[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 30 (Tuesday, March 11, 1997)]
[House]
[Pages H822-H828]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE
The SPEAKER pro tempore. (Mr. Goodlatte). The Chair would remind all
Members to refrain from the use of profanity in their speech on the
floor.
Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to our distinguished
colleague, the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. Tauzin].
(Mr. TAUZIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Speaker, let me say no one needs to be beamed up on
this vote. This is a vote to confirm not only the appointment of
Charlene Barshefsky, who is now our Deputy Trade Representative, to the
Trade Representative, but also to pass a waiver that is necessary for
that confirmation to be complete.
I want to first congratulate her on a near unanimous confirmation in
the Senate and the near unanimous vote in the Senate on behalf of this
resolution.
Let me point out that Charlene Barshefsky was already at USTR as
Deputy Trade Representative when the law in question was passed last
year. So this grandfathering is in fact a recognition of her already
and continuous service at the USTR.
Let me also state that as chairman of the Subcommittee on
Telecommunications and Trade of the Committee on Commerce, we have all
been extraordinarily impressed with the caliber of service that this
ambassador has already provided to this country. She has worked
cooperatively with our committee in keeping us informed and interacting
with us throughout all the WTO negotiations in Geneva that led to the
successful passage of the recent agreement in Geneva on
telecommunications and opening up those markets all over the world to
U.S. investment.
That action alone is going to create opportunities for American jobs
and businesses throughout the world in telecommunications. It is
patterned very much after the 1996 Telecommunications Act that this
House and the Senate so unanimously joined in just 1996 to create an
open market for the United States in telecommunications.
[[Page H823]]
I look forward as chairman of the subcommittee very soon to receiving
the testimony of Ms. Barshefsky before our subcommittee, in not only
reporting on that successful negotiation of which we are all so proud,
but on the continuing efforts to bring other countries in with new and
improved offers so that we can continue to open up markets for
telecommunications services throughout the world for American
businesses and American jobs. I urge the adoption of this resolution.
Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time.
Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of Senate Joint Resolution 5 in the
nomination of Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky to serve as U.S. Trade
Representative. I have had the pleasure of working with Ambassador
Barshefsky over the last few years. I cannot say enough about her
toughness, her tenacity and her aggressive advocacy on behalf of U.S.
interests.
I know Ambassador Barshefsky is tough because the companies in my
district have benefited from her toughness. The Eighth Congressional
District of Illinois, my district, is home to some of the leading high-
technology companies in the country, and they have gained market share,
increased their export sales, and hired new workers in part due to
Ambassador Barshefsky's tenacity. It is because of her toughness that
the cellular phone market in Japan is now more open than ever, that
China has signed a rigorous agreement protecting intellectual property
rights, and that Motorola, to take just one example from my district,
has gained greater access to the Chinese market.
I have seen her in action. A year ago Ambassador Barshefsky started
building support among the Quad nations for a landmark information
technology agreement. At the WTO ministerial meeting in Singapore last
December, I watched her work around the clock to hold together an
alliance and put in place an unprecedented market-opening agreement. It
was an honor and a pleasure to see her rolling up her sleeves, getting
the nitty-gritty detail and coming out with a superior deal. She does
not give up and she does not give in. I am very hopeful that under her
leadership at USTR we would be able to pass fast-track legislation that
would permit the negotiation of further market-opening initiatives.
It has been a real pleasure to work with Ambassador Barshefsky in
large part because of her rare ability to reach across party lines and
work with Members from both sides of the aisle to craft good deals that
best serve our companies and our workers. Good jobs and a strong
economy are American goals, not Republican or Democrat goals.
Ambassador Barshefsky helps us reach those goals together by putting
aside politics and hammering out good policy that opens markets,
increases exports, creates jobs and strengthens the American economy so
that we can remain the world's most competitive Nation into the next
century and beyond.
Mr. Speaker, I agree with the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Archer],
chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, that we should not be
forced to consider a waiver today because the underlining provision
that we seek to waive is ill-advised and should not be in place. I
would like to place in the Record a resolution and report recently
adopted by the American Bar Association which clearly and cogently set
forth the arguments in opposition to the preemployment restrictions
imposed by the underlying provision.
Mr. Speaker, I strongly support the nomination of Ambassador
Barshefsky as U.S. Trade Representative and urge my colleagues to vote
for the waiver on Senate Joint Resolution 5.
American Bar Association Section of International Law and Practice
Recommendation to the House of Delegates
recommendation
Be it resolved, That the American Bar Association urges the
Government of the United States to proceed as follows:
I. Congress should avoid statutory provisions that
disqualify senior executive or judicial appointees on the
basis of clients they have previously represented.
II. Congress and the Administration should continue to
utilize traditional mechanisms (including the Senate's power
of confirmation), rather than special pre- or post-employment
rules, to ensure that senior executive and judicial positions
are filled only by highly qualified persons who will fulfill
the responsibilities of their positions with complete
integrity.
III. Ethics-in-government rules, whether addressed to pre-
or post-government employment activities, should not single
out foreign policy or trade functions for special,
restrictive treatment. Congress should repeal the 1995
amendments to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 207 and 19 U.S.C. Sec. 2171(b),
whose effect is to restrict the pre- and post-employment
activities of U.S. Trade Representatives (``USTRs'') and
Deputy USTRs on behalf of foreign interests, and should not
extend those provisions to cover other senior government
positions.
____
American Bar Association Section of International Law and Practice
Report to the House of Delegates
i. introduction
On July 24, 1995, while debating the Lobbying Disclosure
Act of 1995 (``LDA''),\1\ the Senate accepted an amendment
creating a new restriction on who could serve as United
States Trade Representative (``USTR'') or Deputy USTR.\2\
Specifically, the statute defining the positions of USTR and
Deputy USTR, 19 U.S.C. Sec. 2171(b), was amended to
disqualify from eligibility anyone who at any time in the
past had directly represented, aided or advised a foreign
government or political party in a trade negotiation or trade
dispute with the United States. A related section of the LDA
created new restrictions on the post-employment conduct of
persons who have served as USTR or Deputy USTR. Prior law had
contained a special restriction, enacted in 1992, against a
former USTR's representing, aiding or assisting any foreign
government within three years of having served as USTR.\3\
The LDA extended the ban's duration to a lifetime ban and its
coverage to include Deputy USTRs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Footnotes at end of article.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Senate accepted these two provisions (hereinafter the
``USTR Amendment,'' reproduced in full at Appendix I to this
Report) virtually without debate, and the provisions passed
the House after some unsuccessful attempts to expand their
reach. The President signed the Lobbying Disclosure Act,
including the USTR Amendment, while recognizing the Justice
Department's concern that the new pre-government employment
restrictions may unconstitutionally impinge on the
President's appointments power. In 1996, more bills were
introduced to expand these restrictions to other government
officials, but none were enacted.
The American Bar Association (``ABA'') urges repeal of the
USTR Amendment. While both the pre- and post-employment
restrictions are objectionable, as discussed below, it is the
pre-employment disqualification that raises the most serious
issues, and it is this provisions that most urgently should
be repealed. The provision sets a dangerous precedent for
limiting the availability of qualified candidates to serve in
the U.S. Government. It automatically disqualifies potential
nominees solely based on a prior relationship with a
particular type of client. Such a rule, which effectively
equates an advocate's personal views with those of his or her
client, reflects an unwarranted and incorrect view of the
lawyer/client relationship, especially in view of the
ethical obligations of lawyers and the constitutionally-
recognized right to counsel. In addition, such a rule
takes no account of the nature, length, significance or
contemporaneity of the relationship with the former
client. With regard to the new lifetime post-employment
restrictions for USTRs and Deputy USTRs, there has been no
demonstration that such a ban is needed to address any
real problem, and there are compelling reasons not to
restrict the post-employment conduct of trade negotiators
in such an unusual and severe manner.
In sum, the Report supports the accompanying ABA resolution
urging that the Congress: avoid enacting disqualifications
for service in the U.S. Government which presume that lawyers
and other advisors take on the views of their clients; avoid
singling out foreign policy and trade functions for extra-
restrictive pre- or post-government employment rules; and
promptly repeal the USTR Amendment.
II. THE PRE-EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS
The new pre-employment restriction is unique among
provisions in the U.S. Code creating ``primary officers'' of
the U.S. Government (i.e., positions requiring nomination by
the President and the advice and consent of the Senate). Of
the hundreds of appointees in this category, only USTR and
Deputy USTR candidates can be disqualified based solely on
the identity of their former clients.
There is a serious constitutional objection to this new
pre-employment restriction, in that it infringes on the
President's appointments power. The ABA notes, but does not
rest its concerns on, that objection. The new pre-employment
restriction is also troubling on several policy grounds: (1)
it arbitrarily limits the flexibility of the President to
choose and the Senate to confirm, the best possible person
for a particular government position; (2) it presumes,
without justification, that a person advising a foreign
government personally embraces and retains views antithetical
to those of the U.S. Government; (3) it creates perverse
anomalies unconnected to any legitimate interest in
[[Page H824]]
ensuring the loyalty of senior appointees; and (4) comparable
disqualifications could easily be enacted, based on the same
flawed rationale, for other government positions.
A. The New Disqualification Is of Doubtful Constitutionality
As mentioned above, there is virtually no legislative
history accompanying the USTR Amendment and thus, unlike the
debate surrounding provisions restricting post-government
employment activities, no discussion by the Congress of the
legality of the new pre-employment restriction. As also noted
above, before the USTR Amendment there were no statutory
provisions disqualifying any class of persons from service as
USTR or Deputy USTR.
It is well accepted that the Congress has the
constitutional responsibility for creating the various
government offices not specifically enumerated in the
Constitution.\4\ Further, it is well accepted that the
Congress can attach qualifications to those government
offices:
While Congress may not appoint those who execute the laws,
it may lay down qualifications of age, experience and so on.
Sometimes these qualifications significantly narrow the field
of choice. However, any Congressionally imposed
qualifications must have a reasonable relation to the office.
Otherwise, Congress would be, in effect, creating the
appointing power in Congress, rather than in the President.
Congress may, in short, create the office but may not
appoint the officer. To distinguish between these two powers,
the Court has developed a germaneness test.\5\
The Department of Justice articulated just such serious
constitutional concerns with the USTR Amendment as it relates
to the President's appointments power:
The Department of Justice has long opposed broad
restrictions on the President's constitutional prerogative to
nominate persons of his choosing to senior executive branch
positions. The restriction in the bill is particularly
problematic because it operates in an area in which the
Constitution commits special responsibility to the President,
who ``is the constitutional representative of the United
States in its dealings with foreign nations.'' See, e.g.,
United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 35 (1960). The
officers in question perform diplomatic functions as the
direct representative of the President, a fact that Congress
itself has recognized by providing that they should enjoy the
rank of ambassador. 19 U.S.C. Sec. 2171(b). Regardless of
whether the President would, as a policy matter, be willing
to accept this particular restriction, Congress would exceed
its constitutionally assigned role by setting such a
broad disqualification. See, e.g., Civil Service
Commission, 13 Op. Att'y Gen. 516, 520-21 (1871).\6\
After passage of the Lobbying Disclosure Act by both the
Senate and the House, Justice continued to express serious
concerns about the new pre-employment provision, but did not
recommend that the President veto the Act on this basis.\7\
The President in signing the bill noted the constitutional
issue.\8\
The new disqualification raises serious separation of
powers questions. When such provisions are enacted without
hearings, with virtually no floor debate or legislative
history, and despite constitutional objections noted by the
Department of Justice, the justifications underlying them
should be carefully examined. Where such provisions are not
only constitutionally suspect but also premised on a mistaken
and troublesome view of the lawyer-client relationship, they
should be removed.
B. It Is In The Public Interest for the President to Be Free to Appoint
the Most Highly Qualified Nominees, Regardless of Past Clients
The new disqualification rules out many qualified
individuals who could otherwise serve the nation effectively
as senior trade negotiators. The best qualified candidate for
a particular USTR or Deputy USTR appointment may be someone
who has some experience advising foreign clients. (We note,
in this regard, the adage that it is useful for a prosecutor
to have experience serving as defense counsel.) Yet, the USTR
Amendment would prevent such a person from serving.
While it is wrong to presume a link between advocacy and
personal belief, it is even more wrong to freeze such a
presumption into a statute. Categorical and difficult-to-
amend statutory disqualifications cannot take into account
the nuances of a particular candidate's history. These are
precisely the factors that the President should weigh in
choosing a nominee and the Senate should review in the
confirmation process.
The new disqualification does not only restrict the
President's appointments power. It also represents a failure
to respect the Senate's constitutional role to consider, and
where appropriate disapprove, the President's nominees. The
Senate should preserve its prerogative to consider a
particular nominee's record of advocacy for foreign clients,
or foreign government clients, in the confirmation process
and to determine whether anything in that record is
sufficiently troubling to justify withholding
confirmation.\9\
C. The Unstated Premise of the New Disqualification--That An Advocate
is Either Tainted By or Continuously Captive to the Interests of a
Former Client--Is Inconsistent with U.S. Traditions and Values
During the 1974 Senate consideration of legislation to
establish the office of special prosecutor and to
depoliticize the position of Attorney General, former Supreme
Court Justice Arthur Goldberg described the attorney-client
relationship in the following manner: \10\
One of the traditional concepts applicable to the bar at
large is too often overlooked in senatorial confirmation
hearings involving nominees for Attorney General, Assistant
Attorney General, Deputy, and U.S. Attorneys. That concept--
which I fear, Mr. Chairman, in the day of the organization
man and big interests which lawyers are called upon to serve,
is too often overlooked--is that the bar is independent, that
it is not a servant of a client, but services a client; and
that the men and women of the bar are independent and give
counsel and advise independently. The principal law
enforcement officers of the Government should be lawyers in
that sense, . . .. Any nominee of a different mind or
character should not be confirmed by the Senate.
For just such reasons, it is widely accepted that a lawyer
should not be ineligible for nomination as a judge solely
because of past representation of, for example, criminal
defendants.
The USTR Amendment, and the proposals to extend the
disqualification so that it applies to other government
positions, adopts a different and inaccurate view of the
relationship between advocates and their clients. It is wrong
to assume that an outside adviser, such as a lawyer,
necessarily concurs with the views or actions of his or her
client, or will apply those views in carrying out the duties
of a public office. Certainly, if someone represents more
than one group of clients--for example, foreign governments
in some matters and U.S. corporations in others--it cannot
fairly be presumed that the foreign government representation
determines or more accurately represents the person's own
beliefs.
When an individual leaves the private sector and becomes a
government official, he or she takes on totally new
responsibilities and must move beyond all prior client
interests--those of domestic and foreign clients alike. Other
than preserving their confidences, an appointee has no
continuing obligation to prior clients. The USTR Amendment
wrongly ignores this aspect of public service.
Reflecting its inconsistency with U.S. traditions and
values, the new disqualification is utterly without precedent
in the U.S. Code. Appendix 2 to this Report identifies 126
statutory provisions, relating to U.S. Government civilian
offices, that impose qualifications in addition to Senate
confirmation.\11\ As shown there, those 126 provisions fall
into seven groupings: 3 provisions requiring that appointees
be U.S. citizens; 19 provisions requiring that appointees be
civilians at the time of their appointment; provisions that
establish minimum representation on a board or commission of
certain constituent groups; provisions requiring technical
expertise; 6 provisions imposing ``cooling off'' periods to
ensure civilian control of the military; 7 provisions
imposing other temporary ``cooling off'' periods (e.g.,
sitting members of the U.S. Postal Service Board of Governors
may not simultaneously be representatives of ``special
interests using the Postal Service''); and 2 provisions
containing permanent, uncurable, disqualifications. Of these,
only the USTR disqualification is based on advocacy
activities. The other provides that members of the permanent
board of the Federal Agriculture Mortgage Corporation shall
not be, or have been, officers or directors of a financial
institution.
D. The New Disqualification Creates Perverse Anomalies
Before the USTR Amendment, there were no statutory
qualifications upon who could be nominated and confirmed to
serve as USTR or Deputy USTR. Not even U.S. citizenship, or a
record free of criminal behavior, was (or is) statutorily
required. Thus, the effect of the new pre-government
employment restriction is that a non-citizen, a felon or even
a juvenile could in principle be nominated and confirmed as
USTR, while a highly skilled trade specialist who briefly
advised a foreign government twenty years ago could not.
Such a rule could also deprive the nation of highly skilled
and effective public servants. Had it been in effect at the
time, the USTR Amendment might have disqualified one of
President Reagan's USTRs, Dr. Clayton K. Yeutter, for
activities that apparently did not dominate his pre-
government professional work.\12\ Extending the principle, as
some have proposed, to representing, aiding or advising
foreign private companies might have disqualified
President Bush's USTR, Carla Hills.\13\ Again, to the
extent that questions arise in a particular case about the
overlap between prior advocacy efforts and the advocate's
own current beliefs, such questions can be effectively
explored during the Senate confirmation process.
Broad and seemingly arbitrary interpretations of the USTR
Amendment are possible given the lack of definitions, in
either the statute or the legislative history, for crucial
and open-ended terms such as, but not limited to, ``aided''
and ``advised.'' For example, if a Senator meets with foreign
government officials in an attempt to find a mutually
advantageous solution to a particular bilateral trade
dispute, it could be argued that he or she has ``aided'' or
``advised'' the foreign government in such a manner as to
trigger disqualification from future service as USTR. On the
other hand, it has been observed that the USTR Amendment
would not
[[Page H825]]
prevent appointment of a corporate executive who, in order to
increase profits at his ailing company, negotiates an
enormous tax subsidy from a foreign government in order to
move parts of his factory abroad and subsequently fires
hundreds of his U.S. workers.\14\
E. The New Disqualification Sets an Undesirable Precedent for Other
Government Positions
A significant danger of the USTR Amendment is that the same
principle could be applied to other government positions
involving disciplines other than international trade
negotiation. Persons could be disqualified, by statute, from
being federal judges because they had at some time in their
past represented criminal defendants, even if their
representations had been the result of occasional court
appointment. Positions at the Environmental Protection Agency
could be conditioned, by statute, on never having
represented, aided or assisted clients in favor of, or
opposed to, toxic dump cleanup. Positions at the Department
of Energy could be conditioned, by statute, on never having
represented, aided or assisted clients in favor of, or
opposed to, offshore drilling. Positions at the Consumer
Product Safety Commission could be conditioned, by statute,
on never having represented, aided or assisted clients
supporting, or opposing, specific product liability actions.
More broadly, anyone who has given advice to entities in a
regulated industry could be disqualified from putting his or
her expertise to use as a regulator in that industry. Such a
rule would dramatically restrict the pool of qualified
regulators.
The ABA historically has advanced the view that rigid
(i.e., statutory) pre-employment restrictions for government
appointments should be avoided. For example, in the wake of
the perceived politicization of Justice Department functions
during the Watergate period, during consideration of what
eventually became the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, the
ABA was asked to comment on possible eligibility restrictions
for senior law enforcement positions:
Question. There have been many recommendations to set the
statutory requirements for appointees to the Offices of
Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, Director of the
FBI, and others. Do you generally believe it is a good idea
to set rigid eligibility standards by statute, considering
that many highly qualified individuals would be arbitrarily
excluded from consideration by such standards? If so, what
sorts of standards would you suggest?
Answer. The ABA has not suggested rigid standards for
appointment to any of the above-mentioned positions nor does
it believe rigid standards are advisable.\15\
The USTR Amendment, by contrast, fails the test of narrow
drafting and scope. It reaches backward in time without
limit, disqualifying otherwise qualified candidates by reason
of any covered representation or assistance at any earlier
point in their careers. The amendment reaches candidates who
agreed to assist foreign governments with no idea that doing
so might preclude later public service. The amendment applies
not to a carefully circumscribed category of activities, but
to any representation or assistance, whether significant or
insignificant, to any foreign government on any trade
``negotiation'' or ``dispute'' involving the United
States. Finally, the amendment confuses the advocate's
required role with his or her personal views.
III. THE POST-EMPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS
A. Post-Employment Restrictions of General Application
There have been restrictions on the post-employment
activities of various categories of federal workers since
1872.\16\ The earliest versions approximating the current
provisions were adopted in 1962, as part of an overall
revision of the conflict-of-interest statutes.\17\. In short,
a full and generally effective array of government-wide post-
employment restrictions has been in place for many years.
Those restrictions, subjected to substantial revision and
fine-tuning in the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 \18\ and
the Ethics Reform Act of 1989,\19\ include: a lifetime ban on
appearing before or communicating with any U.S. Government
body on behalf of a party other than the United States, on
matters in which the official ``participated personally and
substantially'' while a federal employee;\20\ a two-year ban
on appearing or communicating with any U.S. Government body
on behalf of a party other than the United States on matters
that were pending under his or her official responsibility in
the year prior to departure from the agency;\21\ a one-year
ban for enumerated senior officials on all substantive
contact with the former agency on behalf of a party other
than the United States, which for Cabinet officers and
certain other very senior officials extends to contacts with
specified top officers of other agencies as well;\22\ and a
one-year ban prohibiting senior officials of all departments
and agencies from (i) representing the interests of a foreign
government or political party before any agency or department
or (ii) aiding or advising a foreign government or political
party with the intent to influence a decision of any
department or agency.\23\
The last of these provisions, a special rule against senior
officials' representing or advising foreign governments, drew
a number of policy and constitutional objections prior to and
at the time of its enactment.\24\ This Report does not
address the propriety of a broad, government-wide, one-year
ban on post-employment activity for foreign governments. It
is noteworthy, however, that this provision was justified
against due process attack on the ground that it presented no
absolute bar to pursuit of employment by covered officials,
but ``merely imposed a waiting period'' of one year.\25\
These post-employment restrictions establish a
comprehensive set of rules that apply across the board to
federal officials and employees in all agencies and
departments. For the most part, these rules appear to have
worked successfully.\26\ They apply with full force to USTRs
and Deputy USTRs, and thereby provide a solid framework for
protecting the public interest in regulating the post-
employment activity of persons who occupy those positions.
B. Special Restrictions Placed Upon Senior Trade Negotiators
Beginning in 1992 and by expansion in the 1995 USTR
Amendment, Congress created a special rule that singles out
former USTRs and Deputy USTRs for special, more restrictive
treatment than other, similarly-situated, former senior
officials. Congress did so with virtually no meaningful
deliberation or explanation. It is the ABA's view that, in so
doing, Congress created a separate category of post-
employment treatment for the senior U.S. trade officials that
cannot be justified and should be eliminated.
The fist step along this path occurred in 1992, when
Congress, as part of an appropriations bill, enacted a new
Section 207(f)(2) which lengthened to three years the foreign
entity ban as it applied to the USTR.\27\ The Senate report
describing this provision contained no meaningful explanation
or justification of the longer period.\28\ In signing the
bill, President Bush took strong objection, noting that the
change had been passed without any public discussion of the
merits, without consideration of its relationship to the
comprehensive amendments passed in the Ethics Reform Act of
1989, and without evaluation of ``the implications of
targeting for coverage just one position.'' \29\ President
Bush signed the bill because it was a necessary funding
measure.
Continuing this pattern of acting without legislative
hearings or development, the 1995 USTR Amendment enlarged
this special USTR restriction to a lifetime ban, and expanded
the ban to cover Deputy USTRs as well as USTRs. Like the
initial 1992 creation of the special post-employment rules of
the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 or the Ethics Reform Act
of 1989, each of which underwent extensive legislative
consideration--the USTR Amendment did so without any
meaningful legislative background.
This action raises serious legal and policy questions. In
departing from the ``waiting period'' rationale that underlay
the general one-year ban on representation of foreign
governments in the Ethics Reform Act of 1989,\30\ the new
lifetime ban raises the very constitutional questions that
led the Justice Department and other witnesses to express
concern during the 1989 reform legislation. One of the bills
leading to the 1989 Act contained a lifetime ban on certain
high ranking officials representing or advising foreign
entities. In hearings on that bill, a Justice Department
spokesman agreed that the lifetime ban raised a serious
constitutional problem.\31\ Another Justice Department
official doubted that reducing the ban to 10 years would
remove the constitutional problem.\32\ Commenting on a
substitute version of the bill, a spokesperson for Common
Cause agreed with shifting away from a lifetime ban on
representing foreign governments in favor of a shorter
period. While believing that the period for the ban should be
longer than for other representations, Common Cause was
``very troubled by a lifetime ban and would not recommend
that.'' \33\ Others testified that even a 10-year ban was too
long.\34\ The ACLU suggested that ``[a]t the very least such
a prohibition should expire if the party controlling the
White House changes in the interim.'' \35\
More importantly, no persuasive rationale has been advanced
for applying special rules to senior trade officials. Former
USTRs were barred by pre-1992 law, for example: from ever
assisting foreign governments in any matter in which they had
direct involvement while in government;\36\ for communicating
with USTR officials on my policy issue for a period of the
one year; \37\ from communicating with USTR officials
within two years on any matter that was active within USTR
during the last year of the former USTR's service; \38\
and from appearing before any agency, within one year
after leaving government, on behalf of a foreign
government or political party.\39\
Taken together, these rules adequately protect against the
possibility, and against the appearance of ``influence
peddling'' or ``misuse of inside information'' by former
trade officials on behalf of foreign interests.
There are at least three other compelling reasons to repeal
the new post-employment restrictions. First, the restrictions
could easily hinder advancement of U.S. interests by
diminishing the pool of qualified senior trade negotiator
candidates. Among the factors cited in discouraging people
from public service are increasingly severe post-employment
restrictions. Past USTRs and Deputy USTRs have not made a
full career of public service; like other senior appointees,
they have returned to their communities and their private
practices after serving in public office. Qualified
candidates may decline to serve if their livelihoods--often
after a relatively short period of government service--would
thereby by materially jeopardized.
[[Page H826]]
Second, there has been no documented misconduct by former
USTRs or Deputy USTRs which would justify the new, heightened
restrictions. Third, there is no principled reason to single
out trade negotiators; rather, the new restrictions simply
penalize or demonize the representation of foreigners. Other
government officials--e.g., the Secretaries of Defense or
Transportation, or the Attorney General--could just as easily
be subject to the same lifetime ban.
Meanwhile, there has been absolutely no showing that the
general rules applicable to all other government officials
insufficiently protect the interests of the United States.
The public interest is in having nominees who become public
officials adhere to the highest standards while executing the
duties of their office. After someone leaves office, the
government's interest is properly limited to preventing the
misuse of its confidential information and the misuse of
influence.\40\
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
For the reasons set out above, it is the view of the ABA
that: Congress should avoid statutory provisions that
disqualify senior executive or judicial appointees on the
basis of clients they have previously represented. Congress
and the Administration should continue to utilize traditional
mechanisms (including the Senate's power of confirmation),
rather than special pre- or post-employment rules, to ensure
that senior executive or judicial positions are filled only
by highly qualified persons who will fulfill the
responsibilities of their positions with complete integrity.
Ethics-in-government rules, whether addressed to pre- or
post-government employment activities, should not single out
foreign policy or trade functions for special, restrictive
treatment. Congress should repeal the 1995 amendments to 18
U.S.C. Sec. 207 and 19 U.S.C. Sec. 2171(b), whose effect is
to restrict the pre- and post-employment activities of U.S.
Trade Representatives (``USTRs'') and Deputy USTRs on behalf
of foreign interests, and should not extend those provisions
to cover other senior government positions.
Respectfully submitted,
Lucinda A. Low,
Chair, Section of International
Law and Practice.
footnotes
\1\ Pub. L. No. 104-65, 109 Stat. 691 (1995).
\2\ See 141 Cong. Rec. S10560-61 (daily ed. July 24, 1995).
\3\ Pub. L. No. 102-395, 106 Stat. 1873, codified at 18
U.S.C. Sec. 207(f)(2).
\4\ See generally Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional
Law 244 (2d ed. 1988) (analyzing the wording of Art. II,
Sec. 2, cl. 2).
\5\ John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law 265
(5th ed. 1995) (footnotes omitted).
\6\ Letter from Andrew Fois, Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legislative Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice to
the Hon. Henry Hyde, Chairman, House Committee on the
Judiciary, concerning S. 1060 [the Senate bill pending before
the House] 2-3 (Nov. 7, 1995).
\7\ Letter from Andrew Fois, Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legislative Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice to
the Hon. Alice M. Rivlin, Director, Office of Management and
Budget concerning S. 1060 2 (Dec. 18, 1995).
\8\ See 51 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 2205-
06 (December 25, 1995).
\9\ The unwarranted breadth of the new disqualification is
demonstrated by the more narrowly drawn alternatives that
Congress did not select. Even assuming arguendo that
assertive use of the Senate's confirmation authority is
insufficient, narrower solutions are available. One is
mandatory recusal with penalties for failure to do so,
combined with strict reporting of prior activities. See,
e.g., 28 U.S.C. Sec. 528 (Justice Department employees).
Recent USTR and Deputy USTR nominees have disclosed prior
representations, including foreign representations, and have
voluntarily recused themselves (temporarily or permanently,
as appropriate) with respect to issues involving those
particular clients. Hearing to consider nomination of Michael
Kantor Before Senate Comm. on Finance, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993); Nomination of Carla Anderson Hills: Before Senate
Comm. on Finance, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). Nominations
of Rufus Hawkins Yerza, Charlene Barshefsky, Walter Broadnex,
Avis Lavelle, Jerry Klegner, David Ellwood, Kenneth Apfel,
Bruce Vladeck, Hariet Rabb and Jean Hanson: Before Senate
Comm. on Finance, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). Other trade
officials have done likewise. See, e.g., Rick Jenkins,
``Trade Nominations Raises `Revolving Door' Issue,''
Christian Science Monitor at 8 (Jan. 14, 1994). Another
alternative is more extensive mandatory reporting of pre-
employment activities over a set period before Senate
confirmation, enhancing the Senate's ability to reject a
nominee based on prior activities if it wishes. See, e.g.,
Hearings on S. 555 (Public Officials Integrity Act of 1977,
Blind Trusts and Other Conflict of Interest Matters) Before
the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 108-09 (1977) (testimony of Fred Wertheimer, Vice
President for Operations, Common Cause). Requiring disclosure
of clients is not without its problems. As noted by the ABA
in 1977, such a regime could place a professional person in
the position of having to violate the confidentiality of a
privileged relationship. See Financial Disclosure Act:
Hearings on H.R. 1, H.R. 9, H.R. 6954, and Companion Bills
Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and
Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 487, 490 (1977) (testimony of Prof.
Livingston Hall and Prof. Herbert S. Miller on behalf of the
American Bar Association).
\10\ Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice:
Hearings on S. 2803, S. 2978 Before the Subcommittee on
Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1974).
\11\ These are all the provisions that could be identified
through review of the U.S. Code, 1994 Edition, and Supplement
I to that Edition. Some of these provisions are also subject
to statutory requirements designed to ensure a balance of
political affiliation on Boards and Commissions, e.g., an
equal number of Democrats and Republicans on the U.S.
International Trade Commission. Additionally, in some cases
an office is required by statute to be filled by an existing
federal, state or local government official. Appendix II
largely ignores such requirements.
\12\ Dr. Yeutter had served on the board of directors of the
Swiss Commodities and Futures Association and had been the
first American businessman invited to Japan (in 1982) under a
Japanese government program to improve trade relations with
the United States. See Hearing on the Nomination of Dr.
Clayton K. Yeutter Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 28-29, (1985) (vita submitted on behalf of
Dr. Yeutter).
\13\ According to third-party testimony at the time of her
appointment, Ambassador Hills had previously been registered
under the Foreign Agents Registration Act as an agent for
Daewoo Industrial Co. See Hearing on the Nomination of Carla
Anderson Hills Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 32, 51 (1989) (testimony of Anthony
Harrigan, President, U.S. Business and Industrial Council).
\14\ See Donald DeKieffer, ``The 1995 `Irrelevant
Qualifications Act' '' Journal of Commerce at 7A (Dec. 30,
1996).
\15\ Watergate Reorganization and Reform Act of 1975:
Hearings on S. 495 Before the Senate Comm. on Government
Operations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 at 174 (1976)
(testimony of William B. Spann, Jr., President-Elect Nominee
of the American Bar Association and Chairman, American Bar
Association Special Committee to Study Federal Law
Enforcement Agencies). The ABA did recommend limited measures
to address perceived problems of politicization of the
Department of Justice. See also id. at 270-71, 295, 298.
\16\ See S. Rep. No. 99-396, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14
(1986); S. Rep. No. 100-101, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9
(1987).
\17\ Prior provisions had barred former employees from
prosecuting claims against the United States for two years
after terminating government employment. See H. Rep. No. 748,
87th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-4 (1961).
\18\ Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824, 1864-66 (1978).
\19\ Pub. L. No. 101-194, 103 Stat. 1716-24 (Nov. 30, 1989).
\20\ 18 U.S.C. Sec. 207(a)(1) (1996).
\21\ 18 U.S.C. Sec. 207(a)(2).
\22\ 18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 207(c), (d).
\23\ 18 U.S.C. Sec. 207(f).
\24\ H. Rep. No. 1068, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1988)
(regarding H.R. 5043); Post-Employment Conflicts of Interest:
Hearings on H.R. 5097 and Related Bills Before the
Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 79-
80 (1986) (testimony of John C. Keeney, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice,
on legislation leading up to the 1989 Act, arguing that post-
employment restrictions could prohibit representations which
were in the national interest). Similar views were forwarded
by the ACLU, which maintained that a statute prohibiting the
representation of foreign interests regulated political
activity and, to be upheld, must withstand strict judicial
scrutiny. See Post-Employment Restrictions for Federal
Officers and Employees: Hearings on H.R. 2267 and Related
Bills Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and
Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 200, 204-06 (1989). See also Appendix
III to this Report.
\25\ S. Rep. No. 101, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1987).
\26\ The ABA may, of course, have occasion in the future to
comment or suggest improvements that would enhance the
effectiveness of these rules. That is not the subject of this
Report.
\27\ Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the
Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1993,
Section 609, Pub. L. No. 102-395, 106 Stat. 1828, 1873
(1992).
\28\ See S. Rep. No. 102-331, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 118
(1992).
\29\ 28 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 1874
(Oct. 12, 1992) (statement by President George Bush upon
signing H.R. 5678).
\30\ See supra, fn. 25.
\31\ Integrity in Post Employment Act of 1986: Hearings on S.
2334 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 37-38, 41-43, 66 (1986) (testimony of John C. Keeney,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division,
Department of Justice).
\32\ Id. at 87-88 (testimony of Stephen S. Trott, Assistant
Attorney General for the Criminal Division, Department of
Justice).
\33\ See id. at 179 (testimony of Ann McBride, Senior Vice
President, Common Cause); Post-Employment Conflicts of
Interest: Hearings on H.R. 5097 and Related Bills Before the
Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
103-04 (1986) (testimony of Ann McBride, Senior Vice
President, Common Cause).
\34\ See id. at 183, 186 (testimony of Norman J. Ornstein,
American Enterprise Institute).
\35\ Hearings on S. 2334 (Integrity in Post Employment Act of
1986) Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. 199 (1986) (testimony of Morton H. Halperin and
Jerry J. Berman on behalf of the American Civil Liberties
Union).
\36\ 18 U.S.C. Sec. 207(a)(1) (1989).
\37\ 18 U.S.C. Sec. 207(c).
\38\ 18 U.S.C. Sec. 207(a)(2).
\39\ 18 U.S.C. Sec. 207(f).
\40\ See Integrity in Post Employment Act of 1986: Hearings
on S. 2334 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 79-80 (1986) (testimony of David H. Martin,
Director, Office of Government Ethics). The American Civil
Liberties Union (``ACLU'') also opined that the misuse of
inside information should be the focus of ethics laws, rather
than the identity of the client. Id. at 198 (testimony of
Morton H. Halperin and Jerry J. Berman on behalf of the
American Civil Liberties Union); Hearings on H.R. 2267 and
Related Bills (Post-Employment Restrictions for Federal
Officers and Employees) Before the Subcommittee on
Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 200, 210-11
(1989).
Mr. HILL. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to express my deep concern about
our action to waive provisions of section 21 of the 1974 Trade Act
relating to the appointment of the U.S. Trade Representative. As you
know, Senate Joint Resolution 5 waives the prohibition banning
individuals who represent or have previously represented foreign
governments from serving as America's top trade representative.
Mr. Speaker, the law we are asked to waive today is not some arcane
law that has been in the books for decades which may have run its time.
It is a law that was approved only 2 years ago to prevent lobbyists of
foreign governments from obtaining an appointment to be our chief trade
negotiator. While I do not doubt
[[Page H827]]
the competency and ability of Ambassador Barshefsky to dedicate her
best efforts as she has done as the Deputy U.S. Trade Representative,
her association as a lobbyist for Canada touches a raw nerve in
Montana.
Mr. Speaker, the farmers and ranchers of my home State of Montana are
suspicious of the administration's commitment to ensure that NAFTA
implementation is fair. To this point, evidence suggests it isn't. The
Lobby Act says that anyone who has worked against the United States in
trade negotiations ought to be excluded from U.S. Government service as
trade representative. When the President signed the Lobby Act he
singled out this provision for praise. Without being too political, it
is an unusual request to waive the law just enacted. Though the issue
is a material matter of law, it also goes to the heart of trust. For my
farmers and ranchers in Montana, there is a constant threat of
subsidized Canadian wheat and barley being dumped in United States
markets. These actions threaten Montanan's livelihood and seriously
question the free-trade agreements with our northern neighbor.
As you know, Mr. Speaker, I consider Canada a strong ally of the
United States. We share the longest unfortified border in the world and
a similar past of standing up against tyranny and for the values of
democracy. However, many Montanans are greatly troubled by Canada's
current trade practices. Despite the implementation of the North
American Free-Trade Agreement [NAFTA], Canada continues to subsidize
its various industries and commodities, including timber, beef, and
grain.
Clearly, we need someone to vigorously negotiate and highlight
American interests in our growing international trade. The stakes have
never been higher for farmers and ranchers in my State of Montana. Our
farmers need to find markets and secure agreements for free and fair
trade. And they need to have confidence that Washington is behind them
100 percent. We passed a law to give them that confidence. Now is not
the time to waiver.
Mr. Speaker, I believe that granting the waiver sends the wrong
signal. Waiving the law only raises suspicion about our long-term
dedication to free trade.
Mr. NEAL of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I support the legislation
before us which grandfathers Ambassador Barshefsky from certain
provisions of the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995. When this
legislation was considered in the Senate, Ambassador Barshefsky was
grandfathered as Deputy U.S. Trade Representative [USTR]. This
resolution would extend that grandfather to Ambassador Barshefsky as
she moves up to the position of USTR.
I have served on the Subcommittee on Trade for 4 years and have had
the opportunity to work closely with Ambassador Barshefsky. Prior to
joining USTR, Ambassador Barshefsky specialized in trade law and policy
for 18 years. She brings expertise to the position of USTR.
In her 4 years at USTR, Ambassador Barshefsky negotiated many major
bilateral and multilateral agreements. With respect to Japan,
Ambassador Barshefsky has been the key policymaker and negotiator. Her
work has resulted in agreements on the following issues: Government
procurement of telecommunications equipment and services, Government
procurement of medical equipment and technology, insurance, flat glass,
and cellular phones and equipment and agreements.
Ambassador Barshefsky was instrumental in reaching the intellectual
property rights enforcement agreement with China. I admire her
determination in reaching agreements when there were many skeptics.
Several times it was down to the wire and she was able to come out with
a solid agreement.
I urge you to vote for this resolution. I look forward to working
with Ambassador Barshefsky in her role as USTR.
Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of Senate Joint
Resolution 5, legislation to waive certain provisions of the Lobbying
Disclosure Act of 1995 with respect to the nomination of Ambassador
Charlene Barshefsky to become the U.S. Trade Representative. This
legislation is necessary to complete the nomination process of
Ambassador Barshefsky.
Ambassador Barshefsky has broad bipartisan support and deserves to be
our next U.S. Trade Representative. Last week, the other body approved
her nomination and the waiver legislation before us today by
overwhelming votes of 99-1 and 98-2, respectively.
During her nearly 4 years of service at the Office of the USTR, first
as Deputy USTR and since April of last year Acting USTR, Ambassador
Barshefsky has compiled an impressive record opening foreign markets
for U.S. exporters and defending U.S. trade interests. For example, she
recently concluded successful multilateral agreements which will reduce
or eliminate tariffs worldwide on trade in information technology
products, and which will open foreign markets for basic
telecommunications services. Last December she concluded a bilateral
agreement with Japan on insurance which opens that market for U.S.
insurance providers. Last year, she also struck an agreement with China
providing for stronger enforcement of U.S. intellectual property rights
in that country.
Clearly, Ambassador Barshefsky has shown that she is a tough and
skillful negotiator internationally. More importantly, however,
Ambassador Barshefsky understands that international trade and our
Nation's trade policies have an impact on the lives and futures of
Americans. For that reason, she consults closely with Members of
Congress and the public at large on her actions. She clearly recognizes
that trade policy is a shared responsibility of the executive and
legislative branches and carries out her responsibilities accordingly.
For those who may have questions or concerns about this waiver, it
must be noted that Congress has previously passed legislation to waive
a statutory requirement on who may serve in a particular Government
position with respect to a specific nominee. It should also be noted
that, as Deputy USTR, Ambassador Barshefsky was specifically exempt
from the provisions in question in the Lobbying Disclosure Act. The
Senate Finance Committee carefully studies her record in the private
sector and agreed unanimously that a waiver was entirely appropriate
for Ambassador Barshefsky.
Mr. Speaker, in the past several years I have come to know and admire
Ambassador Barshefsky's work and tireless dedication on behalf of the
American people. I heartily endorse the legislation before us today and
urge my colleagues to support it. Ambassador Barshefsky will be a U.S.
Trade Representative of which we will all be proud.
Mrs. KENNELLY. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of Senate Joint
Resolution 5 which waives certain provisions of the Trade Act of 1974.
This resolution would grandfather Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky from
the application of certain restrictive provisions of the Lobbying
Disclosure Act of 1995. On occasion the Senate has granted similar
waivers when a statutory provision would have barred a highly qualified
nominee from serving our Nation's executive branch. Let me note,
however, that this resolution applies only to Ambassador Barshefsky and
in no way modifies the statute nor does it have implications for any
other prospective nominees to serve as the U.S. Trade Representative or
as Deputy USTR.
As a Member of the Ways and Means Committee, I have had the pleasure
of working with Ambassador Barshefsky during her time at USTR, first as
deputy to Mickey Kantor and recently in the acting capacity. Ambassador
Barshefsky has been instrumental in developing and pursuing a strong
international trade policy having successfully completed several
multilateral trade and investment treaties. Not only has she
demonstrated her commitment securing agreements beneficial to U.S.
trade interests, she has also demonstrated her willingness to walk away
from the table when other countries have made insufficient offers.
Given her tenacity and resolve on behalf of our country's trade
interests, I firmly believe Charlene Barshefsky to be capable and well
prepared for her role as Trade Representative. Her professional
achievements, her tough negotiating skills and her knowledge of her
subject are most remarkable. I have worked with few people who possess
the ability to discuss both the intricate details of trade minutia and
the whole picture with such clarity and coherence.
We are embarking on a new age in the global marketplace. If we are to
remain competitive, we must be able to compete in foreign markets. The
United States has vigorously pursued agreements and commitments from
our trading partners to open their markets and reduce their trade
barriers in both goods and services. These opportunities should benefit
both American companies and consumers. That must be our goal in seeking
expanded trade in the future; our economic well-being depends on it.
I am confident that Ambassador Barshefsky will continue to pursue a
strong and fair trade agenda that seeks to promote our national
interests abroad and at home. I urge my colleagues to support the
waiver and vote for Senate Joint Resolution 5.
Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of Senate Joint
Resolution 5, a joint resolution waiving provisions of the Trade Act of
1974 relating to the appointment of the U.S. Trade Representative. As
the chairman of the Committee on Agriculture I believe that it is vital
that the person representing the United States in trade negotiations
and resolution of disputes recognize that agriculture is an extremely
important and essential issue to be considered in all trade
negotiations and resolutions of disputes. American farmers and
ranchers, the most productive in the world, can prosper only where
there is free and fair world trade.
In fact, if not for agriculture exports the U.S. trade deficit would
be larger than it currently
[[Page H828]]
is. In 1996, U.S. agriculture exports totaled $60 billion and the
agriculture trade surplus exceeded $26 billion. There is, nevertheless,
ample opportunity for expansion of agriculture trade into the 21st
century. It is incumbent on the administration, through the Office of
the Trade Representative and the Department of Agriculture, to make
sure that opportunities exist for trade expansion and that trade
disputes are resolved in a timely manner.
I have had the opportunity to meet with Ambassador-Designate
Barshefsky and she assures me of her knowledge of agriculture and her
commitment to ensuring the proper emphasis on agriculture export
issues. In our discussions we agreed that agriculture is the No. 1
high-tech export and the No. 1 priority with the USTR. Historically,
agriculture has been a leader in biotechnology, a process through which
researchers develop improved seeds and crops, such as those naturally
protected from diseases and insects. This process has enabled farmers
and ranchers to increase yields and thereby exports. It has also
brought challenges from our trading partners. These challenges must be
vigorously defended by the administration and Ambassador-Designate
Barshefsky assures me that she will do so.
The Uruguay Round agreement included provisions on sanitary and
phytosanitary disputes and provided that sound science be the basis for
resolution of such disputes. Countries' use of nontariff trade barriers
to restrict imports, especially those related to sanitary and
phytosanitary issues, do great harm to American agriculture exports and
thereby the income of our farmers and ranchers. This must be a high
priority with the administration.
The Committee on Agriculture will hold a hearing on March 18, 1997,
to discuss agriculture trade and the barriers that face exporters. The
Secretary of Agriculture and the U.S. Trade Representative have been
invited to testify. This will be an opportunity for the representatives
of the administration to discuss implementation of trade agreements,
the monitoring of the implementation of these agreements by other
countries, and to delineate how they will secure fair treatment for
American commodities in world trade.
In my discussions with Ambassador-Designate Barshefsky she assures me
that agriculture will be a top priority under her watch. That is why I
will support Senate Joint Resolution 5 and the waiver needed to allow
her to assume the position of USTR.
Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Archer] that the House suspend the rules and
pass the Senate joint resolution, Senate Joint Resolution 5.
The question was taken; and (two-thirds having voted in favor
thereof), the rules were suspended and the Senate Joint Resolution was
passed.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
____________________