[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 40 (Tuesday, April 8, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2841-S2844]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. FEINGOLD:
  S. 520. A bill to terminate the F/A-18 E/F aircraft program; to the 
Committee on Armed Services.


          TERMINATING THE F/A-18 E/F SUPER HORNET LEGISLATION

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce legislation to 
terminate the U.S. Navy's F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet Program.
  The basis for this legislation is contained in a 1996 General 
Accounting Office report entitled ``Navy Aviation: F/A-18 E/F Will 
Provide Marginal Operational Improvement at High Cost.'' In this 
report, GAO studied the rationale and need for the F/A-18 E/F in order 
to determine whether continued development of the aircraft is the most 
cost-effective approach to modernizing the Navy's tactical aircraft 
fleet. GAO concluded that the marginal improvements of the F/A-18 E/F 
are far outweighed by the high cost of the program.
  Mr. President, in our current fiscal climate, I have serious concerns 
about authorizing funding for such a costly program, which according to 
GAO will deliver only marginal improvements over the current C/D 
version of the F/A-18.
  As GAO noted in its report, at a projected total program cost of 
$89.15 billion, the F/A-18 E/F Program is one of the most costly 
aviation programs in the Department of Defense. The total program cost 
is comprised of $5.833 billion in development costs and $83.35 billion 
in procurement costs for 1,000 aircraft.
  Mr. President, before I begin to describe GAO's findings in detail, I 
would first like to discuss briefly the role of the F/A-18 aircraft in 
our Nation's overall naval aviation force structure. The Navy performs 
its carrier-based missions with a mix of fighter (air-to-air combat), 
strike (air-to-ground combat), and strike/fighter (multicombat role) 
aircraft. Currently, carrier based F-14 fighter aircraft perform air-
to-air missions; A6E's perform air-to-ground missions; and F/A-18's 
perform both air-to-air and air-to-ground missions. The F/A-18 E/F 
Super Hornet is the latest version of the Navy's carrier-based F/A-18 
strike/fighter plane.
  Mr. President, the F/A-18 E/F is just one of three costly new fighter 
programs the Department of Defense has on the drawing boards right now.
  In addition to the F/A-18 E/F, there is the Air Force's F-22, which 
is intended to replace the A-10 and the venerable F-16 Falcon. The F-22 
is also intended to either supplant or augment the Air Force's top 
fighter, the F-15. It will have stealth capabilities and will be able 
to survive in dense air-defense environments.
  And of course, there is the Joint Strike Fighter, which I will 
discuss in greater detail in a few moments. The JSF is intended to 
perform virtually every type of mission that fighter aircraft perform 
in today's force structure, and is to be employed by the Navy, the Air 
Force, and Marine Corps in unprecedented fashion.
  There are few who seriously believe that the Pentagon can afford to 
maintain all three tactical fighter programs. The General Accounting 
Office, the Congressional Budget Office and many others have maintained 
that the

[[Page S2842]]

likelihood that all three programs can be fully funded with the planned 
number of aircraft buys is virtually nil. In fact, many view the JSF as 
the only modernization program that should be continued. Given our 
fiscal constraints and Federal budget deficit, can we afford to finance 
three separate fighter programs with the caliber and costs of the F/A-
18 E/F, the F-22, and the JSF?
  The answer is unequivocally no. And that is why I am introducing 
legislation to terminate any further development or procurement of the 
program that appears to be most questionable, the E/F upgrade.
  The Navy has based the need for development and procurement of the F/
A-18 E/F on existing or projected operational deficiencies of the F/A-
18C/D in the following key areas: strike range, carrier recovery 
payload and survivability. In addition, the Navy notes limitations of 
current C/D's with respect to avionics growth space and payload 
capacity. In its report, GAO concludes that the operational 
deficiencies in the C/D that the Navy cited in justifying the E/F 
either have not materialized as projected or such deficiencies can be 
corrected with nonstructural changes to the current C/D and additional 
upgrades made which would further improve its capabilities.
  One of the primary reasons the Navy cites in justifying the E/F is 
the need for increased range and the C/D's inability to perform long-
range unrefueled missions against high-value targets. However, GAO 
concludes that the Navy's F/A-18 strike range requirements can be met 
by either the F/A-18 E/F or F/A-18 C/D. Furthermore, it concludes that 
the increased range of the E/F is achieved at the expense of its aerial 
combat performance, and that even with increased range, both aircraft 
will still require aerial refueling for low-altitude missions.
  The F/A-18 E/F specification requirements call for the aircraft to 
have a flight range of 390 nautical miles (nm) while performing low-
altitude bombing missions. The F/A-18 E/F will achieve a strike range 
of 465 nm while performing low-altitude missions by carrying 2 external 
480 gallon fuel tanks. While current C/D's achieve a flight range of 
325 nm with 2-330 gallon fuel tanks while performing low-altitude 
missions--65 nm below the specification requirement of the E/F--when 
they are equipped with the 2-480 gallon external fuel tanks that are 
planned to be used on the E/F, the C/D can achieve a strike range of 
393 nm on low-altitude missions.
  Recent Navy range predictions show that the F/A-18 E/F is expected to 
have a 683 nm strike range when flying a more fuel-efficient, 
survivable, and lethal high-altitude mission profile rather than the 
specified low-altitude profile. Similarly, although F/A-18 E/F range 
will be greater than the F/A-18 C/D, the C/D could achieve strike 
ranges (566 nm with 3-330 gallon fuel tanks or 600 nm with 2-480 gallon 
tanks and 1-330 gallon tank) far greater than the target distances 
stipulated in the E/F's system specifications by flying the same high-
altitude missions as the E/F. Additionally, according to GAO, the E/F's 
increased strike range is achieved at the expense of the aircraft's 
aerial combat performance as evidenced by its sustained turn rate, 
maneuvering, and acceleration which impact its ability to maneuver in 
either offensive or defensive modes.

  One claim the Navy has made in response to the GAO report is that the 
C/D cannot be outfitted with 480-gallon external fuel tanks. GAO 
disputes this, citing contractor studies that concluded 480-gallon 
tanks can be carried on the C/D's inboard stations. GAO also points out 
that the Canadians have flown the F/A-18 C with the larger external 
fuel tanks.
  Mr. President, another significant reason the Navy cites in support 
of the continued development of the E/F is an anticipated deficiency in 
F/A-18C carrier recovery payload--the amount of fuel, weapons and 
external equipment that an aircraft can carry when returning from a 
mission and landing on a carrier.
  However, the deficiency in carrier recovery payload which the Navy 
anticipated of the F/A-18C simply has not materialized. When initially 
procured, F/A-18C's had a total carrier recovery payload of 6,300 
pounds. Because of the Navy's decision to increase the F/A-18C's 
maximum allowable carrier landing weight and a lower aircraft operating 
weight resulting from technological improvements, the F/A-18C now has a 
carrier recovery payload of 7,113 pounds.
  F/A-18C's operating in support of Bosnian operations are now 
routinely returning to carriers with operational loads of 7,166 pounds, 
which exceeds the Navy's stated carrier recovery payload capacity. This 
recovery payload is substantially greater than the Navy projected it 
would be and is even greater than when the F/A-18C was first introduced 
in 1988. In addition, GAO notes that while it is not necessary, 
upgrading F/A-18C's with stronger landing gear could allow them to 
recover carrier payloads of more than 10,000 pounds--greater than that 
sought for the F/A-18 E/F (9,000 pounds).
  While the Navy also cites a need to improve combat survivability in 
justifying the development of the F/A-18 E/F, the aircraft was not 
developed to counter a particular military threat that could not be met 
with existing or improved F/A-18 C/D's. Additional improvements have 
subsequently been made or are planned for the F/A-18 C/D to enhance its 
survivability including improvements to reduce its radar detectability, 
while survivability improvements of the F/A-18 E/F are questionable. 
For example, because the F/A-18 E/F will be carrying weapons and fuel 
externally, the radar signature reduction improvements derived from the 
structural design of the aircraft will be diminished and will only help 
the aircraft penetrate slightly deeper than the F/A-18 C/D into an 
integrated defensive system before being detected.
  Mr. President, as we discuss survivability, it is relevant to 
highlight the outstanding performance of the F/A-18 C/D in the gulf war 
just a few short years ago. By the Navy's own account, the C/D 
performed extraordinarily well, dropping 18 million pounds of 
ordinance, recording all Navy MiG kills, and, in the Navy's own words, 
experiencing ``unprecedented survivability.''

  In addition to noting the operational capability improvements in 
justifying the development of the F/A-18 E/F, the Navy also notes 
limitations of current C/D's with respect to avionics growth space and 
payload capacity. The Navy predicted that by the mid-1990's the F/A-18 
C/D would not have growth space to accommodate additional new weapons 
and systems under development. Specifically, the Navy predicted that by 
fiscal year 1996 C/D's would only have 0.2 cubic feet of space 
available for future avionics growth; however, 5.3 cubic feet of 
available space have been identified for future system growth. 
Furthermore, technological advancements such as miniaturization, 
modularity and consolidation may result in additional growth space for 
future avionics.
  The Navy also stated that the F/A-18 E/F will provide increased 
payload capacity as a result of two new outboard weapons stations; 
however, unless current problems concerning weapons release are 
resolved--air flow problems around the fuselage and weapons stations--
the types and amounts of weapons the E/F can carry will be restricted 
and the possible payload increase may be negated. Also, while the E/F 
will provide a marginal increase in air-to-air capability by carrying 
two extra missiles, it will not increase its ability to carry the 
heavier, precision-guided, air-to-ground weapons that are capable of 
hitting fixed and mobile hard targets and the heavier stand-off weapons 
that will be used to increase aircraft survivability.
  Understanding that the F/A-18 E/F may not deliver as significant 
operational capability improvements as originally expected, I would now 
like to focus on the cost of the F/A-18 E/F Program and possible 
alternatives to it. As previously mentioned, the total program cost of 
the F/A-18 E/F is projected to be $89.15 billion. These program costs 
are based on the procurement assumption of 1,000 aircraft--660 by the 
Navy and 340 by the Marine Corps--at an annual production rate of 72 
aircraft per year. Mr. President, as the GAO report points out, these 
figures are overstated. According to Marine Corps officials and the 
Marine Corps Aviation Master Plan, the Marine Corps does not intend to 
buy any F/A-18 E/F's and, therefore, the projected 1,000 aircraft buy 
is overstated by 340 aircraft.

[[Page S2843]]

  Although the Pentagon contends that the Navy had intended to purchase 
1,000 aircraft all along, extensive documentation and testimony 
demonstrates this not to be the case and the 1,000 figure was the 
original complete buy.
  I would also note the importance of the Marine Corps opting out of 
the E/F Program. Although the E/F was originally developed to service 
two branches with differing needs and requirements, the Marine Corps 
has chosen instead to invest in the Joint Strike Fighter program and 
use those aircraft to replace their AV-8B Harriers and F/A-18 C/D's.
  Furthermore, the Congress has stated that an annual production rate 
of 72 E/F aircraft is probably not feasible due to funding limitations 
and directed the Navy to calculate costs based on more realistic 
production rates as 18, 36, and 54 aircraft per year. In fact, 
according to the Congressional Research Service: ``* * * no naval 
aircraft have been bought in such quantities in recent years, and it is 
unlikely that such annual buys will be funded in the 1990's, given 
expected force reductions and lower inventory requirements and the 
absence of consensus about future military threats.''

  Using the Navy's overstated assumptions about the total number of 
planes procured and an estimated annual production rate of 72 aircraft 
per year, the Navy calculates the unit recurring flyaway cost of the F/
A-18 E/F--costs related to the production of the basic aircraft--at $44 
million. However, using GAO's more realistic assumptions of the 
procurement of 660 aircraft by the Navy, at a production rate of 36 
aircraft per year, the unit recurring flyaway cost of the E/F balloons 
to $53 million. This is compared to the $28 million unit recurring 
flyaway cost of the F/A-18 C/D based on a production rate of 36 
aircraft per year. Thus, GAO estimates that this cost difference in 
unit recurring flyaway would result in a savings of almost $17 billion 
if the Navy were to procure the F/A-18 C/D's rather than the E/F's.
  Mr. President, this is certainly a significant amount of savings. Now 
I know that some of my colleagues will say that by halting production 
of the F/A-18 E/F and instead relying on the F/A-18 C/D, we will be 
mortgaging the future of our Naval aviation fleet. However, Mr. 
President, there is a far less costly program already being developed 
which may yield more significant returns in operational capability. 
This program is the Joint Strike Fighter or JSF Program.
  The JSF Program office is currently developing technology for a 
family of affordable next generation multirole strike fighter aircraft 
for the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy. The JSF is expected to be a 
stealthy strike aircraft built on a single production line with a high 
degree of parts and cost commonality. The driving focus of the JSF is 
affordability achieved by triservice commonality. The Navy plans to 
procure 300 JSF's with a projected initial operational capability 
around 2007.
  Contractor concept exploration and demonstration studies indicate 
that the JSF will have superior or comparable capabilities in all Navy 
tactical aircraft mission areas, especially range and survivability, at 
far less cost than the F/A-18 E/F. The JSF is expected to be a stand 
alone, stealthy, first-day-of-the-war, survivable aircraft. Overall, 
the JSF is expected to be more survivable and capable than any existing 
or planned tactical aircraft in strike and air-to-air missions, with 
the possible exception of the F-22 in air-to-air missions. The Navy's 
JSF variant is also expected to have longer ranges than the F/A-18 E/F 
to attack high-value targets without using external tanks or tanking. 
Unlike the F/A-18 E/F which would carry all of its weapons externally, 
the Navy's JSF will carry at least four weapons for both air-to-air and 
air-to-ground combat internally, thereby maximizing its stealthiness 
and increasing its survivability. Finally, the JSF would not require 
jamming support from EA-6B aircraft as does the F/A-18 E/F in carrying 
out its mission in the face of integrated air defense systems.
  While the JSF is expected to have superior operational capabilities, 
it is expected to be developed and procured at far less expense than 
the F/A-18 E/F. In fact, the unit recurring flyaway cost of the Navy's 
JSF is estimated to range from $31-38 million depending on which 
contractor design is chosen for the aircraft, as compared to GAO's $53 
million estimate for the F/A-18 E/F. Additional cost benefits of the 
JSF would result from having common aircraft spare parts, simplified 
technical specifications, and reduced support equipment variations, as 
well as reductions in aircrew and maintenance training requirements.
  Mr. President, given the enormous cost and marginal improvement in 
operational capabilities the F/A-18 E/F would provide, it seems that 
the justification for the E/F is not as evident as once thought. 
Operational deficiencies in the C/D aircraft either have not 
materialized or can be corrected with nonstructural changes to the 
plane. As a result, proceeding with the E/F program may not be the most 
cost-effective approach to modernizing the Navy's tactical aircraft 
fleet. In the short term, the Navy can continue to procure the F/A-18 
C/D aircraft, while upgrading it to improve further its operational 
capabilities. For the long term, the Navy can look toward the next 
generation strike fighter, the JSF, which will provide more operational 
capability at far less cost than the E/F.
  Mr. President, succinctly put, the Navy needs an aircraft that will 
bridge between the current force and the new, superior JSF which will 
be operational around 2007. The question is whether the F/A-18 C/D can 
serve that function, as it has demonstrated its ability to exceed 
predicted capacity or whether we should proceed with an expensive, new 
plane for a marginal level of improvement. The $17 billion difference 
in projected costs does not appear to provide a significant return on 
our investment. In times of severe fiscal constraints and a need to 
look at all areas of the budget to identify more cost-effective 
approaches, the F/A-18 E/F is a project in need of reevaluation.
  Last year, I offered an amendment to the fiscal year 1997 
authorization bill for the Department of Defense that required the 
Pentagon to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of the F/A-18 E/F Program, 
and to report their findings to the Congress by March 30, 1997. This 
study was to include a review of the E/F program, an analysis and 
estimate of the production costs of the program for the total number of 
aircraft expected to be procured at several different production rates 
and a comparison of the costs and benefits of this program with the 
costs and benefits of the C/D Program. That analysis has not been 
forwarded to the Congress as of this date.
  In addition to this report, the Quadrennial Defense Review [QDR], 
responsible for evaluating all weapon system programs, is also 
scheduled to be completed in the near future.
  Unfortunately, I was enormously disappointed when the Secretary of 
Defense, rather than waiting for these reports to be completed and 
publicly released, announced on March 28 his decision to move forward 
with the E/F Program and procure 62 new F/A-18 E/F fighter planes at an 
initial cost of $48 million each.
  I would have hoped that the Secretary, who I have tremendous respect 
and admiration for, would have waited until the mandated reports had 
been provided to Congress and until the results of the QDR--which could 
have a significant impact on the Pentagon's tactical aircraft 
modernization plans--had been made public. Instead, this perplexing 
decision to proceed with the procurement of 62 of these expensive 
planes precludes the Congress from offering any input on the 
Department's policy based on a review of the required reports. I am 
puzzled as to why the new Secretary did not await these reports before 
announcing this decision.
  The 1996 GAO report concluded that we could achieve almost $17 
billion in cost savings if the Navy elected to procure additional C/D 
versions of the F/A-18 rather than the costlier E/F model. Mr. 
President, by all accounts the F/A-18 C/D is a top quality aircraft 
that has served the Navy well over the last decade, and could be 
modified to meet every capacity the E/F is intended to fulfill over the 
course of the next decade at a substantially lower cost.
  Therefore, considering the Department of Defense has clearly 
overextended itself in terms of supporting

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three major multirole fighter programs, and given that the most 
promising tactical aviation program appears to be the triservice joint 
strike fighter which will likely outperform the F/A-18 E/F at a 
substantially lower cost, it is clear that we must discontinue the E/F 
Program before the American taxpayer is asked to fund yet another 
multibillion dollar duplicative program.
  I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                 S. 520

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. TERMINATION OF THE F/A-18E/F AIRCRAFT PROGRAM.

       (a) Termination of Program.--The Secretary of Defense shall 
     terminate the F/A-18E/F aircraft program.
       (b) Payment of Termination Costs.--Funds available for 
     procurement and for research, development, test, and 
     evaluation that are available on or after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act for obligation for the F/A-18E/F 
     aircraft program may be obligated for that program only for 
     payment of the costs associated with the termination of the 
     program.
                                 ______