[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 31 (Wednesday, March 12, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2201-S2202]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
NOMINATION OF FEDERICO PENA
Mr. KYL. Mr. President, today, I voted in favor of Federico Pena to
be the new Secretary of Energy for the Clinton administration in the
sincere hope that he will be able to provide the Department of Energy
with the leadership and direction it needs to provide the proper
stewardship of our national energy and security needs in the 21st
century.
I have addressed the Energy and Natural Resources Committee with my
grave concerns about the current direction of the Department of Energy,
especially with respect to the maintenance and stewardship of our
nuclear weapons complex. I wish to use this forum, and the occasion of
the Senate vote on Federico Pena, to restate my concerns and to
reiterate my hope that the current trend at the Department of Energy
will be reversed.
Of particular concern has been former Secretary Hazel O'Leary's
technically insupportable insistence that the United States can both
maintain a credible nuclear deterrent and permanently forego nuclear
testing. What is more, her lack of familiarity with the critical work
of the Nation's nuclear weapons laboratories appears to have emboldened
her to exert immense pressure on their directors to abandon the labs'
longstanding view that the nuclear stockpile cannot be certified
without periodic underground testing.
Indeed, the nuclear weapons complex that the next Secretary of Energy
will inherit from former Secretary Hazel O'Leary is a shadow of its
former self, thanks in no small measure to a Clinton administration
policy which the distinguished chairman of the House National Security
Committee, Representatives Floyd Spence, has called erosion by design.
In releasing a study of this reckless policy on October 30, 1996,
Representative Spence observed that:
``The past four years have witnessed the dramatic decline of the U.S.
nuclear weapons complex and the uniquely skilled workforce that is
responsible for maintaining our nuclear deterrent. The Administration's
laissez-faire approach to stewardship of the nuclear stockpile, within
the broader context of its support for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,
is clearly threatening the Nation's long-term ability to maintain a
safe and reliable nuclear stockpile. * * * In my mind, it's no longer a
question of the Administration's ``benign neglect' of our Nation's
nuclear forces, but instead, a compelling case can be made that is a
matter of 'erosion by design.''
Mr. President, I share the concerns expressed in Representative
Spence's study about the implications of the Clinton-O'Leary program
for denuclearizing the United States. In this regard, two portions of
the Spence report deserve special attention.
Stockpile stewardship:
The Clinton Administration's Stockpile Stewardship and
Management Program [SSMP] entails significant technological
risks and uncertainties. Certification that U.S. nuclear
weapons are safe and reliable--in the context of a
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty--depends on developing highly
advanced scientific diagnostic tools that do not yet exist
and may not work as advertised. Funding shortfalls, legal
challenges and other problems are almost certain to
continue to impede progress in achieving the program's
ambitious goals, and raise serious doubts about the
ability of the program to serve as an effective substitute
for nuclear testing. The Administration's commitment to
implementing the SSMP and, more broadly, to maintaining
the U.S. nuclear stockpile is called into question by
DOE's failure to adequately fund the SSMP and to conduct
important experiments.
Dismantling the DOE weapons complex:
Unprecedented reductions and disruptive reorganizations in
the nuclear weapons scientific and industrial base have
compromised the ability to maintain a safe and reliable
nuclear stockpile. The cessation of nuclear-related
production and manufacturing activities has resulted in the
loss of thousands of jobs and critical capabilities * * *.
DOE still lacks concrete plans for resuming the production of
tritium * * *. Unlike Russia or China, the United States no
longer retains the capacity for large-scale plutonium ``pit''
production and DOE's plans to reconstitute such a capacity
may be inadequate.
Information and Physical Security Problems
Yet another alarming legacy of former Secretary O'Leary's tenure as
Secretary of Energy could be the repercussions of her determination to
declassify some of the Nation's most closely held information. As a
result, efforts by unfriendly nations--and perhaps subnational groups--
bent on acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities have been afforded
undesirable insights into designs, developmental experiences and
vulnerabilities of U.S. nuclear devices.
Of particular concern is the fact that data concerning the precise
quantities
[[Page S2202]]
and whereabouts of U.S. weapons grade material have been made public,
potentially greatly increasing the risk of terrorist operations aimed
at stealing or exposing Americans to attack with such materials.
Incredibly, Clinton administration budgets have significantly reduced
the funding available for securing and protecting such sites.
In fact, the 1997 Energy Department annual report on the Status of
Safeguards and Security concluded that there is a $157 million
shortfall in these accounts. Ironically, that almost exactly equals the
amount contributed by the Department of Energy to the so-called
cooperative treaty reduction, or Nunn-Lugar, program that is being
spent ostensibly to improve the safety and security of former Soviet
nuclear weapons and materials.
The Cuban Nuclear Danger
Last but not least in this illustrative listing of the challenges
facing the next Secretary of Energy is another nuclear issue
confronting this Nation--the prospect that one or both of the two
defective nuclear reactors being built by Fidel Castro in Juragua,
Cuba, will be brought online and then fail catastrophically. Should
that happen, millions of Americans living downwind could be exposed to
lethal levels of radioactive fallout.
On September 11, 1995, Secretary O'Leary confirmed this danger in a
letter to the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations
Committee, Senator Helms. She wrote:
If construction [of these reactors] were resumed and the
reactors completed, their poor construction and lack of
regulatory oversight, and uncertainties about the
qualification and experience of its operators would pose
serious safety risks. Written answers accompanying the
O'Leary letter in response to questions posed by Senator
Helms about the Cuban nuclear program cited the following
concerns: ``the quality of civil construction, the
condition of critical reactor components, the regulatory
structure and nuclear operating base, the plant staff
training programs and industrial infrastructure in Cuba
required to support operation and maintenance of nuclear
power plants.''
The O'Leary Energy Department even went so far as to state:
If a poorly designed, defectively constructed nuclear
reactor began operation in Cuba, there would be an
unacceptably high possibility that a large accidental release
of radioactive material would occur. Dependent on the
meteorological conditions at the time of a major accident,
people on the U.S. mainland could be exposed to significant
airborne (radioactive) contamination.
In response to questions I posed to Secretary Pena during his
confirmation hearing before this committee, I have been advised that he
subscribes to the positions taken in the September 1995 O'Leary letter
to Senator Helms. The trouble is that Mrs. O'Leary took no perceptible
steps to address the menace posed by Castro's nuclear project.
This may have been due to the Department's view, as evidenced in some
of the answers to Senator Helms' questions, that the Soviet VVER-440
(Model 318) design might prove to be safe, after all--notwithstanding
the fact that one has never been constructed or operated before.
Alternatively, Mrs. O'Leary may have been satisfied, as suggested by
other answers, that the levels of radiation from a Cuban meltdown would
only contaminate the U.S. food supply--not directly harm the American
people. Yet another explanation could be the O'Leary team's evident
willingness to accept Russian claims that the Juragua reactors are
designed to withstand seismic shocks up to 7 on the Richter scale. The
response to Senator Helms that Mr. Pena has endorsed did not take note
of the fact that there was a 7.0 magnitude quake in the nearby
Caribbean Plate in 1995.
Mr. President, I am concerned that Fidel Castro's nuclear ambitions
could pose a significant threat to the United States. Others who have
warned of this danger include: the General Accounting Office, the House
International Relations Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, NBC
News and several Cuban defectors who had first-hand experience with the
dismal quality control and safety aspects of the Juragua project. It is
astounding--and unacceptable--that preventing such a danger from
materializing is not a top priority for the leadership of the
Department of Energy and the executive branch more generally.
Conclusion
I would conclude by recommending to Secretary Pena that he carefully
study, and try to emulate, the leadership of the first Secretary of
Energy, James Schlesinger. Dr. Schlesinger brought to his position
extraordinary experience and first-hand knowledge of the national
security dimensions of the job. As a former chairman of the Atomic
Energy Commission, Director of Central Intelligence and Secretary of
Defense and by dint of his work in the private sector at the RAND and
Mitre Corp., he was exceptionally well equipped to address the nuclear
weapons-related issues of the day.
It was largely to Dr. Schlesinger's credit that the antinuclear
agenda of an earlier Democratic administration did not result in an
ill-advised Comprehensive Test Ban. Secretary Schlesinger saw to it
that the best professional advice--not the politically correct or
coerced assertions--of those charged with certifying the Nation's
nuclear arsenal were presented faithfully to the President and the
Congress. It was clear that the considered judgment of the directors of
the nuclear weapons laboratories and other responsible experts was that
a small number of low-yield tests would be required each year to avoid
reaching the point where confident weapon certification was no longer
possible.
As a result, the case was convincingly made that such tests were the
essential last step in the scientific process--the experimental
validation of the hypothesis that our weapons would work as designed.
It was documented that many of the problems that appeared sooner or
later in one-third of all designs deployed would never have been
discovered if testing has not continued after the weapons were
deployed. And it was established that without periodic testing, it
would be impossible over time to retain the skilled design physicists
and engineers responsible for daily judgments about the Nation's
nuclear weapons. In the face of these compelling arguments, President
Carter ultimately abandoned the idea of a zero-yield Comprehensive Test
Ban.
We are now confronted with another President committed to a zero-
yield CTB. Indeed, the Senate will shortly be asked to consider such a
treaty negotiated by the Clinton administration. I believe it is
imperative, as the debate on the CTBT gets underway, that the next
Secretary of Energy provide his subordinates in the Department and its
laboratories with the same opportunity for honest, unpoliticized
analysis and testimony as was afforded by Dr. Schlesinger nearly 20
years ago.
I am hopeful that Secretary Pena will take these comments as they are
meant--as an illustrative list of issues which must have his attention.
I also hope he will understand the importance of these national
security matters to Members of Congress and that Federico Pena will
ensure that an environment is recreated in the Department of Energy in
which national security responsibilities and rigorous scientific
practice are given primacy over dubious arms control agendas and
wishful thinking.
If the vote today were on the Clinton energy policy, it would be a
resounding ``no.'' Mr Pena is not an architect of the policy--yet. It
is my hope that when Mr. Pena next appears before us he will
demonstrate a willingness to lead and not be an apologist for a
continued failed policy.
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