[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 37 (Thursday, March 20, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2607-S2610]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                UPSIDE-DOWN MANAGEMENT IN THE CRIME LAB

  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, this is the fifth time I have taken the 
floor to make observations about the FBI's upside-down management of 
its crime lab.
  In my view, the FBI's Director, Louis Freeh, continues to mislead the 
public about the lab. He would have us think that the FBI lab has met 
the highest standards. He has maintained that the allegations of the 
lab's whistleblower, Dr. Frederic Whitehurst, are all wrong. He has 
said that no other scientist in the lab has come forward with similar 
accusations. His testimony before Congress recently was totally 
consistent with that image.
  But documents belie the Director's rosy portrayal of the lab., and of 
his dark portrayal of Dr. Whitehurst.
  Thus far, I have released documents showing there is credibility to 
some of Dr. Whitehurst's allegations. I have pointed to press accounts 
in which the public has learned the IG's still-secret report uncovers 
problems in three specific cases. thus backing up Dr. Whitehurst with 
specifics. I released documents showing that Director Freeh was aware 
of the exact same allegations, investigated them, yet covered them up. 
I revealed that there was a second scientist who came forward with 
serious allegations that paralleled those of Dr. Whitehurst.
  I do not know what it will take for Mr. Freeh to admit these things, 
Mr. President. Perhaps the public needs to see more of the FBI`s 
documents that underscore my points. That's fine by me. Because 
documents don't mislead. They do not have a motive to. But, people do. 
And when leaders of the people mislead, there's a breakdown in 
confidence and trust.
  And so, I am here today, Mr. President, to test the boundaries of Mr. 
Freeh's denials. Today, I am releasing yet more FBI documents, obtained 
through the Freedom of Information Act. These documents contradict Mr. 
Freeh's own assertions. The American people have a right to know this.
  Today, I will reveal a third scientist in the FBI lab, who 
substantiated some of Dr. Whitehurst's more serious allegations. He 
substantiated them just months after the FBI Director and his team of 
lawyers whitewashed them. This third scientist, in fact, was 
Whitehurst's unit chief in the lab.
  Here are the facts. In December 1992, Dr. Whitehurst made the serious 
allegations that his lab reports were being altered by other agents who 
lacked authority to do so. Altered reports could constitute tampering 
with evidence and obstruction of justice, and could therefore be 
criminal.
  The universe of cases being looked at was 48 cases. Not all of them 
were altered. But all had to be checked. Some appeared to contain 
substantial changes. The Whitehurst memo of allegations went to the 
Assistant Director of the FBI for the Laboratory Division.
  In May 1994, a review of the Whitehurst allegations--much more 
extensive than just the altered reports issue, but including them--was 
done by Mr. Freeh's lawyers, rather than by an independent body with 
some scientific background. Ironically, it was the IG's investigation 
that supplied the needed independence and a scientific approach, and 
only then did these problems get aired.
  But, the FBI's review was headed by Mr. Freeh's general counsel, 
Howard Shapiro. He's the Director's top lawyer, himself a controversial 
figure with Congress. Mr. Shapiro felt there was no need to have an 
independent review because, as he said, the FBI has a long, proud 
history of doing its own reviews. Upon completion, the review was 
eventually read and signed-off-on by Director Freeh.
  So, here is what the FBI's own review found. First, there were no 
major problems in the lab. Everything was hunky dory. On the specific 
issue of altered lab reports, here is what Mr. Shapiro found.

       [Laboratory Division] management made it clear that this 
     will not be tolerated and has instructed the Unit Chief's 
     (sic) to reiterate this policy.

  How about that for a finding for this crack review team, Mr. 
President. They're investigating serious, possibly criminal activities. 
Instead of finding out whether it happened, Mr. Shapiro merely said 
it's not supposed to happen. His recommendation? If there were 
alterations, just correct the written report.
  You see, Mr. President, under the long-standing Brady decision, the 
government is required to provide the accused with any information that 
might point to their innocence. Material alterations of lab analysis 
might fit into that category. If changes had been discovered in some 
reports, the proper thing to do was to judge the impact of any 
alterations on each court case. Instead, Mr. Shapiro thought justice 
would be served by simply correcting the paperwork. Cases closed.
  By October 1994--about 5 months after Mr. Shapiro's review was 
issued--the IG got hold of the same allegations. The IG began its own 
review of the 48 cases.
  Meanwhile, in September 1994, the FBI lab managers discovered another 
agent making the same allegations of altered reports as Dr. Whitehurst 
was making. The allegations by then were being investigated thoroughly 
by lab personnel.
  By January 1995, the lab's investigation was completed. An FBI unit 
chief, whose name I will not divulge, wrote a memo of investigation to 
his section chief. In it, he stated that 13 of Whitehurst's 48 cases 
had significant alterations. He recommended the following:

       That [Supervisory Special Agent] (blank) be held 
     accountable for the unauthorized changes he made in the 
     [Auxilliary Examiner] dictation of SSA Whitehurst by 
     administrative action to include both oral reprimand and a 
     letter of censure.

  The unit chief concluded his memo this way: ``(Blank) committed 
errors which were clearly intentional. He acted irresponsibly; he 
should be held accountable; he should be disciplined accordingly.''
  The scientist-unit chief writing the memo, and who backed up Dr. 
Whitehurst's allegations, identified the culprit. I won't reveal who 
either one is. But the memo is significant. It reveals yet another 
scientist--a unit chief, no less--who substantiated Whitehurst's 
allegations. It is another apparent example of an FBI lab agent shaving 
the evidence to get a conviction.
  What was covered over by Mr. Shapiro's team of crack lawyers less 
than 1 year before, was now popping up. The lab's management was 
finding the opposite of what Shapiro and his lawyers found. That meant 
there were conflicting findings. And that is serious. The lab unit 
chief's report was at odds with Director Freeh's. What was senior 
management--those above the lab managers--to do?
  The answer was not long in coming. During this time frame, FBI 
management indeed found a suitable discipline for this rogue agent. Mr. 
President, they promoted him. They made him a unit chief. The agent 
found to have intentionally altered evidence was promoted. That tells 
us how senior management resolved the dilemma. They

[[Page S2608]]

promoted the rogue, and shot the messenger.
  That set the stage for the coverup. Because just 10 months later, 
when the Whitehurst allegations became public, Mr. Freeh issued the 
following statement in response. This was on November 8, 1995. He said:

       The FBI has vigorously investigated his (Whitehurst's) 
     concerns and is continuing to do so. The FBI alone has 
     reviewed more than 250 cases involving work previously done 
     by the Laboratory. To date, the FBI has found no evidence 
     tampering, evidence fabrication, or failure to report 
     exculpatory evidence. Any finding of such misconduct will 
     result in tough and swift action by the FBI.

  Is that what happened to the rogue agent, Mr. President? Yes. The FBI 
took swift action to get him promoted.
  The fact is, the statement by Mr. Freeh on November 8, 1995, was 
utterly false. Lab reports are evidence. If altered substantially--and 
13 reports were--that is evidence of possible evidence tampering, and 
more.
  Ultimately, the IG caught up with the rogue agent. The FBI did not. 
But the IG did. When the IG report finally reached the Bureau, this 
rogue agent became one of the three who were transferred from the lab. 
Yet no other action has been taken against him by the FBI. I aim to 
find out why not.
  Mr. President, what is clear about all this is, the FBI is buried 
under a mountain of evidence showing it cannot police itself. It took 
the inspector general's investigation to finally root out what the FBI 
had covered up. Some good people in the FBI tried to do the right 
thing. But senior management got in the way. Senior management 
apparently places a higher value on maintaining image, rather than 
rooting out wrong.
  Therefore, the time may have come for independent review of the FBI. 
Someone needs to police the police. They cannot police themselves. That 
is for sure. Perhaps the way to go is to beef up the independent IG, 
instead of the FBI's Office of Professional Responsibility, as the 
Director has proposed.
  Growing up on the family farm in Iowa, my father taught us to revere 
and respect the FBI. They were the champions of right versus wrong in 
our society. We looked up to them, whether justified or not.
  I still have that same respect for the FBI. There are literally 
thousands of good, decent men and women serving their country as FBI 
employees.
  But those honest, hardworking agents need and deserve leadership that 
has integrity and credibility. They need leaders who will go after bad 
guys, and protect good guys. Not the other way around. They need 
leaders who reward honesty and punish wrongdoing--not the other way 
around, as we see in this case.
  The issue of bad management in the crime lab is serious. Bad 
scientific analysis used in court means good guys can go to prison, and 
bad guys can walk. That's not what we want. That is un-American. That's 
what they have in dictatorships. There is no room for that in a 
democracy.
  Mr. President, I have talked to my colleagues about the culture at 
the FBI under the present management. It seems to reward those who rush 
to a conviction. It seems to punish those who, in the FBI's eyes, 
``commit truth.''
  There is no better image to show this than how they treated the rogue 
agent--they promoted him--and how they treated Dr. Whitehurst--they 
went after him.
  Mr. President, I do not have to say anything else. That says it all.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have relevant documents to 
which I referred, plus others that will help provide additional 
context, printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

     From SSA Frederic Whitehurst
     To Asst Director John Hicks

     Re alteration of laboratory report of SSA Whitehurst.

       Purpose: to document the alterations of auxiliary examiner 
     * * * laboratory reports of SSA Whitehurst * * *
       Recommendation: That any alteration of AE dictation of SSA 
     Whitehurst be done with the full concurrence of SSA 
     Whitehurst and the Unit Chief of the Materials Analysis Unit.
       Details: On 11/27/92 * * * of the Materials Analysis Unit 
     advised SSA Whitehurst, * * * that * * * had been told by * * 
     * that he was changing the auxiliary examiner dictation of 
     SSA Whitehurst before publishing reports from the Laboratory. 
     This information was the first that SSA Whitehurst has had 
     concerning the changing of his dictation in the five and one 
     half years that SSA Whitehurst has been a examiner in the 
     Laboratory. At no time has SSA * * * consulted SSA Whitehurst 
     concerning these changes.
       As a result of receiving this information, SSA Whitehurst 
     reviewed his files to determine the cases that SSA Whitehurst 
     as worked as an auxiliary examiner since 1987 * * * which 
     these alterations have been taking place and the possible 
     effect of the alterations on the reported expert opinion of 
     SSA Whitehurst.
       During the period from 1987 to present SSA Whitehurst has 
     written forty eight auxiliary examiner reports * * *. Of 
     those reports SSA Whitehurst was able to retrieve sixteen 
     files from records. The other files were listed as checked 
     out and their location was not pursued. Review of the files 
     indicates that * * * has often paraphrased or totally altered 
     the reports. Of the sixteen files reviewed, the Laboratory 
     reports were placed into four groups: 1.) Those where no 
     change was made to the auxiliary examiner report. 2.) Those 
     where paraphrasing of the report was such that the meaning 
     was the same but the words different. 3.) Those where 
     paraphrasing could cause possible problems in court. 4.) 
     Those where paraphrasing changed the meaning or significantly 
     altered the content of the report. In group one there were 
     three reports (70921005, 91121007, and 90615067). In group 
     two there were five reports (71116047, 71221007, 70921006, 
     91121008, and 71116048). In group three there were three 
     reports (80217150, 71125046 and 91207016). In group four 
     there were five reports (71124001, 90823043, 70920045, 
     90623042, and 91130017). Copies of the AE report and the 
     final Laboratory report from each matter are included in the 
     attached package.
       This communication has been submitted to bring attention to 
     possible problems during testimony if AE dictation is 
     arbitrarily changed in the manner described. For example, in 
     Laboratory matter 90823043 the AE dictation is as follows:
       ``Chemical and physical analyses of specimen Q4 have 
     identified the presence of Pyrodex low explosive.
       The results of chemical analyses of specimen Q6 are 
     consistent with the presence of residues of Pyrodex low 
     explosive.
       It is the opinion of this examiner that the residues in Q6 
     originated from a low explosive mixture which contained 
     Pyrodex.
       Pyrodex is a commercial low explosive produced by Hodgdon 
     Powder Co.''
       On the other hand the final report dictation reads,
       ``Present in specimen Q6 are explosive residues which 
     chemical analysis show to have originated from a low 
     explosive mixture which contained Pyrodex. Pyrodex is a 
     commercial low explosive produced by Hodgdon Powder Co. . . .
       Present in specimen Q4 is a quantity of black-colored 
     powder which has been identified as Pyrodex low explosive.''
       Though the wording in the first paragraph is a paraphrase 
     of the contents of the AE dictation, the contents of the 
     second paragraph do not say at all what was said in the AE 
     dictation. There is a big difference between determining that 
     Pyrodex is present and saying that the powder is Pyrodex. In 
     this particular matter there happened to be other materials 
     present in the powder. If faced on the stand with that 
     argument the examiner would have to admit that the dictation 
     was wrong. Opinions presented in the AE reports from the 
     Materials Analysis Unit have been thought out very carefully 
     and reviewed by the Unit Chief very carefully.
       In FBI Laboratory matter 70920045 the AE dictation reads:
       ``Specimen Q4 has the chemical and physical characteristics 
     of C-4 explosive. Semi-quantitative analysis determined that 
     Q4 is composed of 2.5% polyisobutylene, 7.0% Di-(2-
     ethylhexyl) adipate plasticizer and oil and 91.5% high 
     explosive RDX containing a small amount of HMX high 
     explosive. C-4 is a military plastic explosive.
       White powder found in specimen Q6 has the physical and 
     chemical characteristics of pentaerythritol tetranitrate 
     (PETN), a high explosive commonly found in detonating cord.''
       The final Laboratory report reads:
       `` . . . Present in specimen Q4 is a white putty-type 
     material which has been identified as United States Military 
     explosive type M112 commonly referred to as `C-4.' . . .
       Present in specimen Q6 are two (2) lengths of detonating 
     cord which are yellow in color with three black tracer 
     threads that contain the high explosive PETN.''
       In this particular matter no mention is made of the 
     analysis conducted on specimens Q4 or Q6 nor could the 
     Laboratory notes or AE report be found in the file.
       In order to determine if the practice of altering the AE 
     dictation of SSA Whitehurst's explosives analysis results is 
     endemic to the Explosives Unit the reports of three other 
     examiners who are now or have been in the Explosives Unit 
     were reviewed. That review included reports from SSA * * *, 
     SSA * * * and SSA * * *. In not one of their reports were the 
     AE dictation reports of SSA Whitehurst changed even to 
     paraphrase the reports. SSA * * * practice of altering AE 
     reports appears to be an isolated situation.

[[Page S2609]]

     
                                                                    ____
                                                  October 7, 1994.
     Re allegations regarding changes in FBI laboratory reports by 
         Frederick Whitehurst.

     David R. Glendinning,
     Office of Inspector General, Department of Justice, 
         Washington, DC.

       Dear Mr. Glendinning: As you will recall, several months 
     ago you contacted me regarding numerous allegations your 
     office had received against the FBI Laboratory Division (LD) 
     from Supervisory Special Agent Frederick Whitehurst who is an 
     explosive residue examiner in the LD. You explained that 
     Whitehurst had made numerous allegations regarding problems 
     in the FBI LD, but that only one, involving the changing of 
     auxiliary examination dictation, warranted further 
     investigation by your office. I told you that the FBI's 
     Office of the General Counsel (OGC) had also received the 
     same allegations from Whitehurst and was already conducting 
     an investigation. As you know, our preliminary investigation 
     is complete, and the report dated May 24, 1994, was made 
     available to your office.
       As you will recall, the allegation you were interested in 
     investigating involved Whitehurst's claim that in some cases, 
     Principal Examiners (PE) from the Explosives Unit had changed 
     his Auxiliary Examiner (AE) dictation without his approval or 
     knowledge. OGC contacted the LD management regarding this 
     allegation who advised that the LD had a longstanding policy 
     prohibiting any changes in AE dictation by the PE without the 
     express permission of the AE. The LD immediately reaffirmed 
     this policy with all its examiners. The May report made the 
     following recommendation regarding Whitehurst's allegations 
     on this matter:
       Recommendation: We feel that LD management has 
     appropriately addressed this issue. However, we are making 
     the following recommendations to correct any past unapproved 
     AE dictation changes and ensure that the AE has a chance to 
     review final reports:
       1. Examine all past reports where SSA Whitehurst and * * * 
     (the other explosive residues examiner) were the AE's, and 
     compare with the language of the final reports to ensure 
     there were no changes. If changes were made, appropriate 
     action should be taken to correct any substantive errors that 
     were contained in the final report(s).
       2. Require a copy of the final report be distributed to the 
     AE examiners at the same time the final report is mailed to 
     the contributor.
       The FBI adopted the recommendations from the report which 
     are currently being implemented by the LD. The deadline for 
     the review conducted pursuant to recommendation number one is 
     October 15, 1994, and I will forward a copy of the report to 
     your office as soon as it becomes available.
       The LD examiner who is reviewing the Whitehurst and * * * 
     PE/AE reports advised that he believes there are still one or 
     two reports that have not yet been retrieved. Once a final 
     accounting of every report is completed, I will send you a 
     copy of any remaining reports not enclosed with this letter. 
     The only redactions in the enclosed reports are the case 
     names and other personal identifying data.
       The following is a list of the enclosed reports which are 
     identified by the FBI LD number:
     1. 00530046
     2. 70724075
     3. 70921005
     4. 70921006
     5. 70928045
     6. 71019029
     7. 71116047
     8. 71116048
     9. 71125046
     10. 71224001
     11. 71228078
     12. 80121007
     13. 80217150
     14. 80803018
     15. 80803019
     16. 81108029
     17. 81223004
     18. 90403032
     19. 90509063
     20. 90615067
     21. 90623042
     22. 90626055
     23. 90808074
     24. 90823043
     25. 91121007
     26. 91121008
     27. 91130017
     28. 91204079
     29. 91207016
     30. 20124011
     31. 20207023
     32. 20416043
     33. 20618039
     34. 20624009
     35. 20729026
     36. 20812032
     37. 21118013
     38. 21123024
     39. 21214070
     40. 21221093
     41. 21221094
     42. 30422012
     43. 30611054
     44. 30708031
     45. 30802045
     46. 30812043
     47. 30816032
     48. 31001027
       Please do not hesitate to contact me if you need any 
     further information or additional assistance. I can be 
     reached at * * *.
           Sincerely yours,
                                                    ------ ------,
     Associate General Counsel.
                                                                    ____

     To: Mr. Ahlerich
     From: J. J. Kearney

     Re alternations and changes in AE reports by PE examiners 
         without approval of AE examiner scientific analysis 
         section [SAS] Laboratory Division [LD].

       Reference Mr. H. M. Shapiro memorandum to Mr. Hicks, dated 
     6/8/94 and Messrs * * * and * * * memorandum to Mr. Shapiro, 
     dated 5/25/94.
       Purpose: To Advise you of the actions being taken to 
     resolve the captioned issue.
       Recommendation: None, for information only.
       Details: As described in the * * * and * * * memorandum to 
     Mr. Shapiro, SSA Frederic Whitehurst, Materials Analysis 
     Unit, SAS, has alleged that in some instances Principal 
     Examiners (PE) from the Explosives Unit have changed his 
     Auxiliary Examiner (AE) dictation without his approval. 
     Following some review it appears that the practice is 
     isolated to one * * * .
       In addition, prior to issuance of the referenced memoranda. 
     I was approached by * * * a second * * * who rendered a 
     similar complaint concerning the work of * * * I met with * * 
     *. Explosives Unit in an attempt to resolve the issue. During 
     the meetings, it was apparent there was a deeper unresolved 
     issue which existed between the examiners of the two units. 
     The issue centered around what each unit believed their 
     individual roles were when reporting the examinations of 
     evidence in bombing matters. It was the position of the 
     Explosives Unit that examiners in the Materials Analysis Unit 
     should limit their reporting to the chemical analysis of the 
     explosive residues and not discuss the nature of explosive 
     materials. On the Other hand, the Materials Analysis Unit's 
     position was that the Explosives Unit periodically went too 
     far in their interpretation of the residue data when they 
     formulated their conclusions and summary statements in their 
     reports.
       In these meetings, the practice that a PE not change an 
     AE's dictation without first discussing the matter with, and 
     getting the AE's approval was reemphasized with each of the 
     Unit Chiefs and the Examiners. It was agreed that the two 
     units would follow the practice. In addition, in order to 
     ensure that the AE examiner is kept informed as to what is 
     being reported on regarding his work, it was reemphasized 
     that a tickler copy of the final report would be provided to 
     the AE examiner for his review and records.
       Further, I recommended that when bombing cases go to trial, 
     we send both the explosive expert and explosive residue 
     expert to testify to their results. This policy is in keeping 
     with how testimony is handled in other cases in the 
     Laboratory having both AE and PE testimony and would prevent 
     any further confusion or possible misrepresentation of the AE 
     dictation in bombing cases.
       In order to resolve the issue * * * I have asked * * * to 
     review * * *. Some of the cases have already been reviewed by 
     * * *. The remainder of the cases will be reviewed by * * * 
     and all cases will be placed into two categories:
       Category One will include all those cases where no 
     alteration occurred or if an alteration occurred, it did not 
     change the meaning of the dictation.
       Category Two will include all those cases where an 
     alteration of the dictation occurred which caused a change in 
     the meaning of the dictation and may have resulted in a 
     misrepresentation of the data.
       It is anticipated that the remainder of the review will be 
     completed by October 15, 1994. A summary report of * * * 
     findings will be prepared. At that time, it will be 
     determined * * *.
       I have enclosed * * * copy of this memorandum * * * so that 
     the review of this matter will be comprehensive and 
     efficient.
                                                                    ____

                                                 January 13, 1995.
     To: Mr. Kearney
     From: * * *

     Re alterations and Changes in auxiliary examiner (AE) reports 
         by principal examiner (PE) without approval of AE 
         examiner; Scientific Analysis Section (SAS) Laboratory 
         Division (LD).

       Reference J.J. Kearney's directive on 1/4/95, to document 
     recommendations resulting from a review of captioned matter.
       Purpose: To make recommendations regarding the documented 
     alterations of auxiliary examiner dictation from the 
     Materials Analysis Unit (MAU) by SSA Explosives Unit (EU).
       Recommendations: 1. That SSA * * * be held accountable for 
     the unauthorized changes he made in the AE dictation of SSA 
     WHITEHURST by administrative action to include both oral 
     reprimand and a letter of censure.
       2. That the Assistant Director in Charge of the Laboratory 
     Division mandate that all PEs provide a copy of all outgoing 
     reports that include AE dictation to the respective AEs to 
     avoid the possibility of mistakes/errors being furnished to a 
     contributor as a result of misuse or misinterpretation of the 
     AE dictation by the PE.
       3. That the issue as to whether or not revised reports 
     should be prepared and furnished to the contributors in the 
     thirteen (13) cases where I have concluded significant 
     alterations were done SSA * * * be referred to General 
     Counsel for resolution.
       4. That Laboratory policy be re-emphasized to insure that 
     PEs never be allowed to testify to the results/meaning of AE 
     dictation furnished to them that clearly falls outside their 
     expertise.
       Details: Based upon a memorandum to each Laboratory Unit 
     Chief from J.W. HICKS dated 5/24/91, the approved, current 
     Laboratory policy for errors made by a person in the 
     Laboratory is clearly documented. This memorandum lists four 
     types of errors. The alteration of another examiner's 
     dictation without consultation with that examiner or his/her 
     Unit Chief would fit, in my opinion, the criteria of the most 
     serious type of error defined by the ``willful or grossly 
     negligent error.''
       It has always been understood practice (perhaps not written 
     policy) that PEs do not change/alter/reword/revise AE 
     dictation without consulting with and receiving permission 
     from the AE, or their respective Unit chief in combination 
     with the AE.
       The problems that could arise during testimony when AE 
     dictation is arbitrarily

[[Page S2610]]

     changed cannot be over-emphasized. The wording in all MAU 
     dictation is carefully thought out, discussed, peer reviewed 
     often times, and results from correct interpretations of the 
     data. Any dictation signed out by the MAU Unit Chief or his 
     designee should not be changed in any manner without the 
     proper notification and consent of the AE.
       In my opinion, SSA * * * chose to ignore this longstanding 
     practice, a practice that everyone else adheres to.
       It is clear that SSA * * * does not understand the 
     scientific issues involved with the interpretation and 
     significance of explosives and explosives residue 
     composition. He therefore should realize this deficiency and 
     differentiate between his personal opinions and scientific 
     fact. An expert's opinion should be based upon objective, 
     scientific findings and be separated from personal 
     predilections and biases.
       In order to identify a given material, it is necessary for 
     the examiner to acquire sufficient data using acceptable 
     scientific techniques/protocols and instrumentation to 
     specifically identify it. If that level of data is not 
     acquired or does not exist, then complete identification is 
     not possible and words such as ``consistent with'' or 
     ``similar to'' are used. This is nothing new. It is taught in 
     our colleges and universities. It is a standard set by MAU 
     based on experience/background, education, discussions, 
     research and peer review of the analytical procedures in 
     place. By rewording AE dictation, SSA * * * places an 
     examiner in the position where he/she would be required to 
     advise the court that the report overstates the findings and 
     therefore is incorrect.
       A FBI Laboratory report is evidence. Often times the report 
     itself is entered into evidence during the trial proceedings. 
     The fact that SSA * * * did make unauthorized changes in 
     these reports could have resulted in serious consequences 
     during legal proceedings and embarrassment to the Laboratory 
     as well as the entire FBI.
       In conclusion, SSA * * * committed errors which were 
     clearly intentional. He acted irresponsibly; he should be 
     held accountable; he should be disciplined accordingly. The 
     problems regarding AE alterations by SSA * * * are verified. 
     All of the AE dictation furnished to SSA * * * by SSA 
     WHITEHURST has been reviewed. The causes, reasons and events 
     which led to the occurrence of the errors has been discussed. 
     The appropriate administrative action, in my opinion, should 
     be that SSA * * * be given a letter of censure.
                                                                    ____

                                            Department of Justice,


                              Federal Bureau of Investigation,

                                 Washington, DC, November 8, 1995.
       FBI Director Louis J. Freeh today released the following 
     statement:
       The FBI looks forward to working with the Blue Ribbon Panel 
     named today. The FBI will assist the panel in every manner 
     possible to ensure an objective review of our examinations 
     and policies.
       Over the past several years, Special Agent Frederic J. 
     Whitehurst has raised a variety of concerns about forensic 
     protocols and procedures employed in the FBI Laboratory. The 
     FBI has vigorously investigated his concerns and is 
     continuing to do so. The FBI alone has reviewed more than 250 
     cases involving work previously done by the Laboratory. To 
     date, the FBI has found no evidence tampering, evidence 
     fabrication or failure to report exculpatory evidence. Any 
     finding of such misconduct will result in tough and swift 
     action by the FBI.
       The FBI Laboratory conducts over one million examinations 
     per year and our experts testify hundreds of times annually 
     in state and federal courts of law. At trials, FBI Laboratory 
     examinations are constantly subject to extraordinarily 
     vigorous challenge through cross-examination and the 
     presentation of expert testimony by defense witnesses.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Brownback). The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. ROBB. Thank you, Mr. President.

                          ____________________