[Congressional Record Volume 143, Number 22 (Wednesday, February 26, 1997)]
[House]
[Pages H651-H660]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




  REPORT ON GOVERNMENT CAPABILITIES TO RESPOND TO TERRORIST INCIDENTS 
 INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION--MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF 
                           THE UNITED STATES

  The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following message 
from the President of the United States; which was read and, together 
with the accompanying papers, without objection, referred to the 
Committee on National Security:
To the Congress of the United States:
  The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public 
Law 104-201), title XIV, section 1411 requires the President to 
transmit a report to the Congress that assesses the capabilities of the 
Federal Government to prevent and respond to terrorist incidents 
involving weapons of mass destruction and to support State and local 
prevention and response efforts. In accordance with this provision, I 
transmit the attached report on the subject issue.
                                                  William J. Clinton.  
  The White House, February 26, 1997.

 Report to Congress on Response to Threats of Terrorist Use of Weapons 
                 of Mass Destruction, January 31, 1997


                           executive summary

       As the result of recent events, significant threats over 
     the past few years, and the increased availability and 
     proliferation of nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) 
     materials, there is an increasing concern for the potential 
     of terrorist incidents occurring in the United States 
     involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
       Under Presidential and Congressional direction, the Federal 
     Government has made a concerted effort to better respond to 
     domestic terrorist incidents involving WMD. These efforts 
     include assessing current capabilities, identifying 
     shortfalls, and taking steps to remedy them. The Federal 
     Bureau of Investigation (FBI), as the lead agency for crisis 
     management in response to a domestic terrorist threat or 
     incident, has undertaken several initiatives to prevent, 
     mitigate, and respond to the domestic terrorism threat. The 
     Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), with the 
     responsibility for consequence management in response to a 
     terrorist incident, has undertaken several initiatives to 
     identify and enhance the Federal capability to respond to the 
     consequences of a terrorist incident. Several departments and 
     agencies, including the Department of Defense (DOD), 
     Department of Energy (DOE), Department of Health and Human 
     Services (HHS) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
     are involved in enhancing overall terrorism response 
     capabilities, with others in the Federal response planning 
     community actively supporting this effort.
       Local response to a terrorist event is critical to the 
     success of the overall response. Even with a timely Federal 
     response, local first responders have the immediate 
     requirement to deal with the incident and care for victims. 
     FEMA has been working with local and State governments to 
     assess their response capabilities, identify shortfalls and 
     take measures to remedy them. These activities include 
     surveying State terrorism response capabilities, convening a 
     focus group to discuss capabilities and needs of local 
     government for NBC response, sponsoring a conference for fire 
     chiefs from major metropolitan fire departments to discuss 
     lessons learned from recent international terrorism 
     incidents, conducting training activities, and developing 
     exercises featuring terrorism scenarios to test various 
     aspects of crisis and consequence management activities.
       In continuation of these efforts, the Federal Government 
     has developed a program of activities in Fiscal Year (FY) 
     1997 encompassing training, some equipment and capability 
     enhancements, planning, exercises, and other activities 
     involving Federal, State, and local governments to improve 
     the current levels of preparedness and response. The initial 
     focus for training and capability enhancement is to target FY 
     1997 funding on cities and selected jurisdictions based on 
     population, risk and geographic distribution. The FY 1997 
     activities will form the basis for further training, 
     planning, and capability building efforts in FY 1998 and 
     beyond for a broader base of jurisdictions, depending on 
     budget constraints and resource availability.


                              introduction

     Background
       Recent trends indicate growing prospects for terrorist 
     incidents involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In 
     1993, a bomb rocked the World Trade Center in New York City, 
     NY; in 1995, Japanese extremists successfully conducted a 
     chemical attack in the Tokyo subway system and a bomb 
     destroyed

[[Page H652]]

     the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, OK. The chance 
     of a significant WMD incident occurring in the United States 
     is heightened by several factors, including:
       Inexpensive production and availability of chemical/
     biological (C/B) agents;
       Easily obtainable chemical precursors and biological 
     production processes;
       Portability of small amounts of C/B agents especially 
     useful for clandestine purposes;
       Potential for large-scale public impact based on limited 
     ability to quickly identify and/or contain the effects of 
     such substances;
       Increased WMD stockpiles, with the potential for theft or 
     acquisition of the weapons by terrorists groups;
       Capability of inflicting mass casualties; and,
       Increased media coverage of the use of WMD.
     Scope of the Report
       This report responds to the requirement in the Defense 
     Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996, Title XIV, 
     Section 1411 of Public Law 104-201 (also referred to as the 
     Nunn-Lugar amendment), for the President to transmit a Report 
     to Congress that assesses the capabilities of the Federal 
     Government to prevent and respond to terrorist incidents 
     involving WMD and to support State and local prevention and 
     response efforts. Also, the report highlights results and 
     insights gained from earlier Fiscal Year (FY) 1996 
     initiatives and describes what is planned or under way in FY 
     1997 to improve Federal, State, and local capabilities. 
     Finally, it addresses measures to improve capabilities in 
     future years, including funding requirements, legislative 
     improvements, and research and development.
     Lead Agency Responsibilities
       The Department of Justice (DOJ), through the Federal Bureau 
     of Investigation (FBI), has been assigned the lead 
     responsibility for management of the U.S. Government (USG) 
     response to terrorist incidents. The FBI derives its 
     fundamental legal jurisdiction to deter terrorist incidents 
     from an assortment of Federal statutes and Executive Branch 
     directives.
       The FBI has the lead agency role in crisis management which 
     entails the process of identifying, acquiring, and planning 
     the use of resources needed to prevent and/or respond to a 
     potential or actual terrorist incident. The crisis management 
     response incorporates and emphasizes prevention, crisis 
     mitigation efforts, and criminal prosecution of terrorists. 
     Crisis management activities include proactive measures for 
     prevention, immediate incident response, and post-incident 
     response, including command of the operational response as 
     the on-scene manager for an incident, in coordination with 
     other Federal agencies and local and State authorities.
       FEMA has the responsibility for consequence management 
     which entails preparedness and response for dealing with the 
     consequences of a terrorist incident. Consequence management 
     activities include measures to alleviate damage, loss of 
     life, hardship, or suffering caused by the incident; 
     protection of public health and safety; restoration of 
     essential government services; and provision of emergency 
     assistance. FEMA will act in support of the FBI in 
     implementing consequence management response activities.
       The overall goal of Administration policy is to ensure that 
     the United States is prepared to combat domestic and 
     international terrorism in all its forms. Measures undertaken 
     under this policy to deal with the terrorism threat include:
       Reducing vulnerabilities--To reduce vulnerabilities to 
     terrorism both at home and abroad, all Federal department 
     heads have been directed to ensure that their personnel and 
     facilities are fully protected against terrorism. This 
     activity includes reviewing the vulnerability of Government 
     facilities and the critical national infrastructure; reducing 
     vulnerabilities affecting civilian personnel and facilities 
     abroad, military personnel and facilities, U.S. airports, and 
     other transportation modes; and undertaking counterterrorism 
     measures to reduce both the domestic and international 
     terrorist threat.
       Deterring terrorist acts--To deter terrorism, the USG has 
     made it clear that its policies will not be affected by 
     terrorist acts and it will vigorously deal with terrorists 
     and their sponsors to reduce terrorist capabilities and 
     support. In this regard, the pursuit, arrest, and prosecution 
     of terrorists are of the highest priority. Goals include the 
     disruption of terrorist-sponsored activity including 
     termination of financial support, arrest and punishment of 
     terrorists as criminals, application of U.S. laws and new 
     legislation to prevent terrorist groups from operating in the 
     United States, and application of extraterritorial statutes 
     to counter acts of terrorism and apprehend terrorists outside 
     the United States. Return of terrorists from overseas who are 
     wanted for violation of U.S. law is of the highest priority 
     and a central issue in bilateral relations with any country 
     that harbors or assists them.
       Responding to terrorist acts--To respond to acts of 
     terrorism, there must be a rapid and decisive capability to 
     protect U.S. citizens, defeat or arrest terrorists, respond 
     against terrorist sponsors, and provide relief to the 
     victims. The goal during the immediate response phase of an 
     incident is to terminate terrorist attacks so that the 
     terrorists do not accomplish their objectives or maintain 
     their freedom, while authorities seek to minimize damage and 
     loss of life and provide emergency assistance to the affected 
     area. In responding to a terrorist incident, the Federal 
     Government is working to rapidly deploy the needed Federal 
     capabilities to the scene, including specialized elements for 
     dealing with specific types of incidents resulting from WMD 
     threats.
     Recent Initiatives
       While the primary Federal focus historically has been on 
     developing crisis management capabilities, recent events have 
     necessitated placing an increased emphasis on building 
     consequence management capabilities as well. Thus, guidance 
     provided by USG policy has resulted in a number of 
     initiatives being undertaken in FY 1996 to continue to build 
     crisis management capabilities and to enhance consequence 
     management capabilities by assessing Federal, State, and 
     local capabilities to respond to the consequences of a 
     nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) WMD terrorist event. 
     Ongoing activities through FY 1997 build upon these 
     initiatives and respond to new legislation. Some recent 
     initiatives include:
       Development by the FBI of operational guidelines entitled 
     Guidelines for the Mobilization, Deployment and Employment of 
     U.S. Government Elements in Response to a Domestic Terrorist 
     Threat or Incident.
       The formulation of the FBI Domestic Emergency Support Team 
     (DEST) and the first deployment of the DEST in support of the 
     1996 Democratic National Convention.
       Pilot test of a Metropolitan Medical Strike Team (MMST) for 
     the Washington, DC, area and in Atlanta, GA, at the 1996 
     Summer Olympic Games, to provide immediate on-site medical 
     support in response to a terrorist incident involving WMD.
       Multi-agency assessment of the capability of the Federal 
     Response Plan (FRP) to respond to a WMD terrorist event.
       Exercises using terrorism scenarios that address various 
     aspects of crisis management and consequence management.
       Planning, training, and exercises focusing on the terrorism 
     threat conducted in preparation for the 1996 Summer Olympic 
     Games, national political conventions, and the 1997 
     Presidential Inauguration.
       Survey of State terrorism response capabilities conducted 
     in conjunction with the National Governors Association (NGA).
       Focus group discussions with management and emergency 
     responders from four major metropolitan areas on the 
     capabilities and needs of local government to respond to NBC 
     WMD terrorist incidents.
       Conference for fire chiefs of major metropolitan fire 
     departments conducted in conjunction with the International 
     Association of Fire Chiefs featuring lessons learned from 
     recent international terrorism incidents.
       Conferences and exercises on health and medical 
     requirements needed in response to chemical/biological (C/B) 
     terrorism sponsored by the Department of Health and Human 
     Services--Public Health Service (HHS-PHS).
       Numerous training activities sponsored by FEMA and the 
     States to improve responder awareness of the terrorism threat 
     and to begin to build the knowledge and skills required for 
     response to such an incident.
       Development of the Terrorism Incident Annex to the FRP.
       Enhancement of 175 FBI Special Agents to work on WMD 
     issues.
       Establishment of the Hazardous Materials Response Unit 
     (HMRU) to provide scientific and technical expertise to 
     enhance FBI forensic and evidence capabilities.


assessment of federal capabilities to prevent and respond to the use of 
                                  wmd

     Crisis Management/Prevention Capabilities
       Lead Agency Role
       The FBI has been designated as the lead agency for the 
     management of the Federal response to terrorist incidents 
     (hereafter referred to as crisis management). As the lead for 
     crisis management, the FBI has the responsibility for 
     proactive measures involving prevention, immediate incident 
     response, and post-incident response, including functioning 
     as the commander of the on-scene operational response.
       The FBI On-Scene Commander (OSC) is responsible at the 
     incident site for all decisions to resolve the terrorist 
     incident, unless the lead agency responsibility is 
     transferred by the Attorney General (AG) to FEMA, as 
     warranted. In support of the FBI OSC, or as the designated 
     lead agency after transfer of the responsibility by the AG, 
     FEMA coordinates all Federal assistance in support of 
     consequence management needs resulting from the incident with 
     the affected State and local governments.
       Operational guidelines (entitled Guidelines for the 
     Mobilization, Deployment and Employment of U.S. Government 
     Elements in Response to a Domestic Terrorist Threat or 
     Incident) have been developed by the FBI and are awaiting 
     final approval by the AG and the National Security Council 
     (NSC). The Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST), an 
     interagency support component, has been developed and is 
     managed by the FBI.
       During a significant terrorist threat or event including a 
     WMD incident, the FBI may deploy a tailored DEST enhanced 
     with specialized interagency components capable of responding 
     to situations involving chemical/biological (C/B) or nuclear/
     radiological weapons or agents. The FBI-led response will be 
     activated to provide a graduated, tailored response based on 
     the type of incident, in accordance with the FBI's Nuclear or 
     C/B Incident Contingency Plans.

[[Page H653]]

       The FBI OSC, as lead agency official, retains the authority 
     to take appropriate crisis management actions at all times 
     during the crisis management response. On-scene decisions 
     with interagency consultation are made with the Command Group 
     at a Joint Operations Center (JOC), which includes the OSC, 
     on-scene principals of the DEST agencies, other Federal 
     agency representatives, and local and State representatives.
       The DEST Team Leader (DTL) is designated by the Director, 
     FBI. The DTL is primarily responsible for providing the FBI 
     OSC advice and guidance concerning other Federal capabilities 
     available for use in resolving a WMD terrorist incident. This 
     includes crisis management and consequence management 
     assistance, technical or scientific advice, and contingency 
     planning assistance. Upon arrival at a crisis location, the 
     DEST conducts an initial situation assessment, develops 
     appropriate Courses of Action (COAs), makes a consequence 
     assessment, and provides the OSC with recommendations. The 
     DTL coordinates this process and thereafter facilitates the 
     implementation of the OSC's selected COA through specific 
     taskings. The DTL ensures continuous coordination within the 
     various DEST components and with the FBI command post 
     elements, resolves issues within the DEST, ensures effective 
     communications among response elements, and implements 
     required changes within the DEST to achieve the most 
     efficient and effective team possible.
       When determined appropriate by the OSC, the FBI command 
     post will be modified to function as a JOC. The JOC 
     configuration includes representatives of the primary 
     participating agencies and Command, Operations, Consequence 
     Management, and Support Groups as described below:
       Command Group--Comprised of senior officials of the FBI, 
     DOE, DOD, HHS-PHS, FEMA, and other Federal and State 
     agencies, as appropriate, to provide the OSC with a means to 
     quickly coordinate and reach decisions on interagency matters 
     that affect the resolution of the incident.
       Operations Group--Contains representatives of the 
     organizations directly involved in actions in and around the 
     crisis site and whose actions are deemed critical to the 
     successful resolution of the crisis.
       Consequence Management Group--Contains decisionmaking and 
     liaison representatives of consequence management 
     organizations to provide advice on decisions that may have 
     implications for consequence management, and to provide 
     continuity in leadership should a consequence management 
     response become necessary. If consequences become imminent or 
     actually occur, State and local organizations will initiate 
     their consequence management actions, with FEMA expediting 
     the provision of Federal consequence management response 
     support. The Group is coordinated by FEMA with an FBI liaison 
     from the OSC.
       Support Group--Contains representatives of organizations 
     whose primary task is to support members of the Operations 
     Group. Depending on the nature of the crisis, organizations 
     represented in the Operations Group will be asked to provide 
     staff for various support components, including Logistics, 
     Legal, Administrative, Liaison, and Media components. The 
     Media component serves as the single point of contact for the 
     coordination and release of public information to the media 
     from the incident site. DOJ/FBI, in coordination with 
     participating DEST agencies, will develop a strategy and 
     procedures for responding to media inquiries. The overall 
     intent will be for the Federal Government to speak clearly 
     with one voice regarding any response to a terrorist 
     incident.
       Lead Agency Initiatives
       As a result of recent terrorist incidents, and in 
     recognition of the emerging threat of WMD, the FBI has 
     enhanced and modified its capabilities. Some of the changes 
     include:
       Establishment of a separate Domestic Terrorism/
     Counterterrorism Planning Section. This growing section 
     includes separate units formed specifically to more 
     effectively address Domestic Terrorism Operations, WMD, 
     Special Events Management, and Domestic Terrorism Analysis. 
     It is anticipated that during Fiscal Year (FY) 1997 the WMD 
     Unit will divide into two separate units, one handling NBC 
     proliferation matters, threats, and incidents and the other 
     managing exercise and response components (such as the DEST) 
     and implementing the first responder training initiative.
       Establishment of the Hazardous Materials Response Unit 
     (HRMU) within the Laboratory Division. This unit is designed 
     to lead and augment the Federal science and technology 
     response capability to terrorist threats/incidents involving 
     WMD and provide a law enforcement representative in evidence 
     issues to enhance later prosecutive effectiveness and 
     efficiency.
       Establishment of the Critical Incident Response Group 
     (CIRG) at Quantico, VA. The CIRG is recognized as an FBI 
     entity that provides coordinated support to the FBI OSC. The 
     Hostage Rescue Team (HRT), which has been trained to operate 
     in a HAZMAT environment, is part of the CIRG. To assist the 
     HRT in protracted terrorist or other criminal incidents, 
     regional FBI Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams have 
     been enhanced to provide additional tactical support; 
     however, at this time only the HRT has equipment and trains 
     in a HAZMAT environment. The CIRG provides additional 
     operations support in the areas of negotiation, behavioral 
     profiling and assessment, and crisis management support.
       Interagency Capabilities
       To successfully resolve a WMD incident, closely coordinated 
     efforts with appropriate Federal, State, and local law 
     enforcement agencies and other authorities having emergency 
     capabilities to respond to and mitigate the consequences of 
     such an incident will be utilized by the FBI. Appropriate 
     Federal agencies will support the FBI by providing personnel 
     and equipment that will be rapidly deployed and made 
     available for advice and assistance, as warranted by the 
     situation and at the request of the OSC at the incident site. 
     In order to develop close working relationships among Federal 
     agencies concerned with a potential WMD incident, many 
     interagency working groups (IWGs) have been established, some 
     of which are:
       Various Coordinating Sub-Groups, including a Sub-IWG on 
     Exercises co-chaired by the FBI, and a Sub-IWG on Nuclear 
     Trafficking;
       Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) for research and 
     development, science, and technology devoted to 
     counterterrorism;
       Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (IICT), 
     Chemical/Biological/Radiological (CBR) Subcommittee;
       SHIELD Group dealing with C/B proliferation, chaired by the 
     Department of State (DOS);
       Nuclear Export Violation Working Group (NEVWG);
       Missile Trade Analysis Group (MTAG); and
       Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEC).
       Interagency Roles and Responsibilities
       The primary agencies participating in the response to a WMD 
     incident include DOJ, DOD, DOE, HHS, EPA, and FEMA. Depending 
     on the specific details of an incident, the FBI may also 
     request specialized assistance from other agencies, including 
     the Department of Transportation (DOT), the Department of 
     Agriculture (USDA), the Department of the Treasury, the 
     Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), DOS, and the U.S. 
     Intelligence Community (IC). The participating agencies will 
     be incorporated into the existing onscene FBI crisis 
     management structure, which is designed to provide the FBI 
     OSC with a graduated and flexible response capability. For a 
     WMD incident, the DEST will include a specially configured 
     nuclear or C/B response component with staffing and equipment 
     from appropriate Federal agencies, including DOD, DOE, HHS, 
     EPA, and FEMA. Other agencies may be tasked to support the 
     FBI on a case-by-case basis in an effort to prevent, 
     mitigate, and/or manage a WMD incident or threat. Department 
     and agency responsibilities include the following:
       The Secretary of Defense has responsibility for:
       Providing military units that can assist in both the crisis 
     management and consequence management aspects of a WMD 
     incident;
       Designating the supporting equipment and those technical 
     personnel who possess the required expertise to deploy with 
     the DEST;
       Designating pertinent assets for technical response, such 
     as the identification of on-site contaminants, sample 
     collection and analysis, limited decontamination 
     capabilities, air monitoring, medical diagnosis and treatment 
     of casualties, and render-safe procedures for WMD material;
       Providing for the custody, transportation, and disposal of 
     a C/B WMD when beyond the capability of an otherwise 
     cognizant agency and after consultation with DOJ/FBI and EPA, 
     or of nuclear and/or radiological material when beyond the 
     capability of an otherwise cognizant agency (e.g., DOE or 
     EPA) and after consultation with DOJ/FBI and DOE; and
       Providing other support to the OSC through the use of 
     military assets.
       The Secretary of Energy has responsibility for:
       Analyzing threat messages, through the Communicated Threat 
     Credibility Assessment Program, for technical content, 
     nuclear design feasibility, and general credibility, and for 
     providing such analyses to the FBI;
       Designating those technical personnel and supporting 
     equipment to deploy with the DEST as the Nuclear/Radiological 
     Advisory Team (NRAT). The NRAT will normally include a DOE 
     Senior Official who will coordinate the overall DOE response 
     at the scene and liaise with other agencies on matters of 
     mutual concern. The responsibilities of the NRAT are to: Make 
     a scientific and technical assessment of the situation, 
     provide scientific and technical advice to the designated 
     OSC, provide scientific and technical recommendations, 
     including risk/consequence information and requirements for 
     follow-on assets, support tactical operations as directed by 
     the FBI OSC, and perform limited technical measurements and 
     conduct liaison with appropriate DOE response assets.
       Designating those specialized personnel, along with 
     specialized instrumentation and equipment, to assist Federal 
     agencies in locating nuclear weapons or special nuclear 
     material that may be lost, stolen, or associated with bomb 
     threats using the Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST). The 
     responsibilities of the NEST are to provide for: Search of 
     nuclear materials, identification of nuclear materials, 
     diagnostics and assessment of suspected nuclear devices, and 
     disablement and containment programs.
       Providing scientific and technical assistance and support 
     to the FBI, DOD, and FEMA in the areas of threat assessment 
     and

[[Page H654]]

     search operations, access operations, diagnostic and device 
     assessment, disablement and render-safe operations, hazards 
     assessment, containment, relocation and storage of special 
     nuclear material evidence, and in post-incident cleanup;
       Acquiring, maintaining, and making available any special 
     equipment and capabilities required to provide the necessary 
     scientific and technical assistance; and,
       Providing tactical/operational advice and assistance in 
     supporting the FBI for incidents on a DOE facility or 
     involving weapons or material in DOE custody.
       The Secretary of Health and Human Services has 
     responsibility for:
       Designating those technical personnel and supporting 
     equipment to deploy with the DEST;
       Providing technical advice and assistance, such as threat 
     assessment, identification of contaminants, sample collection 
     and analysis, on-site safety and protection activities, 
     medical management plans, and the provision of health and 
     medical care;
       To support this effort, pertinent assets capable of 
     representing the following resources will be made available 
     to the FBI in response to a WMD incident or threat: Office of 
     Emergency Preparedness/Office of Public Health Service (OEP/
     OPHS), Federal Interagency C/B Rapid Deployment Team (CBRDT), 
     Medical Management Support Unit (MSU), Medical Response Teams 
     and Specialty Teams, and Agency Support, Centers for Disease 
     Control and Prevention (CDC); Food and Drug Administration 
     (FDA); Agency For Toxic Substances and Disease Registry 
     (ATSDR); National Institutes of Health (NIH); Substance Abuse 
     and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA); Health 
     Resources and Services Administration (HRSA).
       The Administrator of the EPA has responsibility for:
       Designating technical personnel and supporting equipment to 
     deploy with the DEST;
       Providing technical advice and assistance, such as 
     monitoring, identification of contaminants, sample collection 
     and analysis, and on-site safety, prevention, and 
     decontamination activities;
       Issuing any permits required for the custody, 
     transportation, and disposition of chemical material; and
       Making appropriate assets from the following resources 
     available to the FBI in response to a domestic WMD threat or 
     incident: Office of the Emergency Coordinator, EPA, 
     Environmental Response Team, Edison, NJ, Federal On-Scene 
     Coordinators (FOSCs), located in all EPA Regional Offices, 
     supported by technical assistance contractors to operate in 
     contaminated environments; sample, monitor, cleanup, etc., 
     National Response Team (NRT), the 16-agency team chaired by 
     EPA, Regional Response Teams (RRTs), 13 teams co-chaired by 
     EPA and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) that support the FOSCs, 
     Office of Radiation and Indoor Air (ORJA)/Center for Risk 
     Modeling and Emergency Response (CRMER), Radiological 
     Emergency Response Team, National Enforcement Investigations 
     Center (NEIC), and laboratory support, including: Regional 
     Environmental Services Division and contract labs, Office of 
     Water-Technical Support Division, Cincinnati, OH, National 
     Air and Radiation Environmental Laboratory (NAREL), 
     Montgomery, AL, and Office of Radiation Programs, Las Vegas, 
     NV.
       The Director of FEMA has responsibility for:
       Designating appropriate liaison and advisory personnel to 
     deploy with the DEST; and
       Coordinating on-site consequence management activities with 
     State, local, and appropriate Federal agencies.
     Consequence Management/Response Capabilities
       Lead Agency Role
       FEMA is responsible for the coordination of Federal 
     emergency response activities in support of State and local 
     governments. FEMA coordinates these activities using the 
     concept of operations described in the interagency Federal 
     Response Plan (FRP) and supports other Federal emergency 
     response plans, as described below.
       A WMD terrorist incident may occur without warning and 
     immediately impact large numbers of people. The incident may 
     affect a local jurisdiction, several jurisdictions within a 
     State, or several States. The existing emergency response 
     system may be severely stressed in providing a timely and 
     effective response to the consequences of the incident. Local 
     resources are likely to be quickly exhausted or unavailable 
     to meet the complex requirements of such an event, including 
     immediate needs for lifesaving resources, resulting in a 
     requirement for Federal assistance to augment State and local 
     resources. Due to the potentially devastating impact, 
     coordination at all levels of Government is critical to 
     ensuring that response needs are met. In responding to the 
     consequences of a terrorist incident, the primary objective 
     of the Federal response is to assist State and local 
     governments in carrying out their responsibilities to prevent 
     or minimize the loss of life and property.
       Over the years, a significant base of capability has been 
     developed at the local, State, and Federal levels of 
     government for responding to natural disasters and 
     technological emergencies, including incidents involving 
     nuclear and chemical materials.
       The current response framework includes an array of 
     emergency plans, capabilities, and resources of local, State, 
     and Federal governments, and of private and voluntary 
     organizations. At the Federal level, emergency plans deriving 
     from statutory authorities. Executive orders, national 
     security guidance, and other guidance are used by departments 
     and agencies to carry out their emergency response missions. 
     Under this response framework, Federal resources and 
     capabilities are provided to augment those of State and local 
     responders, including private and voluntary organizations. 
     Existing Federal plans are also being adapted for response to 
     the consequences of a terrorist incident. Current interagency 
     plans include:
       The Federal Response Plan, supported by 29 departments and 
     agencies, is used by FEMA for responding to any incident or 
     situation requiring or potentially requiring Federal 
     emergency or disaster assistance. The FRP implements the 
     authorities of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and 
     Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.) to provide 
     Federal assistance to save lives, protect property, ensure 
     public health and safety, and recover from the impact of the 
     incident or event.
       The Stafford Act provides FEMA with the authority to assign 
     missions to any Federal department or agency in support of a 
     disaster or emergency declared by the President.
       The Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP), 
     supported by 17 Federal departments and agencies, is used to 
     coordinate the Federal radiological response to an incident 
     involving nuclear materials. Radiological response activities 
     under the FRERP include monitoring and assessing the 
     situation, developing and recommending protective action 
     recommendations for the affected population, and serving as 
     the primary Federal source of technical and public 
     information regarding the radiological incident.
       The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution 
     Contingency Plan, or National Contingency Plan (NCP), 
     supported by 15 Federal departments and agencies, is used to 
     coordinate the Federal environmental response to an incident 
     involving HAZMAT, including chemical agents. Environmental 
     response activities include monitoring, decontamination, and 
     long-term restoration.
       As a supplement to the FRP, HHS has recently developed a 
     Health and Medical Services Support Plan for the Federal 
     Response to Acts of C/B Terrorism to coordinate the Federal 
     public health and medical care response to an incident 
     involving C/B materials, including biological agents. Public 
     health and medical care response activities include 
     assessment, triage, treatment, transportation, 
     hospitalization, and followup of victims of a C/B incident.
       Assessment of Response Capabilities
       FEMA has been tasked by the NSC to review the adequacy of 
     the FRP to respond to nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) 
     WMD terrorism incidents and to identify and remedy any 
     shortfalls in stockpiles, capabilities, or training that 
     would affect our ability to respond. Scenarios describing NBC 
     WMD incidents were used to help Federal, State, and local 
     responders focus on the capabilities that would be required 
     and to assess the adequacy of current capabilities to meet 
     response requirements. The Federal effort included a review 
     of the coordination of consequence management activities with 
     crisis management activities, an examination of the 
     relationships among existing Federal interagency emergency 
     plans, an assessment of the capabilities of the FRP to 
     respond to an NBC WMD incident, the availability of medical 
     capabilities for terrorism response, and procedures for 
     military support of medical facilities and decontamination 
     activities.
       The assessment of the FRP and Federal capabilities focused 
     on identifying shortfalls in stockpiles, capabilities, and 
     training that would affect the Federal Government's ability 
     to respond. In conducting the review and subsequent 
     assessment, FEMA sought input from the 29 departments and 
     agencies supporting the FRP. Comprehensive scenario-specific 
     information was provided by key responding agencies including 
     DOD, DOE, HHS, and EPA. Major findings from the assessment 
     are grouped under the following categories:
       Planning and Coordination
       Need for baseline information on capability to respond at 
     all levels.--Emergency planners at all levels lack adequate 
     information on how local, State, and Federal responders are 
     organized, equipped, and trained to respond to a terrorist 
     incident. There is a need for a carefully structured national 
     inventory of local, State, and Federal capability to respond 
     to NBC WMD terrorist incidents.
       Need for better Federal interface with State and local 
     authorities in planning for and developing a mutually 
     supportive NBC WMD response capability.--A comprehensive 
     system is required to provide effective coordination across 
     political jurisdictions for organizing, training, exercising, 
     and responding to a credible NBC WMD terrorist threat or 
     actual terrorist incident, including a strategy for 
     developing and sustaining fully interoperable capability, 
     coordinating training, exercises and evaluation procedures, 
     and supporting mutual operations needs.
       Need for a tailored and timely Federal response to support 
     or augment local and State first responders.--Emergency 
     response actions taken during the initial minutes and hours 
     after an NBC WMD terrorist incident are critical. The 
     capability of local and State first responders, augmented by 
     the use of supplemental Federal resources, needs to be 
     effectively understood and coordinated.

[[Page H655]]

     Initial response options may be severely limited until 
     reliable assessments are made of the NBC WMD consequences at 
     the incident site; therefore, the enhancement of rapid 
     assessment capabilities, including specialized information 
     sharing systems for rapid identification of NBC WMD agents, 
     needs to be a high priority.
       Need to finalize the FRP Terrorism Incident Annex.--The 
     draft FRP Terrorism Incident Annex responds to NSC guidance 
     by linking existing Federal authorities, plans, and 
     capabilities that would be implemented in response to a 
     terrorist incident. The Annex was used to help structure 
     preparedness measures for the 1996 Summer Olympic Games and 
     other special events.
       Need to prioritize the use of the transportation 
     infrastructure to ensure rapid movement of critical, time-
     sensitive response resources.--Disaster response requires 
     time-urgent actions by a large number of participants from 
     the Federal, State, and local response communities. Unless 
     prior planning and prioritization of critical lifesaving 
     response resources are in place and appropriate discipline is 
     maintained, critical elements of the coordinated Federal 
     response in support of State and local authorities will not 
     be available when needed. Plans for the response to an NBC 
     WMD terrorist incident must include a prioritized listing of 
     critical response assets and the assurance of the timely 
     transportation, deployment, and support of time-sensitive 
     critical resources.
       Need to deal with a large number of victims impacted by an 
     NBC WMD terrorist incident.--Planning needs to address the 
     management of large number of potentially contaminated 
     victims and/or the disposition of human remains resulting 
     from an NBC WMD incident. Adequate means must be developed 
     for identifying and tracking victims who may suffer immediate 
     or longer-term consequences from exposure to NBC WMD 
     materials, and who experience psychological trauma from 
     actual or perceived injury or contamination. Appropriate 
     implementing procedures, including public information and 
     other preparedness measures, should be included in all 
     training and orientation efforts.
       Need to manage the stringent public safety measures in 
     response to an NBC WMD terrorist incident.--Actions required 
     to establish and maintain positive control of a potentially 
     contaminated area involved in a terrorist incident will 
     require aggressive and, at times, forceful action which is in 
     sharp contrast to conventional disaster response operations. 
     Immediate, assertive, and time-sensitive public safety 
     actions might not be fully understood or accepted by local 
     officials and the public. Therefore, public safety 
     requirements need to be fully addressed in emergency and 
     disaster planning in order to deal with the unique and 
     demanding requirements of response to an NBC WMD terrorist 
     incident in coordination with State and local authorities.
       Need for fully coordinated, timely, and accurate emergency 
     public information.--With different emergency organizations 
     responding, assessing, and reporting through a variety of 
     Federal plans and programs (with many having no prior 
     experience operating together in an NBC WMD environment), 
     critical information may not be fully coordinated. 
     Technically accurate, complete, and time-sensitive 
     information will be urgently required by the OSCs, national 
     authorities, and the public. Procedures should be established 
     that mandate the establishment and coordinated use of a 
     single Joint Information Center (JIC) that serves the 
     combined response community. Sources of technically accurate 
     information need to be identified, and where appropriate, 
     comprehensive and time-sensitive information on NBC WMD 
     protective measures should be developed and prepositioned to 
     ensure immediate availability. Procedures need to ensure that 
     the JIC is responsive to the particular threat and changing 
     requirements of each phase of the disaster response.
       Need for an electronic information management and 
     communications capability to facilitate response 
     coordination.--There is no dedicated system for the 
     electronic transfer of information among headquarters 
     elements and other emergency operations centers at the 
     national level. This lack of capability extends to State and 
     local entities. Also, there is no national system of priority 
     cellular access by emergency response personnel that ensures 
     cellular access and allows coordination of critical assets 
     within the disaster area. There is a need to continue 
     development of an interagency electronic transfer mechanism 
     that provides a dedicated forum for the electronic exchange 
     of critical emergency response information among Federal 
     departments and agencies.
       Equipment and Training
       Need for specialized equipment and coordinated training for 
     response to an NBC WMD terrorist incident.--Local, State, and 
     Federal organizations and personnel, and private industry 
     supporting critical infrastructures need to be adequately 
     equipped and trained to respond to an NBC WMD terrorist 
     incident. there is a lack of specialized equipment and 
     training, as well as standardization and interoperability 
     necessary to fully respond in a safe, timely, and effective 
     manner. A national program is needed to provide standards and 
     resources for the organizing, equipping, and training of 
     emergency personnel responding to NBC WMD acts of terrorism. 
     This approach should build upon existing national programs 
     and capabilities wherever possible and also identify 
     opportunities for mutual support and cost savings in the 
     procurement of equipment, delivery of specialized training, 
     conduct of exercises, and operational evaluations.
       Need to adequately protect all responders.--Safety 
     considerations for first responders and augmentees from all 
     sources in the initial phases of consequence management need 
     to be a major factor in planning and preparedness.
       Stockpiles
       Need for adequate medical supplies and pharmaceuticals to 
     be available or stockpiled to respond to an NBC WMD terrorist 
     incident in a timely manner.--HHS has noted that adequate 
     medical supplies and pharmaceuticals are not prepositioned 
     and readily available for timely use in response to NBC WMD 
     incidents. Mitigating and antidote medications need to be 
     stockpiled at multiple locations throughout the United 
     States. These stockpiled medications should include specialty 
     medicines, antidotes, diagnostic devices, and general 
     medications for anticipated conditions resulting from a 
     terrorist incident. The Department of Veterans Affairs 
     hospital centers will serve as feasible stockpile locations 
     in view of the multiple sites in the United States and 
     distribution channels already in place. Discussion should 
     also be initiated with specialty medicinal manufacturers 
     regarding internal stockpiles of medications for immediate 
     distribution to an incident site.
     Assessment Summary
       An NBC WMD terrorist incident may occur as a local event 
     with potentially profound national implications. In 
     responding to an NBC WMD incident, first responders must be 
     able to provide critical resources within minutes to mitigate 
     the effects of NBC materials. As the capability of the local 
     government to deal with the immediate effects of an incident 
     is essential to the success of any NBC WMD response, 
     enhancing or building and maintaining the local capability 
     with trained and adequately equipped responders are key 
     components of a viable national terrorist response 
     capability.
       While the assessment of the FRP and Federal capabilities 
     found some deficiencies in overall capability, it also 
     identified several current capabilities being built upon or 
     expanded to ensure a more viable national NBC WMD responder 
     capability. Current initiatives for supplementing existing 
     plans, enhancing operations response capabilities, and 
     increasing the availability of training are described in the 
     Requirements for Improvements in Capabilities section of this 
     report.


     assessment of federal capabilities to support state and local 
                    prevention and response efforts

     Crisis Management/Support Activities
       Many law enforcement, public safety, and emergency response 
     agencies in the United States are well trained and equipped 
     to handle the events surrounding many natural and 
     technological emergency situations, such as improvised 
     explosive devices (IEDs) or HAZMAT spills, without the 
     involvement of the Federal Government. However, it is 
     anticipated that the threatened or actual use of WMD will 
     rapidly overwhelm local and State capabilities and require 
     Federal assistance. In addition to advanced technological 
     assistance available from Federal departments and agencies 
     for the disablement, transport, disposal, and decontamination 
     of such weapons and their effects, the primary jurisdiction 
     for the resolution of a terrorist or criminal incident 
     involving WMD also rests with the Federal Government; 
     therefore, a Federal response deployment will be needed to 
     augment the initial local response.
       As the actions taken and notifications made within the 
     first minutes of a response are critical to the ultimate 
     resolution of the incident, first responders to a WMD 
     incident need specialized training and equipment to ensure 
     that their activities in response to the discovery or use of 
     WMD are done in a manner that facilitates transition to 
     Federal response operations. The FBI engages in a number of 
     activities with State and local agencies to prevent and 
     respond to acts of WMD terrorism, including planning, 
     training, exercises, task forces, and intelligence sharing.
       Planning
       The FBI has been involved throughout the United States in 
     developing plans to respond at a local level to a WMD event. 
     Numerous FBI field offices have worked with State and local 
     law enforcement and other emergency response agencies in 
     planning the response to an event that incorporates the wide 
     variety of resources that would be brought to bear on such an 
     event. These plans are updated through continuous 
     coordination and tested through various exercises.
       Police, fire, and emergency medical personnel need to 
     better understand the FBI's role in coordinating the response 
     to a WMD threat or incident. To that end, the FBI is in the 
     process of coordinating and disseminating national and local-
     level plans for a WMD event relevant to the activities of 
     First responders. This effort is further described in the 
     section on Requirements for Improvements in Capabilities. As 
     discussed below, the FBI also has dedicated significant 
     resources for planning the design and content of a first 
     responder training initiative.
       Training and Exercises
       This past year, the FBI tasked all 56 of its field offices 
     to conduct C/B WMD terrorism exercises in each of their 
     regions in accordance with guidelines set forth in the FBI's 


[[Page H656]]

     C/B Incident Contingency Plan. This includes coordination and 
     participation by other public safety agencies that would be 
     involved in a C/B WMD incident, including first responders, 
     regional offices of supporting Federal agencies, and State 
     emergency management agencies involved in consequence 
     management. Each of the 56 field offices has taken action in 
     response to this tasking, and all are in the process of 
     planning and conducting C/B WMD exercises.
       The FBI is actively engaged with FEMA and other Federal 
     agencies in developing WMD training for State and local 
     emergency First responders. In training First responders 
     throughout the country, this program will incorporate 
     material from all aspects of the response to WMD terrorism, 
     including both local crisis and consequence management 
     activities. The approach to training and equipping Federal, 
     State, and local officials for managing a crisis involving a 
     use or threatened use of a WMD, including the consequences of 
     the use of such a weapon, necessarily requires an 
     understanding of the training mechanisms and delivery systems 
     already in place that address target audiences on related 
     matters and, which, with some adaptation, could accommodate 
     the WMD subject matter. Thereafter, an assessment of the 
     audiences and curricula that remain unaddressed can then be 
     made. Many excellent training courses are currently available 
     across the nation from Federal agencies including FEMA, DOD, 
     DOE, EPA, and various State agencies. The FBI is working to 
     incorporate law enforcement concerns into such training, 
     including evidence protection and preservation.
       Another successful training initiative has been the DOE 
     Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST), which supports the FBI 
     as lead Federal agency in various threats involving nuclear 
     material. Through an ongoing cooperative FBI/DOE program, 
     nuclear-related briefings are provided by NEST personnel at 
     FBI field offices throughout the country. As part of this 
     program, the field offices invite State and local law 
     enforcement agencies, as well as first responders, to these 
     briefings. Through these briefings, participants are made 
     aware of the resources available and are provided with an 
     overview of how the Federal Government investigates, manages, 
     and responds to nuclear-related events. To date, 40 FBI field 
     offices, including the largest metropolitan divisions, have 
     received NEST briefings, and additional field offices are 
     being briefed each month.
       In preparation for the 1996 Summer Olympic Games, the FBI 
     conducted a series of NBC-related counterterrorism exercises, 
     including tabletop, command post, and full-field exercises. 
     These exercises included participation by FEMA, EPA, HHS-PHS, 
     DOD, and DOE; Georgia and Alabama State public safety and 
     emergency management agencies; as well as city and county 
     public safety and emergency management agencies. In addition, 
     the FBI actively participated in several exercises hosted by 
     other Federal agencies in preparation for the Olympics that 
     focused on possible terrorist incidents, including WMD 
     scenarios.
       The FBI actively runs the Awareness of National Security 
     Issues and Response (ANSIR) program. The ANSIR program 
     disseminates information to industry and the public in 
     general concerning national security matters, particularly 
     key issues dealing with terrorism, espionage, proliferation, 
     economic espionage, targeting of the national information 
     infrastructure, targeting of the U.S. Government, perception 
     management, and foreign intelligence activities.
       Task Force/Intelligence Sharing
       The most effective response to any potential or actual WMD 
     incident is a well-integrated effort across local, State, and 
     Federal agencies. The FBI has been involved in a number of 
     actions related to recent events within the United States. 
     For example:
       Federal and local components of the FBI participated in the 
     1996 Summer Olympic Games in Atlanta, GA, including pre-event 
     WMD training scenarios previously discussed, various 
     interagency task forces involved with event management and 
     intelligence activities, and other activities in support of 
     the event.
       Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST) components deployed 
     in support of the 1996 Democratic National Convention in 
     Chicago, IL. This deployment was the first of its kind under 
     the DEST concept.
       The FBI is participating in the development of the 
     Metropolitan Medical Strike Teams (MMSTs), organized by HHS 
     to respond to incident health and medical services 
     requirements.
       The FBI manages 12 standing law enforcement task forces 
     throughout the country. These task forces include both local 
     entities such as sheriffs and State police, as well as local 
     representatives of Federal agencies such as the Immigration 
     and Naturalization Service (INS), Secret Service, and the 
     U.S. Marshals Service. These task forces are prevention-
     oriented groups that allow the exchange and coordination of 
     intelligence and activities across the law enforcement 
     community.
     Consequence Management/Support Activities
       Any assessment of Federal capabilities to support State and 
     local response efforts must address the abilities of State 
     and local governments to respond to an incident and their 
     expectations related to Federal response and support. 
     Obviously there is great variation in response capabilities 
     between jurisdictions at both the State and local levels of 
     government. Local and State capabilities to respond to the 
     consequences of such an event also vary with the particular 
     agent used and whether it involves NBC material. For example, 
     States and communities in proximity to nuclear power 
     plants have better developed capabilities for responding 
     to nuclear incidents than those that are not. Similarly, 
     States and communities in proximity to chemical weapon 
     disposal sites will have expanded capabilities for 
     responding to a terrorist event involving a chemical 
     weapon. Finally, States and communities that have hosted 
     special events that might pose a target for terrorism, 
     such as the 1996 Summer Olympic Games, national political 
     conventions, or high-visibility national conferences and 
     gatherings, are likely to have more complete terrorism 
     response plans than those that have not planned for such 
     events.
       FEMA has been working closely with State and local 
     governments to determine the extent to which their response 
     capabilities are adequate to meet the challenges of 
     responding to a WMD incident. Results from a National 
     Governors Association (NGA) survey, a training focus group 
     involving metropolitan area jurisdictions, and discussions 
     with fire and emergency management constituencies provide 
     good feedback on general State and local capabilities and 
     support requirements. The scenarios describing WMD terrorist 
     events involving NBC agents used in the Federal assessment 
     also were used to help State and local responders focus on 
     the capabilities that would be required and to assess the 
     adequacy of their current consequence management 
     capabilities. While the formats used for assessing the 
     capabilities differed, the findings from the local and State 
     efforts were surprisingly similar to the Federal findings.
       The following summarizes the findings regarding 
     capabilities and deficiencies obtained from the NGA State 
     survey and the metropolitan area training focus group under 
     the categories of planning and guidance, response resources, 
     and training and exercises. Included is an assessment of 
     Federal support capabilities required in each area.
       Planning and Guidance
       The majority of the 22 States responding to the NGA survey 
     and all 4 of the cities participating in the terrorism focus 
     group indicated that their plans address or include response 
     to a terrorist incident; however, the responses also 
     indicated that current planning is not adequate. Many 
     participants in the metropolitan area focus group had limited 
     understanding of the provisions of the Stafford Act (which 
     authorizes and funds support for Federally declared 
     disasters) and the assistance available under the Federal 
     Response Plan. The metropolitan areas in general did not have 
     a good understanding of the resources and support which the 
     Federal Government could provide and how they would go about 
     accessing those resources. The need to continue to stress the 
     importance of communication and coordination between those 
     responsible for crisis management and consequence management 
     at all levels of government was noted by both State and local 
     officials.
       Other planning-related requirements included a need for a 
     more thorough assessment and inventory of local response 
     capabilities and expertise, expanded public awareness of the 
     terrorism threat, additional planning for medical treatment 
     and decontamination procedures (including management of mass 
     fatalities), and legal guidance on the liabilities and 
     authorities for governmental jurisdictions associated with 
     response to NBC incidents. Many of these planning-related 
     requirements parallel deficiencies noted in the State survey 
     and the previously noted Federal assessment.
       Significant progress has been made in defining the 
     responsibilities of various Federal agencies in a terrorist 
     event through planning initiatives, exercises, and 
     Administration guidance. While Federal agencies are assisting 
     their various counterparts at the State and local levels in 
     terrorism planning to the extent that their resources allow, 
     continuing integration of Federal planning with State and 
     local planning is needed to ensure interoperability between 
     plans at the various levels of government.
       Response Resources
       Resource requirements identified by both State and local 
     governments include detection equipment, personal protective 
     equipment (PPE), decontamination equipment and techniques, 
     medical supplies, and access to technical information and 
     additional trained response personnel. Most Sates and 
     communities have some resources and capabilities in each of 
     the above areas, but given the possible magnitude of the 
     incident and the involvement of unfamiliar and potentially 
     lethal agents, most local responders felt that their existing 
     capabilities were either inadequate (for certain C/B agents) 
     or would be rapidly overwhelmed.
       While the Federal Government, especially DOD, DOE, HHS, and 
     EPA, has relevant expertise and possesses some specialized 
     equipment and supplies, the adequacy of the necessary 
     equipment, supplies, and personnel to meet potential 
     requirements and the Federal ability to get them to the 
     incident site vary with both the particular resource required 
     and the geographic location of the incident. Delays 
     associated with getting the required equipment and technical 
     expertise to the site where they are needed will likely 
     result in increased fatalities; however, costs associated 
     with providing appropriate equipment

[[Page H657]]

     and supplies to all localities nationwide are extremely high.
       Training and Exercises
       Most States and major metropolitan areas have personnel 
     trained in emergency response and disaster management with 
     training delivery systems. In terms of nuclear and chemical 
     WMD, many of the principles of HAZMAT and radiological 
     incident response (e.g., scene management, decontamination, 
     etc.) will apply with some modifications or enhancements. 
     Training developed by FEMA and the DOD Chemical Stockpile 
     Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) has direct 
     applicability to terrorist events using chemical agents; 
     however, relatively little training exists on management of 
     incidents involving a biological agent. This is an area of 
     concern for both State and local responders.
       Most requirements noted by both the States surveyed and the 
     metropolitan focus groups addressed the unique 
     characteristics of C/B WMD agents and the associated 
     protective measures for response personnel, incident 
     management skills to deal with potentially large numbers of 
     casualties, and the political and public affairs challenges 
     associated with a terrorist incident. Specifically, they 
     noted a need for (1) additional training for first responders 
     on response actions for incidents (where the hazard is known 
     versus unknown) and use of the appropriate PPE for the 
     various agents; (2) training on how to use the media 
     effectively, coordinate media messages, and minimize public 
     panic; (3) training on how to plan for and manage victim and 
     family assistance in a mass casualty event; (4) training and 
     assistance on medical management issues including triage and 
     decontamination procedures, using available medical 
     resources, and how to deal with immediate and long-term 
     treatment issues; and (5) multi-agency and multi-
     jurisdictional training and exercising to clarify roles and 
     responsibilities and improve interoperability of plans and 
     procedures.
       With the possible exception of biological terrorism, there 
     is considerable technical expertise and many existing 
     training materials within the Federal community to address 
     most of the requirements cited above; however, the size and 
     diversity of the target audience compared with the resources 
     available to deliver the training and to exercise plans 
     limits the Federal Government's capability to provide the 
     required support immediately, thus making this a multi-year 
     effort.


             REQUIREMENTS FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN CAPABILITIES

       Assessments of Federal, State, and local capabilities to 
     respond to WMD terrorist incidents have identified several 
     areas where improvements are required. FY 1997 funds have 
     been allocated to several agencies for WMD-related 
     activities. The FBI has received $133.9 million for 
     Counterterrorism (CT) enhancements. These funds include 
     increased staffing to conduct CT field investigations 
     regarding WMD threats, infrastructure vulnerability, key 
     assets, and international terrorism; resources for improving 
     forensic and crisis management capabilities including 
     specialized equipment, deployable laboratories and teams, 
     training, and forensic database development; and other 
     staffing and resources for improving WMD prevention and 
     response.
       Some $15 million has been allocated to FEMA for consequence 
     management planning and coordination, assessment and 
     training, personnel and protective measures, and grants for 
     specialized training and equipment for firefighters. Besides 
     the above, additional funds have been allocated to DOD, HHS, 
     DOT, and other Federal agencies for terrorism-related 
     activities.
       Several activities and initiatives are already under way to 
     address requirements to improve capabilities for responding 
     to the threat or occurrence of a WMD incident, focusing on 
     training, equipment and capability enhancements, planning, 
     exercises, new initiatives, and research and development to 
     improve the overall local, State, and Federal response 
     capability. All of these activities are being closely 
     coordinated with those of local and State governments to 
     ensure optimal sharing of knowledge and expertise in WMD, 
     while deriving maximum benefit from available resources.
     Training
       This area involves training for individuals involved in all 
     areas of WMD prevention and response. It includes developing 
     and implementing an interagency strategy for meeting priority 
     training requirements efficiently. Several facets of current 
     training activities are described below.
       The FBI is pursuing significant efforts to prevent a WMD 
     incident from occurring through continued proactive and 
     interactive training, planning, exercising, intelligence 
     gathering, and technology applications involving crisis 
     management and consequence management agencies.
       The FBI continues with WMD-related interagency training 
     involving nuclear and C/B incident contingency planning for 
     FBI Headquarters personnel and field office managers. The FBI 
     continues to coordinate with DOD and other government 
     agencies to determine the best equipment, protective gear, 
     and training available. Ongoing training related to 
     successfully operating in a hostile WMD environment will be 
     required for the FBI Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) and other FBI 
     tactical personnel. Equipping and training of selected FBI 
     field office Evidence Response Teams (ERTs) to augment the 
     Hazardous Materials Response Unit (HMRU) in the forensic 
     exploitation of potentially contaminated crime scenes will 
     also be an ongoing activity.
       DOD, in coordination with DOE, FEMA, and other Federal 
     agencies, including the FBI, is providing WMD training to 
     State and local first responders, including local and State 
     police, and fire and emergency medical personnel who would 
     most likely represent the initial response at the site of a 
     WMD incident.
       Since first responders will be required to establish 
     preliminary perimeters, provide triage to victims, and 
     conduct initial interviews, among other actions, their value 
     to the ultimate success of the Federal Government in managing 
     a WMD incident cannot be overestimated. Presently, most first 
     responders have little, if any, specialized training in the 
     WMD area, and as such, would become casualties at the 
     incident scene.
       FEMA, DOE, DOD, HHS, EPA, and the FBI support training to 
     develop a strong State and local first responder 
     infrastructure. Some generic training is already being recast 
     to address WMD requirements. For instance, FEMA and DOD 
     currently have in place a training program for first 
     responders in areas near chemical weapon storage sites under 
     the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program 
     (CSEPP). A training program based on CSEPP and tailored for 
     police/fire/rescue personnel in all jurisdictions is in the 
     initial stages of coordination with FEMA, FBI, and DOD. FEMA 
     is also building on its training for first responders 
     conducted through its National Fire Academy and Emergency 
     Management Institute. In addition, other agencies, such as 
     DOE, DOT, and EPA provide training through their normal 
     programs that are applicable to terrorism response.
       Funding targeted for training in WMD response is being 
     provided through several different sources, as listed below 
     by amount and agency:
       $51 million from DOD to the Nunn-Lugar;
       $5.3 million from FEMA in training grants, including 
     firefighter training and equipment, to the States; and
       $5 million from the Department of Justice (DOJ) for 
     responder training and equipment.
       Federal resources must be used effectively in meeting 
     priority training needs of responders to the consequences of 
     a WMD incident.
       Federal resources will not meet all of the anticipated 
     requests for dealing with the terrorist threat, especially in 
     the area of training. To ensure a coordinated training 
     approach, FEMA convened a Senior Interagency Group (SIG) on 
     consequence management to provide policy-level guidance in 
     the development of a Governmentwide terrorism training 
     strategy, as well as to address other issues related to 
     consequence management. In support of the SIG, an interagency 
     Training Task Group (TTG) was established to identify 
     training audiences and performance requirements, suggest 
     training design (including delivery methodology), define the 
     relationship to existing and ongoing training and 
     capabilities, and set training priorities and plans for 
     short-term and long-term activities. The SICG will continue 
     to monitor results from the TTG and other task groups and 
     provide additional guidance for implementation of an 
     interagency training strategy, which includes the following 
     elements:
       Prioritize training under Nunn-Lugar.--In response to DOD's 
     request for guidance from FEMA and the interagency community 
     on the most appropriate way to allocate training resources to 
     meet training requirements specified in Nunn-Lugar, Section 
     1412, Emergency Response Assistance Program, the interagency 
     strategy calls for allocation of Nunn-Lugar resources 
     (including those provided to HHS for the development of the 
     MMSTs in FY 1997) to target these resources to the 20 largest 
     cities, plus any cities identified by the FBI as being at 
     particularly high risk. Participating cities will be asked to 
     complete an initial training needs assessment and Federal 
     resources and expertise will be applied to meeting those 
     needs, using existing training resources to the extent 
     possible. This focus of Nunn-Lugar resources on the 20 
     largest cities will in no way preclude other target audiences 
     (States, communities, etc.) from eligibility for other 
     training available from FEMA and other Federal agencies or 
     for training resources that may become available in the 
     future.
       Continue to analyze training needs on the basis of 
     performance requirements.--Using the training requirements 
     identified during the FY 1996 assessment initiatives as a 
     base, a list of performance goals for communities in 
     preparing to respond to WMD incidents will be developed to 
     serve as a basis for a community's own needs assessment 
     efforts; however, needs assessment must be an ongoing 
     process, since training needs will evolve over time as new 
     equipment is fielded and experience gained.
       Compile a compendium of existing training.--As noted 
     earlier, many courses and training materials already exist 
     that, with minor modifications, can begin to meet immediate 
     training requirements. FEMA will serve as the repository for 
     information on existing training courses and materials.
       Share courses and delivery systems among agencies.--The 
     previously noted compendium of training resources maintained 
     by FEMA will facilitate sharing of courses and expertise 
     among agencies, thus reducing duplication of efforts.
       Deliver existing or modified training in non-traditional 
     ways.--Alternative delivery

[[Page H658]]

     strategies will be needed to reach more people than are 
     currently reached with classroom, instructor-based training. 
     Use of independent study, computer-based training, satellite 
     broadcasts, etc., will be considered in the overall delivery 
     strategy.
       Develop new training for unmet needs.--It is anticipated 
     that FY 1997 will be used for assessment and delivery of 
     existing training and that development of new training will 
     begin in earnest during FY 1998.
       Enhance interface with States and cities.--To increase the 
     success of the Federal interagency effort, full partnering 
     with the States and communities and constituencies will help 
     ensure that limited resources are applied most effectively.
     Equipment and Capability Enhancements
       This area involves identifying equipment and capabilities 
     needed for a WMD response. It includes stockpiling 
     specialized equipment, enhancing the medical response system 
     to include developing specialized teams and managing mass 
     casualties for a WMD incident, developing a master inventory 
     list of equipment and assets that can be accessed by local 
     and State responders, and undertaking other initiatives to 
     improve operational procedures, including rapid deployment of 
     resources to the incident site and improving communications 
     access.
       The FBI is addressing the need for additional equipment for 
     specialized teams operating in a WMD environment.--While the 
     FBI relies on the support of other Federal agencies 
     possessing specific technical expertise and equipment to 
     respond to an NBC incident, those agencies do not have the 
     law enforcement authority or expertise to collect and 
     preserve evidence at a crime scene, nor to testify in court 
     proceedings. In addition to the critical issue of evidence 
     collection, the FBI may be faced with an incident that 
     requires a tactical response in an environment contaminated 
     with NBC material. The FBI currently possesses a limited 
     capability to operate in such an environment; recent 
     acquisition of funds will allow the for the purchase of 
     HAZMAT protective suits and equipment for HRT and all field 
     Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Teams. This acquisition 
     followed by training will allow the FBI to enhance its 
     capabilities to operate in a WMD environment.
       HHS is enhancing the capabilities of the medical response 
     system to address WMD requirements.--The requirement for 
     immediate and significant medical response to save and 
     protect lives in incidents involving C/B WMD agents has led 
     to several HHS initiatives to enhance the capabilities of the 
     existing medical response system. The enhanced system would 
     include trained and equipped local first responders, MMSTs, 
     specialized medical teams for use in areas without MMSTs, 
     Chemical/Biological Rapid Deployment Teams (CBRDTs), enhanced 
     Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs), patient evacuation 
     and definitive care capabilities of the National Disaster 
     Medical System (NDMS), pharmaceutical caches, and a 
     nationwide network of facilities with specially trained staff 
     equipped to treat WMD victims. Some of these activities are 
     described below:
       HHS continues work on developing MMSTs composed of 
     technical and medical resources for responding to C/B 
     incidents. The MMSTs provide a mechanism for immediate 
     medical response while additional Federal resources are being 
     mobilized and deployed. Each MMST operates as a specially 
     organized, trained, and equipped team and includes 
     capabilities for agent detection and identification, patient 
     decontamination, triage and medical treatment, patient 
     transportation to hospitals, and coordination with local law 
     enforcement activities. After testing the concept in the 
     Washington, DC, metropolitan area and at the 1996 Summer 
     Olympic Games, the Washington, DC, MMST established its 
     initial operational capability in January 1997, and was 
     available to support the 1997 Presidential Inauguration. The 
     goal is to establish a total of 100 MMSTs in the next 5 
     years.
       HHS is developing three specialized national response 
     teams, dispersed geographically throughout the nation, to 
     augment local capabilities in areas without MMSTs.
       The CBRDT is another capability developed by HHS providing 
     a highly specialized, Federal, multi-agency C/B terrorist 
     incident response, medical and health care, and technical 
     assistance that supports the OSC for both crisis management 
     and consequence management response.
       HHS is enhancing 21 of the highest readiness level NDMS 
     DMATs with specialized equipment and training to provide 
     further response augmentation.
       In concert with activities to enhance the medical response 
     system, HHS is addressing the need to develop local response 
     systems for the care of WMD victims. HHS is developing 
     procedures for the handling of mass casualties that may 
     result from an WMD incident to ensure that Federal resources 
     will be available to augment local and State resources for 
     dealing with a health problem of a large scale; however, a 
     timely Federal response can only argument existing local 
     capability and may not meet the needs of all of these 
     victims.
       Federal logistics support capabilities are being enhanced 
     for WMD response.--FEMA is working with DOD, DOT and the 
     General Services Administration (GSA) to enhance basic 
     logistics support capabilities by developing a disaster 
     transportation management system. The system will include a 
     Time-Phased Force Deployment Data and List (TPFDDL) to pre-
     identify logistics requirements for specialized teams, 
     equipment, and supplies needed to respond to an NBC incident 
     and to then optimize their movement to an incident site on a 
     priority basis. A Movement Coordination Center (MCC) is also 
     being developed to coordinate the transportation and movement 
     activities of the critical resources to the affected area.
       FEMA is developing and implementing a Rapid Response 
     Information System.--FEMA is developing guidance and format 
     with data requirements for each FRP department and agency to 
     use in compiling an inventory of its equipment and assets 
     that could be made available to aid State and local officials 
     in responding to a WMD incident. FEMA is working to ensure 
     that FRP departments and agencies develop, maintain, and 
     provide to FEMA their inventory lists for inclusion in a 
     comprehensive Master Inventory, to be initially published by 
     December 31, 1997, with annual updates. FEMA also will 
     develop guidance on accessing and using the physical 
     equipment and assets on the Master Inventory List, including 
     a system to give Federal, State, and local officials 
     controlled access. In coordination with DOD, FEMA will also 
     prepare a database on C/B agents and munitions 
     characteristics and safety precautions for civilian use. 
     The initial design and compilation of this database is to 
     be completed not later than December 31, 1997.
     Planning
       This area involves enhancing Federal contingency plans as 
     well as national and regional response plans to better 
     address the WMD threat. It also includes the development of 
     guidance for local and State responders.
       Each FBI office is developing contingency plans for 
     response to WMD incidents.--Each FBI field office has been 
     requested to furnish an updated plan yearly with points of 
     contact and area facilities that could pose a threat of a WMD 
     incident, or could supply the agents needed for a WMD 
     incident and resources that can be utilized to respond to the 
     incident. Additionally all field offices have been tasked to 
     maintain contingency plans that identify points of contact 
     with regional emergency response agencies and to engage with 
     local authorities in planned WMD exercises, review nuclear 
     facility response plans, and proceed with other proactive 
     initiatives to counter the threat of a WMD incident.
       All FBI field offices with DOE or NRC facilities within 
     their territory maintain site-specific nuclear contingency 
     plans that are updated annually. These plans ensure that the 
     FBI possesses all necessary information regarding each DOE or 
     NRC site to enable an effective FBI response to an incident 
     at any of these sites. Classified and unclassified Nuclear 
     and C/B Incident Contingency Plans have been updated, 
     revised, and disseminated to all FBI Offices and OSCs. This 
     year, all FBI field offices were tasked to provide 
     unclassified versions of these plans to management levels of 
     first responders, i.e., police, fire, and emergency medical 
     personnel, to ensure their understanding and coordination 
     during a unified Federal response.
       Federal emergency response plans are being refined to 
     address WMD consequences.--The PDD-39 assessment validated 
     the need to amend the FRP with incident-specific annexes to 
     better address the unique aspects of the response to a 
     terrorist event. The FRP Terrorism Incident Annex describes 
     the concept of operations for a terrorism response involving 
     the crisis management response, led by the FBI, and the 
     consequence management response, led by FEMA. The Federal 
     interagency community has concurred on the annex and it is 
     scheduled for publication in early 1997.
       FEMA is also developing planning guidance on terrorism 
     response for use by FEMA Regional Offices to incorporate into 
     their interagency Regional Response Plans that describe how 
     the FRP is implemented at the regional level.
       A draft FRP Radiological Incident Annex has been developed 
     that describes the relationship of the FRP to the FRERP, 
     which is used to coordinate Federal monitoring, assessment, 
     and other technical resources in response to a radiological 
     incident, including a WMD involving nuclear materials. The 
     draft annex is being validated in several radiological 
     incident exercises this year and is expected to be published 
     in 1997.
       State and local governments are being supported in 
     improving plans for responding to the consequences of a WMD 
     incident.--States and localities face new planning challenges 
     in preparing for response to a terrorist event using WMD. 
     FEMA's experience in Oklahoma City and the feedback from the 
     metropolitan area focus groups indicate a need for additional 
     guidance by States and local governments for responding to a 
     terrorist incident, including notification procedures, 
     interface with law enforcement personnel, and access to 
     unique Federal capabilities and resources. This is especially 
     true for major metropolitan areas, where direct interface 
     with Federal response personnel and unique Federal resources 
     is more likely in a terrorist event than in a typical natural 
     disaster; therefore, a terrorism supplement to the recently 
     published Guide for All-Hazard Emergency Operations Planning 
     is a priority for FY 1997. In addition to operational 
     planning guidance, there is a need to ensure that Governors 
     and other State senior policy officials are familiar with the 
     challenges they may face in responding to a terrorist event. 
     To

[[Page H659]]

     meet this need, a popular NGA handbook, A Governor's Guide to 
     Emergency Management, will be updated to address terrorism-
     specific issues.
     Exercises
       Improved plans and access to technical information, 
     equipment, and supplies will do little to improve terrorism 
     response capabilities without trained personnel who have had 
     the opportunity to test plans and procedures and assume their 
     roles and responsibilities in exercises. Therefore, while one 
     goal for FY 1997 addresses the development of an interagency 
     strategy for the delivery of training to State and local 
     responders, a related goal focuses on a coordinated approach 
     to exercising plans and procedures.
       Agencies must test and evaluate plans, procedures, and 
     coordination mechanisms for responding to a WMD incident.--
     Interagency WMD terrorism exercises are expensive and require 
     extensive planning to ensure that all participating agencies 
     most effectively test and evaluate their plans, procedures, 
     and coordination mechanisms for responding to a WMD incident 
     as part of the Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST). 
     Interagency participation in these exercises is vital to 
     familiarize all members of the crisis management community 
     with the command structures and functions of the various 
     components.
       Despite the high costs, continuous efforts must be made to 
     exercise for possible WMD contingencies. The FBI is co-chair 
     and an active member of an interagency planning group for 
     exercises, which includes all Federal agencies with a role in 
     response to terrorism as members. WMD scenarios have been the 
     focus of most of the recent exercises and continue to be 
     highlighted in future exercise planning. The FBI Crisis 
     Incident Response Group (CIRG) plays a critical and essential 
     role in all exercise planning deployments and response to 
     credible incidents.
       The FBI exercises with other Federal agencies extensively 
     and anticipates participating in up to eight federally 
     coordinated exercises and numerous State/local exercises 
     annually. A full-field exercise should be scheduled and 
     completed within the next two fiscal years.
       Exercises will be used to test and improve consequence 
     management response capabilities.--This effort addresses the 
     need for improved understanding of and interoperability 
     between response plans at various levels of government and 
     responds to the previously noted requirement for multi-agency 
     and multi-jurisdictional training and exercising to clarify 
     roles and responsibilities and improve interoperability of 
     plans and procedures. FEMA's interagency National Exercise 
     Schedule provides a mechanism for documenting and 
     disseminating information on planned unclassified terrorism 
     WMD exercises involving multiple agencies and/or levels of 
     government.
       Recognizing that terrorism consequence management plans and 
     procedures are either under development or just being 
     finalized, the FY 1997 Federal emphasis will be on tabletop 
     exercises in each FEMA Region to familiarize regional and 
     State responders with the new FRP Terrorism Incident Annex 
     and associated roles and responsibilities. This will 
     culminate in a functional consequence management exercise, 
     ILL WIND, which is scheduled for late FY 1997 in the 
     Washington, DC, area. In addition, FEMA and some States and 
     localities will be involved in exercises sponsored by other 
     agencies that will likely address both crisis and consequence 
     management issues.
       DOD recommends a multi-agency series of field exercises 
     covering a wide range of C/B scenarios in order to build a 
     solid understanding of potential C/B terrorism, and to 
     systematically evaluate improved countermeasures to prevent 
     and respond to such incidents.
       Finally, the SIG has expressed interest in reviewing a 
     coordinated terrorism exercise strategy similar to that 
     developed for training. In interfacing with State and local 
     governments, given the very limited resources available, 
     Federal coordination on planned exercises and priorities for 
     addressing deficiencies is essential. This Federal 
     coordination will occur in the Interagency Working Group-
     Counterterrorism (IWG-CT) Exercise Subcommittee.
     New Initiatives
       Stemming from the FY 1995 National Defense Authorization 
     Act is a joint FBI and DOD initiative, in coordination with 
     the State Department, DOE, the U.S. Customs Service, the 
     Department of Commerce (DOC), and the Intelligence Community 
     (IC) to provide law enforcement officials, judges, and 
     prosecutors from the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and Eastern 
     Europe with training in countering nuclear/radiological 
     smuggling/trafficking and C/B proliferation.
       This 3-year initiative, which includes the training of 
     officials from 3 to 12 FSU/Southern Tier countries at the 
     International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Budapest, 
     Hungary, or at the DOD facilities in Garmisch, Germany, is 
     now under way. The initiative will also provide WMD detection 
     equipment and training to law enforcement officials in their 
     respective countries and undertake a review of each country's 
     laws to recommend statutory changes to complement enforcement 
     and training, as warranted.
       The FBI Laboratory Division has developed the Hazardous 
     Materials Response Unit (HMRU) to resolve scientific and 
     technical aspects of illegal acts involving NBC and 
     environmental incidents. The Laboratory Division has also 
     coordinated with DOD and the Commonwealth of Virginia for 
     training of FBI first responders and the Evidence Response 
     Teams (ERTs) on how to function in tandem with the military 
     in the hostile environment of a WMD incident. In this manner, 
     a sworn FBI evidence expert will direct the collection and 
     preservation of evidence, while at the same time, rely on 
     military advice and assets in order to mitigate a C/B agent 
     and for transport of C/B agents for examination purposes. To 
     date, more than 50 ERT members from 6 major metropolitan 
     field offices have been trained and equipped with HAZMAT 
     protective suits.
     Research and Development
       The FBI is currently pursuing a number of research and 
     development (R&D) efforts to enhance detection capabilities, 
     disablement tools, advanced render-safe techniques, and new 
     forensic tools for identifying terrorist bombings. R&D 
     projects include development of explosive detectors, research 
     on explosives residues, and development of a portable device 
     for the analysis of explosives, drugs, and chemical warfare 
     agents using Raman Spectroscopy. Other R&D projects aimed at 
     providing first responders with the technical capabilities to 
     safely and effectively contain a WMD incident include 
     development of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) 
     countermeasures for large vehicle bombs, development of an 
     affordable miniaturized robotics vehicle capable of 
     delivering explosive disablement tools, identification of 
     render-safe procedures for improvised C/B devices, enhanced 
     explosive detection capabilities for civilian bomb 
     technicians, and the development of methods to identify 
     forensically and capture residues left by improvised 
     explosive charges used by terrorists.
       A number of agencies throughout the counterterrorism 
     community participate in the Technical Support Working Group 
     (TSWG), a subgroup of the NSC Interagency Working Group on 
     Counterterrorism. The TSWG has the specific mission of 
     conducting rapid research, development, and prototyping of 
     counterterrorism technologies. Several different subgroups 
     exist beneath the TSWG focusing on various aspects of 
     counterterrorism. Continued funding of the TSWG and other 
     research and development programs is critical to developing 
     field-deployable technologies to deter, detect, prevent, and 
     resolve potential WMD terrorist threats and incidents.


                    MEASURES TO ACHIEVE IMPROVEMENTS

       Building upon current activities, the following describes 
     the requirements for continued funding, legislative 
     improvements, authorities, and research and development (R&D) 
     initiatives to enhance current weapons of mass destruction 
     (WMD) prevention and response capabilities.
     Funding
       FY 1997 funding is supporting a variety of activities 
     deriving from existing NSC guidance, Nunn-Lugar initiatives, 
     and other programs to determine requirements, assess and 
     remedy shortfalls, and enhance capabilities for WMD 
     prevention and response. To maintain and enhance 
     capabilities, continued funding in FY 1998 and beyond is 
     required to support training, equipment and capability 
     building, planning, and exercises. This requirement for 
     continued funding assumes that State and local governments 
     are also willing to share some of the costs of the capability 
     building.
       In FR 1997, the coordinated interagency training strategy 
     proposes to target the largest 20 cities to receive the 
     majority of training and assistance provided via Nunn-Lugar, 
     with the remaining resources spread among the many other 
     jurisdictions and response groups. In FY 1998, additional 
     jurisdictions are being added to increase the overall 
     preparedness level of local governments to deal with WMD 
     requirements. In support of this effort, training materials 
     will need to be updated as plans and procedures are refined 
     and responder needs are better defined.
       Specialized equipment and protective gear for personnel 
     operating in a WMD environment are required by the FBI and 
     other agencies. The Rapid Response Information System will 
     require annual updating to ensure that the resource and 
     capability information being accessed by local and State 
     response agencies is accurate and complete.
       Continued interagency planning will be required to ensure 
     close coordination among Federal departments and agencies and 
     State and local emergency management agencies in dealing with 
     WMD requirements.
       Finally, most of the exercises planned for FY 1997 are 
     Federal/State tabletop exercises that are relatively 
     inexpensive to plan and deliver. In subsequent years, 
     functional and full-scale exercises involving all levels of 
     government will need to be developed and implemented to 
     ensure full capability.
     Legislation
       On April 24, 1996, the President signed into law the 
     Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. This 
     legislation, which was initially proposed by the President in 
     the State of the Union Address in January 1995, represents 
     the most significant and comprehensive antiterrorism 
     legislative package ever enacted in the United States. 
     Legislative proposals that remain relate to items that 
     Congress dropped from the 1995 Administration proposal, or 
     highly focused issues that have arisen in the course of 
     administering existing law. Within this context, it is 
     anticipated that DOJ will propose several items of 
     legislation designed to enhance the Government's ability to 
     combat terrorism.

[[Page H660]]

       The first priority for additional legislation remains 
     Senate ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). 
     The CWC is the best means to ensure the nonproliferation of 
     chemical weapons and their eventual destruction by all 
     nations. This Convention makes it illegal to develop, 
     produce, acquire, stockpile, retain, transfer, use, own, or 
     possess any chemical weapon, or to knowingly assist, 
     encourage, or induce any person to do so, or attempt or 
     conspire to do so. U.S. compliance with the CWC will require 
     that changes be made to the existing criminal statutes 
     relating to use of chemical weapons, 18 U.S.C. Section 2332c, 
     and use of WMD, 18 U.S.C. Section 2332a. These legislative 
     amendments have been drafted within DOJ and are currently 
     undergoing review. Submission of such a legislative proposal 
     would have to be closely coordinated with the 
     Administration's efforts to achieve ratification of the CWC.
       Although the CWC was not designed to prevent chemical 
     terrorism, certain aspects of the Convention, including its 
     implementing legislation and nonproliferation provisions, 
     will augment existing law enforcement efforts to fight 
     chemical terrorism. Implementing legislation required by the 
     CWC will strengthen legal authority to investigate and 
     prosecute violations of the treaty and raise the level of 
     public alertness to the threat and illegality of chemical 
     weapons. For example, the proposed U.S. implementing 
     legislation contains the clearest, most comprehensive, and 
     internationally recognized definition of a chemical weapon 
     available, far more precise than the term ``poison gas'' 
     contained in Title 18 of the Criminal Code. The definition 
     contained in the implementing legislation will enable an 
     investigator to request a search warrant on the basis of 
     suspicion of illegal chemical weapons activity (such as 
     production of a chemical weapon agent), rather than suspicion 
     of conspiracy to commit terrorism, as exists under current 
     U.S. law. By providing investigators and prosecutors a more 
     precise legal basis for pursuing the development, production, 
     transfer, or acquisition of chemical weapons, CWC 
     implementing legislation improves prospects for detection, 
     early intervention, and possibly even prevention of chemical 
     terrorism in the United States.
     Research and Development
       New or enhanced technical capabilities needed to counter 
     increasingly sophisticated terrorist organizations include 
     the ability to intercept advanced telecommunications, with a 
     primary focus on wireless and satellite-based systems; 
     improved tracking and physical surveillance technologies for 
     weapons, explosives, etc.; automatic language translation and 
     text/key word recognition; and technology to support 
     surreptitious entry.
       Current research and development funding is not adequate. 
     Additional funding is needed to continue work on an indepth 
     chemical characterization of foreign explosives and for 
     continued development of contraband detection technology. 
     Additional funding would accelerate development in a number 
     of key technologies, particularly communications 
     interception, tracking, covert communications, and 
     surreptitious access. These technologies are critical to the 
     support of counterterrorism investigations, especially WMD-
     related threats.
                                  ____



                                ACRONYMS

     AG--Attorney General
     ANSIR--Awareness of National Security Issues and Response
     ATSDR--Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
     C/B--Chemical/Biological
     CBR--Chemical/Biological/Radiological
     CBRDT--Chemical/Biological Rapid Deployment Team
     CDC--Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
     CIRG--Crisis Incident Response Group
     COA--Course of Action
     CRMER--Center for Risk Modeling and Emergency Response
     CSEPP--Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program
     CT--Counterterrorism
     CWC--Chemical Weapons Convention
     DEST--Domestic Emergency Support Team
     DMAT--Disaster Medical Assistance Team
     DOC--Department of Commerce
     DOD--Department of Defense
     DOE--Department of Energy
     DOJ--Department of Justice
     DOS--Department of State
     DOT--Department of Transportation
     DTL--DEST Team Leader
     EMS--Emergency Medical Services
     EOD--Explosive Ordnance Disposal
     EPA--Environmental Protection Agency
     ERT--Evidence Response Team
     ESF--Emergency Support Function
     FBI--Federal Bureau of Investigation
     FDA--Food and Drug Administration
     FEMA--Federal Emergency Management Agency
     FOSC--Federal On-Scene Coordinator
     FRERP--Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan
     FRMAC--Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center
     FRP--Federal Response Plan
     FSU--Former Soviet Union
     FY--Fiscal Year
     GSA--General Services Administration
     HAZMAT--Hazardous Materials
     HHS--Department of Health and Human Services
     HMRU--Hazardous Materials Response Unit
     HQ--Headquarters
     HRSA--Health Resources and Services Administration
     HRT--Hostage Rescue Team
     IC--Intelligence Community
     IED--Improvised explosive device
     IICT--Interagency Intelligency Committee on Terrorism
     ILEA--International Law Enforcement Academy
     INS--Immigration and Naturalization Service
     IWG--Interagency Working Group
     IWG-CT--Interagency Working Group-Counterterrorism
     JABC--Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee
     JIC--Joint Information Center
     JOC--Joint Operations Center
     MCC--Movement Coordination Center
     MMST--Metropolitan Medical Strike Team
     MSU--Medical Management Support Unit
     MTAG--Missile Trade Analysis Group
     NAREL--National Air and Radiation Environmental Laboratory
     NBC--Nuclear, Biological, or Chemical
     NCP--National Contingency Plan
     NDMS--National Disaster Medical System
     NEIC--National Enforcement Investigations Center
     NEST--Nuclear Emergency Search Team
     NEVWG--Nuclear Export Violation Working Group
     NGA--National Governors Association
     NIH--National Institutes of Health
     NRAT--Nuclear/Radiological Advisory Team
     NRC--Nuclear Regulatory Commission
     NRT--National Response Team
     NSC--National Security Council
     OEP/OPHS--Office of Emergency Preparedness/Office of Public 
         Health and Science
     ORIA--Office of Radiation and Indoor Air
     OSC--On-Scene Commander
     PDD--Presidential Decision Directive
     PHS--Public Health Service
     PPE--Personal Protective Equipment
     R&D--Research and Development
     RRT--Regional Response Team
     SAC--Special Agent-in-Charge
     SAMHSA--Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services 
         Administration
     SIG--Senior Interagency Groups
     SWAT--Special Weapons and Tactics
     TEU--Technical Escort Unit
     TPFDDL--Time-Phased Force Deployment Data and List
     TSWG--Technical Support Working Group
     TTG--Training Task Group
     U.S.--United States
     USCG--U.S. Coast Guard
     USDA--United States Department of Agriculture
     USG--United States Government
     WMD--Weapons of Mass Destruction

                          ____________________