[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 27 (Wednesday, March 5, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2001-S2003]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                     ANOTHER MILESTONE FOR THE NPT

 Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I rise to remind my fellow 
colleagues that today marks the 27th anniversary of the entering into 
force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or 
NPT. All too often, the contributions to U.S. security made by 
multilateral arrangements like the NPT go unrecognized.
  I will speak today of a treaty that--with the accession by Oman last 
January--now has 185 members. That is more than any international 
security treaty in history. Though it is true that the NPT has not 
eradicated the global threat of nuclear weapons proliferation--and that 
it faces some daunting challenges ahead --the treaty has undoubtedly 
served U.S. interests well and deserves the respect and support of all 
Members of Congress and indeed all Americans.


                            Some Highlights

  Mr. President, I ask to have printed in the Record at the end of my 
remarks a list supplied by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency of 
all current signatories and parties to the NPT. The only major 
nonmembers are India, Pakistan, Israel, Brazil, and Cuba.
  The NPT was negotiated throughout the 1960's and was signed by 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk on July 1, 1968. The treaty commits the 
United States, Britain, France, Russia, and China--the treaty's so-
called nuclear-weapon states, defined as countries that detonated a 
nuclear explosive device before January 1, 1967--not to transfer, 
directly or indirectly, any nuclear explosive device or control over 
such a device to any other country, and ``not in any way to assist, 
encourage, or induce'' any non-nuclear-weapon state to acquire such a 
device. (Article I.)
  As for the latter states, the treaty obligates them to forswear the 
bomb and to agree to full-scope safeguards of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency [IAEA] over all of their nuclear materials. (Articles II 
and III.)
  The treaty also obligates all of its parties to pursue negotiations 
toward nuclear disarmament, indeed to pursue the eventual goal of a 
``treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective 
international control.'' (Article VI.)
  These respective obligations form the heart of the security 
obligations of members of the NPT. Though the treaty also encourages 
peaceful uses of atomic energy (Article IV), this encouragement 
obviously does not extend to help in making bombs or the fissile 
materials for use in such bombs. The ``NP'' in ``NPT'' continues to 
stand for nonproliferation--not ``Nuclear Proliferation'' or ``Nuclear 
Profiteering.''


                          New Challenges Ahead

  Now, many published critiques have already established that the NPT 
is far from a perfect treaty. Typically these include observations 
about the limits of safeguards, the treaty's lack of complete 
universality, the lack of mandatory sanctions for violations, the 
inclusion of anachronistic language about ``peaceful nuclear 
explosions,'' the lack of an explicit ban on nonnuclear-weapon states 
helping other nonnuclear-weapon states to acquire the bomb, and 
allegations about the treaty's discriminatory division of the world 
into nuclear have's and have not's.
  Though many of these specific criticisms are well-founded, I would 
like to identify some broader challenges that could someday jeopardize 
not just this treaty, but the very existence of nonproliferation as a 
basic norm of the international community.
  Ironically, the first major challenge may well come from the 
disarmers. Though the United States and Russia have recently made 
substantial reductions in their strategic arsenals, it is possible 
that, someday, dozens of nonnuclear-weapon states may reconsider their 
membership or abandon the treaty due to what they may believe is 
inadequate progress toward the goal of total nuclear disarmament. What 
a hypocritical step that would be: it would amount not just to a form 
of extortion, but one based on some rather peculiar logic--``either you 
disarm, right now, in the interests of world peace, or we will arm.'' 
How this will serve the interests of either peace or nonproliferation 
is beyond me.
  I agree that America and all the other nuclear-weapon states should 
reaffirm their obligation under the NPT to negotiate in good faith 
toward the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament. But I do not read the 
NPT itself as

[[Page S2002]]

compelling the United States to disarm as a precondition for other 
countries to abide by the treaty. The START process has already shown 
the world that America and Russia are serious about deep cuts in 
nuclear arms. And the world community will rightfully expect Britain, 
France, and China to make deep cuts of their own, toward the eventual 
goal of eliminating all such weapons, as the treaty provides. I believe 
it is crucial that the nuclear-weapon states fulfill their end of the 
NPT bargain, but I do not believe that the complex and time-consuming 
process of nuclear arms reductions should serve as any pretext for 
further proliferation.

  The second major challenge to the NPT will come from advocates of 
commercial uses of plutonium or highly enriched uranium around the 
world. I would hate to see countries use the NPT as a pretext for new 
demands for access to sensitive technology relating to the manufacture 
of nuclear weapons. If, for example, the acceptance of full-scope 
safeguards is interpreted by some countries as constituting some form 
of entitlement to produce highly enriched uranium or to separate 
plutonium, then the world would be a more dangerous place indeed. We 
need less of such materials in world commerce, not more of them.
  I have no doubt that IAEA safeguards are good and that they are 
getting better, especially thanks to the agency's Programme 93+2 plan 
to improve safeguards, but the agency is already too under-funded and 
overworked to be taking on the new jobs of safeguarding a global 
plutonium economy, not to mention promoting one. And I continue to 
question the basic safeguardability of dangerous fuel cycle operations 
like reprocessing and enrichment, given the difficulty of preventing or 
even detecting diversions which, though small in size, would be quite 
sufficient to make bombs.
  Since no technical fix will ever eliminate all proliferation and 
terrorist threats from commercial uses of such materials, I would urge 
all supporters of nonproliferation to pursue a global moratorium or 
outright prohibition on all production of highly enriched uranium and 
the separation of all bomb-usable plutonium for any purpose. Our goal 
should not be the production by all or some countries of bomb-usable 
nuclear materials under safeguards--our goal should be a ban on the 
production of such materials, period.
  The key point to keep in mind about safeguards is that they serve as 
an important instrument in America's diplomatic tool kit for fighting 
proliferation. By themselves, safeguards do not in any way constitute a 
solution to the problem of proliferation. To the extent that they 
complement other U.S. nonproliferation initiatives, however, they 
thereby deserve our full support.
  A third major challenge facing the NPT is that the nuclear-weapon 
states will, for various reasons, compromise their not in any way to 
assist obligation under article I of the NPT. I have already seen signs 
of some erosion of this key duty, which on its face tolerates no forms 
of assistance.
  Various current and proposed export control reforms would, if fully 
implemented, undoubtedly open up new strains in the NPT's no assistance 
taboo. I have in mind here such proposals as the following: to relax 
controls over sensitive dual-use items going to friendly countries or 
members of multilateral regimes; to drop controls over goods that are 
no longer state-of-the-art--as though obsolete hydrogen bombs would be 
any less of a proliferation threat; to regulate or prohibit only 
significant forms of assistance; to authorize sensitive dual-use 
transfers so long as there is evidence that some other country is 
selling similar goods--this is the old ``foreign availability'' 
loophole; and to eliminate licensing requirements for many dual-use 
goods, and other such dubious schemes.
  Some of these themes were reflected in recent speech by a senior U.S. 
export control official, who said the following:

       We no longer have a clearly defined single adversary. 
     Instead, we aim to restrict a narrow range of transactions 
     that could assist in the development of weapons of mass 
     destruction in irresponsible countries like Iran and Iraq. In 
     attempting to do that, we have refocused our control system 
     on a smaller group of truly critical goods and technologies 
     and on specific problem end uses and end users in addition to 
     the so-called pariah countries. [Source: Under Secretary of 
     Commerce William Reinsch, speech before the National Security 
     Industrial Association, February 25, 1997.]

  This quote illustrates the extent to which America's NPT's duty ``not 
in any way to assist'' is already being interpreted as meaning, in 
effect, ``* * * not to provide a narrow range of truly critical goods 
and technologies that could assist rogue nations to acquire nuclear 
explosive devices.'' The NPT, however, makes no distinction between so-
called critical items and any other items--it rules out any and all 
assistance to any nonnuclear-weapon state.
  The irony of such reform proposals can be seen even more when one 
considers that export controls affect only a tiny fraction of U.S. 
trade. According to Commerce Department data for 1995, $99.20 out of 
every $100 in U.S. exports did not even require an export license. Not 
only that--of those exports that did require a license in that year, 
only one license out of a hundred was denied. In 1991, the Commerce 
Department received 30,537 export license applications--by 1995 this 
number had plummeted to only 9,845, and only 121 of these were 
ultimately denied.
  So the evidence is pretty slim, to say the least, to support any 
claim that rolling back on export controls will substantially boost 
America's competitiveness, except perhaps in the sense of increasing 
America's competitiveness as a proliferator of weapons of mass 
destruction. Yes indeed, America cannot only afford to comply in full 
with the NPT's ``not in any way to assist'' prohibition--from a 
security standpoint, it cannot afford not to comply with this 
obligation.
  Unfortunately, the dubious claim of commercial need is not the only 
factor eroding this prohibition under the NPT. The other threat appears 
in the form of well-meaning pleas coming from two strange bedfellows--
certain nongovernmental experts on nonproliferation, and various 
defense hawks and strategic theorists inside countries that are working 
on the bomb or keeping their bomb options wide open.
  I am referring specifically to proposals to substitute the 
``management'' for the ``prevention'' of proliferation as a goal of 
U.S. policy. America, they argue, should help other countries to make 
to proliferation safe, to ensure that new regional balances of nuclear 
terror remain stable, and to take steps to ensure that new nuclear 
arsenals around the world will remain reliable and guarantee secure 
second strike capabilities. In other words--they appear to believe that 
America should now help to convert the old cold war doctrine of 
``mutual assured destruction'' into an export commodity.
  Even highly esteemed organizations like the Council on Foreign 
Relations seem to be leaning in this direction. In a recent study 
released last January on U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy in South 
Asia and sponsored by the Council, the authors not only recommended 
this basic approach, but also called for new U.S. arms transfers and 
nuclear cooperation with both India and Pakistan with no 
nonproliferation strings attached, specifically no requirement for 
full-scope IAEA safeguards. [Source: Council on Foreign Relations, ``A 
New US Policy Toward India and Pakistan,'' Richard N. Haass, Chairman, 
January 1997.]
  Russia, meanwhile, seems intent on selling two nuclear reactors to 
India without full-scope safeguards, while China--which has never 
accepted such safeguards as a nuclear supply condition--continues to 
engage in nuclear cooperation with Pakistan.
  Unless the United States and other members of the world community 
rally in defense of the NPT and the heart of its verification scheme--
full-scope safeguards--I fear that more and more countries will be 
tempted to reassess their continued membership in that treaty. After 
all, why agree to safeguards restraints when the benefits of membership 
in the treaty can be obtained without such restraints? Nobody should 
take the future of this treaty for granted. By their nuclear supply 
practices in South Asia, Russia and China are simply making 
proliferation pay.


                               Conclusion

  Mr. President, I would like to conclude by saying that if export 
controls remain a valuable instrument of nonproliferation, if the 
inertia toward the eventual goal of nuclear disarmament

[[Page S2003]]

is sustained, if the inertia in some countries to make large-scale 
commercial uses of bomb materials can be broken, and if the zealots of 
regional nuclear deterrence can be kept in check, then I truly believe 
that the NPT will be with us for quite a while and the world will be 
better off as a result.
  If these conditions are not satisfied, I fear not just for the future 
of this treaty, but for the future of world peace.
  The list follows:

   Signatories and Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
                   Nuclear Weapons--January 23, 1997

             [Source: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency]

       Afghanistan.
       Albania.
       Algeria.
       Antigua and Barbuda.
       Andorra.
       Angola.
       Argentina.
       Armenia.
       Australia.
       Austria.
       Azerbaijan.
       Bahamas, The.
       Bahrain.
       Bangladesh.
       Barbados.
       Belarus.
       Belgium.
       Belize.
       Benin.
       Bhutan.
       Bolivia.
       Bosnia & Herzegovina.
       Botswana.
       Brunei.
       Bulgaria.
       Burkina Faso.
       Burundi.
       Cambodia.
       Cameroon.
       Canada.
       Cape Verde.
       Central African Republic.
       Chad.
       Chile.
       China.
       Colombia.
       Comoros.
       Congo, People's Republic of (Brazzaville).
       Costa Rica.
       Cote d'Ivoire.
       Croatia.
       Cyprus.
       Czech Republic.
       Denmark.
       Djibouti.
       Dominica.
       Dominican Republic.
       Ecuador.
       Egypt.
       El Salvador.
       Equatorial Guinea.
       Eritrea.
       Estonia.
       Ethiopia.
       Fiji.
       Finland.
       Former Yugoslav.
       Republic of Macedonia.
       France.
       Gabon.
       Gambia, The.
       Georgia.
       Germany, Fed. Republic of.
       Ghana.
       Greece.
       Grenada.
       Guatemala.
       Guinea.
       Guinea-Bissau.
       Guyana.
       Haiti.
       Holy See.
       Honduras.
       Hungary, Republic of.
       Iceland.
       Indonesia.
       Iran.
       Iraq.
       Ireland.
       Italy.
       Jamaica.
       Japan.
       Jordan.
       Kazakstan.
       Kenya.
       Kiribati.
       Korea, Democratic People's Republic of.
       Korea, Republic of.
       Kuwait.
       Kyrgyzstan.
       Laos.
       Latvia.
       Lebanon.
       Lesotho.
       Liberia.
       Libya.
       Liechtenstein.
       Lithuania.
       Luxembourg.
       Madagascar.
       Malawi.
       Malaysia.
       Maldive Islands.
       Mali.
       Malta.
       Marshall Islands.
       Mauritania.
       Mauritius.
       Mexico.
       Micronesia.
       Moldova.
       Monaco.
       Mongolia.
       Morocco.
       Mozambique.
       Myanmar (Burma).
       Namibia.
       Nauru.
       Nepal.
       Netherlands.
       New Zealand.
       Nicaragua.
       Niger.
       Nigeria.
       Norway.
       Oman.
       Palau.
       Panama.
       Papua New Guinea.
       Paraguay.
       Peru.
       Philippines.
       Poland.
       Portugal.
       Qatar.
       Romania.
       Russia.
       Rwanda.
       St. Kitts and Nevis.
       St. Lucia.
       St. Vincent and the Grenadines.
       San Marino.
       Sao Tome and Principe.
       Saudi Arabia.
       Senegal.
       Seychelles.
       Sierra Leone.
       Singapore.
       Slovakia.
       Slovenia.
       Solomon Islands.
       Somalia.
       South Africa.
       Spain.
       Sri Lanka.
       Sudan.
       Suriname.
       Swaziland.
       Sweden.
       Switzerland.
       Syrian Arab Republic.
       Taiwan.
       Tajikistan.
       Tanzania.
       Thailand.
       Togo.
       Tonga.
       Trinidad and Tobago.
       Tunisia.
       Turkey.
       Tuvalu.
       Turkmenistan.
       Uganda.
       Ukraine.
       United Arab Emirates.
       United Kingdom.
       United States.
       Uruguay.
       Uzbekistan.
       Vanuatu.
       Venezuela.
       Vietnam, Socialist Republic of.
       Western Samoa.
       Yemen.
       Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of.
       Zaire.
       Zambia.
       Zimbabwe.
       Total: 185 (Total does not include Taiwan or SFR 
     Yugoslavia, which has dissolved.)

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