[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 31 (Wednesday, March 12, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2201-S2202]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                      NOMINATION OF FEDERICO PENA

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, today, I voted in favor of Federico Pena to 
be the new Secretary of Energy for the Clinton administration in the 
sincere hope that he will be able to provide the Department of Energy 
with the leadership and direction it needs to provide the proper 
stewardship of our national energy and security needs in the 21st 
century.
  I have addressed the Energy and Natural Resources Committee with my 
grave concerns about the current direction of the Department of Energy, 
especially with respect to the maintenance and stewardship of our 
nuclear weapons complex. I wish to use this forum, and the occasion of 
the Senate vote on Federico Pena, to restate my concerns and to 
reiterate my hope that the current trend at the Department of Energy 
will be reversed.
  Of particular concern has been former Secretary Hazel O'Leary's 
technically insupportable insistence that the United States can both 
maintain a credible nuclear deterrent and permanently forego nuclear 
testing. What is more, her lack of familiarity with the critical work 
of the Nation's nuclear weapons laboratories appears to have emboldened 
her to exert immense pressure on their directors to abandon the labs' 
longstanding view that the nuclear stockpile cannot be certified 
without periodic underground testing.
  Indeed, the nuclear weapons complex that the next Secretary of Energy 
will inherit from former Secretary Hazel O'Leary is a shadow of its 
former self, thanks in no small measure to a Clinton administration 
policy which the distinguished chairman of the House National Security 
Committee, Representatives Floyd Spence, has called erosion by design. 
In releasing a study of this reckless policy on October 30, 1996, 
Representative Spence observed that:
  ``The past four years have witnessed the dramatic decline of the U.S. 
nuclear weapons complex and the uniquely skilled workforce that is 
responsible for maintaining our nuclear deterrent. The Administration's 
laissez-faire approach to stewardship of the nuclear stockpile, within 
the broader context of its support for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 
is clearly threatening the Nation's long-term ability to maintain a 
safe and reliable nuclear stockpile. * * * In my mind, it's no longer a 
question of the Administration's ``benign neglect' of our Nation's 
nuclear forces, but instead, a compelling case can be made that is a 
matter of 'erosion by design.''
  Mr. President, I share the concerns expressed in Representative 
Spence's study about the implications of the Clinton-O'Leary program 
for denuclearizing the United States. In this regard, two portions of 
the Spence report deserve special attention.
  Stockpile stewardship:

       The Clinton Administration's Stockpile Stewardship and 
     Management Program [SSMP] entails significant technological 
     risks and uncertainties. Certification that U.S. nuclear 
     weapons are safe and reliable--in the context of a 
     Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty--depends on developing highly 
     advanced scientific diagnostic tools that do not yet exist 
     and may not work as advertised. Funding shortfalls, legal 
     challenges and other problems are almost certain to 
     continue to impede progress in achieving the program's 
     ambitious goals, and raise serious doubts about the 
     ability of the program to serve as an effective substitute 
     for nuclear testing. The Administration's commitment to 
     implementing the SSMP and, more broadly, to maintaining 
     the U.S. nuclear stockpile is called into question by 
     DOE's failure to adequately fund the SSMP and to conduct 
     important experiments.

  Dismantling the DOE weapons complex:

       Unprecedented reductions and disruptive reorganizations in 
     the nuclear weapons scientific and industrial base have 
     compromised the ability to maintain a safe and reliable 
     nuclear stockpile. The cessation of nuclear-related 
     production and manufacturing activities has resulted in the 
     loss of thousands of jobs and critical capabilities * * *. 
     DOE still lacks concrete plans for resuming the production of 
     tritium * * *. Unlike Russia or China, the United States no 
     longer retains the capacity for large-scale plutonium ``pit'' 
     production and DOE's plans to reconstitute such a capacity 
     may be inadequate.


               Information and Physical Security Problems

  Yet another alarming legacy of former Secretary O'Leary's tenure as 
Secretary of Energy could be the repercussions of her determination to 
declassify some of the Nation's most closely held information. As a 
result, efforts by unfriendly nations--and perhaps subnational groups--
bent on acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities have been afforded 
undesirable insights into designs, developmental experiences and 
vulnerabilities of U.S. nuclear devices.
  Of particular concern is the fact that data concerning the precise 
quantities

[[Page S2202]]

and whereabouts of U.S. weapons grade material have been made public, 
potentially greatly increasing the risk of terrorist operations aimed 
at stealing or exposing Americans to attack with such materials. 
Incredibly, Clinton administration budgets have significantly reduced 
the funding available for securing and protecting such sites.
  In fact, the 1997 Energy Department annual report on the Status of 
Safeguards and Security concluded that there is a $157 million 
shortfall in these accounts. Ironically, that almost exactly equals the 
amount contributed by the Department of Energy to the so-called 
cooperative treaty reduction, or Nunn-Lugar, program that is being 
spent ostensibly to improve the safety and security of former Soviet 
nuclear weapons and materials.


                        The Cuban Nuclear Danger

  Last but not least in this illustrative listing of the challenges 
facing the next Secretary of Energy is another nuclear issue 
confronting this Nation--the prospect that one or both of the two 
defective nuclear reactors being built by Fidel Castro in Juragua, 
Cuba, will be brought online and then fail catastrophically. Should 
that happen, millions of Americans living downwind could be exposed to 
lethal levels of radioactive fallout.
  On September 11, 1995, Secretary O'Leary confirmed this danger in a 
letter to the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations 
Committee, Senator Helms. She wrote:

       If construction [of these reactors] were resumed and the 
     reactors completed, their poor construction and lack of 
     regulatory oversight, and uncertainties about the 
     qualification and experience of its operators would pose 
     serious safety risks. Written answers accompanying the 
     O'Leary letter in response to questions posed by Senator 
     Helms about the Cuban nuclear program cited the following 
     concerns: ``the quality of civil construction, the 
     condition of critical reactor components, the regulatory 
     structure and nuclear operating base, the plant staff 
     training programs and industrial infrastructure in Cuba 
     required to support operation and maintenance of nuclear 
     power plants.''
  The O'Leary Energy Department even went so far as to state:

       If a poorly designed, defectively constructed nuclear 
     reactor began operation in Cuba, there would be an 
     unacceptably high possibility that a large accidental release 
     of radioactive material would occur. Dependent on the 
     meteorological conditions at the time of a major accident, 
     people on the U.S. mainland could be exposed to significant 
     airborne (radioactive) contamination.

  In response to questions I posed to Secretary Pena during his 
confirmation hearing before this committee, I have been advised that he 
subscribes to the positions taken in the September 1995 O'Leary letter 
to Senator Helms. The trouble is that Mrs. O'Leary took no perceptible 
steps to address the menace posed by Castro's nuclear project.
  This may have been due to the Department's view, as evidenced in some 
of the answers to Senator Helms' questions, that the Soviet VVER-440 
(Model 318) design might prove to be safe, after all--notwithstanding 
the fact that one has never been constructed or operated before. 
Alternatively, Mrs. O'Leary may have been satisfied, as suggested by 
other answers, that the levels of radiation from a Cuban meltdown would 
only contaminate the U.S. food supply--not directly harm the American 
people. Yet another explanation could be the O'Leary team's evident 
willingness to accept Russian claims that the Juragua reactors are 
designed to withstand seismic shocks up to 7 on the Richter scale. The 
response to Senator Helms that Mr. Pena has endorsed did not take note 
of the fact that there was a 7.0 magnitude quake in the nearby 
Caribbean Plate in 1995.
  Mr. President, I am concerned that Fidel Castro's nuclear ambitions 
could pose a significant threat to the United States. Others who have 
warned of this danger include: the General Accounting Office, the House 
International Relations Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, NBC 
News and several Cuban defectors who had first-hand experience with the 
dismal quality control and safety aspects of the Juragua project. It is 
astounding--and unacceptable--that preventing such a danger from 
materializing is not a top priority for the leadership of the 
Department of Energy and the executive branch more generally.


                               Conclusion

  I would conclude by recommending to Secretary Pena that he carefully 
study, and try to emulate, the leadership of the first Secretary of 
Energy, James Schlesinger. Dr. Schlesinger brought to his position 
extraordinary experience and first-hand knowledge of the national 
security dimensions of the job. As a former chairman of the Atomic 
Energy Commission, Director of Central Intelligence and Secretary of 
Defense and by dint of his work in the private sector at the RAND and 
Mitre Corp., he was exceptionally well equipped to address the nuclear 
weapons-related issues of the day.

  It was largely to Dr. Schlesinger's credit that the antinuclear 
agenda of an earlier Democratic administration did not result in an 
ill-advised Comprehensive Test Ban. Secretary Schlesinger saw to it 
that the best professional advice--not the politically correct or 
coerced assertions--of those charged with certifying the Nation's 
nuclear arsenal were presented faithfully to the President and the 
Congress. It was clear that the considered judgment of the directors of 
the nuclear weapons laboratories and other responsible experts was that 
a small number of low-yield tests would be required each year to avoid 
reaching the point where confident weapon certification was no longer 
possible.
  As a result, the case was convincingly made that such tests were the 
essential last step in the scientific process--the experimental 
validation of the hypothesis that our weapons would work as designed. 
It was documented that many of the problems that appeared sooner or 
later in one-third of all designs deployed would never have been 
discovered if testing has not continued after the weapons were 
deployed. And it was established that without periodic testing, it 
would be impossible over time to retain the skilled design physicists 
and engineers responsible for daily judgments about the Nation's 
nuclear weapons. In the face of these compelling arguments, President 
Carter ultimately abandoned the idea of a zero-yield Comprehensive Test 
Ban.
  We are now confronted with another President committed to a zero-
yield CTB. Indeed, the Senate will shortly be asked to consider such a 
treaty negotiated by the Clinton administration. I believe it is 
imperative, as the debate on the CTBT gets underway, that the next 
Secretary of Energy provide his subordinates in the Department and its 
laboratories with the same opportunity for honest, unpoliticized 
analysis and testimony as was afforded by Dr. Schlesinger nearly 20 
years ago.
  I am hopeful that Secretary Pena will take these comments as they are 
meant--as an illustrative list of issues which must have his attention. 
I also hope he will understand the importance of these national 
security matters to Members of Congress and that Federico Pena will 
ensure that an environment is recreated in the Department of Energy in 
which national security responsibilities and rigorous scientific 
practice are given primacy over dubious arms control agendas and 
wishful thinking.
  If the vote today were on the Clinton energy policy, it would be a 
resounding ``no.'' Mr Pena is not an architect of the policy--yet. It 
is my hope that when Mr. Pena next appears before us he will 
demonstrate a willingness to lead and not be an apologist for a 
continued failed policy.

                          ____________________