[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 29 (Monday, March 10, 1997)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E416-E417]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                      KENYA'S STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE

                                 ______
                                 

                           HON. BILL McCOLLUM

                               of florida

                    in the house of representatives

                         Monday, March 10, 1997

  Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Speaker, just as the international trade between 
Europe and East Asia and the flow of oil out of the Middle East are 
becoming increasingly important for the well-being and growth of the 
U.S. economy, a new threat to the safety of maritime transportation has 
emerged. Iran is rapidly moving to acquire blue water capabilities--the 
ability to use its navy on the high seas.
  The Iranians are vastly improving their naval capabilities--a 
development of global strategic importance. The recent completion of a 
few acquisition programs of naval vessels and antishipping missiles 
from the PRC and the arrival of the third KILO submarine from Russia 
boosted Tehran's self-confidence in its ability to conduct combat 
operations on a far wider area. These weapons deliveries constitute a 
major upgrade of Iran's naval capabilities. Moreover, the recent 
deliveries are but the first phase of a major and far more 
comprehensive naval expansion program, mainly based on the acquisition 
of numerous surface combatants from the PRC, that will take several 
years to complete. By then, Iran will have the most powerful navy in 
the Persian Gulf region.
  Ultimately, however, most significant is the doctrinal development 
reflecting strategic self-confidence and audacity demonstrated by 
Iran's recent naval operations. Iran is increasingly looking into 
acquiring regional blue-water capabilities. The Iranian Navy already 
has proven the capability to operate over long distances. Most 
impressive were their operations during joint naval exercises with the 
Pakistani Navy throughout the Arabian Sea, and the visits to Indonesia 
by their naval combatants. The Iranian Navy has also operated from 
several port facilities in Sudan and Somalia, where Iran maintains what 
amounts to several military and naval bases.
  The significant development of early 1997 is Iran's acquisition of 
access to, and use of, naval facilities in Mozambique. In return for 
diversified military aid, the Iranian Navy will be able to use port 
facilities in Maputu and Ncala, where the Soviets and Cubans built 
military-compatible port facilities. The agreement between Iran and 
Mozambique specifically permits Iran to use the port facilities for its 
submarines, including the stationing of technical support teams in 
Mozambique and the maintaining of replenishment and crew-support 
installations.
  The true significance of all these activities becomes apparent in the 
context of assertive military doctrine--to forestall, perhaps even 
launch preemptive strikes against, U.S. intervention in case of a major 
escalation in the Persian Gulf region.
  The key to Tehran's war plan in the Persian Gulf is preventing quick 
U.S. military intervention. Hence, it is imperative for Tehran to be 
able to prevent the timely arrival of U.S. Naval Forces. Tehran is 
determined to acquire military capabilities to perform this mission. 
Considering the disparity between the United States and Iranian Navies, 
the only way the Iranians can affect an American intervention is by 
actually seeking out and engaging the United States Naval Forces far 
away from the Persian Gulf before they can affect other activities in 
the region.
  Iran need not engage primary objectives such as carrier task forces. 
For example, the sinking of the prepositioned ships operating from 
Diego Garcia will significantly hinder any U.S. military buildup in the 
Middle East. Moreover, a credible threat to these resupply ships will 
compel the U.S. Navy to divert naval assets that could have been used 
offensively elsewhere to escort and protect the resupply efforts.
  Iran's ability to maintain submarine patrols between Mozambique and 
the Arabian Sea constitutes this kind of threat, for they create a 
barrier between Diego Garcia and the Persian Gulf. One should remember 
that Iran is capable of threatening the shipping lanes along the Red 
Sea from its bases and facilities in Sudan and Somalia. Tehran is 
convinced that in case of a major war in the Persian Gulf, this kind of 
naval operation will be able to delay an intervention by the United 
States until it is too late to save the local Arab governments.

  In the meantime, Teheran continues to raise the ante against the 
United States, the Arab States of the Persian Gulf, and specifically 
Saudi Arabia. Anticipating a new round of brinkmanship and a possible 
eruption in the Middle East, Teheran warns the Arab States against 
permitting the United States to operate against the Iranians. In early 
February 1997, Ayatollah Khomeini delivered explicit threats during his 
al-Quds Day sermon. ``If any of these foreigners in the Persian Gulf 
makes one miscalculated move that could lead to instability, the first 
country that will burn will be the one that invited these foreigners 
here in the first place,'' he declared.
  This strategic development is not irreversible. There are ways to 
remedy the situation. The key to countering and reversing this Iranian 
surge lies in the West being able to operate in the area and project 
power from local installations. In this context Kenya's strategic 
importance cannot be underestimated.
  Kenya's geopolitical status is critical to the international 
community. It is situated in a key position to dominate sea lanes 
running into and out of the Red Sea/Suez Canal, as well as the sea 
lanes along East Africa. Therefore, Kenya's ability to act as a point 
of naval projection into the Indian Ocean is most important, 
particularly in light of possible Iranian-Sudanese attempts to close 
the Suez Canal, and the potential Chinese incursion into the Indian 
Ocean. In the event of radical Chinese moves against the Southeast 
Asian shipping lanes, and the eventual vulnerability of Diego Garcia, 
only India, Australia, South Africa, and Kenya would be able to 
effectively provide the springboard for Western security operations in 
the Indian Ocean. Kenya is the closest bastion, and its port system is 
at the heart of, the newly expanded theater of operations of the 
Iranian navy.

[[Page E417]]

  Teheran and Khartoum are fully aware of Kenya's importance. Kenya is 
situated immediately adjacent to Sudan and Somalia and acts as a 
containing buffer against the southward spread of radical and Islamic 
activity. If Kenya was to embrace the radicalism being pushed down on 
it from Khartoum, and the anomy flowing down from Mogadishu, then any 
hope for stability in eastern and central Africa would be lost.
  President Daniel T. Arap Moi of Kenya has so far resisted the spread 
of radicalism and Islamism. Kenya acts, and could act even more, as a 
potential source of stability for the entire central and east Africa.
  Kenya has traditionally been a pro-Western free market culture as a 
nation-state. In this regard, Nairobi sets an example for, and acts in 
a leadership capacity to, the other nations of sub-Saharan Africa. 
President Arap Moi's ongoing commitment to Western-type ideals acts as 
a benchmark in sub-Saharan Africa.
  Kenya has usually aligned itself with the United States and Britain 
in global strategic matters, and has often provided a bridge to the 
developing world. Now, as the so-called developing world becomes a far 
more dynamic and unstable strategic element in its own right, the 
availability of that bridge which Kenya offers is of even greater 
importance to Washington.

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