[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 32 (Thursday, March 13, 1997)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E471-E474]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




              ENVISIONING A NEW NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

                                 ______
                                 

                           HON. BARNEY FRANK

                            of massachusetts

                    in the house of representatives

                        Thursday, March 13, 1997

  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I submit the following for 
printing in the Record:

[[Page E472]]

              Envisioning a New National Security Strategy

                      (By Hon. Ronald V. Dellums)

       The Cold War has been over now for several years. 
     Throughout that era, congressional colleagues told me: We 
     cannot make cuts in our military budget because of the world-
     wide threat posed by the Soviet Union and its allies. 
     Nonetheless, we believed then and we argued then that we 
     could reduce military spending and thereby help to ratchet 
     back the conflict. Indeed, throughout the last decade of the 
     Cold War, the Congressional Black Caucus proposed a series of 
     budgets to do precisely that.
       With the Cold War over, many colleagues now say: With one-
     third cuts in funding, force structure and personnel, we have 
     gone far enough in our post Cold War draw down. They say that 
     any more will leave us unable to respond to emerging 
     challenges because of hollow forces untrained and unequipped. 
     I say again, our current security environment both allows and 
     demands that we reallocate significant resources from our 
     military accounts, and redirect them into those domestic and 
     foreign policy accounts that contribute equally importantly 
     to our United States national security. Indeed, a strategy 
     that ignores the contributions to national security made by 
     foreign assistance and investments in education and science 
     research and development, just to name two domestic accounts, 
     is not a comprehensive strategy--and therefore it is one that 
     is doomed to fail.
       Certainly instability and danger remain in various parts of 
     the world, including in Russia and other nations of the 
     former Soviet Union. Military modernization in China, 
     Southeast Asia, Latin America and elsewhere--including within 
     the United States--always should give pause for concern. The 
     Persian Gulf and Korean Peninsula merit continued attention 
     because of the possibilities for open warfare between 
     nations. Humanitarian crises and instability throughout the 
     globe will properly continue to require the involvement of 
     the U.S. military at least in the near term--preferably 
     through United Nations' sponsored undertakings in which the 
     United States acts as a colleague which can bring special 
     skills to the table. But we should not allow ourselves to be 
     trapped into the belief that these challenges, only partially 
     military in nature, represent anything requiring anywhere 
     near our current force structure or modernization plans.
       Moreover, we should not view even these ``security'' 
     challenges in purely military terms. They must be seen in 
     their economic, cultural and diplomatic frame of reference. 
     Seen in that light, much of the instability that threatens 
     human rights or outright bloodshed can be diminished and 
     deflected through a robust program of sustainable economic 
     development and timely diplomatic activity in behalf of 
     crisis intervention and conflict resolution. As I noted 
     throughout the Cold War, conflicts that are economic, 
     political, social and cultural in their origins cannot be 
     solved by resort to arms, but only by solving the underlying 
     economic, political, social and cultural origins of the 
     conflict.
       Viewed this way, it is clear there exists an imbalance in 
     the funding of our three ``national security accounts.''
       In one account, we continue to make a commitment to find 
     ways to finance a too-large military force structure, an 
     overly aggressive and in many cases misguided weapons 
     modernization program, and overly programmed requirements to 
     maintain short-term readiness (while not planning 
     successfully to pay for the involvement we will have in 
     peacekeeping and humanitarian ventures). We fail to pay for a 
     sufficient program of foreign assistance and much of what we 
     do pay for goes for military security assistance which often 
     compounds the problems that generate regional instability and 
     hostility, rather than ameliorate the root causes of that 
     instability. And, finally, we have already and continue to 
     sacrifice the necessary investments in education, science, 
     research and development, medical and infrastructure that 
     are absolutely critical to the national security of our 
     nation on the three-tiered alter of sustained military 
     spending, balanced federal budgets and generalized tax 
     breaks.
       It is clear to me that significant spending reductions can 
     be achieved in our military account by a thoughtful 
     application of analysis to understanding the threats and 
     opportunities that great us in this new era. In this paper, I 
     seek to set out the justification for such reductions--
     reductions which I believe represent both a down payment on 
     durable savings in the years beyond which we are currently 
     planning budgets and which will also shape and reduce the 
     military investments that will be made by other nations in 
     the future, especially including China and Russia.
       I will leave it to others to more carefully lay out the 
     types of investments that could be made in both the foreign 
     assistance and domestic investments. But let me assert in 
     regard to both of them that fiscal investments in these 
     priorities will bear enormous leverage toward creating 
     international stability beyond our borders and to ensuring 
     that we have a healthy and vibrant society and polity within 
     our borders.
       In other words, contrary to those who worry that we spend 
     too little on defense, I believe that our current level of 
     spending--far in excess of our most robust potential 
     adversary--is excessive and represents a long-term threat to 
     our national economy and to the integrity of the national 
     treasury and, therefore, to our national security.


                    The Military Funding ``Crisis''

       Much of the discussion to date from the new Congressional 
     majority has centered on how to find equilibrium by an 
     increase in the funding side of the military requirements-
     funding equation, rather than confronting whether or not the 
     program side might be overly robust and therefore excess to 
     our legitimate defense requirements. I believe, as I will set 
     out below, that we should focus on the program side of the 
     equation, and seek to find our equilibrium by scaling back 
     excessive force structure and formulating our modernization 
     effort to meet more appropriately the strategic challenges 
     that will confront us in tomorrow's world. Indeed, when 
     approached from that direction substantial savings can be 
     generated.
       All of us--whatever our political viewpoint--should be able 
     to agree that the United States has not fully reconfigured 
     our forces or our thinking to meet the new realities of the 
     post-Cold War era. The disagreement is over how we can meet 
     them, what our strategy should be and what it will take to 
     implement that strategy. Only when we have answered these 
     questions can we proceed to assess the budgetary requirements 
     to fulfill that strategy.
       My continued assessment of the type and scale of the 
     dangers that exist, the proper response to them and the role 
     of the United States in that response convinces me that we 
     can over the coming five-year defense planning period, and 
     prudence dictates that we should: first, make further 
     reductions in our nuclear arsenal and the infrastructure that 
     supports that arsenal; second weapons acquisition programs 
     that were undertaken to meet Cold War threats and which no 
     longer are required, or which are provocative and thereby 
     detrimental to U.S. interests in long-term stability; third, 
     reduce readiness requirements and plan to incorporate more 
     effectively reserve; forces in our military planning by 
     establishing less stringent planning requirements for 
     conflicts; and fourth, make further marginal force 
     reductions beyond those already projected, including in 
     intelligence accounts.


                      REDUCING THE NUCLEAR DANGER

       The administration's Nuclear Posture Review failed to 
     realize savings that could be made by scaling back our 
     strategic arsenal. More recently, they have declined to 
     pursue opportunities with Russia to undertake START III 
     negotiations, which may prove essential to the Russian 
     ratification of the START II treaty. Former Strategic Command 
     Commander-in-Chief General Butler has quite appropriately 
     shoved the debate over downsizing (towards elimination) of 
     our arsenals right on to the front burner.
       It is such a promising opportunity, that we will fail to 
     secure it at our peril. I have urged the administration, 
     privately and in public, to take unilateral to go below START 
     II levels. Such unilateral initiatives could set the stage 
     for very deep cuts in weapons systems, and could be 
     inspirational to those nations that are currently sitting on 
     the fence as regards their own nuclear futures. The 
     importance of containing the threat of proliferation, and its 
     difficulties, can be seen in the debate regarding the 
     extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Many 
     nations, such as Egypt, appropriate pressed the United States 
     and the other large nuclear powers to embrace and implement 
     their responsibilities under Article VI of the NPT and to 
     secure the adherence to the Treaty of those whose nuclear 
     arsenals are less developed.
       It is potentially catastrophic to our national security to 
     eschew the opportunity both to reduce significantly the 
     nuclear threat that we currently face and to forstall the 
     further proliferation of those threats. By failing to take 
     such steps we also send clear signals to the Russians and the 
     Chinese that their nuclear arsenals are prerequisites for 
     them to maintain their super-power status. In that way we 
     perpetuate the nuclear danger; and by failing to assume our 
     Article VI responsibilities, we invite additional regional 
     instability and new threats to emerge from prospective new 
     members of the nuclear-weapons club.
       For those who worry about this threat to the point of 
     wishing to revive an expensive anti-ballistic missile 
     program, with what I believe is very limited utility to 
     defend the United States from weapons of mass destruction, it 
     strikes me that preventing the emergence or retention of the 
     threats that such a system is designed to counter would be a 
     cautious and cost effective strategy. Scaling back our own 
     strategic forces would be critical to such a strategy.
       Although I believe it is possible to move beyond our 
     reliance upon the traditional triad of strategic elements--
     sea-based missiles, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and 
     bombs dropped from the missiles launched from bombers--one 
     can also maintain the triad, not have to spend the levels 
     that are planned for in the administration budget request, 
     and still move deliberately but cautiously down for force 
     structure ladder. Obviously at some point, maintaining the 
     triad, per se, no longer makes sense and we should move 
     towards the most survivable leg of that triad--our submarine 
     force.
       Making such adjustment could lead to new commitments by the 
     Russians--who face devastating economic circumstances that 
     will literally compel them to make savings when they perceive 
     their strategic interests

[[Page E473]]

     allow them to do so--who seem eager to negotiate 
     reductions beyond the START II goals, and should give the 
     Chinese reasons to moderate their on-going strategic-
     weapons modernization program.
       While this constitutes a more determined effort to scale-
     back our strategic arsenal than is contemplated by the 
     administration, it would provide us with a ``hedge'' capacity 
     in the event of the return of an implacably hostile 
     relationship with Russia. It would place us on a path that 
     signaled our willingness to lead the weapons reduction effort 
     and would set the stage at the end of the five year budget 
     period to implement a plan to reduce our arsenal to a minimum 
     sufficient deterrent. This makes the achievement of nuclear 
     disarmament a feasibility within our lifetimes.


                  End the Cold War Acquisition Program

       With the exception of a temporary reprieve from aggressive 
     spending on acquisitions that was allowed by the force 
     structure reductions that have been on-going during this 
     decade, there has not been a fundamental rethinking of U.S. 
     acquisition strategy. The administration has proposed that in 
     this FYDP we will begin to invest significantly in weapons 
     modernization--feeling that we have reached the limit of 
     relying on the investment of the last decade. The Republican 
     majority by both yesterday's technology and moan when they 
     find they have boxed themselves out of affording the 
     expensive modernization program the administration supports. 
     Neither are awaiting the outcome of the Quadrennial Defense 
     Review (QDR) that could--and should--dramatically alter the 
     priorities that were laid down in the Bottom Up Review 
     undertaken by Secretary Aspin--which will hopefully provide a 
     careful review of programs such as the F-22, the New Attack 
     Submarine and others which requirements were conceptualized 
     during the Cold War.
       I believe strongly that we should avoid buying new systems 
     that maintain the United States and the world on a treadmill 
     of weapons development. Pressing ahead with such invites an 
     arms race that we would be well advised to avoid. We should 
     not fail, as we did in the run-up to MIRV technology, to 
     realize the opportunity that may be available to turn the 
     world away from an accelerated escalation in these types of 
     programs; or we will face much more costly and deadly threats 
     in the long run.
       In addition, we much avoid making purchases of systems that 
     are excessive, redundant, and are designed to replace systems 
     that currently work perfectly well because they are far 
     superior to anything that they confront in a potential 
     theater and will continue to do so into the mid-term future. 
     In this regard, we must examine and scale back our ship 
     purchasing, tactical air craft development, more rationalize 
     our strategic lift program and various other programs.
       The budget savings in these accounts that would be achieved 
     by the types of cutbacks above are, of course, sometimes 
     offset by the need to acquire alternative in order to ensure 
     that the first element of the acquisition requirement of 
     equipping our force with safe and reliable systems is 
     satisfied. The amounts of savings I am suggesting can be made 
     are net adjustments that accommodate for the necessary 
     acquisition of perfectly suitable current-generations systems 
     to meet our foreseeable operational needs. This allows us to 
     resist the temptation to rush new technologies to the 
     battlefield ahead of requirements, but rests on an assumption 
     that we will continue to make prudent investments in research 
     and development.
       These more discerning measures of acquisition would allow 
     us both to lead an effort to slow the level of weapons 
     systems development, retard weapons sales internationally 
     (thereby reducing the threats faced by U.S. and coalition 
     forces), properly equip our forces for the challenges they 
     will face in the near to mid term, and utilize our scarce 
     resources to investigate new technologies that will be 
     more important for the next century. Such a strategy would 
     make the maximum return on investment, and would 
     contribute the best to our effort to control the 
     proliferation of exotic weapons technology.


                      Properly Sizing U.S. Forces

       Properly sizing U.S. forces is also important for ensuring 
     that we do not place scarce defense resources into the wrong 
     pots. The Bottom-Up Review's requirement to have forces 
     sufficient to be able to meet, nearly simultaneously, two 
     major regional contingencies without allied assistance 
     exceeds that which was propounded by President Bush's Defense 
     Secretary Dick Cheney--and exceeds in my judgment a 
     reasonable planning orientation. It would be my hope that 
     both the planning assumptions and the forces that emerged 
     from the BUR will receive serious examination during the QDR.
       First, we should relax slightly the pace at which we 
     believe we would need to respond to a developing crisis. By 
     more deliberately ``metering'' forces into a theater--enough 
     to halt aggression and provide for force protection quickly 
     and then more deliberately once that state is achieved we can 
     both reduce active force structure and readiness 
     requirements. In addition, this expands the opportunities of 
     time during which sanctions, negotiations and other non-
     military efforts can reverse the aggression through less than 
     major armed confrontation. We should bear in mind that 
     Operation Desert Storm commenced seven months after Iraq 
     invaded Kuwait. We would establish a planning horizon to 
     commence counter-offensive military operations more severe 
     than was undertaken in that conflict.
       Second, a change in this pace of operations will allow for 
     a more effective utilization of reserves, and indeed for 
     returning more of our force structure to reserve components.
       Third, such a change will modify lift requirements, not 
     only changing force structure but procurement requirements as 
     well.
       Fourth, by changing the view regarding allied 
     participation, we again can relax our planning requirements 
     for force structure.
       The alternative that I present assumes that additional 
     force structure reductions and realignments can be 
     accomplished in all services through a change in these policy 
     and strategy assumptions, and that these changes will not 
     compromise our ability to meet our security requirements. It 
     assumes the careful management of reserve resources and a 
     continuing determination to work with our allies and others 
     in coalition efforts. I believe that these modest 
     adjustments, to be achieved within the FYDP, will leave us 
     poised to make an assessment early in the next century as to 
     whether or not we have gone far enough in realigning our 
     forces to meet the world's new strategic threats.
       In addition to these larger changes, other miscellaneous 
     savings can be achieved by changing how we do business. Of 
     course, we must realign our priorities within the force in 
     order to ensure that we have the proper types of units \1\ to 
     meet the future challenges and change our operating methods 
     in order to alleviate some of the operational tempo and 
     personnel tempo problems that have arisen.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \1\ I think especially of enhancing our abilities with, for 
     example, AWACs, civic and public affairs units, water 
     purification units and other types of units that are small, 
     but for which there will continue to be an elevated level of 
     demand.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       This issue of operational tempo (optempo), and ultimately 
     personnel tempo (perstempo), stress has elevated visibility 
     at the moment. Many blame the stress of deployment to meet 
     contingencies as placing too great a burden on the shrinking 
     force structure. However, when you compare the size of the 
     force with the numbers involved in deployments, I believe 
     that what is shown is that our ``business as usual'' is out 
     of kilter and that we have too few of some particular types 
     of units.
       By changing forward presence requirements for aircraft 
     carriers, for example, we can reduce perstempo stress among 
     naval forces significantly. And, as was demonstrated by the 
     prompt movement of carriers from one theater to another when 
     crises have emerged, such a decision does not diminish our 
     ability to respond promptly and effectively in order to deter 
     a crisis from erupting into large-scale violence.
       Finally, as we reduce force structure we should be mindful 
     that better intelligence and assessments can offset the 
     possibility of strategic surprise. Having said that there are 
     substantial savings available within the intelligence 
     accounts that could be achieved through various economies and 
     they should be vigorously pursued.


                     The Imaginary Readiness Crisis

       Similarly, different scoring for training and an 
     understanding that training goals are not arbitary standards 
     that result in catastrophic lack of readiness if they are not 
     fully met would change some of the discussion as well. Such 
     an arbitary rating system led to the anecdotal evidence that 
     there was a readiness crisis at the end of the 1994 fiscal 
     year. We need to explore how steeply we can and cannot tier 
     our readiness; we need to ensure that our services are 
     preparing, as well, for the contingencies that should occupy 
     them more and more--humanitarian assistance, conflict 
     resolution, peacekeeping, etc. But, most importantly, by 
     changing the assumption regarding the pace at which personnel 
     will flow into a potential conflict, we can achieve 
     significant savings in training and other readiness 
     requirements.
       In addition, this budget would enhance environmental 
     cleanup and conversion funds that are critical to the 
     successful transformation of our defense infrastructure to 
     civilian use. We cannot walk away from these communities, who 
     have served the nation, and now want to return to civilian 
     activities. These funds are vital to the future well-being of 
     our nation, and to its national security--and they more 
     easily allow us to close excess infrastructure. We should 
     continue to plan to pay for them in the years to come.


                    A Properly Sized Military Budget

       In this paper, I have avoided proposing specific 
     programmatic cuts and have talked more thematically. However, 
     the numbers presented below represent savings that are built 
     from real force structure cuts, real acquisition program 
     termination, from real changes in operation and training 
     tempos. They have been ``scored'' by CBO to ensure that their 
     authority and outlay savings were properly measured.
       Importantly, they are only one approach to organizing a 
     properly sized, properly equipped and properly trained force 
     for the challenges of the 21st Century. Others could choose 
     different pathways, but they would achieve similar savings.
       I felt it important not to get bogged down in a debate over 
     this or that weapon system, this or that force structure 
     element or this or that method of operation. Suffice it to 
     say, if the budget were cut by these levels, we could provide 
     for a sufficient military

[[Page E474]]

     force to defend the United States and its interests, 
     participate effectively as a world leader in international 
     affairs and free up resources vitally needed for our other 
     ``national security'' accounts. Our failure to do so will, 
     as I have indicated elsewhere, be to our long-term 
     national security detriment. It is with that analytical 
     framework and in that spirit that I believe we could 
     achieve these levels of savings in the military account 
     over the coming five fiscal years:

                        [In billions of dollars]                        
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                 Authority      Outlay  
                  Fiscal year                     savings      savings  
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1998..........................................      $27.365      $18.761
1999..........................................       34.713       29.071
2000..........................................       44.845       36.219
2001..........................................       48.685       41.818
2002..........................................       51.630       56.221
                                               -------------------------
1998-2002.....................................      217.238      172.090
------------------------------------------------------------------------

       Let me reiterate my view that these represent savings in 
     one of three national security accounts, funds that can be 
     urgently spent in our other two national security accounts: 
     foreign assistance and domestic programs critical to our 
     well-being and health as a nation. For without strong healthy 
     cities to defend, cohesive communities, an educated citizenry 
     to run our economy and our political institutions, we will 
     wither and decline socially, politically, economically and 
     culturally. We are way past due making these investments, and 
     we fail to make them at our peril. The time is ripe and the 
     opportunity exists to transfer this scale of resources and we 
     should not fail to do so as we think of what type of society 
     and what type of world we seek to build for our children and 
     their children.

                                DELLUMS NATIONAL SECURITY BUDGET PROPOSAL SAVINGS                               
                                       [050 Budget authority in billions]                                       
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                  Fiscal year--                                 
                                             -------------------------------------------------------   FH 1998- 
                                                 1998       1999       2000       2001       2002        2002   
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
050 account--Administration's FY 98 budget                                                                      
 proposal...................................   $265.3     $269.2     $275.0     $281.5     $289.1     $1,642.3  
Total savings 1998-2002.....................     27.365     34.713     44.845     41.818     51.630      217.238
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                DELLUMS NATIONAL SECURITY BUDGET PROPOSAL SAVINGS                               
                                            [050 Outlays in billions]                                           
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                  Fiscal year--                                 
                                             -------------------------------------------------------   FH 1998- 
                                                 1998       1999       2000       2001       2002        2002   
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
050 account--Administration's FY 98 budget                                                                      
 proposal...................................   $263.0     $266.3     $270.0     $269.0     $269.0     $1,601.4  
Total savings 1998-2002.....................     18.761     29.071     36.219     41.818     56.221      172.090
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                                                                                     

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