[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 42 (Thursday, April 10, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2996-S3001]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




             COURT RULING REGARDING THE LINE-ITEM VETO ACT

  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, in March of last year, the Congress passed 
the Line-Item Veto Act. That law, for the first time in our Nation's 
history, gave the President the power to single-handedly repeal 
portions of appropriations or tax laws without the consent of Congress. 
I vigorously opposed passage of the act because of my deep concern over 
the effects of that act on our system of checks and balances and the 
separation of powers that has served this Nation so well for over 200 
years.
  As I have told my colleagues on many occasions, I viewed the passage 
of that law as one of the darkest moments in the history of the 
republic. On January 2 of this year, I, along with Senators Moynihan 
and Levin, former Senator Hatfield, and Representatives Waxman and 
Skaggs, filed a civil action in the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia challenging the constitutionality of the Line-Item 
Veto Act.
  Today, U.S. District Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson of the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia handed down a ruling 
declaring the act to be unconstitutional. Among other things, Mr. 
President, the court held, ``Where the President signs a bill but then 
purports to cancel parts of it, he exceeds his constitutional authority 
and prevents both Houses of Congress from participating in the exercise 
of lawmaking authority. The President's cancellation of an item 
unilaterally effects a repeal of statutory law, such that the bill he 
signed is not the law that will govern the Nation. That is precisely 
what the Presentment Clause was designed to prevent.''
  As Judge Jackson also stated, ``Just as Congress could not delegate 
to one of its chambers the power to veto select provisions of law, it 
may not assign that authority to the President.'' For the reasons set 
forth in his 36-page opinion, the court adjudged and declared 
unconstitutional the Line-Item Veto Act.
  I am very pleased with the court's decision, which I believe to be a 
great victory for the American people, the Constitution, and our 
constitutional system of checks and balances and separation of powers.
  Mr. President, I express my deep appreciation to Mr. Moynihan, Mr. 
Levin, Mr. Waxman, Mr. Skaggs, former Senator Hatfield, for their 
cooperation, and to our excellent team of lawyers for their support, 
for their dedication, and for their active and effective participation 
in this case.
  For the benefit of my colleagues, I ask unanimous consent that the 
Court's full opinion be printed in the Record.
  Mr. President, I understand the Government Printing Office estimates 
that it will cost $1,916 to print this memorandum and order in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

 [United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil No. 
                             97-0001 (TPJ)

Sen. Robert C. Byrd, et al., plaintiffs v. Franklin D. Raines, et al., 
                               defendants


                          memorandum and order

       This action challenges the validity of legislation entitled 
     the Line Item Veto Act, Pub. Law No. 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200 
     (1996) (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 681 note, 691 et 
     seq.) (``the Act''), which empowers the President 
     unilaterally to ``cancel'' certain appropriations and tax 
     benefits after signing them

[[Page S2997]]

     into law. The Act represents an effort by Congress to enlist 
     presidential assistance in controlling rampant federal 
     spending by conferring upon the President what it termed a 
     species of ``enhanced rescission'' power, expanding the 
     authority he formerly possessed under the Impoundment Control 
     Act of 1974. Plaintiffs, four Senators and two 
     Congressmen,\1\ contend that the mechanism chosen by Congress 
     to its desired end contravenes the text and purpose of 
     Article I, section 7, clause 2, known as the ``Presentment 
     Clause'' of the Constitution. Rather than making expenditures 
     of federal funds appropriated by Congress matters of 
     presidential discretion, the Act effectively permits the 
     President to repeal duly enacted provisions of federal law. 
     This he cannot do. Accordingly, the Court will grant 
     plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, deny defendants' 
     motion, and declare the Act unconstitutional.
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     Footnotes at end.
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                                   i

                  Operation of the Line Item Veto Act

       Following years of importuning by successive Presidents and 
     vacillation by earlier Congresses, President Clinton approved 
     the Line Item Veto Act as passed by the 104th Congress on 
     April 9, 1996. Immediately after it became effective on 
     January 1, 1997, the plaintiff Senators and Congressmen filed 
     this action to declare it void. Named defendants are the 
     Director of the Office of Management and Budget and the 
     Secretary of the Treasury--the officials alleged, 
     respectively, to be responsible for executing the President's 
     ``cancellations'' of spending items and limited tax benefits 
     under the Act. The United States Senate and the Bipartisan 
     Legal Advisory Group of the United States House of 
     Representatives have appeared jointly as amici curiae to 
     defend the constitutionality of the Act.
       The Act, which sunsets on January 1, 2005, allows the 
     President, after signing a bill into law, to ``cancel in 
     whole''--
       (1) any dollar amount of discretionary budget authority;
       (2) any item of new direct spending; or
       (3) any limited tax benefit.

     2 U.S.C. Sec. 691(a). ``Dollar amounts of discretionary 
     budget authority'' include any dollar amount set forth in an 
     appropriation law, including those to be found separately in 
     tables, charts, or explanatory text of statements or 
     committee reports accompanying legislation. 2 U.S.C. 
     Sec. 691e(7). Thus the President's cancellation power applies 
     to legislative history as well as to statutory text itself. 
     ``Items of new direct spending'' generally include 
     ``entitlement'' payments to individuals or to state and local 
     governments. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 691e(8); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 491, 
     104th Cong., 2d Sess. at 36 (1996). ``Limited tax benefits'' 
     are those revenue-losing provisions that apply to 100 or 
     fewer beneficiaries in any fiscal year, or tax provisions 
     that provide temporary or permanent transitional relief for 
     10 or fewer beneficiaries from a change in the Internal 
     Revenue Code. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 691e(9). The Act directs the 
     congressional Joint Committee on Taxation to identify limited 
     tax benefits contained in bills and joint resolutions, and 
     provides that those bills and resolutions may include a 
     separate section in which identified tax benefits are not 
     subject to cancellation. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 691f(a)-(c).
       The most critical definition is found in Sec. 691e(4). The 
     term ``cancel'' or ``cancellation'' means ``to rescind'' any 
     dollar amount of discretionary budget authority or to prevent 
     items of new direct spending or limited tax benefits ``from 
     having legal force or effect.'' Id.
       To exercise the cancellation power the President must first 
     determine that it will--
       (i) reduce the Federal budget deficit;
       (ii) not impair any essential Government functions; and
       (iii) not harm the national interest. 2 U.S.C. 
     Sec. 691(a)(A). The President effects a cancellation by 
     transmitting a ``special message'' to Congress within five 
     calendar days (excluding Sundays) after enactment of the 
     law containing the item(s) in question. 2 U.S.C. 
     Sec. 691(a)(B). The Act spells out the content 
     requirements for a special message and provides that it 
     shall be printed in the Federal Register. 2 U.S.C. 
     Sec. 691a.
       Once an item has been canceled, no further action by 
     Congress is required; cancellation takes effect upon 
     Congress' receipt of the special message. 2 U.S.C. 
     Sec. 691b(a). Congress may thereafter introduce a 
     ``disapproval bill'' to reenact any canceled items within 
     five days of receiving the special message, and must pass it 
     within 30 days.\2\ 2 U.S.C. Sec. 691d(b), (c)(1). The 
     President can, of course, exercise a conventional veto of any 
     disapproval bill, but Congress can then reinstate the status 
     quo ante by overriding that veto.

                         Historical background

       The Act is best understood against the historical backdrop 
     of the efforts of the President and Congress over the years 
     to control government spending and, in more recent times, to 
     reduce an ever-increasing federal budget deficit. It is a 
     product of many years of inter-branch conflict and compromise 
     over how to accomplish those goals. Since the outset of the 
     19th Century, American Presidents have labored to influence 
     Congress' spending habits, and many have lobbied in 
     particular for the authority to veto selected provisions of 
     bills presented for their signature. See 12 Op. Off. Legal 
     Counsel 128, 157-65 (1988). Congress has considered both 
     amending the Constitution and enacting several alternative 
     legislative measures to give the President the increased 
     authority he has sought and Congress has intermittently 
     resisted.
       Although Presidents have uniformly acknowledged that the 
     Constitution affords no inherent authority for a line-item 
     veto \3\--indeed, as explained below, it clearly forbids 
     anything but rejection of a bill in toto--they have managed 
     to exert their will by ``impounding''--or simply not 
     spending--appropriated funds. In some instances, Presidents 
     have refused to spend money on measures that conflicted with 
     their foreign policy objectives, or that would advance an 
     unconstitutional purpose. Most of the time, however, 
     Presidents simply preferred not to spend the money for the 
     purposes for which Congress had allocated it. See e.g., David 
     A. Martin, Protecting the Fisc; Executive Impoundment and 
     Congressional Power, 82 Yale L.J. 1636, 1644-45 (1973). Some 
     impoundments have been challenged successfully in federal 
     court; others have either been judicially sanctioned or not 
     contested at all. See City of New Haven v. United States, 634 
     F. Supp. 1449, 1454 (D.D.C. 1986), aff'd 809 F.2d 900 (D.C. 
     Cir. 1987).
       Although presidential impoundments throughout the 19th 
     century occurred in a state of uncertainty as to their 
     legality, Congress has in this century conferred a measure of 
     legitimacy upon them and given some direction as to their 
     use. In the Anti-Deficiency Acts of 1905 and 1906, requiring 
     ``apportionment'' aimed at saving money for the end of a 
     fiscal year, Congress also allowed the President to waive 
     spending appropriations in the event of emergencies or 
     unusual circumstances. Act of March 3, 1905, ch. 1484, 
     Sec. 4, 33 Stat. 1257; Act of Feb. 27, 1906, ch. 510, 
     Sec. 3, 34 Stat. 48. When Congress amended the Anti-
     Deficiency Act in 1950, it created a mechanism for the 
     Executive Branch to recommend the rescission of any 
     reserves not required to carry out the purposes underlying 
     an appropriation. General Appropriation Act of 1951, ch. 
     896, Sec. 1211(c)(2), 64 Stat. 595 (current version at 31 
     U.S.C. Sec. 1512(c)(1)).
       Congress has not, however, always been sanguine about 
     Presidents' refusal to spend appropriated funds. During the 
     Nixon administration, for example, the President's extensive 
     resort to impoundment prompted many lawsuits. See City of New 
     Haven, 634 F. Supp. at 1454 (``by 1974, impoundments had been 
     vitiated in more than 50 cases and upheld in only four''). 
     President Nixon's reluctance to spend appropriated funds also 
     provoked passage of the Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (the 
     ``ICA''), Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 332, a statute 
     critical to an understanding of the present Act.
       The ICA recognized two types of impoundment: ``deferral'' 
     and ``rescission.'' Deferral affects the timing of 
     expenditures, and is accomplished by ``withholding or 
     delaying the obligation or expenditure of budget authority 
     (whether by establishing reserves or otherwise) provided for 
     projects or activities,'' or any other type of Executive 
     action or inaction accomplishing the same result. 2 U.S.C. 
     Sec. 682(1). Deferral is permitted for contingencies, to 
     effect savings achieved through changes or efficiency, or as 
     specifically provided by law. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 684(b). Under the 
     ICA, the President effects a deferral, just as he cancels an 
     item under the Line Item Veto Act, by transmitting to 
     Congress a special message containing statutorily required 
     information. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 684(a). Also like cancellations 
     under the Act, deferrals become effective upon Congress' 
     receipt of the special message; unlike cancellations, 
     however, they expire with the end of the fiscal year.\4\ Id.
       A rescission, under the ICA, is the cancellation of budget 
     authority. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 682(3). In contrast to a 
     cancellation under the Line Item Veto Act, the ICA requires 
     the President to propose a rescission by transmitting a 
     special message to Congress, which Congress may enact or not, 
     as it chooses, within 45 days. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 683(b). The 
     perceived deficiency of the rescission process under the ICA 
     that inspired passage of the Line Item Veto Act was the 
     necessity of congressional acquiescence. Whenever Congress 
     neglected or declined to pass a bill enacting into law a 
     proposed rescission--a most frequent occurrence--the 
     rescission expired.
       The cancellation procedure embodied in the Line Item Veto 
     Act thus came to be known as ``enhanced rescission,'' the 
     enhancement consisting of elimination of the need for 
     congressional action. Two principal alternatives to the Act 
     considered and rejected by the 104th Congress were 
     ``expedited rescission'' and ``separate enrollment.'' The 
     first, exemplified by S. 14 in the 104th Congress, would have 
     preserved the recommendation process but guaranteed that 
     Congress actually and promptly vote on the President's 
     rescission proposals. S. Rep. No. 9, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 
     at 15 (1995). The second would have treated each item of 
     spending as a separate ``bill'' for the President to sign or 
     veto. Separate handling of hundreds of items appeared to 
     present insuperable practical obstacles, however, and 
     potential constitutional difficulties as well. See 141 Cong. 
     Rec. S. 4217, S. 4224-35, S. 4244 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1995). 
     Both Houses of Congress also considered and rejected 
     proposed constitutional amendments to impart line item 
     veto authority. S.J. Res. 2, 14, 15, and 16, and H.J. Res. 
     4, 6, and 17, 104th Cong. (1995).

[[Page S2998]]

                                   II

       Before addressing the merits of the case, the Court is 
     obliged to confront defendants' objections as to its 
     justiciability. In a motion to dismiss the complaint 
     defendants contend that plaintiffs lack standing to press 
     their claim. They also assert that the case is not ripe for 
     judicial resolution, and that the ``equitable discretion'' 
     doctrine requires dismissal. None of these assertions is 
     correct under the law of this Circuit.

                              Standing \5\

       Defendants argue that plaintiffs fail to present a live 
     case or controversay, first, because separation-of-powers 
     considerations counsel against judicial intrusions into 
     disputes between officials of the political branches and, 
     second, because at this point no presidential cancellation 
     has yet been attempted or threatened, and there has, thus, 
     been no discernible injury.
       The parties agree on the standard to be applied: plaintiffs 
     must allege, as ``an irreducible minimum,'' (1) an injury 
     personal to them, (2) that has actually been inflicted by 
     defendants or is certainly impending, and (3) that is 
     redressable by judicial decree. Valley Forge Christian 
     College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and 
     State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982). See also Lujan v. Defenders 
     of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
       Defendants acknowledge that, pursuant to this well-settled 
     standard, this Circuit has repeatedly recognized Members' 
     standing to challenge measures that affect their 
     constitutionally prescribed lawmaking powers. See, e.g., 
     Michel v. Anderson, 14 F.3d 623, 625 (D.C. Cir. 1994) 
     (Members had standing to challenge House Rule permitting 
     delegates to vote in Committee of the Whole based on its 
     alleged vote-diluting effect); Moore v. U.S. House of 
     Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 950-53 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
     (standing to assert violation of constitutional requirement 
     that revenue-raising bills originate in the House), cert. 
     denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985); Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 
     F.2d 1166, 1168-71 (D.C. Cir.) (standing to challenge 
     leadership's committee-seating assignments), cert. denied, 
     464 U.S. 823 (1983). In each case the D.C. Circuit found no 
     separation-of-powers impediments to adjudication of the 
     merits because, as in the present case, Members' alleged 
     injuries arose from interference with the exercise of 
     identifiable constitutional powers. See Moore, 733 F.2d at 
     951. Although the Supreme Court has never endorsed the 
     Circuit's analysis of standing in such cases, for this 
     Court's purposes these precedents are controlling.
       Plaintiff's claim of injury in this case, namely, that the 
     Act dilutes their Article I voting power, is likewise of the 
     kind that suffices to confer standing under Article III. 
     Previously, when a Member voted for an appropriations bill 
     containing multiple items, he or she could be certain that 
     any variation of the package once passed would require 
     another vote by both chambers of Congress. Under the Act, 
     however, as plaintiffs describe it, the Member's same vote 
     operates only to present the President with a ``menu'' of 
     items from which he can select those worthy of his 
     approval, not a legislative fait accompli that he must 
     accept or reject in whole, as in the past. As one Senator 
     characterizes it, his vote for an ``A-B-C'' bill might 
     lead to the post hoc creation of an ``A-B'' law, an ``A-
     C'' law, or a ``B-C'' law, depending on the President's 
     use of his newly conferred cancellation authority, for 
     which neither he nor his colleagues would have voted so 
     reconfigured. Thus, plaintiffs' votes mean something 
     different from what they meant before, for good or ill, 
     and plaintiffs who perceive it as the latter are thus 
     ``injured'' in a constitutional sense whenever an 
     appropriations bill comes up for a vote, whatever the 
     President ultimately does with it.
       Circuit precedent has recognized only interference with the 
     ``constitutionally mandated process of enacting law'' as 
     sufficient to confer standing upon Members to maintain legal 
     action for redress. Moore, 733 F.2d at 951. According to 
     plaintiffs, their right to formulate an appropriations bill 
     that meets with the approval of a majority of both Houses 
     alone, ignoring presidential preferences, is mandated by the 
     Presentment Clause itself. Under the Act the dynamic of 
     lawmaking is fundamentally altered. Compromises and trade-
     offs by individual lawmakers must take into account the 
     President's item-by-item cancellation power looming over the 
     end product. The Court concludes that plaintiffs have 
     standing because they allege that the Act ``interferes with 
     their `constitutional duties to enact laws regarding federal 
     spending' and infringes upon their lawmaking powers under 
     Article I, Section 7.'' Synar  v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 
     1374, 1382 (D.D.C. 1986), aff'd sub nom. Browsher v. Synar, 
     478 U.S. 714 (1986).

                                Ripeness

       Defendants' primary justiciability contention is that 
     plaintiffs must wait until the President cancels an item to 
     bring this lawsuit. Their facial challenge to the Act would 
     elicit an advisory opinion, defendants argue, because whether 
     the President will exercise his authority at all (and whether 
     various other consequences will follow) is entirely 
     speculative. Indeed, courts may not exercise jurisdiction 
     consistent with Article III where a dispute is so unformed as 
     to fail the ``case or controversy'' requirement. See Duke 
     Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 
     U.S. 59, 81 (1978); Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 
     419 U.S. 102, 138 (1974). And in constitutional cases, courts 
     must be particularly careful not to render decisions that are 
     unnecessary. See United States v. National Treasury Employees 
     Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 1019 (1995). The injury that gives 
     shape to a dispute need not have occurred, however, so long 
     as it is ``certainly impending.'' Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 
     U.S. 149, 158 (1990).
       In focusing solely on the President's actual exercise of 
     his cancellation power, defendants overlook plaintiffs' 
     allegation of ongoing harm that befalls them irrespective of 
     whether the President ever cancels an item.\7\ The Supreme 
     Court considered an analogous claim ripe in Metropolitan 
     Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Airport 
     Noise, Inc.,  501 U.S. 252 (1991), where a Board of Review 
     composed of Members of Congress possessed an as-yet 
     unexercised power to veto decisions of MWAA's Board of 
     Directors. ``The threat of the veto hangs over the Board of 
     Directors like the sword over Damocles, creating a `here-and-
     now subservience' to the Board of Review sufficient to 
     raise constitutional questions,'' the Court held. Id. at 
     265 n.13. See also Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727 n.5 
     (1986). Because plaintiffs now find themselves in a 
     position of unanticipated and unwelcome subservience to 
     the President before and after they vote on appropriations 
     bills, Article III is satisfied, and this Court may accede 
     to Congress' directive to address the constitutional cloud 
     over the Act as swiftly as possible. \8\
       Plaintiffs' declarations make clear that the budgetary 
     process is already underway. The President presented his 
     budget proposal in early February, and Members will consider 
     and vote on appropriations between now and October 1, 1997, 
     when the new fiscal year begins. Moreover, Congress is likely 
     to vote on supplemental appropriations for this fiscal year 
     in the next few months. To be sure, appropriations votes are 
     inevitable, and ``certainly impending,'' Whitmore, 495 U.S. 
     at 158.
       Defendants' argument that the case is not ripe because 
     further factual development is required is also unpersuasive. 
     The issues in this case are legal, and thus will not be 
     clarified by further factual development. In what context and 
     when the President cancels an appropriation item is 
     immaterial. The Court will be no better equipped to weigh the 
     constitutionality of the President's cancellation of an item 
     of spending or a limited tax benefit after the fact; the 
     central issue is plain to see right now. \9\
       Finally, defendants assert that plaintiffs' claim is not 
     ripe because the Act might be repealed, or suspended with 
     respect to particular appropriations; a disapproval bill 
     might subsequently vindicate a Member's vote as he intended 
     it; or, if not, Congress could override a presidential veto 
     of a disapproval bill. There are two answers to this 
     argument. First, it ignores the ``sword of Damocles'' effect 
     that pervades the process irrespective of whether the 
     President ever cancels an item. Second, just because Congress 
     as a whole can suspend or repeal the Act, or pass a 
     disapproval bill, does not mean that an individual Member's 
     injury is illusory. A Member cannot procure any such relief 
     on his own. Indeed, the possibility of relief from Congress 
     as a whole is just the sort of speculative prospect that the 
     Court would reject if it were instead offered in support of 
     standing. Just as the NTEU plaintiffs did not have standing 
     simply because the Act made certain injuries possible, 101 F. 
     3d at 1429-30, the present plaintiffs' standing is not 
     undermined by virtue of the fact that the Act makes certain 
     remedies conceivable.

                          Equitable discretion

       Defendants urge the Court to exercise its equitable 
     discretion to dismiss the complaint because of separation-of-
     powers concerns, which apply not only in cases involving 
     internal rules of Congress, see Skaggs v. Carle, 898 F. Supp. 
     1, 2 (D.D.C.), appeal docketed, No. 95-5323 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 
     25, 1995), but also in cases involving challenges to the 
     validity of the legislation itself, see Riegle v. Federal 
     Open Market Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 881 (D.C. Cir.), cert. 
     denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981).
       In this case, however, the Court's equitable power to 
     abstain from taking jurisdiction has been foreclosed by 
     Congress' own determination to invite a lawsuit. See 2 U.S.C. 
     Sec. 692(a)(1). There is therefore neither reason nor 
     occasion to exercise discretion by avoiding the case. See 
     Synar, 626 F. Supp. at 1382 (``Section 274 specifically 
     provides for [declaratory] relief to [Members of 
     Congress], thus eliminating whatever equitable discretion 
     might exist and leaving only the limitations of Article 
     III.'').


                                  iii

       The Court now turns to the issue presented, namely, whether 
     the Act's conferral of cancellation power upon the President 
     violates the Presentment Clause. The Act enjoys a presumption 
     of validity, and the Court may not undertake to evaluate its 
     wisdom. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983). Even if 
     the Act were to appear salutary--or even exigent, given the 
     intractable (and interminable) budget controversy--that fact 
     cannot affect the Court's inquiry. Id. Though a court does 
     not lightly resolve to invalidate a law of the United States, 
     it must nevertheless vindicate the Constitution and the 
     governmental framework it envisions. ``The Framers recognized 
     that, in the long term, structural protections against abuse 
     of power were critical to preserving liberty.'' Bowsher v. 
     Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 730 (1986). Accordingly, the Supreme 
     Court has ``not hesitated to invalidate provisions of law 
     which violate [the separation of powers],'' Metropolitan 
     Wash., Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of 
     Airport Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 273 (1991), and this Court 
     can do no less.

[[Page S2999]]

       This case is indisputably one of first impression. The 
     issue it poses will undoubtedly be finally resolved by the 
     Supreme Court, but at present such Supreme Court precedent as 
     can be found only intimates what the result will be. It is by 
     that jurisprudence, however, that this Court must be guided, 
     and the lesson of those cases appears to be that not even the 
     most beguiling of upgrades to the machinery of national 
     government will be countenanced unless it comports with the 
     constitutional design.
       Shorn of its political and policy-laden implications, this 
     case turns on the narrow and subtle question of whether the 
     President's power under the Act is simply a present-day 
     enlargement of his historically sanctioned impoundment power 
     as it has existed from time to time, as defendants urge, or 
     rather a radical transfer of the legislative power to repeal 
     statutory law, as plaintiffs believe. As explained below, the 
     Court agrees with plaintiffs that, even if Congress may 
     sometimes delegate authority to impound funds, it may not 
     confer the power permanently to rescind an appropriation or 
     tax benefit that has become the law of the United States. 
     That power is possessed by Congress alone, and, according to 
     the Framers' careful design, may not be delegated at all.

                         The Presentment Clause

       The Presentment Clause requires that any bill making or 
     changing federal law must be first passed by both Houses of 
     Congress and then presented to the President in toto, in 
     which form he acts upon it, either to make it (or allow it to 
     become) a law, or to return it to Congress for 
     reconsideration.\10\ U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 7, cl. 2. 
     Plaintiffs focus on the language of ``approval;'' the 
     President's primary duty under the Presentment Clause, they 
     say, is one of approval or disapproval. If he approves of the 
     bill, in toto, his signature is but a ministerial formality. 
     If he does not approve of it, in toto, his duty obliges him 
     to return it with his ``objections'' to the House in which it 
     originated, or at least to leave it be. If he signs it while 
     disapproving of it--or parts of it--as the act purports to 
     authorize him to do, then he does so, according to 
     plaintiffs, in violation of the Presentment Clause.
       For defendants, the operative words are, ``he shall sign 
     it.'' It is the bright-line act of signing alone that 
     converts a bill into law. Approval is a highly subjective, 
     and a temporal, concept. A President may ``approve'' of a 
     bill for many reasons, not all of which import enthusiasm for 
     its legislative consequences. A President may sign a bill of 
     which he actually disapproves (as undoubtedly many Presidents 
     have done) for political, diplomatic, or other purposes 
     unrelated to his judgment of its merit.
       The Court agrees with defendants that the act of signing a 
     bill is the critical requirement of the Presentment Clause. 
     The President's judgment of approval coincides with his 
     decision to sign a bill; it has no independent operative 
     significance. Whether a bill is or is not a law of the United 
     States cannot depend on the President's state of mind when he 
     affixes his signature. He may object to various 
     appropriations and limited tax benefits--that is, he may 
     disapprove of them--but nevertheless sign a bill and thereby 
     remain in full compliance with the Presentment Clause. 
     Likewise, no subsequent action by the President is capable of 
     retroactively undermining the approval he registered with his 
     signature. By that time the Article I approval process has 
     run its course, and the bill indisputably has become a law of 
     the United States. See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 
     224-25 & n.29 (1980); La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United 
     States, 175 U.S. 423, 454 (1899); Burgess v. Salmon, 97 U.S. 
     381, 384-85 (1878).
       Yet, although the court agrees that statutes subject to 
     cancellation will have been ``approved'' in accordance with 
     the Presentment Clause, the Act is vulnerable to the 
     additional charge that, following approval, a cancellation by 
     the President is a legislative repeal that itself must comply 
     with Presentment Clause procedures. The Court must resolve 
     this issue in light of the Supreme Court's admonishment that 
     ``[t]he legislative steps outlined in Art. I are not empty 
     formalities; they were designed to assure that both Houses of 
     Congress and the President participate in the exercise of 
     lawmaking authority.'' Chadha, 462 U.S. at 958 n. 22. It is 
     insufficient, therefore, for defendants to argue that, 
     notwithstanding the resemblance between a cancellation and a 
     statutory repeal, the Act should stand because the same 
     result could be accomplished through clearly constitutional 
     means. Rather, ``the purposes underlying the Presentment 
     Clauses . . . must guide resolution of the question whether a 
     given procedure is constitutional.'' Id. at 946.
       Fundamentally, the Presentment Clause enforces 
     ``bicameralism'' and circumscribes the President's ability to 
     act unilaterally. See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692-93 
     (1892). It embodies ``the Framers' decision that the 
     legislative power of the Federal Government be exercised in 
     accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively 
     considered, procedure.'' Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951. The 
     President's contribution to the process is his approval of 
     (or objection to) legislation as Congress presents it to him. 
     His is merely a qualified check on the will of the 
     legislature. See 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 
     1787 at 97-105 (Max Farrand ed., 1987). The President must 
     consider the whole of the bill presented, which, in today's 
     world of omnibus appropriations and myriad riders, is an 
     undeniably difficult task. Nevertheless, upon considering a 
     bill, he must reach a final judgment: either ``approve it,'' 
     or ``not.'' U.S. Const. art I, Sec. 7, cl. 2. Once he has by 
     his signature transformed the whole bill into a law of the 
     United States, the President's sole duty is to ``take Care 
     that the Laws be faithfully executed.'' U.S. Const. art. II, 
     Sec. 3. See also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 
     U.S. 579, 587 (1952) (``[T]he President's power to see that 
     the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is 
     to be a lawmaker.'').
       Where the President signs a bill but then purports to 
     cancel parts of it, he exceeds his constitutional authority 
     and prevents both Houses of Congress from participating in 
     the exercise of lawmaking authority. The President's 
     cancellation of an item unilaterally effects a repeal of 
     statutory law such that the bill he signed is not the law 
     that will govern the Nation. That is precisely what the 
     Presentment Clause was designed to prevent.

    Delegation of spending authority vs. exercise of lawmaking power

       Defendants dismiss the notion that the Act represents an 
     abdication of Congress' Article lawmaking I power, arguing 
     that it merely ratifies traditional impoundment authority of 
     the President in a novel form. Defendants and amici both 
     allude to a long history of presidential impoundments, many 
     of which have been tested by courts, and as to which the 
     issue has been confined primarily to whether Congress 
     intended to delegate discretion to the President not to spend 
     money it had appropriated; that is, whether its 
     appropriations were permissive or mandatory. See, e.g., Train 
     v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 41 (1975); City of New 
     Haven v. United States, 634 F. Supp. 1449, 1454 n.6 (D.D.C. 
     1986) (citing cases), aff'd 809 F.2d 900 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
     The effect of the ICA was to make all appropriations 
     presumptively mandatory. The Line Item Veto Act merely 
     reverses that presumption, at least for a period of five 
     days. During that limited period, the President has the 
     option to ``cancel'' any appropriation--he may not change it 
     in any manner--after which it remains in the law as he signed 
     it, to be faithfully executed with the remainder.\11\ If he 
     cancels it with an appropriate message to Congress, it is 
     extinguished, as if it had never been part of the bill, 
     unless Congress revives it with a new bill, passed like any 
     other by both Houses of Congress and presented anew to the 
     President. In the meantime no money can be spent for it, just 
     as would have been the case had it been ``deferred'' or 
     ``rescinded'' in accordance with the ICA. The Line Item Veto 
     Act is, therefore, according to defendants, merely an advance 
     delegation by Congress to the President of a brief period of 
     discretion to spend or not, as his judgment dictates, subject 
     to the broad injunctions that his decision not to spend 
     operate to reduce the deficit, and will not impair any 
     essential Government functions or harm the national interest. 
     It is, they say, ``evolutionary, not revolutionary,'' Def. 
     Motion for Summary Judgment at 3, in the perpetual contest of 
     will between Congress and the President in matters of the 
     federal budget.
       It has long been held that Congress may--indeed, of 
     necessity, must--delegate vast authority to the Executive 
     Branch of government to make and to change rules for the 
     governance of national affairs, so long as they are in 
     furtherance of the will of Congress. When courts have 
     inquired into whether Congress has abdicated its legislative 
     function in cases of allegedly overbroad delegations, their 
     sole concern is whether Congress itself articulated 
     ``intelligible principles'' by which delegated authority is 
     to be exercised. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 
     361, 372; J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 
     394, 406, 409 (1928). Since 1935, the Supreme Court has 
     ``upheld, without exception, delegations under standards 
     phrased in sweeping terms.'' Loving v. United States, 116 S. 
     Ct. 1737, 1750 (1996). Defendants are therefore correct that, 
     if the Act's conferral of cancellation power, at least with 
     respect to appropriations, can be equated with a delegation 
     of impoundment authority, their burden under the delegation 
     standard is not ``a tough one.'' National Fed'n Of Fed. 
     Employees v. United States, 905 F.2d 400, 404 (D.C. Cir. 
     1990).\12\
       But defendants are mistaken in asserting that Article I 
     concerns disappear once the President has signed a bill into 
     law, and, consequently, that the delegation doctrine is the 
     only hurdle for them to surmount. Their analysis assumes that 
     Congress conferred a delegable power. It did not; it ceded 
     basic legislative authority. The Constitution vests ``all 
     legislative Powers'' of the United States in Congress, U.S. 
     Const. art I, Sec. 1, including the power of repeal. Chadha, 
     462 U.S. at 954. As Chadha made clear, there are formal 
     aspects of the legislative process that Congress may not 
     alter. Just as Congress could not delegate to one of its 
     chambers the power to veto select provisions of law, it may 
     not assign that authority to the President. Before the 
     question of a delegation's excessiveness ever arises, then, a 
     court must be convinced that Congress did not attempt to 
     alienate one of its basic functions.
       In no case where the Supreme Court decided that a 
     delegation of broad authority was saved by Congress' 
     articulation of intelligible principles was the Court faced 
     with an equivalent of the cancellation power given to the 
     President by the Line Item Veto Act. Cancellation under the 
     Act is simply not the same thing as impoundment, or any other 
     suspension of a statutory provision. Instead,

[[Page S3000]]

     cancellation is equivalent to repeal \13\--and ``repeal of 
     statutes, no less than enactment, must conform with Art. I.'' 
     Chadha, 462 U.S. at 954. Cancellation forever renders a 
     provision of federal law without legal force or effect, so 
     the President who canceled an item and his successors must 
     turn to Congress to reauthorize the foregone spending. 
     Whereas delegated authority to impound is exercised from time 
     to time, in light of changed circumstances or shifting 
     executive (or legislative) priorities, cancellation occurs 
     immediately and irreversibly in the wake of the 
     operationalizing ``approval'' of the bill containing the very 
     same measures being rescinded.
       Thus the cancellation power conferred by the Act is indeed 
     revolutionary, as plaintiffs assert. Never before has 
     Congress attempted to give away the power to shape the 
     content of a statute of the United States, as the Act 
     purports to do. As expansive as its delegations of power may 
     have been in the past, none has gone so far as to transfer 
     the function of repealing a provision of statutory law. The 
     power to ``make'' the laws of the nation is the exclusive, 
     non-delegable power of Congress which the Line Item Veto Act 
     purports to alienate in part for eight years. That it can be 
     recaptured if Congress repeals the Act, or suspends it 
     (either in general, or in particular circumstances) does not 
     alter the fact that, until Congress does so by a separate 
     bill which the President signs (or as to which his veto is 
     overridden), the President has become a co-maker of the 
     Nation's laws. The duty of the President with respect to such 
     laws is to ``take care that [they] be faithfully executed.'' 
     U.S. Const. art II, Sec. 3. Canceling, i.e., repealing, parts 
     of a law cannot be considered its faithful execution.\14\
       Moreover, if cancellation power could constitutionally be 
     delegated as to appropriations and limited tax benefits, 
     defendants have yet to show a tenable constitutional 
     distinction between appropriation and tax laws, on the one 
     hand, and all other laws, on the other. In fact, defendants 
     deny any obligation to suggest such a distinction at all. At 
     oral argument they insisted that there is virtually no limit 
     to the express Article I powers Congress may delegate if it 
     chooses, so long as it articulates ``intelligible 
     principles'' by which its delegate is to be guided. If that 
     is so--if Congress can delegate to the President the power to 
     reconfigure an appropriations or tax benefit bill--why can he 
     not also cancel provisions of an environmental protection or 
     civil rights law he disfavors, and upon exactly the same 
     ``principles'' as are to guide his exercise of cancellation 
     authority under the Line Item Veto Act?
       As authority for the proposition that it is 
     constitutionally permissible for Congress to delegate to the 
     President the power to render a law of the United States 
     inoperable, defendants cite the case of Field v. Clark, 143 
     U.S. 649 (1892). Aside from the fact that the presidential 
     action approved by the Supreme Court in Field v. Clark was 
     merely the ``suspension'' of duly enacted tariffs, not their 
     cancellation, the case is also distinguishable on the ground 
     that the Supreme Court recognized the practice of 
     ``legislating in contingency;'' that is, where Congress 
     itself determines in advance when conditions yet to occur 
     should cause the law to cease to be operate. The President is 
     merely the instrument of its will. Id. at 683-92. See also 
     United States v. Rock Royal Co-op, Inc., 307 U.S. 553, 577-78 
     (1939); Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1939); The Brig 
     Aurora, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382, 388 (1813).\15\ The Line Item 
     Veto Act, in contrast, hands off to the President authority 
     over fundamental legislative choices. Indeed, that is its 
     reason for being. It spares Congress the burden of making 
     those vexing choices of which programs to preserve and which 
     to cut. Thus, by placing on itself the ``onus'' of overriding 
     the President's cancellations, see H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 491, 
     104th Cong., 2d Sess. at 16 (1996), Congress has turned the 
     constitional division of responsibilities for legislating on 
     its head.
       The Court therefore agrees with plaintiffs. In those 
     Supreme Court cases which this Court finds most instructive 
     for its purposes, most notably Chadha, the Supreme Court has 
     repeatedly counseled that when the Constitution speaks to the 
     matter, the Constitution alone controls the way in which 
     governmental powers shall be exercised.\16\ The formalities 
     of the constitutional framework must be respected; the 
     several estates subject to it must function within the 
     spheres the Constitution allots to them.


                                   IV

       In passing the Act, Congress and the President addressed 
     the significant problem of runaway spending, striving to 
     create a more efficient process. But ``the Framers ranked 
     other values higher than efficiency.'' Chadha, 462 U.S. at 
     959. As the Court elaborated: ``With all the obvious flaws 
     of delay, untidiness, and potential for abuse, we have not 
     yet found a better way to preserve freedom than by making 
     the exercise of power subject to the carefully crafted 
     restraints spelled out in the Constitution.'' Id. Various 
     legislative alternatives remain available to give the 
     President a more significant role in restraining 
     government spending. For example, the ``expedited 
     rescission'' model favored by many Members of the 104th 
     Congress would retain the President's role as a 
     recommender of rescissions, see U.S. Const. art. II, 
     Sec. 3, and force Congress to vote on such proposals. And, 
     of course, Congress remains free to attempt passage of a 
     constitutional amendment if it determines that the 
     President should have unilateral revisionary power.
       For the foregoing reasons, it is, this 10th day of April, 
     1997,
       ORDERED, that defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint 
     and motion for summary judgment are denied; and it is
       FURTHER ORDERED, that plaintiffs' motion for summary 
     judgment is granted; and it is
       FURTHER ORDERED, that the Line Item Veto Act, Pub. Law No. 
     104-130, 110 Stat. 1200 (1996), is adjudged and declared 
     unconstitutional.
                                          Thomas Penfield Jackson,
                                              U.S. District Judge.

                               footnotes

     \1\ Senators Robert C. Byrd, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Carl 
     Levin, and Mark O. Hatfield, and Representatives David E. 
     Skaggs and Henry A. Waxman. All but Senator Hatfield are 
     currently sitting Members of the 105th Congress.
     \2\ The President has no authority to cancel items contained 
     in an enacted disapproval bill; he must take it or leave it 
     as presented to him.
     \3\ See, e.g., 33 Writings of George Washington 96 (1940) 
     (``From the nature of the Constitution, I must approve all 
     the parts of a Bill, or reject it in toto.''); William Howard 
     Taft, The Presidency: Its Duties, Its Powers, Its 
     Opportunities and Its Limitations 11 (1916) (``[The 
     President] has no power to veto parts of the bill and allow 
     the rest to become a law. He must accept it or reject it . . 
     .''); 12 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 128, 157-65 (1988) (reviewing 
     other Presidents' views and experience).
     Although some commentators have argued that the Constitution 
     does provide inherent authority for a line item veto, see 
     Stephen Glazier, Reagan Already Has Line-Item Veto, Wall St. 
     J., Dec. 4, 1987, at A14, col. 4; L. Gordon Crovitz, The 
     Line-Item Veto: The Best Response When Congress Passes One 
     Spending ``Bill'' A Year, 18 Pepp. L. Rev. 43 (1990), most 
     scholars have concluded that the text of Article I, Sec. 7, 
     unequivocally precludes such authority. See, e.g., Bruce Fein 
     & William Bradford Reynolds, Wishful Thinking on a Line-Item 
     Veto, Legal Times, Nov. 13, 1989, at 30; Lawrence Tribe and 
     Philip Kurland, Letter to Sen. Edward Kennedy, 135 Cong. Rec. 
     S. 14,387 (daily ed. Oct. 31, 1989); 12 Op. Off. Legal 
     Counsel 128 (1988); 9 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 28 (1985). 
     Moreover, at least two courts have stated in dicta that the 
     President possesses no inherent item veto. See Lear Siegler, 
     Inc. v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102, 1124 (9th Cir.), reh'g en banc 
     ordered, 863 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1988), withdrawn on other 
     grounds, 893 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc); Thirteenth 
     Guam Legislature v. Bordallo, 430 F. Supp. 405, 410 (D. Guam 
     App. Div. 1977), aff'd, 588 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1978).
     \4\ Originally, deferrals were automatically effective but 
     subject to a one-House legislative veto. 88 Stat. at 335. In 
     light of INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), the legislative 
     veto component of the ICA was invalidated, City of New Haven 
     v. Pierce, 809 F.2d 900 (D.C. Cir. 1987), and Congress 
     subsequently amended the ICA to eliminate the offending 
     procedure.
     \5\ Only Article III standing, as opposed to prudential 
     limitations, is at issue in light of Congress' creation of an 
     express right of action in Sec. 692(a)(1) of the Act.
     \6\ Defendants rely on two concurring opinions by D.C. 
     Circuit Judges in arguing that plaintiffs' injury is not 
     sufficiently personal to create a justiciable controversy. 
     See Moore, 733 F.2d at 957-61 (Scalia, J., concurring); 
     Vander Jagt, 699 F.2d at 1179-82 (Bork, J., concurring). Yet, 
     as the three-judge court, of which then-Judge Scalia was a 
     member, recognized in Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 
     1374, 1382 (D.D.C. 1986), aff'd sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 
     478 U.S. 714 (1986), this Circuit's cases unequivocally 
     establish that Members have ``a personal interest . . . in 
     the exercise of their governmental powers.'' 626 F. Supp. at 
     1381 & n. 7.
     \7\ Even if an actual cancellation by the President were 
     required to cause injury, Article III arguably would not 
     require plaintiffs to wait for that event to invoke the 
     Court's jurisdiction. See Abbott Labs v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 
     136, 140 (1967); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 117 (1976) 
     (challenge was ripe in anticipation of ``impending future 
     ruling and determinations'').
     The President has expressed his intention to invoke his new 
     powers under the Act this year. See 141 Cong. Rec. S. 8202-03 
     (daily ed. June 13, 1995) (containing letter from President 
     to Speaker of the House).
     \8\ As in the case of standing, plaintiffs need only satisfy 
     the Article III component of ripeness because Congress 
     unmistakably declared the case fit for judicial review in 
     Sec. 692(c) of the Act. Accordingly, this Circuit's 
     conclusion in National Treasury Employees Union v. United 
     States, 101 F.3d 1423, 1431 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (``NTEU''), that 
     prudential (as well as constitutional) considerations made 
     the union's challenge to the Act not ripe in inapposite.
     \9\ Moreover, fitness for review is a prudential component of 
     the ripeness doctrine, an inquiry Congress obviated by 
     calling for expedited judicial action. See Thomas v. Union 
     Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580-81 (1985); NTEU, 
     101 F. 3d at 1431. But even if the Court were to take into 
     account prudential ripeness factors, they actually militate 
     in plaintiffs' favor, because resolving the issue now will 
     avert the cloud that would hang over any canceled item that 
     Congress fails to disapprove.
     \10\ In the Framers' words: ``Every Bill which shall have 
     passed the House of Representatives and the Senate shall, 
     before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the 
     United States; If he approve it he shall sign it, but if not 
     he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in 
     which it shall have originated, who shall enter the 
     Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to 
     reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of 
     that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, 
     together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it 
     shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds 
     of that House, it shall become a Law. But in all Cases the 
     Votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas and Nays, 
     and the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill 
     shall be entered on the Journal of each House respectively. 
     If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten 
     Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to 
     him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had 
     signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent 
     its return, in which Case it shall not become a Law.''--U.S. 
     Const. art. I, Sec. 7, cl. 2.
     At the behest of James Madison, the Framers included the 
     following clause to ensure that Congress could not evade the 
     presentment requirement simply by passing legislation in 
     forms other than bills: ``Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to 
     Which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of 
     Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of 
     Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the 
     United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall 
     be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be 
     repassed by two thirds of the Senate

[[Page S3001]]

     and House of Representatives according to the Rules and 
     Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.''--U.S. Const. 
     art I, Sec. 7, cl. 3.
     \11\ Defendants cite no analog, as a species of impoundment 
     or anything else, however, to the power to ``cancel'' limited 
     tax benefits found in the Act.
     \12\ See, e.g., Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 
     212, 219 (1989) (upholding delegation of authority to 
     establish and collect pipeline safety fees); Lichter v. 
     United States, 334 U.S. 742, 778 (1948) (upholding grant of 
     power of recover excessive wartime profits), and Yakus v. 
     United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424 (1944) (upholding broad 
     delegation of price-fixing authority).
     \13\ As noted supra, p.4, Sec. 691e(4) of the Act defines the 
     verb ``cancel'' as meaning ``to rescind.'' Webster's Third 
     New International Dictionary 1924 (G.&C. Merriam Co. 1981) 
     defines the verb ``repeal'' as meaning ``1: to rescind or 
     revoke (as a sentence or law) from operation or effect.''
     \14\ Defendants suggest that, in canceling future 
     appropriations, the President will, in fact, be faithfully 
     executing the Line Item Veto Act to reduce the deficit. But 
     the Act contains no mandate to the President to reduce the 
     deficit. It merely conditions cancellations for whatever 
     reason upon, inter alia, their having a deficit-reducing 
     effect.
     \15\ As the Supreme Court further explained in J.W. Hampton, 
     Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 407 (1928), 30 
     years later: ``Congress may feel itself unable conveniently 
     to determine exactly when its exercise of the legislative 
     power should become effective, because dependent on future 
     conditions, and it may leave the determination of such time 
     to the decision of an executive, or, as often happens in 
     matters of state legislation, it may be left to a popular 
     vote of the residents of a district to be affected by the 
     legislation. While in a sense one may say that such residents 
     are exercising legislative power, it is not an exact 
     statement, because the power has already been exercised 
     legislatively by the body vested with that power under the 
     Constitution, the condition of its legislation going into 
     effect being made dependent by the legislature on the 
     expression of the voters of a certain district.''
     \16\ See also Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth. v. 
     Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 501 U.S. 252 
     (1991); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); cf. U.S. Term 
     Limits v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995).
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York is recognized.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, I rise to state that this is a fine 
moment in the history of the Senate. It has come about through the 
leadership of Senator Robert C. Byrd and his devotion to the 
Constitution of the United States. The court today ruled in the most 
explicit terms. It said, ``* * * the Act effectively permits the 
President to repeal duly enacted provisions of Federal law. This he 
cannot do.''
  Then with a grace note that I hope the Senate will appreciate, and I 
know our distinguished occupant of the chair will, with Senator Byrd's 
great attachment to the history of democratic government and theory and 
its glorious origins in Greece, the court referred to the sword-of-
Damocles effect: Not that the President would exercise this power, but 
that he might do it. There is a sword still suspended in this Chamber, 
but soon, I cannot doubt, to be taken down as a consequence of the 
judgment of the Supreme Court. I might add, sir, that there are some in 
Congress who are concerned that the courts interfere too much with our 
procedures. This is a court defending the Constitution and the U.S. 
Congress in its responsibilities.
  Finally, sir, may I state a moment of gratitude to the attorneys, our 
learned counselors, who, on a pro bono basis, argued this case so 
effectively. I ask unanimous consent that their names be printed in the 
Record at this time.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                         Councel for Plaintiffs

       Charles J. Cooper, Michael A. Carvin, David Thompson, 
     Cooper & Carvin, 2000 K Street, N.W., Suite 401, Washington, 
     DC 20006, (202) 822-8950.
       Michael Davidson, 3753 McKinley Street, N.W., Washington, 
     DC 20015 (202) 362-4885.
       Lloyd N. Cutler, Louis R. Cohen, Lawrence A. Kasten, 
     Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, 2445 M Street, N.W., Washington, 
     DC 20037 (202) 663-6000.
       Alan B. Morrison, Colette G. Matzzie, Public Citizen 
     Litigation Group, 1600 20th Street, N.W., Washington, DC 
     20009 (202) 588-1000.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from 
Michigan is recognized for 3 minutes.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I want to announce officially that there 
will be no further votes today.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I thank my friend from West Virginia. The 
Senator from West Virginia is the plaintiff in a historic lawsuit. This 
lawsuit has now taken the first step. Senator Moynihan and I, Senator 
Hatfield, and a number of House Members are co-plaintiffs, and proudly 
so, with Senator Byrd. We are kind of the ``et al.'' Robert Byrd, et 
al. It is a position that we are proud to be in.
  This lawsuit, we should be clear, tests a particular version of the 
line-item veto that is in that bill. What the court held, and what our 
lawyers argued, and what we feel passionately is that once the 
President of the United States affixes his signature to a bill, that is 
the law of the land. Four magic words: ``Law of the land.'' When that 
becomes the law of the land, it cannot be repealed unilaterally by the 
President or by us. It must be repealed according to the Constitution. 
That is the fundamental, bedrock, black letter constitutional law, 
which the court affirmed today. It is pleasing to us that the court did 
so.
  I want to thank our colleagues for making it possible for us to have 
an expedited process in the courts. Whichever side of this dispute we 
were on, we agreed that we ought to resolve it promptly. The bill 
provided that there be an early resolution in court. I think all of our 
colleagues are to be thanked for making that possible.
  The sword of Damocles is there, as the Senator from New York 
mentioned. It still hangs here until there is a final resolution, if 
there is going to be an appeal to the Supreme Court. We hope now that 
the Constitution will prevail. We think it is clear that the courts are 
the right people to give the final interpretation of that Constitution. 
Justice Marshall's vision and holding prevails today, in that a court 
has now ruled on the constitutionality of a law. Presumably, that will 
go to the Supreme Court. We hope for a prompt resolution.
  We are very gratified that what we believe is so fundamental in this 
country has now been reaffirmed by the district court that took the 
first look at this law. That principle, again, is that once that moment 
comes when a Presidential pen is affixed to a bill, that bill binds all 
of us, every one of us, be it the President or any other citizen of 
this land, and that bill cannot be changed. The law cannot be changed 
by the unilateral act of either the President or the Congress, but must 
be repealed as laws are adopted, with the involvement of both the 
President and the Congress, as required by the Constitution.
  Again, my thanks to Senator Byrd for the leadership he has shown in 
protecting the Constitution of the United States. I know Senator 
Moynihan expressed this, and Senator Hatfield, if he were here, would 
say the same, that we are very, very gratified to be on the same side 
of a very critical lawsuit with our good friend from West Virginia.
  Mr. BYRD. If the Senator will yield, I wish to thank my dear friends, 
Senator Moynihan and Senator Levin, for their gracious remarks this 
afternoon. I also wish to thank the majority leader for his cooperation 
in this matter. I went to him about having a piece of legislation 
passed that would help to expedite this action. Although he did not 
agree with me in the matter itself, he was very cooperative in allowing 
that action by the Senate to take place. I thank him for that.
  Mr. President, I join Mr. Moynihan, also, in thanking counsel for 
their excellent services in this important matter.

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