[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 29 (Monday, March 10, 1997)]
[House]
[Pages H807-H810]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                             SPECIAL ORDERS

                                 ______
                                 

  AGENCY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE NATION'S AIRSPACE SAFETY HAS NO DIRECTION

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of 
January 7, 1997, the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Wolf] is recognized 
for 60 minutes as the designee of the majority leader.
  Mr. WOLF. Mr. Speaker, I am deeply concerned about the state of 
affairs at the Federal Aviation Administration [FAA].
  Vacancies at the highest levels have left the FAA leaderless, 
rudderless, and unable to meet its responsibilities to the aviation 
industry and the flying public. Last summer, then FAA Administrator 
David Hinson announced his plans to return to the private sector before 
the end of the year and in November he was gone. Since that time--and 
despite the months of advance notice provided--the position has been 
vacant.
  It's now March and there is no appointed Administrator. The President 
has not even nominated someone for the position. Not only that, Deputy 
Administrator Linda Daschle, who had been serving as Acting FAA 
Administrator, left the agency in January. Another interim Acting 
Administrator was recently named, but there is now no appointed 
Administrator and no Deputy Administrator. Compounding that, the 
department heads of regulation and certification, and airports have 
each been on the job for less than a year.
  The agency responsible for keeping the Nation's airspace safe has no 
direction. What's more, career employees with experience in some of the 
most critical departments at the agency are leaving. But I do want to 
make clear that there are many dedicated, experienced career personnel 
who, day in and day out, keep the FAA running and our skies safe under 
very trying conditions. Since last July, I have been urging the 
President to nominate a qualified permanent Administrator for the FAA. 
I have written to the President on three separate occasions--July 30, 
1996; November 18, 1996; and January 27, 1997--urging him to act 
quickly on this important nomination, and I ask unanimous consent that 
these letters be included in the Record. Again today, I implore the 
President to act.
  Last year, Congress included provisions in the FAA reauthorization 
legislation to establish a National Civil Aviation Review Commission to 
study safety, airport capital needs, and ways to meet those needs, and 
FAA operational needs and ways to meet those needs. The Commission must 
report back to Congress with detailed analysis and recommendations no 
later than 1 year after the date of enactment--no later than October 9, 
1997. Guess what? The Commission has not begun work because its members 
still haven't been named. Thirteen of the 21 members of this Commission 
are to be appointed by the Secretary of Transportation and not a single 
commission member has been appointed. Only 7 months are left for the 
Commission to do its work. This is a critical assignment and yet 
nothing is happening.
  Meanwhile, there's the issue of aviation taxes. We have lost $5.2 
billion in aviation taxes due to funding disputes over FAA financing. 
These taxes expired at the end of 1995, were reinstated briefly in 
August 1996, expired again at the end of the year and were just 
recently reinstated but only for 6 months. And the FAA didn't even 
notice that these taxes were not being collected last year, resulting 
in a near crisis. Shouldn't the FAA have been working to avoid this 
current crisis? Is anybody there? Does anybody care?
  Last year's ValuJet and TWA accidents underscored the need to improve 
aviation safety and airport security. The media has reported 
frightening tales of how fraudulent, bogus parts get inside our 
commercial airliners. Last year, air traffic centers all over the 
country experienced breakdowns in important radar and

[[Page H808]]

communications systems. Who at the FAA is looking at this? Is anybody 
there? Does anybody care?
  Not only is the FAA plagued by a leadership and experience void which 
continues to grow, I believe the FAA is spinning its wheels and wasting 
too much time, attention, and energy on matters not really crucial to 
its critical mission of ensuring aviation safety.
  Far too much time has been spent arguing about new organizational 
arrangements for the FAA. It happens almost like clockwork. Six months 
go by--so it must be time for the FAA to reorganize. Since then mid-
1980's, various groups have recommended changes ranging from the 
creation of an independent FAA to the establishment of a private, 
nonprofit corporation. This was typified by a late-1980's study by the 
National Academy of Sciences, which included a 60-page appendix titled, 
``Organizational Options for the FAA.'' Since then, for at least 10 
years, we've been arguing about how the FAA should be organized, and 
where it would get its money from, instead of debating how the FAA 
could be more efficient and effective at improving aviation safety.
  More recently, after 3 years of extraordinary financial losses in the 
airline industry, Congress in 1992 created the National Commission to 
Ensure a Strong Competitive Airline Industry. That Commission's final 
report, issued in August 1993, recommended with little supporting 
evidence that the FAA be converted to a Federal corporation. With no 
additional evidence, the National Performance Review, headed by Vice 
President Gore, endorsed this recommendation in its report, issued 1 
month later.
  The push was then on to build support for the new Federal corporation 
initiative and ongoing efforts for FAA reform were shelved. Reform was 
seen as undermining support for the new corporation because, if 
effective reform were possible, maybe a corporation was not needed 
after all. So all reform efforts in the agency were effectively stopped 
during the 1992-93 timeframe.
  The problem is, neither the Commission, the National Performance 
Review staff, nor the administration checked with the Congress to see 
if this corporation idea had any chance of being enacted. If they'd 
bothered to ask, they would have soon learned that the idea had no 
support on Capitol Hill. Finally, a year later, the administration 
realized the corporation concept had gained little support among either 
Democrats or Republicans in Congress. But rather than go to the heart 
of the problem and start the reform process, they developed a new 
``mega-proposal''--user fees to fully finance the FAA.
  Keep in mind that only a couple of years before, the issue of 
financing for the agency itself was not an identified concern. We have 
annual budget hearings and financing concerns were never mentioned. But 
all of a sudden, in the late spring 1994, financing became the 
preeminent issue. Not aviation safety. Not management reform. But long-
term funding stability.
  It is still the administration's view that FAA should be made more 
``business like'' by converting to a rate setting agency, like the old 
Civil Aeronautics Board, and the President's budget just recently 
submitted proposes to begin collecting billions of dollars in 
unspecified fees about 18 months from now. The administration has 
changed its focus, rejecting the corporation concept in favor of the 
push for user fee financing.
  We are witnessing something very much like the legend of Nero 
fiddling while Rome burned. What has happened at the FAA over the past 
5 years? The fiddling goes on while the agency deteriorates. While the 
administration stalls on nominating leaders to run the FAA, draws and 
redraws FAA's organizational chart, and debates who gets to foot the 
FAA's bills, the agency responsible for the safety of the flying public 
spirals downward.
  Let me offer one example. Over the past 3 years, FAA cut over 5,000 
people from its rolls because the Department of Transportation gave 
them a disproportionate share of the total reductions needed for 
Governmentwide downsizing. These cuts were quick and severe--allocated 
by a department claiming to desire ``business like'' operations for the 
FAA. Understandably, morale plummeted. Morale was so low that when 
buyouts were offered, the FAA was surprised at how many of its 
experienced people left. And all this was happening while air traffic 
was rising, new air carriers were being approved for operations, and 
economic competition in the industry was becoming more cutthroat. In 
short, the need for FAA safety was never more necessary.

  When the Transportation Appropriations Subcommittee added funds to 
FAA's budget in June 1993 to hire more safety inspectors and to buy 
spare parts for radars and other air traffic control equipment, the 
agency refused the funds. They said the money wasn't needed and could 
not be accommodated, given the FAA's downsizing plan. When funds were 
added to move controllers to those locations where air traffic was 
increasing, the FAA said the funds were not needed.
  Why was this happening? The agency's focus was not on improving its 
field operations, but on lobbying for corporate status. We heard in 
last year's testimony on the ValuJet accident about how safety 
inspectors in the field were told they had to work harder because the 
agency had no more staffing. These problems were known to employees in 
the field, and they could have been fixed with stable, focused 
management attention.
  Now, suddenly, surprise--the FAA is decrying the insufficient 
staffing levels at the agency. In the fiscal year 1997 transportation 
appropriations act, Congress provided funding to support hiring 500 new 
air traffic controllers, 367 new aviation safety inspectors and other 
regulatory oversight personnel. As of January 31, 1997, only 17 new 
controllers had been hired. As of that same date, 133 controllers left 
the job.
  For fiscal year 1998, the administration again proposes to increase 
staff in several areas deemed critical: Air traffic controller staff is 
to increase by another 500; safety inspectors and the certification 
work force is slated to increase by 273; and the security work force is 
to increase by 173. What happened? Why is the FAA suddenly facing a 
staffing crisis? Who was running the FAA and why weren't they focusing 
on these critical management concerns? Is anybody there? Does anybody 
care?
  Even when the FAA has been afforded a real opportunity for management 
attention and reform, it has been slow to take advantage. Congress 
freed the FAA from what the agency said were burdensome procurement and 
personnel rules about 18 months ago. Yet we've seen no significant 
personnel reform since then, and recent GAO reports indicate that 
procurement reform is going slowly. We were told that such fundamental 
reforms would address two of the agency's major problems, and would 
lead to more efficiency and cost savings. Yet, because so little has 
been implemented, there is little evidence of improvement or savings. 
An independent financial assessment of the FAA said the same thing--the 
agency has been too slow to take advantage of these fundamental 
reforms.
  And what about the third problem so much discussed over the past 2 
years--the need for fundamental financing reform? You might remember 
the FAA claims that a $12 billion budget gap in their long-range 
forecasts required a totally new way to finance the agency. They talked 
of a crisis, in order to get more money to spend. But before the ink 
was dry, the GAO found flaws in FAA's estimates. Soon after, the FAA 
acknowledged the estimate was perhaps not as precise as it could be. 
Both general aviation and commercial airlines were clearly skeptical. 
To help get to the bottom of this mess, Congress legislated an 
independent assessment of these costs, which will be considered by a 
Civil Aviation Review Commission--the very Commission I mentioned 
earlier which has yet to be named. The assessment, conducted by Coopers 
and Lybrand, was recently completed and is extremely critical of FAA's 
financial management. It proved that the FAA's estimate of a budget gap 
is very soft, and there are significant opportunities for cost savings 
which the agency has not yet explored. They said, and I quote, ``the 
FAA can't manage money.'' Coopers and Lybrand made a number of 
startling findings in its report, including the following: The costs 
to operate the FAA are uncertain; the FAA's program managers have not 
demonstrated an understanding of financial management; opportunities 
for cost savings exist in staffing and personnel as well as facility 
consolidation and closures. Here, too, we have a failure of management, 
a failure at the highest levels to deal with basic issues at the FAA.

  In the meantime, though, the FAA is still managing its programs as if 
the shortfall were real. They are stretching out or terminating 
modernization programs because of a presumed lack of funding. They 
propose to slash airport development grants by one-third, and at the 
same time telling airports to now buy their own landing aids and 
lighting systems. They are proposing drastic reductions in human 
factors and aviation weather research--the two leading causes of 
aviation accidents. They terminate safety programs like the ASDE-3 
radar which provides enhanced safety for aircraft maneuvering on the 
ground.
  In short, we are seeing a retreat on our commitment to modernize air 
traffic control equipment and airports around the country while large 
increases in the safety work forces cause the budget to spiral out of 
control. New user fees are on top of the assumed continuation of 
existing user fees totaling $100 million approved in the fiscal year 
1997 appropriations act, yet no such fees have been collected thus far. 
What are the details of the FAA's user fee proposal? I have asked both 
the FAA and the Department of Transportation for details but have 
received no additional information. How can we responsibly assess the 
administration's proposal without the fine print?

[[Page H809]]

  The FAA is adrift in turbulent waters, leaderless and rudderless. 
Although Congress helped the agency rid itself of the antiquated 
procurement rules, the FAA has not used that freedom to much advantage, 
and they have lost considerable ground in the administration's internal 
battles of the budget. The FAA's capital budget is going down just as 
the requirements are going up, and user fees are not making any 
difference. We have spent years arguing about how to finance and 
organize the air traffic control system. We have wasted years arguing 
whether or not this kind of tax is better than that kind of tax. If we 
don't stop looking--and start acting--soon, the FAA will run out of 
time. Is anybody there? Does anybody care?
  One final point. A study prepared by Boeing suggests that based on 
the current rate of air travel, by the year 2015, there will be a major 
crash every 8 days somewhere in the world. A major crash every 8 days. 
What is the FAA doing to change this horrific projection?
  It is imperative that steps be taken now to shore up the FAA. The 
President must act now to nominate an administrator and institute 
necessary leadership and management at the highest levels in the FAA. 
The FAA must focus on its critical mission--aviation safety and airport 
security. The flying public must be confident that the FAA is on the 
job, committed to fulfilling its mission of ensuring the best possible 
air traffic control systems and the safest skies and airports. We must 
be assured that the FAA is there and the FAA does care about the safety 
of the flying public. We will accept nothing less.
                                         House of Representatives,


                                  Committee on Appropriations,

                                 Washington, DC, January 27, 1997.
     Hon. William J. Clinton,
     The President,
     The White House, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. President: On two previous occasions, I have 
     written to you regarding the nomination of a permanent 
     Administrator for the Federal Aviation Administration. In the 
     first of those letters, dated July 30, 1996, I outlined my 
     views of the essential qualities which the FAA Administrator 
     should have during this critical time in the agency's 
     history. In the second letter, dated November 18, 1996, I 
     urged the nomination of a new Administrator as soon as 
     possible. I have enclosed copies of those letters for your 
     review, but in summary they suggest the following qualities 
     of leadership for the next administrator:
       1. A clear vision for the future of aviation based on a 
     lifetime of experience and association.
       2. Skills in leadership and management of a large and 
     diverse organization.
       3. Someone who is willing and able to stay in the position 
     for at least four years, with even longer tenure being 
     desirable.
       There are now rumors circulating that individuals being 
     considered for this position have backgrounds not steeped in 
     aviation, safety, or management of a large and diverse 
     workforce, but in general policy development. I hope you will 
     consider beforehand the disastrous effect that a weak 
     nomination could have for this agency, including its 
     relationship with the Congress over the next few years.
       It has now been nearly three months since Administrator 
     David Hinson left the agency. This Friday, Deputy 
     Administrator Linda Daschle (who has been serving as 
     Administrator in an acting capacity) will leave the agency. 
     With these departures, the agency is in desperate need of 
     permanent executive leadership. I am very disappointed in 
     your administration's failure to nominate a qualified 
     individual for this critical position in a timely manner, 
     especially since former Administrator Hinson made public his 
     plans to leave approximately six months ago. I believe only 
     negligence could allow this situation to continue, and I urge 
     in the strongest terms that you nominate a qualified 
     individual for the position of FAA Administrator within the 
     next two weeks.

                                                Frank R. Wolf,

                                         Chairman, Subcommittee on
                              Transportation and Related Agencies.
       Enclosures.


                                     House of Representatives,

                                    Washington, DC, July 30, 1996.
     Hon. William J. Clinton,
     The President,
     The White House, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. President:  I am writing about the position of 
     administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration. I 
     understand that the current administrator, Mr. David Hinson, 
     plans to return to the private sector at year's end. Having 
     worked closely with the FAA and its administrators since my 
     appointment in 1985 to the Subcommittee on Transportation of 
     the House Appropriations Committee, I want to share with you 
     some thoughts on this important posting.
       Because commercial aviation is undergoing spectacular 
     growth, because technologies associated with aviation are 
     developing with lightning speed and because existing control 
     systems necessary to ensure safe, rapid and reliable air 
     travel are approaching the end of useful and effective life 
     and must soon be replaced at tremendous cost, it may be wise 
     to reflect on what type of special person is needed to lead 
     the FAA as it faces these formidable challenges. This is an 
     especially critical time for the FAA with the renewed focus 
     on and need for air safety coupled with today's threats of 
     terrorism targeted at the flying public.
       It seems clear that the future of the FAA will most 
     certainly not be ``business as usual.'' Mr. Hinson's 
     replacement must have a solid founding in the aviation 
     community but not be a captive of it. He or she must have a 
     clear vision for the future based on a lifetime of experience 
     and association. There is little time to ``come up to 
     speed''; responsibilities and decisions will not wait. 
     Whomever is selected must be steeped in aviation, inculcated 
     in the past but not wedded to it.
       It is equally important to select someone skilled in 
     management and leadership, not only to direct this huge and 
     diverse organization, but to help it change course as 
     necessary. Someone is needed who can anticipate the demands 
     of tomorrow and instill teamwork and coordination at all 
     levels of the FAA to get the job done. For example, the job 
     of installing a new air traffic control system is alone a 
     massive undertaking. But to do so while continuing to ensure 
     safe and reliable flight during the proving and conversion 
     period adds immeasurably to the difficulty of the process. 
     Where safety is concerned, there is little room for error.
       Of equal importance is to select someone with a long term 
     commitment to the task at hand. If there has been a 
     shortcoming in the selection of previous administrators it is 
     that no one has been around long enough to get the job done. 
     Each new person has approached the task differently with 
     different priorities, different objectives and different ways 
     of going about things. The technology learning curve is 
     always too steep. By the time an administrator becomes 
     comfortable in the job, he has moved on and the process must 
     begin anew.
       During the relatively short time I have been on the 
     Appropriations Committee, Mr. Hinson is the sixth person to 
     serve as administrator. This seems to me to be too much 
     turnover and too little continuity and we can no longer 
     afford to continue this practice. I hope you will look for 
     someone who will accept the challenge of leading the FAA for 
     four or five or even ten years. Someone should be chosen who 
     will be able to take an idea from the drawing board, shepherd 
     it through development, implementation and follow-up and see 
     it become operational. Change takes time and an administrator 
     is needed who will be accountable for the duration of the 
     process.
       I hope you will ignore the clamor of special interests and 
     political expedience and select as the next FAA administrator 
     someone with experience, vision, wisdom and skill to lead the 
     aviation community and the traveling public who rely upon it, 
     into a long period of safe and reliable operation. I hope 
     these thoughts are helpful to you.
       Best regards.
           Sincerely,
                                                    Frank R. Wolf,
                                               Member of Congress.
                                         House of Representatives,


                                  Committee on Appropriations,

                                Washington, DC, November 18, 1996.
     The President,
     The White House,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. President: I am writing to urge you to appoint a 
     new administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration as 
     soon as possible. Given the serious outstanding issues of 
     aviation safety, FAA reform, and aviation system financing, I 
     believe it is imperative that a full-time administrator be in 
     place quickly. Administrator David Hinson has left this 
     position, and the agency is currently being led by Deputy 
     Administrator Linda Daschle, who has indicated she would not 
     accept the position of Administrator. Mr. Monte Belger, a 
     career official of the agency, has been designated Acting 
     Deputy Administrator during the interim period.
       The new administrator will need some time to adjust to the 
     position before wrestling with the many issues the agency 
     will face over the coming year. For starters the aviation 
     ticket tax will expire on December 31, 1996, and the airport 
     and airway trust fund will be out of money sometime next 
     summer. Because of this, the controversial subject of air 
     traffic control user fees will be hotly debated this spring. 
     The complexity of this subject and its impact on the various 
     aviation interest groups would be a daunting task for any new 
     administrator, and especially one who arrives in January, 
     just as the new Congress begins working on the issues.
       In addition, the FAA has many outstanding issues related to 
     aviation safety which require full-time executive leadership. 
     Safety and security improvements resulting from the ValuJet 
     and TWA 800 crashes are only just beginning, and will require 
     strong follow-up. Improved vigilance over suspected 
     unapproved (including counterfeit) parts has started, but 
     constant attention by top management is needed. And 
     commissioning of new safety equipment such as the terminal 
     doppler weather radar requires strong leadership due to local 
     opposition in some areas.
       Other important work which must be accomplished in 1997 
     includes development of a new compensation system and 
     negotiation of new five-year union contracts for air traffic 
     controllers and maintenance personnel; definition of the next 
     generation ``National Airspace System Architecture Plan''; 
     and coordination with the Gore Commission on Aviation Safety 
     and Security and the National Civil Aviation Review 
     Commission. Many of these activities are already underway and 
     will require the new Administrator's personal knowledge and 
     intervention to be successful.

[[Page H810]]

       In short, this year promises to be a very challenging one 
     for the FAA, and it is no time for the agency to be without a 
     full-time administrator appointed by the President and 
     approved by the Senate. I have previously expressed my view 
     that the next administrator should have strong aviation 
     credentials, and I am enclosing an earlier letter to you 
     which summarizes those views. I urge you to do whatever you 
     can to ensure that a new FAA administrator is nominated 
     quickly--before the Christmas holiday if possible.
           Sincerely,

                                                Frank R. Wolf,

                                         Chairman, Subcommittee on
     Transportation and Related Agencies.

                          ____________________