaps that this is designed to protect 
utilities. But it is really the ratepayers who pay the fee, don't they? 
Certainly not the utilities. Some may argue that a 1 mill fee is 
insufficient to pay for both interim storage and permanent repository. 
DOE's own budget projections show that this is not the case. The 1 mill 
fee generates $630 million per year.
  Because defense waste will also be placed in the permanent 
repository, a portion of the cost, therefore, must be appropriated from 
the national defense budget account to the nuclear waste fee each year. 
In the last few years this has been some $200 million. That is a 
combined total of $830 million each year. Is $830 million per year 
combined with the roughly $6 to $7 billion in the waste fund today 
sufficient to fund both the permanent repository and the interim 
storage facility? This is a key question. According to the Department 
of Energy's own budget plan, the answer is yes. It is plenty. The fact 
is the budgetary provisions in the Department of Energy's own program 
plan assume an interim storage facility is named in 1998.
  To quote from the DOE plan, ``Fiscal year 1999 through the year 2002 
amounts for the program assume the enactment of legislation authorizing 
and siting an interim storage facility and providing appropriate 
funding arrangements.'' So there we have it. DOE's own plan reflects 
exactly the same schedule for siting and constructing an interim 
facility as that set out in Senate bill S. 104. The Department of 
Energy's own plan shows that the cost of both the permanent repository 
and interim facility will range from $535 to $698 million per year. 
That is well under the $830 million going in the fund from the 
ratepayer contributions and defense appropriations. So lack of money is 
not the problem. But if changed circumstances or other factors make the 
cost of the programming to go up, then Senate bill S. 104 provides 
expedited procedures to consider a change in the 1 mill cap.
  Under Senate bill S. 104 the Secretary determines each year whether 
the DOE has collected too little or too much money. The Secretary then 
transmits his or her recommendations to Congress, and a joint 
resolution to raise or lower the fee is introduced and considered on an 
expedited basis. This is another way to ensure that this program will 
be adequately funded for its entire life. But by requiring Congress to 
act to raise the fee we protect the ratepayers, and that is the purpose 
of the language of Senate bill S. 104 and the amendment before us now. 
We carefully balance the needs of the program while protecting the 
ratepayers.
  Mr. President, I urge the adoption of the amendment.
  Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, the pending second-degree amendment caps 
the fee paid by the utilities for nuclear waste disposal services. That 
sounds simple enough, but to understand the amendment we must first 
understand the funding provisions in both the Murkowski substitute, 
which the pending amendment amends, and how both will affect the 
nuclear waste program's current funding mechanism.
  One of the fundamental principles of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 
1982 is that the full cost of disposing of nuclear waste should be 
borne by the waste's generators. In the case of the military waste, 
that means the Treasury and the taxpayers. In the case of commercial 
power plant waste, that means the utilities and their ratepayers.
  The existing nuclear waste program will cost about $34 billion. Of 
this amount, the utilities are responsible for $27 billion and the 
defense program is responsible for $7 billion.
  Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, the utilities' share is 
recovered through a fee on electricity generated by nuclear power. The 
1982 law set the fee at 1 mill, which is one tenth of a cent, per 
kilowatt-hour.
  Congress assumed in 1982 that the fee would need to be adjusted from 
time to time for inflation, to meet higher than expected costs, of if 
the number of plants paying the fee changed. Thus, the existing law 
gives the Secretary of Energy the power to adjust the fee.
  The Secretary has never used his adjustment authority. The fee 
remains at 1 mill despite 14 years of inflation and despite GAO 
concerns that the fee is not recovering the program's full cost. DOE 
admits that the fee will only collect about $19 billion of the $27 
billion the utilities will owe. DOE is counting on interest on the 
unspent balance in the Nuclear Waste Fund to make up the shortfall. The 
utilities will contribute even less than $19 billion if any nuclear 
power plants shut down before the end of their useful lives, as many 
are expected to do as the electricity industry becomes more 
competitive.
  Because of budget scoring roles, the fees collected from the 
utilities do not offset spending on the program. As a result, the 
nuclear waste fee takes in more money than is appropriated to the 
program each year. In fiscal year 1997, for example, the utilities are 
expected to pay $649 million compared to $182 million appropriated to 
the waste program.
  The Murkowski substitute tries to get around these budget constraints 
without violating the Budget Act. The approach taken in the substitute, 
while convoluted, works. First, the substitute preserves the existing 1 
mil mandatory fee. Second, it creates a new offsetting fee, which will 
be set at whatever amount is needed to recover the amount appropriated 
to the program each year. The amount of the offsetting fee will 
fluctuate from year to year. To prevent double recovery from the two 
fees, the amount of the mandatory fee will be reduced by the amount of 
the offsetting fee collected. Thus, the combined fees may total more 
than 1 mill but will never be less than 1 mill.
  The substitute eliminates the Secretary of Energy's existing 
authority to adjust the fee, but it makes up for it by allowing 
Congress to raise the fee to keep up with program spending through the 
annual appropriations process.
  The Murkowski substitute requires the Secretary of Energy to propose 
an increase or decrease to the mandatory 1-mill fee if he finds that 
the combined fees are collecting too little or too much money. The 
Secretary's proposal would not take effect until approved by a joint 
resolution adopted under expedited procedures. The expedited procedures 
provided under the substitute waive Budget Act points of order.
  The Domenici first-degree amendment reinstates any applicable Budget 
Act points of order. That's only fair.
  The Murkowski second-degree amendment, however, has nothing to do 
with the points of order restored by the Domenici amendment. The 
Murkowski second-degree amendment caps the combined total of the two 
fees in the underlying substitute at 1 mill.
  The Murkowski amendment repudiates the full-cost recovery principle 
of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 and shifts part of the cost of 
the nuclear waste program from the utilities and their ratepayers to 
the Treasury and the taxpayers.
  How much of the program's cost will be shifted to the taxpayers is 
unclear but the 1-mill fee will certainly be inadequate to pay the 
program's full cost. GAO already says it is inadequate. DOE says it 
will be inadequate if future interest rates are not high enough to 
offset the current shortfall

[[Page S3086]]

between what the utilities will pay--$19 billion--and what their share 
of the program will cost--$27 billion. The underlying bill, S. 104, 
will increase the cost of the program by $2 billion for interim 
storage. Competition will cause utilities to shut down some nuclear 
plants before the end of their useful lives, thereby decreasing the 
amount of the fees paid.
  Under current law, the Secretary of Energy can correct any shortfall 
by raising the fee, but S. 104 and the Murkowski substitute strips the 
Secretary of that power. Even under the Murkowski substitute, though, 
Congress could still correct any shortfall in future appropriations 
acts. But the Murkowski second-degree amendment forecloses any 
opportunity for DOE or Congress to address a future shortfall except by 
joint resolution.
  The pending amendment fundamentally alters the bargain the Government 
struck with the utilities in 1982. That bargain was that the Federal 
Government would take on the responsibility for disposing of the 
utilities' waste in a permanent repository and, in return, the 
utilities would pay the program's full cost or the repository program 
and, in the meantime, fulfill their responsibility for storing their 
own waste at their reactors until the repository was ready or else pay 
the Government extra to store it at a Federal site.
  The nuclear industry and its Republican supporters have made much of 
the sanctity of the nuclear waste contracts. They have complained 
loudly about DOE's inability to meet the 1998 waste acceptance date in 
the contract and have alleged the Government owes the utilities 
billions of dollars in damages for this failure.
  The Murkowski substitute already rewrites the bargain struck in 1982 
by making the Government responsible for temporary storage. The 
Murkowski second-degree amendment further alters the bargain struck in 
1982 by relieving the utilities of their obligation to pay the full 
cost of the now expanded program.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, what is the pending business?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Amendment No. 43 to amendment No. 42.


                  Amendment No. 31 to Amendment No. 26

  (Purpose: To provide for the case in which the Yucca Mountain site 
    proves to be unsuitable or cannot be licensed and to strike the 
                 automatic default to a site in Nevada)

  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending 
amendment be set aside, and that it be in order to call up amendment 
No. 31.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from New Mexico [Mr. Bingaman] proposes an 
     amendment No. 31 to Amendment No. 26.
       On page 28, line 17, strike ``If the President'' and all 
     that follows through page 29, line 1 and insert the 
     following:
       ``(3) If the Secretary makes a determination under section 
     206(c)(3) that the Yucca Mountain site is not suitable or 
     cannot satisfy the Commission's regulations applicable to the 
     licensing of a repository, the Secretary shall--
       ``(A) terminate all activities (except necessary 
     termination activities) related to construction of an interim 
     storage facility at any site designated under paragraph (1); 
     and
       ``(B) no later than 24 months after such determination, 
     make a preliminary designation of one or more alternative 
     sites for construction of an interim storage facility.
       ``(4) If the Commission, after review of the Secretary's 
     application for construction authorization for the repository 
     or after review of the Secretary's application for a license 
     to receive and possess spent nuclear fuel or high-level 
     radioactive waste at the repository, determines that it is 
     not possible to license a repository at Yucca Mountain under 
     section 206--
       ``(A) the Commission shall promptly notify the Secretary, 
     the Congress, and the State of Nevada of its determination 
     and the reasons therefor; and
       ``(B) the Secretary shall--
       ``(i) promptly take the actions described in paragraphs (1) 
     and (2) of section 204(b);
       ``(ii) suspend all activities (except for necessary 
     surveillance and maintenance) related to construction or 
     operation of an interim storage facility at any site 
     designated under section 204(c)(1); and
       ``(iii) no later than 24 months after being notified by the 
     Commission of its determination, make a preliminary 
     designation of one or more alternative sites for construction 
     of an interim storage facility; and
       ``(iv) at the time of the designation under clause (iii), 
     transmit recommendations to Congress with respect to further 
     construction or operation of an interim storage facility at 
     any site designated under section 204(c)(1).''.

  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, the issue of disposal of spent nuclear 
fuels and high-level radioactive waste has been debated in this Senate 
in one form or another ever since I arrived here some 14\1/2\ years 
ago. Nuclear waste is a serious issue. It demands serious attention by 
all Senators. It is a problem that is national in scope.
  It is also a particular responsibility of the Federal Government. 
After all, it was the Federal Government that proposed, beginning with 
the Atoms for Peace Program in the Eisenhower administration, to 
develop the peaceful uses of nuclear power. The problems of disposal of 
spent nuclear fuel that we face today are the legacy of our past laws 
and decisions.
  I am not going to characterize the current situation as a crisis. 
There is too much hype already about disposal of nuclear waste, from 
all sides of the debate.
  But there are serious problems facing the program that merit 
attention now, in this Congress. I have an important disagreement with 
the chairman of the Senate Energy Committee about the substitute 
amendment that is before the Senate today. I believe that it is fatally 
flawed on two counts, and my amendment is intended to address this 
fatal flaw. But I also believe that the chairman is right when he says 
that simply continuing with the current situation is not acceptable.
  Let me point out a number of issues that call out for congressional 
action at this time.
  First, ratepayers have paid over $8 billion in fees to the nuclear 
waste fund and earned about $2 billion in interest. Only about $5 
billion of this money has been spent on the program.
  Our current budget rules and accounting principles make it nearly 
impossible to give the program, each year, the appropriations that it 
deserves. For example, in fiscal year 1996, the President asked for 
$640 million for the DOE Yucca Mountain Program. Congress appropriated 
only $315 million--half of the request. As a result, the program had to 
abandon a comprehensive program plan that was less than 2 years old, 
and go through yet one more strategic planning exercise to figure out 
how to cope with an inadequate funding base.

  There is no incentive for the President to even make a reasonable 
budget request at this point. Not surprisingly, the utilities and 
public utility commissions, who are paying in $600 million each year 
and seeing only a fraction of that getting spent, are upset with this 
state of affairs. They have every right to be.
  A second reason why action is required in this Congress is that DOE 
won't meet its January 31, 1998, deadline to dispose of spent nuclear 
reactor fuel and is way behind schedule in building a repository. 
Utilities and ratepayers will have to pay for onsite storage for spent 
fuel after 1998 in addition to what they would otherwise have needed if 
DOE had met its 1998 deadline. While many thought that 1998 was 
unrealistic when it was first picked as a target date, no one thought 
that we would be missing it by so wide a margin. Some relief is now in 
order.
  A third problem that needs to be addressed in this Congress is that 
there will never be a repository if EPA doesn't issue a radiation 
standard for it. EPA is right in the middle of the critical path for 
this program, and keeps missing deadline after deadline.
  Part of the blame lies at EPA--it is hard to detect any sense of 
urgency on their part. But an important part of the blame lies in the 
inherent difficulty of writing this standard and having it stand up to 
scrutiny in the courts. Let me remind my colleagues that in 1985, EPA 
did promulgate a radiation standard for the repository. Two years 
later, it was stuck down in court. Without some statutory help to

[[Page S3087]]

clarify issues, I believe that EPA is destined to face the same fate 
again.
  For example, according to the National Academy of Sciences, there is 
no technical basis for incorporating human intrusion into a repository 
standard, because any analysis of human intrusion, in their words, is 
``driven by unknowable factors.'' How will EPA successfully defend a 
new standard in court, if it has to depend on the unknowable?
  Further, the underlying law governing EPA's development of a 
repository standard currently places EPA in a legal catch-22. The law 
requires EPA both to promulgate a dose-based standard and to follow the 
recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences. But the National 
Academy of Sciences has recommended against promulgating a does-based 
standard. Without additional statutory guidance, how does EPA get out 
of that box?

  If we sit by and do nothing, we are setting EPA up for certain 
failure in developing a repository standard over the next few years.
  The final problem that I want to cite which justifies action and 
leads me to conclude that we need to have action in this Congress is 
that there is a lawsuit pending against DOE that seeks to escrow the 
current nuclear waste fee outside the Government. If the court decides 
that there is liability on DOE's part, there may be other payments for 
damages that no one can put a price tag on right now. No one can say 
what the court will do--but it has surprised the Government twice 
already with its rulings in favor of the utilities. One thing is clear 
though. There is a sizable potential for major damage, and perhaps 
fatal damage, to the nuclear waste program over the next 12 months.
  The administration has taken the view that it is premature to 
consider legislation on this topic at this time, and that Congress 
should wait until 1999, when the viability assessment of the Yucca 
Mountain site is complete.
  The list of problems that I have just gone through, and it is far 
from a complete list, won't age gracefully during the next 2 years. If 
we don't fix some of them fairly quickly, I believe that we will be 
wasting a substantial amount of taxpayers' money. I cannot support a 
same time, next Congress approach to clear and serious difficulties in 
this program.
  Further, the administration's emphasis on the viability assessment as 
some sort of touchstone for further congressional action greatly 
exaggerates the value of the viability assessment. The senior Senator 
from Nevada has reminded us repeatedly, in this debate, that the 
viability assessment is not a suitability determination. He is 
absolutely right. All the scientists involved in the viability 
assessment agree with him. The viability assessment will not tell us if 
Yucca Mountain is a good place for a geologic repository.
  The viability assessment will only be useful as a decisionmaking 
guide if Yucca Mountain is so terrible a site for a repository that 
even a small amount of scientific data is sufficient to make an 
overwhelming case that we should give up at that site and look 
elsewhere.
  If the viability assessment will not tell us much, if anything, about 
the suitability of Yucca Mountain for a repository, then why is the 
viability assessment in the critical path for deciding what we should 
legislate here in this Congress?
  I think the problems facing the Yucca Mountain Program speak for 
themselves. They will not wait another 2 years to be resolved and 
neither should we.
  Having agreed with the chairman of the Senate Energy Committee on the 
need for legislation at this time, let me say that in one important 
respect I cannot support the proposal he has presented to the Senate. I 
opposed S. 1936 last year, and I opposed S. 104 this year in its 
original form when we voted on it in committee. Although the chairman's 
substitute amendment today is a vast improvement over last year's bill, 
it still contains fatal flaws that force me to continue to oppose it.
  Before I talk about the fatal flaws in the bill, it is only fair to 
acknowledge the good-faith cooperation that we have had from the 
chairman of the Senate Energy Committee in addressing, since the 
committee's markup, many of the problems that the administration 
identified in last year's bill.
  The chairman said at the markup that he was open to suggestions as to 
how to make the bill better and that he wanted to have a constructive 
dialog, and he meant it. I am glad that I took him at his word for he 
and his staff have negotiated with me and my staff in very good faith, 
and anyone who looks at the substitute amendment that is before us 
today and compares it to the original bill has to admit that, while 
crucial flaws remain, major progress has been made on a number of 
topics toward getting a good bill on this topic.
  Almost all the problems that have been aired in the Chamber in this 
debate and in the veto threat issued by the administration have been 
addressed in one way or another.
  Mr. President, I would like to describe eight areas in which the 
chairman proved to be open and flexible to my suggestions for how to 
improve S. 104 and address major areas of concern raised by the 
administration and others.
  First, radiation standard. Few provisions of last years nuclear waste 
bill, S. 1936, and this year's bill, S. 104, have received more 
criticism than the statutory radiation standard of 100 millirems. Every 
Member of the Senate has received, over the last week, numerous letters 
opposing S. 104 from environmental, religious, and public advocacy 
groups. These letters consistently emphasize the fact that the 100 
millirem standard in S.104 is 4 times higher than similar radiation 
standards for other nuclear facilities. The new radiation standard in 
the substitute amendment, which is identical to the proposal I offered 
in the Energy Committee, resolves this issue. It is a risk-based 
standard that is equivalent to about 25 millirems. It gives statutory 
expression to the major recommendations of the National Academy of 
Sciences on every issue except one. The National Academy recommended 
that the radiation standard be applied at the time of maximum risk, but 
this is 80,000 to 250,000 years from now. In a licensing proceeding, 
which is the venue in which any standard will be applied, proving 
anything with certainty about the world 80,000 years from now--160 
times greater than all of recorded history--is a virtual impossibility. 
So the substitute amendment uses a timeframe for assessing compliance 
in the licensing proceeding of 10,000 years, the same timeframe that 
EPA has proposed to use in the past. The substitute also requires a 
report to Congress from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on the 
predicted compliance of the repository at the time of maximum risk, and 
delays the effective date of the construction license until Congress 
has had 90 days to review the commission's report. A similar approach 
is taken to the question of human intrusion, which the Academy states 
is ``driven by unknowable factors.'' I believe that any objective 
observer would conclude that the radiation standard in the substitute 
amendment resolves all of the objections that were raised against the 
old 100 millirem standard.
  Second, NEPA. S. 104 was criticized for running roughshod over the 
NEPA process. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the licensing 
procedure for the interim storage facility. NRC regulations require it 
to prepare an environmental impact statement for any interim storage 
facility. Yet the time lines in the S. 104, as introduced, would have 
precluded the commission from carrying out a meaningful EIS. NRC 
regulations also clearly state that beginning construction of an 
interim storage facility prior to completion, by the NRC, of its NEPA 
process is, all by itself, grounds for the commission to refuse to 
issue such a license. Yet S. 104, as introduced, instructed DOE to 
start construction as soon as it submits a license application. In 
committee, I offered an amendment to correct these problems. The 
substitute amendment adopts my approach. Under the substitute 
amendment, no construction of an interim storage facility occurs until 
the NRC has completed the NEPA process called for under its 
regulations.
  Third, transportation planning. We have heard a lot of discussion 
about transportation risks in this debate so far. Senator Wyden 
proposed an amendment that was accepted in the committee's markup that 
strengthened the provisions of the bill relating to transportation 
planning. I supported his amendment and he deserves great

[[Page S3088]]

credit for working closely with his own State of Oregon and with the 
Western Governors Association, which includes New Mexico as a member, 
in strengthening the bill in this important area. One goal that he was 
unable to achieve prior to committee markup was to provide for 3 years 
of funding and assistance to States and localities, to enable them to 
be up-to-speed to handle any contingencies related to transportation, 
no matter how remote their probability. The reason that it was rejected 
was because it would have conflicted with the headlines in the bill as 
it stood at that time. After his staff was briefed about progress in my 
discussions on timing issues, he requested that I explore getting them 
the third year of training and assistance. Senator Murkowski was 
agreeable to Senator Wyden's new request, and as a result, every place 
through which nuclear waste may be shipped will now have 50 percent 
more training and assistance. I think this is a real improvement.
  Fourth, timing. S. 104 was criticized for its unrealistic deadlines 
that were virtually impossible to meet. The new deadlines in the 
substitute amendment are virtually the same as those in the proposal 
that I offered in committee. They are drawn from the current DOE 
program plan and from technical discussions by my staff with the actual 
persons at DOE and the NRC who would be responsible for meeting those 
deadlines. The resulting deadlines are very realistic, and in some 
cases have extra scheduling cushion built in.
  Providing enough time for DOE and the NRC to do their work properly 
has the advantage of postponing construction and operation of an 
interim storage site in Nevada until after the scheduled record of 
decision on the permanent repository--September 2000. Under my 
proposal, which Senator Murkowski agreed to, the interim storage 
facility license is issued 9 months after DOE has applied for 
construction authorization for the permanent repository. In other 
words, we don't put the waste on the road to Nevada until well after 
the time at which DOE has determined, as part of its own NEPA process, 
that Yucca Mountain is suitable.

  A final advantage of the way my proposal sequences the interim 
storage facility and the permanent repository is the elimination of 
much of the competition between the two for financial resources.
  In the period 1999-2001, DOE can concentrate on repository 
characterization and on putting together a high-quality repository EIS 
and license application, while the NRC is working on the interim 
storage facility license application.
  In the period 2002-2005, DOE can concentrate on interim storage 
facility construction and initial operation while the NRC is reviewing 
the repository license application.
  Fifth, size of the interim storage facility. In S. 104, as 
introduced, the capacity of the interim storage facility grows to 
either 40,000 metric tons of spent fuel in December of 2002, or, if the 
Secretary is late in submitting a license application for the permanent 
repository or in opening the repository for operations, 60,000 metric 
tons of spent fuel. This extra 20,000 metric tons of capacity is added 
even if the Secretary of Energy does not ask for it or think it is 
necessary. We accumulated 32,000 metric tons of spent fuel over the 
last 40 years. I was concerned that an aboveground storage facility 
that had a capacity of twice today's spent fuel inventory, and a 
licensing term of 100 years, with indefinite renewals into the 22d and 
23d centuries, would be, in reality, more like a permanent aboveground 
repository, than an interim facility.
  I proposed, and Senator Murkowski accepted, a linkage between the 
size of the interim storage facility and the status of the permanent 
repository. Before the permanent repository is in operation, the 
interim storage facility capacity is limited to just what is needed to 
get to that date. It is a bridge, not a replacement. A second part of 
my proposal was to allow the capacity limit of the interim storage 
facility to grow, only after the repository is licensed to operate by 
the NRC, and only for the purposes of operating the interim storage 
facility as an integral part of a total system with the repository. 
This, too, was accepted.
  The adoption of these changes improve the bill, but only represent a 
partial success in terms of establishing the correct relationship 
between the interim storage facility and the permanent repository. My 
remaining amendment to this substitute amendment is intended to finish 
the job on getting the right relationship between the two facilities.
  Sixth, preemption. S. 104, as introduced, contained a very worrisome 
provision preempting all Federal, State, and local laws on the basis of 
a novel standard of ``inconsistent or duplicative.'' Removing this 
preemption provision was a key demand in the administration's veto 
threat. At my suggestion, we have moved to a preemption provision that 
restates the status quo in this area of law. The first part of the 
provision restates the two fundamental Supreme Court rulings on 
preemption of State requirements by Federal law. Its language is 
identical to that found in the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act. 
The second part of the provision is also modeled after the HAZMAT Act. 
It lists five areas where Congress intends this act to be the last 
word. Three of the five are modeled after the areas listed in the 
HAZMAT Act. The other two topic areas for preemption are the land 
transfer provisions of the Act and the siting and licensing of the 
repository and interim storage facility. Neither topic breaks new 
ground. Thus, we have taken a very objectionable provision and removed 
everything that was objectionable about it.
  Seventh, financing. We have heard a lot, over the last few days, 
about the problems of S. 104 in terms of how it pays for the nuclear 
waste program. The junior Senator from Nevada has made some pretty good 
points about how the bill, as introduced, transfers the burden of 
paying for the repository from the beneficiaries of nuclear power to 
the general taxpayer. This issue has been of deep concern to me, as 
well. Fixing this problem is not easy, as has been evidenced by the 
fact that we have had additional amendments on this topic during the 
floor debate. The Nuclear Waste Fund is caught, along with other trust 
funds, in a trap of budgetary rules and accounting principles that have 
grown up over the years and that, in cases like this one, yield results 
that defy common sense. Getting completely out of the trap requires 
cooperation from either the administration or the Budget Committee, and 
neither is willing to help. There is a partial solution, though, that 
puts the program on a sound financial basis outside the current scoring 
window and that can be implemented for 4 years during the scoring 
window. This solution has three parts.
  The first part is a fee that is tied to appropriations, to remove the 
disincentive that now exists to fully fund the program. In the original 
substitute amendment, there was no cap on this fee. Thus, if the 
Congress were to appropriate $800 million of civilian spending to the 
program, the fee would rise to about 1.3 mills per kilowatt-hour. I 
believe that it is appropriate to go over the 1-mill limit, if the 
ratepayers are getting what they are paying for.

  The second part of the partial solution is a second fee that kicks in 
if the level appropriated is less than 1 mill per kilowatt-hour. This 
second fee is set at the difference between the appropriations-based 
fee and the 1.0 mill per kilowatt-hour level. The second fee goes into 
the nuclear waste fund, to build the needed surplus for the last 40 
years of the program.
  The third part of the partial solution is an expedited procedure to 
approve any recommendation by the Secretary to adjust the 1.0 mill per 
kilowatt-hour level used to calculate the second fee. If we need to be 
collecting a larger second fee to ensure the integrity of the Nuclear 
Waste Fund, the Secretary's proposal will make it to the floor for 
expeditious consideration.
  This agreement, as I originally proposed it, completely answers the 
concerns raised by the junior Senator from Nevada. Instead of a 1.0 
mill per kilowatt-hour cap, we have a floor that the Secretary can 
propose to raise, to ensure that the funds needed to keep the nuclear 
waste fund solvent are always there. Instead of transferring liability 
to the general taxpayer and providing corporate welfare to the nuclear 
industry, my original proposal ensures that the industry continues to 
pay its fair share of the costs of the repository.
  Eighth, lawsuit. The last area of agreement that I want to discuss is 
a

[[Page S3089]]

commitment to discuss the current lawsuit by the nuclear industry in 
any conference on the bill. The commitment is in the form of a sense of 
the Senate that the DOE, the utilities, and the public utility 
commissions should settle the lawsuit before we enact this bill into 
law. The idea behind this sense of the Senate language is simple. The 
utilities and public utility commissions have a two-track strategy to 
solve their problems. One is legislative. The other is judicial. There 
is nothing wrong with pursuing both tracks at this time, since it is 
not clear that the legislative track will produce a public law anytime 
soon.
  But if the utilities and the public utility commissions do succeed in 
getting relief from Congress and the President, in the form of nuclear 
waste legislation that delivers an interim storage facility on a 
reasonable timeframe and that fixes the nuclear waste fee problem, then 
the lawsuit against the Federal Government should go away.
  The principle that I believe that the Senate should take to 
conference, then, is that you can't have your cake and eat it too. You 
can't get a complete legislative overhaul of the nuclear waste program 
and then go and try to improve on it, or blow it up, in the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals. I recognize that we are dealing, in the 
lawsuit, with vested contractual rights, and that our options to deal 
with the lawsuit in legislation may ultimately be somewhat limited. But 
I believe that we should put all parties on notice that the Senate is 
serious about a cooperative solution to the problem, and that they 
should be, too.
  Mr. President, I cannot say if the administration thinks that its 
concerns have been resolved. I am still waiting to hear some definitive 
statement from the administration on the amendments that we offered in 
committee a month ago and also a definitive statement on their position 
with regard to the amendment I am offering today.
  Despite the substantial progress toward making S. 104 a better bill, 
a key flaw remains in the substitute. It is an issue of the highest 
importance. It is an issue of whether S. 104, if enacted, would lead to 
the abandonment of our fundamental policy of geologic storage of 
nuclear waste in the circumstance where Yucca Mountain would fail as a 
candidate for a repository.
  This scenario can occur and it does occur in the substitute amendment 
if the proper relationship between the interim storage facility and the 
permanent geologic repository is not maintained.
  So what is this proper relationship that I think is so important? The 
current Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 provides for a facility 
similar to the interim storage facility that is provided for in this 
bill. In the 1982 act it was called the monitored retrievable storage 
facility or MRS. We never found a place to put an MRS, but the 
restrictions on the MRS in current law--which we passed in 1982--are 
instructive as a guide to how we need to think about such facilities.
  In current law, construction of an MRS cannot begin until the 
permanent repository has a construction license. In current law, 
construction of the MRS or acceptance of spent nuclear fuel at the MRS 
is prohibited during any time in which the repository license is 
revoked or construction of the repository, that is, the permanent 
repository, ceases. In current law, the MRS has a capacity limit tied 
to the opening of the repository.
  These restrictions are all safeguards to prevent the MRS from turning 
into a de facto permanent above-ground repository.
  In the case of the current bill, we are allowing the interim storage 
facility to proceed in advance of the licensing of the Yucca Mountain 
facility, and I agree with that. This is a defensible step in light of 
the delays in the repository program and the need for such a facility 
to be in full operation 10 years from now.
  But the decision to allow the interim storage facility to get ahead 
of the permanent repository makes the issue of safeguards to prevent 
the interim storage facility from turning into a de facto permanent 
repository all the more important.
  On the issue of tying the capacity limit of the interim storage 
facility to the opening of the permanent repository, there is a 
provision in the substitute amendment that works providing that the 
substitute also addresses the issue of what happens to the interim 
storage facility if Yucca Mountain fails to pass muster at some point 
in the process. And here is where the rub is. The substitute does not 
address the issue in a complete fashion.
  As I see it, there are four points in the process where Yucca 
Mountain can fail. There must be clarity on what happens to any interim 
storage facility in each of those cases.
  The first point in the process is already covered in the bill. It is 
the viability assessment. As I mentioned earlier, if Yucca Mountain is 
an absolutely terrible place technically to put a repository, we will 
probably find out at this stage. The substitute amendment provides that 
if the President finds, based on the viability assessment, that the 
Yucca Mountain site is unsuitable for a repository, then he and the 
Congress have 24 months to find another interim storage facility site 
or the site in Nevada right next to Yucca Mountain is chosen by 
operation of law. I will come back to the automatic default to Nevada 
in just a moment.
  The second point in the process where Yucca Mountain can possibly 
fail as a candidate repository occurs before the Secretary submits the 
license application to the NRC, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 
During the NEPA process for the repository, the Secretary will have to 
make and defend a suitability determination. If the Secretary 
determines that Yucca Mountain is unsuitable or cannot meet NRC 
licensing standards, then, according to the substitute amendment, the 
Secretary must notify Congress and the State of Nevada to cease all 
activities at the repository site and report to the Congress within 6 
months on the need for additional legislation dealing with nuclear 
waste.
  What the substitute amendment remains silent on is this question: 
What happens to the interim storage facility in this case? The 
Secretary has already submitted a license application to the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, but no construction has started as yet. In that 
case, the silence in the substitute amendment means that the Secretary 
is authorized and in fact is required to go forward in Nevada. In fact, 
the provisions of the substitute amendment, perhaps unintentionally, 
turn the interim storage facility into a runaway train. Recall that the 
statutory limit for the interim storage facility in the substitute is 
tied to what is needed to get you to the date when the permanent 
repository opens. If the permanent repository suddenly moves 30 years 
into the future because of a decision that Yucca Mountain is 
unsuitable, these provisions could be construed as sanctioning moving 
an extra 90,000 metric tons of spent fuel to Nevada. This is 
unacceptable.

  The first provision added to the substitute by my amendment would fix 
this problem. It terminates the Secretary's authority to move forward 
on an interim storage facility at the site in Nevada if Yucca Mountain 
fails as a candidate for a permanent repository during the process of 
making the suitability determination. The Secretary must then make a 
preliminary designation of one or more alternative sites within the 
next 24 months.
  The third and fourth points for potential failure of Yucca Mountain 
as a repository candidate is during the two-step Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission licensing process. Suppose that during this process the NRC 
concludes it is not possible to issue a license for a repository at 
Yucca Mountain. Under the substitute amendment, the construction and 
operation of the interim storage facility continue unabated.
  So the second provision added to the substitute by the amendment that 
I am offering today would try to fix this problem. If Yucca Mountain 
fails to pass muster at the NRC, then all construction and operation of 
the interim storage facility is stopped except for safety-related 
surveillance and maintenance.
  As with the previous case, the Secretary must then make a preliminary 
designation of one or more sites within the next 24 months and must, in 
addition, make recommendations to Congress about what to do with the 
interim storage facility. But in this case, it takes the enactment of 
another law by Congress to restore any authority to

[[Page S3090]]

resume construction or resume shipments to the interim storage 
facility.
  Could there be nuclear waste stored at the interim storage facility 
at this point? Yes, there could. If the NRC concludes that Yucca 
Mountain cannot be licensed after the first 20 months of its 
deliberations on DOE's license application for the repository, then the 
interim storage facility will contain some amount of spent nuclear 
fuel. The same situation can also occur under current law. It is 
possible for the MRS to have its operation suspended because of failure 
to license a permanent repository after the MRS has received spent 
nuclear fuel.
  But if you are troubled by the fact that there is a possibility that 
waste could be shipped to Nevada before the geologic repository is open 
for shipments, then you are against one of the fundamental premises of 
this bill; that is, that it is acceptable to provide for an interim 
storage solution linked to the repository prior to the opening of the 
repository. Whether or not you think this is acceptable is, of course, 
for each Senator to decide. If the program were close to a successful 
opening of the repository today, I would personally be in favor of 
waiting a few more years. But since the date is now 2010 or potentially 
beyond that date if we do not fix some of the other problems with the 
program in this bill, I believe that an interim storage solution is 
acceptable with the right safeguards.
  In the case of the amendment that I am offering here, one of the 
safeguards is to face this issue squarely and to make Congress decide 
what to do and then to enact another law before the Secretary can act. 
In this way at every stage in the process where Yucca Mountain can 
fail, my amendment would stop the interim storage facility in its 
tracks or cancel it outright.
  The probability of Yucca Mountain failing is probably not great, 
particularly after the suitability determination by the Department of 
Energy in the year 2000. But that probability is also not zero. The 5-
mile tunnel has been dug through the mountain. There is more water 
inside the mountain than was previously thought to be the case. Maybe 
this is significant; maybe it is not. There is a second east-west 
tunnel that will go through the exact area under the western side of 
the mountain where most of the waste will be placed. The east-west 
crossing will not occur until after the viability assessment but is 
critical to the suitability determination. The western slope of the 
mountain receives more rainfall than the eastern side. Does this mean 
that there will be even more water under the mountain where the waste 
will be placed? Enough pause to make the mountain fail as a repository 
site? No one knows at this point. That is why we are characterizing the 
mountain in the first place. The ultimate answer will not be known 
until after the window, in the current substitute amendment, for making 
a final and irrevocable decision on proceeding with the interim storage 
facility in Nevada.
  Mr. President, in addition to the problem in the substitute of not 
permitting us to deal with the failure of Yucca Mountain as a candidate 
site at any point at which it can occur, there is the problem of the 
automatic default to Nevada if another site for an interim storage 
facility is not picked within 24 months. Under the substitute 
amendment, an interim storage site in Nevada is established regardless 
of whether the Yucca Mountain site is suitable or not, and the site is 
changed only if Congress and the President can produce another law 
providing for an alternative site within 24 months.
  Realistically, Mr. President, passing another nuclear waste law from 
scratch in 24 months is not going to happen. Consider that we have been 
working on this bill and its predecessors for substantially longer than 
that. The nuclear industry spent a great deal lobbying this effort in 
the last Congress and came up with no solution. Does anybody believe 
that they would make any kind of effort like that if there was an easy 
answer to their problem, which this bill now provides no matter what 
happens? So, the provision contained in subsection 204(C)(2) of the 
bill is fatally flawed on two counts. If Yucca Mountain fails, the 
practical result is that the waste goes to Nevada, no matter what.

  I do not think that any reasonable person should vote for the 
substitute amendment with this provision in it. It is not sound policy 
and it is certainly not fair to the people of Nevada.
  There are lots of ways to ensure that the President acts 
expeditiously in finding an alternative site and proposing legislation 
to Congress. The chairman of the Senate Energy Committee has alluded, 
in previous remarks, to discussions that we have had as to whether a 
mechanism such as a base closure or realignment commission could 
develop a set of recommendations that would be forwarded to Congress 
for action. There are, no doubt, other mechanisms that could work 
equally well. But I think the principle has to be that any default 
mechanism we propose has to be workable and has to be fair, if it is 
actually invoked. I think the scheme in S. 104, the substitute for S. 
104, fails on that point.
  I will conclude these remarks by reiterating the basic principles 
behind the amendment with respect to how interim storage should relate 
to the permanent repository. First, siting an interim storage facility 
next to the Yucca Mountain site is acceptable, but--and this is 
crucial--only as long as that is where the permanent repository is 
going to be built.
  Second, we should not start construction on an interim storage site 
in Nevada until Yucca Mountain has passed the suitability determination 
phase of site characterization. That phase ends with the completion of 
the environmental impact statement for the repository and issuance of 
the record of decision.
  Third, if Yucca Mountain is disqualified as a repository site at any 
point during the process, we should stop any interim storage facility 
at the site in its tracks. The search for a new interim storage site 
should then be part of an overall process of looking for a new 
repository site as well.
  I do not expect my colleagues from Nevada to agree with all these 
principles. I realize they are implacable in their opposition to the 
idea of interim storage in Nevada. I oppose the proposition as set 
forth in the substitute amendment, unless my amendment being offered 
today is agreed to. But I urge Senators who, like me, would like to 
have the chance to vote for a good nuclear waste bill, one that has 
what I think is the right relationship between the two facilities, to 
support this amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent we set aside 
the Bingaman amendment and go back to the pending Domenici amendment, 
which has been brought before the Senate previously.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from New Mexico is recognized.


                            Amendment No. 42

  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I understand that the parliamentary 
situation is that the Domenici amendment has been offered in my behalf 
by the chairman, and that it has had an amendment added to it, so that 
pending before the Senate is the Domenici amendment with an amendment 
thereto, and also the Bingaman amendment, and others? And that at some 
point we will vote on the amendment to the Domenici amendment?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. DOMENICI. I believe whatever needs to be said about my amendment, 
which is clearly a budget issue, has been said. From what I understand, 
my amendment is not controversial. If there is controversy, it has to 
do with the amendment to my amendment; not with it. So I would like to 
take no longer than 10 minutes, and if the Chair will tell me when I 
have used the time, I would not want to take any more time than that, 
of the Senate, to speak on the bill.
  When Congress passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, we created 
a contract with the country's taxpayers that the Government of the 
United States would accept responsibility for waste from the reactors 
providing them with power across these United States. We have now 
watched for 15 years while the date for this permanent geological 
repository has moved from an original target of 1998 to the current 
earliest possible date of 2010. Even though progress at Yucca Mountain 
in

[[Page S3091]]

the last few years has finally been significant, the taxpayers impacted 
by their regional utilities are faced with continued storage of high-
level waste at 80 sites in 41 States. Many of those storage sites are 
near population centers and significant funds are now being expended to 
keep those multiple sites safe and secure. Many of those sites are 
nearly full; 23 will be full in 1998, 1 year from now.
  Incidentally, nuclear energy is still important in the United States. 
While we are not adding any nuclear capacity to our electric generating 
system, about 20 percent of the Nation's electrical power is nuclear 
energy and a failure to promptly act in that regard could, indeed, 
affect the viability of one-fifth of our Nation's electrical supply. 
That is not a small amount.
  Senate bill S. 104, the bill before us, provides a comprehensive plan 
for the Federal Government to meet its obligation to provide a safe 
place for the Nation's spent fuel and high-level nuclear waste. It 
continues the path toward a permanent geological repository that is 
being explored at Yucca Mountain, and provides a critical intermediate 
step to relieve the pressure at those 80 sites by building an interim 
storage facility near Yucca Mountain. I voted last year for S. 1936, 
and S. 104 traces its parentage to S. 1936. But, when S. 104 was 
introduced in the Energy Committee this year, it contained improvements 
over S. 1936. I commend Chairman Murkowski, and those who have worked 
with him, for their diligent, bipartisan efforts over the last few 
weeks to work with many of our colleagues to further improve S. 104.
  S. 104 was a good bill in February and it is a better bill in April. 
S. 104 now includes realistic dates for action on the interim storage 
site. This bill now provides even more time, after the department has 
finalized its viability decision on Yucca Mountain, before the start of 
construction of the interim site. S. 104 now includes improved risk-
based radiation standards that involve the Environmental Protection 
Agency in the process.
  S. 104 applies a HAZMAT-type approach to transportation. The 
hazardous material processes of our law and procedures are going to 
hold true in the transportation arena. And a careful balancing of State 
and Federal laws allowing preemption by State and local laws only where 
State intransigence prevents the Federal purpose from being 
accomplished.
  The new transportation provision in this bill, coupled with years of 
impressive demonstrations on the safety of nuclear waste shipments, 
should completely address the concerns that some continue to express on 
transportation issues. These and other changes make the current version 
of S. 104 significantly better than our previous approaches. S. 104 is 
now truly a bipartisan approach to solving this problem of immense 
national impact. At a time in our history when fiscal responsibility is 
under intense scrutiny, passage of S. 104 is critical, from a financial 
perspective as well as the contractual responsibilities and safety 
issues that it addresses. The current suit against the Department of 
Energy by States and utilities may require the payment of significant 
penalties. Taxpayers will bear the burden for all these penalties. If 
the court rules that the Department of Energy, thus the U.S. 
Government, has breached its contractual obligation and penalties are 
assessed, they will come from the taxpayers of this country. And the 
ratepayers, who happen to also be taxpayers, are already bearing the 
burden for storage of waste at the present 80 sites in this country. 
The financial impact of not moving ahead with S. 104 is very, very 
significant.
  I have been very critical, not alone, with many others, of the 
administration and the Department of Energy in recent years, for their 
inaction and lack of leadership on the critical issues surrounding 
nuclear waste policy. The Department has taken the view that they are 
free of any obligation until a repository is ready. At the same time, 
utility companies are collecting fees from ratepayers to ensure the 
readiness of the storage capability. This is simply bad faith on the 
part of the Department. S. 104 resolves the gridlock which has 
paralyzed the Department and the nuclear industry in this country for 
many years.
  S. 104 continues the evaluation of the repository as an ultimate and 
final solution. But the creation of a monitored retrievable storage 
capability and capacity might also allow the Department to consider 
some of the suggestions developed in 1993 by the Department's task 
force on an alternative program strategy for Yucca Mountain. I hope the 
Department will review that study and even view the monitored 
retrievable storage as providing some time to enable consideration of 
some of the research proposals for approaches like transmutation, the 
changing of the high-level waste to something less energy-possessed, 
and thus, perhaps, provide for some utility rather than storage 
forever. That could reduce the toxicity of the material, which is 
finally emplaced in the repository.
  I hope the administration will reevaluate their stated resistance to 
earlier versions of S. 104. This bill represents a bipartisan approach 
to a national problem. It now addresses the concerns stated by the 
administration with previous versions. S. 104 would give the country 
what it has sought for 15 years, a well-defined path on the nuclear 
waste issue, one that we can truly do, do safely, and do within a 
reasonable period of time. Furthermore, we honor the commitments made 
in 1982 to the citizens who depend upon nuclear power, who have been 
paying for this solution ever since then.
  Incidentally, just as an aside, it is not as if we have not been 
trying for the permanent repository. We have spent in excess of $6 
billion and we have not yet finished the characterization of the site. 
Although some real headway was made in the last 18 months, for which we 
can be grateful to the man who led that, Mr. Dan Dreyfus, who is no 
longer with the Department of Energy--but, essentially, after about $6 
billion and continued spending at a very elaborate amount each year, we 
are still a few years away from that permanent, long-lasting 
repository. In the meantime, problems with the short-term storage 
continue to mount.
  I compliment the chairman of the Energy Committee. This is a good 
solution. I hope it passes with sufficient votes for the President's 
threatened veto not to be sustained. But, in any event, it is worth his 
effort to see that we have found a good, bipartisan, American solution 
to a truly big American problem.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? the Senator from Nevada.
  Mr. BRYAN. Mr. President, may I inquire as to the status? How much 
time is remaining on the amendment we are debating?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska controls 25 minutes on 
this amendment.
  Mr. BRYAN. On the other side of the proposition, if I might inquire 
of the distinguished Senator who is presiding?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico has 19 minutes and 
46 seconds.
  Mr. BRYAN. I am wondering, since I speak in opposition, if I might 
get time either yielded from the time of the Senator from Alaska or the 
Senator from New Mexico? I was not aware that there was not time 
allocated to those who oppose the amendment. If that is the state of 
the parliamentary situation, I ask for 10 minutes, if there is that 
much time available. I do not think I will need that much time.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. I have no objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada has 10 minutes.
  Mr. BRYAN. I thank the Chair. I perhaps will not require all the 
time.
  I do not, Mr. President, want to take much time to talk about the 
merits of S. 104 because, as we will point out later, S. 104 is a very 
bad piece of legislation and, in my view, is a policy disaster. It is 
unnecessary. There are provisions that would preempt Federal and State 
law, standards, viability, transportation--there are many, many things 
that could be said about the legislation, and I will address each of 
those arguments with some particularity.
  I must say that I am constrained to address the issue of the lawsuit, 
because we hear a lot about the lawsuit. The lawsuit was decided before 
our votes were cast last year on S. 1936, but I think it is curious and 
revealing, revealing as to the true motives of this bill. Nothing in S. 
104 deals with the lawsuits.
  This Senator believes that ratepayers who are in a position where 
they may

[[Page S3092]]

incur additional expense for storage because of the unavailability of a 
permanent repository in 1998 are entitled to relief. I do not think 
ratepayers ought to pay twice. I have introduced legislation each year 
that I have been a Member of Congress to express that view. It is 
curious, Mr. President, the utilities who drive the policy in this--
this is the nuclear utilities bill--do not want to talk about that. As 
recently as a couple of weeks ago, the Secretary of the Department of 
Energy acknowledged that the Department wanted to talk about 
compensation to utilities who will incur additional expense because 
they will be storing beyond what was contemplated in 1982 as a 1998 
acceptance date. So this legislation does nothing with respect to 
compensation or to provide relief for ratepayers, and the fact that it 
does not makes the motive so abundantly clear. This is all about 
getting the waste out to Nevada, irrespective of environmental or other 
policy considerations.
  Let me talk, if I may, very briefly, about the substitute as it deals 
with the mill tax levy. Current law provides that the utilities must 
pay into the nuclear waste trust fund on the basis of 1 mill per 
kilowatt hour of nuclear power generated. It goes into a trust fund. 
That is paid only so long as that utility generates nuclear power.
  If you look at this line, Mr. President, the mill fee payment line, 
you will notice it rapidly declines between now and the year 2033, and 
the reason for that is because every currently licensed nuclear reactor 
in America will be closed by 2033. Their license period will expire. So 
with each closure of a reactor, less is being paid into the fund.
  The obligation, however, in terms of dealing with the issue of 
nuclear waste goes out to the year 2071, so that you can see that there 
is another 38 years beyond 2033 that there is a responsibility to make 
payments dealing with the waste, and there will be no money coming in.
  Currently, the Department estimates that the nuclear waste trust fund 
is underfunded between $4 billion and $8 billion currently. If it is 
underfunded, I respectfully submit that you do not need a degree from 
the Wharton School of Finance to know who is going to make up the 
shortfall. It is the American taxpayers who are going to make it up. So 
the current law says with respect to the mill levy and how much it will 
be, is that the Secretary will make a recommendation when it needs to 
be adjusted, and unless the Congress or one House rejects that 
recommendation, that will go into effect. It was a law not written by 
the Nevada delegation. It dates back to the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy 
Act.
  Here is what is done to change all of that. In the original 
substitute, we changed the burden so that now any change to increase 
the rate of mill-tax collection, rather than being enacted unless there 
is a rejection by one House, it requires an affirmative burden to pass 
both Houses of Congress.
  As the distinguished occupant of the Chair knows, based upon his 
considerable legislative experience, it is far more difficult to pass a 
piece of legislation than to object to it.
  So that is the nub of this. It will be virtually impossible if the 
utilities object to an increase in the mill levy to get that on because 
it will require both Houses of Congress to affirmatively act on a 
resolution.
  In the substitute that was offered by the able chairman of the Energy 
Committee, all budget points of order were waived. So the Senator from 
New Mexico, and appropriately so, sought an amendment in the first 
degree to restore a budget point of order, and I have no quarrel with 
that.
  The second degree, in effect, provides that still both Houses must 
approve any increase, and so, in my judgment, this is a provision that 
is designed to provide relief for the utilities to leave the nuclear 
waste fund underfunded by billions and billions of dollars, and long 
after any Member who currently serves in this body or the other body 
leaves, the American taxpayer is going to get the short end of the 
stick.
  Let me say, Mr. President, that no one would disagree if they are 
honest with their original position that it was understood that the 
nuclear utilities would undertake an expense of all of the cost of 
nuclear waste disposal. That was an obligation they agreed to do and 
that is why the mill tax on each kilowatt hour was imposed, that is why 
the nuclear waste trust fund. But through this substitute, we have a 
situation that will exacerbate the shortfall. It is said there is $8 
billion in the trust fund, but, Mr. President, from 2033 until 2071, 
nothing comes into the trust fund because all of the reactors that are 
currently licensed are shut down. That is the buildup, and that is what 
this yellow line indicates, because it begins to build up and it, too, 
declines as the expenses are incurred and the revenues into the fund 
decrease.
  So this is a bad, bad amendment, and I urge that it be rejected. I 
yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. MURKOWSKI addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. How much time is remaining on our side?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Sixteen minutes 30 seconds.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. And the other side has?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The other side has 19 minutes and 45 seconds.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. I do not have need for further discussion. I wonder if 
the other side would consider yielding back their time since we are 
going to have a rollcall vote on this tomorrow.
  Mr. BRYAN. Let me ask my colleague if he cares to speak.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I will be happy to yield back time.
  Mr. BRYAN. I am wondering, I might say to the chairman, at one point 
we had been told that one of our other colleagues may want to speak, 
and I refer to the ranking member on the committee. I do not know if 
that is still the case. May we suggest the absence of a quorum and 
check with him?
  Mr. REID. I am wondering if we can withhold that. Maybe we can set 
this aside and go ahead and work on the Bingaman amendment. Would that 
save time?
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Anything that moves us saves time.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending 
amendment be set aside and we return to the Bingaman amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. If I may, I would appreciate it if we could find out 
if there is going to be any further Members wishing to speak on the 
Domenici amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.


                            Amendment No. 31

  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, first of all, let me spend a little 
time thanking the efforts of Senator Bingaman from New Mexico for his 
efforts on this bill. He and his staff have worked very, very hard. I 
think what we have up to this point is a much better piece of 
legislation as a consequence of the efforts of Senator Bingaman and his 
staff. In the committee markup, as I recall, Senator Bingaman had 
amendments touching about eight different issues, and we were able to 
eventually accommodate the Senator from New Mexico on seven of those. 
We unfortunately could not accept all the amendments, but we certainly 
resolved to work with him and his staff and continue to do so as we 
debate the substitution, and the Bingaman amendment that is before us.

  I think we have made progress. Progress was made on licensing 
requirements for the temporary storage facility. Progress was made in 
the application of NEPA. Progress was made on leasing standards for a 
permanent repository. Progress was made on preemption of other laws, 
and certainly progress was made on nuclear waste fee requirements.
  I think it is fair that we agree that Nevada should be chosen as the 
permanent repository. I was a little confused in his statement where he 
implied that it was unfair that Nevada would necessarily be chosen as 
the last, I guess the last possible choice or the choice of last 
resort, or words to that effect.
  We have 50 States out there and nobody wants it. I have said time and 
time again, you can't throw it up in the air, it is going to come down 
somewhere. So I think it is imperative that

[[Page S3093]]

we recognize that we have to choose a site, and that site is going to 
be objected to by the delegation from that State.
  We have chosen a permanent repository in Nevada, assuming that it 
meets the requirements. Yucca Mountain was chosen after looking at 
other sites, other sites in other States.
  Nevada is the preferred site for a repository. Nevada has been 
selected and, as a consequence, we have 5 miles of tunnel that have 
been completed there. We have expended $6 billion. We are committed, 
probably, by the time we are complete to spend up to $30 billion. So 
that is a given. I would say we agree Nevada should be chosen for an 
interim facility if the viability assessment for the permanent 
repository at Yucca Mountain is positive, and I think that is, more or 
less, the opinion of my friend from New Mexico.
  I think it is further apparent we agree that the President should 
have time to pick an alternative site, even in the event that Yucca 
Mountain is determined not to be viable as a permanent repository.
  We have come a remarkable distance toward total agreement. 
Unfortunately, we have this one area where we have not been able to 
agree and I think that is, of course,the substance of the Bingaman 
amendment.
  I think what we have here, in our opinion, and I tried to cite this 
early in our debate, is an effort to try and get this resolved informed 
by past debates on this subject and the history of the issue. If there 
is any way out of a conclusion to address the disposition of this 
waste, somebody is going to find it, Mr. President.
  We clearly see a lack of direction from the administration on this. I 
personally communicated in three specific letters to the President 
asking what the administration's position is. The administration, in 
all fairness, simply does not have a position.
  You can look at some of the rhetoric that has come out of some of the 
newspapers relative to the administration's position. It is kind of 
surprising to comment on whether they are a little bit naive or not 
well informed, but from the Thursday, April 10, Congress Daily, White 
House Council on Environmental Quality Chairwoman Kathleen McGinty said 
yesterday that the administration would be ``loathe to consider'' 
legislation that would force the Energy Department's hand in building 
the temporary storage facility before it knows the waste would be able 
to stay at Yucca Mountain. ``Loathe to consider'' legislation that 
would force the Energy Department's hand in building the temporary 
storage facility before it knows the waste would be able to stay at 
Yucca Mountain.
  That is totally inaccurate because if one looks at the schedule in 
the bill, in my substitute, if Yucca is viable by December 1998, a 
viability assessment will go to the President. March 1999 would be the 
deadline for a Presidential determination on viability.
  If there is no negative determination, the Nevada test site is 
determined to be the site. The reason for that is obvious. If we do not 
name a site, we are going to be drifting around here where we are 
today.
  April 30, 1999, the Secretary files licensing application with NRC.
  Approximately August of the year 2000, construction begins when the 
EIS is complete.
  No later than June 30 in the year 2003, fuel acceptance begins.
  Now, how can the administration interpret that this legislation would 
force the Energy Department's hand in building a temporary storage 
before it knows the waste would be able to stay at Yucca Mountain?
  Construction cannot begin until August in the year 2000. Somebody 
might say, ``Well, Senator, what's the big deal here? Why not wait for 
Yucca Mountain to be done?'' Well, we are told by the Secretary of 
Energy, Hazel O'Leary, that it will be the year 2015 before Yucca is 
completed, certified, licensed, and ready to take fuel.
  That is why, Mr. President. The ``why'' is that the time is now. We 
have a contractual commitment to take this waste beginning next year, 
1998. We made a contract with the nuclear power industry. We have 
collected $13 billion from the ratepayers of this country. They are 
expecting performance, and the Government has not any capability. The 
Government is not going to be able to accept that waste. And the 
Government is going to be liable for damages.
  Every Member of this body has an obligation to minimize the 
Government's liability associated with those damages. That is what a 
temporary repository at Yucca Mountain is all about: expediting the 
process. So if there is anybody in anybody's office who is 
misconstruing the timing of this--Katie McGinty, of the White House 
Council on Environmental Quality, has somehow gotten an interpretation 
that we would force the Energy Department's hand in building a 
temporary storage facility before it knows the waste would be able to 
stay at Yucca Mountain. It is totally inaccurate; and that is an 
understatement, Mr. President.
  Let us talk about Yucca not being viable.
  If Yucca is not viable, September of the year 2000 would be the 
deadline for the President to designate a site.
  February of the year 2001 would be the deadline for Congress to 
approve a site.
  And if no site is designated and approved, the Nevada test site is 
the site.
  March 2001 the Secretary files a license. July 2002, construction 
begins.
  September 2005, fuel acceptance begins.
  So this is where Senator Bingaman and I have our departure. We feel 
we have to have a bottom line on this debate. We feel that we must 
firmly chart a predictable and sure course to a safe, interim storage 
facility and get it done now, not next year, not in 2 years or 5 years 
or 2001 or 2010 or 2011. I do not want to be standing here in another 4 
our 5 years and have to find that we are still hung up on a decision.
  Congress dealt with this issue in 1982. We thought it had resolved 
the problem forever. In 1987, we had to deal with it again. At that 
time we were told we had resolved nuclear waste once and for all.
  This is the problem, Mr. President. This is the legacy of the 
program. If it is possible to delay a decision, a decision gets 
delayed. It has been in progress so far. If it is possible to push the 
decision off to somebody else's watch, that is what is going to happen. 
And that has been suggested time and time again. If the process is 
vulnerable to political pressure, then political pressure will be used.
  We have learned the hard way that any trap door left anywhere in the 
process inevitably, Mr. President, gets used. And it will happen in 
this case. Any weakness in the approach gets exploited. That is why we 
have spent $6 billion over 15 years and the Federal Government is still 
unable to meet its promise to take the waste in 1998. I implore my 
colleagues, let us not be fooled again. Let us face up to our 
obligation.
  Our bill, Senate bill 104, is destined to make sure there are no trap 
doors here, no copouts, no more delays. This chart shows our selection 
process. No matter what happens, the loop is closed. It is a box. Every 
decision leads to a safe, central storage facility.
  Let me explain to you this effort. Here we sit in 1997, as you see 
over in the left-hand corner of the chart, with the status quo. We have 
waste in 81 sites in 40 States. That is just the harsh reality. If we 
do not do anything, that is where it will remain. Your reactors may go 
down for lack of storage. Your waste is going to remain.
  If you want the waste to move, it has to be transported. That is a 
given. We can do that safely. We have transported 2,400 individual 
shipments.
  So let me follow the red line from next year when we are under 
contract, the Federal Government, to accept the waste. If Yucca 
Mountain is viable for a permanent repository, then we have one safe 
central storage site, it is over. That is one end of the square.
  Let us go up. If Yucca Mountain is not viable for a permanent 
repository, what happens then? Well, then the President can pick an 
alternative site. OK. And Congress will ratify it, and we come right 
back with a square box, one safe, central storage site.
  If the President does not select an alternative site; in other words, 
if the President says--``Well, I just won't act''--our bill deals with 
that possibility. If the President does not act, then where does it go? 
It defaults. It defaults to the Nevada test site. That is

[[Page S3094]]

evidently a problem for my friend from New Mexico.
  But on the other hand, history of this matter suggests that if we 
leave it to the Bingaman amendment--and let me refer to the next 
chart--this is the exposure. And this is where Senator Bingaman and I 
part company, because, if Yucca Mountain is viable, we are fine. If 
Yucca Mountain is not viable, then the Secretary picks an alternative 
site. But if he does not, if he does not do that, no site is chosen and 
we are right back to where we are. We are leaving it where it is. Let 
me run through that again to make sure everybody understands it.
  This is the difference between the Bingaman and our particular 
approach with S. 104. If Yucca Mountain is viable, we have a central 
storage site, no problem. But if Yucca Mountain is not, the Secretary 
picks an alternative storage site. That is fine if he does--if he 
does--Mr. President. But if he does not, we are right back where we 
were.

  Look at the other chart.
  That is the difference between the two particular versions of this 
amendment. We give the President the authority to pick an alternative 
site. Congress ratifies the site, and we are all right. But if the 
President does not select an alternative site, it goes back to the 
Nevada test site.
  That is where we are, Mr. President. I think it is fair to say that 
our concern with the Bingaman amendment is that in our opinion it 
creates the trap door, it opens the process to political pressure. It 
invites indecision, and it invites pressures that will be apparent to 
do nothing so we will all be back where we are now, 40 States, 81 
sites, reactors potentially shutting down because storage sites are 
filled up, and the stuff sits. It still is not moving.
  The Department of Energy tells us that the odds of Yucca Mountain 
being suitable as a permanent repository are good. I think that they 
used the odds currently of 90 percent. Well, that is pretty good around 
here. So the President's finding of suitability looks pretty good. But 
it is still at his own discretion. I ask all of my colleagues and those 
in their offices who listen, do you think the Senators, our good 
friends from Nevada, will try to influence the President's decision? 
Sure they will. They should. We acknowledge that. Wouldn't you if you 
were placed in that situation?
  If the President decides Yucca Mountain is not viable, not a viable 
site for a permanent repository, the need for an interim repository 
becomes even more desperate. The waste simply cannot stay where it is, 
Mr. President, in 80 sites in 41 States. We cannot afford to start 
closing nuclear plants that have run out of room for spent fuel 
because, remember, Yucca, if it is viable, if it is licensable, is not 
going to be ready until the year 2015.
  Under the Bingaman amendment, if the President were to determine that 
Yucca Mountain is not viable, then all the Secretary needs to do to 
prevent the designation of a central storage site is to simply fall 
back to another site; that is my point, leave the waste where it is.
  There is another area that I am concerned about in the Bingaman 
amendment, and that is even if the Secretary does pick a site, the 
tools provided to make that site a reality are somewhat limited.
  Of course, we know that the Secretary does not have the authority to 
withdraw land for an interim repository. The Secretary does not have 
the authority to condemn land for an interim repository. I am fearful, 
under Senator Bingaman's amendment, under this goal, we would not be 
able to reach our mutual goal, which is something where we are both on 
the same track. We want this waste to move. But we both want it to move 
now.
  With the loopholes in here, I am just convinced they would be used. 
With the U.S. court of appeals ruling that DOE has a binding legal 
obligation to take the spent fuel, Mr. President, I just cannot believe 
that we can accept more failures, more runaround, more delays. We 
cannot expose the taxpayer to the liability of more damages resulting 
from the court cases that are going to come up when we are not able to 
take this spent fuel next year.
  Mr. President, I do not want to settle for a failure.
  The U.S. Senate should not settle for a failure. I think we can do 
better, and I hope that we can work out, if you will, some way to 
address the concerns of my friend from New Mexico. As we look at this 
chart and recognize--here they are, Mr. President. These are the 80 
sites throughout the Nation, in 41 States. They are the sites that have 
a problem. If we don't relieve this problem with meaningful legislation 
and if we do it with legislation that provides a trapdoor or a copout 
or an exit that is convenient, politically or otherwise, it is going to 
be used. So our liability and our damages are going to be higher, and 
the fuel is going to stay right where it is now, at 80 sites in 41 
States, instead of getting on with the process that we have outlined in 
S. 104, which is to close the loop.
  Let me show you one more time, Mr. President, what we have attempted 
to do here. We have attempted to force this body to make a decision 
once and for all. All the safeguards are in here, Mr. President. I want 
to refer to them again. Under the substitute, if Yucca Mountain is 
viable, OK, starting in 1998, in December, the viability assessment 
goes to the President. March 1999 is the deadline for the viability 
determination by the President. If there is no negative determination, 
the Nevada test site is the site. That is, if Yucca is viable. On March 
30, 1999, the Secretary files license application with NRC. In 
approximately August 2000 construction begins when the EIS is 
completed.
  The importance of that, Mr. President, is to begin to allay the 
concerns of the White House and Katie McGinty. They have been loath to 
consider building a temporary storage site before it knows that the 
waste would be able to stay at Yucca Mountain. I think that takes care 
of that.
  If Yucca Mountain is not viable, September 2000 is the deadline the 
President has to designate a site. So he has time. Then another 
deadline for Congress, February 2001, is the deadline for Congress to 
approve the site. If no site is designated or approved, OK, it goes 
back to the Nevada test site. But, even then, there are more delays. In 
March 2001, the Secretary files a license. In July 2002, construction 
begins. In September 2005, fuel acceptance begins.
  But, Mr. President, I swear that if we do not close in this loop, we 
won't get the job done. We know that's what the administration 
prefers--not to address it at this time. We have already seen the smoke 
and mirrors relative to their side of the story.
  I will run through the difference I have with Senator Bingaman's 
amendment. If Yucca is viable, OK, the same, except that Senator 
Bingaman would add a new provision, which is that after the Department 
of Energy files a licensing application in the year 2001 and NRC finds 
that Yucca cannot be licensed for some reason, they suspend operations 
at the interim facility and the NRC has 24 months to recommend another 
interim site or restart operations at the NTS.
  But if Yucca Mountain is not viable, Mr. President--here is where the 
bear goes through the buckwheat--the deadline for the Secretary to 
designate an alternate site up here is February 2001. But what happens 
if he doesn't do it, Mr. President? I will tell you what happens. 
Nothing. If he doesn't do his job in February of the year 2001, and no 
site is designated, the stuff stays where it is, at 81 sites in 41 
States.
  I think that should identify sufficiently for the Members the 
differences relative to Senator Bingaman's view of how to resolve this 
problem and the view of the Senator from Alaska. I have the deepest 
respect for my friend, but I am firmly convinced that we have to get it 
resolved, and if we don't do it now, it isn't going to be done. That 
loophole out there will be utilized and we will be back here another 
day, another month, another year on this same process.
  Mr. President, I will be happy to try to work out some way to 
accommodate my friend from New Mexico. I reserve the remainder of my 
time. I yield the floor.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico has 3 minutes 
remaining, and the Senator from Alaska has 3 minutes remaining.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I will need a few more minutes. I ask 
unanimous consent that I be allowed to speak for up to 6 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

[[Page S3095]]

  Mr. BINGAMAN. I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Alaska, 
of course, be given equal time, if he would like that.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I didn't hear that unanimous consent 
request.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The unanimous consent request was that the 
Senator from New Mexico be allowed to have an additional 3 minutes, 
totaling 6 minutes, and also that the Senator from Alaska also have up 
to 6 minutes.
  The Senator from New Mexico.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, let me clarify my understanding of the 
situation. First of all, I agree with much of what was said by the 
Senator from Alaska. The amendment that I am offering here today does 
not, in any way, interfere with the end result, as long as the 
determination is made at every step of the process that the Yucca 
Mountain site is the appropriate site for a permanent repository of 
nuclear waste. If that decision is made, then we are in agreement. Then 
the problem does not exist. It is only if a contrary decision is made 
that we get into disagreement.
  Let me clarify here that there is a difference in my understanding 
between the viability assessment, which is due to be completed on 
December 1, 1998, and the suitability determination, which is due to be 
completed on October 31 of the year 2000. I agree that as long as Yucca 
Mountain is a suitable site and that suitability determination is made 
in the year 2000, then that is the site we ought to go forward with. So 
we are in agreement there.
  I think the question is, if we want to look at a permanent 
repository, I think we choose Yucca Mountain, if it is suitable. If it 
is determined not to be suitable, then the question is, what do we do 
about an interim facility?
  Now, the only reason for putting an interim facility in Nevada is 
that that is where the permanent repository is going to be. The Nuclear 
Waste Technical Review Board said in its report, ``If Yucca Mountain 
proves suitable for permanent repository development, then the 
centralized storage facility should be located there as well.'' That 
makes eminent sense to me. Let's have an interim storage facility 
there, as long as it is decided that we are going to have a permanent 
repository there. If we decide not to have a permanent repository 
there, then, in my view, we ought to have the issue come back to 
Congress, come back to the President to make a decision on what we are 
going to do.
  The reason I think it is so important that we do that is that I think 
the end result is a different end result than the Senator from Alaska 
has in mind. The Senator from Alaska is saying the end result is we 
have to get this waste out of the present locations at these nuclear 
powerplants and move it to a central site. That is the end result he is 
looking for. The end result I am looking for is that we need to have 
geologic storage, permanent storage, of this waste. In my view, my 
amendment has a much greater chance of getting us to geologic permanent 
storage of this waste than his solution does.
  His solution says that, regardless of what we decide about Yucca 
Mountain as a permanent repository, we are going to put the waste in 
Nevada in this interim site, and that's going to happen. There is no 
way to wiggle out of that. Once the suitability of the Yucca Mountain 
site is determined, we are going to put the waste in Nevada. It is 
going to be on an interim site there, and there is no way to wiggle 
out. So we have accomplished our end result.
  My view is that, fine, we moved the waste to Nevada, but it is on a 
slab of cement out in the middle of the desert. It is not in geologic 
storage, not in safe storage, not in permanent storage. Therefore, we 
have not solved the problem that we set out to solve for all these many 
decades with regard to nuclear waste. The only way to get us to a 
geologic repository for that waste, a permanent repository for that 
waste, if the Yucca Mountain proves unsuitable, is to bring it back to 
Congress and the President and say, ``Choose another permanent 
repository for this waste.'' That is what is going to have to happen. 
That is what ought to have to happen. At that time, we also can decide 
what to do about an interim site.
  But it makes no sense to me to be saying, look, if we decide Yucca 
Mountain is not suitable, we decide we can't put the waste there in a 
permanent repository, we are still going to put all the waste there; we 
are going to put it in a central repository, and it is going to be in 
Nevada because we earlier said it was going to be in Nevada. Granted, 
the only reason we said that is because we are going to have a 
permanent repository there. Now we have decided if we can't have a 
permanent repository there, we can still put the waste there and get it 
out of these other States. I don't think that is fair to Nevada. I 
don't think it is good public policy. So I say let's keep the two 
issues tied together. Let's say, if the permanent repository at Yucca 
Mountain in Nevada is determined not to be a suitable facility, if we 
decide that that site, Yucca Mountain, is not a suitable site for a 
permanent repository, then we need to put the brakes on with regard to 
using this interim facility in Nevada and say, wait a minute, we have 
to pick another permanent repository. Let's also make a decision about 
an appropriate interim storage site.
  So that's the difference that we have. I think it is a good-faith 
difference. The great failing that I see with the substitute the way it 
now stands is that if Yucca Mountain is determined not to be an 
appropriate permanent repository, then all of the pressures, the course 
of least resistance will be to move the waste to an interim site in 
Nevada, put it on a cement slab out in the middle of the desert. That 
will be the end of it. The pressure will be off. Congress will be under 
no obligation to do anything else. The President will be under no 
obligation to do anything else. The only people who will suffer, or 
potentially suffer, from this are the people of Nevada. I think that is 
not a responsible public policy position for us to take. We need to 
find another permanent repository if Yucca Mountain proves not to be 
the right permanent repository.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Enzi). The Senator from Alaska has up to 6 
minutes.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, we are so close, yet so far away in our 
differences here. I think it is fair to say that when the viability 
assessment is completely at the discretion of the President, we would 
all agree that it is subject to political pressures. I think we all 
agree that we have an obligation to make a decision. We have agreed to 
withhold on a decision until the viability assessment is available. My 
friend from New Mexico has indicated a concern about the viability and 
the suitability. I am told that the suitability is 80 percent likely. 
Viability is 90 percent. Those are very high odds.
  The problem of how we resolve this and whether or not we are going to 
be delaying this action again, I think, has to be related to the fact 
that when we get the viability assessment, we either choose Nevada if 
it is positive, or give the President time to choose another site if it 
is negative.
  Only if we are unable to choose another site--only then--would it go 
to Nevada. That would imply that the President wasn't doing his job, 
and that Congress wasn't capable of doing their job. And I think we 
both agree that there would be a significant shirking of an obligation 
or duty. I am just fearful with the history of this that without some 
kind of closure that might happen. I believe my friend from New Mexico 
has stated that the only reason for putting interim in Nevada is if 
Yucca is permanent. But if Yucca doesn't pan out then we desperately 
need an interim site, and I think we need it quickly because Yucca is 
the year 2015 from being ready to accept waste. We have 80 sites in 41 
States, and we have lawsuits coming on, and damages coming on. From the 
looks of this place, Congress doesn't make decisions very quickly.
  Let me just say one more thing with regard to delay. Although we may 
not know the ultimate site of an interim facility, there is one 
indisputable fact. We need a central temporary storage facility for our 
Nation's nuclear waste. If Yucca Mountain is viable then it makes sense 
to put the material at the Nevada test site. If Yucca Mountain is not 
viable, it will take 50 or 60 years of process at a minimum to find and 
license another permanent repository site under our present permitting 
process. We cannot leave nuclear waste at

[[Page S3096]]

80 sites around the country over this period of time. That is why the 
crisis is here. The spent fuel pools at nuclear reactors were not 
designed for long-term storage.
  Mr. President, in all due respect, Senate bill 104 was designed to 
make sure there were no trapdoors, and that no matter what happens this 
loop is closed. And this decision has to lead to a safe central storage 
facility ultimately at a permanent repository in Yucca Mountain.
  So, Mr. President, the decision is ours. The time is now. Let's not 
shirk this duty and this responsibility by leaving an open-end 
alternative that I guarantee will be used.
  Mr. President, I believe my time is up. I yield the remainder of my 
time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time is yielded.


                             SECTION 101(F)

  Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I rise to address a specific provision of 
the Murkowski substitute amendment to Senate bill 104, the Nuclear 
Waste Policy Act of 1997. This provision is also in the bill as 
introduced, and was in similar legislation passed by this body in the 
last session of Congress. This provision is of special importance to my 
State and I wish, therefore, to clarify its appearance in this 
important legislation. I refer specifically to section 101, entitled 
``Obligations of the Secretary of Energy,'' paragraph (f), which 
states, ``Nothing in this act is intended to or shall be construed to 
modify . . . obligations imposed upon the Federal Government by the 
U.S. District Court of Idaho in an order entered on October 17, 1995, 
in United States v. Batt (No. 91-0054-S-EJL).''
  Mr. President, the consent order referred to in section 101 of S. 104 
binds the State of Idaho, through the Attorney General, and Gov. Philip 
E. Batt in his official capacity; the Department of Energy, through the 
general counsel and assistant secretary for environmental management; 
and the Department of the Navy, through the general counsel and 
director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program to certain terms and 
conditions to fully resolve all issues in the actions Public Service 
Co. of Colorado versus Batt and United States versus Batt.
  Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Will the senior Senator from Idaho, my colleague, 
yield for a question?
  Mr. CRAIG. I yield to my colleague.
  Mr. KEMPTHORNE. I thank my colleague for bringing the attention of 
this body to an important provision of Senate bill 104; a provision of 
significance to the State of Idaho. Could you elaborate on the 
particular relevance of this consent order settlement agreement to this 
legislation?
  Mr. CRAIG. The consent order has a number of compliance points 
requiring action by the U.S. Department of Energy at the Idaho National 
Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, which have bearing on the 
overall spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste management 
storage and disposal program as structured in Senate bill 104. In 
general terms, the consent order requires specific actions for 
treatment, storage, disposal, or shipment offsite for disposal of spent 
fuel and waste at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental 
Laboratory, and requires these actions to be performed according to a 
timetable set down in the consent order.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. CRAIG. I yield to my colleague from Alaska for a question.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. I understand that this consent order contains 
provisions relating to transuranic waste, spent nuclear fuel, and high-
level waste. Could you please describe the requirements that 
specifically relate to commercial spent nuclear fuel?
  Mr. CRAIG. As I know my colleague from Alaska is aware, the Idaho 
National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory has, over the course 
of its history, received commercial spent nuclear fuel for research and 
development purposes. One of the largest receipts was the receipt of 
the discharged core from the Three Mile Island nuclear powerplant in 
the 1980's. Idaho has also received, and continues to store, expended 
fuel from naval nuclear reactors. One of the key provisions of the 
consent order is that the DOE is ordered to remove all spent fuel, 
including naval spent fuel and Three Mile Island spent fuel from Idaho 
by January 1, 2035.

  Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Will my colleague, the senior Senator from Idaho, 
yield for a question?
  Mr. CRAIG. I yield to my colleague for a question.
  Mr. KEMPTHORNE. As a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I 
am familiar with the important national security contribution made by 
the Navy's Nuclear Propulsion Program. The Idaho National Engineering 
and Environmental Laboratory contains a Navy facility called the 
expended core facility. This facility receives the expended, or spent, 
nuclear cores from Navy vessels for examination and storage. I wonder 
if my colleague from Idaho will explain, for the benefit of our fellow 
Senators, how the consent order affects this important national 
security mission.
  Mr. CRAIG. The consent order limits shipments of naval spent nuclear 
fuel into Idaho. Specifically, the total number of shipments of naval 
spent fuel to Idaho through 2035 shall not exceed 575 shipments and 
shall not exceed 55 metric tons. Most relevant to our discussion of 
Senate bill 104, however, is the Department of Energy's commitment, 
through this settlement agreement, that naval spent fuel stored at the 
Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory on the date of 
the opening of a permanent repository or interim storage facility shall 
be among the early shipments of spent fuel to the first permanent 
repository or interim storage facility.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Will the Senator yield for a further question?
  Mr. CRAIG. I yield to my colleague for a question.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. In the course of deliberations on Senate bill 104, we 
have debated the merits of exclusions for a number of Department of 
Energy sites. Specifically, I am referring to exclusion from 
consideration for selection as the interim storage site for commercial 
spent nuclear fuel under the provisions of this legislation. Does the 
consent order we are discussing have any bearing on this question for 
Idaho?
  Mr. CRAIG. The Senator from Alaska is correct. The consent order 
settlement agreement contains a provision that, except for a narrow 
exception for the treatment of graphite fuel from the Fort St. Vrain 
reactor in Colorado, the Department of Energy will make no shipments of 
spent fuel from commercial nuclear powerplants to the Idaho National 
Engineering and Environmental Laboratory. Therefore, selection of Idaho 
for further commercial fuel storage would be inconsistent with and in 
violation of the consent order.
  Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. CRAIG. I yield to my colleague from Idaho.
  Mr. KEMPTHORNE. I thank my colleague, the senior Senator from Idaho, 
for bringing to the attention of this body the significance of the 
section 101 reference to the Idaho settlement agreement consent order 
and its relevance to the legislation before us, Senate bill 104. I also 
wish to thank my colleague for his continued leadership, along with the 
Senator from Alaska, on this Nation's nuclear waste problem and for 
proposing the common sense solution embodied in this legislation.
  Mr. CRAIG. I thank my colleague from Idaho for his contribution. 
Idaho and its citizens have been addressing the legacy of this Nation's 
nuclear defense missions and the products of its ongoing operations in 
the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program for many decades at the Idaho 
National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory. I believe it is 
important to explain to my colleagues the relationship of this history, 
and its pending commitments, to the legislation before us.


                             Section 101(g)

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, at page 11, lines 2-5 of the manager's 
substitute amendment, section 101(g) provides that ``subject to 
subsection (f), nothing in this act shall be construed to subject the 
United States to financial liability for the Secretary's failure to 
meet any deadline for the acceptance or emplacement of spent nuclear 
fuel or high-level radioactive waste.'' Is it the manager's intention 
that this language prevent contract holders from recovering damages or 
other financial relief from the Government on account of DOE's failure 
to comply with the 1998 deadline established in section 302(a) of the 
Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982?

[[Page S3097]]

  Mr. MURKOWSKI. It is not the manager's intention that section 101(g) 
limit in any way the rights of contract holders, their ratepayers, or 
those agencies of the State governments that represent ratepayers, from 
enforcing any right they might have, including the right to hold the 
Federal Government liable financially, under the 1982 act and the 
contracts executed pursuant thereto. Section 101(g) is expressly 
subject to section 101(f), which makes clear that rights conferred by 
section 302(a) of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 or by the 
contracts executed thereunder are not affected by this bill, including 
section 101(g). To the extent that act or the contracts established a 
1998 deadline and the DOE fails to meet that deadline, it is not the 
manager's intent that the substitute amendment in any way restrict the 
relief available to those damaged by the failure to meet the deadline.
  Mr. LEVIN. Is it correct then that the manager does not intend that 
the amendment would restrict the scope of remedies available to the 
plaintiffs in the litigation in which the Court of Appeals of the 
District of Columbia has held that the 1998 deadline is a binding 
obligations of the Federal Government?
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. That is correct. It is not the manager's intent that 
the language of section 101(g) proscribe the court of appeals or any 
other court from awarding monetary relief or other financial remedies 
to those who have paid fees to the Government under the 1982 act and 
the contracts, or those who will incur additional expense on account of 
the DOE's failure to comply with any right conferred by 1982 act or the 
contracts.
  Mr. LEVIN. If a deadline were imposed by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act 
of 1997, as reflected by the substitute amendment, as well as by the 
Nuclear Waste Policy of 1982 or the contracts executed thereunder, is 
it the manager's intention that section 101(g) would proscribe 
financial liability for failure to meet the deadline to the extent it 
is imposed by the 1982 act? For instance, if DOE were to fail to 
commence the acceptance and emplacement of spent nuclear fuel and high 
level radioactive waste by November 30, 1999 or thereafter, would the 
amendment proscribe a court from imposing financial liability on DOE if 
a court ruled that DOE's inaction constituted a failure to comply with 
the deadline established in section 302(a) of the Nuclear Waste Policy 
Act of 1982 and the contracts?
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. It is not the manager's intention that section 101(g) 
limit the rights or remedies available under the Nuclear Waste Policy 
Act of 1982 or the contracts executed thereunder. If a failure by DOE 
to comply with any deadline established in the amendment also 
constituted a failure to comply with a deadline established by the 1982 
act or a contract under that act, it is not the manager's intent that 
section 101(g) modify the right of any contract holder to see any and 
all remedies otherwise available for the violation of the 1982 act or 
for breach of the contract. It is the manager's intention that section 
101(f) preserve all of those rights, regardless of whether the same or 
a similar obligation is expressed in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 
1997.
  Mr. LEVIN. With respect to a deadline imposed for the first time in 
the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1997, is it the manager's intention 
that section 101(g) proscribe a court order that the Secretary of 
Energy comply with such deadline, or granting relief other than money 
damages to contract holders?
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. It is not the manager's intent that section 101(g) 
proscribe anything other than financial liability for failure to meet a 
deadline imposed by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1997. To the extent 
other forms of relief are available for the Government's failure to 
comply with a deadline imposed by the amendment, the manager does not 
intend that such a remedy be prohibited.
  Mr. LEVIN. Is it the manager's intention that section 101(g) limit 
the liability of the United States for anything other than a failure to 
meet a deadline? For instance, if the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1997 
imposes an obligation which is not a deadline, such as the requirement 
to reimburse contract holders for transportable storage systems if DOE 
uses such systems as part of the integrated management system, is it 
the manager's intention that that obligation not constitute a financial 
liability of the United States?
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. It is not the manager's intention that section 101(g) 
limit the liability of the Federal Government for anything other than a 
deadline. The manager does not intend that any other obligation imposed 
by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1997 be affected by section 101(g).
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, my understanding is that the 
disposition of the S. 104 will take place tomorrow. We will have a vote 
on Domenici, we will have a vote on Bingaman, and a vote on final 
passage. The Parliamentarian has set down I believe on Friday the 
voting procedure. I might ask for the benefit of Members when we could 
anticipate votes to occur and the time between the votes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the orders the votes are to occur 
beginning at 9 a.m. and there will be 3 minutes between each vote. The 
votes subsequent to the first vote will be 10 minutes in length.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from New 
Hampshire.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent 
that I might be recognized in morning business for no more than 5 
minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (The remarks of Mr. Smith of New Hampshire pertaining to the 
introduction of S. 567 are located in today's Record under ``Statements 
on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.'')
  Mr. BRYAN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. BRYAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BRYAN. Mr. President, I am sure that most of my colleagues who 
have watched this debate for the last week are of the opinion that 
after some 5 days of debate that everything that can ultimately be said 
about this legislation has been said, and I hate to disabuse them of 
the notion but my colleague from Nevada and I are going to beg their 
indulgence and talk a little bit more about the substitute that has 
been offered by the Senator from Alaska.
  It is my firm conviction that the belief of the scientific community 
is that this legislation for interim storage is unnecessary. That is 
the conclusion advanced by the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board. We 
have talked about that a great deal. But the reason this is important 
is that this is the scientific community. This is not the Senator from 
Nevada debating with our friends from Alaska, Idaho, or any other State 
delegation. Not a single member of this Nuclear Waste Technical Review 
Board is a Nevadan. That is their position; that it is a fundamental 
flaw in this legislation. It is not necessary. It is not being 
requested by the scientific community. It is not being supported by the 
scientific community, and quite to the contrary. The 1996 report says 
that the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board was reconstituted with 
new members in 1997, a new chairman, and a number of new members. And 
they reaffirmed the position of the technical review board a year ago 
in concluding that it is not necessary. It is not necessary. So it is 
premature. It is unwise. It is the worst of policy.
  I only wish I were capable, Mr. President, of articulating with more 
insight, more capacity, and with more persuasive force because it has 
been said here on the floor of the Senate over and over again that the 
Nevada test site is the preferred alternative. Mr. President, there is 
not one scintilla of evidence to suggest that.
  Yucca Mountain is being characterized or studied for the permanent 
repository. But there has been no scientific evaluation or judgment 
made that the Nevada test site is a preferred alternative--none--
because under the current law an interim storage facility cannot be 
established in Nevada, nor the State of the distinguished occupant

[[Page S3098]]

of the chair, nor any other State until application is made for 
licensure under the permanent site.
  So there has been no search in a scientific sense to have a 
determination made as to an interim site. So anyone who thinks that 
this is the product of analytical scientific reasoning needs to be 
aware of the fact that there has been no study, no evaluation, no 
scientific analysis, nothing--absolutely nothing--that suggests that 
the Nevada test site is a preferred alternative or a desired 
alternative; absolutely not because the focus in terms of the Nuclear 
Waste Policy Act of 1982 is the permanent geological storage. And Yucca 
Mountain, much to my dismay--I don't like this fact--but Yucca Mountain 
is being studied or characterized. And that is where the focus has been 
in terms of scientific study and analysis.
  So I think it is important to make that clear distinction. It has 
been said that the Nevada test site has been used for previous testing 
programs. That is true. But that is not to suggest that makes it a 
preferred or a better site than any one of a number of other 
possibilities around the country. I think we need to try to drive that 
point home to my colleagues who are studying this issue and who are 
trying to make some rational judgments based upon the debate we have 
had over the last 5 days.
  The substitute: It has been said that it is a better piece of 
legislation than the one last year.
  I suppose if a terminally ill man is told that he has 6 months to 
live rather than 3 months to live, that is better news, but it is still 
not a desirable result and certainly something that would cause little 
rejoicing.
  This is a bad piece of legislation because it destroys a carefully 
crafted, carefully constructed environmental protection legislative 
framework that has served America under both Republican and Democratic 
Presidents exceedingly well for the last 28 years or so.
  It has been said by our friends who are arguing for this that we have 
taken care of the problem of preemption. Those who followed the debate 
in the last Congress will recall that preemption was at the heart of 
the issue, and it continues to remain so.
  Here is what the law says. Let me just say that the nuclear utility 
lawyers ought to get an A-plus for being clever and disingenuous, 
because this is an exceedingly skillful bit of legalistic drafting that 
produces a consequence that I think no fair-minded person could 
conclude. The substitute says that except as provided in a couple 
sections a law, regulation, order, or other requirement of a State, 
political subdivision of a State, or Indian tribe is preempted.
  So the argument that is made in the Chamber is that we are only 
preempting State law. Not true, not true, not true, because under the 
legislative system we have established for the environmental acts that 
have been passed over the last nearly three decades, Federal 
legislation is enacted whether we are talking about safe drinking 
water, clean air, clean water, RCRA, in which the States are delegated 
the ability to enforce if they enact legislation that is equal to or 
greater than the Federal legislation.
  It has been suggested the language that is used now in the new 
section 501, found on page 59, of S. 104, the substitute, is just what 
we have in HAZMAT. Not true, Mr. President, not true, not true. HAZMAT 
has a provision that says except as provided in the appropriate 
subsections unless authorized by another law of the United States, a 
requirement of a State, political subdivision of a State, or an Indian 
tribe is preempted. The operative language ``unless authorized by 
another law of the U.S.'' It is not by omission, inadvertence or 
happenstance that operative language ``unless authorized by the U.S.'' 
has been dropped, because it is that provision of law in the HAZMAT 
code that says ``unless authorized by another law of the U.S.'' that 
enables a State statute responding to the delegation of authority given 
to it under Federal environmental law, that those State laws are 
protected because they are authorized by Federal law.
  So here is what we have. Let us forget for a moment what kind of 
passion one might have for nuclear waste and a sense, yes, gosh, it 
ought to be sent somewhere. But let us just talk about policy. If this 
legislation passes, Nevada will be the only State in the Union that 
will be unable to enforce a State law enacted pursuant to an 
environmental delegation of authority.
  Now, what conceivable rationale could possibly lead to that 
conclusion? It is very clear that this is nothing less than a 
preemption, and so we are talking about safe drinking water, clean air, 
clean water, RCRA, much as we did in the last session of the Congress 
when this was debated.
  Another provision is kind of interesting as well if HAZMAT be the 
standard. Under HAZMAT, a State has the ability to make application for 
a waiver to that preemption of a State law--a law that would not be 
enacted pursuant to the delegation of Federal authority under our 
environmental law--but let's just say another provision of State law. A 
State would have the ability to seek a waiver and a judgment would be 
made as to whether or not a waiver should be granted.
  That provision is not included, not included, not included in S. 104. 
Furthermore, under the waiver provision, if a State is denied a waiver 
provision under the HAZMAT legislation, which is again asserted by the 
supporters of S. 104, S. 104 is virtually--and we will come back to the 
word ``virtually'' in a moment--identical to HAZMAT. We already have 
it. No reason to be concerned. This is something that we have 
established, a precedent. The policy is there. We are just simply 
asking you to do no more in S. 104 than we have all agreed to be done 
in HAZMAT.
  Not true, Mr. President, not true, not true, because in HAZMAT a 
State that makes an application for a waiver, that provision that is 
not available under S. 104, also has the ability for judicial review, 
to have the denial reviewed in a court of law consistent with the 
Administrative Procedures Act that exists at the Federal level and 
State level. But under S. 104 there is no mechanism provided for 
judicial review.
  Another provision ever so subtle is a provision that goes on to say 
that any law that is not the same as or substantially the same as--this 
would also be on page 9. I read as follows:

       Except as otherwise provided in this act, a law, 
     regulation, order or other requirement of a State, political 
     subdivision of a State or Indian tribe about any of 
the following subjects that is not substantially the same as--

  ``Not substantially the same as.'' That, too, differs from what we 
have previously had in HAZMAT where we are talking about as long as it 
is not inconsistent with. A totally different standard. Under S. 104, 
your State law is preempted if it is not substantially the same. Under 
HAZMAT, it would be preempted if it was inconsistent with. A big, big 
difference.
  Now, here is what that means. The Senator that presides is from a 
Western State, and he knows the importance of water law to those of us 
in the West. He also knows, because his State, like my own, is 
relatively arid and ground water resources are of critical concern to 
the viability and the integrity of the economy of his State as well as 
my own. Under this provision in S. 104, the ground water quality 
control provisions of State law are preempted, even though those ground 
water provisions have long predated the debate about nuclear waste, 
because they are not substantially the same as the provisions of this 
act. So, in effect, the State of Nevada would be unable to exercise 
control of its own ground water based upon the standards established by 
law or regulation because those statements, standards or regulations 
are not substantially the same as a provision of this act.
  So, in effect, we do have a preemption, a preemption in the first 
instance that gives us the inability to enforce State statutes enacted 
pursuant to an environmental delegation--the whole raft of Federal 
environmental legislation which has as its premise to allow States to 
enforce those standards so long as they enact statutes or regulations 
that would be equal to or greater than the Federal standard. We have no 
provision to apply for a waiver, and we have no ability for judicial 
review. Add to that not only do we preempt those provisions in State 
law that would be inconsistent with the enactment of S. 104, but those 
provisions that are not substantially the same. So a whole host of 
legislative enactments that

[[Page S3099]]

have had nothing to do with the debate and Yucca Mountain or nuclear 
waste could be preempted.
  Now, I have to tell you, what possible policy would justify that 
conclusion? Well, it is our friends to the nuclear utilities who, 
indeed, want to tie our hands, who, indeed, want to trample upon the 
environmental protection provisions that all Americans enjoy 
irrespective of State and to say to one State those provisions shall 
not be available to your citizens.
  I want to talk about the viability assessment because that has been 
discussed at some length during the course of this debate. I think in 
order to do so we need to recount a little history.
  Currently, a standard is being developed by the Environmental 
Protection Agency. That direction was part of the Energy Policy Act of 
1992. The 1992 Energy Policy Act directs the Administrator of the 
Environmental Protection Agency to develop and promulgate a standard 
that is consistent with, and I shall read it:

       The administrator shall, based upon and consistent with the 
     findings and recommendation of the National Academy of 
     Sciences promulgate by rule public health and safety 
     standards for protection of the public from releases from 
     radioactive materials stored or to be disposed of in the 
     repository at Yucca Mountain.

  This was not a provision insisted upon by the Nevada delegation. This 
happens to be a decent policy that directs the EPA to develop a 
standard consistent with the National Academy of Sciences.
  The National Academy of Sciences has come up with its recommendation, 
and the EPA is about ready to promulgate that standard. So what do we 
have now? We have legislation now in S. 104 that says the following. It 
is kind of now we give it to you and now we take it back. Now it says 
in S. 104 that the Administrator shall achieve consistency with the 
findings and recommendations of the National Academies of Science and 
the Commission shall amend its regulations accordingly.
  All right, that sounds like basically we are talking about the 
standards that the Congress directed NAS to come up with the 
recommendations and the Environmental Protection Agency to adopt.
  Not so, Mr. President, not so. Because the following text goes on to 
change those standards considerably. The risk standard, in terms of the 
group that is to be examined, in terms of the possibility of risk due 
to death from cancer, is changed; assumptions are made that are not 
part of the National Academy of Sciences, particularly the length of 
period for which the standard shall apply. It is assumed, for purposes 
of S. 104, that the standard has a premise that there is no population 
migration into or near or adjacent to the area, that we establish the 
standard based upon those people who currently live in the vicinity. 
That is certainly an unrealistic premise, and one that the academy of 
sciences would certainly reject, particularly in an area, as southern 
Nevada is, the fastest-growing place in America with a population that 
now exceeds 1 million people and in which the relentless movement of 
people in the southern Nevada area each month, and each year, moves to 
the north and toward Yucca Mountain. So, why would you freeze or limit 
the ability of those who are to promulgate the standards to only those 
people who are living where they are living today as opposed to those 
who would reflect reasonable migration changes?
  Another provision is the assumption that there will be no human 
intrusion. Again, that is something specifically rejected by the 
National Academy of Sciences. So, we have a standard that is now being 
changed. It is now being changed. This standard was about ready to be 
promulgated based upon the 1992 Energy Act directives with respect to 
the National Academy of Sciences, and requiring the Environmental 
Protection Agency to adopt a standard that is consistent with those 
findings. Now we are given a whole additional subset of limitations and 
restrictions. It is as if one said: I want you to follow with great 
meticulous care and detail the Constitution of the United States, but 
you shall not consider the first amendment, you shall not consider the 
fifth amendment, or the sixth amendment. That is about what we have 
here. Follow the standards, but you cannot do this, you must not 
consider this, and you must put a limitation on the period of time for 
which that evaluation is being given in terms of prospective safety.
  So we have a mockery of the standards. The standards are important 
for a number of reasons, but a lot of debate occurred here earlier this 
afternoon about the assessment--the viability assessment, as it is 
called--and the timeline. That is very, very important because the 
President of the United States is directed to make a viability 
assessment by no later than March 1, 1999. What is the problem? First 
of all, we expected that there would, in fact, be a standard 
promulgated, as I have indicated, because the Environmental Protection 
Agency, after some 5 years working with the National Academy of 
Sciences, is about ready to come forth with one. But as I have also 
indicated in my previous comment, no such standard is going to be 
approved because, if S. 104 becomes the law, a very different standard 
will emerge; a very different standard will emerge. So the President of 
the United States is going to have to make the viability determination. 
He is told, in the first instance, that he should rely upon the 
standard promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency but I must 
say, in view of the fact that the standard is being changed totally, 
nobody believes that new standard will be ready by March 1, 1999, when 
the President has to make his viability assessment.
  So, what does this legislation say? I have never seen anything like 
this. Once upon a time I practiced a little law, I read some statutes, 
examined some regulations. This provision goes on to say if the 
standard under section 206(F), that is what we have been talking about, 
has not been promulgated, and I reiterate I don't believe anybody 
believes that it will be, because they are being asked now to draft a 
new standard with all the limitations that we have previously 
recommended, then, in effect the President shall make this 
determination relative to an estimate--rather, the Secretary, excuse 
me--``relative to an estimate by the Secretary of an overall 
performance standard that is consistent with section 206 (F).''--an 
estimate, a guess; March 1, 1999, because S. 104 directs that a new 
standard be prepared, and it has taken essentially the better part of 5 
years to develop the standard that was about to be promulgated. So, not 
only must the President make a viability assessment on a standard that 
is not in existence, he is directed to make a viability assessment 
based upon an estimate of what that standard might be--an estimate. 
That is just a very nice legalism for a guess. How in the world would 
he be able to make that determination when the technical people, the 
environmental agency, working with the National Academy of Sciences, 
would not have such a standard available to him for a determination? 
So, any suggestion of a standard, any suggestion of a viability 
assessment that is based upon a standard, is simply not going to occur.

  I want to comment on this lawsuit, if I may, before yielding the 
floor to my senior colleague. We have heard it argued 500 different 
ways, in every conceivable mood, tense, that this lawsuit, with the 
decision that the Department of Energy has liability, that this is such 
a dreadful thing, that this will cause the ratepayers to endure all 
kinds of hardship, that they will be denied the benefit of that 
bargain, that it is a terrible, terrible thing and in fairness to the 
ratepayers we need to get S. 104 enacted.
  There is not one word in this legislation that provides any relief to 
the ratepayers. I happen to think that the ratepayers are entitled to 
some protection because, in 1998, under no conceivable scenario will 
any kind of facility be open to which high-level nuclear waste can be 
transported. But I have to tell you, all of this wringing of hands, all 
of this gnashing of teeth, all of this great empathy for the 
ratepayer--and I happen to believe the ratepayer ought to be 
protected--not a single word in S. 104 provides benefits to the 
ratepayer because of additional costs which they might incur if, come 
1998, they need to provide for additional storage on-site.
  Indeed, as has been pointed out time and time again, the Secretary of 
the

[[Page S3100]]

Department of Energy has made it very clear that compensation needs to 
be made. We have heard all kinds of things: It is going to cost $80 
billion, $59 billion, $30 billion--the numbers are as elusive as a 
shooting star. But the measure of damages that the utilities, on behalf 
of their ratepayers, are entitled to is spelled out in the contract. It 
is spelled out in the contract that each utility was required to enter 
into in 1982 or shortly thereafter, when the Nuclear Waste Policy Act 
was entered into. It is clearly laid out in article 9, ``delays.'' It 
is apparently a well-drafted contract.

       If the delays are unavoidable, then in such instances the 
     schedule for delivery of nuclear waste is simply modified in 
     accordance with the exigencies as they are in light of the 
     delay.

  No monetary damages are assessed. If, however, a determination is 
made that the delays were avoidable and that, indeed, the Department of 
Energy bears a responsibility for that delay, then specifically the 
contract provides:

       The charges and schedules specified by this contract will 
     be equitably adjusted to reflect any estimated additional 
     costs incurred by the party not responsible for or 
     contributing to the delay.

  Mr. President, that is fair and that is reasonable. If, indeed, a 
determination is made that this is a delay that is at the fault of the 
Department of Energy, the ratepayer and the utility is entitled to have 
the sums paid into the Nuclear Waste Trust Fund equitably adjusted to 
reflect any estimated additional cost incurred by the party not 
responsible for or contributing to the delay. Mr. President, I agree 
with that. That is fair to the ratepayer. Indeed, in legislation that I 
have introduced in each Congress since 1989, I have essentially 
proposed that kind of remedy.
  So, if my colleagues are concerned about the additional cost that the 
ratepayer may incur because of the unavailability of a repository in 
1998, S. 104 provides no comfort for them or their constituents. There 
is no relief with respect to any additional cost that may be incurred.

  Mr. President, I am going to stop here and yield the floor and give 
my colleague an opportunity to make some comments and then I will 
conclude my remarks thereafter.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. REID addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the senior Senator from 
Nevada.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, S. 104 is a bad bill in the form it was 
originally introduced. The bill in its substitute form is bad--for a 
lot of different reasons. No one in this body that I know of is more in 
tune with the substance of legislation than is the junior Senator from 
New Mexico. This man, who graduated from Stanford University among 
other schools such as Harvard, is a person who understands the merits 
of legislation. He has worked for years to try to improve this piece of 
legislation. He has worked on it because he believes in good public 
policy. He has failed. He has tried, he has tried, but when it comes 
right down to it, the proponents of this legislation will not give the 
junior Senator from New Mexico anything that will really substantively 
improve the bill. They have tried at the edges to play with it a little 
bit, but they have not been willing to change the substance of this 
poor legislation.
  The Senator from New Mexico summed up this legislation best in his 
closing few minutes of remarks today when he said, and I am 
paraphrasing: It is very obvious what is happening. Once the system is 
short-circuited and they go around the law that now exists and 
establish a temporary repository, that will end good science and good 
law.
  In effect, what he was saying is once interim storage is established, 
the billions, the billions of dollars spent trying to determine if 
Yucca Mountain is suitable would be wasted. That is what it amounts to. 
S. 104 is bad. It does not deal with transportation. We do not have the 
means of safely transporting nuclear waste today anywhere in the world, 
as evidenced by what happened recently in Germany. We will talk about 
that later.
  Why do all environmental groups--I repeat, all environmental groups, 
not 65 percent of them, not a majority, not a vast majority, not 85 
percent--100 percent of environmental groups oppose this legislation? 
Not a single group favors this legislation. Why? Because it would be 
difficult to dream up a scenario that would be worse than this for the 
environment.
  One of the things we have not talked about is terrorism.
  We will talk about terrorism in a few minutes, but this legislation 
does not do anything to address the terrorism that is sweeping this 
world and is sweeping this country, and this bill leaves the terrorists 
a sitting duck.
  To show how insincere proponents of this legislation are, let's take 
one amendment that was offered and defeated. We have heard on this 
Senate floor for the past week how safe it is to transport nuclear 
waste, how safe it is generally. In fact, we were told by one of the 
proponents of this legislation that it was safer to transport nuclear 
waste than it was to pick up a carton of milk at a grocery store and 
take it to your home. That is not a paraphrase, that is a statement 
that was made.
  If, in fact, that is true--and, of course, it is not--but if it is 
true and the proponents of this legislation really believe that, why 
wouldn't they accept an amendment we offered that simply said, if you 
want to transport nuclear waste through a State, the Governor of that 
State should agree to let it pass through the State? If this material 
can be transported safely and the material is as benign as they say, if 
it is like picking up a carton of milk at 7-Eleven and taking it home, 
then they should have supported our amendment, but they did not do 
that.
  Mr. President, what is happening can best be illustrated by virtue of 
an editorial that appeared last week in the Washington Post newspaper. 
This editorial said, among other things, that this was not the 
appropriate thing to do, this is not the time to bring up this 
legislation.
  I ask unanimous consent that the full text of the editorial be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                [From the Washington Post, Apr. 8, 1997]

                        Waste Vote in the Senate

       The Senate is scheduled to take a cloture vote today on a 
     bill to create an ``interim'' national nuclear waste 
     repository in Nevada. The outcome is likely to be the same as 
     last year: votes enough to limit debate and pass the bill, 
     but not to overcome the president's promised veto. Our own 
     sense is that the bill is the wrong solution to a genuine 
     problem. The president is right to keep it from passing, but 
     then the administration owes a real alternative, not just lip 
     service to a process that is a pretext for deferral.
       Waste disposal always has been the great unsolved problem 
     of nuclear power. Proponents like to say the nuclear 
     alternative is clean when compared with such other sources of 
     power as coal. It is until you get to the disposal issue: 
     what to do with the spent fuel rods. Then it's the dirtiest 
     of all.
       The expectation always has been that government would play 
     a major part in the disposal issue. In 1982 Congress spelled 
     out the process. A fee would be imposed on consumers of 
     electricity to create a fund; the fund would be used to plan, 
     build and fill a permanent national nuclear waste repository. 
     By a process of elimination having at least as much to do 
     with congressional politics as with science, Yucca Mountain 
     in Nevada was subsequently chosen, over the protests of 
     Nevadans, as the likeliest site. Safety, environmental and 
     all manner of other studies have been underway ever since.
       The government was supposed to start accepting the spent 
     fuel in 1998. There isn't a prayer it will be ready, and 
     meanwhile the material is building up in the storage 
     facilities at the power plants. The bill to create the 
     interim facility is an effort by the industry to force the 
     government's hand on the theory that, absent a forcing move, 
     nothing will ever be done. The utilities are entitled to feel 
     that way. But the interim facility would be adjacent to Yucca 
     Mountain, and the fear on the other side is that that would 
     be it: Yucca Mountain would become the permanent site whether 
     the studies showed it to be best suited or not.
       The permanent storage decision is too important to be made 
     under that kind of pressure. At the same time, the 
     administration needs to give the industry some assurance that 
     the process won't drag on forever. There are critics of the 
     industry who would like to see it choke on its own waste, but 
     that's not a solution. Whatever the future of the industry, 
     the waste is here. There needs to be a policy of something 
     other than deferral to deal with it.

  Mr. REID. Mr. President, ``Waste Vote in the Senate'' is the 
headline. The Washington Post said:

       Our own sense is that the bill is the wrong solution to a 
     genuine problem . . . Proponents like to say the nuclear 
     alternative is

[[Page S3101]]

     clean when compared with such other sources of power as coal. 
     It is until you get to the disposal issue: what to do with 
     the spent fuel rods. Then it's the dirtiest of all . . . .
       The permanent storage decision is too important to be made 
     under that kind of pressure.

  The Washington Post, Mr. President, said that we are being stampeded 
into a decision that will have long-term detrimental effects on this 
country. I believe the Washington Post.
  We also know that the President of the United States is going to veto 
this bill. He is going to veto this bill if it gets 100 votes, which it 
will not. He is going to veto this legislation no matter how many votes 
it gets, because Bill Clinton believes this is bad policy.
  The President has said in a statement of policy earlier this month, 
about a week ago, that this was bad policy for our country. This 
statement has been coordinated with all the Federal agencies. We should 
remember that the President is going to veto this for good reasons: It 
is bad policy.
  The easiest thing for the President of the United States to do would 
be to join with a vast majority who support this legislation, not the 
majority of people, because the President is helping to set public 
policy to oppose this legislation, but it would be easy for him, less 
controversial for him, if he would go along with the madding crowd here 
that says, ``Let's support this legislation.'' He won't do that for a 
number of reasons, not the least of which, as I indicated, it is bad 
public policy.
  We also know that the Secretary of Energy, Federico Pena, opposes 
this legislation, with a letter directed to us on April 8, 1997.
  I ask unanimous consent that a statement of administration policy be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

         Executive Office of the President, Office of Management 
           and Budget,
                                    Washington, DC, April 7, 1997.

                   Statement of Administration Policy

    (This statement has been coordinated by OMB with the concerned 
                               agencies.)


   S. 104--Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1997--Murkowski (R-AK) and 27 
                              cosponsors)

       If S. 104 were presented to the President in its current 
     form, the President would veto the bill. S. 104 would 
     undermine the credibility of the Nation's nuclear waste 
     disposal program by, in effect, designating a specified site 
     for an interim storage facility before the viability of that 
     site as a permanent geological repository has been assessed. 
     The bill would also undermine the ongoing work on the 
     permanent disposal site by siphoning away resources for an 
     interim site.
       The Administration is committed to resolving the complex 
     and important issue of nuclear waste storage in a timely and 
     sensible manner. The Federal government's long-standing 
     commitment to permanent, geological disposal should remain 
     the basic goal of high-level radioactive waste management 
     policy. This Administration has instituted planning and 
     management initiatives to accelerate progress on assessing 
     Yucca Mountain, Nevada, as a permanent geologic disposal 
     site, and urges the Congress to provide sufficient resources 
     to allow the Administration to complete the Yucca Mountain 
     viability assessment in 1998.
       S. 104, however, would effectively establish Nevada as the 
     site of an interim nuclear waste storage facility before the 
     viability assessment of Yucca Mountain as a permanent 
     geologic repository is completed. Moreover, even if Yucca 
     Mountain is determined not to be viable for a permanent 
     repository, the bill would provide no plausible opportunity 
     to designate a viable alternative as an interim storage site. 
     Any potential siting decision concerning such a facility 
     ultimately should be based on objective, science-based 
     criteria and informed by the likelihood of the success of the 
     Yucca Mountain site.
       In addition, the Administration strongly objects to the 
     bill's weakening of existing environmental standards by 
     preempting all Federal, State, and local laws inconsistent 
     with the environmental requirements of this bill and the 
     Atomic Energy Act. This preemption would effectively replace 
     EPA's authority to set acceptable radiation release standards 
     with a statutory standard and would create loopholes in the 
     National Environmental Policy Act.

  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the letter from 
the Secretary of Energy to the Honorable Tom Daschle setting forth the 
Department of Energy's policy be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                      The Secretary of Energy,

                                     Washington, DC, April 8, 1997
     Hon. Tom Daschle,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Daschle: I am writing to inform you of the 
     Department of Energy's views on S. 104, the Nuclear Waste 
     Policy Act of 1997, as reported by the Committee on Energy 
     and Natural Resources.
       The Administration's position on nuclear waste is clear: we 
     are committed to resolving the complex and important issue of 
     nuclear waste disposal in a timely and sensible manner, 
     consistent with sound science and protection of public 
     health, safety, and the environment. The Administration 
     believes that the federal government's longstanding 
     commitment to permanent, geologic disposal should remain the 
     basic goal of high-level radioactive waste management policy.
       The Administration's position on S. 104 is also very 
     straightforward. The Administration believes that a decision 
     on the siting of an interim storage facility should be based 
     on objective, science-based criteria and should be informed 
     by the viability assessment of Yucca Mountain. Therefore, as 
     the President has stated, he would veto any legislation that 
     would designate an interim storage facility at a specific 
     site before the viability assessment at Yucca Mountain has 
     been completed.
       I believe that one of the premier challenges the Department 
     of Energy faces is that of nuclear waste disposal. This 
     challenge requires that we develop the scientific data for 
     the viability assessment of Yucca Mountain as the repository 
     of the Nation's radioactive waste. The repository effort is 
     essential not only for commercial spent fuel disposal but 
     also for the cleanup of the nuclear weapons complex and 
     disposal of weapons-grade materials in furtherance of our 
     nuclear non-proliferation goals.
       I am sensitive to the frustrations expressed over the 
     Department's inability to accept spent nuclear fuel by 
     January 31, 1998. As I committed during the confirmation 
     process, I have met with representatives of both the utility 
     industry and environmental organizations to discuss ways of 
     mitigating the impacts of this delay. I will also be meeting 
     in the near future with representatives of the state public 
     utility commissions.
       Last week, I began a cooperative process with 
     representatives of the utility industry to address the 
     difficult and controversial issues of how the Department will 
     meet its 1998 contractual commitment. I believe we had a 
     constructive discussion of these issues, and we agreed to set 
     up working groups to continue the discussion in the next 
     several weeks. We discussed a number of options for meeting 
     the 1998 commitment, ranging from compensation, to taking 
     title to utilities' spent fuel, to moving the fuel. I also 
     expressed my personal commitment to fill the position of 
     Director of the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste 
     Management as soon as possible and committed to provide 
     more frequent technical updates on the progress of work at 
     Yucca Mountain to stakeholders.
       Unfortunately, the legislation now pending before the 
     Senate, S. 104, contains elements that undermine the Federal 
     government's longstanding commitment to seeking a permanent 
     solution to the nuclear waste problem. The bill would 
     effectively establish the Nevada Test Site as the site for an 
     interim storage facility before the Yucca Mountain viability 
     assessment is completed. If the Yucca Mountain site is found 
     not to be viable, the provisions of the bill do not provide 
     sufficient time to designate, license, and construct a 
     facility at any alternative to the Nevada Test Site, thereby 
     forcing the siting of an interim facility in Nevada 
     regardless of the outcome of the viability assessment. This 
     would be an unwise rush to judgment. Furthermore, designating 
     an interim storage site, before the government can be 
     informed by the repository viability assessment, would 
     jeopardize the long-term strategy for the ultimate disposal 
     of nuclear waste and undermine public confidence in the near-
     term transportation and storage activities.
       S. 104 also contains unrealistic schedules for beginning 
     interim storage facility operations, which, could not be met 
     even if a site were available today. It would repeat the 
     mistakes of the past with regard to unrealistic schedules for 
     completing actions without regard to generating public 
     support. Such schedules would result in excessively curtailed 
     regulatory processes and potential competition for funding 
     between the repository program and interim storage project.
       Finally, I want to emphasize that the Department of Energy 
     has, in fact, made significant progress in this program over 
     the last four years and will be in a position by late 1998 to 
     assess the viability of the Yucca Mountain site for a 
     geologic repository. The Department has underway an 
     aggressive site characterization program at Yucca Mountain 
     focusing on the most critical technical questions (e.g., 
     hydrology, waste package lifetime, and the effects of heat on 
     the repository block). The Department has reduced the cost of 
     the technical and scientific work associated with preparing a 
     license application by approximately 40 percent. The 
     Department also has excavated over four miles of the five-
     mile underground loop of the Exploratory Studies Facility and 
     expects to complete the tunnel this spring and complete seven 
     test alcoves by the end of this year. Following completion of 
     the tunnel, the Department will collect additional scientific 
     and engineering data in order to prepare the materials 
     necessary to complete the viability assessment. Designation 
     of an interim storage site prior to completion of this

[[Page S3102]]

     work is likely to undermine public confidence that a 
     repository evaluation will be objective and technically 
     sound.
       For all of these reasons, I urge you and your colleagues to 
     join the President and the Administration in opposing this 
     legislation.
           Sincerely,
                                                    Federico Pena.

  Mr. REID. Also, Mr. President, I have from the Council on 
Environmental Quality--and let me explain to the viewers what this is. 
The President has, and it has been in the last 20 years, an agency 
within the Executive Office of the President that gives the President 
advice on environmental issues. The chairperson of that very important 
office is Katie McGinty. Her office has advised the President this 
legislation is bad legislation. She has advised the minority leader and 
the majority leader of the U.S. Senate that it is bad policy.
  I ask unanimous consent that a letter dated April 7, 1997, indicating 
Katie McGinty's absolute opposition to this legislation be printed in 
the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

         Executive Office of the President, Council on 
           Environmental Quality,
                                    Washington, DC, April 7, 1997.
     Hon. Tom Daschle,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Daschle: The purpose of this letter is to 
     express my opposition to S. 104, which effectively mandates 
     construction of an interim storage facility for nuclear 
     wastes at the Nevada Test Site, near the location under 
     consideration as a permanent geologic repository at Yucca 
     Mountain. This Administration supports a long-term solution 
     for the disposal of nuclear wastes, but not, as would be the 
     case with S. 104, at the expense of sound science and public 
     health, safety and environmental protection. While I am 
     troubled by a number of provisions in the bill that would 
     undermine such safeguards, I am particularly concerned over 
     the dismantling of the environmental impact assessment 
     process under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).
       Congress passed NEPA in 1969 to ensure that federal 
     agencies integrate environmental values, as well as social, 
     economic and technical factors, into the decision making 
     process. To that end, section 102 of NEPA establishes an 
     ``action forcing device,'' known as an environmental impact 
     statement (EIS), for proposed major federal actions 
     significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. 
     At the heart of the EIS process is the alternatives analysis, 
     in which reasonable alternatives to the proposed action are 
     addressed in an effort to provide a clear basis of choice by 
     decision makers and the public, and to ensure that the most 
     environmentally sound course of action is taken.
       S. 104 renders the NEPA process meaningless by precluding 
     the incorporation of NEPA's core values which are necessary 
     for making informed and timely decisions essential for 
     protecting public health, safety and environmental quality. 
     Consequently, the bill all but locks into place both interim 
     and permanent storage sites by giving decision makers no 
     reasonable options in the event that Yucca Mountain is found 
     unsuitable.
       If Yucca Mountain is found unsuitable for permanent 
     geologic disposal, the time lines in the bill virtually 
     ensure there will not be enough time for the President to 
     designate, and the Secretary of Energy to construct, an 
     interim site. Further, since the EIS for both the interim and 
     permanent facilities are not required until well after the 
     critical decisions have been made--including site selection, 
     design, and some construction--either or both facilities may 
     well be so far into development that if health, safety or 
     environmental problems are identified, there would be no 
     time, nor would it be economically feasible, to look to other 
     sites. This is even more compelling since the bill prevents 
     actions taken by the Secretary and the Nuclear Regulatory 
     Commission from being challenged in court until after these 
     critical decisions have been made.
       Finally, S. 104 precludes the EIS from addressing potential 
     long-term environmental impacts of interim storage; only the 
     initial term of the license or subsequent renewal periods may 
     be considered. In addition, the bill tends to downplay health 
     and safety concerns of state and local communities by stating 
     that the EIS may address the environmental impacts of the 
     transportation of the nuclear wastes to the interim storage 
     facility, only ``in a generic manner.''
       The permanent disposal of nuclear waste is critical to all 
     Americans, and to future generations. When Congress passed 
     NEPA in 1969, it envisioned a decision making process that 
     would ensure that federal agencies ``look before they leap.'' 
     This can occur only if reasonable alternatives to a proposed 
     action are explored earlier in the planning stages, with 
     meaningful public involvement. Only then can an agency make a 
     fully informed decision, one which provides assurances for 
     the maximum possible protection of human health and the 
     environment.
       Thank you for your consideration of this matter. Please do 
     not hesitate to contact me or members of my staff if we can 
     be of further assistance.
           Sincerely,
                                              Kathleen A. McGinty,
                                                            Chair.

  Mr. REID. Mr. President, not only do we have Government agencies 
opposing this legislation, we have already established that the 
scientific community opposes this legislation. When this legislation 
was established, it was determined that there should be some 
nonpartisan, scientific group that could give the Congress and the 
President a scientific view as to what was happening on nuclear waste.
  The Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board was established, and a group 
of scientists were selected. The chairman of this group is from 
prestigious Yale University. He is a dean at one of the schools there. 
They have said, do not support this legislation, interim storage of 
nuclear waste should not be.
  Mr. President, in addition to scientists, we also have environmental 
groups all over the country who oppose this legislation.
  So I guess I would say to the Chair and those within the sound of my 
voice, which position would you support? The position of the 
monopolistic nuclear utilities, the nuclear power lobby? Or the 
scientific community unions, like the United Transportation Union, 
environmentalists, and churches? I would say, first glance and second 
glance and third glance, you would go along with the churches, 
scientists and the environmentalists.
  I am not going to read and have printed in the Record the statements 
from almost 200 environmental groups, but let me just give a brief 
statement from an environmental group in Atlanta, GA. This group is 
called WAND from Atlanta, GA, W-A-N-D. I have a letter written to every 
Senator:

       [We strongly urge] you to oppose S. 104, the Nuclear Waste 
     Policy Act . . . vote against final passage [of this bill].
       S. 104 paves the way for a new era of disregard for public 
     health and safety. The bill carves loopholes in the National 
     Environmental Policy Act, preempts other environmental laws, 
     and eliminates licensing standards for permanent repository. 
     The radiation release standard set by the bill for the 
     permanent repository of 100 millirems would allow individuals 
     to receive four times as much radiation as permitted by 
     current regulations for nuclear waste storage. . . .
       S. 104 mandates interim storage. . .despite the lack of 
     justifiable rationale for interim storage and safety concerns 
     with that site. In the process this bill weakens 
     environmental standards that protect the public, preempts 
     states' rights, and limits public participation in the 
     decisionmaking process.

  I ask unanimous consent that the full text of the Women's Action for 
New Directions in Atlanta, GA, be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                            Women's Action for New Directions,

                                      Atlanta, GA, March 28, 1997.
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator: Women's Action for New Directions (WAND) 
     strongly urges you to oppose S. 104, the Nuclear Waste Policy 
     Act of 1997, support a likely filibuster by Senators Bryan 
     and Reid, and vote against final passage should this bill 
     come to the floor.
       S. 104 paves the way for a new era of disregard for public 
     health and safety. The bill carves loopholes in the National 
     Environmental Policy Act, preempts other environmental laws, 
     and eliminates licensing standards for the permanent 
     repository. The radiation release standards set by the bill 
     for the permanent repository on 100 millirems would allow 
     individuals to receive four times as much radiation as 
     permitted by current regulations for nuclear waste storage. 
     By setting aside important regulations and standards for 
     short-term expediency, the bill sets the stage for future 
     exemptions when other radioactive waste problems, such as 
     cleanup of the nation's nuclear weapons complex, become too 
     perplexing or expensive.
       S. 104 mandates interim storage for high-level waste at the 
     Yucca Mountain Nevada site, the proposed permanent 
     repository, despite the lack of justifiable rationale for 
     interim storage and safety concerns with that site. In the 
     process this bill weakens environmental standards that 
     protect the public, preempts states' rights, and limits 
     public participation in the decision-making process. It would 
     set into motion the largest nuclear waste transportation 
     project in human history, sending thousands of tons of 
     radioactive waste onto the roads and railways in 43 states, 
     without safety standards. It imposes an unrealistic November 
     1999 date for the beginning of high-level waste 
     transportation, despite Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
     conclusions that the waste can stay where it is for 100 
     years.
       Even amendments added to change some items in the bill, 
     such as Senator Wyden's amendments protecting Hanford from 
     becoming an interim dump site, and some

[[Page S3103]]

     transportation provisions, do not address the overall 
     failures of the bill and its mockery of environmental 
     protection.
       We believe the nation's current nuclear waste policy is 
     fundamentally flawed. It places an unfair burden on 
     politically isolated, often indigenous people, endangers 
     public health and safety, . . .

                           *   *   *   *   *


  Mr. REID. Mr. President, native Americans have joined together almost 
in unison against this legislation. Native Americans also have an 
organization called National Environmental Coalition of Native 
Americans, NECONA. They have said this legislation is extremely bad. 
They have done this in the form of a letter written on March 31 of this 
year:

       [D]eveloping a storage facility now would jeopardize the 
     repository program and has the added risk of prejudicing any 
     future decision about the suitability of that site. . .
       The DOE lists 109 cities of over 100,000 people which would 
     be impacted. Dozens of our tribes would also be impacted, and 
     the most recent DOE survey of tribal and state capabilities 
     to deal with nuclear transportation accidents revealed many 
     serious gaps in preparedness.

  I ask unanimous consent that the full text of the NECONA statement be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                            National Environmental


                                Coalition of Native Americans,

                                       Prague, OK, March 31, 1997.
       Dear Senator: We are writing to you as a non-profit, 
     educational coalition of Indian people who have been long 
     concerned about national and international nuclear waste 
     policy. Some of us live near current nuclear waste sites, and 
     others are threatened with massive transportation impacts if 
     plans for future nuclear waste sites are implemented. 
     Seventy-one tribes in North America have declared their lands 
     to be Nuclear Free Zones.
       We urge you to oppose the current Senate bill S. 104 which 
     calls for centralized interim storage of high level nuclear 
     waste and nuclear irradiated fuel at the Nevada site at Yucca 
     Mountain. NECONA, with other environmental groups, views this 
     bill as an unwise re-direction of U.S. nuclear waste policy.
       Congress's own Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board in 
     March 1996 released a report which stated forcefully that 
     ``there are no compelling technical or safety reasons to 
     begin moving spent fuel from reactor sites for the next 
     several years, so the development of a centralized storage 
     facility should be linked to the decision about the 
     suitability of Yucca Mountain,'' in about five years. 
     ``[D]eveloping a storage facility now would jeopardize the 
     repository program'' and ``has the added risk of prejudicing 
     any future decision about the suitability of that site . . 
     .''
       The industry's bills, for example S. 104, to the contrary 
     would direct DOE to place its ``highest priority'' effort on 
     a temporary ``interim storage facility'' in Nevada. While we 
     have serious concerns about the DOE program at the Yucca 
     Mountain site, we do not wish to see a reversal of the 
     current policy, since the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act, of 
     placing highest priority on a continued search for long-term 
     disposition of nuclear waste.
       The nuclear utility industry is pushing in these bills an 
     irresponsible and phony ``solution'' to the problem of 
     nuclear waste. The U.S. Department of Energy in 1996 produced 
     new national maps depicting the national and state routes, by 
     highway and rail, over which massive numbers of irradiated 
     fuel shipments will move beginning around 1999 if the 
     legislation is enacted. The DOE lists 109 cities over 100,000 
     which would be impacted. Dozens of our tribes would also be 
     impacted, and the most recent DOE survey of tribal and state 
     capabilities to deal with nuclear transportation accidents 
     revealed many serious gaps in preparedness.
       The nuclear industry should not be allowed to wash their 
     hands of their ever-mounting nuclear wastes by merely putting 
     the wastes on the rails and highways for thirty years on the 
     way to an interim storage facility--which will most nearly 
     resemble a parking lot--in Nevada.

                           *   *   *   *   *

  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I will also state that the Physicians for 
Social Responsibility, a group consisting of 16,000 American 
physicians, oppose this legislation. We have a letter from their 
executive director, Dr. Musil, who says to every Senator:

       We . . . oppose Senate bill 104 . . . because it mandates a 
     badly flawed nuclear waste management strategy which 
     potentially endangers public health.

  I ask unanimous consent that the full text of this letter be printed 
in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                         Physicians for Social Responsibility,

                                   Washington, DC, March 25, 1997.
       Dear Senator: Physicians for Social Responsibility is one 
     of the nation's largest organized medical societies, with 
     more than 16,000 members and supporters nationwide, 
     representing all major fields of medicine. We write to urge 
     you to oppose Senate bill 104, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act 
     of 1997, because it mandates a badly flawed nuclear waste 
     management strategy which potentially endangers public 
     health.
       S. 104 would allow construction of an ``interim'' nuclear 
     waste dump near Yucca Mountain in Nevada. Storing highly 
     radioactive waste at the site presents a potentially serious 
     public health danger. The Geological Society of America has 
     reported at least 15 small earthquakes since May 1995 at 
     Yucca Mountain, which sits atop two earthquake faults. 
     Moreover, transporting waste where long-term isolation cannot 
     be assured is irresponsible and creates new and possibly 
     greater dangers.
       S. 104 would require the greatest nuclear waste 
     transportation project in history. It would put 95% of the 
     radioactivity of U.S. nuclear waste on our nation's roads and 
     railways in casks of questionable safety. The bill would send 
     highly radioactive nuclear waste through 43 states within 
     one-half mile of 52 million people, providing minimal 
     protection to local communities.
       S. 104 would exempt nuclear waste from most environmental 
     laws. The bill would exempt site selection, license 
     application, and construction from the Environmental Impact 
     Statement (public participation) process normally required by 
     the National Environmental Policy Act. It would also set 
     radiation release standards far higher than any other 
     standard, presenting greater risks to public health and 
     safety.
       Alternatives should be explored. Our organization seeks a 
     thorough examination and review of all national nuclear waste 
     policies and programs. Such a process should include 
     meaningful and effective public participation to ensure a 
     program that is safe and acceptable to the American public.
       We, as health professionals, are deeply concerned about the 
     grave dangers S. 104 would pose to public health and safety. 
     Please do not trade protection of human health and the 
     environment for a short-term non-solution to the nuclear 
     waste problem. Please vote no on S. 104.
           Sincerely,
                                           Robert K. Musil, Ph.D.,
                                               Executive Director.

  Mr. REID. Mr. President, in short, this legislation is bad. The 
technical experts say it is bad. There is no technical or safety reason 
to move spent nuclear fuel. It is before us for one simple reason, and 
that is the power of the nuclear utilities. The motive of the nuclear 
utilities is more money. We have already established the huge profits 
they make. I compared their 17 percent average profit to what I learned 
in a case that I handled against Safeway Stores. They make a little 
over 1 percent on their volume. The nuclear utilities make 17 percent. 
This legislation is here, it is motivated by money, and they want more 
money. Their greed is endangering the American public, our fragile 
environment and the Nation's policy to develop a permanent repository 
for spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste.
  This bill, S. 104, is antienvironmental. The bill is opposed by every 
environmental group in America, as I have stated several times. This 
bill is a disaster for the environment. The public opposes this 
legislation because they see the facade of S. 104's hysterical claims 
of crisis for onsite storage. This is not true.
  The real motivation, we have established, is money. The best option 
is to leave it on site, right where it is today, Mr. President. We 
would save billions of dollars, and it would be safe. Everyone should 
be outraged by this legislation. No better evidence of bad legislation 
exists than that the provisions of the legislation prohibit discussion 
and full and open disclosure of the bill's consequences and its 
alternatives.
  S. 104 is proposing to violate the intent of the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, because the nuclear power industry 
would fail in its efforts if the law were obeyed. The nuclear power 
industry is indifferent to environmental quality, especially when it 
comes to money.
  This legislation would try--and I underline ``try''--to prematurely 
ship tens of thousands of tons of spent nuclear fuel needlessly before 
the country is ready to do that. Past shipments of nuclear waste showed 
there would be about one accident on the road or rail for every 300 
shipments. That suggests, under S. 104, we would have at least 50 
accidents involving high-level nuclear waste.
  That is only part of the story, because in the examples that they 
used, we are talking about very short hauls of nuclear waste. Here we 
are talking about hauling nuclear waste thousands of miles.

[[Page S3104]]

  Most of the shipments under this legislation would be 
transcontinental. Truck transport statistics predict about six 
accidents every million miles, while rail statistics predict about 12 
accidents per million miles.
  Using these statistics, the Nation should expect more than 160 
accidents involving spent nuclear fuel or high-level radioactive waste. 
Each of these accidents would risk radioactive dispersal from 
canisters, each of which contain the radiological equivalent of 200 
Nagasaki bombs. They are talking about hauling this poison, and the 
canisters have not even been designed. The only thing they designed are 
requirements that canisters survive only if you are going less than 30 
miles an hour and have fire temperatures of only 1,475 degrees.
  We all know that most accidents occur going more than 30 miles per 
hour. The technical community knows that diesel burns on the average at 
1,800 degrees. The canisters survive only 1,400-plus degrees, 1,475 at 
the most. Under some conditions, Mr. President, diesel fuel burns at 
temperatures exceeding 3,000 degrees, more than twice what the 
canisters would withstand.
  So if this is not enough, the chairman of the Nuclear Waste Technical 
Review Board also opposed this plan, as I have already mentioned, 
because the country is not ready yet to ship nuclear waste.
  Truck crews have not been trained. There is no integrated emergency 
response plan for these accidents. Police, fire, emergency, medical, 
hazardous material management, radioactive material management--all 
these teams must be developed, and once they are developed become an 
integrated capable force.
  The response force needs an accepted and capable command and control 
structure to organize their action. They do not have one.
  The response force needs to be equipped with technical gear peculiar 
to radioactive material management. They do not have it.
  The response force needs to train together so they can work together 
when it becomes necessary. Integrated training has not been done or 
even contemplated.
  It could not be more obvious that we are not ready to move spent 
nuclear fuel or high-level radioactive waste across this country.
  S. 104 is an open invitation to terrorists. We know that terrorists 
will do anything to grab a headline. Terrorists exist both at home and 
abroad. Terrorists can move freely through this country. Everybody 
knows the routes and schedules of waste shipments. Weaponry exists that 
can breach waste containers. Everybody knows that terrorists with a 
little bit of money and determination can get these weapons.
  Places exist along those routes where shipments could be stopped 
where we know there would be time enough to breach the canisters and 
disperse the waste, to say the least.
  We must do something to prevent terrorists from attacking these 
irresistible targets. We have done nothing. We continue to not do 
anything to prevent this kind of threat.
  We need to be prepared to respond with effective and overwhelming 
capability in a very short time if our prevention tactics fail.
  We are not planning for prevention. We are not planning for response. 
We are sitting around with our heads in the sand hoping that this will 
not happen. That is just what terrorists count on.
  S. 104 spends not one bit of its energy or money on this critical 
issue because the nuclear power industry does not care that much. They 
only care about money. That is the only thing they care about.
  They would risk the lives and health of tens of millions of citizens 
living and working within 10 miles of the routes of this transportation 
system.
  The nuclear power industry and the sponsors of S. 104 have not 
convinced the American people that spent nuclear fuel is safe.
  I have said previously on this floor--and I think it speaks volumes--
they tried this recently in Germany. They could not do it, Mr. 
President. We are talking about moving this waste thousands and 
thousands of miles. They tried in Germany to move it less than 300 
miles.
  What did it take to move six canisters 300 miles? It took 30,000 
police, 170 injuries, 500 arrests, $150 million. Germany has said, 
``We're backing off. This is a program that won't work.''
  So now, Mr. President, that orderly and conservative region of 
Germany has become a hotbed of protest and hatred for the government. 
The transportation program has been stopped. The police have refused to 
continue with arrests and suppression. The German parliament, as I 
mentioned, is reconsidering its decision to move the waste. All that 
for six casks moving just a short distance.
  We have talked, Mr. President, about terrorism. I want everyone to 
understand that this is not something that is just being made up.
  In fact, one organization from North Carolina, just last year, 
decided how hard it would be to commit an act of terrorism with a 
nuclear waste shipment. They determined it would be as easy as falling 
off a log.
  Referring to a letter to the U.S. Senate about a year ago, the Blue 
Ridge Environmental Defense League, which is an old organization, in 
existence for 15 years thereabouts, decided to see if they could find a 
load of nuclear waste and follow it. They could follow it. It was real 
easy.
  They said:

       In the wake of Oklahoma City and Atlanta the dangers posed 
     by domestic or international terrorists armed with explosives 
     make the transport of highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel 
     too dangerous to contemplate for the foreseeable future.

  My friend, the manager of this bill, the senior Senator from Alaska, 
said: ``What are we going to do? Just throw it in the air? If we do, it 
is going to come down some place.''
  That's the whole point of the terrorists. It won't just come down 
some place; it will come down all over the place--with no control over 
where it will come down, according to the Blue Ridge Environmental 
Defense League.
  They have said that ``Our work''--and they only looked in three 
States, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia--``takes us to many 
rural communities. Emergency management personal in these areas are 
dedicated volunteers, but they are unprepared for nuclear waste. 
Volunteer fire departments in rural counties are very good at putting 
out house fires and brush fires,'' but that is about all.
  ``The remote river valleys and steep grades of Appalachia are 
legendary. At Saluda, NC the steepest standard gauge mainline railroad 
grade in the United States drops 253 feet/mile,'' or a 4.8-percent 
grade. ``The CSX and Norfolk Southern lines trace the French Broad 
River Valley and the Nolichucky Gorge west through the Appalachian 
Mountains along remote stretches of rivers famous among whitewater 
rafters for their steep drops and their distance from civilization. The 
Norfolk Southern [Railroad] crosses the French Broad River at Deep 
Water Bridge where the mountains rise 2,200 feet above the river. These 
are the transport routes through western North Carolina that will be 
used for high level nuclear waste'' if this legislation passes.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that their letter be printed 
in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                          Blue Ridge Environmental


                                               Defense League,

                                      Marshall, NC, July 29, 1996.
     Hon. Tom Daschle,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator: The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1996 (S 1936) 
     would place in jeopardy the lives of millions of American 
     citizens by transporting 15,638 casks of highly radioactive 
     material over railways and highways of this nation. This 
     attempt at a quick-fix for the nuclear waste dilemma would 
     cause more problems than it attempts to solve. The people who 
     would bear the greatest burden would be the 172 million 
     Americans who live nearest the transportation corridors. S 
     1936 is a legislative short-circuit that will make us less 
     secure as a nation and which will dump the costs of emergency 
     response on the states and local governments.
       The Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League began in 1984: 
     our work takes us throughout the southeast. Since 1994 we 
     have observed the international shipments of spent nuclear 
     fuel (SNF) from foreign research reactors (FRR) to a disposal 
     site at the Savannah River Site (SRS) in South Carolina. Two 
     shipments arrived at the Military Ocean Terminal at Sunny 
     Point (MOTSU) in North Carolina, were loaded

[[Page S3105]]

     onto rail cars, and then transported overland to SRS. We were 
     able to track both of these shipments from their ports of 
     origin in Denmark, Greece, France, and Sweden across the 
     Atlantic to North Carolina to SRS. We observed the fuel 
     shipments when they arrived at MOTSU. We watched the SNF 
     transfer from ship to train and followed it through the 
     countryside of coastal North and South Carolina. Our reason 
     for doing this was to alert people along the transport route 
     about the shipments through their communities. We rented a 
     light plane and flew out over the SNF ships when they reached 
     the three-mile limit. Television news cameras accompanied us 
     and transmitted pictures for broadcast on the evening news. 
     If we can track such shipments, anyone can. These shipments 
     cannot be kept secret so long as we live in a free society. 
     Our actions were peaceful, but we proved that determined 
     individuals on a shoestring budget can precisely track 
     international and domestic shipments of strategic materials. 
     In the wake of Oklahoma City and Atlanta the dangers posed by 
     domestic or international terrorists armed with explosives 
     make the transport of highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel 
     too dangerous to contemplate for the foreseeable future.
       Our work in North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia takes 
     us to many rural communities. Emergency management personnel 
     in these areas are dedicated volunteers, but they are 
     unprepared for nuclear waste. Volunteer fire departments in 
     rural counties are very good at putting out house fires and 
     brush fires. While serving as a volunteer fire fighter in 
     Madison County, NC, I had the privilege of working with these 
     men and women. We took special training to handle propane 
     tank emergencies utilizing locally-built water pumper trucks. 
     More sophisticated training or equipment was prohibitively 
     expensive and beyond our financial means. Traffic control is 
     a consideration at an emergency scene. Any fire or 
     accident tends to draw a crowd. Onlookers arrive as soon 
     as the fire department--sometimes sooner in remote areas. 
     There are always traffic jams reducing traffic flow to a 
     one-lane crawl day or night, fair weather or foul. The 
     remote river valleys and steep grades of Appalachia are 
     legendary. At Saluda, NC the steepest standard gauge 
     mainline railroad grade in the United States drops 253 
     feet/mile (4.8% grade). The CSX and Norfolk Southern lines 
     trace the French Broad River Valley and the Nolichucky 
     Gorge west through the Appalachian Mountains along remote 
     stretches of rivers famous among whitewater rafters for 
     their steep drops and their distance from civilization. 
     The Norfolk Southern RR crosses the French Broad River at 
     Deep Water Bridge where the mountains rise 2,200 feet 
     above the river. These are the transport routes through 
     western North Carolina that will be used for high level 
     nuclear waste transport as soon as 1998 according to S. 
     1936.
       County emergency management personnel are entrusted with 
     early response to hazards to the public in western North 
     Carolina communities. When we asked about their readiness to 
     respond to a nuclear transport accident, they answered 
     professionally saying, ``We'll just go out there and keep 
     people away until state or federal officials arrive.'' This 
     may be the best that can be done while a fire burns or 
     radiation leaks from a damaged cask. In a recent interview, 
     one western NC emergency coordinator said. ``There is no 
     response team anywhere in this part of the state and, for the 
     foreseeable future, there is no money in local budgets to 
     equip us with any first response to radioactive spills.''
       The concerns of local officials reflect their on-the-scene 
     responsibility while state officials, faced with limited 
     budgets and staff, make plans based on current bureaucratic 
     realities. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act and Amendments of 
     1982 and 1987 place large-scale nuclear transportation 
     scenarios decades in the future. This fact and the limited 
     resources of existing emergency planning departments make the 
     timeline for preparation for nuclear accident response 
     completely inadequate for shipments beginning as soon as 
     1998. In North Carolina's Division of Emergency Management, 
     the lead REP planner has four staffers and a whole state to 
     cover. It is not possible, under these circumstances, to be 
     ready with credible emergency response plans, training, and 
     equipment in two years.
       I am asking you to oppose this expensive and dangerous 
     legislation which would place an unfair and unnecessary 
     financial burden on communities and which would place at risk 
     the health and safety of millions of American citizens.
           Respectfully,
                                                     Louis Zeller.

  Mr. REID. I would just say that terrorists' modus operandi is to find 
areas of weakness so that they can spread terror. This, believe me, Mr. 
President, would spread terror. And that is an understatement.
  As my colleague from Nevada pointed out, S. 104 is not improved with 
the substitute.
  This substitute amendment is no better than S. 104 as originally 
submitted.
  The bottom line of this substitute is that the nuclear power industry 
and its allies insist that spent nuclear fuel be stored in Nevada no 
matter what.
  They did not address their real concern, they say, and that is 
transportation. They did not address environmental concerns.
  The bill now says that if Yucca Mountain is found unsuitable by the 
President, then a different interim storage site must be designated 
within 24 months. If that is not bad public policy, I cannot believe 
what would be.
  If a different interim site is not designated within that period, 
then Nevada would become the default storage site, even though it has 
already been determined scientifically to be inadequate for that 
purpose.
  Everybody knows that no alternative site can be designated in 24 
months. Everybody knows we spent well over 15 years trying to decide 
whether Yucca Mountain is suitable. At least that much time would be 
required before another interim site could be designated.
  Yucca Mountain must be designated as interim storage site under S. 
104 regardless of the suitability assessment. That is wrong. That makes 
a mockery of the scientific and objective process of site 
characterization at Yucca Mountain.
  S. 104 makes worthless the more than $2.5 billion spent on developing 
the Exploratory Studies Facility at Yucca Mountain.
  S. 104 makes worthless all the preceding legislation and all the 
scientific investments for developing a permanent repository in accord 
with national policy for dealing with spent nuclear fuel and high-level 
radioactive waste.
  Everybody knows that once the waste is moved from its generator sites 
to a centralized site, it will never be moved again.
  And, just as surely, once a centralized site is designated, the 
nuclear power lobby and its allies will insist that repository 
resources be diverted to the development and construction of the 
interim facility and away from development of a permanent site.
  So designation of an interim site will terminate the permanent 
repository.
  What does that mean?
  That means that waste that was once meant to be stored in emplacement 
canisters, yet to be proven, in an underground repository, yet to be 
designed, would be instead stored in transportation containers on a 
cement pad, exposed to the weather and damage from human activity or 
natural events.
  That means that any difficult issues that arise with regard to the 
interpretation of data from the Yucca Mountain characterization will 
not be pursued and will not be resolved.
  That means that Yucca Mountain will never be designated as a 
permanent repository under the law, and so spent nuclear fuel will be 
stored indefinitely in a temporary configuration. There will be no 
emplacement casks to provide engineered barriers for waste isolation.
  There will be no natural barriers to inhibit migration of waste that 
escapes the containers.
  There will be no possible promise of public health and safety.
  These are the reasons, Mr. President, I say that S. 104 is a ploy by 
the nuclear power industry to terminate the permanent repository 
program. Because S. 104 will do that, the nuclear power industry is 
behind S. 104.
  A number of years ago, we laid out a logical path that 
would guarantee a permanent disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel. 
We in Nevada, Mr. President, fought that. We thought it was unfair to 
characterize one site. But that has been ongoing. And what the nuclear 
industry now realizes is that it is taking a little longer than they 
thought. Therefore, they want to chuck the experience, money, and 
efforts out and go and pour it on top of the ground, dump nuclear waste 
on top of the ground.

  The architects of that process to develop a permanent repository 
recognized that interim storage at a candidate site for the permanent 
repository would hopelessly compromise the quality, the completeness, 
and the funding of site suitability studies.
  These architects also recognized that such a compromise would 
ultimately negate the whole notion of a permanent repository at that 
site.
  So they prohibited the designation of an interim storage site in any 
State in which a candidate repository site was being evaluated.
  That prohibition extended until the candidate site was deemed 
suitable for permanent disposition of spent nuclear fuel.

[[Page S3106]]

  The strategy developed by the architects of the current law would 
guarantee that a suitable permanent disposal site existed before the 
waste was moved, thereby preventing what S. 104 would guarantee--
permanent storage of nuclear waste in a temporary configuration.
  It is this absolute determination by S. 104 to establish an interim 
storage facility at the Nevada Test Site before determining the 
suitability of Yucca Mountain that compels us to state that S. 104 is 
really all about sabotaging this country's avowed policy to permanently 
dispose of spent nuclear fuel in a geologic repository.
  Think about it. S. 104 would move nuclear waste and store it 
permanently at a site that has been found scientifically to be 
unsuitable for that purpose.
  If Yucca Mountain is found unsuitable, this legislation directs the 
temporary repository to go there. What could be more outrageous? Such a 
folly goes beyond being deceptive or stupid. It is just outrageous.
  S. 104 would knowingly risk public health and safety by storing 
nuclear waste at a location that is determined to be an unsafe storage 
site.
  S. 104 would knowingly risk public health and safety by storing 
nuclear waste on an open concrete pad, exposed to weather and to all 
manner of damage from human activity or natural events, like 
earthquakes, rain, lightning.
  S. 104 would knowingly risk public health and safety by abandoning 
the requirement for the engineered barriers of emplacement casks to 
ensure waste isolation from the environment.
  S. 104 would knowingly risk public health and safety by abandoning 
the requirement for natural barriers of geologic disposal that would 
prohibit migration of waste that escaped from the emplacement casks.
  Supporting S. 104 in its determination to permanently store nuclear 
waste in a temporary site would be about the worst decision this Senate 
could make.
  Mr. President, this is bad public policy. I repeat, to my colleagues, 
who should you support, those that take the position saying this 
legislation is good, supported by the nuclear utilities, or those who 
take the position supported by churches, scientists, doctors, Indian 
tribes, and everyone in the environmental community? I think the choice 
is pretty easy. But sometimes easy choices are not determined about the 
substance of legislation, but by the politics of legislation. We 
submit, Mr. President, that good public policy supports a ``no'' vote 
on this legislation.

  Mr. BRYAN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Thomas). The Senator from Nevada [Mr. 
Bryan] is recognized.
  Mr. BRYAN. I thank the Chair and I thank my colleague for his 
extraordinary review of this piece of legislation, in pointing out its 
pitfalls. We are concluding a week's debate on this, Mr. President. I 
want to make just a couple of more points, and then tomorrow we will 
have a vote and we will either do the right thing, or we will impose 
upon the American public a terrible public policy consequence.
  Mr. President, I have reviewed in an earlier part of my statement the 
various provisions in this bill, which, in my view, represent the most 
atrocious policy options that one could conjure up. As my senior 
colleague mentioned, who would you trust and rely upon to give you 
advice on an issue that, obviously, is very technical, very 
complicated? For those of us who do not deal with these kinds of issues 
every day, this is not something that is intuitive judgment.
  I want to return to the starting point for just a moment to talk 
about this being unnecessary legislation--unnecessary in that the 
policy and the scientific community disagree with its very premise. 
Now, when you look at the various groups that are playing a role in 
this debate, one thing stands out: The only people that are advocating 
this legislation are the nuclear utilities and their supporters. It is 
not the environmental community.
  My colleague recited that every major organization in America that 
has an environmental constituency has opposed this legislation, and for 
good reason. It is not the scientific community. We frequently hear 
science invoked as the governing beacon that ought to guide us in this 
policy debate. If that were true, there would not be a single vote for 
S. 104, because the scientific community is not urging us to enact this 
legislation. This is legislation that has been generated, fomented by 
the nuclear utility industry and is part of the history that we have 
faced in America in dealing with this very complicated, troublesome, 
and very, very dangerous electrical generation source.
  More than 15 years ago, we were confronted with policy debates that 
sound very much like those on the floor today, in which the utilities 
said that we are going to be without energy, we will have brownouts, 
and the utilities will be forced to close because they will run out of 
reactor space. This was all generating hysteria. It was not true then 
and it is not true now. But that has been the legacy that we have in 
this debate, in trying to make our way through the very sound judgments 
that ought to control our decisionmaking process in reaching the proper 
conclusion.
  So, essentially, you have the policymakers, the scientific community, 
the President of the United States all saying, look, this is 
unnecessary. They are allied against the utilities who have made this 
argument, as I say, for several decades. It has been said that this is 
a better piece of legislation. I think that is very questionable, Mr. 
President. When one looks at what is done, we wreak havoc upon the 
environmental legislation in America. Only by the most tortured and 
twisted and convoluted logic could S. 104 be considered sound 
environmental policy.
  The preemption provisions, which I have discussed at some length, 
deprive a State of its ability to enforce environmental laws by the 
Federal Government. It eliminates waiver provisions that are part and 
parcel of our environmental legislation that provides judicial review. 
We talked about what is done to standards. Those have greatly been 
diminished. We are talking about something, Mr. President, that isn't 
just temporarily inconvenient or needs to be cleaned up because it 
would be a nuisance in the community. We are talking about something 
that is lethal, deadly, for 10,000 years and beyond. That is beyond the 
period of recorded history. We have never dealt with that kind of a 
policy issue. I can understand the frustration that some of my 
colleagues experience, that it may be another 4, 5, 6 years before this 
determination or that. But when you are talking about 10,000 years, and 
beyond, 4 or 5 years more to get it right, to do the right thing, to 
protect the health and safety of the American public seems rather 
little to ask when you are dealing with something as dangerous as this.

  We have talked about the flaw in the viability assessment of the 
President of the United States. He has to make his assessment based on 
a standard that is not going to exist. Charitably, it would have to be 
a guess. How can one make a sound policy judgment based upon a standard 
that is yet to be developed and is nonexistent? Whatever one thinks 
about the politics of this administration, one would have to conclude 
that it is the ultimate irresponsibility to ask any Chief Executive to 
make a judgment based upon his or her assessment, when the standard 
upon which the benchmarks are to be measured don't exist.
  My colleague talked at great length about the transportation dangers. 
I understand that we all in this Chamber are candidates who have faced 
the people in our States respectively. I understand that the utilities 
in a number of States have leaned very heavily and have been to the 
offices and advocated and raised all kinds of specters. Let me just 
suggest for a moment that what is happening in California as we speak, 
I think, is very instructive. There, as many of you may be aware, 
nuclear waste is going to be shipped from the Pacific in the Concorde 
and then transported over the Sierra Nevada from California into Nevada 
and, ultimately, to be stored in Idaho. If you think that the pressures 
that the utilities have brought to bear are heavy, when the first 
series of 17,000 shipments of high-level waste traversing the highways 
and rail systems of 43 States, in which 51 million people live within 1 
mile or less--when that begins to occur, much as my senior colleague 
has pointed out with graphic detail about what has occurred fairly 
recently in Germany, that

[[Page S3107]]

is going to be a real constituent concern, and rightly so, because an 
accident can have a devastating impact upon the health of that 
community.
  So this is not just a Nevada issue. This is an issue which will 
affect many millions of people in this country. We have talked about 
the lawsuit, how there is this great empathy and understanding about 
the ratepayers and the consequences for them, how they paid $8 billion 
over the years into the nuclear waste trust fund. Nothing in this 
legislation provides 1 cent of relief for the ratepayers. That, to me, 
is the true indicator of what this is all about. This isn't trying to 
provide equity for the ratepayers. This is not trying to provide or 
prevent ratepayers from paying twice for something that they have 
already paid once for. It has nothing to do with that, or you would see 
relief in S. 104. There is nothing. Nothing provides any relief for a 
lawsuit. The lawsuit remedy, as I have indicated, under section 9 of 
the contract, provides for an equitable adjustment of payments made 
into the nuclear waste fund. I think that is fine. But nothing in this 
legislation deals with the ratepayers, because nothing is contained 
that provides any kind of equitable relief for the ratepayers.
  Finally, let me talk about one other section of this legislation, 
which I think, again, would indicate how corrupting it is in terms of 
doing great violence to the environmental laws of America, laws that 
have, by and large, survived the test of time for nearly three decades 
and have enjoyed bipartisan support. It was during the Nixon 
administration that most of these pieces of legislation first saw the 
light of day.
  I want to talk about the National Environmental Policy Act, as it is 
referred to as NEPA. We are told in one instance that NEPA must be 
followed. It sounds good, doesn't it? But then we are told that the 
following activities will be deemed preliminary activities. That just 
might seem like words--``preliminary.'' That is a very precise term 
because preliminary activities are not subject to judicial review. And 
in most instances, the courts themselves make a judgment as to whether 
something is deemed preliminary or final for the purposes of review. 
But just as a further indication of how this stacks the deck against 
anything that provides environmental protection, you have a whole 
series of actions at page 90 under this act--transportation 
requirements; viability assessment, and that is section 204; 205(a) is 
generic design, submitted for interim storage; 205 is site-specific 
design standards; 205 is license application for interim storage; 206 
is repository characterizations. Each of those sections are deemed to 
be preliminary, so as to preclude the opportunity for independent 
judgment as to whether or not they do, in fact, comply with the law and 
make good sense. So, in effect, what we do in those sections, if 104 
passes, we gut NEPA, eviscerate it. We proclaim our great devotion to 
it in the first section, but then say that it shall not include the 
following.

  Let me further go on to indicate that the essence of NEPA is to 
consider the various options or choices that are available. That is the 
underlying premise, the theory being that if you look at all of the 
options on the table, we will rule out, through some rational, 
thoughtful process, those that are the least compelling from a policy 
point of view and reach a conclusion as to the best of the options 
available. But we are told here, with respect to the environmental 
impact statement, that is part of the NEPA requirement, that this 
commission shall not be required to consider the need for an interim 
storage facility, the time of initial availability of a repository or 
interim storage facility, the alternatives to geological disposal or 
centralized interim storage or alternatives to the interim storage 
facility site. So to profess that we do give any kind of meaningful 
adherence to the National Environmental Policy Act--NEPA--is itself a 
travesty.
  Finally, let me say that when the vote comes tomorrow, I hope that my 
colleagues, putting aside all of the technical arguments for a moment, 
might consider policy. What is the right policy for America? What 
protects public health and safety? What is the most thoughtful way to 
proceed? Mr. President, the most thoughtful way to proceed is to reject 
S. 104. It has been asserted that we have no policy with respect to the 
disposal of nuclear waste. That is simply not true. The policy that we 
have was essentially designed in 1982 with the enactment of the Nuclear 
Waste Policy Act, and that policy first is to site permanent 
repository. I am not ecstatic about, I do not like it, and I wish it 
were not the case that Yucca Mountain in my own State was chosen. But 
that is a policy that came down as a result of the things that were 
done and I believe were highly politicized in terms of the way it was 
done. But nevertheless that is where we are. Yucca Mountain is being 
characterized as an interim storage. This legislation would change the 
existing law, which says that we ought to seek first if a permanent 
repository can pass muster, is it suitable, before making a 
determination as to interim storage. This legislation reverses that 
process and says, in effect, that we will make decisions with respect 
to interim storage irrespective of what happens with respect to the 
permanent repository. That makes no sense at all.

  Finally, I think, just as an admonition, that this has been a very 
difficult time for Nevada. I believe that it is without precedent in 
the years that I have been a Member of this body that a State has been 
so imposed upon, so unconsidered, so rejected of a rational policy 
argument to acquiesce to the requests of a special interest group--the 
nuclear utilities in America.
  But let me say that if we pass S. 104, what a dreadful precedent that 
may be. No other State can be heard to say thereafter, ``Gee, this is 
terrible policy for us as it affects my State.'' In effect, we 
establish a precedent in which a State's rights are imposed upon in 
which the State's ability to protect its own citizens' health and 
safety by way of Federal environmental standards being limited, and in 
which those very basic provisions of the ability to review and get 
judicial determination before something as horrendous as this is 
imposed upon a State, are for all intents and purposes emasculated. 
That is the dreadful policy, and we will rue the day that occurs.
  So I urge my colleagues to reject S. 104. Let's stay the course. It 
may not be perfect in every respect, but at least we are moving on a 
basis of permanent repository in a rational context without getting 
involved in the emotionalism that has been present with respect to this 
frantic effort to have interim storage placed at the Nevada test site, 
a site, as we pointed out, which has not been recommended as a site to 
be preferred. Never, to the best of my knowledge, has it ever been 
studied for interim storage, and it was kind of picked out of the air. 
``You have Yucca Mountain over there, and Yucca Mountain may take it. 
So let's put it here.'' That is not a very rational basis to make a 
policy judgment.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. GRAMS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota.
  Mr. GRAMS. Mr. President, I rise today to urge my colleagues to 
support S. 104, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1997. This much needed 
legislation will help protect the American taxpayers and ratepayers and 
resolve our Nation's growing nuclear waste storage problem.
  As many of my colleagues know, the Department of Energy will not live 
up to its 15-year promise to collect commercial nuclear waste into a 
centralized repository. Unfortunately, with over $6 billion of 
ratepayer's money already spent by the Federal Government, a permanent 
repository will still not be completed until well into the next 
century.
  The map behind me illustrates the result of this failed policy: The 
creation of over 80 nuclear waste storage sites across our Nation. From 
coast to coast and from one international border to another, over 41 
States have been affected by the lack of action. As my colleagues can 
see, this is not a regional problem; it's a national problem demanding 
a Federal solution.
  Mr. President, the Federal Government should no longer be allowed to 
forget its commitment to the American public. Last year, the Federal 
court of appeals agreed that this was a Federal problem when it ruled 
that the Department of Energy will be liable for damages if it does not 
accept commercial nuclear waste by January 31, 1998.
  Under current law, no one at the DOE will be held personally liable 
for any

[[Page S3108]]

assessed damages; the bill will go to the American taxpayers at an 
estimated cost between $40 and $80 billion. Such a tremendous liability 
burden on taxpayers would make the public bailout of the savings and 
loan collapse seem small in comparison.
  Many others agree that a Federal solution is needed immediately. 
Frustrated with the DOE's inability to resolve our nuclear storage 
problem, the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, 
48 State agencies, and 38 utilities have joined forces to ask the 
Federal courts to suspend ratepayer's payments into the nuclear waste 
fund, which finances the Federal Government's commercial nuclear waste 
program.
  They are concerned that their constituents and customers are being 
asked to pay too many times for a failed policy.
  Take, for instance, the situation facing ratepayers in my home State 
of Minnesota. Since 1982, Minnesota's nuclear energy consumers have 
paid over $250 million into the nuclear waste fund believing that the 
Federal Government would fulfill its obligation to transport nuclear 
waste out of Minnesota.
  But as time went on and the DOE continued to ignore its 
responsibilities, utilities in Minnesota and around the country were 
forced to temporarily store their waste within the confines of their 
own facilities.
  When it became clear to many utilities that storage space was running 
out and the Department of Energy would not accept waste by the 
established deadline, utilities then had to go to their States to ask 
for additional onsite storage or else be forced to shut down their 
operations.
  For example, ratepayers in Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, and 
Wisconsin were forced to pay for onsite storage in cooling pools at 
Prairie Island in southeastern Minnesota. In 1994, with storage space 
running out, the Minnesota Legislature--after a bruising battle--voted 
to allow for limited onsite dry cask storage until the year 2004.
  Mr. President, the cost associated with this onsite storage is 
staggering. Ratepayers in the midwestern service area alone have paid 
over $25 million in storage costs and will pay an estimated $100 
million more by the year 2015, in addition to the required payments to 
the Federal Government.
  To make matters worse, storage space will run out at Prairie Island 
just after the turn of the century, forcing the plant to close unless 
the State legislature once again makes up for the DOE's inaction. This 
will threaten over 30 percent of Minnesota's overall energy resources 
and will likely lead to even higher costs for Minnesota's ratepayers.
  In fact, the Minnesota Department of Public Service estimates that 
the increase in costs could reach as high as 17 percent, forcing 
ratepayers to eventually pay three times: once to the nuclear waste 
fund, again for onsite storage, and yet again for increased energy 
costs.
  And Minnesota is not alone in facing this unacceptable situation; 36 
other States across the Nation are facing similar circumstances of 
either shutting down and losing their energy-generating capacity or 
continuing to bail out the Federal Government for its failure to act.
  So, Mr. President, when some of my colleagues speak about how well 
the status quo is working, I would simply point them to my home State 
of Minnesota where the status quo has failed dismally--to the detriment 
of the ratepayers and soon to the taxpayers.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to submit for the Record 
recent letters from Minnesota Governor Arne Carlson and Minnesota 
Department of Public Service Commissioner Kris Sanda on the need to 
pass legislation correcting our Nation's nuclear waste program.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                              Minnesota Department


                                            of Public Service,

                                     St. Paul, MN, April 14, 1997.
     Hon. Rod Grams,
     Dirksen Building, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Grams: Your leadership on the need to address 
     high-level nuclear waste at the nation's nuclear power plants 
     is greatly appreciated. I will continue to do everything in 
     my power to ensure a successful outcome to the vote tomorrow 
     morning and assist you in your efforts on behalf of all 
     Americans who face the costly burden of continuing to delay 
     reform of the U.S. civilian nuclear waste program.
       Attached is a letter from Governor Carlson sent this 
     morning to individual Senators urging their vote for S. 104, 
     the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1997. I hope it helps them to 
     understand the urgency for action.
       Once again, thank you for your powerful advocacy on this 
     issue.
           Sincerely,
                                                       Kris Sanda,
                                                     Commissioner.
                                 ______
                                 

                                           State of Minnesota,

                                     St. Paul, MN, April 14, 1997.
     Hon. Wayne Allard,
     U.S. Senate, Hart Office Building, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Allard: I am writing to strongly urge your 
     support for S. 104, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1997. 
     This Act addresses the glaring deficiencies and failures of 
     this country's civilian nuclear waste program and is of the 
     utmost importance to all American electric consumers and 
     taxpayers.
       In brief summary, S. 104:
       ensures adequate funding for the permanent disposal 
     program.
       eliminates the need for individual high-level waste storage 
     sites at 73 nuclear power plants in 34 states.
       provides centralized waste storage for which DOE is legally 
     responsible under contracts signed with individual utilities.
       ensures the scientific integrity of the disposal program. 
     It authorizes the President to locate the centralized storage 
     site away from Yucca Mountain if, at the President's 
     discretion, it is found to be an unsuitable site.
       subjects waste transportation to Federal hazardous 
     materials regulations and NRC oversight.
       ensures National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) reviews 
     are prepared for licensing. Only those issues already 
     addressed by Congress (i.e., facility need and program 
     alternatives) are not revisited under NEPA.
       averts tens of billions of dollars of U.S. Judgments Fund 
     payments as well as related budget and appropriations 
     problems that will result from program failure.
       American consumers have paid $13 billion to meet their 
     obligation for funding waste disposal under contracts with 
     the federal government. Over half that money has been spent 
     for something else. Now is the time to end this consumer 
     fraud.
       Please support S. 104.
           Warmest regards,
                                         Governor Arne H. Carlson.

  Mr. GRAMS. Mr. President, if there's one part of the status 
quo that is working within our Nation's overall nuclear waste disposal 
program, it is the way in which the Federal Government is actively 
meeting the needs of foreign countries. It is not working for domestic 
spent fuel, but our program seems to be working very well in meeting 
the needs of spent nuclear fuel from foreign countries.

  As this map shows, the DOE has resumed collecting spent nuclear fuel 
from a total of 41 countries under the Atoms for Peace Program.
  Similar to the large number of our States which are facing nuclear 
waste storage problems, countries from around the world are 
experiencing the same problems. The only difference is that their 
needs--not our own ratepayers' needs--are being met by our Federal 
Government.
  In fact, the DOE has completed urgent relief shipments of 252 spent 
nuclear fuel assemblies from European nations to the agency's facility 
at Savannah River. It has also accepted nuclear spent fuel from Latin 
American countries. Ultimately, as I learned during a recent trip to 
the Savannah River site, up to 890 foreign research reactor cores will 
be accepted by the DOE over a 13-year period.
  So they can take it from foreign countries and handle it safely, but 
somehow they cannot handle domestic spent nuclear fuels.
  Mr. President, an important point to discuss when it comes to these 
foreign nuclear waste shipments is how they are transported once they 
reach the continental United States. Nuclear assemblies from these 41 
countries have been and will continue to be transported by rail and 
truck to the Savannah River facility. These photographs illustrate just 
one of the means by which shipments of foreign-generated fuel are being 
transported to the DOE's facility. Here, my colleagues can clearly see 
how foreign nuclear waste is being loaded on to railcars at Charleston 
Harbor and then shipped to the Savannah River facility. The safety 
record of these shipments speaks for itself.
  The Federal Government is also actively accepting nuclear waste from 
many of our universities nationwide. As this map indicates, nuclear 
waste from research reactors at our finest

[[Page S3109]]

educational institutions is being accepted at the DOE's Savannah River 
facility. Again, this nuclear waste is being safely transported by rail 
and truck across the Nation. Chairman Murkowski also spoke extensively 
on this safety record earlier today.
  There has not been one accident nor any release of nuclear 
fuel. These shipments serve as a very small portion of the 2,400 
shipments of high-level nuclear waste that has already been shipped 
across the United States, including naval spent fuel. So, Mr. 
President, as the distinguished chairman of the Senate Energy and 
Natural Resources Committee has indicated, transportation is no longer 
a question of technology but becomes one of politics.

  I understand the rationale behind reducing our international nuclear 
dangers by collecting and transporting spent fuel within our borders. 
But what I and many others cannot comprehend is how our Government has 
made it a priority to help foreign countries with their nuclear waste 
problems while simultaneously ignoring the concerns right here in our 
own country.
  Under this scheme, our Nation will have a disjointed nuclear waste 
storage policy: one that works for our universities and foreign nations 
and another that has failed and will soon be partially administered by 
the actions of the Federal Court of Appeals. It seems clear to me that 
while States, utilities, and ratepayers have kept their end of the 
bargain, the DOE has not. That sends the wrong message to the American 
people about trusting the promises of the Federal Government.
  The Federal Government is living up to its promises in the Atoms for 
Peace Program. It is accepting spent nuclear fuel from 41 countries. 
They have lived up to that policy, that agreement, and that contract, 
but somehow they can't live up to contracts with the American 
ratepayers.
  Despite widespread support for action to create an interim storage 
site--including support from former DOE Secretary Hazel O'Leary and Dan 
Dreyfus, the former administrator of the civilian nuclear waste program 
under the Clinton administration--the DOE has failed to offer a 
substantive alternative to our legislation. Although the Department's 
new Secretary, Federico Pena, now admits that a Federal solution is 
needed to resolve our interim storage problems, he recently indicated 
in a meeting with nuclear utility executives that the DOE is still 
unwilling to move commercial spent fuel. Instead, the DOE offered a 
proposal to compensate utilities for on-site storage.
  In other words, they will not accept it. But the DOE says it is 
willing and offered a proposal to compensate utilities for on-site 
storage.
  Unfortunately, this proposed compensation scheme does little but 
needlessly spend the taxpayers' money while continuing the failed 
status quo. In other words, it just wants to collect more money from 
the taxpayers and then pay it out as compensation. So you are going to 
take it from one pocket and put it into another. It is still the 
taxpayers who are going to be left holding the bag, not the Department 
of Energy, not their budget, not the Secretary of Energy Mr. Pena, but 
the taxpayers. In other words, they don't want to solve the problem. 
They just want taxpayers to continue to pay for their mistakes. It 
signals to the ratepayers that the Federal Government has no intention 
of moving commercial nuclear waste in the near future, despite a 
Federal court mandate.

  Moreover, continuing the policy of noncentralized storage facilities 
may lead to the premature shutdown of one nuclear plant in Minnesota--
compromising 30 percent of the State's energy needs and significantly 
increasing ratepayer costs.
  Again, this is not only typical to Minnesota. Many other States face 
the same problem. Many utilities are facing the same problem. 
Ratepayers could be paying the same increase in power because, again, 
of the lack of action by the DOE.
  In recent communications to the Senate, DOE Secretary Pena and the 
President's Office of Management and Budget yet again indicated the 
Clinton administration's opposition to our legislation to move nuclear 
waste from the over 80 sites around the Nation.
  Speaking of the need for a long-term, permanent repository, the 
letters failed to address any specific alternatives to our legislation 
or how the Federal Government will address future taxpayer liability in 
light of the DOE's failure to live up to its 1998 contractual deadline. 
They offer no alternative except to sit back and say, yes, they will 
adhere to any court-ordered compensation because it is no money out of 
their pocket. They can just delay or defer any kind of an agreement or 
answer and will not live up to their contractual deadline.
  In the last week of debate on this legislation, we have negotiated 
with Senator Bingaman and others who want to resolve our interim 
nuclear waste storage needs. Some important and constructive changes to 
our bill have resulted from that. Although I oppose one change that 
moves the construction of the interim storage facility back 1 or 2 
years, a number of reforms have been made to address the concerns of 
the administration. Among them are helpful provisions strengthening 
radiation protection standards, preemption of State and Federal laws, 
environmental concerns, and funding for the civilian nuclear waste 
program.
  These important changes should help persuade some of my colleagues to 
support this commonsense environmental protection bill, and it should 
also help pave the way for the President to sign this legislation based 
on sound policy and not to veto it due to political concerns. Again, 
this is not oversight. It is not over technology. It is not over the 
safety record of transportation of spent fuel. It is basic, raw 
politics. And above all, Congress has an obligation to protect the 
American public from the estimated $40 to $80 billion they face in 
liability expenses. Our bill will reform our current civilian nuclear 
waste program to help avoid the squandering of billions of dollars of 
ratepayers' and taxpayers' money--not that the Federal Government 
hasn't wasted enough recently, but with tax day tomorrow, this should 
also come as more important to taxpayers to say they don't want 
billions more dollars squandered.
  It will eliminate the current need for onsite storage at our Nation's 
nuclear plants, keep plants from shutting down prematurely due to the 
lack of storage space, and maintain stable energy prices.
  Mr. President, for too long our States, our ratepayers and taxpayers 
have been threatened by a policy of inaction. As reported out of the 
Energy and Natural Resources Committee and amended in the Chamber, this 
legislation sets up a time line for the DOE to finally live up to its 
promises again while helping to protect our environment. As a result, 
this bill has broad bipartisan support across the Nation. It deserves 
to be passed overwhelmingly on behalf of the American public. In 
closing, I urge my colleagues to cast politics aside and to take a 
giant step forward by voting for this very much-needed legislation.
  I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.
  Mr. REID addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Enzi). The Senator from Nevada.
  Mr. REID. I say to my friend from Minnesota, as we have laid across 
the Record here in these proceedings this past week, this legislation 
is bad legislation. If they, the proponents of this legislation, were 
truly concerned about the ratepayers and the fact that there is a court 
decision that says that the Federal Government is responsible under the 
contractual provisions that they entered into with the utilities, it 
would seem there should be something in the legislation agreeing to 
compensate utilities. Nothing. That shows how disingenuous the 
proponents of this legislation are. They talk about problems, but the 
legislation does not meet that.
  Some have complained, Mr. President, as has my friend from Minnesota, 
about the rate of progress toward determining Yucca Mountain's 
suitability for permanent disposition of this waste material. Others 
have complained about the returns from the investments in the Yucca 
Mountain characterization. Those who complain about the Yucca Mountain 
schedule should remember that the Congress has consistently underfunded 
the project budget. Requested levels for funding have never been met. 
In fact, allocations have been less than 75 percent of requested 
levels.

  Perhaps more importantly, this job of developing a permanent 
repository

[[Page S3110]]

of nuclear waste is far more difficult than critics are willing to 
admit. It is far more difficult than even the technical community 
thought it would be when they started. That difficulty should not be a 
mystery. We are undertaking a mission that has never been done before. 
We are starting down a path to completely isolate from the environment 
the most dangerous material in human history for a period longer than 
recorded human history.
  We have no experience with such an assignment, so a lot of options 
must be explored to provide a foundation for the assumptions we must 
make to evaluate effectiveness of final design. Utilities have pushed 
these time lines. The reality of a permanent repository demands a 
research program in which many unforeseen obstacles must be understood 
and resolved.
  These things take time and money. The Congress has seen fit to deny 
the money, so more time has been required than was initially estimated.
  Complaints about returns on the investment in Yucca Mountain have no 
basis in fact either. Those who benefit from nuclear power have been 
paying into the nuclear waste repository at the rate of 1 mill per 
kilowatt hour. Those collections today amount to nearly $12 billion, 
much of which has yet to be spent.
  So there is a lot of talk about abuse of this fund by inappropriate 
application of its resources. It is true that more has been collected 
from the ratepayers than has been appropriated for waste disposal to 
date, but the final bill for a permanent repository is estimated to be 
between $34 billion and $50 billion. That is more than the current plan 
proposes to collect, so it is likely the ratepayers will come out 
ahead.
  That means the general public will contribute to the waste repository 
so that ratepayers will get a break before all is said and done.
  I agree that the waste fund should not be applied to inappropriate 
activities, and I do not think it has. I agree that we should be 
vigilant to see that all the ratepayers' contributions are used for the 
permanent disposition of spent nuclear fuel. But I also believe that 
the general taxpayers should not have to pick up the tab for a 
repository except for that fraction dedicated to disposition of defense 
nuclear waste from whose generation we all benefited through assurance 
of our national security.
  S. 104 provides no improving legislation with regard to funding the 
repository, and none is needed now. The returns on Yucca Mountain 
investments will be realized when the characterization is complete and 
not before. Site characterization must be completed before we see 
clearly the path of future actions.
  In short, my friend from Minnesota has not addressed the problems 
that we face. Those problems are the environmental laws are not being 
met. The transportation problems are certainly not being met. And the 
fact is that there are many, many problems still in existence.
  The parties to the current litigation regarding DOE's contracts with 
waste holders are using on-site storage costs to justify their threats 
to seek damages from the Government. We have gone into this on many 
occasions.
  Sponsors of S. 104 stood and argued on this floor that only passage 
of this bill will relieve every American of this huge obligation. The 
actual incremental costs of on-site storage at the generator sites is 
minimal. That cost is negligible when compared to the costs of 
transportation and the costs that the permanent or temporary repository 
would cost.
  I believe that we should understand that we are here as a result of 
the nuclear power industry, and that reason only. There are certainly, 
Mr. President, many reasons why the statement of the Senator from 
Minnesota was without fact. Those are spread across this record. We 
have answered such statements on many occasions these past 7 days.


                      hanford nuclear reservation

  Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, I would like a clarification of the scope 
and intent of the committee's third amendment to S. 104. That 
amendment, which is incorporated into section 204(b)(1)(D) of the act, 
states that the President shall not designate the Hanford Nuclear 
Reservation in the State of Washington as the site for construction of 
an interim storage facility.
  Am I correct in my belief that this amendment defines interim storage 
facility in a way that would not preclude steps that the Washington 
Public Power Supply System might need to take with regard to the 
storage of the spent nuclear fuel generated at the WNP-2 facility?
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. The Senator is correct. The intent of the committee in 
adopting the third committee amendment was to prevent the President 
from designating the Hanford Nuclear Reservation as the site of the 
nationwide interim storage facility for all civilian and spent nuclear 
fuel and high-level radioactive waste from U.S. commercial reactors. 
This amendment is not intended to preclude steps that an individual 
utility, such as the supply system, might need to take to manage the 
storage of its own spent nuclear fuel.
  Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed as if 
in morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and 
it is so ordered.
  (The remarks of Mr. Nickles pertaining to the introduction of S. 570 
are located in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced Bills 
and Joint Resolutions.'')
  Mr. THOMAS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the senior Senator from 
Wyoming.
  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed as in 
morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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