[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 22 (Wednesday, February 26, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1650-S1653]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                  FRANK M. TEJEDA POST OFFICE BUILDING

  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Iowa, because 
it is very important that we pass a bill tonight. It is for a fallen 
colleague on the other side of the rotunda. We lost the Congressman 
from San Antonio a few weeks ago at the age of 51 to a battle with 
cancer.
  Frank Tejeda was a great Congressman, he was a great friend, and he 
was a patriot for this country. He left high school at the age of 17, 
joined the Marine Corps, came back and graduated from St. Mary's 
University. He then went on to distinguish himself and earn degrees in 
law from U.C. Berkeley and Yale, as well as a masters in public 
administration from Harvard.
  Frank Tejeda was a hero. He earned the Bronze Star for valor, and 
received the Purple Heart for wounds sustained in combat in Vietnam. 
But most of all, he never forgot where he was from--south San Antonio, 
TX. As a leader in his community and as a public servant, Frank always 
remembered the people he represented and was always there for them.
  For that reason, Mr. President, my colleague Senator Gramm and I want 
to name the Postal Service facility being constructed at 7411 Barlite 
Boulevard in San Antonio, TX, as the ``Frank M. Tejeda Post Office 
Building.'' So I am going to make two unanimous-consent requests to 
discharge H.R. 499, which passed unanimously in the House of 
Representatives on February 5, 1997, in order to complete the naming of 
this post office for a great patriot, a great friend, and a wonderful 
Congressman from Texas.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Governmental Affairs 
Committee be discharged from further consideration of H.R. 499; and 
further, that the Senate proceed to its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk 
will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (H.R. 499) to designate the facility of the United 
     States Postal Service under construction at 7411 Barlite 
     Boulevard in San Antonio, Texas, as the ``Frank M. Tejeda 
     Post Office Building.''

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the immediate 
consideration of the bill?
  There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill.
  Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I am honored to join my colleague, Senator 
Kay Bailey Hutchison, in offering a tribute to our late colleague, 
Congressman Frank Tejeda.
  Frank will be remembered as a man who dedicated his life to serving 
America. He was widely admired for his friendly common sense, but in 
particular for the special place that he kept in his heart for the men 
and women who wear the uniform of our country.
  In his short tenure, Frank Tejeda left his mark on our country, on 
the people of Texas, and most personally on the people of San Antonio, 
who knew him best. It is most fitting that we designate the Post Office 
facility to be constructed in San Antonio as the ``Frank M. Tejeda post 
office Building,'' not to remind people of who Frank was, for they do 
not need to be reminded. We designate the facility in Frank's name to 
recall for future generations that a man, whose life was too short, 
made a difference and will live in our hearts.
  The Frank M. Tejeda Building will stand as a monument for dedication, 
commitment, and for the precept that with God-given talents and the 
will to work, we can do anything we set out to do in America. Frank 
Tejeda epitomized those qualities in his life and we honor him.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Phil Gramm and 
myself, I ask unanimous consent that the bill be deemed read a third 
time and passed; that the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table; 
and that any statements relating to the bill appear at the appropriate 
place in the Record.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The bill (H.R. 499) was deemed read the third time and passed.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Thank you, Mr. President. We have now finally passed 
the bill in both Houses of Congress that will name a post office for 
Frank M.

[[Page S1651]]

Tejeda. It is a fitting tribute to a wonderful former Member of the 
U.S. Congress. Senator Gramm and I are very proud to have served with 
him and to cosponsor this bill.
  I thank the Senator from Iowa, and I yield the floor.
  Mr. GRASSLEY addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa.


                the fbi and the alcee m. hastings matter

  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, yesterday I spoke to my colleagues about 
management problems within the FBI, and within the Bureau's reputed 
crime lab. I spoke about the consequences of this mismanagement. 
Confidence and trust in the Nation's premiere law enforcement agency is 
dwindling. It is because of the FBI's own abuses of its very enormous 
powers.
  Yesterday, I mentioned that I would talk about a specific case, with 
specific allegations. The case involves apparent false statements and 
evidence tempering by an FBI agent in a high profile case brought 
before the Federal judicial system and the U.S. Congress.
  In a letter to me dated February 21, FBI Deputy Director Weldon 
Kennedy stated that the Justice Department inspector general ``found no 
instance of perjury evidence tampering, evidence fabrication, or 
failure to report exculpatory evidence.''
  Mr. President, my first response to that is as follows: The IG 
investigation was not a criminal investigation. It therefore would not 
find perjury, evidence tampering, evidence fabrication, or failure to 
report exculpatory evidence. If it had been a criminal investigation, I 
believe Mr. Kennedy would not have said what he said. His credibility 
is undercut by the facts.
  This morning's Washington Post contains a story about how one FBI 
agent, Special Agent Michael P. Malone, apparently shaved evidence, 
provided false statements, and tampered with evidence for an Eleventh 
Circuit Court proceeding involving then-Judge Alcee L. Hastings. Mr. 
Hastings is now a Member of the House of Representatives. Mr. Malone is 
still an FBI agent, and has testified in thousands of cases.
  Despite well-documented evidence of this wrongdoing, the FBI covered 
it up. The evidence was documented by an FBI lab scientist, who 
performed lab tests on a piece of evidence in the Hastings case. Malone 
falsely claimed to have done the tests himself.
  The FBI scientist who made the allegations is not Dr. Frederic 
Whitehurst, the more well-known whistleblower from the FBI lab. Rather, 
it is Dr. William Tobin of the same lab. By the way, this undercuts the 
FBI's assertion that Dr. Whitehurst is the only one in the lab making 
these allegations.
  A memorandum written by Dr. Tobin in 1989 details the alleged false 
statements, evidence shaving, and evidence tampering by Agent Malone. 
It was the basis of reports in the last 24 hours in the media. Mr. 
President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the 
Washington Post story.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

               [From the Washington Post, Feb. 26, 1997]

                     FBI Role in Impeachment Probed

                           (By Pierre Thomas)

       The Justice Department inspector general has been 
     investigating whether the FBI intentionally gave misleading 
     testimony to a judicial panel that was deliberating whether 
     to recommend that then-U.S. District Judge Alcee L. Hastings 
     be impeached.
       The Justice Department probe has uncovered evidence that an 
     FBI examiner who worked on the Hastings case, now a 
     Democratic representative from Florida, vigorously challenged 
     the bureau's laboratory analysis of a key piece of evidence 
     relating to the judge's truthfulness in a bribery trial in 
     the early 1980s. But Justice Department investigators found 
     that FBI supervisors largely ignored the examiner's critique 
     and never provided the dissenting information to Congress, 
     which later removed Hastings from the bench.
       The revelation is the first detailed account supporting 
     allegations by FBI whistleblower Frederic Whitehurst about 
     shoddy FBI laboratory work. Whitehurst claims that bureau 
     officials routinely manipulated forensic work and allowed 
     flawed expert testimony during court proceedings if it helped 
     prosecutions.
       ``It is not just Dr. Whitehurst who has alleged wrongdoing 
     in the FBI crime lab,'' Sen. Charles E. Grassley (R-Iowa) 
     said yesterday.'' . . . I fear the FBI has covered up the 
     lab's shortcomings.''
       Documents obtained by The Washington Post in connection 
     with the Hastings investigation raise questions about the 
     bureau's willingness to address criticisms of its laboratory 
     procedures, even when its own employees raised them, Grassley 
     and others said.
       ``The misrepresentations and misstatements in the 
     transcript (regarding FBI forensic testimony in the Hastings 
     case) . . . represent a glaring pattern of conversion of what 
     should have been presented as neutral data into incriminating 
     circumstances by complete reversal of established laboratory 
     test data with scientifically unfounded, unqualified and 
     biased testimony,'' wrote frustrated FBI examiner William A. 
     Tobin in 1989.
       Tobin wrote that, while he agreed with the FBI's overall 
     forensic assessment in the Hastings case, he was concerned 
     that the bureau's testimony had gone too far in an apparent 
     attempt to bolster the case against Hastings. Tobin's 
     memorandum noted no fewer than 27 exceptions, or challenges, 
     to bureau testimony against Hastings, Florida's first black 
     federal judge, after he was acquitted of federal bribery 
     charges. The judicial inquiry begun after his acquittal 
     raised allegations of racism from African American 
     leaders.
       During an interview with the Justice Department inspector 
     general's office, Tobin reiterated his concerns to 
     investigators, according to sources familiar with the 
     inspector general's ongoing review. He also told 
     investigators that he turned his memorandum in to his 
     supervisor, but the bureau apparently did nothing to address 
     his concerns. In fact, he never heard back from his superiors 
     on the matter, Tobin said. In addition, sources said that 
     investigators have been unable to find Tobin's original 
     forensic report, which should have been used to prepare for 
     the testimony in the Hastings case.
       ``Alcee Hastings and I have believed for some time that a 
     fair amount of evidence against him was manipulated or 
     manufactured,'' said Terence Anderson, Hasting's attorney 
     during impeachment proceedings.
       Hastings called the revelation ``astounding beyond belief. 
     I need to understand who withheld this information, why they 
     withheld it and what effect it would have had if it were 
     presented to Congress,'' which impeached and convicted him.
       Whitehurst's attorney, Stephen Kohn, agreed, saying that 
     ``if the FBI could put forth false evidence regarding a 
     sitting judge, every American is at risk to FBI 
     lawlessness.''
       In response to a broad inspector general investigation of 
     the FBI crime laboratory, Justice Department officials have 
     notified at least 50 state and federal prosecutors of 
     potential problems in their cases.
       Hastings was charged in 1981 along with friend and 
     Washington lawyer William A. Borders Jr. of engaging in a 
     conspiracy to accept a $150,000 bribe from an undercover FBI 
     agent posing as the brother of two men convicted of 
     racketeering. In exchange, Hastings was to reduce the men's 
     sentences and return nearly $1 million in forfeited property.
       Borders was convicted of the crime. Hastings, in a separate 
     trial in 1983, was acquitted of the same charges. He has 
     steadfastly maintained his innocence.
       But after a 3\1/2\-year investigation prompted by an ethics 
     complaint from several of his fellow judges, successive 
     judicial panels concluded that Hastings had not only engaged 
     in a bribery conspiracy, but lied and manufactured evidence 
     at the trial to win acquittal.
       Investigators sought to challenge Hastings' truthfulness on 
     a number of fronts.
       Hastings testified he was with Borders at the time he was 
     alleged to have taken the bribe in part because he was trying 
     to find a leather shop to repair a men's purse whose strap 
     had broken.
       FBI forensic experts were asked to test the strap to see if 
     it could be snapped by accident, as Hastings described, or 
     whether it was too strong and would have had to have been 
     cut. The FBI's lab experts concluded the strap had been cut. 
     The inference was that Hasting had cut the strap in an 
     attempt to concoct an alibi.
       Tobin generally agreed with that conclusion but said he was 
     deeply troubled about FBI testimony in the case and believed 
     it ``revealed a pattern of complete omission of crucial 
     conditions, caveats, premises and or assumptions which may be 
     viewed as tending toward exculpatory.''

  Mr. GRASSLEY. Higher ups in the FBI never did a thing about this 
problem. Yet, it speaks to exactly the charge made by Dr. Whitehurst; 
namely, that the culture within the FBI is to overstate lab results to 
get a conviction. They do this by withholding any data that might show 
the opposite.
  That makes me think of an analogy, Mr. President. Imagine me standing 
by a dog. You ask me if my dog bites. I say ``no.'' You reach down to 
pet the dog, and he bites you. You say, ``I thought you said your dog 
doesn't bite.'' And I say, ``That's not my dog.''
  The point is, I withheld valuable information to keep you from having 
an informed judgment. That is what the FBI does, according to Dr. 
Whitehurst, and in this specific case according to Dr. Tobin. And when 
the IG's investigative report comes out next month, we'll see if there 
are other examples that need following up.
  In an interview with Federal investigators, Dr. Tobin called this 
``forensic prostitution.'' Those were his

[[Page S1652]]

words, Mr. President. Forensic prostitution. It must be really bad when 
a senior, supervisory agent in the FBI's own lab calls that practice 
``forensic prostitution.'' What does that say about the standards in 
the lab? And does not that back up what was charged by Dr. Whitehurst? 
Of course it does.
  The impact of the Tobin memo, in my view, is not whether it would 
change the outcome of the Alcee Hastings case. I have heard arguments 
on both sides. I don't know, for instance, whether it would make enough 
of a difference for me to have changed my vote to convict Mr. Hastings. 
One thing is for sure: Agent Malone sure thought it was important. But 
is not it simply a matter of fairness for Mr. Hastings?
  And that is not the only issue. The impact is much broader, much more 
serious. It raises questions about the integrity of the criminal 
justice process, especially the FBI's role. It raises the inference, in 
this highly visible case before the American people, that other 
evidence could have been tainted.
  This alleged wrongdoing by an FBI agent wasn't done to a terrorist, 
or a mad bomber. He was a sitting Federal judge, a man who held a 
position of prestige and influence in a separate and coequal branch of 
our Government. The testimony was used in a court of law, and before 
the U.S. Congress.
  Senior officials in the FBI knew about this. Nothing was done to 
correct the record. And nothing was done to discipline the agent. Is 
this because the culture in the FBI condones this? Is Dr. Whitehurst 
correct? Is Dr. Tobin correct, that forensic prostitution is condoned?
  Last night, Director Freeh issued a statement saying that this was 
the first time he was aware of the Tobin memo. I don't understand this, 
Mr. President. The Justice Department's inspector general looked into 
this matter. It is in the report that has been sitting on Mr. Freeh's 
desk since January 20. How can he say that this is the first time he 
has heard of this?
  Instead, he has his deputy, Weldon Kennedy, out making misleading 
statements to the public about how the IG didn't find any problems in 
the lab. I detailed this in my statement yesterday. And now we hear the 
Director telling us he was unaware of an issue that was on his desk for 
over a month.
  There is another serious issue, Mr. President. There appears to be a 
missing document. The Tobin memo was written after the fact of Agent 
Malone's allegedly false testimony. But the original report by Dr. 
Tobin of the testing he did on the evidence has been missing. Director 
Freeh's statement last night alludes to that document and the fact that 
it was sent to the chief counsel of the 11th Circuit, which found Judge 
Hastings unfit to serve.
  However, there was not a copy of that report within FBI headquarters, 
where it should have been. The reason it should be there is in case the 
inspector general or others wanted to investigate what happened. The 
fact of Mr. Freeh document, and that the eleventh circuit has it, does 
not answer the relevant question.
  Also not mentioned in the Freeh statement are concerns about the 
public's perception of all this. The public's confidence in Federal law 
enforcement is already on the wane. The FBI lab situation will only add 
to that. I sense that the FBI is still dancing around the truth and 
full disclosure. Nothing short of the truth can and will be tolerated.
  I have written today to the Justice inspector general requesting that 
he investigate the circumstances surrounding the disappearance of the 
original Tobin analysis. I have also written today to the Attorney 
General asking that the IG take the lead on this investigation because 
of possible conflicts of interest for the FBI.
  Finally, Mr. President, let me reiterate a warning I made yesterday 
about action against Dr. Whitehurst or any of the other scientists who 
might come forward. This Congress will not tolerate action against Dr. 
Whitehurst, or any other individual who might come forward with the 
truth. And that message goes for Justice Department officials, as well, 
who have now removed authority from the FBI for any action taken 
against Dr. Whitehurst.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record 
the Tobin memo, plus attachments, and the two letters I sent today, to 
which I referred earlier.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

       Memo To: Section Chief Ken Nimmich.
       From: SA William A. Tobin.
       Subject: Exceptions to Testimony of SA Michael P. Malone in 
     the Matter of U.S. District Judge Alcee S. Hastings.
       Purpose: To advise of exceptions taken to testimony of SA 
     Malone in 11th Circuit judicial inquiry, Atlanta, Georgia.
       Details: In preparation for anticipated congressional 
     testimony on August 3, 1989, SA Tobin reviewed the transcript 
     of the 11th Judicial Circuit testimony in Atlanta, Georgia, 
     of SA Malone. Because of the potential for serious conflict 
     and substantial embarrassment to the Bureau, an audience was 
     requested with you late in the day of August 3, 1989, wherein 
     you requested the specific details of may objections, my 
     exceptions to SA Malone's testimony, and technical analysis 
     as to the effect of the testimony.
       Attached hereto are the requested exceptions and analysis, 
     as well as two photographs of test breaks.
       Recommendations: None. For information only.


 exceptions to testimony of sa malone re u.s. district judge alcee l. 
                                hastings

       1. p. 113, line 2: Metallurgical testing procedures 
     utilized were not ``winging it''. I did not have to ``design 
     a test''. The apparatus is, in fact, designed to test any 
     solid material (including hairs).
       This statement, repeated in various forms several 
     additional times, undermines the legal value of the 
     metallurgical testing as not in compliance with the Frye and 
     ``generally accepted guidelines'' rules.
       2. p. 116, line 23: False statement. SA Malone had no 
     participation in the tensile testing, and had only requested 
     to watch because he had ``. . . never seen such a test . . 
     .'' and wanted to see how they were conducted.
       3. p. 117, line 11: False statement. Either the writing is 
     that of SA Tobin or the evidence has been altered subsequent 
     to the tensile testing. On every nonmetallic item in which I 
     have induced tensile failure on behalf of the FBI Laboratory, 
     I have placed evidence or plain white tape at the fracture in 
     order to identify Laboratory-induced failures, with Sharpie 
     Marking Pen writing ``test tear'' and an arrow pointing to 
     the failure. If my recollection serves me correctly, I 
     believe I noticed when I saw the purse some time later that 
     my own markings had been removed and those of SA Malone had 
     replaced them.
       4. p. 117, lines 21-23: False statement. Photos were made 
     outside the presence of SA Malone by SA Tobin during the 
     course of metallurgical examinations.
       5. p. 118, lines 17, 18: False statement. Neither the test 
     tears nor the photographs were made by SA Malone.
       6. p. 120, line 22: Not true. I did not have to ``jury rig 
     it'' . . . I used standard test fixtures for this type 
     material and specimen. The equipment was designed for any 
     solid material of suitable configuration. The testing was in 
     conformance with the Frye and ``generally accepted 
     guidelines'' rules, contrary to the manner in which the 
     testimony is presented.
       7. p. 123, line 23: False statement, particularly following 
     the specific words ``actually'' and ``yourself''.
       8. p. 124, lines 3-5: Incorrect. In fact, designers and 
     users abhor sudden breaks because of the potential for 
     catastrophic loss of life. Designers, therefore, attempt to 
     insure gradual failures so that it is not instantaneous. The 
     terms ``gradual'' and ``slowly'' are deceptive and relate 
     only to the strain rate selected by SA Tobin for the testing: 
     almost any strain rate could have been selected for the test.
       9. p. 124, lines 6, 7, and 15: The tears did not proceed 
     (propagate) on a ``. . . diagonal line across the entire 
     strap until finally the entire strap went.'' The effect of 
     this ``observation'' is to enhance differences between the 
     questioned tear and the test tears. In addition, 
     characterization of the test tears as ``diagonal across the 
     entire strap'' puts the failure mode in a different category 
     (when reviewed by a metallurgist or materials scientist), not 
     supported by either expectations or actual test behavior.
       10. p. 124 line 24: Use of the term ``pressures'' is not 
     appropriate and is not interchangeable with ``force'' posing 
     a potential technical review problem. On a strap 
     approximately \3/4\" wide and \1/8\" thick, a force of 29 
     lbs. results in approximately 309 lbs/in \2\ on the same 
     cross sectional area results in a force of 2.7 lbs exerted on 
     the strap, a significant difference on technical review.
       11. p. 126, lines 1-3: same comments as #9 above.
       12. p. 127, lines 13-15: same comments as #5 above.
       13. p. 126, line 9:
       14. p. 129, line 9: Direct contradiction to laboratory (AE) 
     findings supported by data. Presents apparently and 
     potentially exculpatory information as incriminating.
       15. p. 129, line 11: Contrived/fabricated response and 
     false. Renders metallurgical test data very likely 
     inadmissible because such data can be deemed to fail the Frye 
     test and the ``generally accepted guidelines''.
       16. p. 130, line 14, 15: Deceptive, if not outright false.

[[Page S1653]]

       17. p. 130, line 24: Not true. The figure is not 
     meaningless with regard to the strap.
       18. p. 131, line 14: Contradicts #17 above, and not 
     accurate. ``Pressures'' likely vary along the entire length 
     of strap.
       19. p. 132, lines 2: Unfounded and in direct contradiction 
     to laboratory test data. In fact, test data indicates the 
     strap would not be capable of supporting or hanging 30 
     pounds. Aggravates incriminating nature of evidence/data and 
     omits assumptions, premises or qualifying stipulations which 
     might be viewed as potentially exculpatory.
       20. p. 133, line 15: Inaccurate and deceptive.
       21. p. 133, line 19: Failure initiation and propagation 
     assessment is completely fabricated.
       22. p. 134, lines 3-8.
       23. p. 135, lines 6-10: Completely fabricated failure 
     propagation assessment.
       24. p. 135, line 21: ditto.
       25. p. 136, line 4: ??? as to where cut started. Unfounded 
     and not supported by data.
       26. p. 143, line 17: Unfounded. There is not data or 
     indication that the cut was made by a person.
       27. p. 144, line 24 and p. 145, lines 7, 8: Inaccurate 
     observations and contrary to expected and actual test data.
       Again suppresses apparent exculpatory material behavior and 
     presents test specimens as incriminating data.
                                  ____


                          Effect of Testimony

       The misrepresentations and misstatements in the transcript 
     would, on review by metallurgical/materials personnel, 
     represent a glaring pattern of conversion of what should have 
     been presented as neutral data into incriminating 
     circumstances by complete reversal of established laboratory 
     test data with scientifically unfounded, unqualified and 
     biased testimony. [See exceptions # 8, 9, 11, 14, 17, 18, 19, 
     21, 23, 24, 26, 27].
       Additionally, the transcript reveals a pattern of complete 
     omission of crucial conditions, caveats, premises and/or 
     assumptions which may be viewed as tending toward exculpatory 
     in nature. Even Mr. Doar had to intercede to bring the 
     testimony back to reality (see p. 146, line 14).
       As an example, existing laboratory reports indicate that 
     the strap failed consistently at approximately 29.2 lbs. and 
     that a weight up to that of an individual can be exerted on 
     the strap by anyone attempting to break the strap. After 
     applying what is one of the weakest motions for exerting 
     force by an individual (pulling an object with both hands 
     exerting forces in opposite directions), he testified that, 
     as a 200 lb. ``weightlifter'', he could not break the strap. 
     [It does not require an expert to visualize how an individual 
     might apply loads greater than what SA Malone exerted]. The 
     strong inference is that it is impossible to accidentally or 
     intentionally exert a breaking load on the straps and, 
     therefore, the strap must be cut to successfully break it. 
     Another example [exception # 26] is the statement that a 
     person made the cut.
       The opinions expressed in the transcript can not be viewed 
     as constituting professional differences. The witness has no 
     apparent academic or empirical training to provide such 
     testimony. Even had the witness undertaken the minimal 
     studies for such testimony, to include Introduction to 
     Materials, Strength of Materials, Engineering Materials, 
     Behavior of Matter, Properties of Materials, Materials and 
     Advanced Materials Laboratories, Mechanical Testing & 
     Laboratory, and Failure Analysis courses or their equivalents 
     (26 credit hours of study), he has not conducted any such 
     testing, utilized the test apparatus, or even observed its 
     use in the prior 15 years or more.
       The testimony, almost in complete entirety, relates to 
     materials strain or deformation, stress applications, tensile 
     test procedures, tensile data, and failure (propagation) 
     assessment. It was very apparent even before SA Malone 
     testified in Atlanta, Ga., that the metallurgical 
     examinations and test results would be of importance to the 
     inquiry, but I was told that I was not needed. From the early 
     stages of judicial proceedings I was queried a number of 
     times for information as to these topics with an explanation 
     of ``personal curiosity''. However, both the number of 
     queries and complexity (specificity) indicated more than a 
     casual interest. I cautioned SA Malone about attempting to 
     present the metallurgical data without some of the crucial 
     caveats, premises or assumptions which must be made, such as 
     system constraints (eg., wearer's hand grasping the strap), 
     lack of complete specimen adjustment to applied forces 
     (varies with the manner in which individual is carrying 
     purse), initial condition statements, strain rate 
     considerations, and manner of stress application. All of 
     these cautions have been ignored and omitted in the 
     testimony, and all of them can be viewed as exculpatory in 
     nature.
       Contributing to the perception of complete exculpatory 
     information suppression, review of the transcript reveals no 
     indication that the Chief Judge or the 11th Circuit panel was 
     in receipt of FBI Laboratory report 51025051 S RU; in fact, 
     it suggests the contrary.
       Further, the metallurgical test data may well be rendered 
     inadmissible because the witness states that I was ``. . . 
     winging it'', that I had to ``jury rig'' and ``fiddle'' with 
     the test apparatus, and that ``. . . nobody in our . . . lab 
     had ever done a test like this, and I have never heard of any 
     studies being published, it's almost a meaningless figure . . 
     .''. Testifying as, what the court thought was, an expert in 
     that area, this is a fairly strong indictment of the testing. 
     These statements beg for a ruling of inadmissability in view 
     of the Frye and ``generally accepted guidelines'' standards.
       These exceptions were originally discussed with Section 
     Chief Ken Nimmich because of a potential for serious and 
     embarrassing conflict in congressional testimony tentatively 
     scheduled for August 3, 1989. Not unexpectedly, our testimony 
     was not needed in the congressional proceedings. However, 
     this is being made a matter of record to indicate that the 
     testimony is not reflective of the metallurgical testing, 
     test data and guidance provided.
       Overall, the exceptions to the testimony of SA Malone do 
     not affect the technical assessment that the purse strap has 
     been cut.
                                  ____

  



                                                  U.S. Senate,

                                Washington, DC, February 26, 1997.
     Hon. Janet Reno,
     Attorney General, Department of Justice, Washington, DC.
       Dear Attorney General: I am writing in reference to my 
     meeting on February 24, 1997 with the DOJ Inspector General 
     during which I requested an investigation into the matter of 
     an alleged missing document detailing an initial F.B.I. 
     analysis of the tests performed on evidence in the case 
     against Alcee L. Hastings.
       According to a February 25, 1997 statement released by 
     F.B.I. Director Louis Freeh, the F.B.I. will be looking into 
     this matter also. I have attached a copy of his statement.
       I have asked the Inspector General to investigate this 
     matter for reasons of ensuring the public's confidence in 
     resolving this matter. In this regard, I believe it is better 
     for an independent investigation rather than one by the 
     F.B.I. Questions have been raised in the public arena in 
     recent years regarding the F.B.I.'s ability to investigate 
     itself. An independent investigation will ensure that there 
     is no question of all the facts being disclosed.
       Please provide a response to this letter by close of 
     business on Friday, February 27, 1997. Your assistance is 
     greatly appreciated.
           Sincerely,
                                              Charles E. Grassley,
         Chairman, Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and 
           the Courts.
                                  ____

         U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on 
           Administrative Oversight and the Courts
                                Washington, DC, February 26, 1997.
     Hon. Michael R. Bromwich,
     Inspector General, Department of Justice, Washington, DC.
       Dear Inspector General: I am writing in reference to our 
     meeting on February 24, 1997 during which I requested that 
     you look into the matter of an alleged missing document 
     detailing an initial F.B.I. analysis of the tests performed 
     on evidence in the case against Alcee L. Hastings. You agreed 
     to see what you could find out.
       According to a February 25, 1997 statement released by 
     F.B.I. Director Louis Freeh, the F.B.I. will be looking into 
     this matter also. I have attached a copy of his statement. 
     However, because of potential conflict of interests, I 
     believe it is extremely important that your office take the 
     lead in this matter.
       Therefore, as Chairman of the Judiciary Subcommittee on 
     Administrative Oversight and the Courts, I formally request 
     that you proceed with this investigation, especially in light 
     of the attached statement by Director Freeh.
       Please respond to this request by March 5, 1997. Your 
     assistance is greatly appreciated.
           Sincerely,
                                              Charles E. Grassley,
                                                         Chairman.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak in morning 
business for up to 10 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has that right.

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