[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 40 (Tuesday, April 8, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2811-S2813]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                      CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I want to add my voice to the statement 
that the Senator from North Dakota made a little earlier in the 
proceedings about the importance of us getting on to a vote on the 
Chemical Weapons Convention. I believe very firmly that this is an 
issue which has been hanging around the Senate for too long. We have 
had many--in fact, years of consideration. We have had, I believe, 14 
hearings now on the Chemical Weapons Convention.
  The convention was supported, of course, by the previous 
administration. President Bush signed the agreement. We need now in 
this administration, the second Clinton administration, to go ahead and 
ratify it. There is an important date coming up which is the 29th of 
April, which is the date by which we need to take action. Let me 
address that issue first, because I know the Senator from Oklahoma did 
speak to the fact that, in his opinion, April 29 was not a date of any 
consequence and it did not matter whether we did anything this month or 
not on the treaty. This is sort of a recent argument that has been made 
and one I think needs to be responded to.
  A failure to ratify by April 29 will have significant adverse 
consequences for our security and for U.S. businesses as well. Our 
ability to oversee the first critical days and months of implementation 
of the treaty will be lost. We now have Americans who are heading up 
the various divisions that monitor the treaty's budget and security 
measures and industry inspections, and those individuals, those 
Americans who now are involved in that will be replaced by individuals 
from countries that have ratified the treaty if we do not take action 
by the 29th of April.
  Moreover, Americans will not be able to be hired as inspectors with 
these international teams if we do not ratify the treaty. Hundreds of 
millions of dollars in sales of American chemical companies and many 
jobs in many of our States will be at risk as a result of mandatory 
trade restrictions which were originally designed to pressure rogue 
states to join in the treaty. Those will be applied to us, Mr. 
President, if we do not go ahead and vote and ratify this treaty.
  Failure to ratify, of course, relegates us to the so-called 
international pariahs that we give a lot of speeches about here on the 
Senate floor, countries like Libya and North Korea. We would be 
squandering U.S. international leadership in the fight against chemical

[[Page S2812]]

weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.
  There have been many speeches given on the floor and by our President 
about how the United States, at this particular point in history, is 
the indispensable Nation. We are the one remaining superpower in the 
world, both militarily and economically and, as such, we have a 
particular responsibility to lead. Our failure to take action on this 
treaty on the Senate floor is an abrogation or default of that 
responsibility and one I think that I do not want to be any party to.
  Another issue that has been raised, which I think needs to be 
addressed, is this issue which involves the question of whether or not 
the Chemical Weapons Convention could be interpreted as providing rogue 
states with the ability to acquire advanced U.S. technologies if we 
enter into this treaty. The issue was raised at the Armed Services 
Committee hearing that we had a couple of weeks ago. In fact, the 
Senator from Oklahoma was there and requested that we get some kind of 
statement from our Department of Defense in writing about their view of 
this.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a letter dated April 2 to 
Senator Robert Smith and signed by Franklin Miller, who is the Acting 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:
                                   Assistant Secretary of Defense,


                                             Defense Pentagon,

                                    Washington, DC, April 2, 1997.
     Hon. Robert C. Smith,
     Senate Dirken Office Building,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Smith: During my 5 March 1997 testimony before 
     the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces of the Senate Armed 
     Services Committee, several questions were raised regarding 
     the impact of the Chemical Weapons Convention on the ability 
     of rogue nations to acquire advanced U.S. technologies and 
     the impact of the Convention on U.S. industry. I am pleased 
     to provide the Administration's official response on these 
     matters.
       Article X: Assistance and Protection Against Chemical 
     Weapons. One concern expressed during the hearing was whether 
     Article X of the CWC might force us to share with nations 
     like Iran our most advanced chemical defense technologies and 
     equipment. I am pleased to reconfirm that Article X, which 
     establishes procedures for State Party requests and possible 
     responses to requests for assistance against chemical 
     weapons, does not require the U.S. to share its advanced 
     chemical weapons defenses and defensive technologies with 
     countries such as Iran. Assistance is defined in the treaty 
     as including items ranging from protective equipment to 
     medical antidotes and treatments.
       States Parties obligations under Article X may be met in 
     one of three ways--by contributing to the voluntary fund 
     (managed by the Organization); by concluding agreements with 
     the Organization concerning the procurement, on demand, of 
     specific types of assistance; or by declaring (within 180 
     days after the CWC's entry-into-force) the kind of assistance 
     it might provide in response to an appeal by the 
     Organization. To meet its obligations under Article X 
     therefore, the U.S. can choose from a variety of options and 
     forms of assistance none of which require sharing our most 
     advanced chemical defense or equipment.
       Senator Inhofe raised a particular concern regarding 
     Paragraph 3 of Article X. This paragraph states that ``Each 
     Party undertakes to facilitate, and shall have the right to 
     participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, 
     material and scientific and technological information 
     concerning the means of protection against chemical 
     weapons.'' The inclusion of the words ``facilitate'' and 
     ``possible'' underscores that no specific exchange is 
     required and that any exchange which does occur is limited to 
     that which we determine would be appropriate and permitted 
     under the Convention.
       A specific concern also was raised regarding whether 
     paragraph 5 of Article X would require the release of 
     advanced and classified information about defensive 
     capabilities and technologies. Paragraph 5 requires the 
     international Technical Secretariat that administers the 
     Convention to establish and maintain ``for the use of any 
     requesting State Party, a data bank containing freely 
     available information concerning various means of protection 
     against chemical weapons as well as such information as may 
     be provided by States Parties.'' As stated in the Article-by-
     Article Analysis submitted to the Senate on November 23, 
     1993, ``freely available'' means ``from open public 
     sources.'' Further, the CWC imposes no obligation on states 
     parties to contribute to this database. Hence, the provision 
     will not require the release of classified or otherwise 
     sensitive information about U.S. chemical defenses.
       Article XI: Economic and Technological Development. A 
     second area of concern raised in the hearing was whether 
     Article XI of the CWC, which relates to cooperation in the 
     field of chemical activities for purposes not prohibited by 
     the CWC, might force our industry to share dual-use 
     technologies and manufacturing secrets with other nations. 
     Article XI does not require private businesses to release 
     such proprietary or otherwise confidential business 
     information, nor does it require the U.S. Government to force 
     private businesses to undertake such actions.
       Access to Information During Inspections. A final area of 
     concern raised during the hearing was whether the CWC might 
     permit nations, such as Iran, to have access to some of our 
     most critical technologies and manufacturing secrets during 
     inspections. In this context, a question was raised as to 
     whether the CWC required modification to preclude rogue 
     nations from getting access to our technologies during 
     inspections.
       The CWC will not provide nations, such as Iran, with access 
     to our most critical technologies and manufacturing secrets. 
     The CWC, which was written with the help of U.S. chemical 
     industry representatives, already contains important 
     protections for industry, including provisions relating to 
     routine and challenge inspections that were designed to 
     protect against the loss of confidential business 
     information.
       The Convention stipulates that States Parties have the 
     right to prohibit inspectors of any nationality from 
     conducting inspections within their territory or any other 
     place under their jurisdiction or control. Additionally, in 
     the case of challenge inspections, the Convention stipulates 
     that the inspected State Party has the right to reject 
     inclusion on the inspection team of an observer from the 
     country requesting the challenge. The Convention stipulates 
     that these teams are composed of international civil servants 
     ``who meet the highest standards of efficiency, competence 
     and integrity.'' If they violate their obligations to hold 
     all information confidential they will be subject to severe 
     penalties, including the possible loss of immunity from 
     prosecution by the inspected State Party.
       The Confidentiality Annex to the Convention provides 
     further protection for confidential information at facilities 
     undergoing inspections. Paragraph 13, for example, specifies 
     that ``States Parties may take such measures as they deem 
     necessary to protect confidentiality, provided they 
     fulfill their obligations to demonstrate compliance. . . 
     .'' Paragraph 16 requires ``due regard . . . to the 
     requirement of protecting confidential information,'' 
     while paragraph 17 limits the information in the 
     international inspectorate reports to ``only . . . facts 
     relevant to compliance.''
       With regard to the question of access, in neither routine 
     inspections nor challenge inspections does the Convention 
     require any facility to allow inspectors unlimited access. 
     For routine inspections, the United States has the right to 
     negotiate a facility agreement for each facility, which will 
     define the degree of access that inspectors would have, 
     including ``specific and detailed arrangements with regard to 
     the determination of those areas of the facility to which 
     inspectors are granted access'' (Paragraph 16 of 
     Confidentiality Annex). This facility agreement would provide 
     the facility with the opportunity to protect sensitive 
     information. Moreover, since advance notice would be given 
     for routine inspections, the facility would have ample time 
     to prepare for the inspection.
       In the case of challenge inspections, the CWC also provides 
     for ``managed access'' that will be conducted in accordance 
     with constitutional obligations with regard to proprietary 
     rights or searches and seizures. Moreover, the facility that 
     is challenged will participate in the negotiations on the 
     degree of permissible access. While the U.S. and the facility 
     shall make every reasonable effort to provide the inspection 
     team an alternative means to satisfy the stated concerns 
     about the facility's compliance, the facility is not 
     obligated to allow inspectors to have unfettered access 
     within the facility.
       I hope this information clarifies the matters that were 
     raised during the 5 March 1997 hearing. As I stated in my 
     opening remarks, the Department of Defense firmly believes 
     that the Chemical Weapons Convention is in the national 
     security interests of the United States. We strongly support 
     its prompt ratification by the United States and approval of 
     its accompanying implementing legislation. If I may be of 
     further assistance to you and to the members of your 
     Subcommittee, please do not hesitate to contact me.
           Sincerely,
                                      Franklin C. Miller (Acting).

  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, this letter goes into great detail about 
why there is no provision in the treaty and there is nothing in the 
treaty that our Department of Defense would interpret as putting an 
obligation on us to provide sensitive technologies to rogue states:

       Senator Inhofe raised a particular concern regarding 
     Paragraph 3 of Article X. This paragraph states that ``Each 
     Party undertakes to facilitate, and shall have the right to 
     participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, 
     material and scientific and technological information 
     concerning the means of protection against chemical 
     weapons.''

  The letter goes on to say:


[[Page S2813]]


       The inclusion of the words ``facilitate'' and ``possible'' 
     underscores that no specific exchange is required and that 
     any exchange which does occur is limited to that which we 
     determine would be appropriate and permitted under the 
     Convention.

  I think it is clear from this analysis that our own Department of 
Defense feels very comfortable with the provisions of this Chemical 
Weapons Convention. The overriding context that this convention is 
presented to us in has to be considered, Mr. President, whenever you 
are debating the chemical weapons treaty or the Chemical Weapons 
Convention.

  Sometime over a decade ago, the United States made a decision to 
terminate the use of chemical weapons and, in fact, to destroy our 
stockpile of chemical weapons. President Reagan signed the law to do 
just that. In accordance with that, President Bush came along, after 
President Reagan, and went ahead and carried out that policy and 
entered into the Chemical Weapons Convention on behalf of the country 
and sent the treaty to the Senate for consideration. It has been 
languishing here ever since President Bush sent it here for 
consideration.
  I think that we would have a very different debate and you would have 
a very different lineup of people on different sides of this issue--
and, frankly, you would have many more people in opposition to this 
treaty--if, in fact, we had not made a decision and put in our own law 
a provision to renounce the use of chemical weapons. But we did. We 
made that decision. President Reagan signed that law.
  And now for people to come to the floor and say, no, no, we are going 
to be putting ourselves at some kind of disadvantage if we enter into a 
treaty with 161 other countries which would subject them to the same 
kind of policy decision which we already made some decade ago, just has 
no logic to it.
  Clearly, there are problems in verifying this treaty. There are 
problems in verifying any treaty. They are probably complicated when it 
comes to verifying a treaty to ban chemical weapons because it takes 
such a small amount of technology and such a small amount of space to 
produce chemical weapons. But that does not mean that we should just 
give up on any and all efforts to verify and any and all efforts to 
inspect.
  I think Madeleine Albright, our Secretary of State, made the point 
very well in a statement she made yesterday where she said, just 
because there may be people--and there are people--who will continue to 
murder and pillage and sell drugs, does not mean we should not pass 
laws to prohibit that. We should pass those laws. We should do our very 
best to enforce those laws and implement them. That is true with 
chemical weapons as well.
  There may be people--and there undoubtedly will be--some rogue states 
and some individual groups, terrorist groups, that try to violate this 
treaty. All I can say is, we need to redouble our efforts to enforce 
the treaty once we ratify it. We need to work with other countries to 
gain their assistance in doing that enforcement.
  Clearly, it is in the best interest of the people of this country 
that we take every action we possibly can to reduce the likelihood that 
chemical weapons will ever be used against Americans in future 
conflicts or in a nonconflict situation. Perhaps the biggest threat 
that we face is not in the use of chemical weapons in a conflict. The 
biggest threat may be the kind of an incident that occurred in Japan in 
a subway where a terrorist group decides that for some perverted reason 
they are going to engage in the use of chemical weapons. This treaty 
will help us to ferret out those kinds of incidents, those kinds of 
risks and to deal with them ahead of time. I think it is clearly in our 
best interest to do so.
  Mr. President, let me just say that I have confidence that the 
Senate, if allowed to vote on this issue, will vote by the necessary 
supermajority to go ahead and pass the treaty and ratify the treaty. 
What we are up against now is an inability to get the treaty to the 
floor for a vote. And that, I think, is a very sad procedural 
circumstance that we have. We have a committee chair who has announced 
that he may or may not allow this issue to be reported from the 
committee so that the full Senate can express its will on the subject.
  Mr. President, I hope very much that my colleagues will join me in 
seeing to it that we do get this issue to the floor, and that we go 
ahead and vote on the treaty. If a Senator wants to vote against the 
Chemical Weapons Convention and go home and explain to his or her 
constituents why they voted against the Chemical Weapons Convention, 
then fine. That is the way the system is supposed to work.
  But for us to deny Members the right to vote is really indefensible, 
in my view, on an issue of this importance. This is tremendously 
important. I have urged, as several Members know, the Democratic 
leader, and indicated to the majority leader that I thought it was 
irresponsible for the Senate to continue doing business as usual while 
this issue continues to languish in committee.
  The deadline is approaching. This is time sensitive. We need to go 
ahead and get the issue to the floor and allow a good debate, allow 
amendments, and allow a vote on the Chemical Weapons Convention.
  I think that needs to be our top priority this April. And we are 
still early enough in the month that we can bring this to the floor, 
debate it, vote on it, and let the Senate do its will. The American 
people have a right to expect that from us. And clearly we need to go 
ahead and follow that course of action.
  I think for us to continue with discussions about: Well, it does not 
really matter whether we sign up now or sign up in June or maybe July 
or maybe this fall some time, that is not accurate, Mr. President. It 
does matter. And we will be giving up a leadership role that we should 
have on arms control issues. We will be giving up a leadership role we 
should have on the banning of chemical weapons. Clearly, I think that 
is contrary to the best interests of the people I represent and 
contrary to the best interests of the American people generally.
  Mr. President, I urge the majority leader and my colleagues on both 
sides of the aisle to put aside other business, and bring this issue to 
the floor. Let us vote on it. Let us have a debate. Anyone who wants to 
offer an amendment should be able to do that. Anyone who wants to offer 
implementing legislation should be able to do that. The Senate should 
vote on it, and then get about other business. So I hope that is the 
course we follow.
  Mr. President, I know there will be additional chances this afternoon 
and later on to debate this issue in more depth. I look forward to 
those. I believe very firmly that this is one of the most important 
issues this Congress, this 105th Congress, will address. I hope very 
much that we will clear the other procedural matters and the other 
substantive matters that are on the agenda and get on to a vote on the 
Chemical Weapons Convention.
  Mr. President, with that I yield the floor and suggest the absence of 
a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Ashcroft). The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________