[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 29 (Monday, March 10, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2035-S2048]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




         STATE DEPARTMENT EXPLANATION OF MEXICO'S CERTIFICATION

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, Senator Coverdell may well come to the 
floor during this period. I hope he does. I will be happy to defer, and 
yield parts of my time to him as well.
  Mr. President, 1 week ago I joined with Senator Coverdell and Senator 
Helms to introduce resolutions of disapproval, to overturn the 
President's decision to certify Mexico for antidrug cooperation.
  Last week I went home and I read the State Department's Statement of 
Explanation, which is just 1\1/2\ pages.
  I must say, I read this document with disbelief. At best, this 
document--which purports to make the case for Mexico's certification--
is a fairy tale. At worst, it is a complete whitewash. Today, I would 
like to take some time and go over parts of it, and indicate my 
thoughts on some of the subjects mentioned and refute some of the 
claims.
  Let me begin by saying that section 490 of the Foreign Assistance Act 
requires the President to certify that Mexico has ``cooperated fully 
with the United States, or taken adequate steps on its own'' to combat 
drug trafficking. Despite the best intentions of President Zedillo and 
the best efforts of the State Department to put a pretty face on the 
situation, the Department's Statement of Explanation, I believe, defies 
credibility.
  The State Department claims that ``The Government of Mexico's 1996 
counterdrug effort produced encouraging results and notable progress in 
bilateral cooperation.'' The facts tell a different story.
  Let me begin with drug seizures:
  The State Department's Statement of Explanation indicates that ``Drug 
seizures and arrests increased in 1996.''

[[Page S2036]]

 While this is technically true--yes, there was a slight increase in 
1996 in both drug seizures and arrests of drug traffickers--that is 
only because the 1995 levels were so dismal. A larger look of Mexico's 
record of drug seizures, going back just a few years to 1992, gives a 
very different perspective.
  The 23.6 metric tons of cocaine seized by Mexico, while slightly 
higher than in 1995, is just about half of what was seized in 1993. So, 
you see, in 1993 they seized 46.2 metric tons of cocaine. Look how it 
has dropped off and leveled off since then.
  Second, drug arrests did increase modestly in 1996 over 1995. But 
look back a few years and it tells a more compelling picture. In 1992 
you had 27,369 drug arrests. In 1996 you had 11,038. That is not a 
stepped-up effort, it is a stepped-down effort. So, after a precipitous 
drop, by more than 50 percent, a barely discernible 5- or 10-percent 
increase, in my view, is not improvement. They are not encouraging 
results and there is not notable progress.
  Today, Mexico is the transit station for 70 percent of the cocaine, a 
quarter of the heroin, 80 percent of the marijuana, and 90 percent of 
the ephedrine used to make methamphetamine, entering the United States.
  These statistics reflect, I believe, more drugs flowing into our 
cities and our communities. How do we know this now? Just look at some 
of the street prices.
  According to the California Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement, in 1993, 
when Mexican cocaine seizures were near their peak, a kilo of cocaine 
sold on the streets of Los Angeles for $21,000. Today, that same kilo 
of cocaine averages $16,500, and I am told that in places you can get 
it for $14,000 a kilo.
  You can see how these prices have dropped. The drop is even more 
dramatic if you look at black tar heroin, which the DEA says is nearly 
the exclusive province of Mexican family-operated cartels, based in 
Michoacan. The price per ounce has dropped from $1,200 in 1993 to $400 
today.
  So today, the street price of black tar heroin has dropped to one-
third of its price 4 years ago.
  Unfortunately, demand remains high, so when the prices drop, the 
obvious conclusion is that you have more supply. The falling price can 
be attributed to increases in the amounts of cocaine and heroin flowing 
across our southern border. I hardly consider this to be evidence of 
``encouraging results and notable progress.''
  When the street prices begin to climb, then I, for one, will begin to 
believe that the supply is being cut.
  So street prices are dropping despite the fact that stepped up 
enforcement on the U.S. side of the border has resulted in increased 
seizures.
  U.S. border agents at the McAllen, TX, border station seized 176,000 
pounds of marijuana in 1996, 20 percent more than in 1993. But the 
burden of combating the increased drug shipments falls 
disproportionately on United States border agents because Mexico does 
little to enforce the border.
  United States Customs and Border Patrol officials have said publicly 
that Mexican traffickers are today going to extraordinary lengths to 
move their products. They are constructing secret compartments in 18-
wheelers. They are saturating areas with hundreds of mules carrying 
backpacks with 40 kilos of marijuana each, and even sacrificing large 
loads of marijuana at the border to allow more valuable shipments of 
cocaine and heroin to slip through behind them. And they have begun to 
use sea lanes in much greater proportion.
  For the State Department to state that there has been improved 
performance by Mexico in intercepting drugs at the border is 
incomprehensible to me. Low seizure figures, low arrest figures, 
falling street prices in our cities--these are hardly indications of 
full cooperation by Mexican authorities in combating drug trafficking.
  Let me speak about the cartels in Mexico. The State Department's 
Statement of Explanation touts the arrests of ``several major drug 
traffickers,'' including Juan Garcia Abrego, leader of the Gulf cartel, 
Jose Luis Pereira Salas, linked to the Juarez and Colombian Cali 
cartel, and Manuel Rodriguez Lopez, linked to a minor operation called 
the Castrillon maritime smuggling organization.
  But who the Mexicans fail to capture tells a much more important 
story. In fact, the State Department admits as much when it says, ``the 
strongest groups, such as the Juarez and Tijuana cartels, have yet to 
be effectively confronted.''
  Let me repeat that: ``the strongest groups * * * have yet to be 
effectively confronted.''
  So here is the State Department explaining to us that Mexico has 
fully cooperated with the United States, and yet telling us in the same 
breath that Mexico has taken no serious action against the 
organizations and individuals most responsible for the bulk of the drug 
trafficking.
  This is also not how United States drug enforcement officials 
describe the efforts in Mexico. Let me share with my colleagues what 
our own drug enforcement officials say about how fully Mexico is 
cooperating in antidrug efforts.
  DEA administrator, Thomas Constantine, has described the Mexican drug 
cartels, in a statement he made to a House committee the week before 
last, as ``the leading organized crime organizations in the Western 
Hemisphere, and for some reason,'' he continues, ``they seem to be 
operating with impunity.''
  His testimony is a chilling account of the extensive operations of 
the major Mexican drug cartels and how corruption within Mexican law 
enforcement agencies has allowed the cartels to conduct their deadly 
trade with virtual impunity. He also described how the Mexican drug 
cartels are expanding their criminal reach into the United States.
  As we debate whether or not to disapprove of Mexico's certification, 
I hope all of my colleagues will take the time to read Mr. 
Constantine's testimony. It makes the case better than anything I have 
seen that Mexico's efforts have, in fact, not met the standard for 
certification.

  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Constantine's 
testimony be printed in the Record after my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I understand the Government Printing 
Office estimates that it will cost $1,152 to print this testimony in 
the Record. I also ask unanimous consent that the Government Printing 
Office estimate be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my 
remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 2.)
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I do this, Mr. President, because I think this is 
testimony that is crucial to a decision that will shortly be before the 
Senate. This is our No. 1 drug enforcement agency in the United States, 
and I think it is important that the testimony of the head of that 
agency be read by Members considering this issue.
  Perhaps the most powerful of all cartels today is the Amado Carrillo-
Fuentes organization, also known as the Juarez cartel. This 
organization operates out of Rancho Hacienda de la Natividad today, 
near Cuernavaca, Morelos, outside of Mexico City. It runs multi-ton 
quantities of Colombian cocaine toward Mexican distribution sites and 
then into the United States.
  The organization runs these drug trafficking operations in Chihuahua, 
Mexico City, Mayarit, Nuevo Leon, Oaxaca, Sinaloa, Sonora, Jalisco, 
Baja, CA, Tamulipas, Veracruz, and Zacatecas, among others.
  Despite the ``encouraging results and notable progress'' cited by the 
State Department, the Juarez cartel is today as strong as it has ever 
been. Worse, it is spreading its tentacles into the United States, and 
this concerns me deeply. One law enforcement official told me it 
controls a majority of the cocaine in Los Angeles.
  Operations linked to the Amado Carrillo-Fuentes organization have 
today been identified in the Texas cities of El Paso, Houston, McAllen, 
Midland, Odessa and San Antonio, and in California's major cities such 
as Los Angeles, San Diego, Sacramento; also, in Nevada's major city, 
Las Vegas; Illinois' major city, Chicago; the major city in the State 
of New York, New York City; and Florida's major city, Miami.
  Do we know who the leaders of this cartel are? Yes, we do, and so do 
the

[[Page S2037]]

Mexican authorities. Amado Carrillo-Fuentes heads the organization and 
controls the cocaine, marijuana and heroin transportation to the United 
States. His brother, Vincente Carrillo-Fuentes, is primarily 
responsible for the group's marijuana trafficking operation.
  These men are considered by President Zedillo to be Mexico's primary 
national security threat. Amado Carrillo-Fuentes has been indicted in 
Florida and in Texas on heroin and cocaine charges. Yet, he has never 
been tried in Mexico, nor has an extradition request for crimes 
committed in the United States been honored.
  Have the Mexican authorities taken any action whatsoever that has 
hampered the operations of the Amado Carrillo-Fuentes organization? The 
answer to date is no. In fact, there is ample evidence to show that the 
Carrillo-Fuentes organization has federal police and government 
officials on their payroll, including the former head of the 
counternarcotics effort in Mexico, General Gutierrez, who was arrested 
3 weeks ago.

  Just a few days ago, Mexico did try to arrest Mr. Carrillo-Fuentes. 
Let me read from the Los Angeles Times, dated Saturday, March 8:

       In an apparently stepped-up search for alleged drug lord 
     Amado Carrillo Fuentes, more than 100 troops backed by light 
     tanks commandeered a luxury hotel in Guadalajara late 
     Thursday night. . . .
       Carlton Hotel manager Carlos Hodria said Friday that about 
     150 soldiers arrived unannounced in trucks and tanks and that 
     the operation lasted about 40 minutes, jarring most of the 
     hotel's personnel and 296 guests. He quoted military officers 
     as saying they were ``searching for a person.''

  Obviously, when you roll tanks up to a hotel, whomever you are 
looking for is going to know that and be long gone. To my knowledge, no 
arrests were made.
  The other major cartel at work in Mexico is the Arellano-Felix 
organization, also known as the Tijuana cartel. This organization 
transports multiton quantities of cocaine and marijuana and large 
quantities of heroin and methamphetamine into the United States where 
it is distributed by agents employed by the cartel in this country.
  The cartel has its base of operations in Tijuana, but it is active in 
Sinaloa, Jalisco, Michoacan, Chiapas, Baja California Norte and Baja 
California Sur. It is of particular concern to me because Southern 
California is the primary entry point of most of the drugs trafficked 
by this organization.
  The Arellano-Felix organization has spread its influence deep inside 
American cities, often recruiting street gangs to do its distribution 
and enforcement work. Orders are given to these agents in U.S. cities 
directly from Tijuana through sophisticated telecommunications 
networks.
  Do we know who the leaders of the Arellano-Felix organization are? 
Again, we do, and so do the Mexican authorities.
  Alberto Benjamin Arellano-Felix is the leader of the organization and 
has overall responsibility for management of the cartel's drug-
trafficking operations.
  His brother, Ramon Eduardo Arellano-Felix, is responsible for the 
group's security operations, which include well-trained paramilitary-
style forces who assassinate rivals and traitors.
  Has any action been taken by the Mexican authorities to rein in the 
operations of the Arellano-Felix organization? Have there been any 
arrests of its senior leaders?
  No, the State Department informs us. This cartel has ``yet to be 
effectively confronted.'' Is this an example of the ``encouraging 
results and notable progress'' cited by the State Department?
  The Amado Carrillo-Fuentes cartel and the Arellano-Felix cartel, to 
the best of my knowledge, are operating with absolute impunity. But 
even the smaller cartels are hardly touched by Mexican authorities.
  I think two recent incidents illustrate just what sort of cooperation 
the United States is receiving from Mexico with respect to the cartels.
  On February 26 of this year, the Washington Post published an hour-
long interview--hour-long interview--with Miguel Angel Caro Quintero, 
leader of the Sonora cartel, who is under indictment in the United 
States for crimes committed in the United States and for whom the 
United States has requested extradition.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this article be printed 
in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 3.)
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, as he told the Post:

       I go to the banks, offices, just like any Mexican. Every 
     day I pass by roadblocks, police, soldiers, and there are no 
     problems. I'm in the streets all the time. How can they not 
     find me? Because they're not looking for me.
  According to law enforcement, the Sonora cartel cultivates, smuggles, 
and distributes heroin and marijuana to the United States, as well as 
transporting Colombian cocaine. It has operations reaching into 
Arizona, Texas, New Mexico, California, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Nebraska, Tennessee, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Louisiana.
  The Washington Post found him, but the Mexican police, up to the last 
few days, were not even looking for him. Perhaps the State Department 
would explain how this qualifies as ``full cooperation'' with the 
United States. I do not see it.
  The other incident was a typical February story. I sometimes wish 
February would last all year round because the pressure of the March 1 
certification decision seems to produce all kinds of results that we 
are unable to get the rest of the year, but on March 2, frequently it 
is business as usual.
  Just hours before the President's decision on certification was to be 
made public, the Mexican Government announced with great fanfare the 
arrest of Humberto Garcia Abrego, a leader of the Gulf cartel.
  Leave aside the question of why Mexican authorities were unable to 
arrest this man the rest of the year but miraculously found him on 
February 27. What happened next is critical to the integrity of the 
effort.
  Only hours after the decision to certify Mexico was announced, 
Humberto Garcia Abrego simply walked out of custody. The Mexican 
Attorney General's office called his release ``inexplicable.'' You 
could not write a script that would illustrate our problem with 
Mexico's inability to deal with the cartels any better than this 
incident.
  Yet, the State Department assures us that there have been 
``encouraging results and notable progress.'' Not with respect to the 
cartels. I sincerely do not believe that the cartels' operations have 
been altered, reduced or impeded at all.
  Those officials whom the cartels cannot buy they kill.
  The cartels have unleashed a reign of terror on honest Mexican law 
enforcement officials. The DEA reports that 12 prosecutors and law 
enforcement officers have been assassinated in Mexico in just the last 
year alone, most of them in connection with the Tijuana cartel.
  Let's start with an incident on February 22, 1996, just about a year 
ago. Approximately 40 Juarez municipal police opened fire on agents 
from the Mexican Attorney General's office, resulting in the death of 
one commandante and one agent. DEA suspects the local police were 
providing protection for drug traffickers.
  On February 23, 1996, Sergio Armanda Silva, a former operations chief 
of the Baja federal police, was assassinated.
  On April 17, 1996, Mexico City's previous top prosecutor, Arturo 
Ochoa Palacios, was gunned down while jogging.
  May 1996, Mexico City's top prosecutor, Sergio Moreno Perez, was 
kidnapped with his adult son in Michoacan state. Their bodies were 
later discovered in a car in Mexico City's suburbs.
  June 27, 1996, drug agency commandante Daniel Beruben-Jaime was 
assassinated in Jalisco.
  July 19, 1996, Isaac Sanchez Perez, the former Baja federal police 
commander, was shot in the back of the head and killed in Mexico City.
  August 17, 1996, Tijuana prosecutor Jesus Romero Magana was gunned 
down outside his home. He was investigating the Arellano-Felix 
organization.
  September 14, 1996, Baja federal police commander Ernesto Ibarra 
Santes, two of his bodyguards and a cab driver were machine-gunned down 
in Mexico city.

[[Page S2038]]

  Ibarra had vowed to go after the Arellano Felix brothers and to purge 
the federal police ranks of any corrupt federal agents who stood in his 
way. He held his post for 28 days.
  September 21, the body of Hector Gonzalez-Baecenas, assistant to 
Garcia Vargas, was found in the trunk of another car. Also tortured.
  September 23, 1996, the body of 43-year-old Jorge Garcia Vargas, 
Tijuana district chief of the Federal antinarcotics agency was found in 
the trunk of a car along with the body of Miguel Angel Silva Caballero, 
a former Federal police commander. Both showed signs of torture.
  November 3, 1996, a former prosecutor named Martin Ramirez-Alvarez 
was murdered in Tijuana. His wife reported that an unknown number of 
individuals stopped them in a vehicle utilizing red and blue police 
strobe lights. They dragged Ramirez-Alvarez out of the vehicle and shot 
him point blank six times. It is believed the Arellano-Felix 
organization is responsible for the assassination.
  On January 3, 1997, 27-year-old State Prosecutor Hodin Gutierrez-Rico 
was assassinated in front of his wife and children at his residence in 
Tijuana. Gutierrez-Rico was investigating the murder of a Tijuana 
municipal police chief and Presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio. 
More than 120 spent shells were found on the ground, and his body was 
deliberately run over several times by a van.
  And so it goes. These murders are, to me, the most compelling because 
their message is undeniable: ``Get too close, and you are dead.'' And 
not one of these cases has been solved to date. This is why the 
corruption of the military general placed in charge of the 
counternarcotics effort is so paralyzing. The question remains: If the 
highest military man can be corrupted, then who is left?
  But Mexico's failure to combat the cartels effectively is having an 
alarming spillover effect into American cities. Robert Walsh, special 
agent in charge of the San Diego office of the FBI told my office that 
all of the major Mexican cartels have members of United States gangs 
working for them.
  These agents distribute the drugs shipped in by the cartels and ship 
the cash generated from drug sales back to Mexico. They also carry out 
revenge murders on orders from Tijuana or Juarez.
  Prof. Peter Lupsha of the University of New Mexico, who has studied 
the cartels for decades, says, ``I don't believe anyone in La Cosa 
Nostra could order a murder 2,000 miles away and expect it to be 
carried out. Carillo-Fuentes can do that and much more.''
  That is why the State Department's utter denial that the problem is 
getting worse is so dangerous. As much as these cartels are destroying 
Mexico, their reach is expanding. They have agents in many of our large 
and mid-size cities. Their drugs are reaching our children. The gangs 
they hire kill ruthlessly to protect their turf in our cities.
  It is no exaggeration to say that the lives of hundreds, if not 
thousands, of Americans are literally at stake in the war against the 
cartels. And the State Department's refusal to face up to facts does 
not protect a single child from the bullets of a drug-running gang or a 
driveby shooter.
  Let me speak about money laundering.
  The next item of progress in the State Department's statement of 
explanation is that ``the Mexican Congress passed two critical pieces 
of legislation which have armed the Government of Mexico with a whole 
new arsenal of weapons to use to combat money laundering, chemical 
diversion, and organized crime.''
  Let us see how good the new money-laundering law is.
  It is true that in May 1996, the Mexican Congress adopted a law that 
for the first time specifically identified money laundering as a 
criminal act. At that time, Finance Minister Guillermo Ortiz Martinez 
committed to develop the regulations that would implement this law by 
January 1997.
  The draft of these regulations, which would require banks and other 
institutions to report suspicious transactions of currency, were due in 
January. Well, it is now March and the regulations have not been 
forthcoming.
  No doubt, the implementation date of these regulations, now scheduled 
for June 1997, will slide, as will the issuance of a second set of 
regulations, governing the reporting of large-scale transactions.
  These regulations are essential to combating money laundering. 
Reporting requirements discourage would-be money launderers, tip off 
law enforcement officials to unlawful activity, and create a paper 
trail that can be a powerful investigative tool.
  But until Finance Minister Ortiz issues the regulations and they are 
implemented, it is business as usual. To date, not a single Mexican 
bank or exchange house has been forced to alter its operations.
  And until the regulations have been issued, we have no real way of 
evaluating the impact of the law. Any law is only as good as its 
implementation. It is a giant leap of faith by the State Department to 
cite the passage of a money-laundering law as a sign of major progress 
when, to date, it has been neither implemented nor enforced.
  There are some key questions that must be answered:

  Will the regulations prevent bank employees or ministry staff from 
tipping off drug cartels about investigations?
  Second, will the regulations provide immunity for employees who 
report a suspicious transaction and are acting in good faith? If not, 
they may be reluctant to report transactions as required, or killed if 
they do.
  Third, will the regulations contain exemptions for any industries? 
They should not.
  In addition, there is a major weakness in the new law in that it does 
not provide for sanctions against banks and financial institutions that 
fail to comply with reporting requirements. Without such sanctions, 
Mexico's money-laundering laws will remain woefully inadequate.
  Now, there is a report today in the Financial Times of London that 
Mexico will introduce its antilaundering regulations this week. We 
shall see. Those regulations will need to be evaluated. But why has it 
taken Mexico until mid-March, and a crisis over certification, to get 
to this point? That is not a sign of a fully cooperating country.

  Meanwhile, massive money laundering continues in Mexico unabated. And 
it is spilling across the southwest border.
  California State Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement Chief George Doane 
testified last March that ``at a money counting and shipping house in 
the Los Angeles area, agents located $6 million in cash and financial 
records in a residence occupied by three Hispanic nationals, indicating 
that $75 million had been counted, packaged, and shipped from the 
residence via a commercial bus company to Mexico.''
  An analysis done by the DEA of all transactions between the San 
Antonio Federal Reserve and area depository institutions showed a 
currency surplus of $2.96 billion in 1995--a clear sign that cartels 
have successfully laundered money to their final destination in Mexico.
  The DEA's Donnie Marshall told Congress in September that a DEA 
investigation known as Zorro II in the Los Angeles area ``resulted in 
the arrests of 156 people, the seizure of approximately 5,600 kilograms 
of cocaine, and over $17 million in U.S. currency. The majority of this 
$17 million was seized as it was being prepared for shipment to Mexico 
or seized from vehicles that were en route to Mexico.''
  Marshall also described cambios, or exchange houses outside the 
banking system, located along the borders of Texas and California, 
which are a significant factor in the laundering of drug proceeds where 
Mexican traffickers intermingle cash derived from drug sales with 
legitimate exchange business. My staff recently visited 22 of these 
exchange houses.
  So the State Department sees encouraging results and notable progress 
in the area of money laundering as well. I say that today there is no 
effective effort to deter the laundering of drug money anywhere in 
Mexico.


                               Corruption

  The State Department's statement of explanation sees progress even 
where--by its own admission--none exists. This is how the Department 
describes Mexico's so-called progress on combating corruption:


[[Page S2039]]


       In an effort to confront widespread corruption within the 
     nation's law enforcement agencies, former Attorney General 
     Lozano dismissed over 1,250 federal police officers and 
     technical personnel for corruption or incompetence, although 
     some have been rehired, and the Government of Mexico indicted 
     two former senior Government officials and a current 
     Undersecretary of Tourism.

  Now, the sentence, in a sense, refutes itself. When you say that some 
have been rehired, of course, if they were innocent, we would want them 
to be rehired. But if they were guilty, we would want them to be 
prosecuted. So let's look and see what happened.
  According to the DEA, of the 1,250 officers dismissed for corruption, 
not a single one was successfully prosecuted--not one.
  The rash of murders of prosecutors and law enforcement officers in 
Tijuana is a case in point. These assassinations have been made 
possible in large part because the Tijuana police have been so 
thoroughly corrupted by the Arellano-Felix organization.
  According to the Los Angeles Times on March 3, 1997, court papers 
recently filed in United States district court by the Mexican 
Government in an extradition case contain testimony to the effect 
that--and let me remind you that this is from court papers submitted by 
the Mexican Government--``the state attorney general and almost 90 
percent of the law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and judges in 
Tijuana and the State of Baja California . . . are on the payroll'' of 
the Arellano-Felix organization.
  In the same San Diego court documents, a former presidential guard, 
army lieutenant Gerardo Cruz Pacheco, told how he recruited soldiers to 
unload drug shipments and helped Tijuana cartel gunmen assassinate Baja 
federal police commander Ernesto Ibarra Santes in September.
  The Federal judicial police have been so corrupted by the cartels 
that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between them and the 
criminals. That is why some were encouraged by the prospect of 
increased participation of the Mexican military, which has not been so 
tainted by corruption, in the anti-drug effort.
  But that's why the startling revelation about Gen. Jesus Gutierrez 
Rebollo, the head of the National Institute to Combat Drugs--Mexico's 
top counternarcotics official--who is a 42-year veteran of the armed 
forces, has cast grave doubts upon that hope.
  When the Mexican Army planned a raid of the wedding of the sister of 
Amado Carrillo-Fuentes, the drug lord had been tipped off in advance, 
some say by General Gutierrez himself. As a result, he escaped arrest 
by leaving early or not attending. But Mexican troops found federal 
police providing protection for drug traffickers at the wedding.
  And most concering to me is that corruption is spreading rapidly 
across the border into the United States. For example:
  In Calexico, CA, former INS inspector Richard Felix admitted to FBI 
agents that he pocketed up to $500,000 in bribes for permitting loads 
of cocaine and marijuana to pass uninspected through his port of entry 
lane.
  In El Paso, former Customs and INS inspector Jose Trinidad Carrillo 
gave drug traffickers a price list for his help in getting drugs 
through his border-entry lane: $10,000 per car, or $40 per pound of 
marijuana and $250 per pound of cocaine.
  Stories of officials of U.S. border towns being bribed are now 
surfacing. Some of this I heard myself in the testimony of a border 
rancher to the Judiciary Committee last year.
  President Zedillo appears to be trying his best to fight drug 
trafficking, and he has honest people on his side, like Elvira Ruiz, 
one of the few female police chiefs in Baja, whose life has been 
consistently threatened by the cartels.
  But the efforts of these people are unfortunately being completely 
overwhelmed by the uncontrollable tide of corruption.
  The arrest of General Gutierrez has been cited by the administration 
as evidence of the Mexican Government's commitment to fight corruption. 
But the way in which this situation was handled raises serious 
questions about Mexico's willingness to cooperate with the United 
States.
  On February 6 of this year, Defense Secretary Enrique Cervantes 
Aguirre confronted General Gutierrez, asking him to explain how he came 
to live in an apartment that was beyond the means of his salary. The 
general began suffering a heart attack and was placed in the hospital. 
After 12 days of investigating, on February 18, Defense Secretary 
Cervantes had Gutierrez placed under arrest for accepting bribes from 
the Carrillo-Fuentes cartel.
  Yet during that entire 12-day period, the Mexican Government gave no 
indication to the United States that it suspected that its top drug 
official was corrupt. In that time, U.S. officials continued regular 
contacts with Gutierrez' National Institute to Combat Drugs, not 
knowing that its operations were directed by a man in the pocket of 
drug kingpins.
  General Gutierrez had been in Washington shortly before he was first 
questioned about his spending habits. He met with our drug czar, Gen. 
Barry McCaffrey, who called him a man of absolute, unquestioned 
integrity. Why would Mexico allow Gutierrez to visit Washington when he 
was suspected of corruption, and why--at the least--would they not 
alert the United States side?
  Our own drug enforcement officials have been forced to conduct damage 
assessments to determine how much and what kind of intelligence was 
provided to the general, and perhaps passed right onto the Amado 
Carrillo-Fuentes. We are left to worry that the lives of our agents in 
the field and our informants have been placed in jeopardy.
  So we can praise the Mexican Government for arresting Gutierrez, but 
their delay in notifying the United States of their suspicions about 
the general begs an important question: Is this a sign of the full 
cooperation for which Mexico has just been certified?


                 Cooperation with U.S. Law Enforcement

  The State Department's statement of explanation then goes on to 
describe the extensive cooperation that has taken place between the 
Mexican and United States Governments:

       The United States and Mexico established the High-Level 
     Contact Group on Narcotics Control (HLCG) to explore joint 
     solutions to the shared drug threat and to coordinate 
     bilateral anti-drug efforts. The HLCG met three times during 
     1996 and its technical working groups met throughout the 
     year. Under the aegis of the HLCG, the two governments 
     developed a joint assessment of the narcotics threat posed to 
     both countries which will be used as the basis for a joint 
     counter-drug strategy.

  All the high-level meetings in the world don't amount to a hill of 
beans unless there is cooperation and coordination on the ground 
between law enforcement agencies of the two sides.
  Once again, the State Department's assertion that these meetings are 
a sign of real progress misses the point. Whether or not our leaders 
can work together is less important than whether our cops can work 
together.
  And plainly, at the moment, they cannot. Given the staggering level 
of corruption in the Mexican police, it is no wonder that DEA 
Administrator Constantine told the House Committee last week: ``In 
short, there is not one single law enforcement institution in Mexico 
with whom DEA has an entirely trusting relationship.''
  That statement by itself should call into question Mexico's 
qualification to be certified. It is echoed by law enforcement agents 
on the ground:
  On March 7, 1997, Ed Ladd, president of the California Narcotics 
Officers' Association, issued a statement in which he announced that 
the association's board had voted unanimously to support congressional 
efforts to overturn the decision to certify Mexico. This vote, Mr. Ladd 
said, ``is based on our longstanding experience with the widespread 
corruption and lack of cooperation shown by the Mexican government.''
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the full text the 
statement of Ed Ladd, president of the California Narcotic Officers' 
Association, be included in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, is it so ordered.
  (See exhibit 4.)
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. T.J. Bonner, president of the National Border Patrol 
Council, the union which represents nearly 5,000 Border Patrol agents, 
told my staff on March 4, 1997:

       The level of trust for Mexican authorities is almost non-
     existent. He said that ``the lack of cooperation includes 
     failure to provide assistance, aiding and abetting criminal

[[Page S2040]]

     activity, and even acts of aggression against Border Patrol 
     Agents.'' He described U.S. agents observing Mexican officers 
     who were clearly escorting aliens and drug smugglers.

  The police chief of El Centro, CA, Harold Carter, told my staff that 
his officers are very leery of who they can trust in Mexico.
  These are the views of our law enforcement officers. But the question 
of whether Mexico is fully cooperating with the United States can also 
be easily answered by looking at Mexico's policies on working with DEA 
agents. In this area, there have been three significant failings.
  One was the failure of the Mexican Government--the same one that has 
just been certified as fully cooperating--to adequately fund and staff 
the binational border task forces that had been agreed upon by the high 
level contact group.
  What good are high-level meetings that produce agreements on 
cooperation if one side then fails to live up to its end of the 
agreement?
  Second, Mexico has hampered the ability of the United States military 
to contribute to interdiction efforts. Mexico refuses to allow United 
States Navy ships on patrol for drug smugglers in the Pacific to put 
into Mexican ports to refuel without 30 days notice--and without paying 
cash. As the cartels increasingly turn to sea-routes to smuggle their 
drugs, this policy seriously hampers our ability to stop them.
  Also, overflights by U.S. reconnaissance aircraft are still under 
negotiation. These flights would enhance the ability of both sides to 
find and disrupt drug shipments.
  The third major failing has been Mexico's refusal to allow United 
States drug enforcement agents to carry sidearms to protect themselves 
while on the Mexican side of the border. As a result, Mr. Constantine 
had no choice but to suspend operations in which DEA agents cross the 
border, because they cannot protect themselves.
  In the last several days, there has been a flurry of meetings between 
American and Mexican officials. Did the United States gain any 
concessions? Well, Mexican officials were quoted as saying that ``the 
rules have stayed exactly where they are''--which means no sidearms. 
There you have it. Full cooperation.


                              Extraditions

  The State Department's statement of explanation makes another 
astonishing claim on the subject of extraditions. It says:

       The Government of Mexico established the important 
     precedent of extraditing Mexican nationals to the United 
     States under the provision of Mexico's extradition law 
     permitting this in ``exceptional circumstances.''

  Here is my understanding of the actual facts:
  First, Mexico says it has changed its policy to allow the extradition 
of Mexican nationals to the United States. Of course, we are talking 
about Mexican nationals who are wanted for crimes committed here in the 
United States.
  Second, to my knowledge, the Mexican government has sent three 
Mexican nationals to the United States. One was Juan Garcia Abrego, 
head of the gulf cartel, but he was expelled, not extradited, because 
he held American as well as Mexican citizenship. The other two were for 
murder and sexual abuse, not for drug charges.
  Third, to date, Mexico has never--never--extradited a single Mexican 
national to the United States on drug-related charges. That, I believe, 
is a fact.
  Now the Mexican Government says, and the State Department apparently 
believes, that Mexico is prepared to extradite Mexican nationals on 
drug charges in ``special circumstances.''
  If this is truly a change of policy on the part of Mexico, let us see 
results. There are 52 outstanding extradition requests for Mexican 
nationals wanted on drug charges. Mexico should honor these requests 
now.
  It should be pointed out that these extradition requests are for 
crimes committed in this country. How can a good friend, ally, and 
neighbor deny extradition of 52 people wanted for drug-related crimes 
committed here, and the statement still be made that they are fully 
cooperating in our antidrug efforts?
  A good place for Mexico to start would be with Francisco Arellano-
Felix of the Tijuana cartel, who is currently in custody in a Mexican 
prison and wanted on narcotics charges here in the United States. 
Another good start would be Miguel Caro Quintero, who walks the streets 
of Sonora without fear of arrest and grants interviews with the 
Washington Post. He has four indictments pending against him in the 
United States.
  Mexican nationals wanted on drug charges is clearly the highest 
priority. These include many of the drug kingpins. But there are other 
sensitive cases as well that need to be resolved.
  John Riley Henrique was indicted by a Federal grand jury in the 
eastern district of California for trafficking at least 150 kilograms 
of cocaine from Mexico to the United States. Henrique, an American 
citizen, is thought to be connected with Miguel Angel Felix Guillardo, 
the mastermind of the 1985 murder of DEA Agent Enrique Camarena.
  Law enforcement sources told my office that John Riley Henrique was 
detained by Mexican law enforcement and then suddenly released without 
warning. He is still believed to be in Mexico. The Mexican authorities 
should find him, apprehend him, and extradite him.
  T.J. Bonner of the National Border Patrol Council testified before 
the Senate Banking Committee on March 28, 1996, about the tragic fatal 
shooting on January 19, 1996, of a Border Patrol agent, our agent, 
Jefferson Barr. Agent Barr was killed while intercepting a group of 
marijuana smugglers along the border near Eagle Pass, TX.
  Before he died, Agent Barr wounded one of his assailants. The FBI 
interviewed the suspect, a Mexican national, in a Mexican hospital, and 
the United States later charged him with murder and sought his 
extradition. The Government of Mexico sentenced the individual to 10 
years in prison on a narcotics-related charge but has refused to 
extradite him.
  For the State Department to say that Mexico is fully cooperating on 
the issue of extraditions under these circumstances dishonors the 
memory of Agent Jefferson Barr.
  America's law enforcement officers know how serious the problem is. I 
would like to quote from a March 2, 1997, press release put out by the 
National Border Patrol Council, local 1613, of San Diego. It reads:

       The certification of Mexico is a clear blow to the efforts 
     of U.S. Border Patrol agents in their daily efforts at 
     thwarting the massive amounts of illegal drugs entering the 
     country every day. Additionally, this certification is a 
     disgrace to the memory of U.S. Border Patrol Agent Jefferson 
     Barr.


                      The Need to Waive Sanctions

  Some worry that decertifying Mexico will harm our relationship with 
an important friend and ally. Others worry that it will make Mexico's 
drug problem worse.
  Mexico is a friend and an ally, but I ask my colleagues: Do we do 
Mexico any favors by turning a blind eye to the depth of the problem? 
Do we do Mexico any favors by suggesting that the status quo is good 
enough? Will Mexico take the steps necessary to combat the flow of 
drugs if the United States keeps telling them year after year after 
year that they are doing enough and that they are fully cooperating?
  The truth is that failure to decertify Mexico makes a mockery of the 
entire certification process. Columbia is decertified. Mexico is not. 
And today, the drugs coming from Mexico are the greatest threat. It 
makes no sense.
  I know of few Members of this body, if any, who want to impose 
sanctions on Mexico. Senate Joint Resolution 21, which the Senator from 
Georgia and I introduced last week, decertifies Mexico but authorizes 
the President to waive all sanctions if it is in the vital national 
interest, and we will give testimony to that resolution in the Foreign 
Relations Committee the day after tomorrow.
  The same is true of House Joint Resolution 58, which passed the House 
International Relations Committee by a vote of 27 to 5 last Thursday 
and will likely pass the full House by a large margin later this week.
  I believe that we do have vital national interests in Mexico that 
require us not to impose sanctions at this point. All we are asking for 
is an honest, accurate assessment of whether Mexico has fully 
cooperated with us in the war on drugs, and to send the message that 
this cooperation must improve rapidly or Mexico will be fully 
decertified next year. This is what the law provides, and the facts, I 
believe,

[[Page S2041]]

speak for themselves. Mexico has not met the test of full cooperation 
required for certification.


                      Steps Toward Recertification

  I realize that the administration has been working feverishly to 
negotiate agreements with Mexico which will show that progress is being 
made, and I hope they can do that. But it is too late to improve 
Mexico's performance in 1996. The year is gone. But let me lay out some 
of the steps I believe Mexico needs to take in order to be eligible to 
be recertified, if she is decertified.
  First, effective action to dismantle the major drug cartels and 
arrest their leaders.
  Second, full and ongoing implementation of effective money-laundering 
legislation and rigorously enforced bank regulations with penalties for 
those who do not comply.
  Third, compliance with all outstanding extradition requests by the 
United States so that cartel leaders and major traffickers can be 
brought to justice.
  Fourth, help at the border. Mexico, as a friend, an ally, and a 
neighbor, should help enforce the border and prevent the flow of 
contraband. It is not enough to see this as simply America's problem. 
And this goes for the seas as well. Not to permit United States 
military ships to refuel in Mexican ports without 30 days notice is 
unacceptable from a friend.
  Fifth, improved cooperation with U.S. law enforcement officials, 
including allowing United States law enforcement agents to resume 
carrying weapons on the Mexican side of the border, and for Mexico to 
pay their share of the effort and be fully supportive of United States 
help.
  Any legitimate American law enforcement officer detailed to Mexico 
and working drugs should be permitted to carry a sidearm --or they 
should not go.
  Sixth, implementation of a comprehensive program to identify, to weed 
out, and to prosecute corrupt officials at all levels of the Mexican 
Government, police, and military.
  If Mexico takes these steps, I would support recertification even 
during the current year, which the law allows if there is significant 
progress in a decertified country.
  Mr. President, I believe I have laid out a strong case that Mexico 
did not earn certification as fully cooperating on counternarcotics in 
1996. Have there been instances of cooperation? Of course. But can 
anyone credibly say that Mexico has fully cooperated with the United 
States? It is not even close.
  It is important for us to be honest with ourselves about this issue. 
If we are not honest with ourselves, we unreasonably lower our guard 
against the incredible danger that Mexican drug trafficking poses to 
our children, our schools, and our communities.
  If we are not honest with ourselves, we dishonor the dedication of 
thousands of DEA and Border Patrol agents who put their lives on the 
line every single day to try to keep drugs from reaching our streets. I 
believe today those agents have every right to feel betrayed.
  Senator Coverdell, Senator Helms, myself, and others will continue 
trying to disapprove the Mexico certification and enact a vital 
national interest waiver. Similar legislation is moving through the 
House. We will make our best effort.
  Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time and ask unanimous 
consent that Senator Coverdell and Senator Hutchinson of Arkansas be 
permitted to speak during morning business charged to the time under my 
control.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.

   Remarks by Thomas A. Constantine, Administrator, Drug Enforcement 
   Administration, Before the House Government Reform and Oversight 
   Committee, National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal 
                          Justice Subcommittee

       Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee: I appreciate 
     this opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee today on 
     the subject of Mexico and the Southwest Border Initiative. My 
     comments today will be limited to an objective assessment of 
     the law enforcement issues involving organized crime and drug 
     trafficking problems with specific attention on Mexico and 
     the Southwest border. This hearing is extremely timely, and 
     during my testimony I will provide the subcommittee with a 
     full picture of how organized crime groups from Mexico 
     operate and affect so many aspects of life in America today. 
     I am not exaggerating when I say that these sophisticated 
     drug syndicate groups from Mexico have eclipsed organized 
     crime groups from Colombia as the premier law enforcement 
     threat facing the United States today.
       Many phrases have been used to describe the complex and 
     sophisticated international drug trafficking groups operating 
     out of Colombia and Mexico, and frankly, the somewhat 
     respectable titles of ``cartel'' or ``federation'' mask the 
     true identity of these vicious, destructive entities. The 
     Cali organization, and the four largest drug trafficking 
     organizations in Mexico--operating out of Juarez, Tijuana, 
     Sonora and the Gulf region--are simply organized crime groups 
     whose leaders are not in Brooklyn or Queens, but are safely 
     ensconced on foreign soil. They are not legitimate 
     businessmen as the word ``cartel'' implies, nor are they 
     ``federated'' into a legitimate conglomerate. These syndicate 
     leaders--the Rodriguez Orejuela brothers in Colombia to Amado 
     Carrillo-Fuentes, Juan Garcia-Abrego, Miguel Caro-Quintero, 
     and the Arellano-Felix Brothers--are simply the 1990's 
     versions of the mob leaders U.S. law enforcement has fought 
     since shortly after the turn of this century.
       But these organized crime leaders are far more dangerous, 
     far more influential and have a great deal more impact on our 
     day to day lives than their domestic predecessors. While 
     organized crime in the United States during the 
     1950's through the 1970's affected certain aspects of 
     American life, their influence pales in comparison to the 
     violence, corruption and power that today's drug 
     syndicates wield. These individuals, from their 
     headquarters locations, absolutely influence the choices 
     that too many Americans make about where to live, when to 
     venture out of their homes, or where they send their 
     children to school. The drugs--and the attendant violence 
     which accompanies the drug trade--have reached into every 
     American community and have robbed many Americans of the 
     dreams they once cherished.
       Organized crime in the United States was addressed over 
     time, but only after Americans recognized the dangers that 
     organized crime posed to our way of life. But it did not 
     happen overnight. American organized crime was exposed to the 
     light of day systematically, stripping away the pretense that 
     mob leaders were anonymous businessmen. The Appalachian raid 
     of 1957 forced law enforcement to acknowledge that these 
     organized syndicates did indeed exist, and strong measures 
     were taken to go after the top leadership, a strategy used 
     effectively throughout our national campaign against the mob. 
     During the 1960's, Attorney General Bobby Kennedy was 
     unequivocal in his approach to ending the reign of organized 
     crime in America, and consistent law enforcement policies 
     were enacted which resulted in real gains. Today, traditional 
     organized crime, as we knew it in the United States, has been 
     eviscerated, a fragment of what it once was.
       At the height of its power, organized crime in this nation 
     was consolidated in the hands of few major families whose key 
     players live in this nation, and were within reach of our 
     criminal justice system. All decisions made by organized 
     crime were made within the United States. Orders were carried 
     out on U.S. soil. While it was not easy to build cases 
     against the mob leaders, law enforcement knew that once a 
     good case was made against a boss, he could be located within 
     the U.S., arrested and sent to jail.
       That is not the case with today's organized criminal 
     groups. They are strong, sophisticated and destructive 
     organizations operating on a global scale. Their decisions 
     are made in sanctuaries in Cali, Colombia, and Guadalajara, 
     Mexico, even day-to-day operational decisions such as where 
     to ship cocaine, which cars their workers in the United 
     States should rent, which apartments should be leased, which 
     markings should be on each cocaine package, which contract 
     murders should be ordered, which official should be bribed, 
     and how much. They are shadowy figures whose armies of 
     workers in Colombia, Mexico and the United States answer to 
     them via daily faxes, cellular phone, or pagers. Their armies 
     carry out killings within the United States--one day an 
     outspoken journalist, one day a courier who had lost a load, 
     the next an innocent bystander caught in the line of fire--on 
     orders of the top leadership. They operate from the safety of 
     protected locations and are free to come and go as they 
     please within their home countries. These syndicate bosses 
     have at their disposal airplanes, boats, vehicles, radar, 
     communications equipment and weapons in quantities which 
     rival the capabilities of some legitimate governments. 
     Whereas previous organized crime leaders were millionaires, 
     the Cali drug traffickers and their counterparts from Mexico 
     are billionaires.
       It is difficult--sometimes nearly impossible--for U.S. law 
     enforcement to locate and arrest these leaders without the 
     assistance of law enforcement in other countries. Their 
     communications are coded. they are protected by corrupt law 
     enforcement officials, despite pledges from the Government of 
     Mexico to apprehend the syndicate leaders, law enforcement 
     authorities have been unable to locate them and even if they 
     are located, the government is not obligated to extradite 
     them to the U.S. to stand trial.
       In Mexico, as is the case wherever organized crime 
     flourishes, corruption and intimidation allow the leaders to 
     maintain

[[Page S2042]]

     control. These sophisticated criminal groups cannot thrive 
     unless law enforcement officials have been paid bribes, and 
     witnesses fear for their lives. Later in my testimony I will 
     discuss some of these problems in greater detail.
       It is frustrating for all of us in law enforcement that the 
     leaders of these criminal organizations, although well known 
     and indicted repeatedly, have not been located, arrested or 
     prosecuted.


               the cali group and traffickers from mexico

       We cannot discuss the situation in Mexico today without 
     looking at the evolution of the groups from Colombia--how 
     they began, what their status is today, and how the groups 
     from Mexico have learned important lessions from them, 
     becoming major trafficking organizations in their own right.
       During the late 1980's the Cali group assumed greater and 
     greater power as their predecessors from the Medellin cartel 
     was brash and publicly violent in their activities, the 
     criminals, who ran their organization from Cali, labored 
     behind the pretense of legitimacy, posing as businessmen, 
     just carrying out their professional obligations. The Cali 
     leaders-the Rodriguez Orejuela brothers, Santa Cruz Londono, 
     Pacho Herrera--amassed fortunes and ran their multi-billion 
     dollar cocaine businesses from high-rises and ranches in 
     Colombia, Miguel Rodriguez Orejuela and his associates 
     composed what was until then, the most powerful international 
     organized crime group in history, employed 727 aircraft to 
     ferry drugs to Mexico, from where they were smuggled into the 
     United States, and then return to Colombia with the money 
     from U.S. drug sales. Using landing areas in Mexico, they 
     were able to evade U.S. law enforcement officials and make 
     important alliances with transportation and distribution 
     experts in Mexico.
       With intense law enforcement pressure focused on the Cali 
     leadership by brave men and women in the Colombian National 
     Police during 1995 and 1996, all of the top leadership of the 
     Cali syndicate are either in jail, or dead. The fine work 
     done by General Serrano, who appeared before your 
     subcommittee only two weeks ago, and other CNP officers is a 
     testament to the commitment and dedication of Colombia's law 
     enforcement officials in the face of great personal danger 
     and a government whose leadership is riddled with drug 
     corruption.
       Since the Cali leaders' imprisonment on sentences which 
     were ridiculously short and inadequate, traffickers from 
     Mexico took on greater prominence. The alliance between the 
     Colombian traffickers and the organizations from Mexico had 
     benefits for both sides. Traditionally, the traffickers from 
     Mexico have long been involved in smuggling marijuana, 
     heroin, cocaine into the United States, and had established 
     solid distribution routes throughout the nation. Because the 
     Cali syndicate was concerned about the security of their 
     loads, they brokered a commercial deal with the traffickers 
     from Mexico, which reduced their potential losses.
       This agreement entailed the Colombians moving cocaine from 
     the Andean region to the Mexican organizations, who then 
     assumed the responsibility of delivering the cocaine into the 
     United States. In 1989, U.S. law enforcement officials seized 
     21 metric tons of cocaine in Sylmar, California; this record 
     seizure demonstrated the extent and magnitude of the Mexican 
     groups' capabilities to transport Colombian-produced cocaine 
     into the United States. This huge shipment was driven across 
     the Mexican/U.S. border in small shipments and stored in the 
     warehouse until all transportation fees had been paid by the 
     Calif and Medellin cartels, to the transporters from Mexico 
     are routinely paid in multi-ton quantities of cocaine, making 
     them formidable cocaine traffickers in their own right.
       The majority of cocaine entering the United States 
     continues to come from Colombia through Mexico and across 
     U.S. border points of entry. Most of the cocaine enters the 
     United States in privately owned vehicles and commercial 
     trucks. There is a new evidence that indicates traffickers in 
     Mexico have gone directly to sources of cocaine in Bolivia 
     and Peru in order to circumvent Colombian middlemen. In 
     addition to the inexhaustible supply of cocaine entering the 
     U.S., trafficking organizations from Mexico are responsible 
     for producing and trafficking thousands of pounds of 
     methamphetamine, and have been major distributors of heroin 
     and marijuana in the W.S. since the 1970's.


                     Major Traffickers from Mexico

       A number of major trafficking organizations represent the 
     highest echelons of organized crime in Mexico. Their leaders 
     are under indictment in the United States on numerous 
     charges. The Department of Justice has submitted Provisional 
     Warrants for many of their arrests to the Government of 
     Mexico, and only one, Juan Garcia Agrego, because he was a 
     U.S. citizen has been sent to the U.S. to face justice. The 
     other leaders are living freely in Mexico, and have so far 
     escaped apprehension by Mexican law enforcement, and have 
     suffered little, if any inconvenience resulting from their 
     notorious status, I believe that in order to fully expose 
     these syndicate leaders, it is more beneficial to refer to 
     them by their personal names than by the names of their 
     organizations.

                         Amado Carrillo-Fuentes

       The most powerful drug trafficker in Mexico at the current 
     time is Amado Carrillo-Fuentes, who, as recently reported, 
     allegedly has ties to the former Commissioner of the INCD, 
     Gutierrez-Rebollo. His organized crime group, based in 
     Juarez, is associated with the Rodriguez-Orejuela 
     organization and the Ochoa brothers, from Medellin, as 
     well. This organization, which is also involved in heroin 
     and marijuana trafficking, handles large cocaine shipments 
     from Columbia. Their regional bases in Guadalajara, 
     Hermosillo and Torreon serve as storage locations where 
     later, the drugs are moved closer to the border for 
     eventual shipment into the United States.
       The scope of the Carrillo-Fuentes' network is staggering; 
     he reportedly forwards $20-$30 million to Colombia for each 
     major operation, and his illegal activities generate ten's of 
     millions per week. He was a pioneer in the use of large 
     aircraft to transport cocaine from Colombia to Mexico and 
     became known as ``Lord of the Skies.'' Carillo-Fuentes 
     reportedly owns a fleet of aircraft and has major real estate 
     holdings.
       Like his Colombian counterparts, Carillo-Fuentes is 
     sophisticated in the use of technology and counter 
     surveillance methods. His network employs state of the art 
     communications devices to conduct business. His organization 
     has become so powerful he is even seeking to expand his 
     markets into traditional Colombian strongholds on the east 
     coast of the United States.
       Presently, Carrillo-Fuentes is attempting to consolidate 
     control over drug trafficking along the entire Mexican 
     northern border, and he plans to continue to bribe border 
     officials to ensure that his attempts are successful. 
     Carrillo-Fuentes, who is the subject of numerous separate 
     U.S. law enforcement investigations has been indicted in 
     Florida and Texas and remains a fugitive on heroin and 
     cocaine charges.

                          Miguel Caro-Quintero

       Miguel Caro-Quintero's organization is based in Sonora, 
     Mexico and focuses its attention on trafficking cocaine and 
     marijuana. His brother, Rafael, is in prison in Mexico for 
     his role in killing DEA Special Agent Kiki Camarena in 1985.
       Miguel, along with two of his other brothers--Jorge and 
     Genaro--run the organization. Miguel himself was arrested in 
     1992, and the USG and GOM cooperated in a bilateral 
     prosecution. Unfortunately, that effort was thwarted when 
     Miguel was able to use a combination of threats and bribes to 
     have his charges dismissed by a federal judge in Hermosillo. 
     He has operated freely since that time.
       The Caro-Quintero organization specializes primarily in the 
     cultivation, production and distribution of marijuana, a 
     major cash-crop for drug groups from Mexico. The organization 
     is believed to own many ranches in the northern border state 
     of Sonora, where drugs are stored, and from which drug 
     operations into the United States are staged. Despite its 
     specialization in marijuana cultivation and distribution, 
     like the other major drug organizations in Mexico, this group 
     is polydrug in nature, also transporting and distributing 
     cocaine and methamphetamine.
       Miguel Caro-Quintero is the subject of several indictments 
     in the United States and is currently the subject of 
     provisional arrest warrants issued by the United States 
     government, yet in an act of astonishing arrogance he called 
     a radio station in Hermosillo, Mexico last May indicating 
     that he was bothered by statements I had made that he was an 
     innocent rancher and charges made against him by DEA were 
     untrue. He then had the audacity to give his address and 
     invite law enforcement officials from Mexico and the United 
     States to visit him--yet he remains at large.

                      The Arellano-Felix Brothers

       The Arellano-Felix Organization (AFO), often referred to as 
     the Tijuana Cartel, is one of the most powerful and 
     aggressive drug trafficking organizations operating from 
     Mexico; it is undeniably the most violent. More than any 
     other major trafficking organization from Mexico, it extends 
     its tentacles directly from high-echelon figures in the law 
     enforcement and judicial systems in Mexico, to street-level 
     individuals in the United States. The AFO is responsible for 
     the transportation, importation and distribution of multi-ton 
     quantities of cocaine, marijuana, as well as large quantities 
     of heroin and methamphetamine, into the United States from 
     Mexico. The AFO operates primarily in the Mexican states of 
     Sinaloa (their birth place), Jalisco, Michoacan, Chiapas, and 
     Baja California South and North. From Baja, the drugs enter 
     California, the primary point of embarkation into the 
     United States distribution network.
       The AFO does not operate without the complicity of Mexican 
     law enforcement officials and their subordinates. According 
     to extradition documents submitted by the Government of 
     Mexico in San Diego, California, key family members 
     reportedly dispense an estimated one million dollars weekly 
     in bribes to Mexican federal, state and local officials, who 
     assure that the movement of drugs continues to flow unimpeded 
     to the gateway cities along the southwestern border of the 
     United States.
       The Arellano family, composed of seven brothers and four 
     sisters, inherited the organization from Miguel Angel Felix-
     Gallardo upon his incarceration in Mexico in 1989 for his 
     complicity in the murder of DEA Special Agent Enrique 
     Camarena. Alberto Benjamin Arellano-Felix assumed leadership 
     of the family structured criminal enterprise and provides a 
     businessman's approach to the management of drug trafficking 
     operations.
       Ramon Eduardo Arellano-Felix, considered the most violent 
     brother, organizes and coordinates protection details over 
     which he

[[Page S2043]]

     exerts absolute control. The AFO maintains well-armed and 
     well-trained security forces, described by Mexican 
     enforcement officials as paramilitary in nature, which 
     include international mercenaries as advisors, trainers and 
     members. Ramon Arellano's responsibilities consist of the 
     planning of murders of rival drug leaders and those Mexican 
     law enforcement officials not on their payroll. Also targeted 
     for assassination are those AFO members who fall out of favor 
     with the AFO leadership or simply are suspected of 
     collaborating with law enforcement officials. Enforcers are 
     often hired from violent street gangs in cities and towns in 
     both Mexico and the United States in the belief that these 
     gang members are expendable. They are dispatched to 
     assassinate targeted individuals and to send a clear message 
     to those who attempt to utilize the Mexicali/Tijuana corridor 
     without paying the area transit tax demanded by the AFO 
     trafficking domain.
       The AFO also maintains complex communications centers in 
     several major cities in Mexico to conduct electronic 
     espionage and counter-surveillance measures against law 
     enforcement entities. The organization employs radio scanners 
     and equipment capable of intercepting both hard line and 
     cellular phones to ensure the security of AFO operators. In 
     addition to technical equipment, the AFO maintains caches of 
     sophisticated automatic weaponry secured from a variety of 
     international sources.
       A Joint Task Force composed of the Drug Enforcement 
     Administration and the Federal Bureau of Investigation has 
     been established in San Diego, California, to target the AFO; 
     the Task Force is investigating AFO operations in Southern 
     California and related regional investigations which track 
     drug transportation, distribution and money laundering 
     activities of the AFO throughout the United States.

                             Jesus Amezcua

       The Amezcua-Contreras brothers operating out of 
     Guadalajara, Mexico head up a methamphetamine production and 
     trafficking organization with global dimensions. Directed by 
     Jesus Amezcua, and supported by his brothers, Adan and Luis, 
     the Amezcua drug trafficking organization today is probably 
     the world's largest smuggler of ephedrine and clandestine 
     producer of methamphetamine. With a growing methamphetamine 
     abuse problem in the United States, this organization's 
     activities impact on a number of the major population centers 
     in the U.S. The Amezcua organization obtains large quantities 
     of the precursor ephedrine, utilizing contacts in Thailand 
     and India, which they supply to methamphetamine labs in 
     Mexico and the United States. This organization has placed 
     trusted associates in the United States to move ephedrine to 
     Mexican methamphetamine traffickers operating in the U.S. 
     Jose Osorio-Cabrera, a fugitive from a Los Angeles 
     investigation until his arrest in Bangkok, was a major 
     ephedrine purchaser for the Amezcua organization.

                          Joaquin Guzman-Loera

       Joaquin Guzman-Loera began to make a name for himself as a 
     trafficker and air logistics expert for the powerful Miguel 
     Felix-Gallardo organization. Guzman-Loera broke away from 
     Felix-Gallardo and rose to patron level among the major 
     Mexican trafficking organizations. Presently, he is 
     incarcerated in Mexico; however, Mexican and United States 
     authorities still consider him to be a major international 
     drug trafficker. The organization has not been dismantled 
     or seriously affected by Guzman-Loera's imprisonment 
     because his brother, Arturo Guzman-Loera, has assumed the 
     leadership role. The Guzman-Loera organization transports 
     cocaine from Colombia through Mexico to the United States 
     for the Medellin and Cali organizations and is also 
     involved in the movement, storage, and distribution of 
     marijuana, and Mexican and Southeast Asian heroin. This 
     organization controlled the drug smuggling tunnel between 
     Agua Prieta, Sonora, Mexico and Douglas, Arizona through 
     which tons of cocaine were smuggled.
       Guzman-Loera, who has been named in several U.S. 
     indictments, was arrested on June 9, 1993 in Talisman, Mexico 
     for narcotics, homicide, and cocaine trafficking and is 
     presently incarcerated at the Almoloya de Juarez Maximum 
     Security Prison in Toluca, Mexico.


           Effect of Mexican Organized Crime on United States

       Unfortunately, the violence that is attendant to the drug 
     trade in Mexico is spilling over the border into U.S. towns, 
     like San Diego, California and Eagle Pass, Texas. Last 
     summer, ranchers along the Texas/Mexico Border reported they 
     were besieged by drug organizations smuggling cocaine and 
     marijuana across their property--fences were torn down, 
     livestock butchered and shots were fired at the ranchers 
     homes at night. Ranchers reported seeing armed patrols in 
     Mexico with night vision equipment, hand-held radios and 
     assault rifles that protected a steady stream of smugglers 
     back packing marijuana and cocaine into the United States. 
     The problem became so acute that the State of Texas and the 
     Federal government sent support in the form of additional 
     U.S. Border Patrol Agents, DEA Special Agents, Officers from 
     the Texas Department of Public Safety and the Texas National 
     Guard. Life has returned somewhat to normal in that area, as 
     the drug gangs reacted to law enforcement pressure and have 
     moved their operations elsewhere.
       DEA information supports widely reported press accounts 
     that the Arellano-Felix organization relies on a San Diego, 
     California gang known as ``Logan Heights Calle 30'' to carry 
     out executions and conduct security for their distribution 
     operations. Six members of ``Calle 30'' were arrested by 
     DEA's violent crime task force and the San Diego Police 
     Department for the murder of a man and his son in San Diego. 
     Since that time 49 members of ``Calle 30'' have been arrested 
     by the Narcotics Task Force in San Diego on a variety of 
     charges from trafficking to violent crimes.
       On December 11, 1996, Fernando Jesus-Gutierrez was shot 
     five times in the face during rush hour in the then exclusive 
     neighborhood, the Silver Strand, in Coronado, California, 
     after his death was ordered by the Arellano-Felix 
     organization. In 1993, a turf battle over the methamphetamine 
     market between rival drug gangs from Mexico resulted in 26 
     individuals being murdered in one summer in the San Diego 
     area.


     U.S. law enforcement strategy versus organized crime in mexico

       The Southwest Border Initiative (SWBI) is Federal law 
     enforcement's joint response to the substantial threat posed 
     by Mexican groups operating along the Southwest Border. The 
     SWBI, now in its third year of operation, is an integrated, 
     coordinated strategy that focuses the resources of DEA, FBI, 
     the United States Attorney's Office, the Criminal Division, 
     the U.S. Border Patrol, the U.S. Customs Service and state 
     and local authorities on the sophisticated Mexican drug 
     trafficking organizations operating on both sides of the 
     U.S./Mexican border.
       Through this initiative we have identified the 
     sophisticated Mexican drug trafficking organizations 
     operating along the entire U.S. border. These groups are 
     transporting multi-ton shipments of cocaine for the Colombia 
     groups, as well as heroin, methamphetamine and marijuana. 
     Imitating the Colombian groups, the Mexican organizations are 
     highly compartmentalized, using numerous workers to 
     accomplish very specific tasks, such as driving load cars, 
     renting houses for storage sites, distributing cocaine, and 
     collecting profits. Through the compartmentalization process 
     each worker performs a distinct task and has no knowledge of 
     the other members of the organization.
       We are attacking the organizations by targeting the 
     communication systems of their command and control centers. 
     Working in concert, DEA, FBI, U.S. Customs Service and the 
     U.S. Attorneys offices around the country conduct wiretaps 
     that ultimately identify their U.S. based organization from 
     top to bottom. This strategy allows us to track the seamless 
     continuum of cocaine traffic as it flows from Colombia 
     through Mexico, to its eventual street distribution in the 
     United States. However, even though this strategy is 
     extremely effective in dismantling the U.S. based portions 
     of the organizations, we are frustrated by not being able 
     to use this same information to reach the organization's 
     bosses in Mexico and their current counterparts in 
     Colombia. Criminals, such as Carillo-Fuentes and Arellano-
     Felix, personally direct their organizations from safe 
     havens in Mexico and until we garner the complete 
     cooperation of law enforcement officials in Mexico, we 
     will never be truly effective in stopping the flow of 
     drugs from their country.
       The Southwest Border Strategy is anchored in our belief 
     that the only way of successfully attacking any organized 
     crime syndicate is to build strong cases on the leadership 
     and their command and control functions. The long-term 
     incarceration of key members of these organization's command 
     and control will cause a steady degradation of their ability 
     conduct business in the United States and with the assistance 
     of foreign governments, the long-term incarceration of the 
     leadership will leave the entire organizations in disarray. 
     The Cali syndicate once controlled cocaine traffic in the 
     world from a highly organized corporate structure, with the 
     incarceration of the Cali leaders we see the cocaine trade in 
     Colombia has become far less monolithic and several 
     independent unrelated organizations are controlling the 
     exportation of cocaine to the U.S. and Mexico. This change is 
     a direct result of the incarceration of the Cali leaders and 
     their inability to fully control their organizations from 
     prison.
       We spoke to you last year about the successes of Zorro II, 
     conducted under the auspices of the SWBI, during which both a 
     Colombian distribution organization and a Mexican smuggling 
     organization were dismantled and the infrastructure of both 
     organizations were destroyed. Ninety court authorized wire 
     taps resulted in the arrest of 156 people and the seizure of 
     $17 million dollars and 5,600 kilograms of cocaine. Most 
     importantly, neither the Colombian or Mexican organizations 
     have been able to reconstitute these distribution 
     organizations. Zorro II confirmed our belief that cocaine 
     distribution in the United States is controlled by the 
     foreign syndicates located in Colombia and Mexico.
       Since Zorro II, we have continued to focus on the command 
     and control function of other transportation and distribution 
     cells operating along the Southwest Border and throughout the 
     U.S. These investigations are time and resource intensive, 
     but yield significant results. Additional investigations, of 
     similar significance and importance as Zorro II, have been 
     developed since that time, however due to the sensitive 
     nature of the investigations. I am precluded from discussing 
     them at this time.

[[Page S2044]]

            corruption and intimidation: tools of the trade

       Traditionally, organized crime has depended on the 
     corruption of officials, and the intimidation of potential or 
     actual witnesses, as well as violence against anyone who 
     stands in the way of business. The Medellin and Cali 
     traffickers were masters of corruption, intimidation and 
     violence, and used these tools effectively to silence and 
     coerce.
       Organized crime figures in Mexico routinely use these tools 
     as well. The recent arrest of the Commissioner of the INCD in 
     Mexico last week is the latest illustration of how deeply 
     rooted corruption is in Mexican anti-narcotics organizations. 
     A good illustration of the extent of corruption in Mexico was 
     revealed when officials, seeking the extradition of two of 
     Arellano-Felix's contract killers, who are currently 
     incarcerated in the United States, submitted papers 
     indicating that the State Attorney General and almost 90 
     percent of the law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and 
     judges in Tijuana and the State of Baja California have been 
     compromised and are on the payroll of the Arellano-Felix 
     brothers. In addition, several high ranking police officers 
     regularly provide the names of witnesses who give statements 
     against the Arellano-Felixes and have even provided 
     information that assisted in locating targets for 
     assassination. Just recently, the Federal Police in Baja 
     California Norte were replaced with military troops, a tacit 
     admission of the level of corruption in that area. Yet, as we 
     observed with the arrest of Gutierrez-Rebollo, the military 
     is not immune from corruption either.
       Historically, corruption has been a central problem in 
     DEA's relationship with Mexican counterparts. In short, there 
     is not one single law enforcement institution in Mexico with 
     whom DEA has an entirely trusting relationship. Such a 
     relationship is absolutely essential to the conduct of 
     business in that, or any other nation where organized crime 
     syndicates traffic in narcotics.
       In the brief time we have allotted to us today, I would 
     like to provide you with some recent examples of the 
     corruption which we encounter all too frequently in Mexico.
       This January, the Mexican Army raided the wedding party of 
     Amado Carillo-Fuentes' sister. When they arrived at the 
     scene. Mexican Federal Judicial Police were guarding the 
     party. The MFJP had alerted Carillo-Fuentes about the planned 
     raid, and he was able to escape.
       The Arellano-Felix organization routinely bribes government 
     officials to obtain information from prosecutors' offices 
     including information on potential witnesses.
       Despite the firing of over 1,200 government officials for 
     corruption charges by President Zedillo, no successful 
     prosecutions of these individuals has taken place.
       In March 1996, DEA Task Force Agents arrested two 
     individuals who identified themselves as police officers from 
     Sonora, Mexico. Eleven hundred pounds of marijuana were found 
     on the scene, and the police admitted they worked at the 
     stash house.
       In July a Mexican Army Division arrested nine Mexican 
     Federal Judicial Police Officers and seized 50 kilograms of 
     cocaine and $578,000 in U.S. currency. The defendants were 
     acting under the direction of the Commandante for Culiacan, 
     Sinalon at the time.
       While a great deal of the corruption plagues the law 
     enforcement agencies in Mexico, the Mexican military and 
     other institutions are also vulnerable to the corrupting 
     influences of the narcotics trade. The Mexican Government has 
     replaced police with military officials, who are not fully 
     trained in all of the aspects of narcotics investigations. 
     This situation is far from ideal. Political officials are 
     also not immune to narcotics corruption: DEA has documented 
     instances where public officials have allowed drug 
     traffickers to freely operate in areas under their control. 
     Corruption is the most serious, most pervasive obstacle to 
     progress in addressing the drug trade in Mexico.
       In addition to the serious corruption problems plaguing 
     anti-narcotics enforcement efforts in Mexico, murders and 
     violence are commonplace methods of silencing witnesses or 
     rivals. Since 1993, twenty-three major drug-related 
     assassinations have taken place in Mexico. Virtually all of 
     these murders remain unsolved. Many of them have occurred in 
     Tijuana or have involved victims from Tijuana. In the last 
     year, 12 law enforcement officials or former officials have 
     been gunned down in Tijuana and the vast majority of the 200 
     murders in that city are believed to have been drug-related.
       A number of these incidents involving law enforcement 
     officials are a serious indication of the depth and breadth 
     of the power of the traffickers in Mexico.
       The Arellano-Felix organization was responsible for setting 
     off a bomb at the Camino Real Hotel in Guadalajara, where 
     they intended to kill a rival trafficker, hosting a party for 
     his daughter. Two men were killed and fifteen people wounded.
       In September 1996, Jorge Garcia-Vargas, Sub-Director of the 
     Tijuana office of the Institute for the Combat of Drugs 
     (INCD) and former Commandante Miguel Angel Silva-Caballero 
     were found shot to death in their car in Mexico City. The 
     bodies showed signs of torture, similar to those on the 
     bodies of Hector Gonzalez-Baecenas. Garcia-Vargas' assistant 
     in Tijuana, and three body guards who were tortured and 
     killed five days earlier in Mexico City. Garcia-Vargas' death 
     came only one year after he took the job in Tijuana.
       Ernest Ibarra-Santes, the Director of Federal Police Force 
     in Tijuana, and two police officers were executed by machine-
     gun fire as they drove along a main street in Mexico City. 
     Ibarra-Santes was executed just 29 days after he became 
     Director and two days after he reprimanded his own force 
     stating ``The Police had become so corrupt they weren't just 
     friends with the traffickers, they were their servants.'' A 
     Mexican Army officer has been implicated in this murder.
       Baja State Prosecutor Godin Gutierrez-Rico was assassinated 
     in front of his residence in Tijuana on January 3, 1997. 
     Guiterrez a supervisory state attorney and former head of a 
     special enforcement unit that investigated high profile 
     homicides in Tijuana, had assisted DEA in identifying several 
     assassins for the Arellano-Felix organization. Information 
     strongly links the Arellano-Felix's to this murder which was 
     particularly vicious; Guiterrez-Rico was shot over 100 times, 
     after which his body was repeatedly run over by an 
     automobile.
       It is hard to imagine that in our own nation, we would 
     stand for such killings and for government inaction in 
     solving the murders. The assassinations in Mexico are akin to 
     three Assistant United States Attorneys, the Special Agent in 
     Charge of the DEA office in San Diego, the Special Agent in 
     Charge of the FBI office in Houston and the Chief of Police 
     in San Diego being murdered callously by drug dealers. 
     Americans would not accept these murders going unsolved and 
     no arrests being made. For any country's law enforcement 
     agencies to be viable partners in the international law 
     enforcement arena, they must apprehend and incarcerate 
     those criminals who murder with such impunity.


                        cooperation with mexico

       The primary program for cooperative law enforcement efforts 
     with the Government of Mexico is a proposed series of 
     Bilateral Task Forces (BTF's). The U.S. and Mexico signed a 
     memorandum of understanding in 1996, outlining the framework 
     for the United States Government and the government of Mexico 
     to conduct joint investigations against targeted drug 
     organizations. These Bilateral Task Forces (BTF's) were 
     established in Juarez, Tijuana and Monterrey. The task forces 
     in Tijuana and Juarez have been limited in their ability to 
     collect intelligence and seize drugs and they have not met 
     their most important objectives of arresting the leaders of 
     the major syndicates and dismantling their organizations.
       During bilateral plenary meetings, Mexican officials 
     promised they would allocate $2.4 million from seized assets 
     the U.S. had shared with Mexico towards the financing of the 
     BTF's; however, Francisco Molina Ruiz, the former head of the 
     INCD, advised DEA that he had been unable to obtain the 
     financial support necessary to make these Task Forces 
     operational. The BTF's for the most part are staffed with 
     enthusiastic young officers, however, they have neither 
     received the training nor the equipment necessary to build 
     cases on and arrest these sophisticated and wealthy drug 
     traffickers.
       The most significant shortcoming of the B.T.F.'s however, 
     lies in its leadership. On at least two occasions, after 
     having been advised of pending enforcement actions by their 
     subordinates, corrupt command officers in Mexico City 
     compromised the investigations. One involved the attempted 
     seizure of sixteen tons of cocaine belonging to the Arellano-
     Felix family. To be successful in Mexico, we must be able to 
     share intelligence with the B.T.F.'s with the confidence that 
     it will be promptly acted on and not be compromised by 
     corrupt officials that is not the condition that we are 
     currently faced with in our relationship with the bi-lateral 
     groups.
       Unfortunately, I was recently forced to limit DEA 
     participation in these B.T.F.'s, because of a decision by the 
     Government of Mexico that would no longer allow us to 
     guarantee the safety of our Special Agents while they were 
     working in Mexico. The atmosphere in Mexico is volatile and 
     threats against DEA Special Agents, along the border, have 
     increased substantially; therefore I have rescinded travel 
     authority for all DEA Special Agents to Mexico, to 
     participate in counter-drug investigations, until they are 
     provided appropriate protection, that is commensurate with 
     the risks inherent in these dangerous assignments.


                         prospects for progress

       Since coming to office, President Zedillo has promised that 
     he would take action against organized criminal groups in 
     Mexico. In that time period he has moved to make significant 
     changes to the law enforcement process by sponsoring the 
     Organized Crime Bill to provide the tools needed to 
     successfully attack the criminal synidates and formed the 
     Organized Crime Task Force and the Bilateral Task Forces. 
     However, even with the improved process, the infrastructure 
     of the mechanism, itself, is so decimated by corruption that 
     short term results are very doubtful.
       The real test is in the mid- and long-term. Unless some 
     meaningful reforms are made in the law enforcement systems 
     responsible for targeting and apprehending major organized 
     crime figures in Mexico, that nation, and unfortunately our 
     own, will continue to fight an uphill battle as drugs will 
     continue to flow into cities and towns across the United 
     States. To date, our inability to successfully attack the 
     major organized crime groups in Mexico, as we have the United 
     States and Colombia, is a direct result of our inability to 
     arrest the leadership of these groups.

[[Page S2045]]

       President Zedillo has acted against corrupt officials, and 
     has stated that he is committed to professionalizing Mexican 
     law enforcement. Yet the bottom line remains; until the major 
     organized crime figures operating in Mexico are aggressively 
     targeted, investigated, arrested, sentenced appropriately and 
     jailed, both Mexico and the United States are in grave 
     danger.
       What law enforcement steps are necessary for long-lasting 
     progress against organized crime leaders in Mexico? We faced 
     the same questions in our mutual struggle against the 
     Colombian organized groups during the past decade. What it 
     took was an all-out effort by the Colombian National 
     Police to target and incarcerate the top leaders in Cali. 
     Until the Government of Colombia was put on notice that 
     their lack of commitment to this goal was unacceptable, 
     the CNP did not have the moral backing it needed to move 
     out aggressively. In Mexico's case, it appears that the 
     political will to rid the country of the its narco-
     trafficking reputation is there; however, what is lacking 
     are clean, committed law enforcement agencies willing to 
     take on the most powerful and influential organized crime 
     figures operating on a global scale.
       We hope that efforts towards this end will bear fruit. In 
     November, 1996, the Government of Mexico passed an Organized 
     Crime Law which provides Law Enforcement officials with many 
     of the tools needed to successfully attack the sophisticated 
     drug syndicates in their country. Included as part of the Law 
     were: authorization to conduct electronic surveillance, a 
     witness protection program; plea bargaining; conspiracy laws; 
     undercover operations; the use of informants by police.
       For these new law enforcement tools to be utilized 
     effectively, the new law mandated the Government of Mexico to 
     form Organized Crime Units to conduct the investigations and 
     further stipulated that the laws could not be enforced until 
     the unit was formed and properly trained. The Organized Crime 
     Units are now in place and consist of 60 officers to 
     investigate crimes specified under the law. The Government of 
     Mexico has agreed to insure the integrity of the Organized 
     Crime Unit through the use of polygraphs and regular 
     background investigations. However, like the Bilateral Task 
     Forces, these units will not be successful and DEA might not 
     be able to share sensitive information with them as long as 
     their supervisors or managers are corrupt.
       It is important to remember that law enforcement in the 
     United States did not have wiretap authority and wide ranging 
     organized crime laws such as RICO and Continuing Criminal 
     Enterprise until the late 1960's. The Government of Mexico is 
     effectively 35 years behind us in establishing laws that were 
     critical in our successful dismantling of organized criminal 
     syndicates. If they work properly, the Bilateral task forces 
     and our Southwest Border Initiative can be favorably compared 
     to the Strike Forces established by Bobby Kennedy in the 
     1960's. This 1990's version of the Strike Force is 
     international in scope and pools the resources, expertise and 
     laws of several federal and state institutions in the United 
     States with those in Mexico.
       It is absolutely essential that the Organized Crime Units 
     and the Bilateral Task Forces have integrity insurance 
     programs as part of their charter. Unless these units are 
     trustworthy, informants who cooperate will not be safe, 
     undercover investigations will be compromised and 
     intelligence sharing process will not function at all. As we 
     have seen recently, both the military and law enforcement 
     have been grievously compromised by these criminal groups and 
     this brings into question the ability of any program in 
     Mexico to remain corruption free. However, last week we saw 
     in the arrest of General Gutierrez-Rebollo, that some 
     trustworthy units do exist and can work without compromise.
       The problems of establishing a corruption-free law 
     enforcement infrastructure are not insurmountable. However, 
     to become credible in the law enforcement arena the 
     Government of Mexico must ensure the integrity of the units 
     that have the responsibility of tracking down and arresting 
     the syndicate leaders, insuring these individuals are either 
     prosecuted in Mexico and receive meaningful sentence 
     commensurate with their crimes or agree to extradite them to 
     the United States where they will receive punishment similar 
     to that of Juan Garcia-Abrego.

                               Exhibit 2

                                  U.S. Government Printing Office,


                                 Office of the Public Printer,

                                   Washington, DC, March 10, 1997.
     Hon. Diane Feinstein,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Feinstein: We return herewith your manuscript 
     entitled ``Re: Remarks by Thomas A. Constantine'' submitted 
     to this Office for insertion in the Congressional Record, and 
     respectfully invite your attention to the following 
     regulation of the Joint Committee on Printing:
       (1) No extraneous matter in excess of two printed Record 
     pages, whether printed in its entirety in one daily issue or 
     in two or more parts in one or more issues, shall be printed 
     in the Congressional Record unless the Member announces, 
     coincident with the request for leave to print or extend, the 
     estimate in writing from the Public Printer of the probable 
     cost of publishing the same.
       (2) No extraneous matter shall be printed in the House 
     proceedings or the Senate proceedings, with the following 
     exceptions: (a) Excerpts from letters, telegrams, or articles 
     presented in connection with a speech delivered in the course 
     of debate; (b) Communications from State Legislatures, and 
     (c) Addresses or articles by the President and the Members of 
     his Cabinet, the Vice President, or a Member of Congress.
       (3) The official reporters of the House or Senate or the 
     Public Printer shall return to the Member of the respective 
     House any matter submitted for the Congressional Record which 
     is in contravention of these provisions.
       This manuscript is estimated to make approximately 5 pages 
     of the Congressional Record at a cost of $1,152.00. If you 
     still desire to have this matter published in the Record, 
     permission must again be requested of the Senate for its 
     inclusion and the probable cost should then be announced and 
     this estimate attached to the manuscript sent to the Official 
     Reporters.
           Sincerely,
     Charles C. Cook, Sr.
       Superintendent, Congressional Printing Management Division.
                                                                    ____


                               Exhibit 3

               [From the Washington Post, Feb. 26, 1997]

           Alleged Kingpin of Sonora Cartel Untouched by Law

                        (By John Ward Anderson)

       Caborca, Mexico.--Miguel Angel Caro Quintero, identified by 
     U.S. officials as one of Mexico's drug smuggling kingpins, 
     arrived in a pickup truck at his modest horse and cattle 
     ranch here and described life in this small desert town 60 
     miles south of the U.S. border.
       ``I go to the banks, offices, just like any Mexican,'' said 
     Caro Quintero, who has four indictments pending against him 
     in the United States on charges involving cocaine, marijuana, 
     money laundering and racketeering. ``Every day I pass by 
     roadblocks, police, soldiers, and there are no problems.''
       ``I'm in the streets all the time. Howe can they not find 
     me?'' he asked at the end of a rare, hour-long interview. 
     ``Because they're not looking for me.''
       Caro Quintero, 33, is identified by U.S. law enforcement 
     officials as the head of the Sonora cartel, which they 
     describe as one of Mexico's main drug mafias. Although 
     arrested here in 1992 on tax charges, he has never been 
     convicted of any crime, and Mexican authorities have never 
     charged him with any drug violation.
       U.S. officials see Caro Quintero as a prime example of how 
     weak Mexican laws and an intricate web of corruption have 
     permitted some alleged drug kingpins to operate their 
     syndicates with impunity and live without fear of arrest, 
     conviction or extradition to the United States. At the same 
     time, high-ranking politicians, government officials, judges, 
     prosecutors, and military and police officers have enriched 
     themselves by protecting the syndicates, and they are rarely 
     prosecuted or investigated.
       After Caro Quintero's 1992 tax arrest, for instance, the 
     United States and Mexico launched a joint prosecution effort. 
     ``But it was thwarted when Miguel used a combination of 
     threats and bribes to have the charges dismissed by a federal 
     judge in Hermosillo [capital of his home state, Sonora], and 
     he's operated freely since that time,'' said an official of 
     the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).
       Similar allegations of high-level corruption are aired 
     almost daily here, depicting decay in Mexico's justice system 
     and some of its other institutions, including the military.
       The recent revelations have prompted a more thorough debate 
     among U.S. officials over whether President Clinton should 
     certify by Saturday that Mexico is a reliable ally in the 
     international war on drugs.
       ``I don't know if `collapse' is the correct term'' for 
     what's happening to the justice system, Attorney General 
     Jorge Madrazo Cuellar said in a recent interview. ``But it's 
     the gravest crisis Mexico has faced in the modern age.'' On 
     Tuesday, Madrazo announced a ``top-to-bottom'' reform of his 
     office to address the crisis--the latest in a number of such 
     reforms announced in recent years.
       The New York Times reported Sunday that two state 
     governors--Manlio Fabio Beltrones Rivera of Sonora and Jorge 
     Carrillo Olea of Morelos--have aided Amado Carrillo Fuentes, 
     head of a Juarez-based smuggling cartel. Despite numerous 
     U.S. intelligence reports detailing their drug ties, the 
     Times reported, ``both [governors] seem to enjoy a tacit 
     immunity from concerted criminal investigation in Mexico and 
     the United States.''
       A spokesman for Attorney General Madrazo said neither 
     governor is under investigation for ties to drug smuggling.
       At the same time, some of Mexico's top alleged kingpins--
     including Carrillo Fuentes, Caro Quintero and brothers Jesus 
     and Luis Amezcua, who are considered among the world's 
     biggest traffickers of methamphetamine--have no drug charges 
     pending in Mexico. Despite indictments against each of these 
     men in the United States, U.S. officials say they face little 
     threat of being apprehended and extradited for trial in the 
     United States because of tough restrictions against 
     extradition in Mexico's constitution.
       Until last year, only two Mexican citizens had been sent to 
     the United States for trial under a 1978 extradition treaty 
     between the

[[Page S2046]]

     two countries. But new laws permit Mexico's foreign minister 
     to find ``an exception'' permitting extradition. Last year, 
     four Mexican citizens were sent to the United States, 
     including two accused drug dealers.
       Juan Garcia Abrego, the head of the Gulf cartel who was 
     recently sentenced to life in prison in a drug trial in 
     Houston, was not extradited but deported to the United States 
     because he held dual citizenship.
       Mexican anti-drug officials said Carillo Fuentes has 
     weapons and conspiracy charges pending against him. If 
     arrested, they said, he would be held while drug trafficking 
     charges were filed and officials considered a pending U.S. 
     request for extradition.
       Authorities thought they would nab Carillo Fuentes at his 
     sister's wedding in early January, when private planes 
     ferrying guests in and out of local airports led drug 
     investigators to believe that he would make an appearance at 
     the ceremony. But the Juarez cartel chief never showed up, 
     and officials say he may have been tipped off by Gen. Jesus 
     Gutierrez Rebollo, the anti-drug czar who was arrested last 
     week after officials charged he had been an informant for 
     Carrillo Fuentes for years. A federal judge indicted 
     Gutierrez yesterday on charges of aiding and protecting 
     cocaine shipments, the Associated Press reported.
       While drug investigations here have been severely hampered 
     by corruption, U.S. and Mexican officials said, until 
     recently they were also crippled by a legal system that did 
     not permit the use of evidence gathered by wiretaps or paid 
     confidential informants. In November, however, Mexico's 
     Congress approved an organized crime bill that legalizes such 
     tactics and institutes a witness protection program.
       ``We didn't have any legal way to introduce into evidence 
     taped conversations--wiretaps--or to protect witnesses who 
     enter into plea bargains in return for evidence that can be 
     used against kingpins,'' said Juan Rebolledo Jout, a top 
     Foreign Ministry official. Without such tools, he said, 
     ``these people are powerful, they are corrupt, and they are 
     difficult to catch.''
       However, Mexican officials conceded, a critical problem 
     still remains. Because U.S. cases are often built with 
     confidential informants and wiretaps, it is unclear whether 
     Mexican judges will allow extraditions to move forward if 
     they are based on U.S. cases that used wiretaps and 
     confidential informants before they became legal in Mexico.
       U.S. officials said they are beginning a major extradition 
     push for Caro Quintero because there are no charges against 
     him in Mexico. Mexican officials said he is under 
     investigation.
       ``The problem is, we don't know why he doesn't have charges 
     against him,'' said the Foreign Ministry's Rebolledo. ``We 
     are reviewing how decisions are made and investigations are 
     being carried out.''
       Caro Quintero denied being involved in any way in drug 
     trafficking. He said he and his family are the victims of a 
     vendetta by U.S. drug agents seeking revenge for the 1985 
     murder in Guadalajara of DEA agent Enrique Camarena.
       Miguel's brother Rafael, co-founder of the infamous 
     Guadalajara drug cartel, was convicted in Camarena's slaying, 
     which U.S. officials frequently cite as the event that opened 
     their eyes to the growing power and menace of Mexico's drug 
     mafias.
       With his brother's imprisonment, ``Miguel Caro Quintero now 
     runs the organization,'' DEA chief Thomas Constantine told 
     the Senate two years ago. It is one of ``the four major 
     [Mexican] drug trafficking organizations that work closely 
     with the Cali [Colombia] mafia'' to smuggle cocaine into the 
     United States, Constantine said.
       Caro Quintero called the charges ``fabrications'' and held 
     up his relatively peaceful lifestyle as proof he is not 
     wanted by the law. He added that he does not believe his 
     brother killed Camarena.
       Tall, with jet-black hair and a thick mustache, wearing 
     bluejean pants and jacket with a plain shirt and a white 
     cowboy hat, Caro Quintero looks like he stepped out of a 
     cigarette ad. He said his family--he has three brothers and 
     six sisters--grew up in the neighboring state of Sinaloa, 
     where his father, who died five years ago, owned a cattle 
     farm. He is married and has two sons, ages 7 and 12.
       Caro Quintero said his family came to Sonora about 15 years 
     ago. He denied reports that his family owns hotels, movie 
     theaters and huge amounts of land in and around Caborca, 
     which is about 75 miles southwest of the border city of 
     Nogales, in a remote desert region known as a haven for 
     traffickers and clandestine airstrips.
       A 1994 indictment in Arizona charged that Caro Quintero 
     negotiated with an undercover DEA agent to set up a series of 
     such clandestine landing strips to smuggle cocaine into the 
     United States.
       Caro Quintero said he and his family own only a ranch where 
     they raise cattle and a farm where they grow honeydews and 
     watermelons for export to the United States. He said the 
     family's land holdings total about 25 acres.
       ``If I had a cartel, I'd have a lot of money and my brother 
     wouldn't be there [in jail],'' he said.


     Statement of President Ed Ladd, California Narcotics Officers 
                              Association

       The Board of the California Narcotics Officers' Association 
     voted today to unanimously support Senator Dianne Feinstein 
     and Senator Paul Coverdell in their efforts to overturn the 
     President's decision to certify Mexico. The California 
     Narcotics Officers' Association Board, representing over 
     7,000 law enforcement agents and prosecutors, is the second 
     largest professional law enforcement association in the 
     nation. Today's vote to join with Senator Feinstein on the 
     decertification issue is based on our longstanding experience 
     with the widespread corruption and lack of cooperation shown 
     by the Mexican government.
       It is no secret that drugs are a huge problem in 
     California. What may not be widely known is the alarming rate 
     in which narcotics spill over the California border from 
     Mexico. It is estimated that 50% to 70% of the cocaine, up to 
     80% of the marijuana and 20% to 30% of the heroin are 
     imported in the United States from Mexico. Without the 
     cooperation of the Mexican government in the war against 
     drugs, we cannot put up a fair fight. We strongly urge 
     Congress to overturn the President's decision to certify 
     Mexico.
       The impact drugs have on our communities exemplifies the 
     need for the United States to demand full cooperation from 
     the Mexican government in their efforts to stem the flow of 
     drugs into our country. As law enforcement agents and 
     prosecutors, we have witnessed the effects drugs have on our 
     cities and communities first hand. Dangerous drugs are 
     becoming more prevalent on our streets. For example, the 
     supply of black tar heroin brought into California from 
     Mexico is growing at such an incredible rate that the price 
     per ounce has been cut in half in just two years--from $800 
     per ounce to $400 an ounce. By certifying Mexico again this 
     year, President Clinton is allowing the drug flow to continue 
     unchecked.
       The corruption and violence created by the Mexican drug 
     cartels will not be lessened until a strong message is sent 
     that Mexico must improve their anti-drug efforts. The 
     President's decision to certify does not send this message. 
     We simply cannot stand by this decision and we strongly urge 
     Congress to overturn it.
       The members of the California Narcotics Officers' 
     Association are happy to support Senators Feinstein and 
     Coverdell and other members of Congress and take whatever 
     steps are necessary to see that full cooperation occurs.

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the State 
Department's statement of explanation on certification be printed in 
the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                              The White House,

                                Washington, DC, February 28, 1997.


                 MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

     Subject: Certification for major narcotics producing and 
         transit countries.
       By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 
     490(b)(1)(A) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as 
     amended, (``the Act''), I hereby determine and certify that 
     the following major drug producing and/or major drug transit 
     countries/dependent territories have cooperated fully with 
     the United States, or taken adequate steps on their own, to 
     achieve full compliance with the goals and objectives of the 
     1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in 
     Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances: Aruba, The 
     Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Cambodia, China, Dominican 
     Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Hong Kong, India, 
     Jamaica, Laos, Malaysia, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
     Taiwan, Thailand, Venezuela, and Vietnam.
       By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 
     490(b)(1)(B) of the Act, I hereby determine that it is in the 
     vital national interests of the United States to certify the 
     following major illicit drug producing and/or transit 
     countries: Belize, Lebanon, and Pakistan.
       Analysis of the relevant U.S. vital national interests, as 
     required under section 490(b)(3) of the Act, is attached. I 
     have determined that the following major illicit drug 
     producing and/or major transit countries do not meet the 
     standards set forth in section 490(b) for certification: 
     Afghanistan, Burma, Colombia, Iran, Nigeria, and Syria.
       In making these determinations, I have considered the 
     factors set forth in section 490 of the Act, based on the 
     information contained in the International Narcotics Control 
     Strategy Report of 1997. Because the performance of each of 
     these countries/dependent territories has differed, I have 
     attached an explanatory statement for each of the countries/
     dependent territories subject to this determination.
       You are hereby authorized and directed to report this 
     determination to the Congress immediately and to published it 
     in the Federal Register.
                                               William J. Clinton.

               State Department Statement of Explanation


                                 mexico

       The Government of Mexico's (GOM) 1996 counter-drug effort 
     produced encouraging resulting and notable progress in 
     bilateral cooperation. President Zedillo has declared the 
     major drug trafficking organizations, and the corruption they 
     foster within governmental structures, to be Mexico's 
     principal national security threat. He has intensified the 
     country's counter-drug effort, in keeping with international 
     human rights norms, both through legal reforms and 
     operationally, through the expanded participation of the 
     nation's military services.

[[Page S2047]]

       Drug seizures and arrests increased in 1996. Mexican 
     authorities seized 23.8 mt of cocaine, 383 kgs of heroin, 
     1015 mt of marijuana, 171.7 kgs of methamphetamine and 6.7 mt 
     of ephedrine (its chemical precursor), and destroyed 20 drug 
     labs. Police arrested 11,283 suspects on drug-related 
     charges. Authorities arrested several major traffickers: Juan 
     Garcia Abrego, Gulf cartel leader and one of the FBI's ``Ten 
     Most Wanted'' fugitives; Jose Luis Pereira Salas, linked to 
     the Cali and Juarez cartels; and Manuel Rodriguez Lopez, 
     linked to the Castrillon maritime smuggling organization.
       The Mexican Congress passed two critical pieces of 
     legislation which have armed the GOM with a whole new arsenal 
     of weapons to use to combat money laundering, chemical 
     diversion and organized crime. The GOM established organized 
     crime task forces in key locations in northern and western 
     Mexico in cooperation with U.S. law enforcement. In an effort 
     to confront widespread corruption within the nation's law 
     enforcement agencies, former Attorney General Lozano 
     dismissed over 1250 federal police officers and technical 
     personnel for corruption or incompetence, although some have 
     been rehired, and the GOM indicated two former senior GOM 
     officials and a current Undersecretary of Tourism. He also 
     sought to expand cooperation with the United States and other 
     governments.
       The United States and Mexico established the High-Level 
     Contact Group on Narcotics Control (HLCG) to explore joint 
     solutions to the shared drug threat and to coordinate 
     bilateral anti-drug efforts. The HLCG met three times during 
     1996 and its technical working groups met throughout the 
     year. Under the aegis of the HLCG, the two governments 
     developed a joint assessment of the narcotics threat posed to 
     both countries which will be used as the basis for a joint 
     counter-drug strategy.
       U.S.-Mexican bilateral cooperation on drug law enforcement 
     continued to improve in 1996, particularly in the areas of 
     money laundering, mutual legal assistance, and criminal 
     investigations. The USG provided training, technical, and 
     material support to personnel of the Office of the Mexican 
     Attorney General (PGR), the National Institute to Combat 
     Drugs (INCD), the Mexican Treasury, and the Mexican armed 
     forces. The Government of Mexico established the important 
     precedent of extraditing Mexican nationals to the United 
     States under the provision of Mexico's extradition law 
     permitting this in ``exceptional circumstances.'' This paves 
     the way for further advances in bringing fugitives to 
     justice. Both governments returned record numbers of 
     fugitives in 1996.
       Even with positive results, and good cooperation with the 
     U.S. and other governments, the problems which Mexico faces 
     remain daunting. The Zedillo Administration has taken 
     important beginning steps against the major drug cartels in 
     Mexico, and towards more effective cooperation with the 
     United States and other international partners, but the 
     strongest groups, such as the Juarez and Tijuana cartels, 
     have yet to be effectively confronted. The level of narcotics 
     corruption is very serious, reaching into the very senior 
     levels of Mexico's drug law enforcement forces, as witnessed 
     by the February 1997 arrest of the recently-appointed 
     national counternarcotics coordinator. President Zedillo 
     acted courageously to remove him as soon as the internal 
     Mexican investigation revealed the problem, but this has been 
     a set-back for Mexico's anti-drug effort, and for bilateral 
     cooperation.
       Mexican police, military personnel, prosecutors, and the 
     courts need additional resources, training and other support 
     to perform the important and dangerous tasks ahead of them. 
     Progress in establishing controls on money laundering and 
     chemical diversion must be further enhanced and implemented. 
     New capabilities need to be institutionalized. Above all, the 
     GOM will have to take system-wide action against corruption 
     and other abuses of official authority through enhanced 
     screening of personnel in sensitive positions and putting 
     into place ongoing integrity controls.
       While there are still serious problems, and a number of 
     areas in which the USG would like to see further progress, 
     the two governments have agreed on the parameters of a joint 
     approach to combat the narcotics threat, and are at work on 
     developing this strategy. The drug issue will remain one of 
     the top issues in the bilateral agenda and will be one of the 
     main issues discussed during President Clinton's planned 
     visit to Mexico in April.

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from South 
Carolina [Mr. Hollings], has asked to cosponsor Senate Joint Resolution 
19, Senate Joint Resolution 20, and Senate Joint Resolution 21, and has 
also asked for time, which I would ask be charged to my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina is recognized.
  Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from 
California. She has, as usual, done her homework and, her persuasive 
arguments at last Thursday's caucus where she debated General McCaffrey 
changed my mind. I had hesitated endorsing her initiative. They taught 
us in the Army years ago, no matter how well the gunners aimed, if the 
recoil is going to kill the gun crew, you do not fire it.

  I had to question myself on the recoil here, from this particular 
initiative. What good was it going to do? Would it do more harm than 
good? It was easily determined, after listening to Senator Feinstein, 
that it was definitely going to do more good because, in line with the 
limited time, you find exactly what I have learned through hard 
experience, in the most recent issue of the London Economist, on page 
43:

       The Americans' uncritical support of Mexico may have helped 
     to spread drug corruption in that country over the past 
     decade.

  I will never forget, a good 15 years ago or so, when Senator Howard 
Baker, Senator Paul Laxalt, Senator Simpson from Wyoming, and myself, 
we were down in Mexico. We had a briefing at that time by President de 
la Madrid. At that time everything was just peaches and cream. We were 
getting along fine. We were moving forward on then the drug program and 
enforcement. I had gone downstairs and forgotten my jacket, raced back 
up to get it, and President de la Madrid at the time was briefing the 
Mexican press. My consulate there was interpreting for me. He was 
giving us unshirted dickens. He said, ``We told those gringos from the 
north that we weren't going to stand for this, we weren't going to do 
this,'' that was a report of a totally different meeting than which we 
had.
  My point is they have constantly used the United States against their 
particular opposition, time and again, in order to maintain office. In 
that light, I want to say again what I said at the hearing with 
Secretary Madeleine Albright at the subcommittee for State, Justice, 
Commerce on last Thursday afternoon, whereby I was counseling Secretary 
Albright, immediately after her statement about Mexico and the great 
progress we were making in the drug effort. I said I didn't want to 
sound as an upstart, I certainly did not want to sound impudent in any 
way, but what I had just heard from the Secretary was State Department 
boilerplate.
  Why did I say it was State Department boilerplate? I read, back in 
the record, the statement made by Warren Christopher 4 years ago. It 
was almost word for word just exactly what Secretary Albright was 
saying. You can go back to Secretary of State Baker's statement and I 
will show you it is almost the same thing. From hard experience, I have 
learned that Senator Feinstein is on target and doing this Nation a 
wonderful service. As she points out this influx of drugs is a cancer 
that is spreading into small towns and communities all over the Nation. 
It is going to take some harsh action of some kind. We have to break 
this notion that we are neighbors and can't speak freely about our 
problems. The situation in Mexico is spinning out of control. The head 
of the drug effort down there in Mexico, turns out to be an associate 
of the drug cartels. Yet we had him here for 12 days of meetings.
  The problem in Mexico was highlighted in the Dallas Morning News:

       ``The intelligence on corruption, especially of drug 
     traffickers, has always been there,'' said Phil Jordan, who 
     headed DEA's Dallas office from 1984 to 1994, ``but we were 
     under instructions not to say anything negative about Mexico. 
     It was a no-no, since NAFTA was a hot political football.''

  Well, there you are. What we are doing is following a policy to 
protect our financial interests; our Wall Street, or our economic 
interests, which of course has not worked out. But that is the 
motivation. That is the influence, and not really getting to the drugs 
and the gangs and the corruption and the law enforcement and crime 
problem that we have in this country.
  So, where I indicated I would withhold because I thought it would 
cause too much damage and I didn't have enough to work with, I went to 
General McCaffrey's statement. This was in an open session not--a 
secure briefing. When asked, ``If this decertification initiative 
passed here and Mexico was decertified, what would happen,'' he said--I 
almost quote it word for word--``we would not be able to work with our 
friends on drugs.''

  The conclusion of this Senator is we have the wrong friends. We have 
the wrong friends. We have been going through, as Bob Dole says: Same 
act, same scene, been there, done that, again and again and again. 
Until we take up something like the Feinstein

[[Page S2048]]

initiative, here, we are not going to get any results.
  Immediately, there is the overreaction. The Senator from New Mexico, 
Senator Domenici, was at the hearing. He said, ``Oh, I differ with 
Senator Hollings absolutely. We don't want to overthrow President 
Zedillo.''
  I don't want to overthrow President Zedillo. I know from the politics 
of Mexico that is the best chance that he stays on, if the United 
States jumps him; then he is secure in office politically. That is not 
the intent. I think the man is honest. I think he is working hard at 
it. But I think it is too great a problem for him. And I think there 
are going to have to be some changes down there. I don't see how a 
decertification initiative of this kind, with the evidence at hand, 
should upset or overthrow.
  I was called by the Albuquerque paper over the weekend, that I 
suggested we overthrow Zedillo. That is how things can get that far out 
of hand. That is nonsense. If he is that weak that a decertification 
initiative here, with the facts at hand, would cause him to lose 
office, then he is very weak and I think maybe that is the problem.
  I think it would be a problem for me, you, or anyone else down there. 
This thing has grown bigger than us all and it is going to take this 
kind of approach to bring ourselves to any kind of results and stop 
this. Because it has been going on year in and year out and we have 
given way to our economic interests in order to continue. As the London 
Economist says, ``The American's uncritical support of Mexico may have 
helped to spread drug corruption in that country over the past 
decade.''
  I agree with that statement. That is an editorial, lost in a news 
column. We ought to take heed and I am delighted, at this time, to join 
in, and I thank Senator Feinstein for enlisting me as a cosponsor.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. HUTCHINSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. HUTCHINSON. Mr. President, I stand here today in full support of 
House Joint Resolution 58 and Senate Joint Resolution 21, resolutions 
expressing Congress' disapproval of the President's certification to 
Congress that Mexico has fully cooperated with United States 
antinarcotics efforts during the last year.
  Section 490 of the Foreign Assistance Act dutifully permits Congress 
to disapprove Presidential certifications made under this section if it 
enacts a joint resolution to that effect.
  The importance of Mexico's full cooperation with United States 
antinarcotic efforts cannot be overstated. Drug use among American 
teenagers has nearly doubled in the last 5 years. Most importantly, 
more than 70 percent of illegal narcotics entering the United States 
comes from the Nation of Mexico.
  Mr. President, as we all know, on February 28, the Clinton 
administration certified that Mexico cooperated fully with United 
States efforts to combat international narcotics trafficking during 
1996. However, on February 27, 1 day before the President issued the 
certification, the day before the administration received a bipartisan 
letter from 39 Senators, myself included, urging our Government to deny 
certification to Mexico, the facts unequivocally show that Mexico has 
not fully cooperated with the United States.
  Seventy percent of the illicit drugs that enter the United States 
still enter through Mexico. There has been no change in those figures 
or on that front.
  The DEA says that Mexican drug traffickers are manufacturing massive 
and unprecedented quantities of high purity meth and supplying it to 
distribution networks here in the United States which are destroying 
our youth and creating a new front in the drug war.
  Not 1 Mexican national out of the 100 or more the United States wants 
currently for trial here in the United States on serious drug charges 
has been extradited to the United States, despite the numerous requests 
that our Government has issued to the Mexican Government.
  Our own DEA Administrator, Thomas Constantine, has recently said:

       There has been little or no effective action taken against 
     the major Mexican-based cartels. . . . The Mexicans are now 
     the single most powerful trafficking group--worse [even] than 
     the Colombian cartels.

  Mexico's counternarcotics effort is plagued by corruption in the 
Government and in the national police. Among the evidence are that 
eight Mexican prosecutors and law enforcement officials have been 
murdered in Tijuana in recent months. The revelation that Gen. Jesus 
Gutierrez Rebollo, Mexico's top counternarcotics official and a 42-year 
veteran of the armed forces, had accepted bribes from the cartels casts 
grave doubts upon Mexico's ability to curb corruption at the highest 
levels of its own Government.
  While there have been increases in the amount of heroin and marijuana 
seized by Mexican authorities, cocaine seizures remain low. The 1996 
levels are half those seized in 1993. And the same holds true on drug-
related arrests; they are half the figure of the 1992 level.
  Lastly, on the eve of full certification to Mexico, the Mexican 
police released a notorious money launderer linked to a major drug 
dealer, and the United States was informed of this fact only after 
certification was announced. The Mexican police officers who released 
the individual are now under investigation as a result of this early 
release.
  In the face of these substantive facts, President Clinton still 
certified that Mexico was fully cooperating with our antidrug efforts. 
As a father of three, I cannot in good faith be witness to the 
corruption of the well-being of America's children.
  Mr. President, the resolutions before us are simple. Mexico has 
failed with regard to antidrug cooperation; however, the President has 
certified giving them a passing grade.
  I say to Members of the Senate, both of these resolutions contain a 
waiver provision that would permit the President to continue both 
bilateral assistance and multinational development assistance for 
Mexico. By adopting these resolutions we are declaring that Mexico has 
not fully cooperated and therefore should not receive the United States 
certification.
  Mr. President, based on the facts, including the national interest 
waiver, we must send a message to the Nation of Mexico that the 
administration made the wrong decision and that these resolutions will 
set that record straight while preserving stability in our relationship 
with Mexico.
  So, Mr. President, I urge the adoption of both House Joint Resolution 
58 and S.J. Res. 21 for the good of the Nation and for the good of our 
children.
  I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DeWINE. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. DORGAN. I would be happy to.
  Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that after my 
colleague is done speaking that I have 10 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DeWINE. I thank the Senator very much.

                          ____________________