[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 24 (Friday, February 28, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1789-S1790]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                     THE WAR AGAINST ILLEGAL DRUGS

  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. President, before this day is ended, the 
administration must decide whether or not to certify Mexico as an ally 
in the war against illegal drugs.
  Having served in the House of Representatives as chairman of the 
Western Hemisphere Committee for some years, and representing the State 
of New Jersey, which, among other centers of urban and suburban life in 
our country, has been plagued by narcotics, I feel a need and a 
responsibility to address the administration on this issue before it 
makes its final judgment because I believe, based on the actions of the 
Government of Mexico in the last year, the choice, though difficult, is 
very clear. The simple fact is that no country anywhere on the globe 
now poses a more immediate threat to our actions in curtailing the 
spread of narcotics than Mexico. Indeed, the administrator of the DEA 
has said, and I quote, ``Mexicans are now the single most powerful drug 
trafficking operation in the world.''
  The State Department's 1996 World Narcotics Control Strategy Report 
outlines the threat that Mexico now represents. It cites Mexico as the 
principal transit route for cocaine entering the United States and a 
major source for heroin and marijuana. Indeed, Mr. President, it has 
been suggested that with the success of American operations in the 
Caribbean and the Bahamas, fully two-thirds of cocaine now entering the 
United States is being routed through Mexico. As we have succeeded in 
the Caribbean and the Bahamas pound for pound, dollar for dollar, 
Mexico has been available to compensate the drug cartels. The State 
Department's 1996 report further concludes, ``Mexico is the most 
important money laundering center in the Western Hemisphere.''

  There is no escaping the fact that Mexican cartels now are bribing 
whomever can be bribed and killing those who resist. In recent months, 
eight Mexican prosecutors and law enforcement personnel have been 
murdered in Tijuana, all this since certifying last year that Mexico 
was assisting United States Government operations. In the last year, 
Mexico has failed to capture or extradite a single high-ranking member 
of any drug cartel. There are now 52 outstanding United States 
extradition requests for drug dealers, and Mexico has not complied with 
a single one of those extradition requests. Indeed, Mr. President, 
there is no record of any Mexican national ever being extradited to the 
United States on a narcotics charge.
  There has been considerable hope since certification last year that 
the use of the Mexican Armed Forces would represent a change. If, 
indeed, the narcotics strategy of Mexico included not simply law 
enforcement personnel who might have been compromised but Mexico 
represented and recognized that this was a matter of their own national 
security and involved their armed forces, that there might be a change. 
But the record is now clear. There has not been a change. The 
announcement of only last week that General Gutierrez, a 42-year 
veteran of the armed forces, had accepted bribes from the Carrillo 
Fuentes cartel makes clear that the entry of the Mexican Armed Forces 
is not only insufficient but inadequate and, indeed, potentially 
counterproductive.
  Changes in Mexican law lead us to the same conclusion. Last year the 
Mexican Parliament passed criminal money laundering laws, but they are 
both incomplete and completely not implemented. These laws at a minimum 
do not require banks to report large and suspicious currency 
transactions. Unfortunately, the Mexican Government, having not 
implemented its antinarcotics strategy, having now recognized that the 
entry of the armed forces is inadequate or counterproductive and taking 
no actions against laundering with the banks, it therefore, in my 
judgment, can be concluded that Mexico has not taken the certification 
process seriously. Previous certifications have brought no new 
cooperation, and now we must reach a different judgment.
  Indeed, Mr. President, in light of the evidence of the corruption of 
law enforcement personnel, new evidence of corruption of the armed 
forces, the failure to comply with American requests for extradition, 
the failure to enforce their own laws on money laundering, the United 
States Government should be answering the following question: What else 
would Mexico have to do to be denied certification? Having

[[Page S1790]]

failed on almost any level of analysis, what else could they do? Here 
is what we see.
  The United States today will also readdress the question of whether 
or not Colombia should be recertified. It is an arguable question. In 
the last year, since we denied certification, the Colombian military 
genuinely seems to have at least undergone some change. They have 
mobilized 5,000 troops and through the use of joint military and law 
enforcement operations destroyed laboratories producing 1\1/2\ tons of 
cocaine per day. They have issued 3,000 arrest warrants on drug charges 
and removed 450 million dollars' worth of cocaine from the production 
pipeline.

  The administration may or may not, on their own evidence, recertify 
Colombia. But the Colombian experience gives evidence that, while it is 
difficult to take action against a friendly government, people in 
Colombia or Mexico that we respect, it is successful. Our 
decertification of Colombia produced results. It is a question the 
administration must address before deciding on their actions about 
Mexico today.
  The President is faced with three possibilities in deciding whether 
to certify Mexico in the drug war. He can certify that Mexico is fully 
cooperating with the United States Government actions. That would be 
false on its face. There is no evidence to support a conclusion that 
Mexico is being cooperative. Indeed, it would make the entire 
certification process lose all credibility. No nation involved in 
narcotrafficking within its borders would ever feel any responsibility 
or pressure to cooperate with the U.S. Government activities if we were 
to so stretch our credibility by fully certifying Mexico.
  Second, the administration can decertify Mexico and bring a halt to 
all American foreign assistance except antidrug programs.
  Or, third, the administration can decertify Mexico but grant a 
national security waiver. The last of these options I would understand. 
People could legitimately argue the relative merits of decertification 
with a national security waiver, based on specific promises of the 
Mexican Government; to deny certification but, for 1 more year, to give 
one last chance for them to meet the responsibility to their own 
people, the international community, and their previous promises. But 
to certify, given that this other option is available, would be 
inexplicable to our own people, an insult to those engaged in this 
country in law enforcement, and contrary to the evidence.
  On occasion, in this country, we describe our efforts against 
narcotics as a war on drugs. But in dealing with foreign governments 
with whom we would like to have good relations, we seek to win a war 
without casualties. The sensitivities of the Mexican Government might 
be a casualty in this certification, but it is necessary if we are to 
be serious and produce real results.
  Finally, I hope the administration will reach the right judgment. The 
stakes are high. I urge the administration to take these comments and 
these facts into consideration in reaching its judgment.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Idaho.
  Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, may I inquire, is the Senate in morning 
business?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate is in morning business.

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