[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 22 (Wednesday, February 26, 1997)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1650-S1653]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
FRANK M. TEJEDA POST OFFICE BUILDING
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Iowa, because
it is very important that we pass a bill tonight. It is for a fallen
colleague on the other side of the rotunda. We lost the Congressman
from San Antonio a few weeks ago at the age of 51 to a battle with
cancer.
Frank Tejeda was a great Congressman, he was a great friend, and he
was a patriot for this country. He left high school at the age of 17,
joined the Marine Corps, came back and graduated from St. Mary's
University. He then went on to distinguish himself and earn degrees in
law from U.C. Berkeley and Yale, as well as a masters in public
administration from Harvard.
Frank Tejeda was a hero. He earned the Bronze Star for valor, and
received the Purple Heart for wounds sustained in combat in Vietnam.
But most of all, he never forgot where he was from--south San Antonio,
TX. As a leader in his community and as a public servant, Frank always
remembered the people he represented and was always there for them.
For that reason, Mr. President, my colleague Senator Gramm and I want
to name the Postal Service facility being constructed at 7411 Barlite
Boulevard in San Antonio, TX, as the ``Frank M. Tejeda Post Office
Building.'' So I am going to make two unanimous-consent requests to
discharge H.R. 499, which passed unanimously in the House of
Representatives on February 5, 1997, in order to complete the naming of
this post office for a great patriot, a great friend, and a wonderful
Congressman from Texas.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Governmental Affairs
Committee be discharged from further consideration of H.R. 499; and
further, that the Senate proceed to its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk
will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
A bill (H.R. 499) to designate the facility of the United
States Postal Service under construction at 7411 Barlite
Boulevard in San Antonio, Texas, as the ``Frank M. Tejeda
Post Office Building.''
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the immediate
consideration of the bill?
There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill.
Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I am honored to join my colleague, Senator
Kay Bailey Hutchison, in offering a tribute to our late colleague,
Congressman Frank Tejeda.
Frank will be remembered as a man who dedicated his life to serving
America. He was widely admired for his friendly common sense, but in
particular for the special place that he kept in his heart for the men
and women who wear the uniform of our country.
In his short tenure, Frank Tejeda left his mark on our country, on
the people of Texas, and most personally on the people of San Antonio,
who knew him best. It is most fitting that we designate the Post Office
facility to be constructed in San Antonio as the ``Frank M. Tejeda post
office Building,'' not to remind people of who Frank was, for they do
not need to be reminded. We designate the facility in Frank's name to
recall for future generations that a man, whose life was too short,
made a difference and will live in our hearts.
The Frank M. Tejeda Building will stand as a monument for dedication,
commitment, and for the precept that with God-given talents and the
will to work, we can do anything we set out to do in America. Frank
Tejeda epitomized those qualities in his life and we honor him.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Phil Gramm and
myself, I ask unanimous consent that the bill be deemed read a third
time and passed; that the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table;
and that any statements relating to the bill appear at the appropriate
place in the Record.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The bill (H.R. 499) was deemed read the third time and passed.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Thank you, Mr. President. We have now finally passed
the bill in both Houses of Congress that will name a post office for
Frank M.
[[Page S1651]]
Tejeda. It is a fitting tribute to a wonderful former Member of the
U.S. Congress. Senator Gramm and I are very proud to have served with
him and to cosponsor this bill.
I thank the Senator from Iowa, and I yield the floor.
Mr. GRASSLEY addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa.
the fbi and the alcee m. hastings matter
Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, yesterday I spoke to my colleagues about
management problems within the FBI, and within the Bureau's reputed
crime lab. I spoke about the consequences of this mismanagement.
Confidence and trust in the Nation's premiere law enforcement agency is
dwindling. It is because of the FBI's own abuses of its very enormous
powers.
Yesterday, I mentioned that I would talk about a specific case, with
specific allegations. The case involves apparent false statements and
evidence tempering by an FBI agent in a high profile case brought
before the Federal judicial system and the U.S. Congress.
In a letter to me dated February 21, FBI Deputy Director Weldon
Kennedy stated that the Justice Department inspector general ``found no
instance of perjury evidence tampering, evidence fabrication, or
failure to report exculpatory evidence.''
Mr. President, my first response to that is as follows: The IG
investigation was not a criminal investigation. It therefore would not
find perjury, evidence tampering, evidence fabrication, or failure to
report exculpatory evidence. If it had been a criminal investigation, I
believe Mr. Kennedy would not have said what he said. His credibility
is undercut by the facts.
This morning's Washington Post contains a story about how one FBI
agent, Special Agent Michael P. Malone, apparently shaved evidence,
provided false statements, and tampered with evidence for an Eleventh
Circuit Court proceeding involving then-Judge Alcee L. Hastings. Mr.
Hastings is now a Member of the House of Representatives. Mr. Malone is
still an FBI agent, and has testified in thousands of cases.
Despite well-documented evidence of this wrongdoing, the FBI covered
it up. The evidence was documented by an FBI lab scientist, who
performed lab tests on a piece of evidence in the Hastings case. Malone
falsely claimed to have done the tests himself.
The FBI scientist who made the allegations is not Dr. Frederic
Whitehurst, the more well-known whistleblower from the FBI lab. Rather,
it is Dr. William Tobin of the same lab. By the way, this undercuts the
FBI's assertion that Dr. Whitehurst is the only one in the lab making
these allegations.
A memorandum written by Dr. Tobin in 1989 details the alleged false
statements, evidence shaving, and evidence tampering by Agent Malone.
It was the basis of reports in the last 24 hours in the media. Mr.
President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the
Washington Post story.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the Washington Post, Feb. 26, 1997]
FBI Role in Impeachment Probed
(By Pierre Thomas)
The Justice Department inspector general has been
investigating whether the FBI intentionally gave misleading
testimony to a judicial panel that was deliberating whether
to recommend that then-U.S. District Judge Alcee L. Hastings
be impeached.
The Justice Department probe has uncovered evidence that an
FBI examiner who worked on the Hastings case, now a
Democratic representative from Florida, vigorously challenged
the bureau's laboratory analysis of a key piece of evidence
relating to the judge's truthfulness in a bribery trial in
the early 1980s. But Justice Department investigators found
that FBI supervisors largely ignored the examiner's critique
and never provided the dissenting information to Congress,
which later removed Hastings from the bench.
The revelation is the first detailed account supporting
allegations by FBI whistleblower Frederic Whitehurst about
shoddy FBI laboratory work. Whitehurst claims that bureau
officials routinely manipulated forensic work and allowed
flawed expert testimony during court proceedings if it helped
prosecutions.
``It is not just Dr. Whitehurst who has alleged wrongdoing
in the FBI crime lab,'' Sen. Charles E. Grassley (R-Iowa)
said yesterday.'' . . . I fear the FBI has covered up the
lab's shortcomings.''
Documents obtained by The Washington Post in connection
with the Hastings investigation raise questions about the
bureau's willingness to address criticisms of its laboratory
procedures, even when its own employees raised them, Grassley
and others said.
``The misrepresentations and misstatements in the
transcript (regarding FBI forensic testimony in the Hastings
case) . . . represent a glaring pattern of conversion of what
should have been presented as neutral data into incriminating
circumstances by complete reversal of established laboratory
test data with scientifically unfounded, unqualified and
biased testimony,'' wrote frustrated FBI examiner William A.
Tobin in 1989.
Tobin wrote that, while he agreed with the FBI's overall
forensic assessment in the Hastings case, he was concerned
that the bureau's testimony had gone too far in an apparent
attempt to bolster the case against Hastings. Tobin's
memorandum noted no fewer than 27 exceptions, or challenges,
to bureau testimony against Hastings, Florida's first black
federal judge, after he was acquitted of federal bribery
charges. The judicial inquiry begun after his acquittal
raised allegations of racism from African American
leaders.
During an interview with the Justice Department inspector
general's office, Tobin reiterated his concerns to
investigators, according to sources familiar with the
inspector general's ongoing review. He also told
investigators that he turned his memorandum in to his
supervisor, but the bureau apparently did nothing to address
his concerns. In fact, he never heard back from his superiors
on the matter, Tobin said. In addition, sources said that
investigators have been unable to find Tobin's original
forensic report, which should have been used to prepare for
the testimony in the Hastings case.
``Alcee Hastings and I have believed for some time that a
fair amount of evidence against him was manipulated or
manufactured,'' said Terence Anderson, Hasting's attorney
during impeachment proceedings.
Hastings called the revelation ``astounding beyond belief.
I need to understand who withheld this information, why they
withheld it and what effect it would have had if it were
presented to Congress,'' which impeached and convicted him.
Whitehurst's attorney, Stephen Kohn, agreed, saying that
``if the FBI could put forth false evidence regarding a
sitting judge, every American is at risk to FBI
lawlessness.''
In response to a broad inspector general investigation of
the FBI crime laboratory, Justice Department officials have
notified at least 50 state and federal prosecutors of
potential problems in their cases.
Hastings was charged in 1981 along with friend and
Washington lawyer William A. Borders Jr. of engaging in a
conspiracy to accept a $150,000 bribe from an undercover FBI
agent posing as the brother of two men convicted of
racketeering. In exchange, Hastings was to reduce the men's
sentences and return nearly $1 million in forfeited property.
Borders was convicted of the crime. Hastings, in a separate
trial in 1983, was acquitted of the same charges. He has
steadfastly maintained his innocence.
But after a 3\1/2\-year investigation prompted by an ethics
complaint from several of his fellow judges, successive
judicial panels concluded that Hastings had not only engaged
in a bribery conspiracy, but lied and manufactured evidence
at the trial to win acquittal.
Investigators sought to challenge Hastings' truthfulness on
a number of fronts.
Hastings testified he was with Borders at the time he was
alleged to have taken the bribe in part because he was trying
to find a leather shop to repair a men's purse whose strap
had broken.
FBI forensic experts were asked to test the strap to see if
it could be snapped by accident, as Hastings described, or
whether it was too strong and would have had to have been
cut. The FBI's lab experts concluded the strap had been cut.
The inference was that Hasting had cut the strap in an
attempt to concoct an alibi.
Tobin generally agreed with that conclusion but said he was
deeply troubled about FBI testimony in the case and believed
it ``revealed a pattern of complete omission of crucial
conditions, caveats, premises and or assumptions which may be
viewed as tending toward exculpatory.''
Mr. GRASSLEY. Higher ups in the FBI never did a thing about this
problem. Yet, it speaks to exactly the charge made by Dr. Whitehurst;
namely, that the culture within the FBI is to overstate lab results to
get a conviction. They do this by withholding any data that might show
the opposite.
That makes me think of an analogy, Mr. President. Imagine me standing
by a dog. You ask me if my dog bites. I say ``no.'' You reach down to
pet the dog, and he bites you. You say, ``I thought you said your dog
doesn't bite.'' And I say, ``That's not my dog.''
The point is, I withheld valuable information to keep you from having
an informed judgment. That is what the FBI does, according to Dr.
Whitehurst, and in this specific case according to Dr. Tobin. And when
the IG's investigative report comes out next month, we'll see if there
are other examples that need following up.
In an interview with Federal investigators, Dr. Tobin called this
``forensic prostitution.'' Those were his
[[Page S1652]]
words, Mr. President. Forensic prostitution. It must be really bad when
a senior, supervisory agent in the FBI's own lab calls that practice
``forensic prostitution.'' What does that say about the standards in
the lab? And does not that back up what was charged by Dr. Whitehurst?
Of course it does.
The impact of the Tobin memo, in my view, is not whether it would
change the outcome of the Alcee Hastings case. I have heard arguments
on both sides. I don't know, for instance, whether it would make enough
of a difference for me to have changed my vote to convict Mr. Hastings.
One thing is for sure: Agent Malone sure thought it was important. But
is not it simply a matter of fairness for Mr. Hastings?
And that is not the only issue. The impact is much broader, much more
serious. It raises questions about the integrity of the criminal
justice process, especially the FBI's role. It raises the inference, in
this highly visible case before the American people, that other
evidence could have been tainted.
This alleged wrongdoing by an FBI agent wasn't done to a terrorist,
or a mad bomber. He was a sitting Federal judge, a man who held a
position of prestige and influence in a separate and coequal branch of
our Government. The testimony was used in a court of law, and before
the U.S. Congress.
Senior officials in the FBI knew about this. Nothing was done to
correct the record. And nothing was done to discipline the agent. Is
this because the culture in the FBI condones this? Is Dr. Whitehurst
correct? Is Dr. Tobin correct, that forensic prostitution is condoned?
Last night, Director Freeh issued a statement saying that this was
the first time he was aware of the Tobin memo. I don't understand this,
Mr. President. The Justice Department's inspector general looked into
this matter. It is in the report that has been sitting on Mr. Freeh's
desk since January 20. How can he say that this is the first time he
has heard of this?
Instead, he has his deputy, Weldon Kennedy, out making misleading
statements to the public about how the IG didn't find any problems in
the lab. I detailed this in my statement yesterday. And now we hear the
Director telling us he was unaware of an issue that was on his desk for
over a month.
There is another serious issue, Mr. President. There appears to be a
missing document. The Tobin memo was written after the fact of Agent
Malone's allegedly false testimony. But the original report by Dr.
Tobin of the testing he did on the evidence has been missing. Director
Freeh's statement last night alludes to that document and the fact that
it was sent to the chief counsel of the 11th Circuit, which found Judge
Hastings unfit to serve.
However, there was not a copy of that report within FBI headquarters,
where it should have been. The reason it should be there is in case the
inspector general or others wanted to investigate what happened. The
fact of Mr. Freeh document, and that the eleventh circuit has it, does
not answer the relevant question.
Also not mentioned in the Freeh statement are concerns about the
public's perception of all this. The public's confidence in Federal law
enforcement is already on the wane. The FBI lab situation will only add
to that. I sense that the FBI is still dancing around the truth and
full disclosure. Nothing short of the truth can and will be tolerated.
I have written today to the Justice inspector general requesting that
he investigate the circumstances surrounding the disappearance of the
original Tobin analysis. I have also written today to the Attorney
General asking that the IG take the lead on this investigation because
of possible conflicts of interest for the FBI.
Finally, Mr. President, let me reiterate a warning I made yesterday
about action against Dr. Whitehurst or any of the other scientists who
might come forward. This Congress will not tolerate action against Dr.
Whitehurst, or any other individual who might come forward with the
truth. And that message goes for Justice Department officials, as well,
who have now removed authority from the FBI for any action taken
against Dr. Whitehurst.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record
the Tobin memo, plus attachments, and the two letters I sent today, to
which I referred earlier.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Memo To: Section Chief Ken Nimmich.
From: SA William A. Tobin.
Subject: Exceptions to Testimony of SA Michael P. Malone in
the Matter of U.S. District Judge Alcee S. Hastings.
Purpose: To advise of exceptions taken to testimony of SA
Malone in 11th Circuit judicial inquiry, Atlanta, Georgia.
Details: In preparation for anticipated congressional
testimony on August 3, 1989, SA Tobin reviewed the transcript
of the 11th Judicial Circuit testimony in Atlanta, Georgia,
of SA Malone. Because of the potential for serious conflict
and substantial embarrassment to the Bureau, an audience was
requested with you late in the day of August 3, 1989, wherein
you requested the specific details of may objections, my
exceptions to SA Malone's testimony, and technical analysis
as to the effect of the testimony.
Attached hereto are the requested exceptions and analysis,
as well as two photographs of test breaks.
Recommendations: None. For information only.
exceptions to testimony of sa malone re u.s. district judge alcee l.
hastings
1. p. 113, line 2: Metallurgical testing procedures
utilized were not ``winging it''. I did not have to ``design
a test''. The apparatus is, in fact, designed to test any
solid material (including hairs).
This statement, repeated in various forms several
additional times, undermines the legal value of the
metallurgical testing as not in compliance with the Frye and
``generally accepted guidelines'' rules.
2. p. 116, line 23: False statement. SA Malone had no
participation in the tensile testing, and had only requested
to watch because he had ``. . . never seen such a test . .
.'' and wanted to see how they were conducted.
3. p. 117, line 11: False statement. Either the writing is
that of SA Tobin or the evidence has been altered subsequent
to the tensile testing. On every nonmetallic item in which I
have induced tensile failure on behalf of the FBI Laboratory,
I have placed evidence or plain white tape at the fracture in
order to identify Laboratory-induced failures, with Sharpie
Marking Pen writing ``test tear'' and an arrow pointing to
the failure. If my recollection serves me correctly, I
believe I noticed when I saw the purse some time later that
my own markings had been removed and those of SA Malone had
replaced them.
4. p. 117, lines 21-23: False statement. Photos were made
outside the presence of SA Malone by SA Tobin during the
course of metallurgical examinations.
5. p. 118, lines 17, 18: False statement. Neither the test
tears nor the photographs were made by SA Malone.
6. p. 120, line 22: Not true. I did not have to ``jury rig
it'' . . . I used standard test fixtures for this type
material and specimen. The equipment was designed for any
solid material of suitable configuration. The testing was in
conformance with the Frye and ``generally accepted
guidelines'' rules, contrary to the manner in which the
testimony is presented.
7. p. 123, line 23: False statement, particularly following
the specific words ``actually'' and ``yourself''.
8. p. 124, lines 3-5: Incorrect. In fact, designers and
users abhor sudden breaks because of the potential for
catastrophic loss of life. Designers, therefore, attempt to
insure gradual failures so that it is not instantaneous. The
terms ``gradual'' and ``slowly'' are deceptive and relate
only to the strain rate selected by SA Tobin for the testing:
almost any strain rate could have been selected for the test.
9. p. 124, lines 6, 7, and 15: The tears did not proceed
(propagate) on a ``. . . diagonal line across the entire
strap until finally the entire strap went.'' The effect of
this ``observation'' is to enhance differences between the
questioned tear and the test tears. In addition,
characterization of the test tears as ``diagonal across the
entire strap'' puts the failure mode in a different category
(when reviewed by a metallurgist or materials scientist), not
supported by either expectations or actual test behavior.
10. p. 124 line 24: Use of the term ``pressures'' is not
appropriate and is not interchangeable with ``force'' posing
a potential technical review problem. On a strap
approximately \3/4\" wide and \1/8\" thick, a force of 29
lbs. results in approximately 309 lbs/in \2\ on the same
cross sectional area results in a force of 2.7 lbs exerted on
the strap, a significant difference on technical review.
11. p. 126, lines 1-3: same comments as #9 above.
12. p. 127, lines 13-15: same comments as #5 above.
13. p. 126, line 9:
14. p. 129, line 9: Direct contradiction to laboratory (AE)
findings supported by data. Presents apparently and
potentially exculpatory information as incriminating.
15. p. 129, line 11: Contrived/fabricated response and
false. Renders metallurgical test data very likely
inadmissible because such data can be deemed to fail the Frye
test and the ``generally accepted guidelines''.
16. p. 130, line 14, 15: Deceptive, if not outright false.
[[Page S1653]]
17. p. 130, line 24: Not true. The figure is not
meaningless with regard to the strap.
18. p. 131, line 14: Contradicts #17 above, and not
accurate. ``Pressures'' likely vary along the entire length
of strap.
19. p. 132, lines 2: Unfounded and in direct contradiction
to laboratory test data. In fact, test data indicates the
strap would not be capable of supporting or hanging 30
pounds. Aggravates incriminating nature of evidence/data and
omits assumptions, premises or qualifying stipulations which
might be viewed as potentially exculpatory.
20. p. 133, line 15: Inaccurate and deceptive.
21. p. 133, line 19: Failure initiation and propagation
assessment is completely fabricated.
22. p. 134, lines 3-8.
23. p. 135, lines 6-10: Completely fabricated failure
propagation assessment.
24. p. 135, line 21: ditto.
25. p. 136, line 4: ??? as to where cut started. Unfounded
and not supported by data.
26. p. 143, line 17: Unfounded. There is not data or
indication that the cut was made by a person.
27. p. 144, line 24 and p. 145, lines 7, 8: Inaccurate
observations and contrary to expected and actual test data.
Again suppresses apparent exculpatory material behavior and
presents test specimens as incriminating data.
____
Effect of Testimony
The misrepresentations and misstatements in the transcript
would, on review by metallurgical/materials personnel,
represent a glaring pattern of conversion of what should have
been presented as neutral data into incriminating
circumstances by complete reversal of established laboratory
test data with scientifically unfounded, unqualified and
biased testimony. [See exceptions # 8, 9, 11, 14, 17, 18, 19,
21, 23, 24, 26, 27].
Additionally, the transcript reveals a pattern of complete
omission of crucial conditions, caveats, premises and/or
assumptions which may be viewed as tending toward exculpatory
in nature. Even Mr. Doar had to intercede to bring the
testimony back to reality (see p. 146, line 14).
As an example, existing laboratory reports indicate that
the strap failed consistently at approximately 29.2 lbs. and
that a weight up to that of an individual can be exerted on
the strap by anyone attempting to break the strap. After
applying what is one of the weakest motions for exerting
force by an individual (pulling an object with both hands
exerting forces in opposite directions), he testified that,
as a 200 lb. ``weightlifter'', he could not break the strap.
[It does not require an expert to visualize how an individual
might apply loads greater than what SA Malone exerted]. The
strong inference is that it is impossible to accidentally or
intentionally exert a breaking load on the straps and,
therefore, the strap must be cut to successfully break it.
Another example [exception # 26] is the statement that a
person made the cut.
The opinions expressed in the transcript can not be viewed
as constituting professional differences. The witness has no
apparent academic or empirical training to provide such
testimony. Even had the witness undertaken the minimal
studies for such testimony, to include Introduction to
Materials, Strength of Materials, Engineering Materials,
Behavior of Matter, Properties of Materials, Materials and
Advanced Materials Laboratories, Mechanical Testing &
Laboratory, and Failure Analysis courses or their equivalents
(26 credit hours of study), he has not conducted any such
testing, utilized the test apparatus, or even observed its
use in the prior 15 years or more.
The testimony, almost in complete entirety, relates to
materials strain or deformation, stress applications, tensile
test procedures, tensile data, and failure (propagation)
assessment. It was very apparent even before SA Malone
testified in Atlanta, Ga., that the metallurgical
examinations and test results would be of importance to the
inquiry, but I was told that I was not needed. From the early
stages of judicial proceedings I was queried a number of
times for information as to these topics with an explanation
of ``personal curiosity''. However, both the number of
queries and complexity (specificity) indicated more than a
casual interest. I cautioned SA Malone about attempting to
present the metallurgical data without some of the crucial
caveats, premises or assumptions which must be made, such as
system constraints (eg., wearer's hand grasping the strap),
lack of complete specimen adjustment to applied forces
(varies with the manner in which individual is carrying
purse), initial condition statements, strain rate
considerations, and manner of stress application. All of
these cautions have been ignored and omitted in the
testimony, and all of them can be viewed as exculpatory in
nature.
Contributing to the perception of complete exculpatory
information suppression, review of the transcript reveals no
indication that the Chief Judge or the 11th Circuit panel was
in receipt of FBI Laboratory report 51025051 S RU; in fact,
it suggests the contrary.
Further, the metallurgical test data may well be rendered
inadmissible because the witness states that I was ``. . .
winging it'', that I had to ``jury rig'' and ``fiddle'' with
the test apparatus, and that ``. . . nobody in our . . . lab
had ever done a test like this, and I have never heard of any
studies being published, it's almost a meaningless figure . .
.''. Testifying as, what the court thought was, an expert in
that area, this is a fairly strong indictment of the testing.
These statements beg for a ruling of inadmissability in view
of the Frye and ``generally accepted guidelines'' standards.
These exceptions were originally discussed with Section
Chief Ken Nimmich because of a potential for serious and
embarrassing conflict in congressional testimony tentatively
scheduled for August 3, 1989. Not unexpectedly, our testimony
was not needed in the congressional proceedings. However,
this is being made a matter of record to indicate that the
testimony is not reflective of the metallurgical testing,
test data and guidance provided.
Overall, the exceptions to the testimony of SA Malone do
not affect the technical assessment that the purse strap has
been cut.
____
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC, February 26, 1997.
Hon. Janet Reno,
Attorney General, Department of Justice, Washington, DC.
Dear Attorney General: I am writing in reference to my
meeting on February 24, 1997 with the DOJ Inspector General
during which I requested an investigation into the matter of
an alleged missing document detailing an initial F.B.I.
analysis of the tests performed on evidence in the case
against Alcee L. Hastings.
According to a February 25, 1997 statement released by
F.B.I. Director Louis Freeh, the F.B.I. will be looking into
this matter also. I have attached a copy of his statement.
I have asked the Inspector General to investigate this
matter for reasons of ensuring the public's confidence in
resolving this matter. In this regard, I believe it is better
for an independent investigation rather than one by the
F.B.I. Questions have been raised in the public arena in
recent years regarding the F.B.I.'s ability to investigate
itself. An independent investigation will ensure that there
is no question of all the facts being disclosed.
Please provide a response to this letter by close of
business on Friday, February 27, 1997. Your assistance is
greatly appreciated.
Sincerely,
Charles E. Grassley,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and
the Courts.
____
U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on
Administrative Oversight and the Courts
Washington, DC, February 26, 1997.
Hon. Michael R. Bromwich,
Inspector General, Department of Justice, Washington, DC.
Dear Inspector General: I am writing in reference to our
meeting on February 24, 1997 during which I requested that
you look into the matter of an alleged missing document
detailing an initial F.B.I. analysis of the tests performed
on evidence in the case against Alcee L. Hastings. You agreed
to see what you could find out.
According to a February 25, 1997 statement released by
F.B.I. Director Louis Freeh, the F.B.I. will be looking into
this matter also. I have attached a copy of his statement.
However, because of potential conflict of interests, I
believe it is extremely important that your office take the
lead in this matter.
Therefore, as Chairman of the Judiciary Subcommittee on
Administrative Oversight and the Courts, I formally request
that you proceed with this investigation, especially in light
of the attached statement by Director Freeh.
Please respond to this request by March 5, 1997. Your
assistance is greatly appreciated.
Sincerely,
Charles E. Grassley,
Chairman.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak in morning
business for up to 10 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has that right.
____________________