[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 37 (Thursday, March 20, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2607-S2610]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
UPSIDE-DOWN MANAGEMENT IN THE CRIME LAB
Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, this is the fifth time I have taken the
floor to make observations about the FBI's upside-down management of
its crime lab.
In my view, the FBI's Director, Louis Freeh, continues to mislead the
public about the lab. He would have us think that the FBI lab has met
the highest standards. He has maintained that the allegations of the
lab's whistleblower, Dr. Frederic Whitehurst, are all wrong. He has
said that no other scientist in the lab has come forward with similar
accusations. His testimony before Congress recently was totally
consistent with that image.
But documents belie the Director's rosy portrayal of the lab., and of
his dark portrayal of Dr. Whitehurst.
Thus far, I have released documents showing there is credibility to
some of Dr. Whitehurst's allegations. I have pointed to press accounts
in which the public has learned the IG's still-secret report uncovers
problems in three specific cases. thus backing up Dr. Whitehurst with
specifics. I released documents showing that Director Freeh was aware
of the exact same allegations, investigated them, yet covered them up.
I revealed that there was a second scientist who came forward with
serious allegations that paralleled those of Dr. Whitehurst.
I do not know what it will take for Mr. Freeh to admit these things,
Mr. President. Perhaps the public needs to see more of the FBI`s
documents that underscore my points. That's fine by me. Because
documents don't mislead. They do not have a motive to. But, people do.
And when leaders of the people mislead, there's a breakdown in
confidence and trust.
And so, I am here today, Mr. President, to test the boundaries of Mr.
Freeh's denials. Today, I am releasing yet more FBI documents, obtained
through the Freedom of Information Act. These documents contradict Mr.
Freeh's own assertions. The American people have a right to know this.
Today, I will reveal a third scientist in the FBI lab, who
substantiated some of Dr. Whitehurst's more serious allegations. He
substantiated them just months after the FBI Director and his team of
lawyers whitewashed them. This third scientist, in fact, was
Whitehurst's unit chief in the lab.
Here are the facts. In December 1992, Dr. Whitehurst made the serious
allegations that his lab reports were being altered by other agents who
lacked authority to do so. Altered reports could constitute tampering
with evidence and obstruction of justice, and could therefore be
criminal.
The universe of cases being looked at was 48 cases. Not all of them
were altered. But all had to be checked. Some appeared to contain
substantial changes. The Whitehurst memo of allegations went to the
Assistant Director of the FBI for the Laboratory Division.
In May 1994, a review of the Whitehurst allegations--much more
extensive than just the altered reports issue, but including them--was
done by Mr. Freeh's lawyers, rather than by an independent body with
some scientific background. Ironically, it was the IG's investigation
that supplied the needed independence and a scientific approach, and
only then did these problems get aired.
But, the FBI's review was headed by Mr. Freeh's general counsel,
Howard Shapiro. He's the Director's top lawyer, himself a controversial
figure with Congress. Mr. Shapiro felt there was no need to have an
independent review because, as he said, the FBI has a long, proud
history of doing its own reviews. Upon completion, the review was
eventually read and signed-off-on by Director Freeh.
So, here is what the FBI's own review found. First, there were no
major problems in the lab. Everything was hunky dory. On the specific
issue of altered lab reports, here is what Mr. Shapiro found.
[Laboratory Division] management made it clear that this
will not be tolerated and has instructed the Unit Chief's
(sic) to reiterate this policy.
How about that for a finding for this crack review team, Mr.
President. They're investigating serious, possibly criminal activities.
Instead of finding out whether it happened, Mr. Shapiro merely said
it's not supposed to happen. His recommendation? If there were
alterations, just correct the written report.
You see, Mr. President, under the long-standing Brady decision, the
government is required to provide the accused with any information that
might point to their innocence. Material alterations of lab analysis
might fit into that category. If changes had been discovered in some
reports, the proper thing to do was to judge the impact of any
alterations on each court case. Instead, Mr. Shapiro thought justice
would be served by simply correcting the paperwork. Cases closed.
By October 1994--about 5 months after Mr. Shapiro's review was
issued--the IG got hold of the same allegations. The IG began its own
review of the 48 cases.
Meanwhile, in September 1994, the FBI lab managers discovered another
agent making the same allegations of altered reports as Dr. Whitehurst
was making. The allegations by then were being investigated thoroughly
by lab personnel.
By January 1995, the lab's investigation was completed. An FBI unit
chief, whose name I will not divulge, wrote a memo of investigation to
his section chief. In it, he stated that 13 of Whitehurst's 48 cases
had significant alterations. He recommended the following:
That [Supervisory Special Agent] (blank) be held
accountable for the unauthorized changes he made in the
[Auxilliary Examiner] dictation of SSA Whitehurst by
administrative action to include both oral reprimand and a
letter of censure.
The unit chief concluded his memo this way: ``(Blank) committed
errors which were clearly intentional. He acted irresponsibly; he
should be held accountable; he should be disciplined accordingly.''
The scientist-unit chief writing the memo, and who backed up Dr.
Whitehurst's allegations, identified the culprit. I won't reveal who
either one is. But the memo is significant. It reveals yet another
scientist--a unit chief, no less--who substantiated Whitehurst's
allegations. It is another apparent example of an FBI lab agent shaving
the evidence to get a conviction.
What was covered over by Mr. Shapiro's team of crack lawyers less
than 1 year before, was now popping up. The lab's management was
finding the opposite of what Shapiro and his lawyers found. That meant
there were conflicting findings. And that is serious. The lab unit
chief's report was at odds with Director Freeh's. What was senior
management--those above the lab managers--to do?
The answer was not long in coming. During this time frame, FBI
management indeed found a suitable discipline for this rogue agent. Mr.
President, they promoted him. They made him a unit chief. The agent
found to have intentionally altered evidence was promoted. That tells
us how senior management resolved the dilemma. They
[[Page S2608]]
promoted the rogue, and shot the messenger.
That set the stage for the coverup. Because just 10 months later,
when the Whitehurst allegations became public, Mr. Freeh issued the
following statement in response. This was on November 8, 1995. He said:
The FBI has vigorously investigated his (Whitehurst's)
concerns and is continuing to do so. The FBI alone has
reviewed more than 250 cases involving work previously done
by the Laboratory. To date, the FBI has found no evidence
tampering, evidence fabrication, or failure to report
exculpatory evidence. Any finding of such misconduct will
result in tough and swift action by the FBI.
Is that what happened to the rogue agent, Mr. President? Yes. The FBI
took swift action to get him promoted.
The fact is, the statement by Mr. Freeh on November 8, 1995, was
utterly false. Lab reports are evidence. If altered substantially--and
13 reports were--that is evidence of possible evidence tampering, and
more.
Ultimately, the IG caught up with the rogue agent. The FBI did not.
But the IG did. When the IG report finally reached the Bureau, this
rogue agent became one of the three who were transferred from the lab.
Yet no other action has been taken against him by the FBI. I aim to
find out why not.
Mr. President, what is clear about all this is, the FBI is buried
under a mountain of evidence showing it cannot police itself. It took
the inspector general's investigation to finally root out what the FBI
had covered up. Some good people in the FBI tried to do the right
thing. But senior management got in the way. Senior management
apparently places a higher value on maintaining image, rather than
rooting out wrong.
Therefore, the time may have come for independent review of the FBI.
Someone needs to police the police. They cannot police themselves. That
is for sure. Perhaps the way to go is to beef up the independent IG,
instead of the FBI's Office of Professional Responsibility, as the
Director has proposed.
Growing up on the family farm in Iowa, my father taught us to revere
and respect the FBI. They were the champions of right versus wrong in
our society. We looked up to them, whether justified or not.
I still have that same respect for the FBI. There are literally
thousands of good, decent men and women serving their country as FBI
employees.
But those honest, hardworking agents need and deserve leadership that
has integrity and credibility. They need leaders who will go after bad
guys, and protect good guys. Not the other way around. They need
leaders who reward honesty and punish wrongdoing--not the other way
around, as we see in this case.
The issue of bad management in the crime lab is serious. Bad
scientific analysis used in court means good guys can go to prison, and
bad guys can walk. That's not what we want. That is un-American. That's
what they have in dictatorships. There is no room for that in a
democracy.
Mr. President, I have talked to my colleagues about the culture at
the FBI under the present management. It seems to reward those who rush
to a conviction. It seems to punish those who, in the FBI's eyes,
``commit truth.''
There is no better image to show this than how they treated the rogue
agent--they promoted him--and how they treated Dr. Whitehurst--they
went after him.
Mr. President, I do not have to say anything else. That says it all.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have relevant documents to
which I referred, plus others that will help provide additional
context, printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
From SSA Frederic Whitehurst
To Asst Director John Hicks
Re alteration of laboratory report of SSA Whitehurst.
Purpose: to document the alterations of auxiliary examiner
* * * laboratory reports of SSA Whitehurst * * *
Recommendation: That any alteration of AE dictation of SSA
Whitehurst be done with the full concurrence of SSA
Whitehurst and the Unit Chief of the Materials Analysis Unit.
Details: On 11/27/92 * * * of the Materials Analysis Unit
advised SSA Whitehurst, * * * that * * * had been told by * *
* that he was changing the auxiliary examiner dictation of
SSA Whitehurst before publishing reports from the Laboratory.
This information was the first that SSA Whitehurst has had
concerning the changing of his dictation in the five and one
half years that SSA Whitehurst has been a examiner in the
Laboratory. At no time has SSA * * * consulted SSA Whitehurst
concerning these changes.
As a result of receiving this information, SSA Whitehurst
reviewed his files to determine the cases that SSA Whitehurst
as worked as an auxiliary examiner since 1987 * * * which
these alterations have been taking place and the possible
effect of the alterations on the reported expert opinion of
SSA Whitehurst.
During the period from 1987 to present SSA Whitehurst has
written forty eight auxiliary examiner reports * * *. Of
those reports SSA Whitehurst was able to retrieve sixteen
files from records. The other files were listed as checked
out and their location was not pursued. Review of the files
indicates that * * * has often paraphrased or totally altered
the reports. Of the sixteen files reviewed, the Laboratory
reports were placed into four groups: 1.) Those where no
change was made to the auxiliary examiner report. 2.) Those
where paraphrasing of the report was such that the meaning
was the same but the words different. 3.) Those where
paraphrasing could cause possible problems in court. 4.)
Those where paraphrasing changed the meaning or significantly
altered the content of the report. In group one there were
three reports (70921005, 91121007, and 90615067). In group
two there were five reports (71116047, 71221007, 70921006,
91121008, and 71116048). In group three there were three
reports (80217150, 71125046 and 91207016). In group four
there were five reports (71124001, 90823043, 70920045,
90623042, and 91130017). Copies of the AE report and the
final Laboratory report from each matter are included in the
attached package.
This communication has been submitted to bring attention to
possible problems during testimony if AE dictation is
arbitrarily changed in the manner described. For example, in
Laboratory matter 90823043 the AE dictation is as follows:
``Chemical and physical analyses of specimen Q4 have
identified the presence of Pyrodex low explosive.
The results of chemical analyses of specimen Q6 are
consistent with the presence of residues of Pyrodex low
explosive.
It is the opinion of this examiner that the residues in Q6
originated from a low explosive mixture which contained
Pyrodex.
Pyrodex is a commercial low explosive produced by Hodgdon
Powder Co.''
On the other hand the final report dictation reads,
``Present in specimen Q6 are explosive residues which
chemical analysis show to have originated from a low
explosive mixture which contained Pyrodex. Pyrodex is a
commercial low explosive produced by Hodgdon Powder Co. . . .
Present in specimen Q4 is a quantity of black-colored
powder which has been identified as Pyrodex low explosive.''
Though the wording in the first paragraph is a paraphrase
of the contents of the AE dictation, the contents of the
second paragraph do not say at all what was said in the AE
dictation. There is a big difference between determining that
Pyrodex is present and saying that the powder is Pyrodex. In
this particular matter there happened to be other materials
present in the powder. If faced on the stand with that
argument the examiner would have to admit that the dictation
was wrong. Opinions presented in the AE reports from the
Materials Analysis Unit have been thought out very carefully
and reviewed by the Unit Chief very carefully.
In FBI Laboratory matter 70920045 the AE dictation reads:
``Specimen Q4 has the chemical and physical characteristics
of C-4 explosive. Semi-quantitative analysis determined that
Q4 is composed of 2.5% polyisobutylene, 7.0% Di-(2-
ethylhexyl) adipate plasticizer and oil and 91.5% high
explosive RDX containing a small amount of HMX high
explosive. C-4 is a military plastic explosive.
White powder found in specimen Q6 has the physical and
chemical characteristics of pentaerythritol tetranitrate
(PETN), a high explosive commonly found in detonating cord.''
The final Laboratory report reads:
`` . . . Present in specimen Q4 is a white putty-type
material which has been identified as United States Military
explosive type M112 commonly referred to as `C-4.' . . .
Present in specimen Q6 are two (2) lengths of detonating
cord which are yellow in color with three black tracer
threads that contain the high explosive PETN.''
In this particular matter no mention is made of the
analysis conducted on specimens Q4 or Q6 nor could the
Laboratory notes or AE report be found in the file.
In order to determine if the practice of altering the AE
dictation of SSA Whitehurst's explosives analysis results is
endemic to the Explosives Unit the reports of three other
examiners who are now or have been in the Explosives Unit
were reviewed. That review included reports from SSA * * *,
SSA * * * and SSA * * *. In not one of their reports were the
AE dictation reports of SSA Whitehurst changed even to
paraphrase the reports. SSA * * * practice of altering AE
reports appears to be an isolated situation.
[[Page S2609]]
____
October 7, 1994.
Re allegations regarding changes in FBI laboratory reports by
Frederick Whitehurst.
David R. Glendinning,
Office of Inspector General, Department of Justice,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Glendinning: As you will recall, several months
ago you contacted me regarding numerous allegations your
office had received against the FBI Laboratory Division (LD)
from Supervisory Special Agent Frederick Whitehurst who is an
explosive residue examiner in the LD. You explained that
Whitehurst had made numerous allegations regarding problems
in the FBI LD, but that only one, involving the changing of
auxiliary examination dictation, warranted further
investigation by your office. I told you that the FBI's
Office of the General Counsel (OGC) had also received the
same allegations from Whitehurst and was already conducting
an investigation. As you know, our preliminary investigation
is complete, and the report dated May 24, 1994, was made
available to your office.
As you will recall, the allegation you were interested in
investigating involved Whitehurst's claim that in some cases,
Principal Examiners (PE) from the Explosives Unit had changed
his Auxiliary Examiner (AE) dictation without his approval or
knowledge. OGC contacted the LD management regarding this
allegation who advised that the LD had a longstanding policy
prohibiting any changes in AE dictation by the PE without the
express permission of the AE. The LD immediately reaffirmed
this policy with all its examiners. The May report made the
following recommendation regarding Whitehurst's allegations
on this matter:
Recommendation: We feel that LD management has
appropriately addressed this issue. However, we are making
the following recommendations to correct any past unapproved
AE dictation changes and ensure that the AE has a chance to
review final reports:
1. Examine all past reports where SSA Whitehurst and * * *
(the other explosive residues examiner) were the AE's, and
compare with the language of the final reports to ensure
there were no changes. If changes were made, appropriate
action should be taken to correct any substantive errors that
were contained in the final report(s).
2. Require a copy of the final report be distributed to the
AE examiners at the same time the final report is mailed to
the contributor.
The FBI adopted the recommendations from the report which
are currently being implemented by the LD. The deadline for
the review conducted pursuant to recommendation number one is
October 15, 1994, and I will forward a copy of the report to
your office as soon as it becomes available.
The LD examiner who is reviewing the Whitehurst and * * *
PE/AE reports advised that he believes there are still one or
two reports that have not yet been retrieved. Once a final
accounting of every report is completed, I will send you a
copy of any remaining reports not enclosed with this letter.
The only redactions in the enclosed reports are the case
names and other personal identifying data.
The following is a list of the enclosed reports which are
identified by the FBI LD number:
1. 00530046
2. 70724075
3. 70921005
4. 70921006
5. 70928045
6. 71019029
7. 71116047
8. 71116048
9. 71125046
10. 71224001
11. 71228078
12. 80121007
13. 80217150
14. 80803018
15. 80803019
16. 81108029
17. 81223004
18. 90403032
19. 90509063
20. 90615067
21. 90623042
22. 90626055
23. 90808074
24. 90823043
25. 91121007
26. 91121008
27. 91130017
28. 91204079
29. 91207016
30. 20124011
31. 20207023
32. 20416043
33. 20618039
34. 20624009
35. 20729026
36. 20812032
37. 21118013
38. 21123024
39. 21214070
40. 21221093
41. 21221094
42. 30422012
43. 30611054
44. 30708031
45. 30802045
46. 30812043
47. 30816032
48. 31001027
Please do not hesitate to contact me if you need any
further information or additional assistance. I can be
reached at * * *.
Sincerely yours,
------ ------,
Associate General Counsel.
____
To: Mr. Ahlerich
From: J. J. Kearney
Re alternations and changes in AE reports by PE examiners
without approval of AE examiner scientific analysis
section [SAS] Laboratory Division [LD].
Reference Mr. H. M. Shapiro memorandum to Mr. Hicks, dated
6/8/94 and Messrs * * * and * * * memorandum to Mr. Shapiro,
dated 5/25/94.
Purpose: To Advise you of the actions being taken to
resolve the captioned issue.
Recommendation: None, for information only.
Details: As described in the * * * and * * * memorandum to
Mr. Shapiro, SSA Frederic Whitehurst, Materials Analysis
Unit, SAS, has alleged that in some instances Principal
Examiners (PE) from the Explosives Unit have changed his
Auxiliary Examiner (AE) dictation without his approval.
Following some review it appears that the practice is
isolated to one * * * .
In addition, prior to issuance of the referenced memoranda.
I was approached by * * * a second * * * who rendered a
similar complaint concerning the work of * * * I met with * *
*. Explosives Unit in an attempt to resolve the issue. During
the meetings, it was apparent there was a deeper unresolved
issue which existed between the examiners of the two units.
The issue centered around what each unit believed their
individual roles were when reporting the examinations of
evidence in bombing matters. It was the position of the
Explosives Unit that examiners in the Materials Analysis Unit
should limit their reporting to the chemical analysis of the
explosive residues and not discuss the nature of explosive
materials. On the Other hand, the Materials Analysis Unit's
position was that the Explosives Unit periodically went too
far in their interpretation of the residue data when they
formulated their conclusions and summary statements in their
reports.
In these meetings, the practice that a PE not change an
AE's dictation without first discussing the matter with, and
getting the AE's approval was reemphasized with each of the
Unit Chiefs and the Examiners. It was agreed that the two
units would follow the practice. In addition, in order to
ensure that the AE examiner is kept informed as to what is
being reported on regarding his work, it was reemphasized
that a tickler copy of the final report would be provided to
the AE examiner for his review and records.
Further, I recommended that when bombing cases go to trial,
we send both the explosive expert and explosive residue
expert to testify to their results. This policy is in keeping
with how testimony is handled in other cases in the
Laboratory having both AE and PE testimony and would prevent
any further confusion or possible misrepresentation of the AE
dictation in bombing cases.
In order to resolve the issue * * * I have asked * * * to
review * * *. Some of the cases have already been reviewed by
* * *. The remainder of the cases will be reviewed by * * *
and all cases will be placed into two categories:
Category One will include all those cases where no
alteration occurred or if an alteration occurred, it did not
change the meaning of the dictation.
Category Two will include all those cases where an
alteration of the dictation occurred which caused a change in
the meaning of the dictation and may have resulted in a
misrepresentation of the data.
It is anticipated that the remainder of the review will be
completed by October 15, 1994. A summary report of * * *
findings will be prepared. At that time, it will be
determined * * *.
I have enclosed * * * copy of this memorandum * * * so that
the review of this matter will be comprehensive and
efficient.
____
January 13, 1995.
To: Mr. Kearney
From: * * *
Re alterations and Changes in auxiliary examiner (AE) reports
by principal examiner (PE) without approval of AE
examiner; Scientific Analysis Section (SAS) Laboratory
Division (LD).
Reference J.J. Kearney's directive on 1/4/95, to document
recommendations resulting from a review of captioned matter.
Purpose: To make recommendations regarding the documented
alterations of auxiliary examiner dictation from the
Materials Analysis Unit (MAU) by SSA Explosives Unit (EU).
Recommendations: 1. That SSA * * * be held accountable for
the unauthorized changes he made in the AE dictation of SSA
WHITEHURST by administrative action to include both oral
reprimand and a letter of censure.
2. That the Assistant Director in Charge of the Laboratory
Division mandate that all PEs provide a copy of all outgoing
reports that include AE dictation to the respective AEs to
avoid the possibility of mistakes/errors being furnished to a
contributor as a result of misuse or misinterpretation of the
AE dictation by the PE.
3. That the issue as to whether or not revised reports
should be prepared and furnished to the contributors in the
thirteen (13) cases where I have concluded significant
alterations were done SSA * * * be referred to General
Counsel for resolution.
4. That Laboratory policy be re-emphasized to insure that
PEs never be allowed to testify to the results/meaning of AE
dictation furnished to them that clearly falls outside their
expertise.
Details: Based upon a memorandum to each Laboratory Unit
Chief from J.W. HICKS dated 5/24/91, the approved, current
Laboratory policy for errors made by a person in the
Laboratory is clearly documented. This memorandum lists four
types of errors. The alteration of another examiner's
dictation without consultation with that examiner or his/her
Unit Chief would fit, in my opinion, the criteria of the most
serious type of error defined by the ``willful or grossly
negligent error.''
It has always been understood practice (perhaps not written
policy) that PEs do not change/alter/reword/revise AE
dictation without consulting with and receiving permission
from the AE, or their respective Unit chief in combination
with the AE.
The problems that could arise during testimony when AE
dictation is arbitrarily
[[Page S2610]]
changed cannot be over-emphasized. The wording in all MAU
dictation is carefully thought out, discussed, peer reviewed
often times, and results from correct interpretations of the
data. Any dictation signed out by the MAU Unit Chief or his
designee should not be changed in any manner without the
proper notification and consent of the AE.
In my opinion, SSA * * * chose to ignore this longstanding
practice, a practice that everyone else adheres to.
It is clear that SSA * * * does not understand the
scientific issues involved with the interpretation and
significance of explosives and explosives residue
composition. He therefore should realize this deficiency and
differentiate between his personal opinions and scientific
fact. An expert's opinion should be based upon objective,
scientific findings and be separated from personal
predilections and biases.
In order to identify a given material, it is necessary for
the examiner to acquire sufficient data using acceptable
scientific techniques/protocols and instrumentation to
specifically identify it. If that level of data is not
acquired or does not exist, then complete identification is
not possible and words such as ``consistent with'' or
``similar to'' are used. This is nothing new. It is taught in
our colleges and universities. It is a standard set by MAU
based on experience/background, education, discussions,
research and peer review of the analytical procedures in
place. By rewording AE dictation, SSA * * * places an
examiner in the position where he/she would be required to
advise the court that the report overstates the findings and
therefore is incorrect.
A FBI Laboratory report is evidence. Often times the report
itself is entered into evidence during the trial proceedings.
The fact that SSA * * * did make unauthorized changes in
these reports could have resulted in serious consequences
during legal proceedings and embarrassment to the Laboratory
as well as the entire FBI.
In conclusion, SSA * * * committed errors which were
clearly intentional. He acted irresponsibly; he should be
held accountable; he should be disciplined accordingly. The
problems regarding AE alterations by SSA * * * are verified.
All of the AE dictation furnished to SSA * * * by SSA
WHITEHURST has been reviewed. The causes, reasons and events
which led to the occurrence of the errors has been discussed.
The appropriate administrative action, in my opinion, should
be that SSA * * * be given a letter of censure.
____
Department of Justice,
Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Washington, DC, November 8, 1995.
FBI Director Louis J. Freeh today released the following
statement:
The FBI looks forward to working with the Blue Ribbon Panel
named today. The FBI will assist the panel in every manner
possible to ensure an objective review of our examinations
and policies.
Over the past several years, Special Agent Frederic J.
Whitehurst has raised a variety of concerns about forensic
protocols and procedures employed in the FBI Laboratory. The
FBI has vigorously investigated his concerns and is
continuing to do so. The FBI alone has reviewed more than 250
cases involving work previously done by the Laboratory. To
date, the FBI has found no evidence tampering, evidence
fabrication or failure to report exculpatory evidence. Any
finding of such misconduct will result in tough and swift
action by the FBI.
The FBI Laboratory conducts over one million examinations
per year and our experts testify hundreds of times annually
in state and federal courts of law. At trials, FBI Laboratory
examinations are constantly subject to extraordinarily
vigorous challenge through cross-examination and the
presentation of expert testimony by defense witnesses.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Brownback). The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. ROBB. Thank you, Mr. President.
____________________