[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 22 (Wednesday, February 26, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1659-S1681]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




          STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

      By Mr. DeWINE (for himself and Mr. Graham):
  S. 358. A bill to provide for compassionate payments with regard to 
individuals with blood-clotting disorders, such as hemophilia, who 
contracted human immunodeficiency virus due to contaminated blood 
products, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Labor and Human 
Resources.


                THE RICKY RAY HEMOPHILIA RELIEF FUND ACT

  Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, I introduce, along with my distinguished 
colleague Senator Bob Graham, the Ricky Ray Hemophilia Relief Fund Act 
of 1997. This legislation will serve as the counterpart to similar 
legislation that will be introduced in the House of Representatives by 
Representative Porter Goss.
  Mr. President, the purpose of this legislation is to offer some 
measure of relief to families that have suffered serious medical and 
financial setbacks because of their reliance on the Federal 
Government's protection of the blood supply.
  In 1995, the Institute of Medicine released the findings of a major 
investigation into how America's hemophilia community came to be 
decimated by the HIV virus.
  According to that report, the Federal agencies responsible for blood 
safety did not show the appropriate level of diligence in screening the 
blood supply.
  The Federal agencies did not move as quickly as they should have to 
approve blood products that were potentially safer.
  And the Federal Government did not warn the hemophilia community, 
when the Government knew--or should have known--that there were 
legitimate concerns that the blood supply might not be safe.
  The Government's failure caused serious harm to real people--people 
who were counting on the Government to meet its responsibilities.
  Mr. President, this legislation is about trust. A substantial number 
of citizens trusted the Government to exercise due vigilance, and the 
Government let them down. It's only right that the Government try to 
offer them some measure of relief.
  Mr. President, I recognize the budgetary realities we have to 
confront. As we move through the process, we will have to address the 
issue of compensation. I think it's absolutely essential that we begin 
this process--now.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. CRAIG:

[[Page S1660]]

  S. 360. A bill to require adoption of a management plan for the Hells 
Canyon National Recreation Area that allows appropriate use of 
motorized and nonmotorized river craft in the recreation area, and for 
other purposes; to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.


           HELL'S CANYON NATIONAL RECREATION AREA AMENDMENTS

  Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, Public Law 94-199, designating the Hells 
Canyon National Recreation Area, was signed into law December 31, 1975.
  Section 10 of the act recognizes that the use of both motorized and 
nonmotorized river craft are valid activities on the Snake River within 
the recreation area.
  The language seems clear. However, assurances by the Congress and the 
Forest Service 22 years ago that the long-established and traditional 
use of motorized river craft would be continued are now being callously 
disregarded by the agency.
  The most recent indication of this attitude has arisen during a 
review and revision of the river management plan for the NRA. Despite 
the lack of any demonstrable resource problems, and in the face of 
overwhelming public support for motorized river craft, the agency has 
again decided to close part of the river to powerboats. The new river 
management plan would close the heart of the canyon to motorized river 
craft for 21 days during the peak of the recreation season. Such a 
closure would also prohibit traditional motor use of the wild river 
segment to reach privately-owned lands within the scenic river segment 
of the NRA.
  The revised management plan is still in dispute as the result of 
appeals filed by commercial motorized river users. The vast majority of 
people, over 80 percent, who recreate in the Hells Canyon segment of 
the Snake River do so by motorized river craft. Some are private 
boaters, but most travel with commercial guides on scenic tours. This 
popular form of recreation is accomplished with a minimum of impact to 
the river, the land or other resources.
  Most river users, motorized and non-motorized, are willing to share 
the river. However, a small group of non-motorized users objects to 
seeing powered craft even though they have a rich choice of 
nonmotorized alternatives in this geographic area, such as the Selway 
and Middle Fork of the Salmon Rivers. Motorized users, however, don't 
have that luxury. The only other white water rivers open to them in the 
entire Wild and Scenic River System are portions of the Rogue and 
Salmon Rivers. Without a single doubt, the Hells Canyon portion of the 
Snake River is our Nation's premier whitewater power boating river.
  Mr. President, the Snake River is different from most rivers in the 
Wild and Scenic System. It is a high-volume river with a long and 
colorful history of use by motorized river craft. The first paying 
passengers to traverse its rapids on a motor boat made their journey on 
the 110-foot Colonel Wright in 1865. Later, the 136-foot Shoshone made 
its plunge through the canyon from Boise to Lewiston in 1870 and was 
followed by the 165-foot Norma in 1895. Gasoline-powered craft began 
hauling people, produce, and supplies in and out of the canyon in 1910, 
and the first contract for regular mail delivery was signed in 1919, 
continuing today. The Corps of Engineers began blasting rocks and 
improving channels in 1903. They worked continuously until 1975 to make 
the river safer for navigation.
  Mr. President, as you can see, the use of motorized river craft is 
deeply interwoven in the history, traditions, and culture of Hells 
Canyon. That is why Congress deliberately created a non-wilderness 
corridor for the entire length of the river in the authorizing 
legislation. During debate, Congress tried to make it clear that use of 
both motorized and nonmotorized river craft would be valid uses of the 
river within the recreation area--the entire river for the entire year. 
It was not their intent in 1975 to allow the managing agency to decide 
that one valid use would prevail to the exclusive use over the other.
  Quite clearly, the issue of power boating's validity will not be 
settled unless decided by the courts or unless Public Law 94-199 is 
clarified by Congress. The courts are already burdened by too many 
cases of this type, resulting in a waste of time, energy, and financial 
resources for both the United States and its citizens. The only 
practical and permanent resolution of this issue is to clarify 
congressional intent in a manner that will not allow any future 
misunderstanding. This is what I propose to do with this legislation.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. JEFFORDS:
  S. 631. A bill to amend the Endangered Species Act of 1973 to 
prohibit the sale, import, and export of products labeled as containing 
endangered species, and for other purposes; to the Committee on 
Environment and Public Works.


                the rhino and tiger product labeling act

  Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, the bill I am introducing today works to 
end the illegal killing of rare and endangered species that are close 
to extinction. These species include rhinos, tigers, bears, and many 
other animals that are slaughtered for senseless reasons. The bill, 
titled the Rhino and Tiger Product Labeling Act, seeks to amend the 
Endangered Species Act of 1973 to prohibit the sale of products labeled 
as containing endangered species.
  Since 1970, the world's population of rhinos has declined by 90 
percent. Among the 5 species of rhinos, fewer than 11,000 individual 
rhinos exist in the wild. Tigers are facing a similar fate. At the turn 
of the century, as many as 100,000 tigers lived in the wild. Today, 
less than 5,000 tigers remain. Three subspecies are already extinct, 
and the remaining five subspecies are found only in sparse pockets of 
Asia.
  The greatest threat to the existence of rhinos and tigers in the wild 
continues to be the high demand for products containing rhino horn and 
tiger parts. The prohibition of the illegal trade in endangered species 
parts has not been well enforced in most Asian countries, where rhino 
and tiger products are valued for their medicinal value. Although the 
primary market for these illegal products continues to be in Asia, a 
large market has developed here in America.
  Investigators have found that in the United States, the trade in 
endangered species continues to be widely practiced. Many pharmacies in 
Los Angeles and New York offer rhino and tiger products for sale--a 
strong indication that it is time for the United States to concentrate 
on its role as a consumer nation of endangered species parts and 
products. In a recent survey, investigators found that 80 percent of 
pharmacies and supermarkets in New York's Chinatown district had tiger 
products openly for sale. Many of these products were imported from 
China. Demand for such products here in the United States is leading 
directly to the elimination of these species in their native habitat 
overseas. This trade must end.
  To curb this trade we need effective labeling laws and we must ban 
all products containing or claiming to contain ingredients derived from 
endangered species. Many products which advertise ingredients such as 
rhino horn or tiger parts do not even contain trace amount of these 
endangered species. However, the mere fact that they are on store 
shelves leads to increased demand for the real stuff. In addition, 
these products have been tested in the United States by the Food and 
Drug Administration and have been found to contain toxic metals that 
are harmful to human health if taken in the doses found in many 
traditional medicines. A ban on products containing ingredients from 
endangered species as well as those claiming to contain endangered 
species parts is vital to protect human health and to maintain the few 
remaining rhinos, tigers and bears in their wild habitat.
  My legislation will make it illegal to even intend to sell a product 
containing an endangered species. Today, Fish and Wildlife 
investigators are overwhelmed trying to control the illegal sale of 
endangered species parts and products. This bill will allow 
investigators to completely halt the sale of products labeled as 
containing endangered species.
  I am strong proponent of the protection and conservation of 
endangered species. If we do not act now, future generations will not 
be able to enjoy many of the species of wildlife now in existence. 
Currently there are insufficient legal mechanisms enabling the U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service to forcefully interdict and confiscate 
products

[[Page S1661]]

that are labeled as containing endangered species and to prosecute the 
merchandisers once the products are on store shelves. This bill seeks 
to close a significant loophole in the illegal trade in products 
containing or claiming to contain ingredients from endangered species. 
My hope is that this legislation, when passed in the 105th Congress, 
will help curb the escalating trade in wildlife and endangered species 
parts and stem the decrease in the populations of some of the Earth's 
most magnificent animals.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. LEAHY (for himself and Mr. Biden):
  S. 362. A bill to deter and punish serious gang and violent crime, 
promote accountability in the juvenile justice system, prevent juvenile 
and youth crime, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the 
Judiciary.


          the anti-gang and youth violence control act of 1997

  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I rise to introduce the Anti-Gang and Youth 
Violence Control Act of 1997. This is the President's juvenile justice 
bill, and I am pleased to introduce it on behalf of the administration.
  Like the Democratic leadership bill, S. 15, the President's Anti-Gang 
and Youth Violence Control Act includes important provisions to address 
the increases in juvenile crime and gang violence that we have seen 
over the past decade.
  Just as we proposed measures in S. 15 to streamline the procedures 
for prosecuting violent juveniles, the President's bill would take 
steps to ensure that serious juvenile offenses are addressed quickly 
and efficiently by the courts.
  In addition, the President's bill targets many of the same problems 
we addressed in S. 15, such as increasing the penalties for witness 
intimidation--a particular problem for prosecutors in gang cases--and 
improving the rights of the victims of juvenile crime to include 
restitution, notification of disposition, and greater public access to 
juvenile proceedings.
  The President's bill also addresses the Federal Government's grant 
authority in the area of juvenile justice and delinquency prevention. I 
applaud the President for his reform-minded effort for improving the 
Federal Government's role in helping State and local authorities 
prevent juvenile crime and juvenile victimization. I look forward to 
working with the President and my colleagues on both sides of the aisle 
on this issue. It is important that we reach a bipartisan agreement on 
the role the Federal Government should play in this area as we move 
forward into the next century.
  Certain sections of the administration's bill differ from S. 15, and 
I look forward to sorting out this and other differences in the 
proposals.
  I commend President Clinton and the Department of Justice on their 
efforts to address the problems of gang and youth violence with the 
concrete proposals in this bill. I urge my colleagues to put partisan 
politics aside, to work together on finding constructive solutions to 
these problems. Our challenge is to resolve any differences in approach 
in ways that make sense and will work to reduce youth and gang 
violence.
  As we proceed to meet this challenge, I know we will depend heavily 
on Senator Biden, our former chairman and ranking member of the 
Judiciary Committee and now the ranking member on the Youth Violence 
Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee. He has worked hard and 
effectively on these issues in the past and, I thank him in advance for 
continuing to share his expertise on these important issues.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that additional material be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

 ANTI-GANG AND YOUTH VIOLENCE ACT OF 1997--SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS

       The Anti-Gang and Youth Violence Act of 1997 is a 
     comprehensive federal effort to address the nation's youth 
     and juvenile crime problem. This legislation contains many of 
     the proposed amendments to the federal code that were 
     contained in legislation introduced, but not enacted into law 
     during the 104th Congress. This legislation also redesigns, 
     refocuses, and enhances the federal government's role in 
     relation to state, local and Indian tribal governments in 
     combating and preventing juvenile and youth crime, violence, 
     gang involvement, and drug use. Additionally, this 
     legislation includes the authorization for several programs 
     submitted by the President in his fiscal year 1998 budget 
     request.

               Title I--Findings, Policies, and Purposes

       This title enumerates findings regarding juvenile crime and 
     violence, as well as purposes tied to the various provisions 
     of the legislation. Additional definitions are provided as 
     needed.

         Title II--Targeting Violent Gang, Gun and Drug Crimes


 Subtitle A--Federal Prosecutions Targeting Violent Gangs, Gun Crimes 
                   and Illicit Gun Markets, and Drugs

            Part 1--Targeting Gang and Other Violent Crimes

     Section 2111.  Increased penalties under the RICO law for 
         gang and violent crimes.
       This amendment would boost the penalty for certain crimes 
     typically committed by gangs and other violent crime groups 
     by eliminating an anomaly in the penalty provisions of the 
     federal Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
     statute (18 U.S.C. 1963(a)). Specifically, the amendment 
     would increase the maximum penalty from twenty years to the 
     greater of twenty years or the maximum term applicable to a 
     racketeering activity on which the defendant's violation is 
     based. This principle already applies under the RICO statute 
     where the predicate racketeering activity carries a maximum 
     life sentence. The present twenty-year maximum applicable to 
     all other predicate racketeering offenses is anomalous in 
     light of the fact that several of the predicate offenses that 
     constitute ``racketeering activity'' themselves carry more 
     than twenty-year (but less than life) maximum prison terms, 
     e.g., 18 U.S.C. 1344 (bank fraud) and 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B) 
     (large-scale drug trafficking).
     Section 2112.  Increased penalty and broadened scope of 
         statute against violent crimes in aid of racketeering.
       This amendment would close loopholes in 18 U.S.C. 1959, the 
     law punishing violent crimes in aid of racketeering. The 
     statute presently and anomalously reaches threats to commit 
     any crime of violence (with the requisite intent) but only 
     the actual commission of some such crimes. The amendment also 
     would clarify that the term ``serious bodily injury'' in 18 
     U.S.C. 1959 shall be defined as provided in 18 U.S.C. 1365.
       This proposal also would increase penalties for certain 
     violent crimes in aid of racketeering in recognition of the 
     serious nature of such crimes and to bring the penalties in 
     line with other penalties for similar crimes in title 18. 
     First, the amendment would increase from a maximum of ten 
     years' imprisonment to a maximum of life imprisonment a 
     conspiracy or attempt to commit murder or kidnapping, in 
     violation of 18 U.S.C. 1959. That statute punishes various 
     violent offenses committed in aid of racketeering activity. 
     The present ten-year maximum penalty for a conspiracy or 
     attempt to commit murder or kidnapping in aid of racketeering 
     is clearly inadequate. The maximum penalty for a conspiracy 
     to commit a murder within the special maritime and 
     territorial jurisdiction of the United States is life 
     imprisonment, 18 U.S.C. 1117, as is the maximum penalty for a 
     conspiracy to commit kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. 1201(c). Such acts 
     when performed with the additional intent of furthering 
     racketeering activity deserve no lesser punishment. Moreover, 
     an attempt warrants an equivalent sanction as a conspiracy. 
     Second, the amendment would increase from five years to ten 
     years the maximum penalty for committing or threatening to 
     commit a crime of violence under paragraph (4). Finally, the 
     amendment would increase from three years to ten years the 
     maximum penalty for attempting or conspiring to commit a 
     crime involving maiming, assault with a dangerous weapon or 
     assault resulting in serious bodily injury under paragraph 
     (6).
     Section 2113.  Facilitating the prosecution of car-jacking 
         offenses.
       This section would eliminate an unjustified and unique 
     scienter element created for the offense of carjacking by the 
     enactment of section 60003(a)(14) of the Violent Crime 
     Control and Law Enforcement Act. The carjacking statute, 18 
     U.S.C. 2119, essentially proscribes robbery of a motor 
     vehicle. It punishes the taking of a motor vehicle that has 
     moved in interstate or foreign commerce ``from the person or 
     presence of another by force and violence or by 
     intimidation.'' The basic penalty is up to fifteen years' 
     imprisonment but rises if serious bodily injury or death 
     results.
       Prior to the enactment of VCCLEA, the offense applied only 
     if the defendant possessed a firearm. Section 60003(a)(14) of 
     that law appropriately deleted the firearm requirement, as 
     had been proposed in the Senate-passed bill, but in 
     conference a new scienter element was added that the 
     defendant must have intended to cause death or serious 
     bodily injury. This unique new element will 
     inappropriately make carjackings difficult or impossible 
     to prosecute in certain situations. Robbery offenses 
     typically require only what the carjacking statute 
     formerly required by way of scienter, i.e., that property 
     be knowingly taken from the person or presence of another 
     by force and violence or by intimidation. The Hobbs Act, 
     18 U.S.C. 1951, the quintessential federal robbery law 
     which carries a higher maximum penalty

[[Page S1662]]

     than the carjacking statute, essential defines ``robbery'' 
     in this manner. The new requirement of an intent to cause 
     death or serious bodily harm will likely be a fertile 
     course of argument for defendants in cases in which no 
     immediate threat of injury occurs, such as where a 
     defendant enters an occupied vehicle while it is stopped 
     at a traffic light and physically removes the driver. Even 
     when a weapon is displayed, the defendant may argue that 
     although it was designed to instill fear, he had no intent 
     to harm the victim had the victim in fact declined to 
     leave the car.
       Carjacking is one of the most serious types of robbery 
     precisely because, unlike other person property, a car is a 
     place where people are accustomed to feel safe and where they 
     and their family spend hours of their lives. To give 
     defendants who take cars from the person or presence of their 
     occupants by force and violence or intimidation a new legal 
     tool with which to resist their prosecution is unjustified. 
     This new element should be eliminated as soon as possible 
     from Section 2119. The proposed amendment would do so.
     Section 2114.  Facilitation of RICO prosecutions.
       This amendment is intended to overcome decisions in the 
     First and Second Circuits that require proof that a RICO 
     conspiracy defendant agreed personally to commit at least two 
     acts of racketeering activity. United States v. Ruggiero, 726 
     F. 2d 913, 921 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984); 
     United States v. Winter, 663 F. 2d 1120, 1136 (1st Cir. 
     1981), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1011 (1981). See also United 
     States v. Sanders, 929 F. 2d 1466, 1473 (10th Cir.), cert. 
     denied, 112 S. Ct. 143 (1991). Virtually all other circuits 
     have more recently rejected these holdings and have concluded 
     that it is sufficient to show that the defendant joined the 
     conspiracy and agreed that two or more racketeering acts 
     would be committed by some conspirators on behalf of the 
     enterprise. See, e.g., United States v. Pryba, 900 F. 2d 748, 
     759-60 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Traitz, 871 F. 2d 
     368, 395-96 (3 d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 821 (1989); 
     United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F. 2d 489, 491-98 (7th Cir. 
     1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1101 (1987); United States v. 
     Joseph, 781 F. 2d 549, 554-55 (6th Cir. 1986; United States 
     v. Tille, 729 F. 2d 615, 619 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 
     U.S. 845 (1984); United States v. Carter, 721 F. 2d 1514, 
     1528-31 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 819 (1984).
       There is no reason to require that a defendant charged with 
     RICO conspiracy personally commit racketeering acts. Standard 
     conspiracy law does not contain such a requirement. See, 
     e.g., Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 645-48 
     (1946). It should be sufficient to show that the defendant 
     joined the overall conspiracy and agreed to the commission of 
     a pattern of racketeering activity by others on behalf of the 
     conspiracy. This amendment resolves this conflict in the 
     circuits.
     Section 2115.  Elimination of the statute of limitations for 
         murder and Class A felonies.
       This section makes important changes in federal law and 
     will enhance the ability of federal prosecutors to bring 
     serious offenders to justice. The first proposal relates to 
     the prosecution of certain murders. Current law provides that 
     no statute of limitations shall apply for the commission of a 
     federal crime punishable by death. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3281. This 
     statute should be amended to further eliminate the statute of 
     limitations for any federal offense involving murder, even if 
     the crime does not carry the death penalty. The rationale 
     behind this proposal is straightforward. Most states have no 
     statute of limitations for murder. Moreover, the act of 
     killing another person is so serious that no murderer should 
     go unpunished simply because the government was unable to 
     develop a case for many years.
       By virtue of the 1994 Crime Act, most murders committed 
     during the course of a federal offense are now punishable by 
     the death penalty--and thus already have no statute of 
     limitations. The 1994 Crime Act only applies, however, to 
     murders committed on or after the Crime Bill was passed on 
     September 13, 1994. The proposed legislation will help bridge 
     this gap by eliminating the statute of limitations for 
     murders committed within five years of the date of passage of 
     the legislation and September 13, 1994. Furthermore, the 
     Crime Act did not provide for the death penalty for murders 
     committed in violation of the RICO statute. 18 U.S.C. 
     Sec. Sec. 1961 et seq. The proposed legislation would bridge 
     another important gap by eliminating the statute of 
     limitations for RICO offenses when murders are committed in 
     furtherance of a racketeering enterprise.
       The second proposal relates to the prosecution of certain 
     violent crimes and drug trafficking crimes. Current law 
     provides that the general federal five-year statute of 
     limitations applies to non-capital crimes of violence and 
     drug trafficking crimes. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3282. This proposal 
     extends to 10 years the statute of limitations for all crimes 
     of violence and drug trafficking crimes (except for cases 
     involving murder) currently classified as Class A felonies. 
     Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3559, Class A felonies are 
     the most serious federal crimes, which carry a maximum 
     sentence of life imprisonment or death.
       This proposal is necessary for several reasons. First, 
     evidence of gang-related and other violent crimes, as well as 
     drug trafficking crimes, often develops years after the 
     crimes were committed because the organizations, gangs, and 
     racketeering enterprises that typically perpetrate such 
     crimes enforce strict codes of silence--through violence and 
     threats of violence--on their members. Thus, some violent 
     crimes and drug trafficking crimes are not solved until 
     imprisoned defendants begin to cooperate after spending years 
     behind bars--years in which the five-year statutes of 
     limitations may have lapsed. Second, society's interest in 
     repose and fairness to prospective defendants is greatly 
     outweighed by society's interest in punishing those 
     individuals who commit crimes that are so serious that 
     Congress has imposed a maximum sentence of life imprisonment 
     or death. Under current law, theft of major art work carries 
     a 20-year statute of limitations (18 U.S.C. Sec. 3294), and 
     most white-collar crimes involving financial institutions 
     (e.g., theft of money by a bank teller) carry a 10-year 
     statute of limitations (18 U.S.C. Sec. 3293). Given that 
     Class A crimes of violence and drug trafficking crimes 
     generally are at least as harmful to society as these 
     offenses, there is no reason for these Class A felonies to 
     carry such a relatively short statute of limitations.
     Section 2116.  Forfeiture for crimes of violence, 
         racketeering, and obstruction of justice.
       This section extends the forfeiture statutes to cover all 
     crimes of violence plus the racketeering crimes set forth in 
     Chapter 95 (18 U.S.C. Sec. 1951-60), including extortion, 
     murder-for-hire, and violent crimes in aid of racketeering, 
     and the obstruction of justice offenses set forth in Chapter 
     73 (18 U.S.C. Sec. 1501-17). Presently, there is no 
     forfeiture authority for such offenses except when they are 
     included in a RICO prosecution.

 Part 2--Targeting Serious Gun Crimes and Protecting Children from Gun 
                                Violence

     Section 2121.  Gun ban for dangerous juvenile offenders.
       This amendment would make it unlawful for any person 
     adjudicated a juvenile delinquent for serious violent 
     felonies or drug crimes to receive or possess firearms. It 
     would also make it unlawful for any person to sell or 
     otherwise dispose of any firearm to any person knowing or 
     having reasonable cause to believe that the recipient has 
     been adjudicated a juvenile delinquent for such crimes. Under 
     current law, persons adjudicated juvenile delinquent, even 
     for the most serious crimes, e.g., murder, may receive and 
     possess firearms as adults. This amendment will ensure that 
     such juveniles will be ineligible to possess firearms after 
     the finding of juvenile delinquency.
       The disability will only apply to the most serious drug 
     offenses and violent crimes, as enumerated in the recently 
     enacted ``three-strikes'' law (but because it would otherwise 
     be impossible to administer, the proposed statutory reference 
     incorporates the basic offenses enumerated in paragraph 
     (c)(2) of section 3559, without the exceptions set forth in 
     paragraph (3)). In addition, this amendment will only apply 
     to findings of acts of juvenile delinquency that occur after 
     the effective date of the statute. Thus, persons who have 
     acted or been adjudicated delinquent prior to the effective 
     date will not be subject to this disability. Adjudicated 
     delinquents would be permitted under the proposal to have 
     their firearms rights restored based upon an individualized 
     determination by an appropriate authority of the state of 
     their suitability for such restoration.
       The proposal also would make a conforming change to the 
     restoration of rights statute affecting adult convictions. 
     One of the most serious problems today hindering enforcement 
     of a federal firearms statutes arises from the definition of 
     ``conviction'' in 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(20). Under 18 U.S.C. 
     922(g), it is unlawful for a convicted felon to possess a 
     firearm. Section 922(g) violations also serve as the basis 
     for the mandatory penalties applicable under the Armed Career 
     Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e), for 922(g) violators with 
     three or more crime of violence or serious drug trafficking 
     convictions. What is a ``conviction'' is therefore vital to 
     the enforcement of these important provisions.
       Prior to the 1986 Firearms Owners' Protection Act, a 
     conviction for purposes of federal firearms prohibitions was 
     a question of federal, not state, law. Federal law provided 
     that once an individual was convicted of a felony, that 
     person remained under a federal firearms disability 
     irrespective of state laws purporting to restore the person's 
     rights to possess firearms. Offenders could apply for relief 
     from firearms disabilities to the Secretary of the Treasury. 
     The 1986 Act, however, changed this policy and provided, in 
     18 U.S.C. 921(a)(20), that a conviction for which a person 
     has had civil rights restored generally ``shall not be 
     considered a conviction'' under federal firearms statutes.
       The 1986 amendment has had adverse effects from the 
     standpoint of public safety. This results from the fact that 
     about half the states have laws that provide for some form of 
     automatic firearms rights restoration, including several 
     states that provide for such restoration after a waiting 
     period, and at least one state that automatically restores 
     firearms possession rights immediately upon completion of a 
     felon's sentence, so that the felon is enabled to walk 
     directly out of prison into a gun dealer's establishment and 
     legally arrange to purchase a firearm. Other states make 
     restoration of rights automatic except for certain categories 
     of felons (typically those convicted of violent crimes), 
     while still other states make restoration automatic for 
     some types of firearms but not others.
       Under the proposed amendment, state laws restoring firearms 
     rights would continue to be recognized for federal firearms 
     enforcement purposes, but only if the restoration of

[[Page S1663]]

     rights was done on an individualized rather than an automatic 
     basis, including a determination that the circumstances of 
     the person's conviction, and his or her record and 
     reputation, make it unlikely that the person will endanger 
     public safety. The Federal Government should not give effect 
     to state restoration of rights statutes that provide for no 
     individualized consideration of the offender's likelihood of 
     committing future crimes. About half the states currently 
     restore firearms rights only after such an individualized 
     review. The remaining states need not change their laws if 
     they do not wish to do so, but the Congressional policy 
     underlying the federal felon-in-possession prohibition in 18 
     U.S.C. 922(g) should not be deemed superseded by a state law 
     that automatically restores a felon's firearms rights. Such 
     automatic restoration laws insufficiently protect the public 
     safety, not only in the states that provide for such 
     automatic restoration but in other states to which the 
     convicted felon may travel.
       The proposed amendment also includes a provision, in the 
     final sentence, that would reverse the outcome in United 
     States v. Indelicato, 97 F.3d 627 (1st Cir. 1996). The Court 
     there held, contrary to other courts of appeals, that where a 
     state had never deprived a convicted felon of his or her 
     civil rights as a result of the conviction, that person was 
     to be considered as if the state had ``restored'' such 
     rights. Whether or not this interpretation is deemed correct 
     under the current law, as a matter of policy it makes sense 
     to require a state to make an individualized determination of 
     suitability to possess firearms in every case involving a 
     conviction of a state crime punishable by more than one year 
     in prison.
     Section 2122.  Locking devices for firearms.
       The amendment would require Federal firearms licensees, 
     other than licensed collectors, to provide a locking device 
     with every firearm sold to a nonlicensee. The term ``locking 
     device'' would be defined as a device that can be installed 
     on a firearm that prevents the firearm from being discharged 
     without removing the device. It would also include firearms 
     being developed which can ``identify'' their lawful possessor 
     by the use of a personal electronic ``key'', palmprint, or 
     other identifier. The provision is intended to provide added 
     safety to gun owners and to prevent accidental discharges 
     that can result when children gain access to firearms.
     Section 2123. Enhanced penalties for discharging or 
         possessing a firearm during a crime of violence or drug 
         trafficking crime.
       In Bailey v. United States, __ U.S. __, 116 S. Ct. 501, 133 
     L. Ed. 2nd 472 (1995), the Supreme Court put a restrictive 
     interpretation of the verb ``use'' in relation to a firearms 
     violation under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c), finding that an 
     offender only ``uses'' a firearm if the weapon is ``actively 
     employed'' in connection with a criminal act. The legislative 
     proposal makes it clear that the statute punishes possession 
     of a firearm, as well as its ``use.'' Under the proposal, 
     possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent 
     crime or drug felony will result in a 5-year mandatory 
     minimum penalty. Offenders will receive a 10-year mandatory 
     minimum penalty if during the commission of a drug felony or 
     violent crime, the offender discharges the firearm or uses it 
     to inflict bodily harm.
     Section 2124.  Juvenile handgun possession.
       This proposal would increase the penalties for violations 
     of 18 U.S.C. 922(x), which makes it unlawful for a person to 
     transfer a handgun to a juvenile or for a juvenile to possess 
     a handgun. Existing law provides a penalty of not more than 
     one year for violations of Sec. 922(x) and, if the person 
     transferring the handgun to the juvenile knew that the 
     handgun would be used in a crime of violence, a penalty of 
     not more than 10 years. Existing law also provides for 
     probation by juvenile offenders, unless the juvenile has been 
     previously convicted of certain offenses or adjudicated as a 
     juvenile delinquent.
       The proposal would eliminate probation as a mandatory 
     sentence for juveniles. Thus, juveniles would be sentenced to 
     a penalty of not more than one year or, if previously 
     convicted under this section or adjudicated delinquent for an 
     act that would be a serious violent felony under 18 U.S.C. 
     3559(c) if committed by an adult, sentenced to up to five 
     years' imprisonment. The proposal also increases the penalty 
     for adults who transfer handguns to juveniles knowing that 
     they intend to use it in the commission of a crime of 
     violence to not less than three years nor more than 10 years 
     (currently only the ten-year maximum applies).
     Section 2125.  Increased penalty for firearms conspiracy.
       This section would amend the firearms chapter of title 18 
     to provide that a conspiracy to commit any violation of that 
     chapter is punishable by the same maximum term as that 
     applicable to the substantive offense that was the object of 
     the conspiracy. An identical amendment was enacted to the 
     explosives chapter of title 18 by section 701 of the Anti-
     Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-
     132). This also accords with several other recent 
     congressional enactments, including 21 U.S.C. 846 (applicable 
     to drug conspiracies) and 18 U.S.C. 1956(h) (applicable to 
     money laundering conspiracies). This trend in federal law, 
     which is emulated in the penal codes of many States, 
     recognizes that, as the Supreme Court has observed, 
     ``collective criminal agreement--partnership in crime--
     presents a greater potential threat to the public than 
     individual delicts.'' Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 
     587, 593 (1961); accord, United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 
     671, 693-94 (1975).

                 Part 3--Targeting Illicit Gun Markets

     Section 2131.  Certain gang-related firearms offenses as RICO 
         predicates
       The proposed amendment would add a number of title 18 
     firearms offenses that are related to gang activity to the 
     RICO statute. A brief description of the covered offenses is 
     as follows: 922(a)(1) (illegally engaging in business of 
     dealing in firearms); (922(a)(6) (knowingly making false 
     statement to a licensee in order to acquire a firearm); 
     922(i) (transporting a firearm in interstate or foreign 
     commerce knowing it to have been stolen); 922(j) (possession 
     or disposition of a firearm or ammunition knowing it to have 
     been stolen); 922(k) (transporting or receiving a firearm 
     interstate with an obliterated serial number); 922(o) 
     (unlawful possession or transfer of a machinegun); 922(g) 
     (unlawful possession of a firearm that affects or has moved 
     in interstate commerce in a school zone); 922(u) (theft from 
     a licensee of a firearm that has moved in interstate 
     commerce; 922(v) (illegal transfer or possession of a 
     semiautomatic assault weapon); (922(x)(1) sale or transfer of 
     a firearm to a person known to be a juvenile); 924(b) 
     (transporting or receiving a firearm in interstate commerce 
     with intent to commit therewith a felony); 924(g) (traveling 
     interstate to acquire a firearm, with intent to commit a 
     crime of violence, drug trafficking offense, or other 
     enumerated felony); (24(h) (transferring a firearm with 
     knowledge it will be used to commit a crime of violence or 
     drug trafficking offense); 924(k) (smuggling a firearm into 
     the United States with intent to commit a crime of violence 
     or drug trafficking offense); 924(l) (theft of a firearm from 
     a licensee); and 924(m) (traveling in interstate or foreign 
     commerce to acquire a firearm, with intent to engage 
     illegally in business of dealing in firearms).
     Section 2132.  Felony treatment for offenses tantamount to 
         aiding and abetting unlawful purchases
       This proposal would increase the punishment for the most 
     serious record keeping violations committed by federal 
     licensees, which are tantamount to aiding and abetting 
     unlawful deliveries or purchases of firearms, to the same 
     level of offense as that committed by the unlawful provider 
     or receiver. Sections 922(b) (1) and (3) proscribe sales of 
     firearms known to be juveniles or to reside out of State, 
     respectively. Each carries a five-year maximum sentence for a 
     willful violation under 18 U.S.C. 924(a)(1)(D). Sections 
     922(a)(6) and (d) proscribe, respectively, making false 
     statements to a licensee in relation to the acquisition of a 
     firearm, and knowingly selling a firearm to a convicted felon 
     or other prohibited category of firearm recipient. Each is 
     punishable by up to ten years' imprisonment.
       At present, all record keeping violations by licensees are 
     misdemeanors carrying a maximum of one year in prison. This 
     is insufficient in the above situations, where the knowingly 
     false record keeping entry is very serious and closely 
     associate with or in the nature of aiding and abetting a 
     violation involving the provision of a firearm to a person 
     not entitled to obtain it. Accordingly, the amendment would 
     increase the penalty for such record keeping violations to 
     the same as that would attach to the underlying violation.
     Section 2133.  Secure storage of firearms inventories
       This amendment would require Federal firearms licensees 
     other than collectors and gunsmiths to store their firearms 
     inventory in accordance with regulations issued by the 
     Secretary. The purpose of the amendment is to provide 
     security requirements for the firearms industry. Thefts of 
     firearms from dealers is a growing problem and contributes to 
     the number of firearms available to juvenile youth gangs and 
     other criminals. In issuing the storage regulations, the 
     Secretary would be required to consider the standards of 
     safety and security used by the firearms industry. The 
     industry, as well as other interested persons, could 
     participate in the rulemaking process and have input into the 
     regulations.
     Section 2134.  Suspension of federal firearms licenses and 
         civil penalties for willful violations of the Gun Control 
         Act
       Under current law, the only available administrative 
     remedies to deal with licensees' violations are the extreme 
     measures of denying license renewal applications and license 
     revocation. There may be certain minor violations of the Gun 
     Control Act, e.g., failure to timely record information in 
     required records, that may not warrant license revocation or 
     license denial. This amendment provides new administrative 
     sanctions, less severe than current administrative remedies, 
     including license suspension, civil money penalties, and 
     authority to accept monetary offers in compromise of 
     violations of the law and regulations.
     Section 2135.  Transfer of firearm to commit a crime of 
         violence
       Present 18 U.S.C. 924(h) makes it unlawful to transfer a 
     firearm ``knowing'' that the firearm will be used to commit a 
     crime of violence or drug trafficking crime. However, 18 
     U.S.C. 924(b) makes it unlawful to transport or receive a 
     firearm in interstate commerce ``with knowledge or reasonable 
     cause to believe'' that any felony is to be committed

[[Page S1664]]

     therewith. Both statutes carry the same maximum penalty.
       There is no plausible reason why section 924(h) is limited 
     to instances in which the actor has knowledge that a crime of 
     violence or drug trafficking crime will be committed, as 
     opposed to having ``reasonable cause to believe'' that such 
     is the case. Indeed, the offenses covered by section 924(h)--
     violent felonies and drug trafficking felonies--are 
     inherently more serious than the offenses covered by section 
     924(b), which extends to all felonies. Accordingly, this 
     section would conform the scienter element in section 924(h) 
     by adding ``reasonable cause to believe'' to that statute.
     Section 2136.  Increased penalty for knowingly receiving 
         firearm with obliterated serial number.
       The current maximum penalty for knowingly receiving a 
     firearm with an obliterated or altered serial number in 
     violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(k) is five years. This offense is 
     tantamount to that of receiving a firearm known to be stolen. 
     However, the latter carries a maximum penalty of ten years. 
     Accordingly, this amendment would increase the maximum 
     penalty for receiving a firearm with an obliterated or 
     altered serial number to ten years.
     Section 2137.  Amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines for 
         transfers of firearms to prohibited persons.
       The proposed amendment would require the United States 
     Sentencing Commission to provide an increase in the base 
     offense level for certain firearms violators under sentencing 
     guideline section 2K2.1. The increase should assure that the 
     base offense level for a person who transfers firearms or 
     ammunition with knowledge or reasonable cause to believe that 
     the transferee is a convicted felon or otherwise in a 
     prohibited category is the same as that for the transferee. 
     Under Federal law the offense of selling or disposing of a 
     firearm or ammunition to any person knowing or having 
     reasonable cause to believe that the person is in a 
     prohibited category is punishable by a maximum term of 
     imprisonment of 10 years--the same penalty that applies to 
     the transferee. See 18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 922(d), 922(g) and 
     924(a)(2).
       The sentencing guidelines provide that a prohibited person 
     who engages in a firearm offense is subject at least to 
     offense level 14. Thus, for example, a convicted felon who 
     unlawfully acquires a firearm in violation of section 922(g) 
     of title 18, United States Code, would face a sentencing 
     range of 18-24 months of imprisonment if his past conviction 
     resulted in a sentence of imprisonment of 60 days or more. 
     However, the transferor currently faces a guideline offense 
     level of just 12 (10-16 months of imprisonment for a first 
     offender, which can result in five months of imprisonment and 
     five months of supervised release with home confinement). The 
     transferor in this case should be subject to offense level 
     14, like the transferee.
       Guideline section 2K2.1 also provides an offense level of 
     20 for a prohibited person whose offense involved a 
     machinegun or certain other dangerous firearms. The proposed 
     directive would require the Sentencing Commission to make 
     this offense level applicable to the transferor of such a 
     weapon if the transferor knows or has reasonable cause to 
     believe that the transferee is in a prohibited category. 
     However, the sentencing guidelines currently provide 
     additional base offense level increases in the case of 
     defendants who have prior felony convictions of either a 
     crime of violence or controlled substance offense, 
     Sec. 2K2.1(a)(1), (2), (3), and (4)(A). The directive to the 
     Sentencing Commission specifically exempts these additional 
     increases from its requirements.
     Section 2138.  Forfeiture of firearms used in crimes of 
         violence and felonies.
       The amendment adds the authority to forfeit firearms used 
     to commit crimes of violence and all felonies to 18 U.S.C. 
     Sec. Sec. 981 and 982. This authority would be in addition to 
     the authority already available to Treasury agencies under 18 
     U.S.C. Sec. 924(d).
       The purpose of the amendment is (1) to provide for criminal 
     as well as civil forfeiture of firearms; and (2) to permit 
     forfeiture actions to be undertaken by Department of Justice 
     law enforcement agencies who have authority to enforce the 
     statutes governing crimes of violence but who do not have 
     authority to pursue forfeitures of firearms under the 
     existing statutes.
       Section 924(d) of title 18 already provides for the civil 
     forfeiture of any firearm used or involved in the commission 
     of any ``criminal law of the United States.'' The statute, 
     however, is enforced only by the Treasury Department and its 
     agencies; it provides no authority for the FBI, for example, 
     to forfeit a gun used in the commission of an offense over 
     which it has sole jurisdiction. Moreover, Sec. 924(d) 
     provides for civil forfeiture only.
       Subsection (d) adds a provision to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(d) 
     intended to permit the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and 
     Firearms to forfeit property that otherwise would have to be 
     forfeited by another agency. Under Sec. 924(d), ATF is 
     presently authorized to forfeit a firearm used or carried in 
     a drug trafficking crime. Property involved in the drug 
     offense itself, such as drug proceeds, may also be 
     forfeitable under the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. 
     Sec. 881, but ATF does not presently have authority to 
     forfeit property under that statute and has to turn the 
     forfeitable property over to another agency. The amendment 
     does not expand the scope of what is forfeitable in any way, 
     but does allow the forfeiture to be pursued by ATF when the 
     agency is already involved in the forfeiture of a firearm in 
     the same case.
       Finally, subsection (e) clarifies an ambiguity in the 
     present statute relating to the 120-day period in which a 
     forfeiture action must be filed. Presently, the statute says 
     that a forfeiture proceeding must be filed within 120 days of 
     the seizure of the property. This was intended to force the 
     government to initiate a forfeiture action promptly. In one 
     case, however, where the government did initiate an 
     administrative forfeiture action within the 120-day period, 
     the claimant filed a claim and cost bond which required the 
     government to begin the forfeiture action over again by 
     filing a formal civil judicial proceeding in federal court. 
     The claimant then moved to dismiss the judicial proceeding 
     because the complaint was filed outside the 120-day period.
       The court granted the motion to dismiss because the literal 
     wording of Sec. 924(d) requires any forfeiture action against 
     the firearm to be filed within 120 days of the seizure. 
     United States v. Fourteen Various Firearms, __ F. Supp. __, 
     1995 WL 368761 (E.D. Va. June 19, 1995). This interpretation, 
     however, leads to unjust results in cases where the 
     government promptly commences an administrative forfeiture 
     action but the claimant waits the full time allotted to him 
     to file a claim. (Under Section 101 of this Act, the claimant 
     would have 30 days from the date of publication of notice of 
     the administrative forfeiture action to file a claim, which 
     is likely to be several months after the seizure even if the 
     government initiated the administrative forfeiture almost 
     immediately after the seizure.) In such cases, Congress could 
     not have intended the 120-day period for filing a judicial 
     complaint to count from the date of the seizure; indeed, it 
     is often the case that the claimant doesn't even file the 
     claim until more than 120 days have passed. Thus, the 
     amendment clarifies the statute to make clear that the 
     government must initiate its administrative forfeiture 
     proceeding within 120 days of the seizure and then will have 
     120 days from the filing of a claim, if one is filed, to file 
     the case in federal court. The amendment also tolls the 120-
     day period during the time a related criminal indictment or 
     information is pending.
     Section 2139.  Forfeiture for gun trafficking
       This section provides for the forfeiture, under 18 U.S.C. 
     Sec. Sec. 981 and 982, of vehicles used to commit gun 
     trafficking, such as transporting stolen firearms, and for 
     the proceeds of such offenses. The provision is limited to 
     instances in which five or more firearms are involved, thus 
     making it clear that it is not intended to be used in 
     instances where an individual commits a violation involving a 
     small number of firearms in his or her personal possession.

  Part 4--Targeting Serious Drug Crimes and Protecting Children From 
                                 Drugs

     Section 2141.  Increased penalties for using minors to 
         distribute drugs
       This provision would amend Section 420 of the Controlled 
     Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 861) to increase the current 
     mandatory minimum penalty for using or employing minors to 
     distribute drugs from one year to three years. Similarly, the 
     provision would increase the mandatory minimum penalty for a 
     second or subsequent violation of this statute from one year 
     to five years. The proposed increases are necessary to punish 
     persons who use or employ minors to distribute illegal drugs 
     and to deter others from engaging in such reprehensible 
     conduct.
     Section 2142.1  Increased penalties for distributing drugs to 
         minors
       This provision would amend Section 418 of the Controlled 
     Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 859) to increase the minimum 
     penalty for distributing drugs to minors from one year to 
     three years for a first offense, and from one year to five 
     years for a second or subsequent offense. The proposal would 
     also alter the age of the minor that triggers these 
     penalties. Under the proposed amendment, the penalties would 
     apply whenever a person at least eighteen years of age 
     distributes drugs to a person under eighteen. Presently, the 
     statute punishes a person at least eighteen who distributes 
     drugs to a person under twenty-one, thus reaching some 
     transactions in which the buyer is significantly older than 
     the seller. This makes little sense and is inconsistent with 
     the companion statute, 21 U.S.C. 861, which punishes persons 
     who employ minors to distribute drugs. The proposed amendment 
     would bring section 859 into conformity with section 861.
     Section 2143.1  Increased penalties for drug trafficking in 
         or near a school or other protected location
       This provision would amendment Section 419 of the 
     Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 860) to increase the 
     mandatory minimum penalty for distributing drugs in or near a 
     school or other protected location. The provision also would 
     increase the mandatory minimum penalty for second and 
     subsequent offenses from one to five years. The increased 
     penalties for drug trafficking in or near schools or other 
     protected locations are consistent with the other proposed 
     penalty increases in this legislation and are aimed at 
     protecting children from drug trafficking and abuse, 
     punishing drug dealers who target

[[Page S1665]]

     children, and deterring others who might engage in such 
     conduct.
     Section 2144.1  Serious juvenile drug trafficking offenses as 
         Armed Career Criminal Act predicates
       This section would amend the Armed Career Criminal Act 
     (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(e)(2)(A), to permit the use of an 
     adjudication of juvenile delinquency based on a serious drug 
     trafficking offense as a predicate offense under that Act. 
     The ACCA targets for a lengthy period of at least 15 years' 
     imprisonment those felons found in unlawful possession of a 
     firearm who have proven records of involvement in serious 
     acts of misconduct involving drugs and violence.
     Section 2145.  Attorney General authority to reschedule 
         certain drugs posing imminent danger to public safety.
       Under existing law, the Attorney General is empowered to 
     add temporarily a substance to Schedule I of the Controlled 
     Substances Act when necessary to respond to an imminent 
     danger to public safety. See 21 U.S.C. 811(h). However, the 
     Attorney General is not authorized to reschedule a substance 
     that already has been placed on one of the schedules of the 
     Controlled Substances Act. Once a substance has been added to 
     one of the schedules, any rescheduling of that substance must 
     be done pursuant to the standard procedures for scheduling or 
     rescheduling a substance. Under the standard procedures, the 
     rescheduling of a substance can take several years.
       The proposal would extend the Attorney General's existing 
     authority to schedule a substance on an emergency basis to 
     include the rescheduling of an already scheduled drug to 
     Schedule I. This authority will give the Attorney General to 
     respond to public health crises involving scheduled 
     substances, such as the rapidly escalating abuse of rohypnol, 
     a Schedule IV drug with no approved medical uses in the 
     United States.
       The proposal contains the same limitations and procedures 
     as apply to the Attorney General's existing emergency 
     scheduling authority. The Attorney General could temporarily 
     reschedule a substance only for one year, with the 
     possibility of a one-time six month extension under certain 
     circumstances. In addition, the Secretary of Health and Human 
     Services would continue to have a formal role in advising the 
     Attorney General in any proposed rescheduling.
     Section 2146.  Increased penalties for using federal property 
         to grow or manufacture controlled substances.
       This provision would increase the penalty for cultivating 
     or manufacturing a controlled substance on federally owned or 
     leased land. A significant amount of the domestic marijuana 
     crop is grown on federal lands and a substantial number of 
     methamphetamine laboratories also have been discovered on 
     federal lands. Federal law enforcement agencies believe that 
     the use of federal lands for cultivating and manufacturing 
     controlled substances has increased because there is no 
     possibility that the land will be forfeited as is the case if 
     the cultivation or manufacture took place on private 
     property.
     Section 2147.  Clarification of length of supervised release 
         terms in controlled substance cases.
       This section resolves a conflict in the circuits as to the 
     permissible length of supervised release terms in controlled 
     substance cases. Under 18 U.S.C. 3583(b), ``[e]xcept as 
     otherwise provided,'' the maximum authorized terms of 
     supervised release are 5 years for Class A and B felonies, 3 
     years for Class C and D felonies, and 1 year for Class E 
     felonies and certain misdemeanors. The drug trafficking 
     offenses in 21 U.S.C. 841 prescribe special supervised 
     release terms, however, that are longer than those applicable 
     generally under section 3583(b). Those longer terms, which 
     may include lifetime supervised release, were enacted in 1986 
     in the same Act which inserted the introductory phrase 
     ``Except as otherwise provided'' in section 3583(b). Because 
     of this clear legislative history and intent, two courts of 
     appeals have held that section 3583(b) does not limit the 
     length of supervised release that may be imposed for a 
     violation of 21 U.S.C. 841 when a greater term is there 
     provided. United States v. LeMay, 952 F.2d 995, 998 (8th Cir. 
     1991); United States v. Eng, 14 F.3d 165, 172-3 (2d Cir. 
     1994. One court of appeals, however, has reached the opposite 
     result, holding that the length of a supervised release term 
     that can be imposed for controlled substance cases is limited 
     by 18 U.S.C. 3583(b). United States v. Gracia, 983 F.2d 625, 
     630, (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Kelly, 974 F.2d 22, 
     24-5 (5th Cir. 1992).
       Although the issue has not arisen with frequency, the 
     conflict is entrenched and should be dealt with definitively. 
     Accordingly, the amendment would add the words 
     ``Notwithstanding section 3583 of title 18'' to the title 21 
     controlled substance offenses in the parts of those statutes 
     dealing with supervised release to make clear that the longer 
     terms there prescribed control over the general provision in 
     section 3583.
     Section 2148.  Technical correction to assure compliance of 
         sentencing guidelines with provisions of all federal 
         statutes.
       This section would amend 28 U.S.C. 994(a) to assure that 
     sentencing guidelines promulgated by the United States 
     Sentencing Commission are consistent with the provisions of 
     all federal statutes. Currently, section 994(a) contains a 
     requirement of consistency only with statutes in titles 28 
     and 18 of the United States Code. No discussion of this 
     somewhat peculiar limitation appears in the legislative 
     history, see S. Rep. No. 98-225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 
     163 (1983). The limitation seems to have been based on the 
     mistaken assumption that all provisions pertinent to the 
     promulgation of sentencing guidelines were contained in those 
     two titles. However, other provisions, such as mandatory 
     minimum sentences in title 21, are relevant and clearly are 
     meant to act as constraints on the guidelines. This amendment 
     will insure that guidelines are not created that are 
     inconsistent with the provisions of any relevant enactment 
     of Congress.
     Section 2149.  Drug testing, treatment, and supervision of 
         incarcerated offenders.
       This section amends Section 20105(b) of the Violent 
     Offender Incarceration/Truth-In-Sentencing (VOI/TIS) grant 
     program of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act 
     of 1994 by adding the language at Section 20105(b)(1)(B) and 
     Section 20105(b)(2). The victims' rights language at Section 
     20105(b)(A) is current law as Section 20105(b).
       The amendment adds several requirements to the conditions a 
     state must meet in order to receive funding under the VOI/TIS 
     program. First, the state must by September 1, 1998, have a 
     plan for drug testing/monitoring and treatment for violent 
     offender housed in their corrections facilities. This plan 
     needs to include sanctions for inmates who test positive. 
     Second, the language at (2) would permit the state to use 
     funds received under the VOI/TIS program to pay the costs of 
     the testing and treatment required under (B). Currently the 
     provisions at (B) are found in the Conference Report H.Rpt. 
     104-863 that accompanies the Department's fiscal year 1997 
     appropriations act. The language at (2) is not included. The 
     goal of the amendment is to make the language at (B) 
     permanent and add the language at (2) by amending the 
     underlying law.


  subtitle b--grants to prosecutors' offices to target gang crime and 
                           violent juveniles

       This subtitle amends Section 31702, Community-Based Justice 
     Grants for Prosecutors,'' of Title III of the Violent Crime 
     Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (42 U.S.C. 13862) to 
     respond to the increase of violent juvenile offenders and the 
     rate of gang-related juvenile crime. This subtitle provides 
     needed resources for state and local prosecutors to 
     facilitate the prosecution of violent and serious juvenile 
     offenders. There is no existing comparable legislative text 
     and programs previously authorized to assist prosecutors have 
     not been appropriated. As part of the President's fiscal year 
     1998 budget proposal, this program is authorized for 
     appropriations of $100,000,000 for fiscal year 1998 and 
     $100,000,000 for fiscal year 1999.
       Specifically, the legislation expands authority to: hire 
     additional prosecutors to reduce prosecutorial backlogs; 
     enable prosecutors to more effectively prosecute youth drug, 
     gang, and violence problems; supply the technology, 
     equipment, and training to assist prosecutors in reducing the 
     rate of youthful violent crime while increasing the rate of 
     successful identification and rapid prosecution of young 
     violent offenders; and assist prosecutors in their efforts to 
     engage in community-based prosecutions, problem solving, and 
     conflict resolution techniques through collaborative efforts 
     with law enforcement officials, school officials, probation 
     officers, social service agencies, and community 
     organizations.
       There is also a two percent set aside of all funds 
     appropriated under this Part to be set aside for ``training 
     and technical assistance'' consistent with the above-
     mentioned purposes. Similarly, 10 percent is taken ``off the 
     top'' of all funds appropriated under this Part to be set 
     aside for research, statistics, and evaluation'' consistent 
     with these purposes. Numerous jurisdictions have requested 
     training and technical assistance as a priority need. 
     Additionally, through the introduction of various bills, 
     Congress has evidenced its support for enhanced research, 
     statistics, and evaluation.


       subtitle c--grants to courts to address violent juveniles

       Subtitle C establishes federal grant funding for states, 
     units of local government, and Indian tribal governments to 
     use in developing and implementing innovative initiatives to 
     increase levels of efficiency, expediency, and effectiveness 
     with which juvenile and youths are processed and adjudicated 
     within the criminal and juvenile justice system. This is a 
     new grant authority to assist state, local, and tribal 
     courts, including probation and parole offices, public 
     defenders, and victim/witness service providers, to respond 
     to violent and serious youthful offenders.
       This subtitle amends Section 21062 of Subtitle F of Title 
     XXI of the ``Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 
     1994'' (42 U.S.C. 14161), that currently provides assistance 
     to state and local courts. This subtitle reintroduces the 
     Administration's State and Local Courts Assistance Program 
     Act to authorize the establishment of the juvenile gun 
     courts, drug courts, other specialized courts, and innovative 
     programs to better deal with the adjudication and prosecution 
     of juveniles. As part of the President's fiscal year 1998 
     budget proposal), this program is authorized for 
     appropriations of $50,000,000 for fiscal year 1998.

[[Page S1666]]

   Title III--Protecting Witnesses To Help Prosecute Gangs and Other 
                           Violent Criminals

     Section 3001.  Interstate travel to engage in witness 
         intimidation or obstruction of justice.
       This section would amend the Travel Act (18 U.S.C. 1952) to 
     add witness bribery, intimidation, obstruction of justice, 
     and related conduct in State criminal proceedings to the list 
     of predicates under the Travel Act (18 U.S.C. 1952). Recent 
     studies demonstrate that witness intimidation is one of the 
     most serious impediments to the prosecution of violent 
     street gangs and drug trafficking organizations in State 
     courts. This amendment responds to the growing witness 
     intimidation problem by authorizing federal prosecution of 
     persons who travel in interstate commerce with the intent 
     to bribe or intimidate a witness, obstruct a criminal 
     proceeding, or engage in related conduct.
     Section 3002.  Expanding pretrial detention eligibility for 
         serious gang and other violent criminals.
       This section would make three amendments to the pretrial 
     detention statutes designed to enhance the ability, in 
     appropriate circumstances, to use these statutes in 
     prosecutions against gang members and against other violent 
     criminals. Under the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. 3141 et seq., 
     defendants charged with certain offenses can be detained 
     pretrial if the court concludes there is clear and convincing 
     evidence that no condition or combination of conditions of 
     release will adequately assure the safety of any other person 
     and the community. See 18 U.S.C. 3142 (e) and (f). The kinds 
     of charges that permit such detention on grounds of the 
     defendant's dangerousness include certain serious drug 
     trafficking offenses and a ``crime of violence''. They also 
     include any felony if the defendant has previously been 
     convicted of two or more crimes of violence or serious drug 
     trafficking offenses.
       The first proposal would add a definition of the term 
     ``convicted'' to include adjudications of juvenile 
     delinquency. Thus, it would permit pretrial detention, upon 
     the requisite showing, of persons charged with any felony, 
     e.g., interstate transportation of a stolen automobile, who 
     had two or more prior violent or drug convictions, including 
     juvenile delinquency adjudications for such conduct. This 
     should facilitate the use of pretrial detention when 
     appropriate against young career offenders such as gang 
     members.
       The second proposed amendment relates to the definition of 
     ``crime of violence'' in 18 U.S.C. 3156(a)(4). That 
     definition reaches offenses (A) that have as an element the 
     use or attempted or threatened use of physical force, (B) any 
     other felony offenses that, by their nature, involve a 
     substantial risk that physical force may be used in the 
     course of their commission, and (C), by virtue of an 
     amendment in the 1994 crime bill, any felony under chapter 
     109A or 110 (which proscribe sex offenses and child 
     pornography).
       It is not clear whether the offenses of possession of 
     explosives or firearms by convicted felons qualify as 
     ``crimes of violence'' under the second or (B) branch of the 
     definition. What little case law exists suggests that they 
     do. See United States v. Sloan, 820 F. Supp. 1133, 1136-41 
     (S.D. Ind. 1993); United States v. Aiken, 775 F. Supp. 855 
     (D. Md. 1991). See also, United States v. Dodge, 846 F. Supp. 
     181 (D. Conn. 1994). The Sloan court noted that, although the 
     Supreme Court held in United States v. Stinson, 113 S. Ct. 
     1913 (1993), that a similar definition of ``crime of 
     violence'' in the sentencing guidelines did not encompass the 
     felon-in-possession statutes, because the Sentencing 
     Commission had promulgated a policy statement to that effect, 
     the bail statutes serve a very different purpose from 
     sentencing enhancements and should be more broadly construed 
     to protect the public from continued endangerment by 
     convicted felons charged with a new offense of weapon 
     possession. (Prior to the Commission's policy statement, the 
     courts were divided as to whether a violation of 18 U.S.C. 
     922(a) was a crime of violence for sentencing purposes). This 
     proposed amendment would codify the result reached in Sloan. 
     It would not mandate pretrial detention but would permit the 
     government to show, in the case of a convicted felon such as 
     a gang member charged with violating the certain explosives 
     or firearms statutes, that no one or more conditions of 
     release would be adequate to safeguard society.
       The third proposed amendment would make membership or 
     participation in a criminal street gang, racketeering 
     enterprise, or other criminal organization a factor to be 
     considered by courts in making bail determinations. 
     Presently, many other personal history and characteristics of 
     the individual charged are required to be considered in 
     making bail decisions, such as prior convictions, drug abuse, 
     and whether the alleged offense was committed while on 
     parole, probation, or other form of release pending criminal 
     trial. Clearly, gang or organized crime group membership is a 
     relevant factor that bears both on dangerousness and risk of 
     flight and that courts should take into account in making 
     bail determinations. The amendment is not intended to impinge 
     on rights of freedom of association but rather to reach 
     membership or participation in those organizations that 
     exist, at least in part, for the purpose of committing crimes 
     or depriving third parties of their lawful rights. See Madsen 
     v. Women's Health Center, Inc. 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2530 (1994).
     Section 3003.  Conspiracy penalty for obstruction of justice 
         offenses involving victims, witnesses, and informants.
       Increasingly typical of many criminal gangs is violence 
     directed at silencing or retaliating against witnesses or 
     potential witnesses and informants. 18 U.S.C. 1512 and 1513 
     set forth offenses and penalties that, generally speaking, 
     adequately deter and punish such offenses. However, a 
     conspiracy to engage in witness intimidation or retaliation 
     in violation of these statutes is punishable only under the 
     catchall conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. 371, which carries a 
     maximum prison term of only five years. This is clearly 
     inadequate to vindicate an offense that involves, for 
     example, a conspiracy to kill a witness or potential witness 
     in a federal criminal proceeding. Such a conspiracy, if 
     perpetrated upon the special maritime and territorial 
     jurisdiction, would be punishable by up to life 
     imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. 1117. This is consistent with the 
     principle, recognized in some federal statutes and 
     prevalent in modern State criminal codes, that a 
     conspiracy warrants the same maximum penalty as the 
     offense which was its object. This principle is reflected 
     in several recently enacted federal statutes, including 21 
     U.S.C. 846 (drug conspiracies), 18 U.S.C. 1856(h)(money 
     laundering conspiracies), and 18 U.S.C. 844(n)(explosives 
     conspiracies). The proposed amendment in this section 
     would apply this principle to 18 U.S.C. 1512 and 1513 and 
     thus provide better protection from gang violence to 
     witnesses and informants.

                  Title IV--Protecting Victim's Rights

       Title IV contains two Sections that expand the rights and 
     protections afforded to the victims of crime, particularly 
     crimes committed by juvenile offenders and crimes committed 
     against children. It should be noted that a number of other 
     provisions of the Anti-Gang and Youth Violence Act of 1997 
     expand the rights and protections of crime victims. For 
     example, the proposed Section 5002, which amends 18 U.S.C. 
     5032, would establish a rebuttable presumption that juvenile 
     proceedings shall be open to victims and members of the 
     public, with special protections and access afforded to crime 
     victims. In addition, proposed Section 5037 would expand the 
     allocution rights of crime victims, including the right to 
     have input into the predisposition report prepared by the 
     probation officer and the right to appear before the judge 
     and be heard prior to an order of disposition.
     Section 4001.  Records of crimes committed by juvenile 
         offenders.
       The proposed Section 40001 would amend 18 U.S.C. 5038(a)(6) 
     to correct an oversight in current law. The amendment 
     affirmatively provides for a victim's or a victim's official 
     representative's allocation at the dispositional phase of the 
     juvenile proceeding. In addition, the new statutory language 
     clarifies that communication is allowable with the victim 
     about ``the status or disposition of the [juvenile] 
     proceeding in order to effectuate any other provision of 
     [state or federal] law''. This language clears up any 
     ambiguity in current law by explicitly extending to victims 
     of juvenile offenders the right to information about the 
     juvenile proceeding that they might need or be entitled to 
     under any other state or federal law, such as the victim's 
     rights set out in 42 U.S.C. 10606. Thus, under this new 
     language, victims of juvenile offenders would be treated like 
     victims of adult offenders. For example, victims would be 
     able: to know about the status of the proceedings and the 
     release status of the offenders; to consult intelligently 
     with the prosecutor; and to make a knowledgeable victim 
     impact statement at the time of the disposition. In addition, 
     if state law allows victim compensation or grants any other 
     rights, this provision allows communication about the federal 
     delinquency proceeding in order to effectuate those 
     provisions.
       Fingerprints and photographs of adjudicated delinquents 
     found to have committed the equivalent of an adult felony 
     offense or a violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(x) and 924(a)(6) 
     (possession of a handgun by a juvenile) would be sent to the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and made available in 
     the manner applicable to adult defendants.
       The limited availability of juvenile criminal records is a 
     serious concern in connection with violent and firearms 
     offenses. In order to address this problem, the Department of 
     Justice amended its regulations in 1992 to expand the ability 
     of the FBI to receive and retain records from State courts 
     for ``serious and/or significant adult and juvenile 
     offenses.'' 28 C.F.R. 2032. The proposed bill would further 
     alleviate this problem by making corresponding changes in the 
     statutory rules for reporting offenses by juveniles who are 
     prosecuted federally. This amendment was passed in substance 
     by the Senate in the 103rd Congress as Section 618 of H.R. 
     3355.
       Further disclosure of records relating to a juvenile or a 
     delinquency proceeding would be authorized if it would be 
     permitted under the law of the State in which the delinquency 
     proceeding took place. The proposal will allow for the 
     development of State systems of graduated sanctions by making 
     it possible for the court to take into account a juvenile's 
     criminal history when imposing sentence. The records could 
     also be used for analysis by the Department of Justice if so 
     requested by the Attorney General.
       Finally, the new Section 5038(c) would be amended to allow 
     the disclosure of ``necessary docketing data''. This is 
     necessary because the nationwide military justice system 
     cannot process traffic tickets without disclosing some 
     docketing information.

[[Page S1667]]

     Section 4002.  Victims of Child Abuse Act extension of 
         authorizations.
       This section extends the authorization of appropriations 
     for programs under Subchapter I of the Victims of Child Abuse 
     Act (42 U.S.C. 13001 et seq.). The programs authorized under 
     VOCA include regional children's advocacy centers, local 
     children's advocacy centers, and specialized training and 
     technical assistance for state and local practitioners 
     dealing with the prosecution of child abuse cases. These 
     programs currently are administered by the Office of Juvenile 
     Justice and Delinquency Prevention.

 Title V--Federal Prosecution of Serious and Violent Juvenile Offenders

     Section 5001.  Short title.
       The amendments made in this title are designed to provide 
     protection for the community and hold juveniles accountable 
     for their actions. They will help ensure that prosecution of 
     serious juvenile offenders is more swift and certain, and 
     that punishment of juvenile offenders will be commensurate 
     with the seriousness of the crimes committed.
     Section 5002.  Delinquency proceeding or criminal 
         prosecutions in district courts.
       Under current law, the decision to charge a juvenile as an 
     adult for specified crimes is made by the United States 
     district court as a result of a motion by the United States 
     to transfer the juvenile for criminal prosecution. The 
     offenses subject to this transfer authority are limited. Even 
     more restrictive are the list of violent offenses for which a 
     juvenile under 15 years of age can be transferred.
       There is virtually universal agreement among federal 
     prosecutors that the present system is cumbersome and has 
     frequently inhibited them for seeking adult prosecution. 
     Prosecutors who have sought the transfer of juveniles to 
     adult status have experienced many difficulties in the 
     application of an outmoded statute or have encountered judges 
     personally opposed to the transfer of juveniles, even in 
     cases involving very serious crimes. Moreover, there is a 
     presumption under present law in favor of a juvenile 
     adjudication, and a district court's decision to decline 
     transfer to adult status may be reversed only upon a finding 
     of abuse of discretion. United States v. Juvenile Male #1, 47 
     F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 1995). The result is a juvenile justice 
     system which fails to provide an effective deterrent to 
     juvenile crime and fails adequately to protect the public.
       The proposed statute would amend 18 U.S.C. Sec. 5032 to 
     greatly strengthen and simplify the process for prosecuting 
     the most dangerous juveniles as adults in federal court. The 
     legislation would bring federal law into conformity with that 
     of many states by giving prosecutors, rather than the courts, 
     the discretion to charge a juvenile alleged to have committed 
     certain serious felonies as an adult or as a juvenile.
       The proposed statute would retain the minimum age in 
     existing law for prosecution of a juvenile as an adult but 
     would expand the list of offenses with serious violent, gun 
     or drug felonies. A number of states have similar statutes.
       The legislation would, however, create a distinction 
     between juveniles 16 years of age and older and those who are 
     younger. Prosecution of juveniles 13 to 15 years of age at 
     the time of the offense would require approval of the 
     Attorney General or his or her designee at a level not lower 
     than Deputy Assistant Attorney General. This internal Justice 
     Department approval requirement (which would not be 
     litigable) has been used in other types of particularly 
     sensitive cases and would ensure that careful scrutiny and 
     uniform standards are used in determining whether to bring 
     criminal charges against very young juveniles. Prosecutors 
     would retain the discretion to proceed against anyone under 
     age 18 as a juvenile delinquent. In those cases, the current 
     requirement for prosecutorial certification would apply, thus 
     assuring that most such cases are handled at the state or 
     local level.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \1\ The federal prosecutor would be required to certify that 
     (A) the appropriate State does not have or declines to assume 
     jurisdiction over the juvenile, or (B) the offense is one 
     specified in the statute, and (C) there is a substantial 
     federal interest in the case of the offense to warrant the 
     exercise of federal jurisdiction. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 5032(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       The proposed bill would amend section 5032, to expand the 
     list of serious felonies for which a juvenile can be 
     prosecuted as an adult to include additional violent crimes, 
     firearms charges and drug offenses. Under the amended 
     statutes, a juvenile could be prosecuted as an adult for the 
     following offenses:
       (1) a serious violent felony or a serious drug offense as 
     described in section 3559 (c)(2) or (c)(3) or a conspiracy or 
     attempt under section 406 of the Controlled Substances Act or 
     under section 1013 of the Controlled Substances Import and 
     Export Act (21 U.S.C. 846 or 963) to commit an offense 
     described in section 3559(c)(2); and
       (2) the following offenses if they are not described in 
     paragraph (1): (A) a crime of violence (as defined in section 
     3156(a)(4)) that is a felony; (B) an offense described in 
     section 844(d), (k), or (l), or paragraph (a)(6) or 
     subsection (b), (g), (h), (j), (k), or (l), of section 924; 
     (C) a violation of section 922(o) that is an offense under 
     section 924(a)(2); (D) a violation of section 5861 of the 
     Internal Revenue Code of 1986 that is an offense under 
     section 5871 of such Code (26 U.S.C. 5871);
       (E) a conspiracy to violate an offense described in any of 
     subparagraphs (A) through (D); or
       (F) an offense described in section 401 or 408 of the 
     Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 841, 848) or a 
     conspiracy or attempt to commit that offense which is 
     punishable under section 406 of the Controlled Substances Act 
     (21 U.S.C. 846), or an offense punishable under section 409 
     or 419 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 849, 860), 
     or an offense described in section 1002, 1003, 1005, or 1009 
     of the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 
     952, 953, 955 or 959), or a conspiracy or attempt to commit 
     that offense which is punishable under section 1013 of the 
     Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 963).
       To ensure the prosecution in one trial of all offenses 
     charged, a juvenile tried as an adult for one of the 
     designated offenses could also be prosecuted as an adult for 
     any other offenses properly joined under the Federal Rules of 
     Criminal Procedure. With these amendments, juveniles 
     convicted as adults could receive substantially higher 
     sentences than under current law, commensurate with their 
     crimes and criminal histories.
       The existing statute excludes younger juveniles in Indian 
     country charged with certain crimes from prosecution unless 
     the tribal government opts to have the provision apply. The 
     proposal would continue this provision.
       The proposed bill allows, in certain limited circumstances, 
     the district court to order that a juvenile charged as an 
     adult be tried under the juvenile delinquency procedures. 
     This is sometimes referred to as a ``reverse waiver.'' Any 
     juvenile charged with one of the offenses listed in 3(A)-(F) 
     or a juvenile under the age of 16 would be able to request a 
     ``reverse waiver'' hearing. A motion making such a request 
     would have to be filed within 20 days of the juvenile first 
     being charged as an adult. At the hearing, the juvenile 
     charged as an adult would have the burden of establishing 
     that it would be in the interest of justice that the case be 
     tried under the juvenile delinquency provisions of 5032(a). 
     The criteria by which the court should make its determination 
     are listed in the proposed statute. The procedure for 
     appellate review of the court's ruling would be similar to 
     that presently used after a motion to suppress evidence. If 
     the trial court determined that the juvenile should be tried 
     as a juvenile delinquent, the government would have the right 
     to seek an expedited appeal. In the event the court 
     determined that the juvenile had not carried his or her 
     burden of establishing that it was in the interests of 
     justice that there be a reverse waiver, then the case would 
     proceed to trial as an adult prosecution and the juvenile 
     could appeal in the event of a guilty verdict.
       Juveniles under the age of 16 charged as adults, but who 
     have not previously been adjudicated delinquent of a serious 
     violent felony, and who are charged with certain limited 
     offenses would be sentenced under the sentencing guidelines 
     but would not be subject to mandatory minimums.
       Section 5032(a)(4) is amended to make clear that federal 
     juvenile proceedings are normally open to the public but may 
     be closed in the interests of justice or for good cause 
     shown. It also includes a provision allowing victims, their 
     relatives and guardians to be included when the public is 
     otherwise excluded, unless the same two tests applied for 
     exclusion of the public also independently require exclusion.
     Section 5003.  Custody prior to appearance before judicial 
         officer.
       Minor changes have been made to make clear that the 
     procedures applicable to the arrest of a juvenile prior to 
     the formal filing of charges apply whether or not it is 
     anticipated that the juvenile will be charged as a juvenile 
     or as an adult.
     Section 5004.  Technical and conforming amendments to Section 
         5034.
       This section is amended to clarify that it applies to 
     juvenile proceedings only.
     Section 5005.  Speedy trial.
       The proposed status would require that for a juvenile in 
     custody juvenile delinquency proceedings begin within 45 
     days, rather than the current 30 days. Exclusions in the 
     Speedy Trial Act (18 U.S.C. Sec. 3161(h)) would also be made 
     applicable for the first time in juvenile delinquency 
     proceedings. This additional time is necessary, particularly 
     in cases involving both adult and juvenile defendants such as 
     in the prosecution of gangs, to protect witnesses and 
     critical evidence by ensuring that the trial of a juvenile 
     does not proceed before the case against the adults. The time 
     within which a disposition hearing must be held after an 
     adjudication of delinquency would also be increased from 20 
     to 40 days. Within the 40 days, the probation office would 
     prepare a predisposition report which would include victim 
     impact information. Forty days is consistent with federal 
     court practice generally and will provide the time necessary 
     to prepare a comprehensive report.
     Section 5006.  Disposition; availability of increased 
         detention, fines and supervised release for juvenile 
         offenders.
       The legislation would amend section 5037 to make fines and 
     supervised release--not presently sentencing options--
     available for adjudicated delinquents in addition to 
     probation and detention. The maximum period of official 
     confinement for an adjudicated delinquent would be increased 
     to ten years or through age 25 to give judges increased 
     sentencing flexibility for juveniles who are adjudicated 
     delinquent. The maximum period

[[Page S1668]]

     for probation would be increased to the same period 
     applicable to an adult. To strengthen the accountability 
     of juveniles to victims, mandatory restitution would also 
     apply to adjudicated delinquents.
     Section 5007.  Technical amendment of Sections 5031 and 5034.
       This section makes technical and confirming amendments to 
     Sections 5031 and 5034.

       Title VI--Incarceration of Juveniles in the Federal System

     Section 6001.  Detention prior to disposition or sentencing.
       Sections 6001 and 6002 relate to the detention of juvenile 
     offenders prior to disposition or sentencing. Specifically, 
     the bill would amend 18 U.S.C. 5035, to provide that juvenile 
     offenders less than 16 years of age being prosecuted as 
     adults but not yet convicted must be placed in an available, 
     suitable juvenile facility located within, or a reasonable 
     distance from, the district in which the juvenile is being 
     prosecuted. If such a suitable juvenile facility is not 
     available, the juvenile could be placed in any other suitable 
     facility located within, or a reasonable distance from, the 
     district in which the juvenile is being prosecuted. Only if 
     neither of these types of facilities is available could a 
     juvenile less than 16 years old be placed in some other 
     suitable facility. In order to protect the safety of these 
     younger offenders, the bill would require that, to the 
     maximum extent feasible, juveniles not be detained prior to 
     sentencing in any institution in which they have regular 
     contact with adult prisoners.
       The requirement in current Section 5035, that a juvenile 
     charged with juvenile delinquency has regular contact with 
     adult prisoners would generally be retained in the proposed 
     legislation. However, the proposed bill would permit 
     juveniles adjudicated delinquent, once they reach the age of 
     18, to be placed with adults in a correctional facility. This 
     recommended change is consistent with recent regulatory 
     changes to state requirements under the Juvenile Justice and 
     Delinquency Prevention Act, 42 U.S.C. 5601 et seq.
       Section 5039 of title 18, United States Code, would also be 
     amended to permit juveniles adjudicated delinquent to be 
     placed with adults in community-based facilities in order to 
     provide transition services for juveniles moving from 
     incarceration to the community and to allow juveniles to be 
     housed in their home communities. These changes would help 
     protect younger juveniles 13 or 14 years old, from 19 or 20 
     year-olds who, although adjudicated delinquent, may be as 
     dangerous as adults.
       The legislation would also amend Sections 5035 and 5039 to 
     give the Attorney General discretion to confine with adults a 
     serious juvenile offender 16 years of age or older who is 
     charged as an adult, both before and after conviction. As 
     under present law, only those juveniles charged as adults 
     whom a judicial officer has found would, if released, 
     endanger the safety of another person or the community or 
     would pose a substantial risk of flight could be detained 
     prior to trial.
       The current requirement in Section 5039 that every juvenile 
     under 18 years of age who is in custody be provided with 
     adequate food, heat, light, sanitary facilities, bedding, 
     clothing, recreation, education, and medical care, including 
     necessary psychiatric, psychological, or other care and 
     treatment would continue to apply to every juvenile charged 
     as an adult who is detained prior to trial and sentencing and 
     would be expanded to provide for reasonable safety and 
     security as well.
       These changes are consistent with current practice in many 
     states and are proposed to ensure that the most violent 
     juvenile criminal offenders are not detained or incarcerated 
     with juvenile delinquents. By providing the discretion to 
     house older juveniles prosecuted as adults, adjudicated 
     delinquents once they reach the age of 18 and all juveniles 
     convicted as adults in adult facilities, this proposal would 
     also solve practical problems reported by the U.S. Marshals 
     Service and the U.S. Attorneys, who have experienced great 
     difficulty in finding suitable juvenile facilities for older 
     and violent juvenile offenders.
     Section 6002.  Rules governing the commitment of juveniles.
       The legislative analysis for the amendments made in this 
     discussion are discussed in the analysis accompanying Section 
     5005.

       Title VII--Office of Juvenile Crime Control and Prevention

       Title VII establishes within the Office of Justice Programs 
     the ``Office of Juvenile Crime Control and Prevention,'' the 
     ``Juvenile Crime Control and Prevention Formula Grant 
     Program,'' the ``Indian Tribal Grant Programs,'' and ``At-
     Risk Children Grants Program,'' and ``Developing, Testing, 
     and Demonstrating Promising Programs Program,'' the 
     ``Incentive Grant Programs,'' the ``Research, Statistics, and 
     Evaluation'' grants, and the ``Training and Technical 
     Assistance'' grants.
       Subtitle A of Title VII creates the ``Office of Juvenile 
     Crime Control and Prevention'' to replace the Office of 
     Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. The new Office 
     of Juvenile Crime Control and Prevention responds to the 
     changing nature of juvenile and youth crime and represents a 
     more focused, efficient, and effective office. Fundamental 
     protections safeguarding juveniles and youth within the 
     juvenile justice system have been maintained, while 
     operations within this new office have been streamlined to 
     better coordinate and integrate juvenile and youth crime 
     initiatives with other Department of Justice activities, 
     particularly activities within the Office of Justice 
     Programs, the National Institute of Justice and the Bureau 
     of Justice Statistics, as well as with states, units of 
     local government, Indian tribal governments, and local 
     communities.
     Section 7001.  Short title.
       This section provides that Title VII of the Anti-Gang and 
     Youth Violence Act may be cited as the ``Juvenile Crime 
     Control and Prevention State and Local Assistance Act of 
     1997.''


   subtitle a--creation of the office of juvenile crime control and 
                               prevention

     Section 7101.  Establishment of Office.
       Section 2701 establishes the ``Office of Juvenile Crime 
     Control and Prevention'' under the general authority, and the 
     ``supervision and direction'' of the Assistant Attorney 
     General for the Office of Justice Programs, United States 
     Department of Justice. The words ``supervision and 
     direction'' are used to describe the line of authority and 
     reporting relationship between the Director of the Office of 
     Juvenile Crime Control and Prevention and the Assistant 
     Attorney General for the Office of Justice Programs in the 
     same way the words ``supervision and direction'' are used to 
     describe the line of authority and reporting relationship 
     between the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human 
     Services and the Assistant Secretary of Health as cited at 42 
     United States Code Section 202. This section continues the 
     Department of Justice's efforts in maintaining coordination 
     and cooperation among those federal agencies whose 
     jurisdictions involve the health, welfare, education or 
     general well-being of youths and/or juveniles. There are 
     numerous transitional elements to provide for the continuity 
     between the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
     Prevention and the new Office of Juvenile Crime Control and 
     Prevention, including a specific transfer for the current 
     Administrator of the Office of Juvenile Justice and 
     Delinquency Prevention to become the Director of the Office 
     of Juvenile Crime Control and Prevention.
     Section 7102.  Conforming amendments.
       Section 7102 makes minor and technical conforming 
     amendments.
     Section 7103.  Authorization of appropriations.
       Section 7103 provides for the authorization of 
     appropriations to carry out the functions of the Office of 
     Juvenile Crime Control and Prevention.


                 subtitle b--juvenile crime assistance

       Subtitle B of Title VII of the Act maintains and 
     establishes numerous federal grant programs and initiatives--
     the ``Juvenile Crime Control and Prevention Formula Grant 
     Program,'' the ``Indian Tribal Grant Program,'' the 
     ``Incentive Grant Program,'' the ``Developing, Testing, and 
     Demonstrating Promising Programs'' program, the ``At-Risk 
     Children Grants Program,'' and two initiatives that provide 
     additional funding for research, statistics, evaluation, and 
     training and technical assistance.
     Section 7201.  Formula grant assistance.
       Section 7201 amends the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
     Streets Act of 1968 by maintaining but revising the formula 
     grant program.
       This federal grant program has fewer state planning 
     requirements, specifically allocates ten percent of all 
     grants funds appropriated to be set aside and used for 
     research activities (including program evaluations, data 
     collection efforts, and studies to identify initiatives that 
     reduce juvenile and youth crime and violence), and 
     specifically allocates two percent of all grant funds 
     appropriated to be set aside and used for providing training 
     and technical assistance to states and local communities for 
     the implementation of initiatives and programs that have 
     demonstrated a high likelihood of success.
       Under a new formulation, all states receive 50 percent of 
     their allocation. To receive the remaining funds a state must 
     continue to follow established practices and procedures for 
     protecting juveniles within the juvenile justice system. 
     These provisions are reflected in the Department of Justice's 
     newly issued regulations, 28 CFR Part 31, governing this 
     section. Should a state fail to meet the requirements of this 
     section, the unallocated funds may be redistributed within 
     the state.
     Section 7202.  Indian tribal grants.
       Section 7202 establishes for the first time a direct 
     federal grant program whereby funding goes directly from the 
     Office of Juvenile Crime Control and Prevention to Indian 
     tribal governments without utilizing state pass-through 
     procedures. Grant funds under this section shall be used for 
     initiatives designed to reduce, control, and prevent juvenile 
     and youth crime on Indian lands. This method of direct 
     funding is expected to better address and respond to the 
     needs and concerns of Indian tribes as well as increase 
     funding for these tribes. Also included is language 
     amending the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act 
     of 1994 to substantially increase funding targeted for 
     correctional facilities on Indian tribal lands.
     Section 7203.  At-risk children grant programs.
       The ``At-Risk Children Grants Program'' is a new federal 
     grant program administered by the Office of Juvenile Crime 
     Control and Prevention that provides federal assistance to 
     states, for distribution by states to local

[[Page S1669]]

     units of government and locally-based organizations to combat 
     truancy, school violence, and juvenile crime by providing 
     funding for local crime prevention and intervention 
     strategies. Programs and initiatives funded with these grants 
     are designed to address youth within the juvenile justice 
     system who, with some focused supervision, direction, and 
     discipline, can go forward to lead-crime-free, productive 
     lives. This program is an expansion of what is currently 
     known as Title V of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
     Prevention Act.
       Grants awarded pursuant of this Part may be used for: 
     supporting locally based efforts for assisting high-risk 
     juveniles and juveniles within the juvenile justice system; 
     preventing and reducing truancy and school drop outs; 
     enforcing juvenile curfews; supporting school safety 
     programs, juvenile mentoring, violence reduction programs, 
     intensive supervision services, jobs and life skills 
     training, family strengthening interventions, early childhood 
     services, after-school programs for juveniles, tutoring 
     programs, recreation and parks programs, parent training 
     initiatives, health services, alcohol and substance abuse 
     services, restitution and community services activities, 
     leadership development, accountability and responsibility 
     education, and other such efforts designed to prevent or 
     reduce truancy, school violence, and juvenile crime.
       Local units of government that participate under this Part 
     must utilize a local planning board to develop a three-year 
     plan.
     Section 7204.  Developing, testing, and demonstrating 
         promising programs.
       Section 7204 establishes new federal discretionary grant 
     programs for states, units of local government, and Indian 
     tribal governments administered by the Office of Juvenile 
     Crime Control and Prevention to develop, test, and 
     demonstrate initiatives and programs that have a high 
     probability of preventing, controlling, and/or reducing 
     juvenile crime. These grants were developed to motivate 
     states, units of local government, and Indian tribal 
     governments to independently generate innovative initiatives 
     to combat juvenile crime and youth violence.
       This section replaces the current multiple discretionary-
     categorical grant programs currently established by the 
     Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, by 
     consolidating several categorical grant programs into a 
     single, flexible, broad program.
     Section 7205.  Incentive grant program.
       This section establishes new federal formula grant programs 
     for states, units of local government, and Indian tribal 
     governments to develop and advance initiatives to prevent, 
     control, reduce, evaluate, adjudicate, or sanction juvenile 
     or youthful crime.
       The state agency that receives a formula grant is eligible 
     to apply for a grant under this Part. Every applicant must 
     submit assurances to the Director of the Office of Juvenile 
     Crime Control and Prevention that they have or will have 
     within one year of submittal of an application:
       (1) implemented a system of accountability-based graduated 
     sanctions; and/or
       (2) implemented a system of information collaboration and 
     dissemination regarding acts of juvenile delinquency and 
     adjudication of the same.
       Grants authorized under this section may be used to:
       Achieve paragraphs (1) and/or (2) above; advance 
     initiatives that prevent or intervene in the unlawful 
     possession, distribution, or sale of a firearm by or to a 
     juvenile; implement initiatives that facilitate the 
     collection, dissemination, and use of information regarding 
     juvenile crime; implement new initiatives that assist state 
     and local jurisdictions in tracking, intervening with, and 
     controlling serious, violent, and chronic juvenile offenders; 
     implement comprehensive program services in juvenile 
     detention and correction facilities; implement procedures 
     designed to prevent and reduce juvenile disproportionate 
     minority confinement; or for any other purpose related to 
     juvenile crime reduction, control, and prevention as 
     determined by the Director of the Office.
     Section 7206.  Research, statistics and evaluation.
       Better research, evaluation, and statistical analysis is 
     critical to understanding and addressing the causes of 
     juvenile and youth crime. Under this section, increased 
     funding is combined with a collaboration between the Director 
     of the Office of Juvenile Crime Control and Prevention and 
     the Directors of the National Institute of Justice and the 
     Bureau of Justice Statistics to better direct and expand 
     these functions.
     Section 7207.  Training and technical assistance.
       This section provides for specific federal grant funding 
     for much-needed technical and training assistance for 
     individuals in the fields of juvenile justice and juvenile 
     and youth crime. Funding under this section will enable more 
     communities to implement effective programs and initiatives 
     that reduce, control, and prevent juvenile and youth crime. 
     While this is a new federal grant program, training and 
     technical assistance have been established functions of the 
     Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.
       In further recognition of the importance of high quality 
     and focused research, statistical analysis, evaluation, 
     training, and technical assistance, Title VII includes 
     specific provisions within each funded program setting aside 
     a percentage of grant funds appropriated for the above-
     mentioned functions. These monies are in addition to funding 
     appropriated for these functions in Sections 409 and 410 of 
     Title VII. Specifically, Sections 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 
     and 408 of Title VII of this Act provide that 2 percent of 
     all funds appropriated for each funded program shall be set 
     aside for training and technical assistance consistent with 
     Title VII. Similarly, Sections 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, and 
     408 provide that 10 percent of all funds appropriated for 
     each funded program shall be set aside for research, 
     statistics and evaluation activities consistent with Title 
     VII.


               subtitle c--missing and exploited children

       This subtitle amends the ``Missing Children's Assistance 
     Act'' (42 U.S.C. 5771 et seq.) by extending its authorization 
     to the year 2001 and by setting aside funds appropriated 
     under this subtitle to be used for research, statistics, 
     evaluation, and training. Additionally, conforming language 
     is added to the Act to reflect the replacement of the Office 
     of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention with the new 
     Office of Juvenile Crime Control and Prevention.

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, today I am pleased to join Senator Leahy in 
introducing on behalf of the administration, President Clinton's Anti-
Gang and Youth Violence Act, which the President announced last week in 
Boston.
  Three years ago Congress passed the Biden crime bill into law. Today, 
the verdict is in--the law is working to reduce adult crime. For 
example, the projected violent crime rate is the lowest since 1991 and 
the projected murder rate is the lowest since 1971.
  But we all know that, unlike adult crime, juvenile crime is on the 
rise. The statistics are all too familiar: Violent juvenile crime 
increased by 69 percent from 1987 to 1994; from 1983 to 1994 the 
juvenile homicide rate jumped 169 percent; and just recently, the 
Center for Disease Control has reported that the United States has the 
highest rate of childhood homicide, suicide, and firearm related deaths 
of 26 industrialized countries. We can and must do better than that.
  The President's program is based in large part, on success stories 
from cities like Boston, MA, which developed a comprehensive community-
based strategy to both prevent at-risk youth from becoming criminals 
and deal harshly with those already in the criminal justice system.
  Boston's Operation Night Light sends probation officers on patrol 
with police to ensure that youth with criminal records stay out of 
trouble and to assist in the investigation of new crimes. And Boston's 
police force has joined with Federal law enforcement to target the 
illegal gun markets that supply most of the guns to gangs and violent 
youth.
  The results have been dramatic: Youth homicides have dropped 80 
percent citywide; violent crime in public schools dropped 20 percent in 
just 1 school year; and most impressively--not a single youth died from 
a firearm homicide during 1996. Now that is a record we could be proud 
of.
  We are taking the same balanced approach to juvenile crime and drug 
abuse as we did in the 1994 Crime Act--tough sanctions, certain 
punishment and protection of vulnerable kids.
  Like the Democratic crime bill I, Along with Senators Daschle, Leahy, 
and many others introduced earlier this year--S. 15--the President's 
juvenile crime initiative cracks down on violent juvenile offenders and 
youth gangs, takes concrete steps toward preventing drug and gun 
violence, and invests in programs that will get kids off the streets 
and into supervised programs during the after-school hours when they 
are most likely to be the victims of gangs and criminals or the 
customers of drug pushers.
  The Anti-Gang and Youth Violence Act proposes to use Federal law 
enforcement where its expertise and resources can best contribute to 
fighting crime and the spread of gangs. The act also seeks assistance 
for local police and criminal justice systems to help them address 
matters that we all know are local law enforcement challenges that they 
handle the best.
  On the Federal level the President's bill: contains tough new Federal 
penalties applicable to gang activities such as racketeering, witness 
intimidation, car-jacking, and interstate firearms and drug 
trafficking; cracks down on juvenile gun use by extending the Brady 
bill to juveniles and requiring the sale of gun locks; makes juvenile 
records more accessible to police and

[[Page S1670]]

educators; and targets abuse of drugs popular among youths by giving 
the Attorney General emergency rescheduling authority.
  But in recognition that the battle against youth crime and drug abuse 
is fought primarily in our communities and schools, the President's 
bill provides over $325 million annually to support State and local 
governments to: hire additional prosecutors to target gang and youth 
violence; create special drug and gun courts to handle violent 
juveniles more effectively; create safe-havens for at-risk youth; 
initiate systems of graduated sanctions so youth receive certain 
punishment for their first offense instead of a mere slap on the wrist; 
and promote use of curfews and put truants back in school where they 
belong.
  The President also proposes to recraft the Federal Juvenile Justice 
Office by eliminating bureaucracies, streamlining programs, providing 
additional flexibility to States and localities, and sharpening the 
Office's focus on research and development. These are reforms that I 
have long advocated.
  However, the President's reform proposal reaffirms our commitment to 
a few core principles that have worked well over the past 23 years--
juveniles should not be housed in adult jails or lockups; juveniles in 
custody should be separated from adult criminals; status offenders 
should not be incarcerated; and where it exists, the disproportionate 
confinement of minorities must be addressed.
  With the introduction of this legislation the administration, Senate 
Republicans, and Senate Democrats have now all made it a priority to 
address the problem of youth violence. Of course, there are other 
proven, effective crime control programs that I would like to pursue--
such as extending the 100,000 Cops Program to put another 25,000 cops 
on the beat. I am sure there are initiatives which others would want to 
push.
  But, instead of trying to pass an omnibus bill--which we all know 
will be difficult, if not impossible--I think that we should keep our 
focus on a targetted, specific bill which keeps our focus on the most 
immediate concern: youth violence and the criminal victimization of 
youth.
  I look forward to working with the administration and my Republican 
colleagues to craft responsible legislation that will address the 
pressing concerns of the American public and be signed into law during 
this session of Congress.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. HOLLINGS (for himself, Mr. Inouye, and Mr. Dorgan):
  S. 363. A bill to amend the Communications Act of 1934 to require 
that violent video programming is limited to broadcast after the hours 
when children are reasonably likely to comprise a substantial portion 
of the audience, unless it is specifically rated on the basis of its 
violent content so that it is blockable by electronic means 
specifically on the basis of that content; to the Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation.


         the children's protection from violent programming act

  Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I rise to offer legislation that will 
help parents limit the amount of television violence coming into their 
homes. As my colleagues know well, Congress has been studying this 
issue for 40 years and the issues have not changed. Recent press 
reports continue to validate my concerns that all the talk and promises 
have yielded nothing but the status quo, and efforts to encourage the 
industry to police itself continue to yield meager results.
  Enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 marked the second 
time Congress has passed legislation to encourage the entertainment 
industry to limit the amount of violence seen on television. The first 
time was the effort in the late 1980's led by our former colleague from 
Illinois, Paul Simon. Senator Simon's approach, the Television Program 
Improvement Act, was designed to grant the industry a 3-year antitrust 
exemption to work together to adopt voluntary guidelines that would 
lead to reducing violence depicted in television programs. The result 
of this industry collaboration was announced in December 1992 with a 
statement of joint standards regarding the broadcasting of excessive 
television violence. In June 1993, the networks made a commitment that, 
before and during the broadcasting of programs that might contain 
excessive violence, the following announcement would be made: ``Due to 
some violent content, parental discretion is advised.'' The Independent 
Television Association, the trade group representing many of the 
television stations not affiliated with one of the networks, adopted a 
similar voluntary code. Subsequent studies detailed, however, that 
despite these voluntary guidelines, violence continued to rise.
  In 1993, therefore, I introduced my safe harbor bill for the first 
time. The Commerce Committee held one hearing in the 103d Congress and 
a second hearing during the 104th. The Commerce Committee reported my 
bill, S. 470, by a vote of 16 to 1. The hearing record substantiates 
the constitutionality of my safe harbor approach, with both Attorney 
General Reno and Federal Communications Commission [FCC] Chairman Hundt 
on record as testifying that the safe harbor approach is 
constitutional. My efforts to bring my bill to the floor for a vote 
were repeatedly blocked.
  The second time, Congress legislated in this area was last year when 
the so-called V-Chip provision was incorporated into the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996. I voted for this provision but had my 
doubts about its effectiveness. Once again, Congress relied on the 
industry to help parents limit the amount of violence. To make the V-
chip work, the 1996 act encouraged the video programming industry to 
``establish voluntary rules for rating video programming that contains 
sexual, violent or other indecent material about which parents should 
be informed before it is displayed to children,'' and to broadcast 
voluntarily signals containing these ratings.
  Pursuant to the 1996 act, all segments of the entertainment industry 
created the TV ratings implementation group--ratings group, headed by 
the Motion Picture Association of America [MPAA] president Jack 
Valenti. The group devised an age-based ratings system--not a content-
based system. The proposal has been met with widespread criticism as 
being too broad and vague for parents. I recommend that my colleagues 
read this past Saturday's New York Times February 22, 1997, to 
understand the confusion surrounding this issue. The age-based ratings 
system does not give parents sufficient information. Parents want the 
ability and the choice to block out specific content they find 
unsuitable for their children.
  So, here we are. Congress passes legislation designed to limit the 
amount of television violence, again relying on the industry to act 
responsibly. The voluntary ratings system proposed by the industry, 
called the TV parental guidelines, consists of the following six age-
based ratings:


                                  TV-Y

  All Children. This program is designed to be appropriate for all 
children. Whether animated or live action, the themes and elements in 
this program are specifically designed for a very young audience, 
including children from ages 2 through 6. This program is not expected 
to frighten younger children.


                                 TV-Y7

  Directed to older children. This program is designed for children age 
7 and above. It may be more appropriate for children who have acquired 
the developmental skills needed to distinguish between make-believe and 
reality. Themes and elements in this program may include mild physical 
or comedic violence, and may frighten children under the age of 7. 
Therefore, parents may wish to consider the suitability of this program 
for their very young children.


                                  TV-G

  General Audience. Most parents would find this program suitable for 
all ages. Although this rating does not signify a program designed 
specifically for children, most parents may let younger children watch 
this program unattended. It contains little or no violence, no strong 
language and little or no sexual dialogue or situations.


                                 TV-PG

  Parental Guidance Suggested. This program may contain some material 
that some parents would find unsuitable for younger children. Many 
parents may want to watch it with their younger children. The theme 
itself may

[[Page S1671]]

call for parental guidance. The program may contain infrequent coarse 
language, limited violence, some suggestive sexual dialogue and 
situations.


                                 TV-14

  Parents Strongly Cautioned. This program may contain some material 
that many parents would find unsuitable for children under 14 years of 
age. Parents are strongly urged to exercise greater care in monitoring 
this program and are cautioned against letting children under the age 
of 14 watch unattended. This program may contain sophisticated themes, 
sexual content, strong language, and more intense violence.


                                  TV-M

  Mature Audience Only. This program is specially designed to be viewed 
by adults and therefore may be unsuitable for children under 17. This 
program may contain mature themes, profane language, graphic violence, 
and explicit sexual content.
  I ask my colleagues, how will parents be able to block out a specific 
violent program based on this system?
  There are several problems with this approach.
  The 1996 Act envisioned that the ratings system, and consequently, 
the encoded programming, would allow parents to block specific 
programming content they found objectionable. Under the proposed age-
based ratings system, parents are unable to block specific violent 
programming. The proposed age-based ratings place the entertainment 
industry in the position of making the judgment about program 
suitability--not the parent. Moreover, one of the biggest problems with 
the proposed age-based ratings system is that it intermingles three 
types of programming content: violence, sexual material, and adult 
language. Thus it prevents parents from gaining any specific 
information about whether or not a show actually contains any violent 
depictions.
  The National PTA, the American Medical Association [AMA], the 
American Academy of Pediatrics [AAPA], the National Education 
Association [NEA], Children Now, the American Psychological Association 
[APA], the Coalition for America's Children, the Children's Defense 
Fund, the American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry [AACAP], 
the Family Research Council, the Foundation to Improve Television, and 
the Center for Media Education all have criticized the age-based 
ratings systems. Instead, they advocate ratings based on specific 
program content. These groups have criticized the proposed age-based 
ratings as too vague and broad for parents to decide what is right for 
their child to watch in their own home. In addition, the groups state 
that the ratings raise more questions than they answer.
  The AACAP was particularly critical of the ratings system, stating 
that:

       Programs portraying graphic and realistically appearing 
     violence, sex, horror, adult language, and illegal behavior 
     without social consequences increase the risk of dangerous 
     behaviors and aberrant emotional and intellectual development 
     by children and adolescents. . . . An age-based system, such 
     as the one now being proposed, carries the risk of missing 
     significant developmental variations in young people.

  The V-chip legislation was intended to empower parents with the 
ability to block out objectionable content-specific programming. The 
ratings system does not accomplish this objective. To correct this, I 
have decided to reintroduce my safe harbor legislation with the 
addition of a new provision. The new version requires confining the 
distribution of violent programming to hours of the day when children 
are not likely to comprise a substantial portion of the audience unless 
the broadcasters adopt a content-specific ratings system that allows 
parents to block out violent programming. If the industry continues to 
insist upon the age-based ratings, then my safe harbor would apply for 
violent programming. It's a very simple proposition. Either the intent 
of the 1996 law is met and parents can block out objectionable content, 
or my safe harbor will ensure that violent programming is aired at 
hours later in the day to protect children from the harmful effects of 
violent programming.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                 S. 363

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Children's Protection from 
     Violent Programming Act''.

     SEC. 2. UNLAWFUL DISTRIBUTION OF VIOLENT VIDEO PROGRAMMING.

       Title VII of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 701 
     et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:

     ``SEC. 718. UNLAWFUL DISTRIBUTION OF VIOLENT VIDEO 
                   PROGRAMMING NOT SPECIFICALLY BLOCKABLE BY 
                   ELECTRONIC MEANS.

       ``(a) Unlawful Distribution.--It shall be unlawful for any 
     person to distribute to the public any violent video 
     programming not blockable by electronic means specifically on 
     the basis of its violent content during hours when children 
     are reasonably likely to comprise a substantial portion of 
     the audience.
       ``(b) Rulemaking Proceeding.--The Commission shall conduct 
     a rulemaking proceeding to implement the provisions of this 
     section and shall promulgate final regulations pursuant to 
     that proceeding not later than 9 months after the date of 
     enactment of the Children's Protection from Violent 
     Programming Act. As part of that proceeding, the Commission--
       ``(1) may exempt from the prohibition under subsection (a) 
     programming (including news programs and sporting events) 
     whose distribution does not conflict with the objective of 
     protecting children from the negative influences of violent 
     video programming, as that objective is reflected in the 
     findings in section 551(a) of the Telecommunications Act of 
     1996;
       ``(2) shall exempt premium and pay-per-view cable 
     programming; and
       ``(3) shall define the term `hours when children are 
     reasonably likely to comprise a substantial portion of the 
     audience' and the term `violent video programming'.
       ``(c) Repeat Violations.--If a person repeatedly violates 
     this section or any regulation promulgated under this 
     section, the Commission shall, after notice and opportunity 
     for hearing, immediately revoke any license issued to that 
     person under this Act.
       ``(d) Consideration Of Violations In License Renewals.--The 
     Commission shall consider, among the elements in its review 
     of an application for renewal of a license under this Act, 
     whether the licensee has complied with this section and 
     the regulations promulgated under this section.
       ``(e) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--
       ``(1) Blockable by electronic means.--
       The term `blockable by electronic means' means blockable by 
     the feature described in section 303(x).
       ``(2) Distribute.--The term `distribute' means to send, 
     transmit, retransmit, telecast, broadcast, or cablecast, 
     including by wire, microwave, or satellite.''.

     SEC. 3. ASSESSMENT OF EFFECTIVENESS.

       (a) Report.--The Federal Communications Commission shall--
       (1) assess the effectiveness of measures undertaken under 
     section 718 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 718) 
     and under subsections (w) and (x) of section 303 of that Act 
     (47 U.S.C. 303(w) and (x)) in accomplishing the purposes for 
     which they were enacted; and
       (2) report its findings to the Committee on Commerce, 
     Science, and Transportation of the United States and the 
     Committee on Commerce of the United States House of 
     Representatives, with 18 months after the date on which the 
     regulations promulgated under section 718 of the 
     Communications Act of 1934 (as added by section 2 of this 
     Act) take effect, and thereafter as part of the biennial 
     review of regulations required by section 11 of that Act (47 
     U.S.C. 161).
       (b) Action.--If the Commission finds at any time, as a 
     result of its assessment under subsection (a), that the 
     measures referred to in subsection (a)(1) are insufficiently 
     effective, then the Commission shall initiate a rulemaking 
     proceeding to prohibit the distribution of violent video 
     programming during the hours when children are reasonably 
     likely to comprise a substantial portion of the audience.
       (c) Definitions.--Any term used in this section that is 
     defined in section 718 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 
     U.S.C. 718), or in regulations under that section, has the 
     same meaning as when used in that section or in those 
     regulations.

     SEC. 4. SEPARABILITY.

       If any provision of this Act, or any provision of an 
     amendment made by this Act, or the application thereof to 
     particular persons or circumstances, is found to be 
     unconstitutional, the remainder of this Act or that 
     amendment, or the application thereof to other persons or 
     circumstances shall not be affected.

     SEC. 5. EFFECTIVE DATE.

       The prohibition contained in section 718 of the 
     Communications Act of 1934 (as added by section 2 of this 
     Act) and the regulations promulgated thereunder shall take 
     effect 1 year after the regulations are adopted by the 
     Commission.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. LIEBERMAN (for himself, Mr. McCain, Mr. Lott, Mr. 
        Ashcroft, Mr. Gorton, Mrs. Feinstein, Mr. Gregg and Mr. Frist):

[[Page S1672]]

  S. 364. A bill to provide legal standards and procedures for 
suppliers of raw materials and component parts for medical devices; to 
the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.


             THE BIOMATERIALS ACCESS ASSURANCE ACT OF 1997

  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I am introducing today, together with 
Senator McCain and a number of other Senators from both sides of the 
aisle, the Biomaterials Access Assurance Act of 1997. This bipartisan 
bill responds to a looming crisis affecting more than 7 million 
patients annually who rely on implantable life-saving or life-enhancing 
medical devices such as pacemakers, heart valves, artificial blood 
vessels, hydrocephalic shunts, and hip and knee joints. These patients 
are at risk of losing access to the devices on which their lives and 
well-being depend because, as a result of actual and potential 
skyrocketing legal costs, the companies that supply the raw materials 
without which those devices cannot be made are simply refusing to sell 
their raw materials to device manufacturers. If we do not act soon, 
makers of the life-saving medical devices that we take for granted 
today may no longer able to buy the raw materials and components 
necessary to produce their products, and the public health may be 
seriously jeopardized. By taking the small step Senator McCain and I 
propose today, millions of Americans will no longer have to worry about 
losing access to the life-saving medical devices on which they depend.
  The reason for this impending crisis is an all too common one: an 
out-of-control product liability system. During hearings I held in 
1994, as chairman of the Subcommittee on Regulation and Government 
Information, and again during hearings held by the Commerce Committee 
last Congress, we heard the same story from witness after witness. They 
all explained that the current legal system makes it too easy to bring 
lawsuits against raw materials suppliers and too expensive for those 
suppliers to defend themselves--even when the suppliers are not at 
fault and end up winning, as they virtually always do. According to one 
study, only three out of hundreds of liability cases brought against a 
raw material supplier led to a finding of wrongdoing against the 
supplier. Nevertheless, in all of those cases, the suppliers had to 
spend enormous amounts of money to defend themselves--often much more 
than the supplier ever profited from its sale of the raw materials. 
Many suppliers consequently have made the entirely rational decision 
that the costs of defending these lawsuits are just too high to justify 
selling raw materials to the makers of implantable medical devices. In 
short, for those suppliers, it just isn't worth it.
  How could this happen? A study by Aranoff Associates paints a clear, 
but dismal, picture. That study surveyed the markets for polyester 
yarn, resins such as DuPont's Teflon, and polyacetal resin such as 
DuPont's Delrin. The study showed that sales of these raw materials for 
use in manufacturing implantable medical devices was just a tiny 
percentage of the overall market--$606,000 out of total sales of over 
$11 billion, or just 0.006 percent. In return for that extra $606,000 
in total annual sales, however, that raw material supplier, like 
others, faced potentially huge liability related costs, even if they 
never lost a lawsuit.
  To take one example, a company named Vitek manufactured an estimated 
26,000 jaw implants using about 5-cents worth of DuPont Teflon in each 
device. The device was developed, designed, and marketed by Vitek, 
which was not related to DuPont. When those implants failed, Vitek 
declared bankruptcy, its founder fled to Switzerland, and the patients 
sued DuPont. DuPont has won virtually all these cases, but the cost has 
been staggering. The study estimated that DuPont spent at least $8 
million per year over 6 years to defend these suits. To put this into 
perspective, DuPont's estimated legal expenses in these cases for just 
1 year would have bought over a 13-year supply of DuPont's Dacron 
polyester, Teflon, and Delrin for all U.S. makers of implantable 
medical devices, not just makers of jaw implants. Faced with this 
overwhelming liability, DuPont decided to stop selling its products to 
manufacturers of permanently implanted medical devices.
  One supplier's decision alone might not be troublesome, but it is not 
just one supplier that has reached that decision. When I rose during 
the debate over the product liability bill last year, I put in the 
record the names of twelve suppliers who had withdrawn from the 
biomaterials market. Since then, I have learned that at least two more 
suppliers have done the same. There is no reason to believe that the 
economics will be different for other suppliers around the world. One 
of the witnesses at our 1994 hearing testified that she contacted 15 
alternate suppliers of polyester yarn worldwide. All were interested in 
selling her raw materials--except for use in products made and used in 
the United States. By itself, this is a powerful statement about the 
nature of our American product liability laws, and it makes a powerful 
case for reform.
  What's at stake here, let me be clear, is not protecting suppliers 
from liability and not even just making raw materials available to the 
manufacturers of medical devices. What's at stake is the health of 
millions of Americans who depend on medical devices for their everyday 
survival. What's at stake is the health of children like Thomas Reilly 
from Houston, TX, who suffers from hydrocephalus, a condition in which 
fluid accumulates around the brain. A special shunt enables him to 
survive. But continued production of that shunt is in doubt because the 
raw materials' suppliers are concerned about the potential lawsuit 
costs. At our hearing in 1994, Thomas' father, Mark Reilly, pleaded for 
Congress to move forward quickly to assure that the supply of those 
shunts will continue.
  What's at stake is the health of adults like Peggy Phillips of Falls 
Church, VA, whose heart had twice stopped beating because of 
fibrillation. Today, she lives an active, normal life because she has 
an implanted automatic defibrillator. Again, critical components of the 
defibrillator may no longer be available because of potential product 
liability costs. Ms. Phillips urged Congress to move swiftly to enact 
legislation protecting raw materials and component part suppliers from 
product liability.
  The scope of this problem affects young and old alike. Take a 
pacemaker. Pacemakers are installed in patients whose hearts no longer 
generate enough of an electrical pulse to get the heart to beat. To 
keep the heart beating, a pacemaker is connected to the heart with 
wires. These wires have silicone rubber insulation. Unfortunately, the 
suppliers of the rubber have begun to withdraw from the market. With 
this pacemaker, thousands of Americans can live productive and healthy 
lives for decades.

  Take another example, a heart valve. Around the edge of a heart valve 
is a sleeve of polyester fabric. This fabric is what the surgeon sews 
through when he or she installs this valve. Without that sleeve, it 
would be difficult, if not impossible, to install the valve. Without 
that valve, patients die prematurely.
  In short, this developing product liability crisis will have 
widespread and serious effects. We cannot simply allow the over 7 
million people who owe their health to medical devices to become 
casualties of an outmoded legal liability system. Because product 
liability litigation costs make the economics of supplying raw 
materials to the implantable medical device makers very unfavorable, it 
is imperative that we act now. We cannot rationally expect raw 
materials suppliers to continue to serve the medical device market out 
of the goodness of their hearts, notwithstanding the liability related 
costs. We need to reform our product liability laws, to give raw 
material suppliers some assurance that unless there is real evidence 
that they were responsible for putting a defective device on the 
market, they cannot be sued simply in the hope that their deep pockets 
will fund legal settlements.
  I have long believed that liability reform could be both proconsumer 
and probusiness. I believe the testimony we heard on this subject 
during the past two Congresses proved this once again. When fear of 
liability suits and litigation costs drives valuable, lifesaving 
products off the market because their makers cannot get raw materials, 
consumers are the ones to suffer. When

[[Page S1673]]

companies divert money from developing new lifesaving products to 
replace old sources of raw materials supplies, consumers are again the 
ones to suffer. When one company must spend millions just to defend 
itself in lawsuits over a product it did not even design or make--for 
which it simply provided a raw material worth 5 cents--it is the 
consumer that suffers the most.
  Based on the testimony we heard in 1994, I, along with my 
distinguished colleague from Arizona, committed to forging a solution 
to remedy this immediate threat to our national public health. That 
year, and again in the 104th Congress, we introduced the Biomaterials 
Access Assurance Act, which we reintroduce again today. This bill will 
establish clear national rules to govern suits against suppliers of raw 
materials and component parts for permanently implantable medical 
devices. Under this bill, a supplier of raw materials or component 
parts could be sued only if the materials they supplied do not meet 
contractual specifications, or if they properly can be classified as a 
manufacturer or seller of the whole product. They could not, however, 
be sued for deficiencies in the design of the final device, the testing 
of that device, or for inadequate warnings with respect to that device.

  Our colleagues recognized the need for that bill last year, and so 
passed it as part of the 104th Congress' product liability reform bill. 
Unfortunately, President Clinton vetoed that bill, but in his message 
to Congress, he made clear that he viewed the biomaterials provision 
portion of it as, in his words, ``a laudable attempt to ensure the 
supply of materials needed to make life-saving medical devices.'' We 
hope that he continues to see the provision in that light.
  I believe that enactment of this bill would help ensure that 
America's patients continue to have access to the best lifesaving 
medical devices in the world. We must act now, however. This piece of 
legislation is preventative medicine at its best and is just the cure 
the patients need.
  I ask unanimous consent that a copy of the bill be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                 S. 364

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Biomaterials Access 
     Assurance Act of 1997''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       Congress finds that--
       (1) each year millions of citizens of the United States 
     depend on the availability of lifesaving or life enhancing 
     medical devices, many of which are permanently implantable 
     within the human body;
       (2) a continued supply of raw materials and component parts 
     is necessary for the invention, development, improvement, and 
     maintenance of the supply of the devices;
       (3) most of the medical devices are made with raw materials 
     and component parts that--
       (A) are not designed or manufactured specifically for use 
     in medical devices; and
       (B) come in contact with internal human tissue;
       (4) the raw materials and component parts also are used in 
     a variety of nonmedical products;
       (5) because small quantities of the raw materials and 
     component parts are used for medical devices, sales of raw 
     materials and component parts for medical devices constitute 
     an extremely small portion of the overall market for the raw 
     materials and medical devices;
       (6) under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 
     U.S.C. 301 et seq.), manufacturers of medical devices are 
     required to demonstrate that the medical devices are safe and 
     effective, including demonstrating that the products are 
     properly designed and have adequate warnings or instructions;
       (7) notwithstanding the fact that raw materials and 
     component parts suppliers do not design, produce, or test a 
     final medical device, the suppliers have been the subject of 
     actions alleging inadequate--
       (A) design and testing of medical devices manufactured with 
     materials or parts supplied by the suppliers; or
       (B) warnings related to the use of such medical devices;
       (8) even though suppliers of raw materials and component 
     parts have very rarely been held liable in such actions, such 
     suppliers have ceased supplying certain raw materials and 
     component parts for use in medical devices because the costs 
     associated with litigation in order to ensure a favorable 
     judgment for the suppliers far exceeds the total potential 
     sales revenues from sales by such suppliers to the medical 
     device industry;
       (9) unless alternate sources of supply can be found, the 
     unavailability of raw materials and component parts for 
     medical devices will lead to unavailability of lifesaving and 
     life-enhancing medical devices;
       (10) because other suppliers of the raw materials and 
     component parts in foreign nations are refusing to sell raw 
     materials or component parts for use in manufacturing certain 
     medical devices in the United States, the prospects for 
     development of new sources of supply for the full range of 
     threatened raw materials and component parts for medical 
     devices are remote;
       (11) it is unlikely that the small market for such raw 
     materials and component parts in the United States could 
     support the large investment needed to develop new suppliers 
     of such raw materials and component parts;
       (12) attempts to develop such new suppliers would raise the 
     cost of medical devices;
       (13) courts that have considered the duties of the 
     suppliers of the raw materials and component parts have 
     generally found that the suppliers do not have a duty--
       (A) to evaluate the safety and efficacy of the use of a raw 
     material or component part in a medical device; and
       (B) to warn consumers concerning the safety and 
     effectiveness of a medical device;
       (14) attempts to impose the duties referred to in 
     subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (13) on suppliers of 
     the raw materials and component parts would cause more harm 
     than good by driving the suppliers to cease supplying 
     manufacturers of medical devices; and
       (15) in order to safeguard the availability of a wide 
     variety of lifesaving and life-enhancing medical devices, 
     immediate action is needed--
       (A) to clarify the permissible bases of liability for 
     suppliers of raw materials and component parts for medical 
     devices; and
       (B) to provide expeditious procedures to dispose of 
     unwarranted suits against the suppliers in such manner as to 
     minimize litigation costs.

     SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

       As used in this Act:
       (1) Biomaterials supplier.--
       (A) In general.--The term ``biomaterials supplier'' means 
     an entity that directly or indirectly supplies a component 
     part or raw material for use in the manufacture of an 
     implant.
       (B) Persons included.--Such term includes any person who--
       (i) has submitted master files to the Secretary for 
     purposes of premarket approval of a medical device; or
       (ii) licenses a biomaterials supplier to produce component 
     parts or raw materials.
       (2) Claimant.--
       (A) In general.--The term ``claimant'' means any person who 
     brings a civil action, or on whose behalf a civil action is 
     brought, arising from harm allegedly caused directly or 
     indirectly by an implant, including a person other than the 
     individual into whose body, or in contact with whose blood or 
     tissue, the implant is placed, who claims to have suffered 
     harm as a result of the implant.
       (B) Action brought on behalf of an estate.--With respect to 
     an action brought on behalf of or through the estate of an 
     individual into whose body, or in contact with whose blood or 
     tissue the implant is placed, such term includes the decedent 
     that is the subject of the action.
       (C) Action brought on behalf of a minor or incompetent.--
     With respect to an action brought on behalf of or through a 
     minor or incompetent, such term includes the parent or 
     guardian of the minor or incompetent.
       (D) Exclusions.--Such term does not include--
       (i) a provider of professional health care services, in any 
     case in which--

       (I) the sale or use of an implant is incidental to the 
     transaction; and
       (II) the essence of the transaction is the furnishing of 
     judgment, skill, or services;

       (ii) a person acting in the capacity of a manufacturer, 
     seller, or biomaterials supplier; or
       (iii) a person alleging harm caused by either the silicone 
     gel or the silicone envelope utilized in a breast implant 
     containing silicone gel, except that--

       (I) neither the exclusion provided by this clause nor any 
     other provision of this Act may be construed as a finding 
     that silicone gel (or any other form of silicone) may or may 
     not cause harm; and
       (II) the existence of the exclusion under this clause may 
     not--

       (aa) be disclosed to a jury in any civil action or other 
     proceeding; and
       (bb) except as necessary to establish the applicability of 
     this Act, otherwise be presented in any civil action or other 
     proceeding.
       (3) Component part.--
       (A) In general.--The term ``component part'' means a 
     manufactured piece of an implant.
       (B) Certain components.--Such term includes a manufactured 
     piece of an implant that--
       (i) has significant non-implant applications; and
       (ii) alone, has no implant value or purpose, but when 
     combined with other component parts and materials, 
     constitutes an implant.
       (4) Harm.--
       (A) In general.--The term ``harm'' means--
       (i) any injury to or damage suffered by an individual;
       (ii) any illness, disease, or death of that individual 
     resulting from that injury or damage; and

[[Page S1674]]

       (iii) any loss to that individual or any other individual 
     resulting from that injury or damage.
       (B) Exclusion.--The term does not include any commercial 
     loss or loss of or damage to an implant.
       (5) Implant.--The term ``implant'' means--
       (A) a medical device that is intended by the manufacturer 
     of the device--
       (i) to be placed into a surgically or naturally formed or 
     existing cavity of the body for a period of at least 30 days; 
     or
       (ii) to remain in contact with bodily fluids or internal 
     human tissue through a surgically produced opening for a 
     period of less than 30 days; and
       (B) suture materials used in implant procedures.
       (6) Manufacturer.--The term ``manufacturer'' means any 
     person who, with respect to an implant--
       (A) is engaged in the manufacture, preparation, 
     propagation, compounding, or processing (as defined in 
     section 510(a)(1)) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
     Act (21 U.S.C. 360(a)(1)) of the implant; and
       (B) is required--
       (i) to register with the Secretary pursuant to section 510 
     of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 360) 
     and the regulations issued under such section; and
       (ii) to include the implant on a list of devices filed with 
     the Secretary pursuant to section 510(j) of such Act (21 
     U.S.C. 360(j)) and the regulations issued under such section.
       (7) Medical device.--The term ``medical device'' means a 
     device, as defined in section 201(h) of the Federal Food, 
     Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321(h)) and includes any 
     device component of any combination product as that term is 
     used in section 503(g) of such Act (21 U.S.C. 353(g)).
       (8) Raw material.--The term ``raw material'' means a 
     substance or product that--
       (A) has a generic use; and
       (B) may be used in an application other than an implant.
       (9) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary 
     of Health and Human Services.
       (10) Seller.--
       (A) In general.--The term ``seller'' means a person who, in 
     the course of a business conducted for that purpose, sells, 
     distributes, leases, packages, labels, or otherwise places an 
     implant in the stream of commerce.
       (B) Exclusions.--The term does not include--
       (i) a seller or lessor of real property;
       (ii) a provider of professional services, in any case in 
     which the sale or use of an implant is incidental to the 
     transaction and the essence of the transaction is the 
     furnishing of judgment, skill, or services; or
       (iii) any person who acts in only a financial capacity with 
     respect to the sale of an implant.

     SEC. 4. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS; APPLICABILITY; PREEMPTION.

       (a) General Requirements.--
       (1) In general.--In any civil action covered by this Act, a 
     biomaterials supplier may raise any defense set forth in 
     section 5.
       (2) Procedures.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, the Federal or State court in which a civil action 
     covered by this Act is pending shall, in connection with a 
     motion for dismissal or judgment based on a defense described 
     in paragraph (1), use the procedures set forth in section 6.
       (b) Applicability.--
       (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), 
     notwithstanding any other provision of law, this Act applies 
     to any civil action brought by a claimant, whether in a 
     Federal or State court, against a manufacturer, seller, or 
     biomaterials supplier, on the basis of any legal theory, for 
     harm allegedly caused by an implant.
       (2) Exclusion.--A civil action brought by a purchaser of a 
     medical device for use in providing professional services 
     against a manufacturer, seller, or biomaterials supplier for 
     loss or damage to an implant or for commercial loss to the 
     purchaser--
       (A) shall not be considered an action that is subject to 
     this Act; and
       (B) shall be governed by applicable commercial or contract 
     law.
       (c) Scope of Preemption.--
       (1) In general.--This Act supersedes any State law 
     regarding recovery for harm caused by an implant and any rule 
     of procedure applicable to a civil action to recover damages 
     for such harm only to the extent that this Act establishes a 
     rule of law applicable to the recovery of such damages.
       (2) Applicability of other laws.--Any issue that arises 
     under this Act and that is not governed by a rule of law 
     applicable to the recovery of damages described in paragraph 
     (1) shall be governed by applicable Federal or State law.
       (d) Statutory Construction.--Nothing in this Act may be 
     construed--
       (1) to affect any defense available to a defendant under 
     any other provisions of Federal or State law in an action 
     alleging harm caused by an implant; or
       (2) to create a cause of action or Federal court 
     jurisdiction pursuant to section 1331 or 1337 of title 28, 
     United States Code, that otherwise would not exist under 
     applicable Federal or State law.

     SEC. 5. LIABILITY OF BIOMATERIALS SUPPLIERS.

       (a) In General.--
       (1) Exclusion from liability.--Except as provided in 
     paragraph (2), a biomaterials supplier shall not be liable 
     for harm to a claimant caused by an implant.
       (2) Liability.--A biomaterials supplier that--
       (A) is a manufacturer may be liable for harm to a claimant 
     described in subsection (b);
       (B) is a seller may be liable for harm to a claimant 
     described in subsection (c); and
       (C) furnishes raw materials or component parts that fail to 
     meet applicable contractual requirements or specifications 
     may be liable for a harm to a claimant described in 
     subsection (d).
       (b) Liability as Manufacturer.--
       (1) In general.--A biomaterials supplier may, to the extent 
     required and permitted by any other applicable law, be liable 
     for harm to a claimant caused by an implant if the 
     biomaterials supplier is the manufacturer of the implant.
       (2) Grounds for liability.--The biomaterials supplier may 
     be considered the manufacturer of the implant that allegedly 
     caused harm to a claimant only if the biomaterials supplier--
       (A)(i) has registered with the Secretary pursuant to 
     section 510 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 
     U.S.C. 360) and the regulations issued under such section; 
     and
       (ii) included the implant on a list of devices filed with 
     the Secretary pursuant to section 510(j) of such Act (21 
     U.S.C. 360(j)) and the regulations issued under such section;
       (B) is the subject of a declaration issued by the Secretary 
     pursuant to paragraph (3) that states that the supplier, with 
     respect to the implant that allegedly caused harm to the 
     claimant, was required to--
       (i) register with the Secretary under section 510 of such 
     Act (21 U.S.C. 360), and the regulations issued under such 
     section, but failed to do so; or
       (ii) include the implant on a list of devices filed with 
     the Secretary pursuant to section 510(j) of such Act (21 
     U.S.C. 360(j)) and the regulations issued under such section, 
     but failed to do so; or
       (C) is related by common ownership or control to a person 
     meeting all the requirements described in subparagraph (A) or 
     (B), if the court deciding a motion to dismiss in accordance 
     with section 6(c)(3)(B)(i) finds, on the basis of affidavits 
     submitted in accordance with section 6, that it is necessary 
     to impose liability on the biomaterials supplier as a 
     manufacturer because the related manufacturer meeting the 
     requirements of subparagraph (A) or (B) lacks sufficient 
     financial resources to satisfy any judgment that the court 
     feels it is likely to enter should the claimant prevail.
       (3) Administrative procedures.--
       (A) In general.--The Secretary may issue a declaration 
     described in paragraph (2)(B) on the motion of the Secretary 
     or on petition by any person, after providing--
       (i) notice to the affected persons; and
       (ii) an opportunity for an informal hearing.
       (B) Docketing and final decision.--Immediately upon receipt 
     of a petition filed pursuant to this paragraph, the Secretary 
     shall docket the petition. Not later than 180 days after the 
     petition is filed, the Secretary shall issue a final decision 
     on the petition.
       (C) Applicability of statute of limitations.--Any 
     applicable statute of limitations shall toll during the 
     period during which a claimant has filed a petition with the 
     Secretary under this paragraph.
       (c) Liability as Seller.--A biomaterials supplier may, to 
     the extent required and permitted by any other applicable 
     law, be liable as a seller for harm to a claimant caused by 
     an implant if--
       (1) the biomaterials supplier--
       (A) held title to the implant that allegedly caused harm to 
     the claimant as a result of purchasing the implant after--
       (i) the manufacture of the implant; and
       (ii) the entrance of the implant in the stream of commerce; 
     and
       (B) subsequently resold the implant; or
       (2) the biomaterials supplier is related by common 
     ownership or control to a person meeting all the requirements 
     described in paragraph (1), if a court deciding a motion to 
     dismiss in accordance with section 6(c)(3)(B)(ii) finds, on 
     the basis of affidavits submitted in accordance with section 
     6, that it is necessary to impose liability on the 
     biomaterials supplier as a seller because the related seller 
     meeting the requirements of paragraph (1) lacks sufficient 
     financial resources to satisfy any judgment that the court 
     feels it is likely to enter should the claimant prevail.
       (d) Liability for Violating Contractual Requirements or 
     Specifications.--A biomaterials supplier may, to the extent 
     required and permitted by any other applicable law, be liable 
     for harm to a claimant caused by an implant, if the claimant 
     in an action shows, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
     that--
       (1) the raw materials or component parts delivered by the 
     biomaterials supplier either--
       (A) did not constitute the product described in the 
     contract between the biomaterials supplier and the person who 
     contracted for delivery of the product; or
       (B) failed to meet any specifications that were--
       (i) provided to the biomaterials supplier and not expressly 
     repudiated by the biomaterials supplier prior to acceptance 
     of delivery of the raw materials or component parts;
       (ii)(I) published by the biomaterials supplier;
       (II) provided to the manufacturer by the biomaterials 
     supplier; or

[[Page S1675]]

       (III) contained in a master file that was submitted by the 
     biomaterials supplier to the Secretary and that is currently 
     maintained by the biomaterials supplier for purposes of 
     premarket approval of medical devices; or
       (iii) included in the submissions for purposes of premarket 
     approval or review by the Secretary under section 510, 513, 
     515, or 520 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 
     U.S.C. 360, 360c, 360e, or 360j), and received clearance from 
     the Secretary if such specifications were provided by the 
     manufacturer to the biomaterials supplier and were not 
     expressly repudiated by the biomaterials supplier prior to 
     the acceptance by the manufacturer of delivery of the raw 
     materials or component parts; and
       (2) such conduct was an actual and proximate cause of the 
     harm to the claimant.

     SEC. 6. PROCEDURES FOR DISMISSAL OF CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST 
                   BIOMATERIALS SUPPLIERS.

       (a) Motion To Dismiss.--In any action that is subject to 
     this Act, a biomaterials supplier who is a defendant in such 
     action may, at any time during which a motion to dismiss may 
     be filed under an applicable law, move to dismiss the action 
     against it on the grounds that--
       (1) the defendant is a biomaterials supplier; and
       (2)(A) the defendant should not, for the purposes of--
       (i) section 5(b), be considered to be a manufacturer of the 
     implant that is subject to such section; or
       (ii) section 5(c), be considered to be a seller of the 
     implant that allegedly caused harm to the claimant; or
       (B)(i) the claimant has failed to establish, pursuant to 
     section 5(d), that the supplier furnished raw materials or 
     component parts in violation of contractual requirements or 
     specifications; or
       (ii) the claimant has failed to comply with the procedural 
     requirements of subsection (b).
       (b) Manufacturer of Implant Shall Be Named a Party.--The 
     claimant shall be required to name the manufacturer of the 
     implant as a party to the action, unless--
       (1) the manufacturer is subject to service of process 
     solely in a jurisdiction in which the biomaterials supplier 
     is not domiciled or subject to a service of process; or
       (2) an action against the manufacturer is barred by 
     applicable law.
       (c) Proceeding on Motion To Dismiss.--The following rules 
     shall apply to any proceeding on a motion to dismiss filed 
     under this section:
       (1) Affidavits relating to listing and declarations.--
       (A) In general.--The defendant in the action may submit an 
     affidavit demonstrating that defendant has not included the 
     implant on a list, if any, filed with the Secretary pursuant 
     to section 510(j) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
     (21 U.S.C. 360(j)).
       (B) Response to motion to dismiss.--In response to the 
     motion to dismiss, the claimant may submit an affidavit 
     demonstrating that--
       (i) the Secretary has, with respect to the defendant and 
     the implant that allegedly caused harm to the claimant, 
     issued a declaration pursuant to section 5(b)(2)(B); or
       (ii) the defendant who filed the motion to dismiss is a 
     seller of the implant who is liable under section 5(c).
       (2) Effect of motion to dismiss on discovery.--
       (A) In general.--If a defendant files a motion to dismiss 
     under paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (a), no discovery 
     shall be permitted in connection to the action that is the 
     subject of the motion, other than discovery necessary to 
     determine a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, until 
     such time as the court rules on the motion to dismiss in 
     accordance with the affidavits submitted by the parties in 
     accordance with this section.
       (B) Discovery.--If a defendant files a motion to dismiss 
     under subsection (a)(2)(B)(i) on the grounds that the 
     biomaterials supplier did not furnish raw materials or 
     component parts in violation of contractual requirements or 
     specifications, the court may permit discovery, as ordered by 
     the court. The discovery conducted pursuant to this 
     subparagraph shall be limited to issues that are directly 
     relevant to--
       (i) the pending motion to dismiss; or
       (ii) the jurisdiction of the court.
       (3) Affidavits relating status of defendant.--
       (A) In general.--Except as provided in clauses (i) and (ii) 
     of subparagraph (B), the court shall consider a defendant to 
     be a biomaterials supplier who is not subject to an action 
     for harm to a claimant caused by an implant, other than an 
     action relating to liability for a violation of contractual 
     requirements or specifications described in subsection (d).
       (B) Responses to motion to dismiss.--The court shall grant 
     a motion to dismiss any action that asserts liability of the 
     defendant under subsection (b) or (c) of section 5 on the 
     grounds that the defendant is not a manufacturer subject to 
     such section 5(b) or seller subject to section 5(c), unless 
     the claimant submits a valid affidavit that demonstrates 
     that--
       (i) with respect to a motion to dismiss contending the 
     defendant is not a manufacturer, the defendant meets the 
     applicable requirements for liability as a manufacturer under 
     section 5(b); or
       (ii) with respect to a motion to dismiss contending that 
     the defendant is not a seller, the defendant meets the 
     applicable requirements for liability as a seller under 
     section 5(c).
       (4) Basis of ruling on motion to dismiss.--
       (A) In general.--The court shall rule on a motion to 
     dismiss filed under subsection (a) solely on the basis of the 
     pleadings of the parties made pursuant to this section and 
     any affidavits submitted by the parties pursuant to this 
     section.
       (B) Motion for summary judgment.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of law, if the court determines that the pleadings 
     and affidavits made by parties pursuant to this section raise 
     genuine issues as concerning material facts with respect to a 
     motion concerning contractual requirements and 
     specifications, the court may deem the motion to dismiss to 
     be a motion for summary judgment made pursuant to subsection 
     (d).
       (d) Summary Judgment.--
       (1) In general.--
       (A) Basis for entry of judgment.--A biomaterials supplier 
     shall be entitled to entry of judgment without trial if the 
     court finds there is no genuine issue as concerning any 
     material fact for each applicable element set forth in 
     paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 5(d).
       (B) Issues of material fact.--With respect to a finding 
     made under subparagraph (A), the court shall consider a 
     genuine issue of material fact to exist only if the evidence 
     submitted by claimant would be sufficient to allow a 
     reasonable jury to reach a verdict for the claimant if the 
     jury found the evidence to be credible.
       (2) Discovery made prior to a ruling on a motion for 
     summary judgment.--If, under applicable rules, the court 
     permits discovery prior to a ruling on a motion for summary 
     judgment made pursuant to this subsection, such discovery 
     shall be limited solely to establishing whether a genuine 
     issue of material fact exists as to the applicable elements 
     set forth in paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 5(d).
       (3) Discovery with respect to a biomaterials supplier.--A 
     biomaterials supplier shall be subject to discovery in 
     connection with a motion seeking dismissal or summary 
     judgment on the basis of the inapplicability of section 5(d) 
     or the failure to establish the applicable elements of 
     section 5(d) solely to the extent permitted by the applicable 
     Federal or State rules for discovery against nonparties.
       (e) Stay Pending Petition for Declaration.--If a claimant 
     has filed a petition for a declaration pursuant to section 
     5(b)(3)(A) with respect to a defendant, and the Secretary has 
     not issued a final decision on the petition, the court shall 
     stay all proceedings with respect to that defendant until 
     such time as the Secretary has issued a final decision on the 
     petition.
       (f) Manufacturer Conduct of Proceeding.--The manufacturer 
     of an implant that is the subject of an action covered under 
     this Act shall be permitted to file and conduct a proceeding 
     on any motion for summary judgment or dismissal filed by a 
     biomaterials supplier who is a defendant under this section 
     if the manufacturer and any other defendant in such action 
     enter into a valid and applicable contractual agreement under 
     which the manufacturer agrees to bear the cost of such 
     proceeding or to conduct such proceeding.
       (g) Attorney Fees.--The court shall require the claimant to 
     compensate the biomaterials supplier (or a manufacturer 
     appearing in lieu of a supplier pursuant to subsection (f)) 
     for attorney fees and costs, if--
       (1) the claimant named or joined the biomaterials supplier; 
     and
       (2) the court found the claim against the biomaterials 
     supplier to be without merit and frivolous.

     SEC. 7. APPLICABILITY.

       This Act shall apply to all civil actions covered under 
     this Act that are commenced on or after the date of enactment 
     of this Act, including any such action with respect to which 
     the harm asserted in the action or the conduct that caused 
     the harm occurred before the date of enactment of this Act.

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, Senator Lieberman and I are here to 
announce the introduction of bipartisan legislation to address a health 
care crisis facing over 7 million Americans who each year receive life-
saving or life-enhancing medical implants. The availability of these 
implants is jeopardized because the suppliers of raw materials used in 
the implants can no longer afford to expose themselves to the 
ridiculous and unjust litigation costs that can result from doing 
business with implant makers.
  The problem is that, in the quest for a deep pocket, biomaterials 
suppliers are roped into product liability lawsuits concerning the 
implant even though those suppliers are not involved in the design, 
sale or manufacture of the implant. Biomaterials suppliers just provide 
raw materials used in the production of vital medical devices such as 
brain shunts, pacemakers, and artificial joints.
  In virtually every case, biomaterials suppliers are not found liable 
in these lawsuits. Unfortunately, the massive cost of defending these 
lawsuits often overwhelms the relatively small

[[Page S1676]]

amount of revenue biomaterials suppliers receive through the sale of 
their product to implant makers. As one might expect, biomaterials 
suppliers are deciding they cannot risk financial ruin to supply 
biomaterials.
  This bill, the Biomaterials Access Assurance Act of 1997, shields 
biomaterials suppliers from the crushing costs of unwarranted 
litigation. The bill simply permits suppliers of biomaterials to be 
quickly dismissed from a lawsuit if they did not manufacture or sell 
the implant and if they met the contract specifications for the 
biomaterial. This bill will not prohibit someone who has been injured 
from filing a lawsuit and recovering damages.
  This legislation is critically important to saving lives. In 1995, 
Tara Ransom, a young girl from Arizona, wrote me a letter indicating 
her concern that she would die because a new brain shunt would not be 
available for her. Tara has a life-threatening condition called 
hydrocephalus where excess fluid builds up on the brain. Without a 
silicone-based brain shunt to drain the fluid build-up, the pressure 
would likely kill Tara.
  The supplier of the silicone for Tara's brain shunt has indicated 
they must withdraw from the biomaterials market due to the risk of 
unwarranted litigation. Thirteen other companies have also indicated 
they will no longer supply biomaterials due to concerns about 
unwarranted litigation.
  We cannot let this insanity continue. Lives are at stake, and we have 
a moral duty to Tara and the thousands of others whose lives are at 
stake to pass this litigation.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I am pleased today to join with my 
colleagues, Senator McCain and Senator Lieberman, in supporting 
biomaterials access assurance legislation to confront a looming health 
care crisis in our country.
  This legislation is of vital importance to the 8 million Americans 
who require life-saving and life-enhancing implantable medical devices. 
Most of us have a family member or friend who has benefitted from these 
wondrous products. The availability of the biomaterials necessary for 
medical device production is critical to the health of millions of 
Americans. The ramifications of unavailability are severe and, in the 
end, it is those in need of the devices who will suffer the most.
  This bill helps to curtail the impending health crisis by encouraging 
suppliers of raw materials and component parts to re-enter the medical 
implant market. Under the bill's provisions, a supplier of raw 
materials and/or component parts cannot be sued for design or 
manufacturing deficiencies of the final product unless the supplier can 
properly be classified as the designer, manufacturer or seller of the 
product as a whole.
  In recent years, and due in no small part to the prospect of 
derivative participation in broad-based lawsuits, major biomaterial 
suppliers have expressed their intent to limit or cease their shipments 
to manufacturers in the medical implant device market. Often, such a 
supplier has minimal or no knowledge or control of the design, 
manufacture or sale of an implant device. Nonetheless, under current 
product liability law, such a supplier can be named as a defendant in a 
product liability lawsuit based on the design, manufacture and sale of 
the device itself. And, although suppliers have been found not liable 
in the overwhelming number of such lawsuits, they must give great 
consideration to potential damage verdicts and the oppressive financial 
burden of lawsuit defense costs before deciding to supply manufacturers 
with raw materials and component parts.

  The detrimental effects of the biomaterials shortage are beginning to 
take their toll.
  Although the United States has been a leader in the medical implant 
field, that may change as our ability to focus on new technologies and 
to contribute funds to research and development is impaired by the 
diversion of available resources now directed to the search for and 
qualification of alternative biomaterials suppliers.
  As medical device manufacturers find it increasingly difficult to 
obtain needed raw materials and component parts, the industry's 
research and development resources, otherwise devoted to improving 
existing health care technologies, are drained and redirected to ensure 
material availability to meet current production demand. In some 
instances, no alternative sources for materials are found to exist.
  Just as many suppliers cannot afford the risk of liability suits, 
many manufacturers cannot afford the terms of indemnification contracts 
required by suppliers. Consider the case of Baxter Healthcare Corp., 
which operates a manufacturing plant in Cleveland, MS, employing 
approximately 1,000 people. A major manufacturer of life-saving and 
life-enhancing implantable medical devices such as heart valves, sewing 
rings, and left ventricular assist devices, Baxter is highly dependent 
upon medical-grade biomaterials for production.
  In facing a future based upon operation within this shortage 
scenario, Baxter is now diverting millions of dollars from research and 
development to fund its quest for finding alternative materials. Like 
manufacturers in other parts of the country, Baxter is dealing with 
suppliers that are faced with product liability risks that far exceed 
the benefit gained in dealing with a medical device manufacturer.
  For example, Baxter needed to purchase resin--less than 10 pounds a 
year--with a cost on the open market of less than $3 per pound. The 
supplier required an iron-clad indemnification contract before the 
materials could be sold to Baxter, and also demanded an annual fee of 
nearly $100,000 over and above normal material costs for continued use 
of the material--in other words, a surcharge for the risk associated 
with potential liability.
  This drain on manufacturers, as well as the uncertainty of obtaining 
any materials for the manufacture of their products, is directly 
attributable to the biomaterials shortage.
  Mr. President, the stability of the manufacturing process is in 
constant peril, and patients' lives hang in the balance. Let's act to 
limit liability to instances of genuine fault, and not encourage more 
frivolous lawsuits where they are, in fact, so often detrimental to 
consumer interests.
  It is my hope that the Senate will recognize the seriousness of the 
biomaterials shortage and that we will support this effort to encourage 
suppliers to re-enter the medical device market and to ensure that 
patients have available these critical, often life-saving options.
  Thank you, Mr. President, for the opportunity to articulate the 
urgency and criticality of this legislation.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. COVERDELL:
  S. 365. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide 
for increased accountability by Internal Revenue Service agents and 
other Federal Government officials in tax collection practices and 
procedures, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Finance.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. COVERDELL (for himself, Mrs. Hutchison, Mr. McCain, Mr. 
        Faircloth, Mr. Kyl, Mr. Thomas, and Mr. Inhofe):
  S. 366. A bill to amend the Congressional Budget and Impoundment 
Control Act of 1974 to prohibit the consideration of retroactive tax 
increases; to the Committee on the Budget and the Committee on 
Governmental Affairs, jointly, pursuant to the order of August 4, 1977, 
that if one Committee reports, the other Committee have 30 days to 
report or be discharged.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. COVERDELL (for himself, Mr. Abraham, Mrs. Hutchison, Mr. 
        McCain, Mr. Kyl, Mr. Faircloth, and Mr. Inhofe):
  S.J. Res. 17. A joint resolution proposing an amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States to prohibit retroactive increases in 
taxes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.


                         TAX REFORM LEGISLATION

  Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, today I rise to offer a tax reform 
package to provide greater tax fairness and to protect citizens from 
Internal Revenue Service--IRS--abuses. This package includes three 
initiatives: a constitutional amendment called the retroactive tax ban 
amendment, a bill to establish a new budget point of order against 
retroactive taxation, and the Internal Revenue Service Accountability 
Act.
  The first, the retroactive tax ban amendment, is a constitutional 
amendment to prevent the Federal Government from imposing any tax 
increase

[[Page S1677]]

retroactively. The amendment states simply ``No Federal tax shall be 
imposed for the period before the date of enactment.'' We have heard 
directly from the taxpayers, and looking backward for extra taxes is 
unacceptable. It is not a fair way to deal with taxpayers.
  In addition, I am introducing a bill that would create a point of 
order under the Budget Act against retroactive tax increases. Because 
amending the Constitution can be a very long prospect--just look at the 
decades-long effort on behalf of the balanced budget amendment--I 
believe this legislation is necessary to provide needed protection for 
American families from the destabilizing effects of retroactive 
taxation.
  It was clear to Thomas Jefferson that the only way to preserve 
freedom was to protect its citizens from oppressive taxation. Even the 
Russian Constitution does not allow you to tax retroactively. 
Retroactive taxation is wrong, and it is morally incorrect.
  Families and businesses and communities must know what the rules of 
the road are and that those rules will not change. They have to be able 
to plan their lives, plan their families, and plan their tax burdens in 
advance. They cannot come to the end of a year and have a Congress of 
the United States and a President come forward and say, ``All your 
planning was for naught, and we don't care.''
  Mr. President, my third proposal is the Internal Revenue Service 
Accountability Act. It is wide-ranging and deals with a number of 
faults within the IRS that I have become aware through my constituent 
services work and through discussions with everyday Americans. Whenever 
I travel through my State, or across the Nation for that matter, 
concerns inevitably are raised about the IRS. This agency seems to 
believe the vast majority of American taxpayers are looking to cheat 
the Government. Instead, I believe American taxpayers are honest and 
hardworking, and they deserve to be treated accordingly.
  Our Nation suffers under an unfair and incomprehensible tax code that 
takes far too much of what we earn. Even worse, the organization 
responsible for enforcement of the tax code--the IRS--often seeks to 
intimidate and frighten honest citizens. We cannot tolerate a Tax Code 
that punishes families, and we cannot tolerate an IRS eager to bully 
and harass taxpayers.

  Let me briefly outline my proposal. First, the IRS Accountability Act 
would make agents of the IRS responsible for their actions. My 
legislation would make it a crime for an agent to use extortion-like 
tactics when collecting a tax. Agents must know there are real 
consequences for their actions. When they abuse their authority by 
maliciously and willfully disregarding the statutory procedures 
established for collecting taxes from honest taxpayers, they must be 
held accountable.
  In addition, this legislation would lift the current shield 
protecting IRS agents from holding any personal liability for their 
actions in the course of collecting a tax. I was surprised to learn 
that this shield remains in place even when their abusive actions 
result in judgments against the United States for hundreds of thousands 
of dollars. How ironic that American taxpayers end up footing the bill 
for the abuses they suffer. My legislation would end this intolerable 
arrangement.
  My legislation also protects the privacy of taxpayers. A few years 
back, I was shocked to learn that nearly 370 employees of the Atlanta 
IRS office were caught accessing the tax returns and return information 
of friends, neighbors, and celebrities without proper authorization. 
They were file snooping. The IRS Accountability Act would make this 
activity a crime and allows the offender to be held personally liable.
  Further, my legislation requires notification of any taxpayer who 
suffers this abuse. Unfortunately, what should seem to be a simple 
matter of decency must be required of the IRS. In response to 
suggestions taxpayers be notified when their privacy has been invaded 
by file snoopers, IRS Commissioner Margaret Richardson stated, ``I'm 
not sure there would be serious value to that in terms of protecting 
the taxpayers' rights.'' With all respect, such sentiment is typical of 
a Washington status quo mentality that is out-of-touch with the rest of 
America.
  Recent reports in the press suggesting the IRS has been conducting 
audits for political reasons, add weight to the need for limitations on 
this activity. The IRS Accountability Act requires that all audits be 
reasonably justified. It also prohibits random audits and reauditing of 
returns or issues of a return unless approved by court order in the 
course of a criminal investigation. Further, the IRS will be limited 
explicitly to 3 years from the time a return is filed in which to 
conduct an audit unless approved by court order in the course of a 
criminal investigation.
  The IRS Accountability Act also would extend the time responsible 
taxpayers have to pay a tax without suffering a penalty. I could not 
say how often I hear complaints about the inaccessibility of the IRS. 
Time and time again, taxpayers cannot get answers from the IRS or even 
speak with a customer service agent.

  According to the IRS Taxpayer Advocate's recent report, one of the 
most common complaints against the IRS is its failure to acknowledge 
taxpayer correspondence.
  The IRS's only responses seems to be more threats and higher 
penalties. The IRS Accountability Act will help taxpayers by offering 
some needed relief.
  This legislation also preserves the integrity of judicial decisions 
against the IRS. This section grants a Federal court the authority to 
dismiss a case of controversy involving the IRS if it is shown that a 
similar or identical case already has been decided within the court's 
jurisdiction or circuit. The IRS places itself above our Federal 
judiciary and will choose to disregard a court decision in subsequent 
cases when it believes the court's decision is in error. This arrogance 
must be held in check.
  Mr. President, this legislation would place limits I believe are 
needed on the IRS when it seizes or levies assets. How many times have 
we heard press reports that a child's earnings from a paper route has 
been seized or that a child's pennies have been taken to pay the tax 
bill of a relative.
  In Georgia, I recently learned of an instance where the care and 
health of an elderly nursing home patient was jeopardized by the IRS 
when it seized her account to pay the tax bill of a relative. Even 
though it was well documented that the account contained only her 
Social Security benefits and were used to pay for her care, the IRS 
refused to relent until my office interceded. In addition, we have 
heard numerous examples where assets have been taken erroneously. My 
legislation would ensure that all levies and seizures are proper under 
the law and are warranted by requiring the IRS to obtain prior court 
approval.
  My legislation also places what I believe are reasonable limits on 
the accrual of interest and penalties. Specifically, it would decouple 
the two, preventing interest from accruing on the penalty portion of an 
unpaid tax bill.
  Keep in mind the IRS' track record on responding to taxpayers. 
According to the IRS Taxpayer Advocate, it isn't good. Now add the 
following to the mix: interest on the unpaid tax, penalties on the 
unpaid tax, and interest on the penalty on the unpaid tax. If a 
hardworking taxpayer is unfortunate enough to run afoul of the IRS, 
before he or she knows it, the tax bill has doubled, even tripled. For 
too many taxpayers, when they become aware a problem exists, their bill 
has turned into a burden they cannot hope to pay.
  Further, this legislation would equalize the interest rates charged 
by the IRS and against the IRS. Current law gives the IRS an advantage 
in interest charges over taxpayers. I believe this is predicated on the 
assumption that the Federal Government is more entitled to a taxpayer's 
income than the taxpayer. Nothing should be farther from the truth. 
Requiring equal rates to be charged will provide equity and bring to a 
close another instance where Washington thinks it knows best with what 
to do with families' income.
  Finally, the IRS Accountability Act provides fairness in cases of 
mathematical and clerical errors. For honest mistakes, the taxpayer 
should have an opportunity to correct it without getting slapped by a 
tax bill full of interest and penalty charges. Under my legislation, a 
taxpayer would have a 60-day grace period after notification in which 
to pay the unpaid tax or to file

[[Page S1678]]

an abatement request without incurring penalty or interest charges. 
However, should the 60-day period elapse without the taxpayer selecting 
either option, penalties and interest would be owed in full.
  In closing, Mr. President, let me say what I have stated many times 
before on the floor of the Senate. American families already send 55 
percent of their income to government in the form of taxes and other 
costs. Out of the remaining 45 percent, we expect them to clothe, feed, 
house, educate, and otherwise raise America.
  We also know that if things do not change, future generations will 
face a lifetime tax rate of 84 percent. Already, families are bullied 
and harassed by an agency eager to intimidate. How much farther would 
the IRS be willing to go to collect an 84 percent tax burden? The time 
has come to bring reason to the IRS. I invite my colleagues to join me 
in this effort.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. WELLSTONE:
  S. 367. A bill to amend the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 to 
allow leave to address domestic violence and its effects, and for other 
purposes; to the Committee on Finance.


               battered women's employment protection act

  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, while we have begun to make important 
progress toward seriously addressing the devastating physical and 
emotional effects of domestic violence, little attention has been paid 
to the severe economic consequences of domestic abuse. The Battered 
Women's Employment Protection Act, which I am introducing today, will 
ensure eligibility for unemployment compensation to women who are 
separated from their jobs as a direct result of domestic violence. 
Several new studies illustrate the need for the legislation I am 
introducing today. The evidence is irrefutable, domestic violence 
dramatically affects women's ability to work and support themselves and 
their children.
  According to New York City's Victims Service, one-quarter of battered 
women recently surveyed who have survived abuse had lost their jobs due 
to the effects of domestic violence.
  Abusive husbands and partners harass 74 percent of employed battered 
women at work, either by showing up at the workplace or calling them at 
work. It is not unusual for women in abusive relationships to be late 
for work at least 5 times a month, to leave early at least 5 times a 
month, and to miss at least 3 full days of work a month--National Work-
place Resource Center on Domestic Violence.
  There have been cases brought to my attention in my home State of 
Minnesota where the women trying to escape abusive relationships could 
have benefited from this legislation, and we know that, sadly, there 
are many more such stories throughout the country.
  On February 12, 1997, a woman came into the Women's Rural Advocacy 
Program in Marshall, MN, after her partner had emotionally, verbally, 
and physically assaulted her. After many years of fighting, her abuser 
finally let her get a drivers license and a car. His motivation for 
allowing her to do this was that she could get a job, resulting in more 
money for himself. Three months into her job, her partner assaulted her 
and she was in need of safe housing and constant protection. Because of 
the fear of her abuser finding her and her child, it was not safe for 
her to take their child to daycare, so she was unable to get to work. 
Seeing that this was a new job, she did not have any vacation days she 
could use.
  Her abuser soon found out where she was located. She panicked and 
took her child and left the shelter, presumably the city, her friends, 
and her job. The shelter advocate we spoke to had no idea where she 
went, but was sure she had no money, very little clothes, and no car.
  A woman, known as Sarah, is a 34-year-old college educated mother of 
5 children, all under the age of 12. Sarah and her husband of 15 years 
had a successful market research company. Their combined salaries 
totaled over $225,000. The husband was the president of the company, 
Sarah the vice president. They were equal share holders in the company 
until Sarah came in contact with law enforcement and the Lewis House 
Shelter due to her hospitalization for extensive injuries suffered at 
the hands of her abusive husband.
  Sarah admits that the abuse has gone on for years. She filed for an 
order of protection, filed assault charges, and filed for divorce. Her 
husband then fired Sarah from the company they started. Her lawyer 
tells Sarah that she can sue for her position to be reinstated in the 
company. Sarah knows she is not safe and that nothing can protect her 
or her children from the repeated pattern of abuse. She is faced with 
the loss of her position, her income, legal fees, medical bills, as 
well as the foundation of her children's lives.
  It took Sarah 6 months to find a full-time position. She has 
supported herself by using credit cards she maintained in her own name. 
She begins her new life with $30,000 of new debt. Her batterer 
maintains his company today, with no loss of position and an increase 
in income.
  For women attempting to escape a violent environment, this 
legislation can be a lifeline.
  There has been great progress in the last few years in societal and 
legislative response to violence within the home. One area that has not 
been sufficiently addressed, in my opinion, is the economic cost of 
domestic abuse.
  The Bureau of National Affairs recently estimated that domestic 
violence costs employers between 3 and 5 billion dollars per year. 
Domestic violence results in lower productivity, greater absenteeism, 
and increased health costs.
  The National Institute for Justice estimates that from 1987 to 1990, 
domestic violence cost Americans $67 billion a year.
  According to annual estimates for reported domestic violence 
injuries, family violence exacts a significant economic toll on the 
well-being of the family, and the United States.
  Forty-four million, three hundred ninety-three thousand, seven 
hundred dollars total annual medical costs, 21,000 hospitalizations, 
28,700 emergency room visits, and 175,000 days lost from work.
  In addition--50 to 80 percent of women on AFDC are victims or past 
victims of domestic violence (Taylor Institute Study, 1996). One year 
after divorce, women's incomes average only 67 percent of their pre-
divorce incomes compared to 90 percent for men (Report of the American 
Psychological Association Presidential Task Force on Violence and the 
Family, 1996).
  The Battered Women's Employment Protection Act will help women retain 
employment and financial independence by ensuring that employed victims 
of domestic violence can have time off from work to make necessary 
court appearances, seek legal assistance, and get help with safety 
planning, without penalty from the employer.
  This bill enables employees to use their family, medical, sick, and 
other leave in order to deal with circumstances arising from domestic 
abuse.

  Circumstances that would allow an employee to take leave include 
going to the doctor for injuries caused by domestic violence, seeking 
legal remedies such as going to court, seeking orders of protection, or 
meeting with a lawyer.
  Current Federal and State laws fail to address the negative economic 
consequences domestic violence can cause. Today, battered women are not 
expressly allowed to take leave from work to address the consequences 
of family violence--both the physical and legal effects. This bill will 
help women to escape abusive situations by helping them retain 
employment and financial independence. And, by requiring employers to 
provide leave to employees for the purpose of dealing with domestic 
violence and its aftermath--it does not increase costs to employers, it 
permits employees to use their existing leave to deal with domestic 
violence.
  Furthermore, to ensure that battered women can retain the 
independence necessary to leave their abusers without having to rely on 
welfare, the bill requires that States provide unemployment benefits to 
women who are forced to leave work as a result of domestic abuse. The 
bill ensures eligibility for unemployment compensation to women who are 
separated from their jobs as a direct result of domestic violence. For 
example, victims of abuse could not be denied unemployment if they were 
forced to leave their jobs because they had to relocate for safety

[[Page S1679]]

reasons. Similarly, a woman would be eligible for unemployment 
compensation if she was fired from her job because she repeatedly 
showed up late for work with physical signs of abuse or was excessively 
absent from work as a result of abuse. In addition, the bill provides 
for specialized training of personnel in assessing unemployment 
compensation claims based on domestic violence.
  All of us here today are committed to doing what we can to help 
battered women and their children escape domestic violence. I urge my 
colleagues to join in this effort by cosponsoring the Battered Women's 
Employment Protection Act.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                 S. 367

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND REFERENCE.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Battered 
     Women's Employment Protection Act ''.
       (b) Reference.--Whenever in this Act an amendment or repeal 
     is expressed in terms of an amendment to, or repeal of, a 
     section or other provision, the reference shall be considered 
     to be made to a section or other provision of the Family and 
     Medical Leave Act of 1993 (29 U.S.C. 2601 et seq.).

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.

       (a) Findings.--Congress finds that--
       (1) violence against women is the leading cause of physical 
     injury to women, and the Department of Justice estimates that 
     intimate partners commit more than 1,000,000 violent crimes 
     against women every year;
       (2) approximately 95 percent of the victims of domestic 
     violence are women;
       (3) in the United States, a woman is more likely to be 
     assaulted, injured, raped, or killed by a male partner than 
     by any other type of assailant;
       (4) the Bureau of Labor Statistics predicts that women will 
     account for two-thirds of all new entrants into the workforce 
     between now and the year 2000;
       (5) violence against women dramatically affects women's 
     workforce participation, insofar as one-quarter of the 
     battered women surveyed had lost a job due at least in part 
     to the effects of domestic violence, and over one-half had 
     been harassed by their abuser at work;
       (6) a study by Domestic Violence Intervention Services, Inc 
     found that 96 percent of employed domestic violence victims 
     had some type of problem in the workplace as a direct result 
     of their abuse or abuser;
       (7) the availability of economic support is a critical 
     factor in a women's ability to leave abusive situations that 
     threaten them and their children, and over one-half of the 
     battered women surveyed stayed with their batterers because 
     they lacked resources to support themselves and their 
     children;
       (8) a report by the New York City Victims Services Agency 
     found that abusive spouses and lovers harass 74 percent of 
     battered women at work, 54 percent of battering victims miss 
     at least 3 days of work per month, 56 percent are late for 
     work at least 5 times per month, and a University of 
     Minnesota study found that 24 percent of women in support 
     groups for battered women had lost a job partly because of 
     being abused;
       (9) a survey of State unemployment insurance agency 
     directors by the Federal Advisory Council on Unemployment 
     Compensation found that in 31 States battered women who leave 
     work as a result of domestic violence do not qualify for 
     unemployment benefits, in 9 States the determination often 
     varies depending on the facts and circumstances, and in only 
     13 States are they usually considered qualified for 
     unemployment benefits;
       (10) a study by the New York State Department of Labor 
     found that, when filing for unemployment insurance benefits, 
     domestic violence victims frequently hide their victimization 
     and do not disclose the domestic violence as a reason for 
     their problems with the job or need to separate from 
     employment;
       (11) 49 percent of senior executives recently surveyed said 
     domestic violence has a harmful effect on their company's 
     productivity, 47 percent said domestic violence negatively 
     affects attendance, and 44 percent said domestic violence 
     increases health care costs, and the Bureau of National 
     Affairs estimates that domestic violence costs employers 
     between $3,000,000,000 and $5,000,000,000 per year; and
       (12) existing Federal and State legislation does not 
     expressly authorize battered women to take leave from work to 
     seek legal assistance and redress, counseling, or assistance 
     with safety planning and activities.
       (b) Purposes.--Pursuant to the affirmative power of 
     Congress to enact this Act under section 5 of the Fourteenth 
     Amendment to the Constitution, as well as under clause 1 of 
     section 8 of Article I of the Constitution and clause 3 of 
     section 8 of Article I of the Constitution, the purposes of 
     this Act are--
       (1) to promote the national interest in reducing domestic 
     violence by enabling victims of domestic violence to maintain 
     the financial independence necessary to leave abusive 
     situations, to achieve safety and minimize the physical and 
     emotional injuries from domestic violence, and to reduce the 
     devastating economic consequences of domestic violence to 
     employers and employees, by--
       (A) providing unemployment insurance for victims of 
     domestic violence who are forced to leave their employment as 
     a result of domestic violence; and
       (B) entitling employed victims of domestic violence to take 
     reasonable leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 
     1993 (29 U.S.C. 2601 et seq.) to seek medical help, legal 
     assistance, counseling, and safety planning and assistance 
     without penalty from their employer;
       (2) to promote the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment by 
     protecting the civil and economic rights of victims of 
     domestic violence and by furthering the equal opportunity of 
     women to employment and economic self-sufficiency;
       (3) to minimize the negative impact on interstate commerce 
     from dislocations of employees and harmful effects on 
     productivity, health care costs, and employer costs from 
     domestic violence; and
       (4) to accomplish the purposes described in paragraphs (1) 
     , (2) and (3) in a manner that accommodates the legitimate 
     interests of employers.

     SEC. 3. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION.

       (a) Unemployment compensation.--Section 3304(a) of the 
     Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended--
       (1) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (18);
       (2) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (19) and 
     inserting ``; and'';
       (3) by adding after paragraph (19) the following:
       ``(20) compensation is to be provided where an individual 
     is separated from employment due to circumstances directly 
     resulting from the individual's experience of domestic 
     violence.'';
       (4) by redesignating subsections (b) through (f) as 
     subsections (c) through (g), respectively, and
       (5) by inserting after subsection (a) the following:
       ``(b) Construction.--
       ``(1) Directly resulting from violence.--For the purpose of 
     determining, under subsection (a)(20), whether an employee's 
     separation from employment is `directly resulting' from the 
     individual's experience of domestic violence, it shall be 
     sufficient if the separation from employment resulted from--
       ``(A) the employee's reasonable fear of future domestic 
     violence at or en route to or from her place of employment;
       ``(B) the employee's wish to relocate to another geographic 
     area in order to avoid future domestic violence against the 
     employee or the employee's family;
       ``(C) the employee's need to recover from traumatic stress 
     resulting from the employee's experience of domestic 
     violence;
       ``(D) the employer's denial of the employee's request for 
     the temporary leave from employment to address domestic 
     violence and its effects authorized by section 102 of the 
     Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (29 U.S.C. 2612); or
       ``(E) any other respect in which domestic violence causes 
     the employee to reasonably believe that termination of 
     employment is necessary for the future safety of the employee 
     or the employee's family.
       ``(2) Reasonable efforts to retain employment.--For 
     purposes of subsection (a)(20), where State law requires the 
     employee to have made reasonable efforts to retain employment 
     as a condition for receiving unemployment compensation, it 
     shall be sufficient that the employee--
       ``(A) sought protection from or assistance in responding to 
     domestic violence, including calling the police or seeking 
     legal, social work, medical, clergy, or other assistance;
       ``(B) sought safety, including refuge in a shelter or 
     temporary or permanent relocation, whether or not the 
     employee actually obtained such refuge or accomplished such 
     relocation; or
       ``(C) reasonably believed that options such as a leave, 
     transfer, or alternative work schedule would not be 
     sufficient to guarantee the employee or the employee's 
     family's safety.
       ``(3) Active employment search.--For purposes of subsection 
     (a)(20), where State law requires the employee to actively 
     search for employment after separation from employment as a 
     condition for receiving unemployment compensation, such 
     requirement shall be deemed to be met where the employee is 
     temporarily unable to actively search for employment because 
     the employee is engaged in seeking safety or relief for the 
     employee or the employee's family from domestic violence, 
     including--
       ``(A) going into hiding or relocating or attempting to do 
     so, including activities associated with such relocation or 
     hiding, such as seeking to obtain sufficient shelter, food, 
     schooling for children, or other necessities of life for the 
     employee or the employee's family;
       ``(B) actively pursuing legal protection or remedies, 
     including meeting with the police, going to court to make 
     inquiries or file papers, meeting with attorneys, or 
     attending court proceedings; or
       ``(C) participating in psychological, social, or religious 
     counseling or support activities to assist the employee in 
     ending domestic violence.
       ``(4) Requirement to provide documentation or other 
     evidence.--In determining if

[[Page S1680]]

     an employee meets the requirements of paragraphs (1), (2), 
     and (3), the employer of an employee may require the employee 
     to provide--
       ``(A) documentation of the domestic violence, such as 
     police or court records, or documentation of the domestic 
     violence from a shelter worker, attorney, clergy, or medical 
     or other professional from whom the employee has sought 
     assistance in addressing domestic violence and its effects; 
     or
       ``(B) other corroborating evidence, such as a statement 
     from any other individual with knowledge of the circumstances 
     which provide the basis for the claim, or physical evidence 
     of domestic violence, such as photographs, torn or bloody 
     clothes, or other similar evidence.

     All evidence of domestic violence experienced by an employee, 
     including an employee's statement, any corroborating 
     evidence, and the fact that an employee has applied for or 
     inquired about unemployment compensation available under 
     subsection (a)(20) shall be retained in the strictest 
     confidence of the employer, except to the extent consented to 
     by the employee where disclosure is necessary to protect the 
     employee's safety.''.
       (b) Social Security Personnel Training.--Section 303(a) of 
     the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 503(a)(4)) is amended by 
     redesignating paragraphs (4) through (10) as paragraphs (5) 
     through (11), respectively, and by inserting after paragraph 
     (3) the following:
       ``(4) Such methods of administration as will ensure that 
     claims reviewers and hearing personnel are adequately trained 
     in the nature and dynamics of domestic violence and in 
     methods of ascertaining and keeping confidential information 
     about possible experiences of domestic violence, so that 
     employment separations stemming from domestic violence are 
     reliably screened, identified, and adjudicated and full 
     confidentiality is provided for the employee's claim and 
     submitted evidence.''.
       (c) Definitions.--Section 3306 of the Internal Revenue Code 
     of 1986 is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(u) Domestic violence.--The term `domestic violence' 
     includes abuse committed against an employee or a family 
     member of the employee by--
       ``(1) a current or former spouse of the employee;
       ``(2) a person with whom the employee shares a child in 
     common;
       ``(3) a person who is cohabitating with or has cohabitated 
     with the employee as a romantic or intimate partner; or
       ``(4) a person from whom the employee would be eligible for 
     protection under the domestic violence, protection order, or 
     family laws of the jurisdiction in which the employee resides 
     or the employer is located.
       ``(v) Abuse.--The term `abuse' includes--
       ``(1) physical acts resulting in, or threatening to result 
     in, physical injury;
       ``(2) sexual abuse, sexual activity involving a dependent 
     child, or threats of or attempts at sexual abuse;
       ``(3) mental abuse, including threats, intimidation, acts 
     designed to induce terror, or restraints on liberty; and
       ``(4) deprivation of medical care, housing, food or other 
     necessities of life.''.

     SEC. 4. ENTITLEMENT TO LEAVE FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE.

       (a) Authority for Leave.--Section 102(a)(1) (29 U.S.C. 
     2612(a)(1)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(E) In order to care for the child or parent of the 
     employee, if such child or parent is addressing domestic 
     violence and its effects.
       ``(F) Because the employee is addressing domestic violence 
     and its effects, the employee is unable to perform any of the 
     functions of the position of such employee.''.
       (b) Definition.--Section 101 (29 U.S.C. 2611) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:
       ``(14) Addressing domestic violence and its effects.--The 
     term `addressing domestic violence and its effects' means--
       ``(A) experiencing domestic violence;
       ``(B) seeking medical attention for or recovering from 
     injuries caused by domestic violence;
       ``(C) seeking legal assistance or remedies, including 
     communicating with the police or an attorney, or 
     participating in any legal proceeding related to domestic 
     violence;
       ``(D) attending support groups for victims of domestic 
     violence;
       ``(E) obtaining psychological counseling related to 
     experiences of domestic violence;
       ``(F) participating in safety planning and other actions to 
     increase safety from future domestic violence, including 
     temporary or permanent relocation; and
       ``(G) any other activity necessitated by domestic violence 
     which must be undertaken during hours of employment.''.
       (c) Intermittent or Reduced Leave.--Section 102(b) (29 
     U.S.C. 2612(b)) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following:
       ``(3) Domestic violence.--Leave under subparagraph (E) or 
     (F) of subsection (a)(1) may be taken by an employee 
     intermittently or on a reduced leave schedule. The taking of 
     leave intermittently or on a reduced leave schedule pursuant 
     to this paragraph shall not result in a reduction in the 
     total amount of leave to which the employee is entitled under 
     subsection (a) beyond the amount of leave actually taken.''.
       (d) Paid Leave.--Section 102(d)(2)(B) (29 U.S.C. 
     2612(d)(2)(B)) is amended by striking ``(C) or (D)'' and 
     inserting ``(C), (D), (E), or (F)''.
       (e) Certification.--Section 103 (29 U.S.C. 2613) is amended 
     by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (f) and by 
     inserting after subsection (d) the following:
       ``(e) Domestic Violence.--In determining if an employee 
     meets the requirements of subparagraph (E) or (F) of section 
     102(a)(1), the employer of an employee may require the 
     employee to provide--
       ``(1) documentation of the domestic violence, such as 
     police or court records, or documentation of the domestic 
     violence from a shelter worker, attorney, clergy, or medical 
     or other professional from whom the employee has sought 
     assistance in addressing domestic violence and its effects; 
     or
       ``(2) other corroborating evidence, such as a statement 
     from any other individual with knowledge of the circumstances 
     which provide the basis for the claim, or physical evidence 
     of domestic violence, such as photographs, torn or bloody 
     clothes, etc.''.
       (f) Confidentiality.--Section 103 (29 U.S.C. 2613), as 
     amended by subsection (e), is amended--
       (1) in the title by adding before the period the following: 
     ``; CONFIDENTIALITY''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(f) Confidentiality.--All evidence of domestic violence 
     experienced by an employee or the employee's child or parent, 
     including an employee's statement, any corroborating 
     evidence, and the fact that an employee has requested leave 
     for the purpose of addressing domestic violence and its 
     effects, shall be retained in the strictest confidence by the 
     employer, except to the extent consented to by the employee 
     where disclosure is necessary to protect the employee's 
     safety.''.

     SEC. 5. ENTITLEMENT TO LEAVE FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYEES FOR 
                   DOMESTIC VIOLENCE.

       (a) Authority for Leave.--Section 6382 of title 5, United 
     States Code is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(E) In order to care for the child or parent of the 
     employee, if such child or parent is addressing domestic 
     violence and its effects.
       ``(F) Because the employee is addressing domestic violence 
     and its effects, the employee is unable to perform any of the 
     functions of the position of such employee.''.
       (b) Definition.--Section 6381 of title 5, United States 
     Code is amended--
       (1) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (5);
       (2) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (6) and 
     inserting ``; and''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(7) the term `addressing domestic violence and its 
     effects' means--
       ``(A) experiencing domestic violence;
       ``(B) seeking medical attention for or recovering from 
     injuries caused by domestic violence;
       ``(C) seeking legal assistance or remedies, including 
     communicating with the police or an attorney, or 
     participating in any legal proceeding related to domestic 
     violence;
       ``(D) attending support groups for victims of domestic 
     violence;
       ``(E) obtaining psychological counseling related to 
     experiences of domestic violence;
       ``(F) participating in safety planning and other actions to 
     increase safety from future domestic violence, including 
     temporary or permanent relocation; and
       ``(G) any other activity necessitated by domestic violence 
     which must be undertaken during hours of employment.''.
       (c) Intermittent or Reduced Leave.--Section 6382(b) of 
     title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end 
     the following:
       ``(3) Leave under subparagraph (E) or (F) of subsection 
     (a)(1) may be taken by an employee intermittently or on a 
     reduced leave schedule. The taking of leave intermittently or 
     on a reduced leave schedule pursuant to this paragraph shall 
     not result in a reduction in the total amount of leave to 
     which the employee is entitled under subsection (a) beyond 
     the amount of leave actually taken.''.
       (d) Other Leave.--Section 6382(d) of title 5, United States 
     Code, is amended by striking ``(C) or (D)'' and inserting 
     ``(C), (D), (E), or (F)''.
       (e) Certification.--Section 6383 of title 5, United States 
     Code, is amended by redesignating subsection (e) as 
     subsection (f) and by inserting after subsection (d) the 
     following:
       ``(e) Domestic Violence.--In determining if an employee 
     meets the requirements of subparagraph (E) or (F) of section 
     6382(a)(1), the employer of an employee may require the 
     employee to provide--
       ``(1) documentation of the domestic violence, such as 
     police or court records, or documentation of the domestic 
     violence from a shelter worker, attorney, clergy, or medical 
     or other professional from whom the employee has sought 
     assistance in addressing domestic violence and its effects; 
     or
       ``(2) other corroborating evidence, such as a statement 
     from any other individual with knowledge of the circumstances 
     which provide the basis for the claim, or physical evidence 
     of domestic violence, such as photographs, torn or bloody 
     clothes, etc.''.
       (f) Confidentiality.--Section 6383 of title 5, United 
     States Code, as amended by subsection (e), is amended--
       (1) in the title by adding before the period the following: 
     ``; Confidentiality'', and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(g) Confidentiality.--All evidence of domestic violence 
     experienced by an employee or the employee's child or parent, 
     including an employee's statement, any corroborating 
     evidence, and the fact that an employee has requested leave 
     for the purpose of addressing domestic violence and its 
     effects, shall be retained in the strictest confidence by the 
     employer, except to the extent consented to by

[[Page S1681]]

     the employee where disclosure is necessary to protect the 
     employee's safety.''.

     SEC. 6. EFFECT ON OTHER LAWS AND EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS.

       (1) More Protective.--Nothing in this Act or the amendments 
     made by this Act shall be construed to supersede any 
     provision of any Federal, State or local law, collective 
     bargaining agreement, or other employment benefit program 
     which provides greater unemployment compensation or leave 
     benefits for employed victims of domestic violence than the 
     rights established under this Act or such amendments.
       (2) Less Protective.--The rights established for employees 
     under this Act or the amendments made by this Act shall not 
     be diminished by any collective bargaining agreement, any 
     employment benefit program or plan, or any State or local 
     law.

     SEC. 7. EFFECTIVE DATE.

       (a) General Rule.--Except as provided in subsection (b), 
     this Act and the amendments made by this Act shall take 
     effect upon the expiration of 180 days from the date of the 
     enactment of this Act.
       (b) Unemployment Compensation.--
       (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), the 
     amendments made by section 3 shall apply in the case of 
     compensation paid for weeks beginning on or after the 
     expiration of 180 days from the date of the enactment of this 
     Act.
       (2) Meeting of state legislature.--In the case of a State 
     with respect to which the Secretary of Labor has determined 
     that the State legislature is required in order to comply 
     with the amendments made by section 3, the amendments made by 
     section 3 shall apply in the case of compensation paid for 
     weeks which begin on or after the expiration of 180 days from 
     the date of the enactment of this Act and after the end of 
     the first session of the Sate legislature which begins after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act or which began prior to 
     the date of the enactment of this Act and remained in session 
     for at least 25 calendar days after such date of enactment. 
     For purposes of the preceding sentence, the term ``session'' 
     means a regular, special, budget, or other session of a State 
     legislature.

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