[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 40 (Tuesday, April 8, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2809-S2811]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                      CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I have the utmost respect for my 
distinguished colleague from North Dakota, Senator Dorgan. I have to 
admit, however, I seem to disagree with him more than agree with him. 
Let me just cover a couple of things that he said that I feel quite 
strongly--I am sure he believes them, but they are certainly not true.
  First of all, as far as the deadline is concerned, it seems like 
every time you want to get something done you impose a deadline and say 
we have to do it by--in this case, the 29th of April. There is no 
deadline on this. Once this thing goes, the vote takes place, we can 
become a part of it if we want to wait until June or July or August. 
There is no deadline.
  I am reminded a little bit of the deadline they had when we had, I 
believe it was, the GATT Treaty. We had a special session of the U.S. 
Senate that was held in November, before the new Senate came in--this 
was in 1994--that would allow those individuals who were defeated or 
who retired to vote on something and not the new person who was 
elected. My daddy taught me a long time ago if the train is coming 
fast, slow it down. That is what we need to do with the Chemical 
Weapons Convention. We had a debate on this last fall. I think the 
debate was a very fruitful one, and a lot of things came out. So let us 
not talk about a deadline of the 29th. I look forward to debating this 
and discussing this with the Senator from North Dakota this afternoon.
  The next thing that he said that I take issue with is the idea that 
it is easier to oppose than to support the Chemical Weapons Convention. 
He is saying it is easier. Maybe it was easier for Mark Twain. This is 
not easier, because I will tell you I have been very outspoken in 
opposition to this Chemical Weapons Convention, and all I hear from 
people is, ``You mean you are for chemical weapons?'' That is not the 
issue at all. It is a lot easier to demagog this thing and say, ``Let's 
sign this and do away with chemical weapons.'' We are not going to do 
away with chemical weapons, and we all know that.
  As far as this is not a matter, as he stated, between the fuzzies and 
those in favor of a strong national defense, let us wait until the vote 
takes place and make that determination. I will wager that when the 
vote takes place, we will find out that those individuals with the 
highest American security ratings would be the ones who will oppose the 
Chemical Weapons Convention. That is a very easy thing to do. Just take 
the ratings and look and see how the vote comes out. Those individuals 
who consistently vote against such things as the National Missile 
Defense System, Theater Missile Defense System, vote for all of these 
disarmaments. A lot of the motive there is to put that money into 
social programs. I think we all know that.
  Let me just cover a couple of things in this brief period of time. 
First of all, this is not global. The Senator from North Dakota talked 
about Spain and about France and about all these countries. We don't 
have a problem with

[[Page S2810]]

these countries. Let us look and see who is not a part of this. Iraq is 
not a part of this.
  North Korea is not a part of this. Libya is not a part of this. Syria 
is not a part of this. If you ask any ``in'' person, in a logical 
manner, ``Who do you think would be the greatest threat to the United 
States,'' and you name the top 15, those countries would be there. It 
is not global. Those countries that involve themselves in terrorist 
activities are countries that are not a part of this. Of course, I 
think we all understand it does not cover terrorist activities anyway.
  Let's look at the countries that are a part. Iran is now a signatory 
here, and yet Iran, if anyone here believes that they will keep their 
word in destroying all of their chemical arsenal, then I have a bridge 
I would like to sell them, because that is not going to happen. We know 
it is not verifiable, and there is no better evidence of that than 
after the Persian Gulf war when the United Nations was given incredible 
power to go out and examine and inspect and try to determine whether or 
not Iraq, who we had just defeated, had chemical weapons, then we find 
out through our intelligence community, that even with those very 
stringent inspection abilities that the United Nations had, that Iraq, 
still, was developing various weapons of mass destruction, including 
chemical weapons.
  I think it is important to show that it is not effective, that it 
will not banish poison gas or shield our soldiers, as Clinton claims. 
Jane's Defense Weekly came out last week and reported that Russia has 
developed three new nerve agents without using any of the precursor 
chemicals banned by the Chemical Weapons Convention. What does that 
mean, Mr. President? It means that they are already out there trying to 
figure out and trying to develop chemical weapons that can be used that 
are not using the precursor chemicals that would be banned. In other 
words, let's assume everybody is honest and everybody is complying, it 
is all verifiable, and all the countries belong to it. When it gets 
down to it, the bottom line is, you can still come out with chemicals 
that do not use these precursor chemicals. So, it would not be 
effective in that respect.
  I think we should also look at the constitutionality of this. I know 
a lot of times things are passed around here over the fact that it is a 
violation of the Constitution. I happen to be the chairman of the Clean 
Air and Private Property and Wetlands Subcommittee of the Environment 
and Public Works Committee. It is almost a daily thing that the 
Government takes land away from people without due compensation. So we 
know that there are things happening that violate constitutional 
rights. But in this case, it would permit searches and seizures without 
warrants or probable cause. I think this is a very serious thing.
  And as far as trade secrets, we would be giving up something here. We 
all hear we are going to all destroy our chemical weapons. We have not 
stopped to realize what we are giving up in order to have this utopia 
that we seem to think is going to appear. One is, we have to open up 
and allow countries, like Iran, to inspect our chemical companies and 
our fertilizer companies and our cosmetic companies to see if there is 
anything in there that they are using and they would be able to get a 
lot of technology from this. This is something with which we have to be 
concerned.
  Then we have more regulations on American business. This is something 
that we deal with. I have often said there are three reasons we are not 
globally competitive in this country. One is we are overtaxed; the 
other is our tort laws; and the other is we are overregulated. How can 
we compete with other countries when we are overregulated? This is one 
more regulation, one more set of forms that all these companies--
cosmetic companies and others--will have to fill out.
  Then, of course, we have the thing that is talked about quite often, 
and that is, this is going to make us much more comfortable in terms of 
our defense against any type of chemical weapons.
  I have an editorial, that I will be asking in a minute to be printed 
in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks, from the Wall Street 
Journal. I hope my friend from North Dakota, the distinguished Senator 
who spoke before me, will listen to this. I will read the last couple 
of sentences in this editorial from the Wall Street Journal, which is 
dated February 19, 1997:

       The biggest danger of ratification is that it would 
     similarly lull the U.S. and other responsible nations into 
     the false belief that they are taking effective action 
     against the threat of chemical weapons. The case for this 
     treaty strains belief too far.

  Lastly, let me suggest that a lot of the people, who are very fine 
people, who have signed on and said, ``Yes, we want the United States 
to be a part of the Chemical Weapons Convention,'' have not really 
taken the time to study and see what we are giving up. I will share 
with you just a couple of things that came from a meeting of February 
27, 1997, when General Schwarzkopf, who is supportive of ratification 
of the Chemical Weapons Convention, was before our Senate Armed 
Services Committee, and I asked him a few questions.
  I asked him questions concerning how it would affect terrorists. Of 
course, he agreed it would not have any effect.
  Then I said:

       Do you think it wise to share with countries like Iran our 
     most advanced chemical defensive equipment and technologies?
       General Schwarzkopf. Our defensive capabilities?
       Senator Inhofe. Yes.
       General Schwarzkopf. Absolutely not.
       Senator Inhofe. Well, I'm talking about sharing our 
     advanced chemical defensive equipment and technologies, which 
     I believe under Article X [they] would be allow[ed]  . . . Do 
     you disagree?

  Then he said:

       I'm not familiar with all the details . . ..

  One of the problems we have is, so many people who are supporting the 
ratification of this Chemical Weapons Convention have not read all the 
details, have not read what we are giving up, I say to the 
distinguished Senator from North Dakota, and we are giving up many 
things that would normally be considered private.
  Lastly, I will say, in conclusion, that there are a lot of people who 
are opposed to this. They are very prominent in the defense community. 
Certainly, four of our past Secretaries of Defense are opposed to the 
ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Rumsfeld, Schlesinger, 
who, incidentally was in a Democrat administration, Weinberger, and 
Dick Cheney have all taken positions and said this is not in the best 
interest of the United States.
  So, I hope we will have a lengthy debate on this, and I am hoping, 
quite frankly, that we are not going to be able to bring this up until 
we have had a chance for a thorough debate.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the testimony from the 
Senate Armed Services Committee hearing of February 27, 1997, be 
printed in the Record, and immediately following that, the Wall Street 
Journal editorial dated February 19, 1997, be printed in the Record, in 
that order.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

Excerpt from the Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, February 27, 
                                  1997

       Senator Inhofe. If the Chemical Weapons Convention were in 
     effect, would we still face a danger of chemical attack from 
     such places as Iraq [which has not signed the CWC]--or Iran 
     [which] actually signed onto it?
       General Schwarzkopf. Senator, I think that the answer is 
     probably yes. But, I think the chances of that happening 
     could be diminished by the treaty only because it would then 
     be these people clearly standing up and thumbing their noses 
     at international law--and it would also help us build 
     coalitions against them if that were to happen.
       Senator Inhofe. Aren't they still thumbing their noses 
     right now in Iraq?
       General Schwarzkopf. There's no question about it, 
     Senator--I mean the fact that they used it in the first place 
     against their own people but, I still feel--we have renounced 
     the use of them and I am very uncomfortable placing ourselves 
     in the company with Iraq and Libya and countries such as 
     North Korea that have refused to sign that Convention. The 
     problem with those kinds of things is that verification is 
     very difficult and enforcement is very difficult. . . .
       Senator Inhofe. General Shali[kashvili] I think in August 
     of 1994 said that ``even one ton of chemical agent may have a 
     military impact.'' I would ask the question: Do you believe 
     that an intrusive, on-site inspection--as would be allowed by 
     the Chemical Weapons convention--would be able to detect a 
     single ton or could tell us conclusively that there isn't a 
     single ton?
       General Schwarzkopf. No, no as I said earlier, we can't 
     possibly know what's happening on every single inch of every 
     single territory out there where this would apply.

[[Page S2811]]

       Senator Inhofe. And as far as terrorists are concerned, 
     they would not be under this?
       General Schwarzkopf. Of course not.
       Senator Inhofe. Like any treaty, we have to give some 
     things up, and in this case, of course we do and there are a 
     couple of things that I'd like to [explore]--the 
     interpretation from the White House changed--they said that 
     if the Chemical Weapons Convention were agreed to, that it 
     would affect such things as riot control agents like tear gas 
     in search-and-rescue operations and circumstances like we 
     faced on Somalia--where they were using women and children at 
     that time as shields. Do you agree that we should be 
     restricted from using such things as tear gas?
       General Schwarzkopf. I don't believe that is the case but I 
     will confess to you that I have not read every single detail 
     of that Convention so, therefore, I really can't give you an 
     expert opinion. I think you could get a better opinion here.
       Secretary White. I am going to hesitate to give a 
     definitive answer because there has been, in the 
     administration, a very precise and careful discussion about 
     what exactly, and in what situations, this would apply and 
     when this wouldn't apply. . . .
       Senator Inhofe. Do you think it wise to share with 
     countries like Iran our most advanced chemical defensive 
     equipment and technologies?
       General Schwarzkopf. Our defensive capabilities?
       Senator Inhofe. Yes.
       General Schwarzkopf. Absolutely not.
       Senator Inhofe. Well, I'm talking about sharing our 
     advanced chemical defensive equipment and technologies, which 
     I believe under Article X [they] would be allow[ed] to [get]. 
     Do you disagree?
       General Schwarzkopf. As I said Senator, I'm not familiar 
     with all the details--I--you know, a country, particularly 
     like Iran, I think we should share as little as possible with 
     them in the way of our military capabilities.
                                                                    ____


             [From the Wall Street Journal, Feb. 19, 1997]

                           A Dangerous Treaty

       Among the many good reasons why the Senate should not 
     ratify the Chemical Weapons Convetion is a substance known as 
     A-232. This highly lethal nerve agent was concocted by a 
     Russian scientific team precisely for the purpose of 
     circumventing the terms of the CWC, which both the U.S. and 
     Russia have signed but not yet ratified. A-232 would escape 
     scrutiny under the treaty because it is made from 
     agricultural and industrial chemicals that aren't deadly 
     until they are mixed and therefore don't appear on the CWC's 
     schedule of banned chemicals.
       The world has known about A-232 since the May 1994 
     publication on this page of an article by a Russian 
     scientist, who warned how his colleagues were attempting to 
     camouflage their true mission. It is now the subject of a 
     classified Pentagon paper, reported in the Washington Times 
     earlier this month, on the eve of what is shaping up to be an 
     escalation of the battle joined in September over 
     ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
       The Administration was forced to sound the retreat then, 
     pulling the treaty from consideration when it became clear 
     that the Senate was preparing to vote it down. Now it's 
     trying again, this time in full cry about the urgency for 
     U.S. ratification before April 29, the date it goes into 
     effect. For now, Senator Jesse Helms has kept the treaty tied 
     up in the Foreign Relations Committee, making the sensible 
     argument that the new Senate ought first to focus on matters 
     of higher priority then ramroding through a controversial 
     treaty that merits careful deliberation.
       The Administration, meanwhile, is mounting a full-court 
     press, with the President offering a plea for ratification in 
     his State of the Union address ``so that at last we can begin 
     to outlaw poison gas from the earth.'' This is an admirable 
     sentiment--who isn't against marking the world safe from the 
     horrors of poison gas?--but it's far from the reality. In 
     fact, ratification would more likely bring the opposite 
     results.
       Article XI is one of the key danger areas. It would 
     obligate U.S. companies to provide fellow signatories with 
     full access to their latest chemical technologies, 
     notwithstanding American trade or foreign policy. One country 
     delighted at the prospect of upgrading its chemical industry 
     is China, which, upon signing the CWC, issued a declaration 
     saying, ``All export controls inconsistent with the 
     Convention should be abolished.'' No doubt Cuba and Iran, to 
     name two other signatories, share the same sentiment. That 
     Russian team that came up with A-232 no doubt could 
     accomplish much more with the help of the most up-to-date 
     technology from the U.S.
       Verification is an insurmountable problem, and no one--not 
     even the treaty's most ardent supporters--will promise that 
     the treaty can be enforced. In the Administration's 
     obfuscating phrase, the CWC can be ``effectively verified.'' 
     Yet if chemical weapons are easy to hide, as A-232 proves, 
     they are also easy to make. The sarin used in the poison-gas 
     attack on the Tokyo subway was created not in a fancy lab but 
     in a small, ordinary room used by Aum Shinri Kyo's amateur 
     chemists. The treaty provides for snap inspections of 
     companies that make chemicals, not of religious cults that 
     decide to cook up some sarin in the back office. The CWC 
     wouldn't make a whit of difference.
       Those snap inspections, by the way, could turn into a huge 
     burden on American businesses, which would have to fork out 
     millions of dollars in compliance costs (through the biggest 
     companies no doubt would watch the heaviest burden fall on 
     their smaller competitors).
       More than 65 countries have already ratified the CWC, 
     including most U.S. allies. But somehow we don't think the 
     world is more secure with Australia and Hungary committed to 
     ridding the world of chemical weapons when such real threats 
     as Libya, Iraq, Syria and North Korea won't have anything to 
     do with the CWC. How can a treaty that professes to address 
     the problem of chemical weapons be credible unless it 
     addresses the threat from the very countries, such as Syria 
     and Iraq, that have actually deployed these weapons?
       With or without the CWC, the U.S. is already committed to 
     destroying its chemical weapons by 2004. That doesn't mean 
     the rest of the world shares any such commitment; what 
     possible peaceful purpose does Russia have in the clandestine 
     production of A-232? Instead of pushing a treaty that can't 
     accomplish its impossible goals, the Administration would be 
     better advised to use its clout, rather than that of some 
     planned U.N.-style bureaucracy, in getting the Russians to 
     stop making nerve gas.
       It's hard to find a wholehearted advocate of the treaty. 
     The gist of the messages from most of its so-called champions 
     is that it's a poor deal, but it's the best on offer. But 
     their cases have acknowledged so many caveats that it's hard 
     to see how they've reached such optimistic conclusions. The 
     biggest danger of ratification is that it would similarly 
     lull the U.S. and other responsible nations into the false 
     belief that they are taking effective action against the 
     threat of chemical weapons. The case for this treaty strains 
     belief too far.

  Mr. INHOFE. I yield the floor.
  Mr. BINGAMAN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be 
allowed to speak as in morning business for 10 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________