[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 37 (Thursday, March 20, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2722-S2723]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




              COST OF UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN BOSNIA

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I rise today to speak about the 
escalating costs of the United States involvement in Bosnia.
  Recently, I asked the administration representatives for a ballpark 
estimate of the expected cost to the United States taxpayer of the 
American operation in Bosnia.
  I was astonished to hear that administration estimates have been 
revised to $6.5 billion.
  Six-point-five billion dollars. To put that in perspective, we were 
originally told that the Bosnia mission would cost the United States 
taxpayer some $2 billion. Later, the estimate was revised to $3 
billion. Now, it has risen to a staggering $6.5 billion.
  Mr. President, the cost has now risen more than threefold since the 
original estimates we were given. That is equal to just over half of 
the entire foreign operation budget for fiscal 1997 which is about 
$12.2 billion.
  Let me review what has happened here. In late 1995, when the 
administration negotiated the United States troop commitment outlined 
by the Dayton accords, the administration came to the Congress with an 
estimate for United States troop participation in the NATO Peace 
Implementation Force in Bosnia, commonly referred to as IFOR. According 
to information provided to my office by the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense [OSD], this initial estimate of $2 billion was generated using 
a force deployment model based on experience in Desert Storm and 
Somalia * * * [although] the types of forces, deployment schedules, 
field conditions, and security situation had not been determined.'' 
Once troops were deployed to Bosnia, new information about the field 
conditions became available and pushed the original estimate up by 
about 50 percent.
  As I understand it, unexpected and adverse weather conditions, 
including major floods, further complicated the operation--delaying the 
establishment of land routes and altering placement of planned camp 
sites. According to the Defense Department, additional reserves were 
also required to back fill for troops that had been deployed to the 
region.
  Further refinements of the cost estimate were again made in July 
1996, when the Defense Department recognized the need for additional 
moneys--to the tune of almost $310 million--for pulling out heavy 
armored forces and replacing them with military police, as well as 
additional communications requirements. A new total cost estimate of 
$3.2 million for operations through the end of 1996--that is, for 
approximately one full year--was provided to congressional staff in 
July.
  The conditions that led to these refinements also helped throw the 
time line for the 1-year mission out of whack. So, no one could have 
really been surprised by the announcement

[[Page S2723]]

last October--just as the Congress was preparing to take its long 
recess--that the United States had decided to dispatch additional 
troops to Bosnia. The new deployment of an additional 5,000 troops was 
to be part of a new mission--the one we now call SFOR, or NATO 
stabilization force--and would last 18 months, through June 1998.
  The extension of the U.S. mission in the region, of course, required 
a new cost estimate. Using actual costs to date, projected force levels 
for fiscal year 1997 and for fiscal year 1998, and expected operating 
costs, the Defense Department now says that total costs for the 
operation are expected to be $6,512,000,000.
  Mr. President, when Congress was first consulted about the Bosnia 
operation back in 1995, I asked whether or not the United States would 
be able to withdraw troops from IFOR in December 1996, as the 
administration said then, even if the mission clearly had not been 
successful. I had my doubts then that the stated goal--ending the 
fighting and raising an infrastructure capable of supporting a durable 
peace--would be achievable in 12 months' time. I foresaw a danger that 
conditions would remain so unsettled that it would then be argued that 
it would be folly--and waste--to withdraw on schedule.
  My concerns and hesitations of October 1995 were only compounded by 
the October 1996 announcement that additional troops were being 
deployed to Bosnia, and compounded further in November 1996 when it 
became clear that the mission was being extended for an additional 18 
months.
  In my view, the handwriting has been on the wall for some time now.
  As many in this Chamber will recall, I was one of the few Members of 
Congress, and the only Democrat, to vote against the initial deployment 
of troops in 1995. At that time, I questioned the projections regarding 
the duration and cost of the mission.
  What I feared then has happened. The United States continues to be 
drawn deeper into a situation from which we appear unable to extricate 
ourselves. The war in Vietnam was called a quagmire. We referred to 
continued United States troop deployment in Somalia as mission creep. I 
fear that the Bosnia operation presents the same dilemma. There will 
continue to reasons to encourage continued U.S. military presence on 
the ground. Despite an original estimate of $2 billion, that presence 
is now moving closer and closer to $7 billion.
  I recognize that the Bosnia mission has not been without some 
positive results. We can all be grateful that people are no longer 
dying en masse in Bosnia and that United States and troops from other 
nations are to be applauded for having largely succeeded in enforcing 
the military aspects of the Dayton accords. But successive delays in 
holding municipal elections and the lasting, and at-large, presence of 
indicted war criminals are continuing signs that the progress of 
American troop presence is transitory at best.
  At the heart of the conflict is that the strategic political goals of 
the warring factions remain unchanged. Peace in the region appears to 
be achievable, unfortunately, only at the point of NATO arms.
  Mr. President, I now fear that, come next June, when the SFOR mission 
is expected to end, and after we will have invested $6.5 billion, there 
is a real danger that we will be back at square one.
  I hope that the lesson learned from Bosnia is that we should not make 
commitments of United States resources, be they military, humanitarian, 
or otherwise, without a candid assessment of the likely level and 
duration of the commitment. While it is clear that there were sound, 
military reasons for upping the financial projections for U.S. 
participation in both IFOR and SFOR, I can not believe that the 
original estimate was as candid of an assessment as we could have had, 
even that early in the process.
  We are told that U.S. troops will finish their mission next June. But 
that begs a question: What certainty is there that even this promise 
will be kept? I fear, as I did when the United States first committed 
20,000 ground troops, that there is no easy way out of this situation. 
The cost of U.S. involvement continues to rise. And troops, from my 
State and from throughout the Nation, continue to be deployed.
  When will it end, Mr. President. When will it end?
  At the very time we are straining hard to eliminate the Federal 
deficit, the dollars continue to pour out of our Treasury. The cost of 
this excursion goes on and on.

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