[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 40 (Tuesday, April 8, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2811-S2813]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I want to add my voice to the statement
that the Senator from North Dakota made a little earlier in the
proceedings about the importance of us getting on to a vote on the
Chemical Weapons Convention. I believe very firmly that this is an
issue which has been hanging around the Senate for too long. We have
had many--in fact, years of consideration. We have had, I believe, 14
hearings now on the Chemical Weapons Convention.
The convention was supported, of course, by the previous
administration. President Bush signed the agreement. We need now in
this administration, the second Clinton administration, to go ahead and
ratify it. There is an important date coming up which is the 29th of
April, which is the date by which we need to take action. Let me
address that issue first, because I know the Senator from Oklahoma did
speak to the fact that, in his opinion, April 29 was not a date of any
consequence and it did not matter whether we did anything this month or
not on the treaty. This is sort of a recent argument that has been made
and one I think needs to be responded to.
A failure to ratify by April 29 will have significant adverse
consequences for our security and for U.S. businesses as well. Our
ability to oversee the first critical days and months of implementation
of the treaty will be lost. We now have Americans who are heading up
the various divisions that monitor the treaty's budget and security
measures and industry inspections, and those individuals, those
Americans who now are involved in that will be replaced by individuals
from countries that have ratified the treaty if we do not take action
by the 29th of April.
Moreover, Americans will not be able to be hired as inspectors with
these international teams if we do not ratify the treaty. Hundreds of
millions of dollars in sales of American chemical companies and many
jobs in many of our States will be at risk as a result of mandatory
trade restrictions which were originally designed to pressure rogue
states to join in the treaty. Those will be applied to us, Mr.
President, if we do not go ahead and vote and ratify this treaty.
Failure to ratify, of course, relegates us to the so-called
international pariahs that we give a lot of speeches about here on the
Senate floor, countries like Libya and North Korea. We would be
squandering U.S. international leadership in the fight against chemical
[[Page S2812]]
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.
There have been many speeches given on the floor and by our President
about how the United States, at this particular point in history, is
the indispensable Nation. We are the one remaining superpower in the
world, both militarily and economically and, as such, we have a
particular responsibility to lead. Our failure to take action on this
treaty on the Senate floor is an abrogation or default of that
responsibility and one I think that I do not want to be any party to.
Another issue that has been raised, which I think needs to be
addressed, is this issue which involves the question of whether or not
the Chemical Weapons Convention could be interpreted as providing rogue
states with the ability to acquire advanced U.S. technologies if we
enter into this treaty. The issue was raised at the Armed Services
Committee hearing that we had a couple of weeks ago. In fact, the
Senator from Oklahoma was there and requested that we get some kind of
statement from our Department of Defense in writing about their view of
this.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a letter dated April 2 to
Senator Robert Smith and signed by Franklin Miller, who is the Acting
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Defense Pentagon,
Washington, DC, April 2, 1997.
Hon. Robert C. Smith,
Senate Dirken Office Building,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Smith: During my 5 March 1997 testimony before
the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces of the Senate Armed
Services Committee, several questions were raised regarding
the impact of the Chemical Weapons Convention on the ability
of rogue nations to acquire advanced U.S. technologies and
the impact of the Convention on U.S. industry. I am pleased
to provide the Administration's official response on these
matters.
Article X: Assistance and Protection Against Chemical
Weapons. One concern expressed during the hearing was whether
Article X of the CWC might force us to share with nations
like Iran our most advanced chemical defense technologies and
equipment. I am pleased to reconfirm that Article X, which
establishes procedures for State Party requests and possible
responses to requests for assistance against chemical
weapons, does not require the U.S. to share its advanced
chemical weapons defenses and defensive technologies with
countries such as Iran. Assistance is defined in the treaty
as including items ranging from protective equipment to
medical antidotes and treatments.
States Parties obligations under Article X may be met in
one of three ways--by contributing to the voluntary fund
(managed by the Organization); by concluding agreements with
the Organization concerning the procurement, on demand, of
specific types of assistance; or by declaring (within 180
days after the CWC's entry-into-force) the kind of assistance
it might provide in response to an appeal by the
Organization. To meet its obligations under Article X
therefore, the U.S. can choose from a variety of options and
forms of assistance none of which require sharing our most
advanced chemical defense or equipment.
Senator Inhofe raised a particular concern regarding
Paragraph 3 of Article X. This paragraph states that ``Each
Party undertakes to facilitate, and shall have the right to
participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment,
material and scientific and technological information
concerning the means of protection against chemical
weapons.'' The inclusion of the words ``facilitate'' and
``possible'' underscores that no specific exchange is
required and that any exchange which does occur is limited to
that which we determine would be appropriate and permitted
under the Convention.
A specific concern also was raised regarding whether
paragraph 5 of Article X would require the release of
advanced and classified information about defensive
capabilities and technologies. Paragraph 5 requires the
international Technical Secretariat that administers the
Convention to establish and maintain ``for the use of any
requesting State Party, a data bank containing freely
available information concerning various means of protection
against chemical weapons as well as such information as may
be provided by States Parties.'' As stated in the Article-by-
Article Analysis submitted to the Senate on November 23,
1993, ``freely available'' means ``from open public
sources.'' Further, the CWC imposes no obligation on states
parties to contribute to this database. Hence, the provision
will not require the release of classified or otherwise
sensitive information about U.S. chemical defenses.
Article XI: Economic and Technological Development. A
second area of concern raised in the hearing was whether
Article XI of the CWC, which relates to cooperation in the
field of chemical activities for purposes not prohibited by
the CWC, might force our industry to share dual-use
technologies and manufacturing secrets with other nations.
Article XI does not require private businesses to release
such proprietary or otherwise confidential business
information, nor does it require the U.S. Government to force
private businesses to undertake such actions.
Access to Information During Inspections. A final area of
concern raised during the hearing was whether the CWC might
permit nations, such as Iran, to have access to some of our
most critical technologies and manufacturing secrets during
inspections. In this context, a question was raised as to
whether the CWC required modification to preclude rogue
nations from getting access to our technologies during
inspections.
The CWC will not provide nations, such as Iran, with access
to our most critical technologies and manufacturing secrets.
The CWC, which was written with the help of U.S. chemical
industry representatives, already contains important
protections for industry, including provisions relating to
routine and challenge inspections that were designed to
protect against the loss of confidential business
information.
The Convention stipulates that States Parties have the
right to prohibit inspectors of any nationality from
conducting inspections within their territory or any other
place under their jurisdiction or control. Additionally, in
the case of challenge inspections, the Convention stipulates
that the inspected State Party has the right to reject
inclusion on the inspection team of an observer from the
country requesting the challenge. The Convention stipulates
that these teams are composed of international civil servants
``who meet the highest standards of efficiency, competence
and integrity.'' If they violate their obligations to hold
all information confidential they will be subject to severe
penalties, including the possible loss of immunity from
prosecution by the inspected State Party.
The Confidentiality Annex to the Convention provides
further protection for confidential information at facilities
undergoing inspections. Paragraph 13, for example, specifies
that ``States Parties may take such measures as they deem
necessary to protect confidentiality, provided they
fulfill their obligations to demonstrate compliance. . .
.'' Paragraph 16 requires ``due regard . . . to the
requirement of protecting confidential information,''
while paragraph 17 limits the information in the
international inspectorate reports to ``only . . . facts
relevant to compliance.''
With regard to the question of access, in neither routine
inspections nor challenge inspections does the Convention
require any facility to allow inspectors unlimited access.
For routine inspections, the United States has the right to
negotiate a facility agreement for each facility, which will
define the degree of access that inspectors would have,
including ``specific and detailed arrangements with regard to
the determination of those areas of the facility to which
inspectors are granted access'' (Paragraph 16 of
Confidentiality Annex). This facility agreement would provide
the facility with the opportunity to protect sensitive
information. Moreover, since advance notice would be given
for routine inspections, the facility would have ample time
to prepare for the inspection.
In the case of challenge inspections, the CWC also provides
for ``managed access'' that will be conducted in accordance
with constitutional obligations with regard to proprietary
rights or searches and seizures. Moreover, the facility that
is challenged will participate in the negotiations on the
degree of permissible access. While the U.S. and the facility
shall make every reasonable effort to provide the inspection
team an alternative means to satisfy the stated concerns
about the facility's compliance, the facility is not
obligated to allow inspectors to have unfettered access
within the facility.
I hope this information clarifies the matters that were
raised during the 5 March 1997 hearing. As I stated in my
opening remarks, the Department of Defense firmly believes
that the Chemical Weapons Convention is in the national
security interests of the United States. We strongly support
its prompt ratification by the United States and approval of
its accompanying implementing legislation. If I may be of
further assistance to you and to the members of your
Subcommittee, please do not hesitate to contact me.
Sincerely,
Franklin C. Miller (Acting).
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, this letter goes into great detail about
why there is no provision in the treaty and there is nothing in the
treaty that our Department of Defense would interpret as putting an
obligation on us to provide sensitive technologies to rogue states:
Senator Inhofe raised a particular concern regarding
Paragraph 3 of Article X. This paragraph states that ``Each
Party undertakes to facilitate, and shall have the right to
participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment,
material and scientific and technological information
concerning the means of protection against chemical
weapons.''
The letter goes on to say:
[[Page S2813]]
The inclusion of the words ``facilitate'' and ``possible''
underscores that no specific exchange is required and that
any exchange which does occur is limited to that which we
determine would be appropriate and permitted under the
Convention.
I think it is clear from this analysis that our own Department of
Defense feels very comfortable with the provisions of this Chemical
Weapons Convention. The overriding context that this convention is
presented to us in has to be considered, Mr. President, whenever you
are debating the chemical weapons treaty or the Chemical Weapons
Convention.
Sometime over a decade ago, the United States made a decision to
terminate the use of chemical weapons and, in fact, to destroy our
stockpile of chemical weapons. President Reagan signed the law to do
just that. In accordance with that, President Bush came along, after
President Reagan, and went ahead and carried out that policy and
entered into the Chemical Weapons Convention on behalf of the country
and sent the treaty to the Senate for consideration. It has been
languishing here ever since President Bush sent it here for
consideration.
I think that we would have a very different debate and you would have
a very different lineup of people on different sides of this issue--
and, frankly, you would have many more people in opposition to this
treaty--if, in fact, we had not made a decision and put in our own law
a provision to renounce the use of chemical weapons. But we did. We
made that decision. President Reagan signed that law.
And now for people to come to the floor and say, no, no, we are going
to be putting ourselves at some kind of disadvantage if we enter into a
treaty with 161 other countries which would subject them to the same
kind of policy decision which we already made some decade ago, just has
no logic to it.
Clearly, there are problems in verifying this treaty. There are
problems in verifying any treaty. They are probably complicated when it
comes to verifying a treaty to ban chemical weapons because it takes
such a small amount of technology and such a small amount of space to
produce chemical weapons. But that does not mean that we should just
give up on any and all efforts to verify and any and all efforts to
inspect.
I think Madeleine Albright, our Secretary of State, made the point
very well in a statement she made yesterday where she said, just
because there may be people--and there are people--who will continue to
murder and pillage and sell drugs, does not mean we should not pass
laws to prohibit that. We should pass those laws. We should do our very
best to enforce those laws and implement them. That is true with
chemical weapons as well.
There may be people--and there undoubtedly will be--some rogue states
and some individual groups, terrorist groups, that try to violate this
treaty. All I can say is, we need to redouble our efforts to enforce
the treaty once we ratify it. We need to work with other countries to
gain their assistance in doing that enforcement.
Clearly, it is in the best interest of the people of this country
that we take every action we possibly can to reduce the likelihood that
chemical weapons will ever be used against Americans in future
conflicts or in a nonconflict situation. Perhaps the biggest threat
that we face is not in the use of chemical weapons in a conflict. The
biggest threat may be the kind of an incident that occurred in Japan in
a subway where a terrorist group decides that for some perverted reason
they are going to engage in the use of chemical weapons. This treaty
will help us to ferret out those kinds of incidents, those kinds of
risks and to deal with them ahead of time. I think it is clearly in our
best interest to do so.
Mr. President, let me just say that I have confidence that the
Senate, if allowed to vote on this issue, will vote by the necessary
supermajority to go ahead and pass the treaty and ratify the treaty.
What we are up against now is an inability to get the treaty to the
floor for a vote. And that, I think, is a very sad procedural
circumstance that we have. We have a committee chair who has announced
that he may or may not allow this issue to be reported from the
committee so that the full Senate can express its will on the subject.
Mr. President, I hope very much that my colleagues will join me in
seeing to it that we do get this issue to the floor, and that we go
ahead and vote on the treaty. If a Senator wants to vote against the
Chemical Weapons Convention and go home and explain to his or her
constituents why they voted against the Chemical Weapons Convention,
then fine. That is the way the system is supposed to work.
But for us to deny Members the right to vote is really indefensible,
in my view, on an issue of this importance. This is tremendously
important. I have urged, as several Members know, the Democratic
leader, and indicated to the majority leader that I thought it was
irresponsible for the Senate to continue doing business as usual while
this issue continues to languish in committee.
The deadline is approaching. This is time sensitive. We need to go
ahead and get the issue to the floor and allow a good debate, allow
amendments, and allow a vote on the Chemical Weapons Convention.
I think that needs to be our top priority this April. And we are
still early enough in the month that we can bring this to the floor,
debate it, vote on it, and let the Senate do its will. The American
people have a right to expect that from us. And clearly we need to go
ahead and follow that course of action.
I think for us to continue with discussions about: Well, it does not
really matter whether we sign up now or sign up in June or maybe July
or maybe this fall some time, that is not accurate, Mr. President. It
does matter. And we will be giving up a leadership role that we should
have on arms control issues. We will be giving up a leadership role we
should have on the banning of chemical weapons. Clearly, I think that
is contrary to the best interests of the people I represent and
contrary to the best interests of the American people generally.
Mr. President, I urge the majority leader and my colleagues on both
sides of the aisle to put aside other business, and bring this issue to
the floor. Let us vote on it. Let us have a debate. Anyone who wants to
offer an amendment should be able to do that. Anyone who wants to offer
implementing legislation should be able to do that. The Senate should
vote on it, and then get about other business. So I hope that is the
course we follow.
Mr. President, I know there will be additional chances this afternoon
and later on to debate this issue in more depth. I look forward to
those. I believe very firmly that this is one of the most important
issues this Congress, this 105th Congress, will address. I hope very
much that we will clear the other procedural matters and the other
substantive matters that are on the agenda and get on to a vote on the
Chemical Weapons Convention.
Mr. President, with that I yield the floor and suggest the absence of
a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Ashcroft). The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
____________________